Author: Ed Morrison

  • Cleveland, Part II: Re-Constructing the Comeback

    Yesterday, in Part I, I talked about how, despite the Cleveland region’s significant assets, the Greater Cleveland Partnership’s strategy is failing to transform its economy. Today I’ll focus on the strategy’s five weaknesses, and how to fix them.

    First: The Wrong Approach To Achieving Scale
    To be effective, economic development initiatives have to be big enough to make a difference. Traditionally, this has meant building bigger organizations. The Cleveland leadership is following an economic development model based on hierarchies.

    What worked 30 years ago does not work so well today. Across the business landscape large, vertically integrated organizations are breaking apart. In economic development, this transition means that civic leaders need to build regional scale by developing networks. In a world of increasing economic complexity, regions that have strong, trusted networks will be more competitive. They will learn faster, spot opportunities faster, and will align their resources more quickly. And they will make faster and better decisions. Cleveland’s civic leadership can be far more effective if it learns the power of social networks. A number of good books explore this topic; The Tipping Point should be required reading.

    Second: Misunderstanding Public-Private Partnerships
    Over the past decade, Cleveland’s business leadership has revealed a startling misunderstanding of the nature of the two categories of public-private partnerships that drive economic development.

    Publicly-led and privately-supported investment projects typically involve large infrastructure, as well as projects in which public financing represents over half of the total development budget, such as stadiums, museums, libraries, and community sports complexes.

    The second category involves privately-led and publicly-supported investment projects. Here, the private sector takes the lead, but the public sector provides support and guidance. Good examples include tax increment financing districts, business improvement districts, and virtually all economic development incentives.

    Cleveland, during the Voinovich Administration, executed well on publicly-led and privately supported projects. A new baseball stadium, the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, the Science Museum, the new basketball arena, and the Cleveland Browns stadium are all examples. Starting in the mid-1990’s this capability degraded rapidly, so that it has taken over ten years (with no end in sight) to complete the last of the Voinovich projects, the convention center.

    But when it comes to privately-led and publicly supported investment, the business community has proven itself inept. It took ten years for it to establish a business improvement district around the new baseball stadium and arena. The signature downtown shopping mall, Tower City, has no anchors, no street visibility, and terrible parking.

    The easiest way to learn how these partnerships can be successful involves visiting other cities. Not surprisingly, Cleveland’s civic leadership does not regularly take leadership visits, a common practice among dynamic metro regions.

    Third: No Strategic Framework, No Theory Of Change
    Foundations are fond of asking for a “theory of change”. In other words, they want their grantees to orient themselves within a broader system. They want a simple, clear explanation of how a proposed intervention will transform the system to better performance.

    Cleveland’s leadership has no apparent theory of change. Overwhelmingly, the strategy is now driven by individual projects. These projects, pushed by the real estate interests that dominate the board of the Greater Cleveland Partnership, confuse real estate development with economic development. This leads to the “Big Thing Theory” of economic development: Prosperity results from building one more big thing.

    The economy has shifted under the leadership’s feet. We are rapidly moving toward an economy of networks embedded in other networks. With an economy driven by knowledge and networks, economic development is more than land development, real estate projects, and recruiting firms that move from Michigan to Mexico.

    Today, economic development begins with brainpower in 21st-century skills, and Cleveland’s leadership largely ignores the role of developing brainpower. The next version of the Cleveland+ strategy should explain how the city-region will innovate to build these skills. The best places to look: Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Syracuse and Kalamazoo.

    Prosperous regions must also develop thick, trusted networks to convert this brainpower into wealth through innovation and entrepreneurship. Cleveland’s top-heavy development organizations need to shift toward network-based strategies that are more lean and agile. That will put investment toward more productive use. Good examples to follow: Ann Arbor Spark and the Milwaukee 7.

    In order to attract and retain smart people, regional leaders need to develop quality, connected places, “hot spots” that attract people and “smart growth” strategies that efficiently leverage scarce public investments. In Cleveland’s case, the city needs more coherence to its physical development, one that embraces the city’s inevitable shrinkage in the years ahead.

    To create a buzz, effective regional leaders build their brands, not with clever logos, but with powerful experiences and stories that help people to connect their past to a prosperous future. Action, authentic stories, and networks are changing Akron, Youngstown, Kalamazoo and Milwaukee, all cities facing the same challenges as Cleveland.

    Fourth: The Wrong Mindset For Making Decisions
    If you live in a world of hierarchies, you live in a world of two directions: top-down or bottom-up, with top-down the preferred direction. It’s the direction of command-and-control; of predictability and stability. Bottom up is the opposite. It implies disorganization and chaos, inefficiency and fragmentation, confusion and uncertainty. If you approach economic development from a top-down perspective, you want to limit and control public comment. Civic engagement is a carefully circumscribed event, not a process; a meeting, not a collaboration. Anyone who has attended a school board meeting understands this point.

    There’s only one problem. The top-down world does not exist in economic development. Complex public/private strategies are developed in a “civic space” outside the four walls of any one organization. Within the civic space, no one can tell anyone else what to do. Strategies born in a top-down mindset are doomed to fail.

    Networks have no top or bottom, only nodes and links. Strategy is an exercise of aligning, linking and leveraging assets across a network. Transformation takes place when enough people in the network align themselves toward a specific outcome, through purposeful conversation. To traditionalists, conversation is a distraction or a waste of time. In the years ahead, the challenge for places like Cleveland will be to manage complex conversations.

    At Purdue, we are developing the new disciplines of “Strategic Doing”, an approach to select and test transformative ideas in complex environments quickly. Traditional approaches of strategic planning are too linear, time-consuming, inflexible and expensive. Strategic Doing offers an alternative. By translating ideas into action quickly, the disciplines of Strategic Doing build both collective knowledge and trusted connections. They lead us to “link and leverage” strategies that multiply the effective power of our assets.

    Cleveland’s leadership has a long way to travel down this road. There’s a naive ineptitude in the civic deliberations on complex issues. For over ten years, the Greater Cleveland Partnership has been fiddling with a convention center decision. In the long run, the upside for the city is minimal, while the downside grows each day. By following traditional top down management models, the city’s leadership, if it’s lucky, will build a 30-year-old idea 10 years late.

    Fifth: Weak (Or Nonexistent) Metrics
    In traditional world hierarchies, metrics are the primary instrument of top-down control. It’s not surprising that, as a rule, economic development professionals tend to shy away from measurements. Relatively few regional strategies include them.

    In a networked world, metrics serve different and more important functions. They help clarify outcomes, and add coherence by promoting alignment. Visions are difficult to translate to action. More specific outcomes and metrics mark the direction in which we are heading. They help us learn “what works”. Economic development is inherently an inductive process of experimentation. Without measurement, we have no way of knowing whether or not our underlying assumptions are more right than wrong.

    Creating The Comeback
    Cleveland can find a new path to prosperity, but it will take new leadership committed to transparency and different ways of thinking and acting. With new leadership, Cleveland can do better. It will find prosperity with initiatives that embrace brainpower, creativity, innovation, sustainability, collaboration. These are the foundations on which Cleveland’s future can be built and created.

    Ed Morrison is an Economic Policy Advisor at the Purdue Center for Regional Development. This article draws from Royce Hanson, et.al, “Finding a New Voice for Corporate Leadership in a Changed Urban World”, a case study from The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program (September 2006).

  • Cleveland: How The Comeback Collapsed

    The Cleveland comeback has stalled. Once hailed as a shining example of rebirth in our industrial heartland, Cleveland now sits rudderless and drifting backward. Between 2000 and 2007, Cleveland suffered one of the largest proportional population losses in the country: the city shrank by 8%. Per capita income growth in Cleveland also lags behind cities like Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh. Since the early 1990s, the gap between Cleveland and these other cities has widened. As a regional economy deteriorates, the pressure for social services goes up. It’s not surprising, therefore, that local tax rates in Cleveland are among the highest in the country. Political corruption also takes a toll; Cleveland sits in Cuyahoga County where federal law enforcement officials recently launched a sweeping probe of political corruption.

    The future doesn’t look much brighter. Cuyahoga County is often described as the epicenter of the foreclosure crisis; since 2000, it has had the highest per capita rate in the country. Overnight, foreclosures have decimated neighborhoods that took years to rebuild. In the Cleveland neighborhood of Kinsman, half of the mortgage properties are in foreclosure. In other neighborhoods foreclosure rates range from 25% to 30% and, not surprisingly, are concentrated in the lowest income neighborhoods, the places hardest to rebuild. About 72 hours after a house becomes vacant, vandals strip appliances, windows, and fixtures (scrap metal recycling is a booming business in Cleveland). Stripping the pipes renders the property a total loss.

    Meanwhile, the Cleveland Municipal School District is making improvements only at a glacial pace. According to a recent report by America’s Promise, Cleveland ranks 48th of 50 large school districts in high school graduation rates. Fewer than six in ten of Cleveland’s 9th graders will complete high school; dropout factories here include Collinwood and East Tech high schools, where only four in ten 9th graders graduate.

    Many older industrial cities face the same set of challenges, but few cities started three decades ago with the same promise of regeneration. The collapse of the steel industry in the late 1960s was the beginning of Cleveland’s spiral downward. It did not help that 40 years ago, when the Cuyahoga River caught on fire, Cleveland jokes became a staple of late-night television. The city hit bottom when it filed for bankruptcy in 1978.

    It turned the page with the election of George Voinovich as mayor in 1980. Voinovich, a tough minded Republican, challenged the business, labor and civic leadership of the city to transform Cleveland, and the business community responded. A core of corporate CEO’s organized Cleveland Tomorrow – modeled on the Allegheny Conference in Pittsburgh – which drove a focused agenda of urban transformation. By 1989, Fortune magazine applauded the new trajectory in “How Business Bosses Saved a Sick City”.

    The partnership between the city and the business community began to shift in 1990 with the election of mayor Michael White. While the business community worked with White to complete projects like a new baseball stadium and basketball arena that had been planned earlier, the relationship between the mayor and the business community gradually deteriorated. A 1995 community push for mayoral control of the city school system represented the last big collaboration. By the time White began his third term in ’97, the Voinovich momentum pushing public-private partnerships had evaporated.

    At the same time, dramatic changes were taking place in Cleveland’s corporate landscape. By the late 1990s, the city had lost five Fortune 500 headquarters. Manufacturing, the backbone of the region’s economy, shrank dramatically. As the influence of manufacturing declined, real estate developers emerged as important forces within Cleveland’s business circle. Entering the 2001 recession, Cleveland was clearly in trouble. The Cleveland Plain Dealer proclaimed a “quiet crisis”. The editors started pushing for a master plan for economic development to follow up on the momentum of the Voinovich years. As one editor noted, the region was about to face “economic extinction.” The business leadership responded by consolidating different business organizations — Cleveland Tomorrow (leading CEOs), the Greater Cleveland Growth Association (a chamber of commerce), the Cleveland Roundtable (a group focused on diversity issues), and the Council of Smaller Enterprises (a small business organization) — into the Greater Cleveland Partnership.

    The Partnership focused its economic development agenda on building a convention center, the last Voinovich era project. It also re-organized a set of affiliate economic development organizations for better control and (hopefully) impact. JumpStart (for start-ups), BioEnterprise (for life science companies), MAGNET (for manufacturing companies), Team NEO (a recruiting organization), and Cleveland+ (a new branding effort) were to drive the transformation of the city-region, renamed Cleveland+. The Partnership has been resourceful in financing. A close relationship with a new coalition of foundations, called Fund for our Economic Future, provides about $8 million a year for the affiliate organizations, and effectively operates as a financing arm for the Cleveland+ strategy.

    To finance the new convention center, the Partnership pushed County Commissioners to approve a sales tax increase for about $500 million. In July 2008, the Commission — cleverly skating past a public vote (which by all accounts would have rejected the plan) — increased the sales tax unilaterally…and in a hurry. The vote to finance a convention center took place without a development plan, or even a site, in place. So, in effect, Cuyahoga County taxpayers are already paying for a non-existent convention center. The reason for all the rush seems clear. Last July, on the eve of the Commission vote to raise the sales tax, the Federal Bureau of Investigation assembled a team of over 200 agents to launch a public corruption probe, with raids of county offices, the home of one commissioner, and the offices of several contractors. Federal prosecutors are looking into the close relationship between county officials and several contracting and real estate development firms.

    Amidst the turmoil, Cleveland’s leadership has drifted into a classic case of group think. By shutting themselves off from public scrutiny, they have tried to shield themselves from growing public opposition. But in the process, they have drifted into a dream world that is increasingly detached from underlying market realities. The City’s future, according to the leadership’s current thinking, hinges on a convention center. There’s only one problem: There is no evidence that this strategy will work (and plenty of evidence that it will not). Convention centers represent a formula for low-skill, low-wage employment and public operating deficits as far as the eye can see.

    Put the convention center aside for a moment. Despite the significant assets within the region, the Greater Cleveland Partnership’s broader strategy for Cleveland is failing to transform the city-region’s economy.

    There are five weaknesses in the current Cleveland strategy: The wrong approach to scale, to public/private partnerships, to theoretical underpinnings, to change, to decision-making, and to understanding metrics.

    In Part II, I talk about what went wrong in each of these important realms, and how to strengthen each one.

    Ed Morrison is an Economic Policy Advisor at the Purdue Center for Regional Development. This article draws from Royce Hanson, et al, “Finding a New Voice for Corporate Leadership in a Changed Urban World”, a case study from The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program (September 2006).