New Geography

Author: Joel Kotkin

  • Rome Vs. Gotham

    Urban politicians have widely embraced the current concentration of power in Washington, but they may soon regret the trend they now so actively champion. The great protean tradition of American urbanism – with scores of competing economic centers – is giving way to a new Romanism, in which all power and decisions devolve down to the imperial core.

    This is big stuff, perhaps even more important than the health care debate. The consequence could be a loss of local control, weakening the ability of cities to respond to new challenges in the coming decades.

    The Obama administration’s aggressive federal regulatory agenda, combined with the recession, has accelerated this process. As urban economies around the country lose jobs and revenues, the D.C. area is not merely experiencing “green shoots” but blossoming like lilies of the field.

    To be sure, the capital region has been growing fat on the rest of America for decades, but its staggering success amid the recession is remarkable. Take unemployment: Although the district itself has relatively high rates, unemployment in Virginia and Maryland – where most government-related workers live – has remained around 7% while the nation’s rate approaches 10%.

    The reason is obvious: an explosion of government amid a decline in the private sector. Factories may be closing in Michigan, tech jobs and farms may be disappearing in California, but the people who grease the skids of the ever-expanding federal machine seem to be doing just fine.

    This is most evident at the top of the job market. The capital region now boasts the healthiest technology employment picture in the nation. Virginia has the highest proportion of tech workers in the nation. Maryland ranks fifth, and the district itself is seventh.

    The area also continues to enjoy continued growth in the lucrative professional and business service jobs category. Over the past year, according to latest estimates by www.jobbait.com, the D.C. area was the only region in the nation to enjoy growth in this field.

    Signs of Washington’s ascent abound. The local real estate market appears to be on the mend even as others suffer continued strong declines in values and rising foreclosures. Hotel prices, dropping virtually everywhere else, look to be rising as well.

    Occupancy rates, falling in most places, actually increased during the first half of 2009, as did revenues, which have taken a nosedive elsewhere. In New York prices have plunged – even the mighty Waldorf has been slashing rates.

    In many ways, the economic disasters in New York and other cities have proved a boon for Washington. Wall Street’s demise, for example, has been D.C.’s gain as the locus of financial power leaves New York for the Treasury, Fed, White House and the finance-related congressional committees. K Street is the new Wall Street, where you play for the really big stakes.

    This shift may soon spread beyond the financial sector. Want to get into the energy business? You can bypass Houston and head to the Energy Department and Environmental Protection Agency – they are the ones handing out subsidies and grants to “deserving” applicants. Thinking of expanding your city to accommodate new middle-class families? The people at the Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development have their own ideas on how your cities and regions should grow.

    Manufacturing might be important to your economy, but Washington – a region with virtually no history of productive industry – generally regards factories as polluters, greenhouse gas emitters and labor exploiters. If you have enough lobbyists you might be able to hang on, but don’t really expect much in the way of positive help.

    Some “progressives” may like this model – after all, it originated in Europe, the supposed fount of all that is enlightened. Since the 18th century, Europe’s urban history has been largely dominated by great imperial centers – London, Paris, Moscow and Berlin – that treat other cities like something akin to poor relations.

    Even today European cities and localities tend to have far less control over their destiny than in the U.S. Zoning, planning decisions and even economic strategy often originate from the center, as does the power to tax and spend. For decades, Europe’s legacy of ancient urban privilege – so critical in emerging out of the dark ages – has ebbed before the increasing power of the national capitals. More recently the super-capital of Brussels, like Washington, thrives in hard times that are decimating other European urban economies.

    The great European capitals rose largely because they also served as the domicile of princes, bureaucrats and, until recent times, the clerical establishment. Other cities might have enjoyed a boom – such as Manchester during the industrial revolution – but, ultimately, hierarchy served to concentrate power in the great capital cities.

    In contrast, American cities and communities traditionally have retained control over planning, development and other critical growth factors. Equally important, American cities, noted the great sociologist E. Digby Baltzell, were not dominated by aristocracy but were “heterogeneous from top to bottom.” Urban growth came primarily not by central design but as a result of the often ruthless schemes and lofty aspirations, often ruthlessly expressed, of local political and business leaders.

    For example, the quintessential American city, New York, started as a commercial venture. As early as the mid-17th century 18 languages were spoken on Manhattan Island (population of 1,000) and numerous faiths practiced. In early New Amsterdam, the counting house, not the church or any public building, stood as the most important civic building.

    Even after the Dutch were pushed out by the more powerful British military, the bustling island city – renamed New York – retained its fundamentally commercial character. It served briefly as the nation’s capital, but its power grew from its port and its immigrants. The city’s entrepreneurial spirit and social mobility startled many Europeans. As the French consul to New York complained in 1810, “The inhabitants…have in general no mind for anything but business. New York might be described as a permanent fair in which two-thirds of the population is constantly being replaced; where huge deals are being made, almost always with fictitious capital; and where luxury has reached alarming heights.”

    This entrepreneurial pattern also drove the growth of New York’s many competitors – first the great industrial cities such as Cleveland, Chicago and Detroit and, later, West Coast metropolises like Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay area and Seattle. More recently, there has been a similar spectacular rise of formerly obscure places like Dallas, Houston, Atlanta and Miami.

    Through much of this time Washington barely registered among the ranks of American urban centers. Despite early expectations that Washington would become “the Rome of the New World,” it lagged behind other American cities through much of the 19th century. The city was widely reviled as a fetid, swampy place with atrocious cuisine – hog and hominy grits were its staples – that offered little in the way of commerce, industry or culture. Even its great buildings were compared to “the ruins of Roman grandeur.”

    The First World War, the Depression and then the Second World War each boosted Washington’s status but hardly into the first rank of cities. Few entrepreneurs were attracted to a city dominated by regulators, clerks and lawyers. The cultural center lay in New York and Boston – and later Los Angeles. The Bay Area, Massachusetts and later Texas evolved into the primary technological centers.

    Not until the 1960s did Washington begin to emerge as something like a traditional national capital, with a large permanent population of well-educated and cultured citizens as well as a robust economy based on the defense industry and the expanding welfare state.

    But the financial crisis of 2008 has set the stage for an unprecedented growth of the region, with a Democratic president and majority seemingly determined to expand federal mandates into every crevice of community life. There is an eagerness to use federal authority in unprecedented ways that could bring federal influence into virtually every minute decision made in an urban area.

    This concentration of power is also bad news for urban economies, including New York’s. As New York University’s Mitchell Moss has observed, Gotham may be losing its perch as the true national financial center. But other cities also should take note of the trend. Polycentric sprawling cities like Los Angeles, Dallas, Houston, Phoenix and Atlanta soon may find themselves forced to reorganize themselves along lines preferred by federal urban “experts.” Hard-pressed industrial cities may find new environmental restrictions on ports and other key infrastructures an impediment to a much-needed renaissance.

    American cities are at a critical moment. Our competitive, commercial urban tradition certainly has its flaws, but it also has produced the advanced world’s most dynamic roster of modern cities and regions. Ceding the power of urban planning to Washington will cripple the American city – except, of course, for the one that reigns as locale for imperial control.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • The New Radicals

    America’s ”kumbaya” moment has come and gone. The nation’s brief feel-good era initiated by Barack Obama’s stirring post-partisan rhetoric–and fortified by John McCain’s classy concession speech–has dissolved into sectarian bickering more appropriate to dysfunctional Iraq than the world’s greatest democratic republic.

    Yet little of the shouting concerns the fundamental economic issue facing the U.S. today: the decline of upward mobility and income growth for the working and middle classes. Instead we have politicos battling over two versions of ”trickle down” economics.

    The Democrats seem bent on installing a permanent ruling mandarinate alongside a small financial aristocracy. The Republicans, meanwhile, simply want to help the rich hold onto as much of their money as possible.

    Neither approach will improve prospects for the vast majority of Americans. The Bush Administration policies of low taxes–for the upper classes–and less regulation helped engender a massive asset bubble unsupported by economic fundamentals. This ultimately drove up both the current account and federal deficits and led to the severe Great Recession.

    The Obama ”trickle down” is, sadly, not all that different from the Bush-Paulson strategy. Like its predecessor, it endorses the bailout of giant financial institutions as the linchpin of its economic policy. It is, simultaneously, profoundly anti-democratic and anti-capitalist.

    Other aspects of the Obama policy seem likely to prop up Wall Street traders at the expense of the rest of us. The administration’s big ”cap and trade” proposals could prove more advantageous to well-heeled ”carbon traders” than to the environment. The other big winners may be Silicon Valley venture capitalists, who– increasingly bereft of their own ideas for making money–hope to cash in on Washington-subsidized energy schemes.

    Of course, not all Democrats have sold out. Sens. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., and John Tester, D-Mont., have expressed opposition to bailing out ”too big to fail” institutions. New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo has been fearless in unveiling the enormous Wall Street bonuses–over $32.6 billion last year– handed out as firms suffered $81 billion in losses and almost drove the world economy to ruin.

    Unfortunately, these are exceptions. Illinois Sen. Dick Durbin recently admitted that the banks remain ”the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill,” adding that they ”frankly own the place.”

    So far in 2009 the Democrats have netted nearly 60% of all campaign contributions that have come from the financial industry, now the largest sector in terms of donations. The biggest donations have gone to such influential Democrats as Sen. Charles Schumer and his sidekick, newly appointed Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, from New York; Sen. Chris Dodd D-Conn., and Majority Leader Harry Reid D-Nev. Schumer, the Street’s leading vassal in Congress, has emerged as the rising star in the Democratic leadership. If Majority Leader Reid loses his seat–as is now possible, according to polls in Nevada–Wall Street’s main man could well end up a future Majority Leader.

    Some Democrats try to have it both ways, playing populists for the peanut galleries but getting cozy with the industry when it matters. Massachusetts Rep. Barney Frank, the House Financial Services Chairman, talks tough but has a history of friendly relations with financial powerhouses. One of Frank’s own top assistants, Michael Pease, just went to work for the biggest winner since taking TARP bucks, Goldman Sachs. As left-winger blogger Glenn Greenwald put it recently: ”The only way they can make it more blatant is if they hung a huge Goldman Sachs banner on the Capitol dome and branded it onto the foreheads of leading members of Congress and executive branch officials.”

    In the end the faux populist Democrats end up with policies that make Ronald Reagan’s ”trickle down” seem downright Leninist. Harry Truman once quipped that ”There should be a real liberal party in this country, and I don’t mean a crackpot professional one.” Sadly, it’s increasingly the latter.

    The hypocrisy should open a path for the Republicans as wide as the Grand Canyon. But the ill-named Party of Lincoln still seems to think that the path to power lies in the tired old formula of ultra-patriotism, guns, abortion and religious rectitude. Screaming ”socialism” may awaken the spirits of some on the old right, but it’s hard to make a convincing case when George Bush socialized banking and grew the deficit.

    You certainly can’t trust big-business conservatives to stop bonuses for the TARP babies, particularly the 25 financial firms deemed ”too big to fail” by the likes of Ben Benanke. Give GOP big-business leaders higher stock prices, and they will follow you anywhere. Only a few–such as Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa,–have shown they are truly serious about the free market or defending the interests of the regular taxpayer.

    Given this sad political picture, the best hope now is to build an alternative perspective that focuses on the basic economic issues. This would not be the media celebrated movement of moderates–Democrats-lite and Republicans-lite–who seek kumbaya through compromise. It would, instead, require a radical third tendency–neither strictly left or right–that would draw on long-term American priorities and values.

    These new radicals would focus on basic issues like improving infrastructure, and primary education and bolstering the nation’s productive economy. Their inspiration would come from a long tradition of federal successes–from the Homestead Act and the WPA to the Interstate Highway and the space program. They would view the financial crisis not as an imperative for protecting the well-connected but for financial reform, decentralization and innovation.

    Such an approach would address what the British author Austin Williams calls our ”poverty of ambition.” Americans historically have rejected a future constrained by entrenched hierarchies. Most, I believe, would support spending money and paying taxes, if it was spent to achieve big things that would lead to a greater, more widespread prosperity and opportunity.

    Just imagine if the upward of $1 trillion spent guaranteeing Goldman Sachs and Citigroup executives giant paydays had instead gone into roads, bridges, subways, buses, port development, skills training, energy transmission lines and basic scientific research. And imagine if instead of protecting Citigroup and Bank of America, we encouraged stronger local banks and solvent financial entrepreneurs to fill the breach left behind by gross failures.

    Such an approach may seem extreme, but it might have wide appeal. We know, for example, that the TARP bailout is widely unpopular. Indeed, according to one survey taken earlier this year, Americans oppose continuing bailouts for banks by better than 2 to 1.

    As I travel the country, I find anger is deepest among business owners who find securing loans increasingly difficult nearly a year after the original bailout. Even as the economy slowly recovers, this anger will become more pronounced with the coming bonuses doled out to those at bailed-out firms. As Sen. Grassley puts it: ”My people ask, ‘When are these people going to be put in jail?”’ Instead we’re paying for them to stay at the Ritz.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Why The ‘Livable Cities’ Rankings Are Wrong

    Few topics stir more controversy between urbanists and civic boosters than city rankings. What truly makes a city “great,” or even “livable”? The answers, and how these surveys determine them, are often subjective, narrow or even misguided. What makes a “great” city on one list can serve as a detriment on another.

    Recent rankings of the “best” cities around the world by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Monocle magazine and the Mercer quality of life surveys settled on a remarkably similar list. For the most part, the top ranks are dominated by well-manicured older European cities such as Zurich, Geneva, Vienna, Copenhagen, Helsinki and Munich, as well as New World metropolises like Vancouver and Toronto; Auckland, New Zealand; and Perth and Melbourne in Australia.

    Only Monocle put a truly cosmopolitan world city – Tokyo – near the top of its list. The Economist rankings largely snubbed American cities – only Pittsburgh made it anywhere near the top, at No. 29 out of 140. The best we can say is most American cities did better than Harare, Zimbabwe, which ran at the bottom. Honolulu got a decent No. 11 on the Monocle list and broke into the top 30 on Mercer’s, as did No. 29 San Francisco. But regarding American urban boosters, that’s all, folks.

    To understand these rather head-scratching results, one must look at the criteria these surveys used. Cultural institutions, public safety, mass transit, “green” policies and other measures of what is called “livability” were weighted heavily, so results skewed heavily toward compact cities in fairly prosperous regions. Most of these regions suffer only a limited underclass and support a relatively small population of children. In fact, most of the cities are in countries with low birthrates – Switzerland’s median fertility rate, for example, is about 1.4, one of the lowest on the planet and a full 50% below that of the U.S.

    These places make ideal locales for groups like traveling corporate executives, academics and researchers targeted by such surveys. With their often lovely facades, ample parks and good infrastructure, they constitute, for the most part, a list of what Wharton’s Joe Gyourko calls “productive resorts,” a sort of business-oriented version of an Aspen or Vail in Colorado or Palm Beach, Fla. Honolulu is an exception, more a vacation destination than a bustling business hub.

    Yet are those the best standards for judging a city? It seems to me what makes for great cities in history are not measurements of safety, sanitation or homogeneity but economic growth, cultural diversity and social dynamism. A great city, as Rene Descartes wrote of 17th century Amsterdam, should be “an inventory of the possible,” a place of imagination that attracts ambitious migrants, families and entrepreneurs.

    Such places are aspirational – they draw people not for a restful visit or elegant repast but to achieve some sort of upward mobility. By nature these places are chaotic and often difficult to navigate. Ambitious people tend to be pushy and competitive. Just think about the great cities of history – ancient Rome, Islamic Baghdad, 19th century London, 20th century New York – or contemporary Los Angeles, Houston, Shanghai and Mumbai.

    These represent a far different urbanism than what one finds in well-organized and groomed Zurich, Vienna and Copenhagen. You would not call these cities and their ilk with metropolitan populations generally less than 2 million, “bustling.” Perhaps a more fitting words would be “staid” and “controlled.”

    Peace and quiet is very nice, but it doesn’t really encourage global culture or commerce. Growth and change come about when newcomers jostle with locals not just as tourists, or orbiting executives, but as migrants. Great cities in their peaks are all about this kind of yeasty confrontation.

    Alas, comfort takes precedence over dynamism in these new cities. Take the immigration issue: Unlike Amsterdam in its heyday or London or New York today, most northern European countries have turned hostile to immigration and many have powerful nativist parties. These are directed not against elite corporate executives or academics, but newcomers from developing countries. In some cases, resentment is stoked by immigrants taking advantage of well-developed welfare systems that worked far better in a homogeneous country with shared attitudes of social rights and obligations.

    Of course, these cities aren’t total deadweights. After all, Switzerland has its banks, Helsinki boasts Nokia and Denmark remains a key center of advanced and green manufacturing technology. For its part, Vancouver gets Americans to shoot cheap movie and TV shows with massive tax breaks and will host the Winter Olympics. But none can be considered major shapers of the modern world economy.

    The one American city favored by The Economist, Pittsburgh, represents a pale – and less attractive – version of these top-ranked European, Canadian or Australian cities. Its formerly impressive array of headquarters has shrunk to a handful. Once the capital of steel, it now pretty much depends on nonprofits, hospitals and universities.

    You will be hearing a lot more about Pittsburgh – the city has a prodigious PR machine funded largely by nonprofit foundations and universities – as it gets ready to host the G-20 meeting next month. Fans claim that the former steel town has developed a stable – if hardly dynamic – economy. Its torpidity is being sold a strength; boom-resistant in the best of times, it’s also proved relatively recession-proof as well.

    In this sense, Pittsburgh represents the American model of the slow-growth European city. This may appeal to those doing quality-of-life rankings, but not to those who have been fleeing the Steel City for other places for generations. Immigrants are hardly coming in droves either – Pittsburgh ranks near last among major metropolitan areas in percentage of foreign-born residents. As longtime local columnist and resident Bill Steigerwald notes, since 1990 more Pittsburghers have been dying than being born. If this represents America’s urban future, perhaps it’s one that takes its inspiration from Alan Weisman’s “A world without us.”

    Yet the future of urbanism, here and abroad, will not be Pittsburgh. Based on current preferences, something like 20 million – or more – people will have moved to U.S. cities by 2050. Most will likely settle in more dynamic places like New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Phoenix, Dallas, Chicago and Miami. These cities have become magnets for restless populations, both domestic and foreign-born. They also contain all the clutter, constant change, discomfort and even grime that characterize great cities through history.

    But it’s economics that drives migrants to these dirtier, busier metropolitan centers. Many of the cities at the top of the livability lists, by contrast, are also among the world’s most expensive. They generally also have high taxes and relatively stagnant job markets.

    Many U.S. cities, however, offer far more materially to their average residents than their elite European counterparts do. American cities, when assessed by purchasing-power parity, notes demographer Wendell Cox, do very well indeed. Viewed this way, the U.S. boasts eight of the top 10 – and 37 of the top 50 – metropolitan regions in terms of per capita income.

    The top city on Cox’s list, San Jose, Calif., epitomizes both the strengths and weaknesses of the American city. The heartland of Silicon Valley, the San Jose region has generated one of the world’s most innovative – and well-paid – economies. On the other hand, its mass transit usage is minuscule, its cultural attributes measly and its downtown hardly a tourist destination.

    Meanwhile, pricey and scenic Zurich, No. 2 on the Mercer list and No. 10 on The Economist rankings, comes in 74th when considering adjusted per capita income. Economist favorite Vancouver, one of the most expensive second-tier cities on the planet, ranks 71st. For the average person seeking to make money and improve his or her economic status, it usually pays not to settle in one of the world’s “most livable” cities.

    This is not to say that rambunctious urban centers like Los Angeles, New York or London couldn’t learn from their more “livable” counterparts. Anyone who has braved the maddening crowds in Venice Beach, Times Square or London’s Piccadily knows a city can have too much of a good thing. Los Angeles could use a more efficient bus system. Better-maintained subways and commuter trains in New York would be welcome by millions as they would in Greater London.

    Ultimately great cities remain, almost by necessity, raw (and at times unpleasant) places. They are filled with the sights and smells of diverse cultures, elbowing streetwise entrepreneurs and the inevitable mafiosi. They all suffer the social tensions that come with rapid change and massive migration. New York, Los Angeles, London, Shanghai, Mumbai or Dubai may not shoot to the top of more elite, refined rankings, but they contain the most likely blueprint of our urban future.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Green Jobs Can’t Save The Economy

    Nothing is perhaps more pathetic than the exertions of economic developers and politicians grasping at straws, particularly during hard times. Over the past decade, we have turned from one panacea to another, from the onset of the information age to the creative class to the boom in biotech, nanotech and now the “green economy.”

    This latest economic fad is supported by an enormous industry comprising nonprofits, investment banks, venture capitalists and their cheerleaders in the media. Their song: that “green” jobs will rescue our still weak economy while saving the planet. Ironically, what they all fail to recognize is that the thing that would spur green jobs most is economic growth.

    All told, green jobs constitute barely 700,000 positions across the country – less than 0.5% of total employment. That’s about how many jobs the economy lost in January this year. Indeed a recent study by Sam Sherraden at the center-left New America Foundation finds that, for the most part, green jobs constitute a negligible factor in employment – and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Policymakers, he warns, should avoid “overpromising about the jobs and investment we can expect from government spending to support the green economy.”

    This is true even in California, where green-job hype has become something of a fetish among self-styled “progressives.” One recent study found that the state was creating some 10,000 green jobs annually before recession. To put this into context, the total state economy has lost over 700,000 jobs over the past year (more than 200,000 in Los Angeles County alone). Any net growth in green jobs has barely made a dent in any economic category; only education and health services have shown job gains over this period.

    More worrisome, in terms of national competitiveness, the green sector seems to be going in the wrong direction. The U.S.’s overall “green” trade balance has moved from a $14.4 billion surplus in 1997 to a nearly $9 billion deficit last year. As the country has pushed green energy, ostensibly to free itself from foreign energy, it has become ever more dependent on countries such as China, Japan and Germany for critical technology. Some of this is directly attributable to the often massive subsidies these countries offer to green-tech companies. But as New America’s Sherraden puts it, this “does not augur well for the future of the green trade balance.”

    Nor are we making it any easier for American workers to gain from green-related manufacturing. Some of America’s “greenest” regions are inhospitable for placing environmentally oriented manufacturing facilities. For example, high taxes and regulatory climate have succeeded in intimidating solar cell makers from coming to green-friendly California; a manufacturer from China told the Milken Institute’s Ross DeVol that the state’s “green” laws precluded making green products there.

    Attempts to put windmills in Nantucket, Mass., the Catskills and Jones Beach in New York and other scenic areas have also been blocked by environmentalist groups. Transmission lines, necessary to take “renewable” energy from distant locales to energy-hungry cities, often face similar hurdles. Solar farms in the Mojave desert might help meet renewable energy quotas but, as wildlife groups have noted, may not be so good for local fauna.

    And then there is the impact of green policies on the overall economy. Green power is expensive and depends on massive subsidization, with government support levels at roughly 20 times or more per megawatt hour than relatively clean and abundant natural gas. Lavishing breaks for Wall Street investors and favored green companies also may be harmful to the rest of the economy. A recent study on renewable energy subsidies on the Spanish economy found that for every “green” job created more than two were lost in the non-subsidized economy.

    So how do we build a green economy that is sustainable without massive subsidies? First, governments need to learn how to say no to some environmentalists. Green jobs and renewable energy can not be fully developed without affecting somebody’s backyard. Windmills will have to be built in some scenic places; transmission lines may mar somebody’s “view-shed.”

    Arguably, the thing that would spur green jobs and domestic industries most would be economic growth. Environmentalists long have been cool to growth, since they link it to carbon production and other noxious human infestations. As an official at the Natural Resources Defense Council put it, the recession has “a moment of breathing room.” Disaster may be still looming, but bad times add a few more moments to our carbon clock.

    Long term, though, I would argue hard times may prove harmful for the environmental cause. Even with subsidies, many renewable energy projects are now on hold or being canceled across the country. Slackening energy demand, brought on by a weak economy, has undermined the case for new sources of energy generation; what looked attractive with oil prices at $140 a barrel and headed higher looks at $70 less so.

    Similarly, hard-pressed homeowners and businesses don’t constitute the best market for new, often expensive “green” products. A growing economy, which would drive up energy prices, could spur a more sustainable interest in alternative energy from firms that now only do so for public relations concerns. At the same time, cash-rich consumers could more afford to install energy-saving home insulation or rooftop solar panels. A strong economy would also spur sales of new energy-efficient appliances and cars.

    This process would go more quickly if government relied less on mandates, which tend to scare serious investors, and turned toward incentives. With the right tax advantages, energy efficiency could become a positive imperative for companies.

    There’s also an unappreciated political calculus at work. A persistently weak economy undermines support for the green agenda. For the first time in 25 years, according to a Gallup poll, more people place higher priority on economic growth than on the environment.

    Furthermore, more people now feel claims about global warming are “exaggerated.” Early this year, Pew reported that global warming ranked last among the top 20 priorities of Americans.

    Ultimately, environmentalists need to realize that the road to a green economy does not lie in promoting hysteria, guilt and self-abnegation while ignoring prohibitive costs and grim economic realities. Green enthusiasts should focus on promoting a growing economy capable of generating both the demand and the ability to pay for more planet-friendly products. After all, the economy needs green jobs less than green jobs need a thriving economy.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Forget Second Stimulus; We Need Economic Vision

    As the American economy slowly heals, the Obama administration will no doubt claim some credit for its $787 billion stimulus — and perhaps even suggest doubling down for a second stage. Republicans, for their part, will place their emphasis on the “slow” part of the equation and persistent high unemployment, blaming the very same stimulus program.

    Whatever the politics, no new stimulus should be considered unless it deals with the fundamental illness undermining the country’s long-term economic prospects. Such a stimulus would address the country’s essential problem: persistent overconsumption amid underproduction.

    Neither party wants to address this issue because neither chooses to understand it. From the very beginning, the Obama administration has viewed the stimulus as a political issue, not an economic one. This became clear to me even before the election when I asked Obama’s campaign economic adviser, Austan Goolsbee, about “the goal” of the president-to-be’s program.

    All I got for my trouble was vague political rhetoric about improving the economy. Though some parts of the stimulus, such as extending health and unemployment benefits, were clearly justified, the whole program never sought to address the roughly $800 billion annual imbalance between American consumption and production.

    Instead, we have witnessed a grab bag of political handouts — Chicago machine politics on a grand scale — designed to placate key Democratic constituencies. Most have gone to what my old teacher Michael Harrington described as “the social-industrial complex” consisting of the education industry, social service providers and the various government bureaucracies.

    As a recent New America Foundation report makes clear, precious little has gone to the productive side of the economy that determines the country’s competitiveness and creates many high-paying blue-collar jobs. Infrastructure, a critical component of any productivity-enhancing strategy, has accounted for barely 10 percent of the package.

    The results have not been pretty for the productive sectors of the economy. Construction workers now have higher than 19 percent unemployment; jobs in this sector have fallen during the past year in 333 out of 352 metropolitan areas, with more than 200 plunging by double digits. Meanwhile, the hard-pressed manufacturing sector suffers more than 12 percent unemployment.

    Why this disinclination to fund the tangible parts of the economy? One reason may be that those working in construction and manufacturing — both blue-collar workers and white-collar professionals — do not wield the same influence in this law review administration as college professors, Service Employees International Union-organized workers or unionized teachers.

    One also senses that some militant environmentalists in the administration may be less than enthusiastic about anything associated with the entire carbon-creating part of the economy. Certainly, new factories, natural gas facilities, roads, ports and waterways don’t fit the professed passion of the president’s own science adviser, John Holdren, for the gradual “de-development” of the U.S. and other advanced economies.

    Even prospects for the auto industry — the one manufacturing sector that the administration has effectively annexed — are threatened by plans to enact policies that will “coerce” Americans out of their cars. This amounts to trying to “save” an industry by destroying it.

    For sectors not under government control — warehousing, fossil fuel energy, home construction and agriculture — the administration’s “green” regulatory regime could boost costs at the worst possible time. As a result, the coming recovery once again may be consumption-led and fail to improve our overall competitiveness. The biggest beneficiaries will most likely be Chinese manufacturers, German and Japanese automakers and, because of a lack of sufficient domestic alternatives, energy producers from Venezuela and the Middle East to Russia.

    If they had a collective IQ over 50, the still largely discredited Republicans could run strongly against this economic scenario. Yet, for the most part, they seem incapable of putting the national interest ahead of Wall Street’s profits and corporate excess.

    So no matter how much the conservatives complain, Obamanomics most likely will end up with results remarkably like those of Bushonomics: more consumption, less production, expanding public debt, asset inflation on Wall Street and a slowly declining middle-class standard of living. The only real difference will lie in who gets to rob the public — instead of pharmaceutical and oil companies, we get Gorite “renewable” energy traders and well-connected “green” venture capitalists.

    Americans need to place a pox on both these flawed models. We need a totally new approach that focuses on key productivity-enhancing investments such as improved transportation infrastructure — new roads, bridges, ports and waterways to meet the demands of an expanded economy for a growing population. We should be looking at modern equivalents of the New Deal electrification program, the GI Bill, the Eisenhower highway and the space program.

    Clearly, an infrastructure that is inadequate today will be utterly useless in 2050, when there are projected to be at least 100 million more Americans. Already, our energy-generating capacity in some parts sputters like that of a Third World country. Commodity exports, such as grains, unable to reach foreign markets because of a lack of rail cars and adequate waterways, are left to rot and feed rats.

    This is not the way to prepare ourselves for ever greater competition from countries such as China, India and Brazil. Americans must demand a program that, while perhaps financially painful now, will make it possible for our progeny to enjoy a prosperous future rather than a declining one.

    This article first appeared at Politico.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Salinas Dispatch: A Silver Lining in the Golden State

    From a distance, a crisis often takes on ideological colorings. This is true in California, where the ongoing fiscal meltdown has devolved into a struggle between anti-tax conservatives and free-spending green leftist liberals.

    Yet more nuances surface when you approach a crisis from the context of a specific place. Over the past two years my North Dakota-based consulting partner, Delore Zimmerman, and I have been working in Salinas, a farm community of 150,000, 10 miles inland from the Monterey coast and an hour’s drive south of San Jose. Our work has been funded by a variety of sources, including the city, local business interests and the Chamber of Commerce.

    Our goal has been to find ways to promote upward mobility in the town, which is almost two-thirds Hispanic. Poverty is widespread, and gang problems rank among the worst in California. Unemployment, devastated by the recent recession, hangs at around 15%.

    These conditions are not at all unusual for inland California, and they are particularly prevalent in farm regions. In the Central Valley, over the next range of mountains, conditions are far worse, with some communities losing thousands of acres in production and unemployment rushing upward of 40%.

    One liberal journalist, Rick Wartzman, recently described the vast agricultural region around Fresno as “California’s Detroit.” As environmentalists push to cut back on water supplies and protect fish populations in the San Francisco Bay Delta, Wartzman notes, its local workers and businesspeople “are fast becoming a more endangered species than Chinook salmon or delta smelt.”

    In Salinas, where water comes from local aquifers, wells and the Salinas River, death seems less imminent, but there is a profound sense that things may be deteriorating. Local growers worry about regulatory constraints that will drive up costs to meet new state greenhouse gas standards. They also fear a possible county initiative, promoted by the well-funded local greens, to ban the growing of genetically modified foods.

    The growers’ response to the pressure – as with other businesses in California – is not to quit but to scale down operations. Some are cutting back thousands of acres of lettuce and other green crops that have been the prime business for the area for nearly a century.

    Yet we also see many reasons for hope. Salinas remains a unique place with an amazing richness in what the French call terroir, a combination of climate and soil. The city’s most famous son, John Steinbeck, wrote of the Valley’s unique topography:

    “The high gray-flannel fog of winter closed off the Salinas Valley from the sky and the rest of the world. On every side it sat like a lid on the mountains and made of the great valley a closed pot.”

    Growing conditions in Salinas cannot be easily duplicated elsewhere. Its richness has created a cornucopia responsible for the predominant part of the area’s private-sector employment.

    But it’s not just physical factors that make Salinas – and California – so productive. People matter too. The area is populated by scores of hard-driving agricultural families, people whose forebears transformed the place into the “salad bowl” of a nation. By 1952, when Steinbeck published East of Eden, Salinas produced 70% of the nation’s lettuce and much of its fresh vegetables.

    Salinas’ growers are not hereditary gentry; talk to local farmers and you find people whose roots lay in Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Japan and, increasingly, Mexico. “People, if given opportunity, can accomplish anything,” notes Lorri Kester, CEO of Mann Packing, a leading broccoli producer. “Many of the firms that lead us now were started by ‘Okies’ who worked the land. Now we see the same things with Latinos who started out as hands and now are foremen or managers.”

    What the Salinas growers do best – like their high-tech counterparts up in the Santa Clara Valley – is innovate. Working with the USDA and University of California-Davis scientists, they have led the way in creating new strains of vegetables and new ways of marketing, including the notion of “salad in a bag.”

    But not all the knowledge that makes Salinas such an economic powerhouse comes from entrepreneurs or PhDs. Like many agricultural communities, Salinas has had a sometime brutal labor history, particularly in the 1930s. The worst of this is now thankfully over, but farm labor remains a tough and often unrewarding profession.

    Yet even the hardest-edged growers acknowledge the importance of their labor force. Although education levels remain relatively low, our research revealed an extraordinarily high concentration of people with practical skills that can be applied to growing the agricultural economy. Future mechanization may reduce the overall employee counts but will make growers even more dependent on skilled workers in the fields.

    This proficiency, acquired in the fields and the processing sheds, has helped create another product for the Valley: expertise. Salinas growers, foreman, irrigation workers and marketers now sell their knowledge in other parts of California, as well as to Arizona, Mexico and, increasingly, East Asia. “I am seeing a lot of product and technical products from Salinas go to China and elsewhere,” notes Frank Pierce, a local agricultural consultant.

    Salinas also teaches you to avoid the great distinction made by many pundits between the “knowledge” industry and the productive type that focuses on tangible goods. A successful economy draws on information but also creates real products. There is a relationship between the two that is dynamic and has long been a critical component of California’s economic vitality.

    This is not just true of Salinas. I learned long ago from the founding fathers of Silicon Valley – people like Intel founder Bob Noyce and venture capitalist Don Valentine – that the practical knowledge from making circuits and chips helped create the Valley’s unique engineering terroir. Similarly, the “magic” of Hollywood does not emerge full-blown from the brain storms of stars and moguls. The entertainment complex’s unique abilities grow from the interplay of practical knowledge of less glamorous camera people, grips, editors, caterers and prop-managers servicing what Angelenos invariably refer to as “the industry.”

    Sadly, this insight largely has been lost on California’s political and business leadership. Among the so-called “progressive” community, production of any kind, outside of small artisanal farms or funky software shops, is disdained.

    This anti-development ethos has gained extra traction by claims that large farms and factories might add to the “carbon footprint” of a given place. Among well-funded foundations and some corporate leaders there remains an implicit sense that California can still mine enough riches in cyberspace to support the vast hoi polloi.

    Yet in reality, Californians need hard jobs, even mundane ones. The farm, sound stage or electronics factory provide the employment essential to broad-based prosperity. And when those jobs leave California they usually migrate to a place – whether over the border or abroad – where wages are lower and environmental controls are far weaker.

    This is not to argue that California’s right has the answers either. Lower taxes are generally preferable to higher ones. But in Salinas – and California – sometimes higher taxes might be preferable to cutting services, like the critical training offered by community colleges, which make the economy work and offer hope to the younger generation.

    In Salinas, Mayor Dennis Donahue, a Democrat of the Pat Brown variety, has embraced a call to raise the sales tax in order to maintain basic services. It’s not an ideal solution, but in the real world of running a city, particularly one with a big gang problem, you don’t want to cut back on police and libraries or add to already surging unemployment.

    What California needs most now is what it’s most missing: common sense and a sense of balance. This is what we learned in Salinas. California cannot be saved by ideologies – it needs to be saved from them.

    To be sure, preserving the land and air quality should remain a priority; it is the basis of California’s riches and unique appeal. But sustainability – the great buzzword of our time – needs to apply not only to the environment but also the economy and society. The right-wing solution of lower taxes even at the price of eviscerating the public sector and letting the infrastructure deteriorate does not constitute a program for long-term prosperity.

    We prefer an approach that focuses on practical steps for private and public sectors to collaborate on restoring economic growth. In Salinas, this means establishing – through cooperation with Hartnell, the local community college – a center for the development of agricultural technology. Salinas could use its combination of intellectual and grassroots knowledge to become the Silicon Valley of the “fresh” economy. It would also serve as a center of practical research on E. coli and other diseases that threaten the entire agricultural industry.

    Another step would be to expand the area’s thriving wine corridor to promote the region’s vintages. And there needs to be a plan to restore the historic central core into a bustling business district and to attract the predominately Latino shoppers, now lured to malls and outlet centers outside the city, back into town.

    These steps will take effort and money, but neither free market ideology nor green zealotry alone will get it done. California’s greatness was created not just by entrepreneurs or through its public sector, but in a clever, pragmatic melding of the two. Blessed with resources of topography, climate and human skill, our state should not allow dueling extremes to turn a global paragon into a planetary laughingstock.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Moving to Reloville, America’s Cross-Country Careerists

    Peter T. Kilborn’s Next Stop, Reloville: Life Inside America’s New Rootless Professional Class documents an important piece of social history: the lives of relocating corporate executives. These modern-day ­nomads—overwhelming white, well-educated and middle-class—maintain the business machine of large companies. They include the technicians, marketing executives and professional managers who accept a rootless life in exchange for handsome remuneration.

    Most of these people live in what Mr. Kilborn calls ­Relovilles, an archipelago of mostly newer, upscale suburban communities that includes places such as Alpharetta, Ga., Highland Ranch, Colo., Overland Park, Kan., and a series of Texas locales from Plano, outside Dallas, to the Woodlands on the periphery of Houston.

    In the many vignettes he provides, Mr. Kilborn portrays these executives and their families in a dispassionate, even sympathetic manner. We meet Jim and Kathy Link, who have moved seven times in a little more than 10 years as Mr. Link pursued a career in selling ­employee-benefit services. The author rides along with Kathy as she shuttles the kids to ­soccer practice,and he tracks the buying and selling of the Links’ homes. “The basement is approximately the same size as my parents’ entire house,” says Jim, marveling at how much house his $200,000 annual ­income bought in Alpharetta.

    We also meet Matt Fisher and his family. He’s an inventory-management specialist who, we’re told, has “averted dead-ending his career by mining his network of contacts to move from Chicago to Cleveland, to Columbus, to Houston, and ­finally to Flower Mound,” in Texas. Matt explains: “You can escalate your career if you want to move around. The ones who don’t move around don’t get the calls . . . because ­nobody knows who they are.”

    Although Mr. Kilborn is clearly an advocate for the ideal of rooted, organic ­communities—a value shared by many of the “Relos” in his book—he evinces none of the snobbish dismissal of middle-class values and aspirations that one finds in the work of new urbanists such as James Howard Kunstler or Andres Duany. Yet despite the appealingly sensible outlook of ­“Reloville,” the book does not rise to the level of the great social histories, such as ­Herbert Gans’s “Levittowners” or even Alan Wolfe’s “One ­Nation.” Mr. Kilborn’s work lacks both the statistical rigor and deep historical perspective found in the best such works.

    Mr. Kilborn also falls into something of the old journalist’s trap: trying to sell your story as something bigger than it is. He calls the Relos “a disproportionately influential strain of the vast middle class.” Yet in many ways they may not be as important as he suggests.

    Overall, Mr. Kilborn estimates the total Relo population at around four million in 2007. The number includes something like 800,000 households that are moved every year by companies in the U.S.—not an insignificant group but hardly a major one in a country of more than 300 million people.

    Despite his claims of their significance, Mr. Kilborn ­acknowledges that the Relos are far from “masters of the universe” who actually shape economies and societies. In fact, most are more the servants of top management than people in control of their own destinies. They are, Mr. Kilborn notes, “twenty-first-century heirs of William S. Whyte’s ­‘Organization Man,’ who ­exchanged the promise of job security and a pension for his loyalty and toil.”

    Yet it seems clear that the whole world of “The Organization Man” of the 1950s—predicated on stable employment— is shrinking, and rapidly. The days of large corporate ­organizations with a secure cadre of midlevel executives seems ­itself an anachronism. Companies routinely restructure their bureaucracies and outsource—to smaller independent firms domestically as well as to firms overseas. Relos may represent less the wave of the future than a stubborn ­hangover from the past.

    One critical reason for the reduced need to uproot workers is new telecommunications technology. For generations, IBM was instrumental in shaping the Relo group that Mr. Kilborn describes. After all, this was a company with initials that, executives joked, really meant “I’ve been moved.” Yet today IBMers are not as mobile as in the past—not in terms of physical movement anyway. As much as 40% of the IBM work force operates full-time at home or remotely at clients’ businesses. For members of the company’s highly regarded consulting practice, the percentage is even higher—they’re logging frequent-flyer miles, and piling up points at ­Residence Inns, not putting down even shallow roots.

    Perhaps even more important may be social changes that could make Relos less relevant in the future. For decades in the post-World War II era it was believed that “spatial mobility” would increase, hastening social disintegration. This vision was epitomized in Vance Packard’s 1972 best-seller, “A Nation of Strangers,” with its vision of America as “a society coming apart at the seams.”

    But in fact, far from becoming ever more nomadic, Americans are becoming less so, as the population ages and as ­formerly urban amenities are more widely dispersed and ­accessible. As recently as the 1970s, 20% of Americans moved annually; by 2004 the number had dropped to 14%— the lowest since 1950. By 2008, barely 10% were relocating.

    These days human-resource executives complain that workers are increasingly unwilling to move even for a promotion, citing family and other concerns. With the recent economic downturn, worker ­mobility in the U.S. has waned further. The decline in the relocation tradition seems likely to persist in good times or bad.

    Even the denizens of ­Relovilles who bought houses under the assumption that they’d be selling and moving on after a few years are now deciding to stay put. And formerly transient communities are evolving into something more permanent. Recent interviews that I conducted in the Woodlands, near Houston—one of the Relovilles identified by the author—revealed a growing sense of community, with some three-generation families now settled in the area.

    Over the past 40 years the institutions of community have emerged in the Woodlands. For example, a well-managed and expansive social-service organization called Interfaith has risen to take care of many needs, from welcoming new families to providing services to children and seniors. A well-attended cultural center has grown up in the town, as has something of a Main Street shopping district. The Woodlands is shedding its past as a generic Reloville and becoming its own place.

    Urban critics might see these evolving Relovilles as too faux for their tastes, but they do hint at a more rooted, less mobile suburban world, far more human than that envisioned by many futurists over the past few decades. Mr. ­Kilborn’s “Reloville” may turn out to be less about America’s social future than a fair and well-written chronicle of a ­phenomenon that is slowly, but inexorably, relocating into the history books.

    This article first appeared in The Wall Street Journal.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • The Blue-State Meltdown and the Collapse of the Chicago Model

    On the surface this should be the moment the Blue Man basks in glory. The most urbane president since John Kennedy sits in the White House. A San Francisco liberal runs the House of Representatives while the key committees are controlled by representatives of Boston, Manhattan, Beverly Hills, and the Bay Area—bastions of the gentry.

    Despite his famous no-blue-states-no-red-states-just-the-United-States statement, more than 90 percent of the top 300 administration officials come from states carried last year by President Obama. The inner cabinet—the key officials—hail almost entirely from a handful of cities, starting with Chicago but also including New York, Los Angeles, and the San Francisco area.

    This administration shares all the basic prejudices of the Blue Man including his instinctive distaste for “sprawl,” cars, and factories. In contrast, policy is tilting to favor all the basic blue-state economic food groups—public employees, university researchers, Silicon Valley, Hollywood, Wall Street, and the major urban land interests.  

    Yet despite all this, the blue states appear to be continuing their decades-long meltdown. “Hope” may still sell among media pundits and café society, but the bad economy, increasingly now Obama’s, is causing serious pain to millions of ordinary people who happen to live in the left-leaning part of America.

    For example, while state and local budget crises have extended to some red states, the most severe fiscal and economic basket cases largely are concentrated in places such as New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Oregon, and, perhaps most vividly of all, California. The last three have among the highest unemployment rates in the country; all the aforementioned are deeply in debt and have been forced to impose employee cutbacks and higher taxes almost certain to blunt a strong recovery.

    The East Coast–dominated media, of course, wants to claim that we have reached “the twilight” of Sunbelt growth. This observation seems a bit premature. Instead, traditional red-state strongholds such as the Dakotas, Idaho, Texas, Utah, and North Carolina, dominated the list of fastest-growing regions recently compiled for Forbes by my colleagues at www.newgeography.com.

    When the recovery comes, job growth also is most likely to resurge first in the red states, while the blue states continue to lag behind. For reasons as diverse as regulatory policy, aging infrastructure, and high levels of taxation, blue states continue to be more susceptible to recessions than their red counterparts.

    This assumption is borne out by an analysis of economic cycles by the website JobBait.com, which has found that since 1990 the states most vulnerable to economic downturns include the Great Lakes states of Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, and New York as well as Connecticut and California. Those most resistant have been generally red bastions such as the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Texas, and resource-rich states such as Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, and Wyoming.

    This suggests that even the hardest-hit red states, notably Florida and Arizona, are likely better positioned in the long term for a recovery. A generation of out-migration may be slowing down temporarily due to the recession, but many people moved to places such as Arizona, Florida, Texas, and Georgia over the first seven years of the decade; in contrast, the high-tax blue states, including New York, New Jersey, and California, lost 1,100 people every day between 1998 and 2007. Most of them headed to the red states.

    “When the economy comes back,” notes veteran California-based economist and forecaster Bill Watkins, “there will be a pent-up demand. People will compare and move to the places that are affordable and don’t have the fundamental tough tax and regulatory structures.”

    Devolution in Blue

    These demographic and economic trends will have a long-term political impact. The net in-migration states—almost all of them red—will gain new representatives in Congress after the next census while New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and perhaps even California could see their delegations shrink.

    In fact, amidst the Blue Man’s current political ascendency, the devolutionary process is likely to continue. Its roots are very deep, and will prove more difficult to reverse than media and policy claques suggest. In historic terms, blue states’ relative decline represents one of the greatest shifts of political and economic power since the Civil War.

    In the modern period that starts with the end of the Second World War, the states that are now blue were also, to a large extent, the best. They included the undisputed centers of finance, industry, culture, and education. Blue-state politicians also dominated both parties, either directly or behind the scenes.

    In contrast, the Red Man was disdained. As late as the 1940s, Los Angeles—still then very much in its red period—as well as Houston, Dallas, Charlotte, and Phoenix, were all not listed on the Social Register, the ultimate list of the socialite elite. You might visit Texas or invest in its oil, buy Los Angeles real estate, or winter in Scottsdale, but these were not places of consequence. These cities were not for civilized, serious people.

    Yet demographic forces changed this balance of power forever. In sharp contrast to Europe, often the preferred model for the Blue Man, the United States’ population exploded in the postwar era. This expansion could not be comfortably accommodated in the old cities.

    New demographics and timing shaped America’s urban patterns in largely unforeseen ways. Urban theorist Ali Modarres notes that America’s population over the second half of the 20th century grew by 130 million, essentially doubling, while the populations of France, Germany, and Britain together increased by 40 million, or 25 percent.

    In Europe slower population growth meant that planners could accommodate expansion through gradual expansion of existing cities. In contrast, America’s huge growth could only be accommodated by creating new places and vastly expanding others. This led to the growth of suburbs everywhere, but the bulk of expansion took place in vast emerging metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, and later Phoenix, Dallas, Houston, Atlanta, Miami, and Las Vegas.

    This trend held up through much of the past decade. Nevada’s s population grew at four times the national increase of 8 percent while Arizona expanded three times as much and Florida twice the average. In contrast, growth in the blue states of the Northeast and Midwest generally stood well behind the national average.

    More important still, the new regions experienced a broad entrepreneurial explosion that reshaped the whole economy. In many cases, this growth came directly at the expense of the blue states. When major companies relocated they tended to leave places like New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago for the burgeoning red cities.

    In 1950 Atlanta did not rank among America’s most important economic centers; 50 years later it stood among the most popular cities for large corporations and their subsidiaries. The same could be said for places like Houston, Dallas, and Charlotte. It was the quintessential American story, evidence, as Marxist scholar William Domhoff observed, that America’s “open class system is almost the opposite of a caste system.”

    Blue Man Economics

    Today two principles now drive the political economy of the blue states—and so shape the Obama administration today. The first one is the relentless expansion of public sector employment and political power. Although traditional progressives such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Fiorello La Guardia, and Pat Brown built up government employment, they never contemplated the growth of public employee unions that have emerged so powerfully since the 1960s.

    Public sector employees initially played a positive role, assuring that the basic infrastructure—schools, roads, subways, sewers, water, and other basic sinews of society and the economy—functioned properly. But as much of the private economy moved out of places such as New York, Illinois, and, more recently, California, public sector employment began to grow as an end to itself.

    Some blue-state theorists, columnist Harold Meyerson among them, have identified this new, highly unionized public sector workforce not so much an adjunct to the middle class but its essence. This has become very much the reality in many core blue regions—particularly big cities like New York, Chicago, and Detroit—as the private-sector middle class has drifted to the suburbs or out to the red states.

    Even before the recession these public-sector unions and their lavish benefits had become a major burden for blue states and cities. In California alone state pensions are now $200 billion underfunded. San Francisco has more than 700 retirees or their survivors earning pensions in excess of $100,000 per year. In New York, despite Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s occasional utterances about the city’s expanding pension system being “out of control,” city contributions to the pension system have grown fivefold under his watch. They now consume roughly one in ten dollars in the city budget.

    The only way to pay for these expenditures rests on the second key blue economic principle—the notion of an ever expanding high-end “creative economy.” This conceit is based on the notion that tangible things matter little and that, as former Wired magazine editor Kevin Kelly put it, “communication is the economy.”

    New York pioneered the idea that the economy could depend totally on the efforts of the talented few, mostly those on Wall Street but also those in the media and other “creative” industries. This formula has been widely accepted since New York Mayors John Lindsay and Ed Koch allowed New York City’s public sector to expand, often with borrowed money.

    Sadly this focus has tended to leave little room for a diverse economy that might employ an expanding, upwardly mobile middle class. Instead, companies and employees in these high-value industries tend to dominate almost all the attention of blue-state policy makers.

    Since this class had less need than traditional industries for basic infrastructure, a confluence of interest has emerged between the post-industrial elites and the public employees. Money raised from the monied post-industrial elite would essentially buy social peace by funneling largesse not into improving the roads, subways, or ports but into the pockets of the public employees.

    The Great Delusion and Its Blue-State Victims

    This elite strategy has served to bifurcate most blue states into an affluent core and a rapidly declining periphery. For example, California, a state whose shift from red to blue has given some heft to “progressives” everywhere, has experienced an increasing gap between a small sliver of wealthy metropolitan residents along the coast and an increasingly marginalized interior populated largely by middle- and working-class Hispanics.

    And then there is the imposition of increasingly stringent environmental regulation. This has hit hardest the essential sectors of the non-“creative class” economy such as manufacturing, warehousing, and agriculture. Basic industries depend more than finance or “creative” ones on reasonably priced energy and land, access to raw materials, and a sane regulatory regime. “In California,” notes economist Watkins, “everything has priority over the economy.”

    You can see the effects clearly in California. Climate change regulations work to constrain new construction of homes, particularly suburban single-family homes. Manufacturing industries, even relatively “clean” ones, make easy targets for carbon-hunting regulators. A recent Milken Institute report found that between 2000 and 2007 California lost nearly 400,000 manufacturing jobs, all this while industrial employment was growing in major competitive rivals such as Texas and Arizona.

    Trucking firms, saddled with harsh new deadlines to shift to cleaner vehicles, also are going out of business. Like manufacturers, many of these have historically been sources of upward mobility for largely Latino entrepreneurs and workers.

    Perhaps the most searing disaster is unfolding in the rich Central Valley. Large areas are about to be returned to desert—due less to a mild drought than to regulations designed to save obscure fish species in the state’s delta. Over 450,000 acres have been allowed to go fallow. Nearly 30,000 agriculture jobs—mostly held by Latinos—were lost just in May. Unemployment, 17 percent across the Central Valley, reaches to more than 40 percent in some towns such as Mendota.

    “We are getting the sense some people want us to die,” notes native son Tim Stearns, a professor of entrepreneurship at California State University at Fresno. “It’s kind of like they like the status quo and what happens in the Central Valley doesn’t matter. These are just a bunch of crummy towns to them.”

    A similar process of secular decline can also be seen in the peripheries of other blue states such as upstate New York, which has ranked near the bottom of job growth nationwide over the past 40 years. But nowhere has this occurred more completely than in Michigan.

    Under the leadership of Governor Jennifer Granholm, Michigan has sought to reinvent itself from an industrial powerhouse to a center of the “creative economy.” For much of her first term, Granholm focused on such inanities as promoting a “cool cities” program, following the notion that creating places for the terminally hip would help turn around her state’s economy.

    Yet in the end, Michigan stands at the worst end of almost every calculator, with the highest unemployment and rates of out-migration, and the worst cities for business. Its per capita income, which was 16th in the nation shortly before Granholm ascended as governor, has now dropped to 33rd, the lowest since the federal government has been keeping records.

    Detroit now suffers a 22 percent unemployment rate, the highest of any major city. Nearly one in three residents is on food stamps. But the pain goes well beyond Motor City. Altogether Michigan communities account for a remarkable six of the nation’s ten worst job markets, according to the most recent Forbes–New Geography survey.

    Waiting for Obama

    Many in the true blue states greeted Barack Obama’s election like the coming of a Messiah who would redress these serious problems. After all, it is widely believed in blue states that the red-state barbarians had looted the Treasury for their clients in the energy, industrial, home-building, pharmaceutical, and defense industries. Now the blue states, and their industries, would get payback. A vast expansion of public infrastructure, more emphasis on basic industry, and incentives for new entrepreneurial ventures could now help rapidly declining areas in the blue states.

    Yet hopes that Obama would emphasize such basic infrastructure now have been dashed. Instead, the stimulus has been largely steered to social service providers, “green” industries, and academic research. One reason, as we now know, is that feminists saw such an approach as too favorable to “burly men” who might not have been among the president’s core fan base.

    Sadly, many of those “burly men,” particularly the unemployed, still reside in the blue states. They might not be in the places inhabited by the post-industrial elites but they do live in the hardscrabble neighborhoods, industrial suburbs, and small towns from Michigan and upstate New York to California’s vast interior.

    Another group that may be unexpectedly hurt by the Obama policies will be the middle and upper middle classes in blue states. Already burdened by high rates of taxation locally and higher costs for everything from housing to education, these hardy souls—making more than $125,000 to $250,000 a year—now are about to find themselves heaped in with the “rich.” Higher federal tax rates, as proposed by the administration, could prove disastrous for many blue-state middle-income families.

    The Chicago Model: Obama’s ‘Closed Circle’

    This skewed allocation of resources reflects the administration’s roots in contemporary Chicago. It derives from a pattern of rewarding core constituencies as opposed to lifting up the whole economy.

    The financial bailout reflects one part of this. Money lavished on bankers and lawyers, most of them in New York and Chicago, represents relief to what is now a core Obama constituency. Indeed the whole Troubled Asset Relief Program mechanism is being run by what Simon Johnson, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, has described as a “wonderfully closed circle.”

    This approach, notes University of Illinois political scientist Dick Simpson, comes naturally for an administration dominated by veterans of the Chicago machine. Politicians in the Windy City do not worry much about opposition—49 out of 50 aldermen are Democrats—and follow policies adopted by the small central cadre.

    Once the message is set upon, notes Simpson, Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley operatives such as David Axelrod set about spinning things. This system is ideal for cultivating both media skill and political discipline during election season—something so evident in Obama’s brilliant campaigns against first Hillary Clinton and then John McCain, Simpson observes.

    But machine politics do not necessarily work out so well for the rest of the population. “The principle problem is that the machine is not subject to democracy,” notes Simpson, who remains hopeful for the Obama presidency. “There’s massive patronage, a high level of corruption . . . There’s a significant downside to authoritarian rule. The city could do much better.”

    To be sure, there has been considerable gentrification in Chicago, as in many cities. Chicago’s “revival” also has been a classic case of blue-state economics, driven largely by a now fading real estate boom, the financial industry, a growing college and university population, and tourism. But overall, from the point of view of most middle and working class residents, Chicago’s political system has proved inefficient and costly. This can be seen in demographic trends that show Chicago as the only one of few large U.S. cities to lose population. At the same time, the middle class, particularly those with children, continue to flee to the suburbs. Roughly half of all white families (as of 2005) leave when their children reach school age.

    Is There Hope for Blue America?

    Ultimately, waiting for Obama will not revive the blue states. Instead the best prospect lies in blue states healing themselves. Fortunately, there are some tentative signs of unrest. The same regime failure that stuck to Republicans in the wake of the Bush presidency soon may be felt by Democrats burdened with the failed legacy of Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine, or New York Governor David Paterson. Even Illinois, the president’s home state, could go Republican, suggests political scientist Simpson, if the Republicans put up a viable, middle-of-the-road candidate.

    Powerful signs of mounting resistance have emerged in the most important state of all, California. The massive rejection of the budget agreement last spring was a blow to not only its architects, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the Democrats in the legislature, but the general conventional wisdom that holds increased taxes as the key to addressing the state’s budget problem.

    Even in deep blue Los Angeles, the public sector machine built around onetime union organizer and current Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa has lost some recent battles, including an attempt to create a public sector union monopoly over the city’s solar industry. There is now greater appreciation of soaring public sector pension obligations as groups like the California Foundation for Fiscal Responsibility expose lists of public employees enjoying mega-pensions.

    Similar efforts have started in other states, and with private-sector pensions being cut around the country, anger over the emerging privileged class of public workers may well gain traction. Ultimately, more people in blue states will begin to realize that their states need to learn again how to compete against both their red counterparts and the rest of the world.

    There is no intrinsic reason blue states should continue to decline. They have created much of the industrial enterprise, technological innovation, and cultural vitality that made the United States the world’s preeminent country. The prospects for these places can certainly be brighter than they are today.

    This article originally appeared at the American.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

    *State map courtesy of Mark Newman: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/election/2008/

  • The Next Culture War

    The culture war over religion and values that dominated much of the last quarter of the 20th century has ended, mostly in a rout of the right-wing zealots who waged it.

    Yet even as this old conflict has receded , a new culture war may be beginning. This one is being launched largely by the religious right’s long-time secularist enemies who are now enjoying unprecedented influence over our national politics.

    For all the manifest differences between these two groups, these culture warriors have much in common. Each represents an effort by a highly motivated minority to impose a particular vision of life on a population that does not share either their level of conviction or specific policy preferences.

    The Christian right saw its mission as using government policy to restore family and faith to a country they saw losing adherence to both. Not content with hometown pieties, they wanted to use government power to regulate areas ranging from abortion and gay marriage to stem cell research, in ways reflecting their values and agenda.

    For a while, their agenda also appealed to white ethnics in urban areas, largely Catholics, who recoiled against the crime and disorder in city streets. When they moved en masse to the suburbs, the religious right’s social base narrowed further.

    One critical weakness of the movement stemmed from the fact that many prominent figures like Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell and Jesse Helms rose from the segregationist South. This limited their appeal outside the white Confederate ethnic enclaves in small towns and some Southern suburbs. They were notably less successful in the fastest-growing, more ethnically and socially diverse communities, where the future of evangelical Christianity now is being shaped.

    Many of the goals espoused by Christian political activists are clearly commendable – promoting charity and respect for human life. In some areas, such as abortion, they have made real inroads on influencing broader society’s attitudes. But overall, their political attempts to impose a narrow religious agenda has fallen into disrepute even among Republicans.

    Today, the locus of the culture war has shifted to the secularist left, whose primary geographic base lies in our densest, most elite cities. This group has evolved into its own version of what the Calvinists would call “the elect” – those chosen to thrive amid a sinful nation. They might also be called “the cognitive elite,” since their self-image comes not from religious worship but from a sense of higher intelligence, greater rationality and even superior healthfulness.

    Perhaps the most honest description of this largely urban grouping was made in the Seattle alternative paper The Stranger shortly after George Bush’s 2004 re-election. Shocked by John Kerry’s defeat, The Stranger defined their preferred constituency as “islands of sanity, liberalism and compassion.” The red regions, they concluded, were the abode of “people [who] are fatter and slower and dumber.”

    At the time, The Stranger’s solution was to secede in spirit from the red states and build a new America hewing to what they considered humane and scientific values. Yet four years later, the self-proclaimed “islands of sanity” now dominate the government in a manner unprecedented in recent American history.

    The rapid ascendancy of the new culture warriors has everything to do with class and caste. The religious right’s base lay predominately in the small towns and lower middle class. They may have had more votes than the sophisticated city-dwellers, but in the end they had little influence among Bush-era policy-makers, whose greater allegiance was to Wall Street, energy and other corporate interests.

    In sharp contrast, the cognitive elites rise straight from the critical bastions of Obama-era power. They draw strength from the mainstream media, the vast “progressive” non-profit community, the universities, and the professional policy elites. University and think-tank denizens, according to a recent National Journal survey, constitute 37 percent of the top 366 appointees by the Obama administration, far more than under the Bush regime.

    One group, not surprisingly far less well-represented, are white Christians, whose number, according to the National Journal, has dropped from 71 percent under Bush to 46 percent. It’s not that the Obamites lack faith, just that they lean less to conservative Christianity and more toward the gospel according to Al Gore.

    Like their Christian right counterparts, the cognitive elite’s agenda does address some important issues. You do not have to embrace the theology of global warming (aka climate change) to favor incentives for reducing energy use and cleaning up pollution. Advocating healthier outcomes through more walking, bike riding and better school lunches also make sense as public goals. And a planning approach that allows for more housing options in suburbs and better access to transit also could be useful.

    The problem here, as with the Christian right, lies with overzealousness and intolerance. Whether environmentalism qualifies as a religion or ideology for legal purposes, it is clearly being embraced in a quasi-theological way. As Bjorn Lomborg and others have pointed out, any objection to the Gorite carbon emissions agenda invites scorn and denunciation for, as Paul Krugman recently suggested, “treason against the planet.” Even mild skeptics can expect to be treated like a strident atheist at a mega-church – although probably with likely far less compassion or politeness.

    Critically, the climate-change zealots likely will be in our faces and wallets far more than the religious fulminators. Although the public is widely skeptical of the whole climate change agenda, they will have to confront a huge new bureaucratic apparatus that could impact millions of businesses and local planning decisions down to the household level.

    This desire to micromanage in the public interest also extends well beyond climate change. There is clear desire now to influence everything from how we live to what we eat. You can see the beginnings in everything from ever-higher cigarette taxes to bans on trans-fats at your local hot dog stand.

    San Francisco, always ground zero for such intrusive lunacy, now has determined to find ways to shove healthy foods on the plates of city residents, preferably from urban gardens. The city is even taking steps to prevent city workers from ordering donuts for meetings. Now bureaucrats must follow guidelines from the Health Department.

    City workers even have to cut bagels into quarters or halves, presumably so that workers may all look as svelte as Mayor Gavin Newsom. “We have an eating and drinking problem in America,” declared Newsom, a candidate for governor with an admitted former alcohol problem of his own.

    But perhaps the most intrusive changes may come in terms of planning and development. The Obama administration has already declared its desire to “coerce” people out of their cars and discourage sprawl in order to promote its health and carbon-cutting agendas.

    This could evolve into a concerted attempt to force more Americans into the high-density housing as opposed to the single family suburban homes they prefer for reasons ranging from cost to privacy and safety. It may be questionable how much these steps will improve health or the environment, but this may not matter much given the current theological consensus.

    What we now see is policy enacted in the name of scientific dogma, even though science’s essence lies in open inquiry and debate. In the process, agendas are often conflated; reports even mildly contrary to the received wisdom of climate change are ridiculed or ignored. For some urbanists, climate change also provides a convenient excuse to reverse the dispersion to suburbs that they have railed against for decades.

    What we need now is not self-interested dogma, but open, wide-ranging debate designed to find the most effective ways to achieve energy efficiency in both cities and suburbs. Amid the worst economic downturn in a half-century, we also might want to weigh the impact of some “green” policies on the employment, income and wealth prospects for middle- and working-class Americans.

    The anointed secular clerisy seems destined to become very unpopular. Americans do not like to be preached to by their political leaders about how to manage the details of their lives, particularly when the preachers often fail to follow their own precepts; this was a core problem with those who aligned with the religious right. Environmental and health activists would do better to focus more on suasion as opposed to coercion and to offer incentives rather than dictates to achieve their goals.

    They should also learn that problems are addressed most effectively at the local, community and familial levels. The wide access to information through the Internet undermines the very logic for relentlessly centralized solutions; the best “green” policies may be those that evolve organically and fit specific local conditions.

    Basically, cultural warfare makes for stupid politics, as the Republicans should have – but likely have not – learned by now. The new culture war now developing could pose similar dangers for the Democrats, if they are not careful.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Tracking Business Services: Best And Worst Cities For High-Paying Jobs

    Media coverage of America’s best jobs usually focuses on blue-collar sectors, like manufacturing, or elite ones, such as finance or technology. But if you’re seeking high-wage employment, your best bet lies in the massive “business and professional services” sector.

    This unsung division of the economy is basically a mirror of any and all productive industry. It includes everything from human resources and administration to technical and scientific positions, as well as accounting, legal and architectural firms.

    Overall there are roughly 17 million professional and business services jobs, 4 million more than manufacturing. This makes it twice as big as the finance sector and five times the size of the much-ballyhooed tech sector. While its average salary – roughly $55,000 a year – is somewhat lower than in those other elite sectors, its wages are still higher than those in all the other large sectors, like health. The sector’s $1 trillion in total pay per year accounts for nearly 20% of all wages paid in the nation; finance and tech together only account for $812 billion.

    More than that, the business and professional services sector has encompassed the fastest-growing part of the high-wage economy. Employment in lower-wage sectors like education has also grown quickly. But employment in other sectors that pay their employees well, such as technology, has remained stagnant; jobs in some, such as manufacturing, have fallen sharply. Critically, the business services sector – particularly at the better-paying end – seems to have weathered the current recession better than these other high-wage sectors.

    The crucial question remains: In what regions is this critical economic cog booming? In a new analysis with my colleagues at the Praxis Strategy Group, we examined Bureau of Labor Statistics employment data for this sector, keeping an eye on trends over both the last year and the last decade. Some of the metropolitan areas that boasted short-term growth in this sector also maintained steady employment success over the long-term, which suggests that these particular cities have sturdy economies that aren’t as prone to intense boom-bust cycles.

    At the top of our list of best places is greater Washington, D.C., and its surrounding suburbs in Virginia and Maryland. Government jobs may drive that economy, but it is the lawyers, consultants and technical services firms who harvest the richest benefits. As New York University public policy professor Mitchell Moss observes, Washington has emerged as the “real winner” in the recession – not just for public-sector workers but private-sector ones too.

    Fastest Growing Professional and Business Services Sectors
    Area Name Jobs in Sector 2009
    (thousands)    		 Sector Share of Jobs 2009
    (percent of total)    		 Growth 2008 – 2009
    (percent growth)    		 Cumulative Growth 2001 – 2009
    (percent growth)    		 2001-2009 Job Change (thousands) 2008-2009 Job Change (thousands)
    Northern Virginia, VA 355.2 27.2% 1.5% 22.4% 65.0 5.2
    Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 558.7 23.0% 0.9% 22.8% 103.6 5.1
    Austin-Round Rock, TX 112.4 14.4% 3.3% 18.7% 17.7 3.6
    Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 382.3 14.7% 0.9% 19.2% 61.5 3.2
    Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 106.6 14.0% 2.8% 8.0% 7.9 2.9
    Bethesda-Frederick-Rockville, MD 125.7 21.9% 2.1% 9.0% 10.4 2.6
    Wichita, KS 31.5 10.1% 3.5% 16.4% 4.4 1.1
    Chattanooga, TN-GA 25.9 10.6% 4.3% 11.8% 2.7 1.1
    Peoria, IL 23.0 12.1% 4.5% 43.2% 6.9 1.0
    Rochester, NY 61.8 11.9% 1.5% 1.9% 1.1 0.9
    Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 31.0 14.5% 3.0% 7.5% 2.2 0.9
    Mansfield, OH 5.1 9.1% 19.4% 4.1% 0.2 0.8
    Kennewick-Pasco-Richland, WA 20.8 22.2% 4.2% 20.2% 3.5 0.8
    St. Louis, MO-IL 195.4 14.6% 0.4% 3.9% 7.4 0.8
    Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO 33.5 16.2% 2.2% 34.2% 8.5 0.7
    Macon, GA 12.1 11.9% 5.5% 31.2% 2.9 0.6
    Pittsburgh, PA 158.9 13.9% 0.4% 14.5% 20.1 0.6
    Fresno, CA 30.7 10.3% 1.9% 23.3% 5.8 0.6
    Provo-Orem, UT 23.3 12.4% 2.5% 16.7% 3.3 0.6
    Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC 42.2 14.3% 1.3% 31.1% 10.0 0.5

    Over the past year, parts of northern Virginia – ground zero for the so-called “beltway bandits” who work in industries the government depends on to do its job – have enjoyed the fastest growth in business and professional services, adding over 5,200 jobs despite the current downturn.

    Other areas around the nation’s capital have also seen strong growth. The Washington D.C.-Arlington-Alexandria area, for example, came in second on our list, gaining nearly 5,100 positions, while No. 6 the Bethesda-Frederick-Rockville, Md., metro area added 2,600. In addition, yet another Virginia area – No. 5-ranked Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, a center for military-related industries – gained nearly 2,900 jobs in this sector.

    It’s far too early to thank the free-spending ways of Barack Obama’s administration for all this growth. As anyone can tell you, the Bush White House and its Republican Congress were not exactly models of fiscal restraint. Plus, Washington and Northern Virginia have seen growth in their business services sectors over the last several years, in the period stretching from 2001 to 2009. Together those two metros added over 165,000 new jobs in this critical, high-wage sector.

    Of course, you don’t have to head to Washington to find a high-paying job – although you might not be able to escape unpleasant summer weather. The other major group of business-services hot spots includes Austin, Texas, at No. 3, and Houston, at No. 4. These Lone Star local economies have continued to thrive not only during the current recession but also over the last decade.

    The others winners include farther-afield locales in Kansas, Tennessee, Illinois and New York. These areas could be gaining both from companies seeking to lower costs and from the new capabilities for remote work due to the Internet. Even though they didn’t make our list, a host of smaller communities – like Mansfield, Ohio; Provo, Utah; and Charleston, S.C. – also enjoyed significant growth in the business services sector over the past year.

    So if these are the places where this segment of the economy is growing and high-paying jobs are easier to come by, where is the opposite true? The worst cities on our list span three archetypes: Rust Belt basket cases, Sunbelt flame-outs and expensive big cities. Perhaps the toughest losses were in Michigan: Detroit and the Warren-Troy metro area suffered big setbacks both in the last year and over the last decade.

    Fastest Declining Professional and Business Services Sectors
    Area Name Jobs in Sector 2009
    (thousands)    		 Sector Share of Jobs 2009
    (percent of total)    		 Growth 2008 – 2009
    (percent growth)    		 Cumulative Growth 2001 – 2009
    (percent growth)    		 2001-2009 Job Change (thousands) 2008-2009 Job Change (thousands)
    Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 289.2 16.0% -10.8% 7.9% 21.2 -35.1
    Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI 202.5 18.5% -12.0% -21.2% -54.4 -27.7
    Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL 633.6 16.8% -4.1% -2.9% -19.0 -27.0
    Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 574.7 14.3% -4.2% -3.4% -20.4 -25.2
    Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 390.3 16.4% -5.9% -1.3% -5.1 -24.4
    Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 170.9 16.2% -8.5% 7.7% 12.3 -16.0
    Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 261.9 18.0% -4.7% 4.0% 10.2 -12.8
    Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 253.4 14.4% -4.6% -4.6% -12.2 -12.3
    Edison-New Brunswick, NJ 164.5 16.3% -6.7% -2.6% -4.4 -11.9
    Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI 108.9 14.7% -9.5% -20.9% -28.8 -11.4
    Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 120.3 13.4% -8.3% 13.6% 14.4 -10.8
    Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 133.7 11.2% -6.5% 36.0% 35.4 -9.2
    Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 223.2 18.5% -3.7% 12.3% 24.5 -8.6
    New York City, NY 595.7 15.8% -1.4% -0.8% -5.1 -8.4
    Newark-Union, NJ-PA 163.5 16.0% -4.7% -0.5% -0.8 -8.0
    Bergen-Hudson-Passaic, NJ 130.6 14.6% -5.8% -9.1% -13.0 -8.0
    Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 107.6 12.9% -6.6% -1.7% -1.8 -7.6
    Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL 139.1 13.4% -4.7% 2.2% 3.0 -6.8
    Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 158.0 15.6% -4.0% -7.1% -12.2 -6.7
    Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 108.2 12.1% -5.8% 38.1% 29.9 -6.6
    Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA 308.8 18.2% -2.0% -6.8% -22.5 -6.4
    Sacramento–Arden-Arcade–Roseville, CA 106.1 12.3% -5.6% -1.8% -1.9 -6.3
    Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 137.8 13.3% -4.3% -5.2% -7.6 -6.1
    Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 207.0 16.9% -2.9% 4.0% 8.0 -6.1

    Consistent job losses in business services in these areas – some 54,000 in the Troy area since 2001 – reveal the clear connection between employment in business services and in the region’s fundamental auto industry. It turns out that elite services often prove dependent on basic industry. When industrial plants shut down, it’s not just blue-collar workers and company executives that suffer; as a result, these firms will use fewer lawyers, accountants, architects and technical consultants.

    A similar picture emerges in cities like Phoenix, which lost about 35,000 business-services jobs in just one year. This loss stems from the collapse of the housing bubble, which powered the rest of the regional economy. The same meltdown caused smaller but still significant reversals in one-time boomtowns like Orlando, Fla., Atlanta and Southern California’s Santa Ana region, which encompasses Orange County, where business service employment dropped by double-digit rates over the past year.

    Yet these same areas should see some recovery, perhaps more so than the traditional auto manufacturing-focused towns. Phoenix, Orlando and other Sun Belt locations – including a host of other areas in Florida – all saw increasing employment in business services over the past decade. If the economy comes back, along with a stabilization of the residential real estate market, business-services job growth will likely begin to take off again. After all, the fundamental reasons for the success of these areas, such as warm weather, lower costs and the need to serve a growing population, have not fundamentally changed.

    Perhaps most perplexing is the fate of some of the other places on our worst cities list, particularly the biggest metropolitan areas. The professional and business services sector is widely considered ideal for large, cosmopolitan centers, since lots of industries require support. But Chicago experienced a huge chunk of job losses – almost 25% – in this sector during the last year. Other big cities, including Los Angeles, Minneapolis and New York, also suffered.

    This is not a new phenomenon. These and other big cities, like Boston and San Jose, San Francisco and Oakland in California, have been shedding these types of jobs since 2001. These losses, however, have been concentrated at the lower-wage end of the business service pyramid, in areas like human resources and administration. These are the positions that companies can fill more easily and cheaply using the Internet or by hiring in less expensive outposts.

    That’s why Washington and its environs, which has seen across-the-board business growth, remain the great exception. Many business-services jobs outside the beltway appear to be becoming more nomadic, based in places where firms face lower costs and where workers can afford to live well on middle-income salaries. Even the long-term resiliency of higher-wage employment like law and accounting in traditional business hubs like New York could be at risk over time, with some jobs shifting to less expensive locales or even overseas.

    The changing nature of business services presents a boon to some communities and a challenge to others as they seek to survive and thrive in spite of the current recession. How some cities manage to grow this segment of their economies may well presage which parts of the country will thrive best during the years of recovery – and beyond.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.