Author: Joel Kotkin and Shashi Parulekar

  • The State of the Anglosphere

    The world financial crisis has provoked a stark feeling of decline among many in the West, particularly citizens of what some call the Anglosphere: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand. In the United States, for example, roughly 73 percent see the country as on the wrong track, according to an Ipsos MORI poll—a level of dissatisfaction unseen for a generation.

    Commentators across the political spectrum have described the Anglosphere as decadent, especially compared with the rising power of China. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman praises the “reasonably enlightened group of people” who make up China’s one-party autocracy, which, he feels, provides more effective governance than the dysfunctional democracy of Washington, a point echoed in a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed by former Service Employees International Union boss Andy Stern. On the conservative side, author Mark Steyn sees the U.S. and its cultural mother in England as “facing nothing so amiable and genteel as Continental-style ‘decline,’ but something more like sliding off a cliff.” Even Australia, arguably the strongest economy in the Anglosphere, is increasingly troubled, with local declinists decrying the country’s growing dependence on commodity exports to developing nations—above all, to China. “We are to be attendants to an emerging empire: providers of food, energy, resources, commodities and suppliers of services such as education, tourism, gambling/gaming, health (perhaps), and lifestyle property,” frets the Australian’s Bernard Salt.

    It’s indisputable that the Anglosphere no longer enjoys the overwhelming global dominance that it once had. What was once a globe-spanning empire is now best understood as a union of language, culture, and shared values. Yet what declinists overlook is that despite its current economic problems, the Anglosphere’s fundamental assets—economic, political, demographic, and cultural—are likely to drive its continued global leadership. The Anglosphere future is brighter than commonly believed.

    Start with economics. Like Germany in the 1930s or Japan in the 1970s, China has found that centrally directed economic systems can achieve rapid, short-term economic growth—and China’s has indeed been impressive. But over time, the growth record and economic power achieved by the free-market-oriented English-speaking nations remain peerless. A little-noted fact these days is that the Anglosphere is still far and away the world’s largest economic bloc. Overall, it accounts for more than one-quarter of the world’s GDP—more than $18 trillion. In contrast, what we can refer to as the Sinosphere—China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau—accounts for only 15.1 percent of global GDP, while India generates 5.4 percent (see Chart 1). The Anglosphere’s per-capita GDP of nearly $45,000 is more than five times that of the Sinosphere and 13 times that of India (see Chart 2). This condition is unlikely to change radically any time soon, since the Anglosphere retains important advantages in virtually every critical economic sector, along with abundant natural resources and a robust food supply.

    Graph by Robert Pizzo

    Graph by Robert Pizzo

    Not surprisingly, Anglosphere countries retain close cultural and economic ties with one another. In making foreign direct investments, the United States shows a strong preference for Anglosphere countries, especially the United Kingdom and Canada (see Chart 3). The same is true for Australia, a nation whose economic future might seem to lie with Asia’s budding economic superpowers. Notwithstanding its worries about becoming a mere attendant to a rising China, Australia tilts its overseas investment heavily toward the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand.

    Graph by Robert Pizzo

    Anglosphere countries possess overwhelming military superiority to protect their economic interests. While the United States dominates military technology and hardware, Britain ranks fourth in military spending, with both Australia and Canada ranking in the top 15. The U.S. is headquarters to the world’s three largest defense companies: Lockheed, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. America’s Anglosphere ally Australia has joined informally with Singapore and the Philippines (both are nations where English is spoken widely) to provide a potential regional military counterweight to China.

    Anglosphere economic and military leadership is reflected in, and grows out of, the English-speaking world’s remarkable technological leadership. The vast majority of the world’s leading software, biotechnology, and aerospace firms are concentrated in English-speaking countries. Three-fifths of global pharmaceutical-research spending comes from Britain and America; more than 450 of the top 500 software companies in the world are based in the Anglosphere, mainly in the U.S., which hosts nine of the top ten. Out of the ten fastest-growing software firms, six are American and one is British. Internet giants like Apple, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon have no foreign equivalents remotely close in size and influence.

    Graph by Robert Pizzo

    English is an ascendant language, the primary global language of business and science and the prevailing tongue in a host of key developing countries, including India, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Kenya, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. Over 40 percent of Europeans speak English, while only 19 percent are Francophone. When German, Swedish, and Swiss businesspeople venture overseas, they speak not their home language but English.

    Long-run trends in the developing world also point to the expansion of the English language. French schools have been closing even in former French colonies, such as Algeria, Rwanda, and Vietnam, where students have resisted learning the old colonial tongue. English is becoming widely adopted in America’s biggest competitor, China, and it dominates the Gulf economy, where it serves as the language of business in hubs such as Dubai. The Queen’s tongue is, of course, broadly spoken in that other emerging global economic superpower, India, where it has become a vehicle for members of the middle and upper classes to communicate across regional boundaries. In Malaysia, too, English is the language of business, technology, and politics.

    With linguistic ascendancy comes cultural power, and the Anglosphere’s remains uncontested. In total global sales of media, movies, television, and music, it has no major competitor. Its exports of movies and TV programs dwarf those of established European powers like France and Germany and upstarts such as China, Brazil, and India (see Chart 5). Exports from Hollywood and the cultural capitals of other Anglosphere countries are growing enormously in developing countries: Hollywood box-office revenues grew 25 percent in Latin America and 21 percent in the Asia-Pacific region (with China accounting for 40 percent of that region’s box office). The hit movie Avatar made over $2 billion outside North America; in Russia, Hollywood films earn twice as much as their domestic counterparts. Anglophone preeminence extends to pop music, with Americans Eminem, Lady Gaga, and Taylor Swift, along with the U.K.’s Susan Boyle, ruling global charts. Japanese, Korean, and Chinese pop artists do have large followings in Asia, but the biggest global stars continue to originate in the Anglosphere. This is true of fashion trends, too: Los Angeles, New York, and London dominate fashion for everything from sportswear to lingerie in the increasingly global “mall world.”

    Graph by Robert Pizzo

    Much has been made of the aging of the West, but the English-speaking countries are not graying as rapidly as their historical European rivals are—notably, Germany and Italy—or as Russia and many East Asian countries are. Between 1980 and 2010, the U.S., Canada, and Australia saw big population surges: the U.S.’s expanded by 75 million, to more than 300 million; Canada’s nearly doubled, from 18 million to 34 million; and Australia’s increased from 13 million to 22 million. By contrast, in some European countries, such as Germany, population has remained stagnant, while Russia and Japan have watched their populations begin to shrink.

    The U.S. now has 20 people aged 65 or older for every 100 of working age—only a slight change from 1985, when there were 18 for every 100. By 2030, the U.S. will have 33 seniors per 100 working Americans. But consider the numbers elsewhere. In the world’s fourth-largest economy, Germany already has 33 elderly people for every 100 of working age—up from only 21 in 1985. By 2030, this figure will rise to 48, meaning that there will be barely two working Germans per retiree. The numbers are even worse in Japan, which currently has 35 seniors per 100 working-age people, a dramatic change from 1985, when the country had just 15. By 2030, the ratio is expected to rise to 53 per 100.

    Meanwhile, the nation that so many point to as the twenty-first-century superpower—China—now has a fertility rate of 1.6, even lower than that of Western Europe. Over the next two decades, its ratio of workers to retirees is projected to rise from 11 to 23. Other countries, such as Brazil and Iran, face similar scenarios. These countries, without social safety nets of the kinds developed in Europe or Japan, may get old before they can get rich.

    These figures will have an impact on the growth of the global workforce. Between 2000 and 2050, for example, the U.S. workforce is projected to grow by 37 percent, while China’s shrinks by 10 percent, the EU’s decreases by 21 percent, and, most strikingly, Japan’s falls by as much as 40 percent.

    In this respect, immigration presents the most important long-term advantage for the Anglosphere, which has excelled at incorporating citizens from other cultures. A remarkable 14 million people immigrated to Anglosphere countries over the last decade. The United States, in particular, remains a powerful magnet: in 2005, it swore in more new citizens—the vast majority from outside the Anglosphere—than the next nine countries put together. The U.K. last year also experienced the strongest immigration in its history.

    In sum, post-financial-crisis reports of the Anglosphere’s imminent irrelevance have been exaggerated—wildly.

    This piece originally appeared in The City Journal.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and contributing editor to the City Journal in New York. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Shashi Parulekar is the director of global sales and marketing and chief technology officer for Zemarc Corporation.

    Graphs by Robert Pizzo

  • India Conquers the World

    From the exclusive Club Lounge on the 19th floor of Singapore’s Mandarin Oriental, Anish Lalvani gazes out at the city’s skyline, a dazzling array of glass and steel and vertical ambition. The Lalvani family has come a long way since the days when Anish’s paternal grandfather, Tirath Singh Lalvani, got his start in business by retailing medicines to King George VI’s soldiers in Karachi. Back then the city was a part of British colonial India—until independence arrived in 1947, and its inhabitants suddenly found themselves amid the bloody turmoil of the newborn Pakistan. The Lalvanis, like millions of others on both sides of the border, fled for their lives. But instead of making new homes in present-day India, the Lalvanis sought their fortunes abroad. Today the family’s Hong Kong–based Binatone Group employs some 400 people on four continents. “We couldn’t break the old boys’ network,” says Anish. “But overseas we created our own.”

    The Lalvanis’ voyage from refugees to moguls embodies a worldwide phenomenon: the growing size and sway of the Indian diaspora. The exile population now numbers some 40 million people, spread across West Africa, the Americas, and East Asia. And in many of those countries—including the United States, Britain, Canada, Singapore, and Australia—Indian immigrants and their offspring have both higher incomes and higher education levels than the general population.

    The international importance of India itself is rising to an extent unmatched since the onset of the European-dominated global economy in the 17th century. And with the country’s economy growing at roughly 8 percent a year for the past decade—more than double the rate of the United States—India’s influence can only continue to strengthen. Most economists predict that by 2025 the country will outstrip Japan to become the world’s third-largest economy.

    India is more dynamic than any other major country in demographic terms as well. Its population today is 1.21 billion, second only to China’s 1.3 billion, and thanks to the latter’s one-child policy, India’s numbers are expected to surpass those of China by the late ’20s, when India will have an estimated 1.4 billion people versus China’s 1.39 billion. Currently home to the world’s second-largest contingent of English speakers, India seems destined to step into first place, ahead of the United States, by 2020.

    But the mother country’s rise has been more than equaled by that of India’s émigrés. In fact, the diaspora remains one of India’s most important sources of foreign capital. According to the most recent available figures, workers from India in 2009 sent $49 billion in remittances to relatives back home, outpacing China by $2 billion and Mexico by $4 billion. Four percent of India’s gross domestic product comes from North American remittances alone.

    In fact, India’s business community tends to be family–centered, both at home and abroad. Chinese entrepreneurs are more than twice as likely to be financed through banks, most of them state-owned. In contrast, Indian firms and business networks tend to be essentially familial and tribal, extending in networks across the world. “Much of the Indian middle class has ties outside India,” notes researcher Vatsala Pant, formerly with the Nielsen office in Mumbai. “Our ties around the world are also family ties.”

    The importance of such familial links can be seen in the close relationship between diaspora settlement and commerce. The top five areas for Indian investment—Mauritius, the Americas, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and the U.K.—have large, established Indian communities and -Indian-run companies that are particularly active in electronics and software.

    Today, even the largest Indian firms, such as Tata and the Reliance Group, are controlled by groups of relatives whose power is enhanced by their wide geographic reach. “We’re very flexible about doing business,” notes Lalvani, who was raised in Britain, is a permanent resident of Hong Kong, and is married to an Indian-American. “We’re global and cosmopolitan—ethnically Indian but also tied to the U.S., U.K., and Hong Kong. They’re all things that make me who I am, and make our business work.”

    That business illustrates nicely the worldwide extent of India’s entrepreneurship. In 1958 Anish’s father, Partap Lalvani, and his uncle Gulu teamed up in London to launch Binatone as a supplier of Asian-built consumer electronics and electrical goods. Its range of products grew to include domestic appliances like kettles, toasters, and irons, and today its employees are active in otherwise neglected markets, such as the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and off-the-grid corners of Africa.

    The Indian diaspora began when Indian workers fanned out across the British Empire during the late 18th century. The exodus intensified after Britain abolished slavery in 1834, setting off a major demand for labor around the globe. Indians were sent out to become contract laborers on Malaya’s rubber plantations, or to work as indentured servants in the West Indies. Although many eventually returned home, others stayed in their new countries, and in many cases became integral parts of the national economy. Some rose to skilled positions in the colonial civil service and military, while others became businessmen, teachers, doctors, and moneylenders.

    Even after the empire’s end, émigrés kept pouring out of India to seek better lives abroad—and with them they brought brains and a willingness to work hard. In the United States, where the Indian diaspora represents less than 1 percent of the population, its members account for roughly 13 percent of the graduate students at the country’s top universities. Overall, 67 percent of people of Indian descent living in America hold at least a bachelor’s degree, compared with 28 percent of the total population. And those statistics are echoed elsewhere in the world. In Canada, people of Indian descent are twice as likely to hold graduate or professional degrees. In Britain, some 40 percent of the medical students and doctors in the National Health Service are of Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi origin.

    Indians’ presence in the business realm is no less notable than in the world of higher learning. According to the latest survey by the University of Essex, the per capita income of ethnic Indians in Britain is about £15,860 (nearly $26,000), higher than that of any other ethnic group in the country and almost 10 percent above the median nation-al income. The study found that the unemployment rate among ethnic Indians is close to half the national average. In the United States, recently published data estimate average household income at $50,000, but it’s $90,000 for ethnic Indians—and a 2007 survey found that between 1995 and 2005, more companies were launched by ethnic Indians than by immigrants from Britain, China, Japan, and Taiwan combined.

    The expatriates have brought their culture with them—and that too is spreading into the general population wherever they go. Two million Brits enjoy at least one Indian meal per week, and onscreen entertainment from India has permeated the global market. Not so long ago, Bollywood movies were largely intended for domestic consumption, but foreign sales have become significant in recent years, with the large markets in the dominant diaspora countries. Today, Bollywood movies and television shows command an estimated $3 billion to $4 billion in overseas receipts, placing India’s film industry second only to Hollywood itself. In fact, India beats the rest of the world in the number of movies made and tickets sold, and industry sources estimate that as many as a third of ticket buyers in the West are non-Indians.

    Back in India, conditions remain harsh despite the country’s recent advances. The average life span in Mumbai is barely 56 years, a full quarter century less than in Britain and the United States, and poverty across the country remains at shocking levels, with four in 10 Indians living on less than $1.25 a day. Statistics like that are scarcely an incentive for members of the diaspora to return to their homeland.

    For entrepreneurs like Anish Lalvani, however, there’s a more compelling reason to remain abroad: it helps them stay in closer touch with the global marketplace. Having his home base in Hong Kong provides Lalvani with access to Chinese manufacturing and a broad talent pool. “We don’t have many Indians in our management,” he says proudly of the Binatone Group’s operations. “We get the talent from around the world.”

    As large as it may be, Binatone is far from the scale of its Chinese, American, or Japanese competitors. That means it has to keep a keen eye out for new opportunities that the bigger guys have overlooked. Building family businesses through such dogged opportunism is what has driven the expansion of Greater India. “The emerging markets are small, and it takes a lot of flexibility to get in there,” Lalvani says. “We have to go into places where the costs are low, and there are minimal chain stores, so we can get our stuff on the shelves.” But as far as Lalvani and others like him are concerned, it’s a matter of fundamental self-respect. “It’s more than just ginning up cash,” he says. “It’s about not screwing up what your father started.”

    This piece originally appeared in Newsweek.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Parulekar is an engineer by training. He holds a master’s in -finance and an M.B.A.

    Research for this piece was financed by the Legatum Institute.

    Maps by Ali Modarres.

    Photo by lecercle