Author: Joel Kotkin

  • Who Killed California’s Economy?

    Right now California’s economy is moribund, and the prospects for a quick turnaround are not good. Unable to pay its bills, the state is issuing IOUs; its once strong credit rating has collapsed. The state that once boasted the seventh-largest gross domestic product in the world is looking less like a celebrated global innovator and more like a fiscal basket case along the lines of Argentina or Latvia.

    It took some amazing incompetence to toss this best-endowed of places down into the dustbin of history. Yet conventional wisdom views the crisis largely as a legacy of Proposition 13, which in effect capped only taxes.

    This lets too many malefactors off the hook. I covered the Proposition 13 campaign for the Washington Post and examined its aftermath up close. It passed because California was running huge surpluses at the time, even as soaring property taxes were driving people from their homes.

    Admittedly it was a crude instrument, but by limiting those property taxes Proposition 13 managed to save people’s houses. To the surprise of many prognosticators, the state government did not go out of business. It has continued to expand faster than either its income or population. Between 2003 and 2007, spending grew 31%, compared with a 5% population increase. Today the overall tax burden as percent of state income, according to the Tax Foundation, has risen to the sixth-highest in the nation.

    The media and political pundits refuse to see this gap between the state’s budget and its ability to pay as an essential issue. It is. (This is not to say structural reform is not needed. I would support, for example, reforming some of the unintended ill-effects of Proposition 13 that weakened local government and left control of the budget to Sacramento.)

    But the fundamental problem remains. California’s economy–once wondrously diverse with aerospace, high-tech, agriculture and international trade–has run aground. Burdened by taxes and ever-growing regulation, the state is routinely rated by executives as having among the worst business climates in the nation. No surprise, then, that California’s jobs engine has sputtered, and it may be heading toward 15% unemployment.

    So if we are to assign blame, let’s not start with the poor, old anti-tax activist Howard Jarvis (who helped pass Proposition 13 and passed away over 20 years ago), but with the bigger culprits behind California’s fall. Here are five contenders:

    1. Arnold Schwarzenegger

    The Terminator came to power with the support of much of the middle class and business community. But since taking office, he’s resembled not the single-minded character for which he’s famous but rather someone with multiple personalities.

    First, he played the governator, a tough guy ready to blow up the dysfunctional structure of government. He picked a street fight against all the powerful liberal interest groups. But the meathead lacked his hero Ronald Reagan’s communication skills and political focus. Defeated in a series of initiative battles, he was left bleeding the streets by those who he had once labeled “girlie men.”

    Next Arnold quickly discovered his feminine side, becoming a kinder, ultra-green terminator. He waxed poetic about California’s special mission as the earth’s guardian. While the housing bubble was filling the state coffers, he believed the delusions of his chief financial adviser, San Francisco investment banker David Crane, that California represented “ground zero for creative destruction.”

    Yet over the past few years there’s been more destruction than creation. Employment in high-tech fields has stagnated (See related story, “Best Cities For Technology Jobs“) while there have been huge setbacks in the construction, manufacturing, warehousing and agricultural sectors.

    Driven away by strict regulations, businesses take their jobs outside California even in relatively good times. Indeed, according to a recent Milken Institute report, between 2000 and 2007 California lost nearly 400,000 manufacturing jobs. All that time, industrial employment was growing in major competitive rivals like Texas and Arizona.

    With the state reeling, Arnold has decided, once again, to try out a new part. Now he’s posturing as the strong man who stands up to dominant liberal interests. But few on the left, few on the right or few in the middle take him seriously anymore. He may still earn acclaim from Manhattan media offices or Barack Obama’s EPA, but in his home state he looks more an over-sized lame duck, quacking meaninglessly for the cameras.

    2. The Public Sector

    Who needs an economy when you have fat pensions and almost unlimited political power? That’s the mentality of California’s 356,000 workers and their unions, who make up the best-organized, best-funded and most powerful interest group in the state.

    State government continued to expand in size even when anyone with a room-temperature IQ knew California was headed for a massive financial meltdown. Scattered layoffs and the short-term salary givebacks now being considered won’t cure the core problem: an overgenerous retirement system. The unfunded liabilities for these employees’ generous pensions are now estimated at over $200 billion.

    The people who preside over these pensions represent the apex of this labor aristocracy. This year two of the biggest public pension funds, CalPERS and CalSTERS, handed out six-figure bonuses to its top executives even though they had lost workers billions of dollars.

    Almost no one dares suggest trimming the pension funds, particularly Democrats who are often pawns of the public unions. Some reforms on the table, like gutting the two-thirds majority required to pass the budget, would effectively hand these unions keys to the treasury.

    3. The Environment

    Obama holds up California’s environmental policy as a model for the nation. May God protect the rest of the country. California’s environmental activists once did an enviable job protecting our coasts and mountains, expanding public lands and working to improve water and air resources. But now, like sailors who have taken possession of a distillery, they have gotten drunk on power and now rampage through every part of the economy.

    In California today, everyone who makes a buck in the private sector–from developers and manufacturers to energy producers and farmers–cringes in fear of draconian regulations in the name of protecting the environment. The activists don’t much care, since they get their money from trust-funders and their nonprofits. The losers are California’s middle and working classes, the people who drive trucks, who work in factories and warehouses or who have white-collar jobs tied to these industries.

    Historically, many of these environmentally unfriendly jobs have been sources of upward mobility for Latino immigrants. Latinos also make up the vast majority of workers in the rich Central Valley. Large swaths of this area are being de-developed back to desert–due less to a mild drought than to regulations designed to save obscure fish species in the state’s delta. Over 450,000 acres have already been allowed to go fallow. Nearly 30,000 agriculture jobs–held mostly by Latinos–were lost in the month of May alone. Unemployment, which is at a 17% rate across the Valley, reaches upward of 40% in some towns such as Mendota.

    4. The Business Community

    This insanity has been enabled by a lack of strong opposition to it. One potential source–California’s business leadership–has become progressively more feeble over the past generation. Some members of the business elite, like those who work in Hollywood and Silicon Valley, tend to be too self-referential and complacent to care about the bigger issues. Others have either given up or are afraid to oppose the dominant forces of the environmental activists and the public sector.

    Theoretically, according to business consultant Larry Kosmont, business should be able to make a strong case, particularly with the growing Latino caucus in the legislature. “You have all these job losses in Latino districts represented by Latino legislators who don’t realize what they are doing to their own people,” he says. “They have forgotten there’s an economy to think about.”

    But so far California’s business executives have failed to adopt a strategy to make this case to the public. Nor can they count on the largely clueless Republicans for support, since GOP members are often too narrowly identified as anti-tax and anti-immigration zealots to make much of a case with the mainstream voter. “The business community is so afraid they are keeping their heads down,” observes Ross DeVol, director of regional economics at the Milken Institute. “I feel they if they keep this up much longer, they won’t have heads.”

    5. Californians

    At some point Californians–the ones paying the bills and getting little in return–need to rouse themselves. The problem could be demographic. Over the past few years much of our middle class has fled the state, including a growing number to “dust bowl” states like Oklahoma, Texas and Arkansas from which so many Californians trace their roots.

    The last hope lies with those of us still enamored with California. We have allowed ourselves to be ruled by a motley alliance of self-righteous zealots, fools and cowards; now we must do something. Some think the solution is reining in citizens’ power by using the jury pool to staff a state convention, as proposed by the Bay Area Council, or finding ways to undermine the initiative system, which would remove critical checks on legislative power.

    We should, however, be very cautious about handing more power to the state’s leaders. With our acquiescence, they have led this most blessed state toward utter ruin. Structural reforms alone, however necessary, won’t turn around the economy’s fundamental problems and help California reclaim its role as a productive driver of the American dream.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Did Homeowners Cause The Great Recession?

    The person who caused the current world recession can be found not on Wall Street or the city of London, but instead could be you, and your next-door neighbor–the people who put so much of their savings and credit to buy a house.

    Increasingly, conventional wisdom places the fundamental blame for the worldwide downturn on people’s desire–particularly in places like the U.K., the U.S. and Spain–to own their own home. Acceptance of the long-term serfdom of renting, the logic increasingly goes, could help restore order and the rightful balance of nature.

    Once considered sacrosanct by conservatives and social democrats alike, homeownership is increasingly seen as a form of economic derangement. The critics of the small owner include economists like Paul Krugman and Ed Glaeser, who identify the over-hot pursuit of homes as one critical cause for the recession. Others suggest it would be perhaps nobler to put money into something more consequential, like stocks.

    Homeowners also get spanked by leading new urbanists, like Brookings scholar and urban real estate developer Chris Leinberger. He lays blame for the downturn not on unscrupulous financiers but squarely on aspiring suburban home buyers. “Sprawl,” he intones, “is the root cause of the financial crisis.”

    If only we built more high-density, transit-oriented housing–which, incidentally, is not exactly thriving–the crisis could be happily resolved, he believes. This approach is echoed by big-city theoreticians like Richard Florida, who believes that both homeownership and the single-family house “has outlived its usefulness.” In his “creative age,” we won’t have much room for either single-family homes or owners. Instead, we will be leasing our ever-more-tiny cribs–just like yuppies with their BMWs–as we wander from job to job.

    To be sure, many people who bought homes in the last few years should not have qualified. Weak lending standards, promoted by both unscrupulous industry figures like Countrywide’s Angelo Mozillo as well as Congress–including the many “friends” receiving cut-rate loans from the disgraced mortgage firm–clearly made things worse.

    Yet the recent real estate debacles should not obscure the tremendous positives associated with homeownership. Widespread and diffuse ownership of property has been a critical element in successful republics, from early Rome and the Dutch Republic to the foundation of the United States. Jefferson held that “small land holders are the most precious part of a state.” In the ensuing generation, progressives embraced widespread ownership of property as central to democratic aims. Lincoln’s Homestead Act stands out as a prime example.

    Even by the 1940s, this model was only partially realized. Barely 40% of the population owned their homes. Homeownership remained confined largely to small-town denizens and the urban upper classes. No one in my mother’s family–growing up in the tenements of Brownsville, Brooklyn–even considered homeownership an achievable goal. It was hard enough simply to pay the rent and put food on the table.

    Yet by the 1960s, rising prosperity and government-subsidized loans helped most of my numerous aunts and uncles own their residence.

    Presidents from Roosevelt to Clinton all identified homeownership as a critical social goal. Government loan programs exploded as housing starts doubled in the post-war era. By 2005, the homeownership rate was approaching 70%.

    This trend also took place in other advanced countries, from the U.K. and Australia to Canada and Spain. It reflected what the Italian urbanist Edgardo Contini once referred to as “the universal aspiration.” In some cases, such as Japan, societies that had been divided between landlords and peasants for millennia now boasted a huge, and growing, cadre of small owners.

    In virtually every country, this was largely a suburban phenomenon. People bought houses where land was cheaper, stores and schools newer. Here, too, people could transcend the often confining social limits of the old neighborhood. It was also, as the novelist Ralph G. Martin, noted “a paradise for children.”

    Through all this, the chattering class never lost its contempt for homeowners and their suburban refuges. Old gentry long disliked the idea of dispersed ownership of property–even if many got rich selling their own estates to developers. Aesthetes disliked the seemingly banal housing tracts “rising hideously,” as Robert Caro put it, from the urban periphery. This critique was applied not only to Queens and Long Island but also to places like Milton Keynes or Basildon outside London, and greater Tokyo’s Chiba prefecture.

    Along with the fashion police, the new owners also took criticism from their urban betters, many of them also owners of country homes, for deserting the city. Some on the left feared the homeowners as a bastion of conservative politics. Architects, planners and developers identified them as opponents of their grand plans to refashion suburbia into a denser, more rental-oriented environment.

    Yet, despite the disdain, the dream of homeownership survived. Many boomers, who in their 1960s radical phase denounced suburban tracts as sterile and racist, meekly ended up buying homes there. So, increasingly, did middle-class minorities, whose rates of homeownership rose faster after 1994 than that of whites.

    To be sure, the financial crisis has led to a sharp drop in levels of homeownership, as occurred in the last big recession of the early 1990s. In the future, some suggest that aging boomers will force the home market to collapse even more due both to the current mortgage meltdown and changing demographics.

    Yet there are limits to how far homeownership will drop. Urban boosters, apartment-builders and greens–all advocates of expanding the renter class–tend to ignore several key facts. For one thing, the vast majority of boomers are holding onto their mostly suburban homes far longer than ever suspected. Many will remain there until forced into assisted living, nursing homes or the cemetery.

    Then we have the X generation, who, if anything, has favored large homes and exurbs in large numbers. In addition, behind them lie the large cohorts of millenials, who according to surveys conducted by generational chroniclers Morley Winograd and Mike Hais, prioritize the ownership idea even more than their boomer parents do.

    No doubt, the weak economy will slow this generation’s push into the home market. However, by the next decade, as this generation enters the late 20s and early 30s, they will find their economic footing and be ready to enter the market for houses in a big way.

    The real question then will become which companies and regions will meet the expanding demand. Over the past decade, we saw the demand for housing push middle-class families toward destinations as varied as Las Vegas and Phoenix, Austin, Houston, Dallas and Atlanta. Others have started heading to more affordable markets in the nation’s heartland, to the metropolitan areas like Kansas City, Des Moines and Sioux Falls.

    Rather than a source of economic weakness, this renewed quest for homeownership could underpin a sustainable recovery. As prices fall to reasonable levels, more people will qualify for reasonable loans. First, the empty houses and somewhat later, the condominiums now on the market will find buyers, in most places in a matter of a few years.

    This shift will create huge opportunities for a diverse set of geographies. For urban areas like New York or Los Angeles, there will be a unique–perhaps once in a generation–chance to induce middle-class people to settle down in big-city homes or condominiums. If they become homeowners, they will be more likely to stay than move elsewhere to the suburbs or other regions when the time comes to buy a home.

    Other, more affordable, less regulated and often more economically dynamic places like Texas and the Great Plains may realize even greater gains. Over time, we will likely see a recovery in some now-suffering parts of the Sunbelt. The renewal of home demand could also help revitalize many of our hardest-hit sectors, including construction and manufacturing.

    Sadly, some policymakers in Washington seem less than enthusiastic about this prospect. Many close to President Obama seem to dislike single-family homes and suburbs. Some embrace the policy which the British called “cramming,” essentially forcing people into ever smaller, denser units. Energy Secretary Steven Chu recently praised the notion of small apartments with numerous people. “You know, body heat keeps a lot of the apartment warm,” he suggested. You can’t do this in a big apartment with a few people.”

    My suspicion is that most Americans are not quite ready to become their own heaters, any more than modern farm families like having farm animals live with them–although they, too, generate warmth. Instead, we should explore less unpleasant ways to cut energy use though such things as incentives for decentralizing work, promoting home-based labor, more tree planning and effective insulation.

    An administration that places itself at odds with the “universal aspiration” that has driven growth in the advanced world for over a half-century could delay a full recovery unnecessarily. Advocacy of what amounts to declining living standards and a return to feudalism might also prove a less than successful political strategy.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Amid Obama’s Change is More of the Same

    The Obama administration has been, so far, hierarchical and even conservative in its thinking. Following and even surpassing the Bush administration’s reliance on an M.B.A.-trained elite, which drove the country nearly to ruin, the Obama approach seems to boil down to finding the smartest guy in the room, rather than utilizing people with hands-on experience or acquired wisdom.

    This fixation on hierarchy has been unexpected for an administration whose stock sold on the notion of being something other than the same old, same old. Yet as it turns out, the Obamanians seem to be as narrow, if not narrower, than their much-disdained predecessors.

    Early on, President Barack Obama’s magical mystery tour gained power in places you would not expect it to — winning critical victories in overwhelmingly white, socially conservative Great Plains and Midwestern states. Yet today, he has built one of the narrowest administrations, both ideologically and regionally, in recent memory.

    This trend became apparent in a new National Journal study of the administration’s top 366 officials. To be sure, the Obama team has more Hispanics, African-Americans and women than its predecessors. But beyond gender and color, the Journal reports, this is an administration of remarkable sameness.

    For one thing, people with practical business experience — outside of finance — have little role in formulating economic policy. This differs from the Bush administration’s tilt toward traditional autocracies; this is more rule by the cognitive elites. A history of real problem solving seems to matter less than the quality of university pedigrees; the Obama team appears to be a bit like a giant law review, drawing on only the best and brightest from places such as the University of Chicago, Oxford, Harvard and Stanford, as well as some elite think-tank denizens.

    This narrow gauge is even clearer geographically. There are few people around the president who come directly from exurbs or small towns; virtually all the inner circle hail from a handful of locales — Washington, Chicago, New York, Boston and the Bay Area. Remarkably, according to the National Journal, only 7 percent worked last year in a state carried by John McCain. Red appears to be one color that does not pass diversity muster for this administration.

    The danger here is not so much inexperience but a vision clouded by similar experiences and prejudices from the liberal wing of the baby boomer generation. The president remains broadly popular with the young, yet his administration is actually older than that of President George W. Bush. Obama may be a millennial matinee idol, but his administration appears boomer-dominated in its point of view.

    This may explain why Obama has focused so much on the old obsessions of left-leaning boomer elites — health care, civil rights, pacifistic foreign policy — and less on the issues, notably job and wealth creation, that matter most to those younger than 50. Even on the environment, an issue with great appeal to millennial Americans, his approach has been less community-based and consensual and more dogmatically and centrally directed than might appeal to a generation shaped by social networking and the Internet.

    Of course, Obama still could change course and evolve into the bold, innovative leader needed for these fast-changing times. However, to get there, he must be more than merely articulate. This president needs a surer and more current approach to dealing with epochal challenges whether on the public squares of Tehran or on this country’s Main Streets.

    This article first appeared at Politico.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Why The Left Is Questioning Its Hero

    Much has been made by the national media and the markets about the emergence from our desiccated economic soil of what President Obama has called “green shoots.” But although the economy may already be slowly regenerating (largely due to its natural resiliency), we need to question whether these fledglings will grow into healthy plants or a crop of crabgrass.

    The political right has made many negative assessments of the president’s approach, decrying the administration’s huge jump in deficit spending and penchant for ever more expansive regulatory control of the economy. Polling data by both The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal shows some growing unease about both the expanding federal role in the economy and the growing mountain of debt.

    But this conservative critique, which includes sometimes shrill accusations of nascent “socialism,” isn’t the most important counter to Obamanomics. Perhaps more on point – and politically risky for the administration – are criticisms coming from his supposed bedfellows further to the left.

    One recent example comes from a new report issued by my old colleagues at the liberal-leaning New America Foundation called “Not Out of the Woods: A Report on the Jobless Recovery Underway.” It amounts to a blistering, if largely unintentional, critique of the administration’s policies, providing a sobering antidote to manufactured euphoria peddled by both presidential spin-meisters and some Wall Streeters.

    The report baldly asserts that the president’s programs are simply not sufficient to make up for a “huge job creation deficit” that is getting worse by the day. It estimates the country needs to generate 125,000 or more new jobs a month just to keep pace with population growth – something few see happening for at least several years.

    Even with little immediate hope for such employment gains, the report does cite government and private-sector projections of upward of 10% unemployment well into next year. More worrisome still, the authors assert that the administration’s current program is unlikely to create a return to a “normal” level of joblessness – to between 4% and 5% – until after the president’s first term.

    The New America report then goes on to make some even scarier observations. It claims unemployment rates are far higher in reality than official statistics reveal, citing calculations by Chairman of New America’s Economic Growth Program Leo Hindery of what they call “effective unemployment.” This also includes the millions now working part-time but seeking “full-time and productive work.”

    Hindery is no conservative. He was an adviser to John Edwards and, more recently, to the president himself. Yet his prognosis is grimmer than the ones offered by most right-wingers. He calculates that the real unemployment rate in the country last month was not 9.3%, which is the figure that was reported, but rather closer to an alarming 16.8%. By that measure, more than 30 million people are effectively out of work. That’s nearly one-fifth of the labor force.

    Given current economic policies, the report suggests, we can expect “a six-year recovery for what has been to date only a year-and-a-half recession.” Hiring by government and green industries are clearly not going to make up for the massive losses in productive sectors like manufacturing, business services, energy and agriculture.

    Against this grim background, the president’s program seems inadequate and even chimerical. To be sure, the massive bailout of institutions such as the big banks – as well as Chrysler and General Motors – has provided some reassurance to Wall Street that paper assets may continue their recent upward climb.

    Yet that will do precious little to make a dent in unemployment elsewhere in the economy. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, chief economic guru Larry Summers and others might see “green shoots” for investors, but those could turn out to be more like crabgrass for the rest of us.

    In fact, finance is surviving the recession remarkably unscathed. Just compare the numbers. Since 2007, manufacturing (and other blue-collar-dominated sectors) lost 13% of its employment, while construction payrolls have plunged over 16%. Meanwhile, finance, the industry arguably most responsible for the economic meltdown, has dropped a mere 5% of its jobs. Today unemployment in the financial sector stands at less than 5%, compared with nearly 20% in construction and over 12% for manufacturing.

    So as hundreds of thousands of construction and factory workers are being sacrificed, many grandees of finance – like top executives of Bank of America and Citigroup – remain in their plush perches. Even proven financial demolition experts like Mark Walsh, who led Lehman Brothers’ disastrous march into toxic properties, are now being paid to clean up the mess they so brilliantly created.

    No wonder some factions of the left are becoming uneasy with their hero. Some privately admit that the administration – despite its pro-middle class rhetoric – has adopted an economic program that makes Ronald Reagan seem like the vox populi. One wonders how they will react later this year, when continued high unemployment meets massive, perhaps even record, Wall Street bonuses.

    This state of affairs, as the New America report correctly suggests, does not lead us down a path toward “a strong and sustained recovery.” Clearly, we need something more. For one thing, the country needs to reassert its ability to produce more of what it consumes. (See Joel Kotkin’s earlier column, “We Must Remember Manufacturing.”)

    Others on the left are also making this point, perhaps none more effectively than an article in the Nation called “The Case for Kenosha.” The piece, in short, skewers the Obama administration’s manhandling the auto industry and manufacturing sectors. It accuses Obama of taking the old industrial belt on a “wild ride” that will lead to more plant shutdowns and increased outsourcing to foreign factories. “With ‘fixes’ like these,” the article states, “it’s hard to imagine how Obama plans to fulfill his campaign promise to ‘revive and strengthen all of American manufacturing.’”

    This is not to say that the entire left side of the political spectrum opposes the administration’s economic policy. There is now more than one left in this country, and the gaps between these lefts are every bit as wide as those between, say, small-government libertarians, social conservatives and messianic global interventionists.

    To date, the administration has listed toward the agenda of what may be best described as the left’s gentry wing. These include activists at universities, urban planners and liberal nonprofits, many of whom see in Obama’s pro-green policies and multicultural agenda the fulfillment of their long-time fantasies.

    This, at times, puts them at odds with large parts of the middle- and working-class base of the Democratic Party. The administration’s plans to”coerce” people out of their cars for the alleged good of the environment probably does not offer much “hope” for those working at auto plants. Highly dependent as they are on stocks and asset inflation for their income, the gentry are not likely to object to the administration’s coddling of large financial institutions.

    Then there is the party’s populist contingent, whose inspiration comes more from FDR and Harry Truman than from the likes of Barney Frank and Nancy Pelosi. They are less likely to see much of a difference between a Timothy Geithner or a Hank Paulson. To them, the two Treasury secretaries have both been useful servants for the nation’s “economic royalists.”

    Of course, most conservatives might despair over the populists’ tendency to embrace statist solutions to our economic problems. But would-be inheritors of the Reaganite mantle should at least sympathize with their goal to restore broad-based upward mobility and close-to-full employment. Indeed, if the Republican Party figures out how to take command of the issues like job creation and social mobility, they could even become relevant once again.

    Right now, though, critiques from the left may be more effective than yammering from the still-clueless right. The president knows that talk of green shoots makes people and markets feel better. But unless those shoots show some staying power, the long-term economic consequences – and ultimately political ones, too, for the president and his party – could prove unwelcome indeed.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Europe: No Longer A Role Model For America

    For decades many in the American political and policy establishment–including close supporters of President Obama–have looked enviously at the bureaucratic powerhouse of the European Union. In everything from climate change to civil liberties to land use regulation, Europe long has charmed those visionaries, particularly on the left, who wish to remake America in its image.

    “There is much to be said for being a Denmark or Sweden, even a Great Britain, France or Italy,” wrote political scientist Andrew Hacker in his 1971 book The End of the American Era .This refrain has been picked up again more recently by the likes of Washington Post reporter T.R. Reid and economist Jeremy Rifkin. Just last year, international relations scholar Parag Khanna shared his vision of a “shrunken” America lucky to eke out a meager existence between a “triumphant China” and a “retooled Europe.”

    But the tendency to borrow from the European toolbox may be somewhat questionable, particularly given that a growing number of Europeans are either uninterested–barely 40% bothered to vote in E.U. Parliament elections last week–or in open revolt against their own system of government. In the elections, for example, parties generally opposed to expanding E.U. power gained ground in countries as diverse as Hungary, Slovakia and the Netherlands. In Britain, the relatively small U.K. Independence Party, which even opposed membership in the U.N., out-polled the Labour Party and trailed only the Conservatives, who announced their own shift toward a more euro-skeptic point of view.

    Although the E.U.’s current top-down bureaucratic approach is clearly losing support, these recent events don’t necessarily mean the E.U. is doomed. It’s just that people who might be happy to accept a customs union and perhaps even a common currency are simply proving loath to hand over land use controls and environmental standards, much less foreign policy, to Brussels-based bureaucrats. At its root this move represents both a cry against control and a cry for greater autonomy.

    For the Obama administration, there may be some significant lessons here. Compared with Europeans, Americans are disposed to dislike too much central control. Turning Washington into a new Brussels, with regulations to cover virtually any human activity, could backfire both on the president and his party.

    But it’s also critical not to see Europe’s new tilt as affirming Reaganite cowboy capitalism. Many European countries, particularly the northern ones, are justly proud of the “social” models of capitalism they embrace. There are many policies–such as Danish incentives for industrial firms to greenify themselves, efficient universal health care and tough fuel economy standards for cars–that should be discussed and perhaps even adopted in some form in the U.S.

    In one sense, we should understand that Europeans are trying to protect their preferred standards when it comes to culture, social structure and lifestyle. They remain, if you will, fundamentally conservative in their efforts to preserve their well-established welfare states.

    But overall the anti-E.U. vote should make it clear that Europe’s overall economic system makes for a poor role model for our country. When the current economic crisis first hit, many European leaders–and their American fans, like Harvard economist Ken Rogoff–saw vindication for the E.U.’s economic policy and a much tougher road for the U.S. over the next year or two. Yet in reality, Europe already has suffered as much as we have from the downturn, and recovery there may also be even slower to emerge. In some countries, such as Greece and France, social unrest has been far more evident than here in the U.S.

    Simply put, European models do not necessarily work better–and when they do, they have occurred in part due to shifts away from strict welfare-state policies. As Sweden’s Nima Sanandaji and Robert Gindehag have argued the recent return to growth in places like Sweden came only after some modest reforms in both taxes and social benefits.

    Yet at the same time, even successful European countries–as well as the whole E.U.–generally experience slower growth than the U.S. with respect to measures like gross domestic product and job growth. This makes it an example of limited utility for America, a country that needs strong economic growth in order to maintain both its quality of life and overall social sustainability.

    The biggest source of divergence between the U.S. and the E.U. lies in demographic trends. For the most part, Europe is aging far more rapidly, and its workforce is shrinking. As demographer Ali Modarres notes, America’s population over the second half of the 20th century grew by 130 million, essentially doubling, while the populations of France, Germany and Britain together increased by 40 million, or 25%.

    As a result, there is virtually no European equivalent for cities like Houston, Phoenix, Las Vegas or Atlanta. American cities sprawl–and will likely continue to do so–because they are newer and because they are growing much faster in a country that is much vaster. Even with 100 million more people, the country will still be one-sixth as crowded as Germany.

    These differences will only become more stark. Opposition to immigration–from both Muslim countries and the E.U.’s own eastern periphery–is growing even in historically tolerant places like Great Britain, Denmark and Holland. Over time, migration into Europe is destined to slow. In Barack Obama’s wildly multicultural America, strong restrictionist sentiments have not gained much political ground, and, at most, efforts are directed not at reducing legal immigration but rather shifting it toward a more meritocratic model.

    So we can expect America’s population to continue growing at close to the highest rate in the advanced industrial world while Europe remains among the most rapidly aging places on earth. America’s fertility rate is 50% higher than Russia’s, Germany’s and Italy’s. By 2040, for example, the U.S. could have a greater population than the first 15 member nations of the European Union. Compare that prediction to 1950, when America had only half the population of Western Europe.

    These numbers point toward separate destinies for the U.S. and the E.U. Throughout history, low fertility and societal and economic decline have been inextricably linked, affecting such once-vibrant civilizations as ancient Rome, 17th-century Venice and, now, contemporary Europe.The desire to have children also reflects a fundamental affirmation of faith in the future and in values that transcend the individual. This is particularly true in affluent societies, where it is socially acceptable to remain childless and technology has made the decision not to have children easier to enforce.

    The U.S.’ demographic vitality will allow it to emerge from the current economic doldrums with more rapid growth than Europe–continuing a trend that has generally held for most of the past two decades. Innovation, largely a product of youthful indiscretion, also will continue to emerge more quickly stateside. Indeed, according to one recent European Commission survey, at the current rate of innovation, it would take 50 years for the E.U. to catch up to the U.S.

    Largely thanks to these demographic pressures, we could see an American economy twice the size of the E.U.’s by 2050. Unlike Europe, we have better prospects for growth, since there’s really no sustainable alternative for our society. In contrast, 40 years from now Europe’s economic growth rate is expected to fall 40%, due directly to the shrinking size of both its labor force and its internal market.

    We can ultimately expect two very different courses to develop. In America, the emphasis needs to be on sustained growth to prevent a massive decline in living standards. In contrast, Europe may be able to maintain a steady level of prosperity–even with lower growth, since its population will be either stagnant or declining–at least until the looming costs of maintaining a welfare state impose onerous economic burdens.

    Environmentally, Europe will become a “green” hero–because lower economic growth means a natural reduction in energy consumption and dreaded greenhouse gas emissions. Americans, on the other hand, will need to depend more on technological fixes–some of them from Europe–and embrace less economically damaging paths to growth. (These include promoting such things as working close to or at home and developing more fuel-efficient cars.)

    Neither Europe nor America–particularly given a much-reduced E.U. bureaucracy–has a better or worse model. We just have to recognize that these are, in the end, increasingly different societies: The former is focused on preservation of its hard-won peace and prosperity; the latter is challenged more by constant, major and sometimes even frightening change.

    Some may still hold out the hope that wise men in the old continent will present us with a road map to the future. But given the revolt going on against this mega-European ideal, we should understand that even many across the pond are having second thoughts about a future controlled by Brussels. Perhaps it’s better to recognize that most solutions to America’s problems–now and in the future–will be concocted not in Brussels, Berlin or Paris, but at home.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Britain’s Labour Lessons For Obama

    LONDON – The thrashing of Britain’s New Labour Party – which came in a weak third in local and European Parliament elections this week – may seem a minor event compared to Barack Obama’s triumphal overseas tour. Yet in many ways the humiliation of New Labour should send some potential warning shots across the bow of the good ship Obama.

    Labour’s defeat, of course, stemmed in part from local conditions, notably a cascading Parliamentary expense scandal that appears most damaging to the party in power. Yet beyond those sordid details lies a more grave tale – of the possible decline of the phenomenon I describe as gentry liberalism.

    Gentry liberalism – which reached its height in Britain earlier this decade and is currently peaking in the U.S. – melded traditional left-of-center constituencies, such as organized labor and ethnic minorities, with an expanding class of upper-class professionals from field like media, finance and technology.

    Under the telegenic Tony Blair, an Obama before his time, this coalition extended well into the middle-class suburbs. It made for an unbeatable electoral juggernaut.

    But today, this broad coalition lies in ruins. An urban expert at the London School of Economics, Tony Travers, suggests that New Labour’s biggest loss is due to the erosion of middle-class suburban support. The party also appears to be shedding significant parts of its historic working-class base, particularly those constituents who aren’t members of the public employee unions.

    Even some longstanding ethnic minorities, most notably the highly entrepreneurial South Asians, also show signs of drifting away from Labour. The only Labour supporters left, then, are the liberal gentry, the government apparatus and the most aggrieved minorities.

    This process started before the Parliamentary scandals, Travers adds. Last year a Conservative, Boris Johnson, was able to unseat the sitting Labour-ite mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, largely due to votes from the outer boroughs of the city.

    The shift reveals the weakening hold of gentry liberalism. At its core, gentry liberalism depends on massive profits in key sectors – largely finance and real estate – to maintain its affluence while servicing both its environmentally friendly priorities and redistributing wealth to the long-term poor.

    This has also allowed for a massive expansion of both the scope and size of government. Today government-funded projects account for close to half of Britain’s gross domestic product (GDP), and this share is heading toward its highest level since the late 1940s. In some depressed parts of country, like in the north of England, it stands at over 60%.

    As long as the City of London was minting money – much of it recycled from abroad – the government could afford to pay its bills. But with the economy in a deep recession, Labour can no longer count on the same sources to finance expanding government.

    Although the liberal gentry are not much affected by diminished job opportunities, higher taxes or reduced services, those problems do afflict the tax-paying working and lower middle classes who dominate suburban areas. “We are not [just] dealing with upward mobility,” notes Shamit Saggar, a University of Sussex social scientist with close ties to the Labour Party, “but also the prospect of downward mobility.”

    Both in Britain and America, these middle-income suburban voters remain by far the largest electoral bloc. Last year they divided their votes about evenly between Obama and John McCain, which helped the Democrats, along with the huge supermajorities Obama racked up in the urban core, forge an easy victory.

    In Britain, however, now these suburban as well as small-town voters are tilting to the right, notes Sarah Castells of the Ipsos-Mori survey organization. This is in large part because they no longer believe the Labour Party supports their aspirations. “This is where we see a shift to the Tories,” Castells explains.

    The now-diminished Labour base of public employees, minorities and these gentry liberals is not a sustainable electoral coalition. In total, Labour can’t count for more than one-quarter of the electorate.

    Although vastly different in their class status, these groups share a common interest in an ever-more-expansive state. For public sector workers and the welfare-dependent poor, there is the reasonable motive of self-interest. In contrast, the liberal gentry’s enthusiasm for expanded government stems increasingly from their embrace of environmental regulation, which has become something of a religion among this set.

    You have to wonder what average Brits must make of the likes of Jonathon Porritt, the head of the government’s Sustainable Development Commission – a member of the gentry in both attitude and lineage. The Eton-educated Porritt’s recent pronouncements include such gems as a call to restrict the number of children per family to two to reduce Britain’s population from 60 to 30 million. He also has scolded overweight people for causing climate change.

    These do not seem like sure electoral winners. Today extreme green policies that were once merely odd or eccentric are becoming increasingly oppressive, leading to even more actions that disadvantage suburban lifestyles. Environmental activists’ solution for the country’s severe housing shortage – particularly in the London region – is to cram the working and middle classes into dense urban units resembling sardine cans and force even more suburbanites off the road.

    Even so, large-scale house production over the past decade has lagged behind demand and, as a result, the tidy single-family home with a nice back garden so beloved by the British public may soon be attainable only by the highly affluent – and, ironically, that includes much of the gentry. What an odd posture for a party supposedly built around working-class aspirations.

    “New Labour has brought in ‘New Urbanism,’ and the results are not pretty,” suggests University of Westminster social historian Mark Clapson, as he showed me some particularly tiny, surprisingly expensive new houses outside of London.

    This kind of approach has gained some proponents among the Obama crowd. Recent administration pronouncements endorse such things as “coercing” Americans from their cars, fighting suburban “sprawl” and even imposing restrictions on how much they can drive. It makes you wonder what future they have in mind for our recently bailed-out auto companies.

    It’s possible that America’s middle-income voters will eventually be turned off by such policies, as is the case in Britain. President Obama’s remarkable genius for political theater may insulate him now, but it won’t for eternity. Over time, some of the Democrats’ hard-won, suburban middle-class support could erode.

    The key here may be the quality of the opposition. In Britain, the Conservatives may have found at least an adequate leader in David Cameron. People see him as a viable prime minister. Right now, the Republicans have no such figure, allowing themselves to be led by gargoyles like Rush Limbaugh and Newt Gingrich.

    Yet the president cannot count on Republicans’ continued ineptitude. There’s only so much tolerance in the U.S. – both for cascading public debt and ever-expanding government regulation.

    Of course, Obama still has time to get it right. But if he remains the prisoner of the gentry, he and his party could experience some of the pain now being inflicted upon their ideological counterparts across the pond.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Is Your City Safe From The Tech Bust?

    A decade ago, the path to a successful future seemed sure. Secure a foothold in the emerging information economy, and your city or region was destined to boom.

    That belief, as it turned out, was misguided.

    In the decade between 1997 and 2007, the information sector–which includes jobs in fields from media, publishing and broadcasting to computer programming, data processing, telecommunications and Internet publishing–has barely created a single new net job, while some 16,000,000 were created in other fields.

    The biggest losses have been in the telecommunications sub-field, which has shed 400,000 jobs nationwide since its peak in 2000. Not surprisingly the media and publishing industries have also lost ground, while employment in other arenas such as motion pictures, software and data-processing have remained stagnant for much of the decade.

    Equally critical, it seems clear that simply being a high-tech magnet does not make a region a prodigious job creator. The San Jose metropolitan area, better known as the heart of Silicon Valley, boasted over 960,000 jobs in 1997. Last year, even after the ballyhooed Version 2.0 of the dot-com boom, that number had actually declined–to barely 900,000. According to figures from economic-strategy firm Praxis Strategy Group, other traditionally tech-heavy areas, including San Francisco and Boston, also did poorly in terms of growth through the balance of this decade.

    Perhaps most disturbing, many areas are also losing their share of the information industry. For example, the information-sector job count, notes the Public Policy Institute of New York, has actually been stagnant or in decline in places like New Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota and New York.

    The same pattern also affects so-called “cool” cities that were supposed to be ideal for high-tech jobs, according to a recent study by my colleagues at Praxis. The biggest declines in information jobs since 2000 have occurred in San Francisco (which lost 31,800 jobs), Northern Virginia (35,200) and Washington, D.C. (40,700).

    Silicon Valley dropped 5,400 positions since 2000, which amounts to 11.6% of all its information-sector jobs. The only bright spot for blue states is in Washington, where growth is driven by big employers Microsoft and Boeing. Los Angeles, buoyed by the relatively stable entertainment sector, has also managed to hold its own.

    Faced with all these cities that are merely struggling not to lose any jobs, just where is the tech-sector growth? It’s in less-celebrated areas of the country, like Idaho, New Mexico, North Carolina, Nevada–and in parts of Florida, South Dakota and South Carolina. By region, the fastest gainers turned out to be places like Orlando, Fla. (with 2,176 new information jobs since 2000), Madison, Wis. (2,400), Boise, Idaho (1,500), Wilmington, N.C. (1,267) and Charleston, S.C. (1,033).

    What distinguish most of these places are factors beyond prominent employers. These could include such prosaic things as tax rates (particularly on incomes), the cost of housing and the overall climate toward business. Information-sector jobs, it turns out, follow the basic rules of economic development seen in other industries.

    Of course, this is not to say tech jobs don’t matter. As the Milken Institute’s Ross DeVol argues in his new study of high-tech centers, technology jobs pay better than most, and their presence can boost other parts of local economies. And although they may not be multiplying fast, in some centers, like Silicon Valley, Boston and Southern California, whatever employment already exists has enough inertia to allow them to remain the largest tech centers in the country.

    Yet the problem is that the information economy, by itself, simply doesn’t reliably spur broader economic growth. That may be due to changes within the sector itself. From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, tech firms largely focused on creating productivity-enhancing products. Many of them also used on-shore manufacturing. Aerospace was a smaller industry, but it was still vital.

    These catalysts helped create dynamic companies that both employed large numbers of people directly and used contractors (whose numbers increased). The Silicon Valley I reported on in the mid-1980s housed an essentially industrial economy with many good jobs for middle- and working-class people. It was both a hotbed for pioneering entrepreneurs and a society that offered and encouraged opportunity.

    Today, however, tech has become increasingly software- and media-oriented. New companies tend to emerge from a small pool, and they are financed by a relative handful of local venture capitalists. Once launched, they may conduct some research and development at home, but marketing and customer service are either off-shored or moved to remote locations like the Great Plains or the “Intermountain West,” between the Cascades and the Rockies.

    As a result, even star companies like Google create a far smaller number of jobs than predecessor firms like Hewlett Packard, Intel or IBM. And even newer companies like venture darling San Francisco-based Twitter may go public, valued at $250 million or more, with only 45 employees.

    This, of course, represents very good news for a select few: investors and a handful of highly educated software engineers. But the Bay region’s broader economy and society isn’t as lucky.

    That’s because most segments of the information sector that do create lots of jobs tend to take place elsewhere. For example, when Intel considers opening a new chip plant, which could open up 7,000 new positions, it won’t build it in the Valley of its birth but rather in farther-flung locales like Oregon, Arizona and New Mexico. California has become too expensive; businesses there are heavily regulated and taxed for most industrial activity.

    So maybe it’s time to unlearn some of the assumptions we developed during the first tech boom. In the 1990s and early 2000s, many held that the information revolution would tame the business cycle, guarantee constant high returns and create widespread prosperity. Now we know better.

    The model of Silicon Valley, as DeVol suggests, cannot be easily duplicated. Another well-promoted formula, linking great universities to up-and-coming hip cities for the so-called “creative class,” has proved very limited when it comes to creating new jobs. And, anyway, trends in tech growth suggest that basic economic conditions like general affordability, taxes and the regulatory environment play an important role.

    Just as troubling may be the class divisions on display in places like Silicon Valley. As manufacturing and middle management jobs have fled, its capital, San Jose, has become more of a backwater. As local blogger Adam Mayer has pointed out, San Jose increasingly serves as a dormitory for the bottom-feeders of the Silicon Valley food chain.

    In contrast, tech power and influence is shifting to those areas that have always been well-to-do and are likely to stay that way–academically-oriented places like Cambridge, Palo Alto and San Francisco. They are becoming ever-more-exclusive reserves for the restless young and those with the greatest talent within the media and software industries. Meanwhile, the service class commutes in from the surrounding periphery to tidy up and run restaurants, while high housing costs and an overall lack of opportunities for other kinds of workers drive away much of the middle class, particularly families.

    In geographic terms, the real losers in this brave new tech world may be the communities on the fringes of those high-end tech areas. Take Lowell, Mass. Lowell, a former mill town widely celebrated for its tech-led revival in the 1980s, has seen little job growth since the late 1990s. But why pick Lowell, when it’s far cheaper and easier to expand in Boise or, even better, Bangalore, India?

    The time has come to let go of vintage fantasies about tech that date from the 1990s. Key regions–and the country as a whole–need to understand that the information sector is best seen not as an end in itself but as an industry that derives its value from how it works with other parts of the economy, such as finance and business services, agriculture, energy, manufacturing, warehousing and engineering. (Manufacturing alone employs 25% of the U.S.’s scientists and 40% of its engineers–and their related technicians.) We have to nurture a broad industrial base so that innovations in this sector do not simply end up boosting off-shore industry.

    Techies won’t save us from the folly of deindustrialization; in essence, we can no longer believe that it’s possible to Google our way to prosperity.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Can California Make A Comeback?

    These are times that thrill some easterners’ souls. However bad things might be on Wall Street or Beacon Hill, there’s nothing more pleasing to Atlantic America than the whiff of devastation on the other coast.

    And to be sure, you can make a strong case that the California dream is all but dead. The state is effectively bankrupt, its political leadership discredited and the economy, with some exceptions, doing considerably worse than most anyplace outside Michigan. By next year, suggests forecaster Bill Watkins, unemployment could nudge up towards an almost Depression-like 15%.

    Despite all this, I am not ready to write off the Golden State. For one thing, I’ve seen this movie before. The first time was in the mid 1970s. The end of the Vietnam War devastated the state’s then powerful defense industry, leaving large swaths of unemployment and generating the first talk about the state’s long-term decline.

    An even scarier remake came out in the 1990s. Everything was going wrong, from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unexpected deflating of Japan to a nearly Pharaonic set of plagues, ranging from earthquakes and fires to the awful Los Angeles riots of 1992.

    Yet each time California came roaring back, having reformed itself and discovered new ways to create wealth. In the wake of the early ’70s decline came the first full flowering of Silicon Valley as well as other tech regions, from the west San Fernando Valley to Orange and San Diego counties. Much of the spark for this explosion of growth came from those formerly employed in the defense and space sectors.

    The ’90s recovery was even more remarkable. Amazingly, the politicians actually were part of the solution. Aware the state’s economy was crashing, the state’s top pols–Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, Sen. John Vasconcellos, Gov. Pete Wilson–made a concerted effort to reform the state’s regulatory regime and otherwise welcomed businesses.

    The private sector responded. High-tech, Hollywood, international trade, fashion, agriculture and a growing immigrant entrepreneurial culture all generated jobs and restored the state’s faded luster.

    These sectors still exist and still excel even under difficult conditions. The problem this time is that the political class seems clueless how to meet the challenge.

    Politics have not always been a curse to California. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Golden State’s growth stemmed in large part from what historian Kevin Starr describes as “a sense of mission” on the part of leaders in both parties. Starr chronicles this period in his forthcoming book, Golden Dreams: California in an Age of Abundance, 1950-1963.

    Under figures like Earl Warren, Goodwin Knight and Pat Brown, Starr notes, California “assembled the infrastructure for a great commonwealth.” Their legacy–the great University system, the California Water Project, the freeways and state park system–still undergirds what’s left of the state economy.

    Perhaps the best thing about these investments was that they helped the middle class. Sure, nasty growers, missile makers and rapacious developers all made out like bandits–which is why many of them also backed Pat Brown. But the ’50s and ’60s also ushered in a remarkable period of widespread prosperity.

    Millions of working- and middle-class people gained good-paying jobs, and could send their children to what was widely seen as the world’s best public university system. People who grew up in New York tenements or dusty Midwest farm towns now could enjoy a suburban lifestyle complete with single-family homes, cars, swimming pools and drive-through hamburger stands.

    “This was an epic success story for the middle class,” historian Starr notes. It’s one reason why, when people ask me about my politics, I proudly identify myself as a Pat Brown Democrat.

    That’s why California’s current decline is so bothersome. A state that once was home to a huge aspirational middle class has become increasingly bifurcated between a sizable overclass, clustered largely near the coast, and a growing poverty population.

    Over the past 40 years California’s official poverty rate grew from 9% to nearly 13% in 2007, before the recession. Three of its counties–Monterey, San Francisco and Los Angeles–boast large populations of the über rich but, adjusted for cost of living, also suffer some of the highest percentages of impoverished households in the nation.

    Most worrisome has been the decline of the middle–the increasingly diverse ranks of homeowners, small business people and professionals. The middle has been heading out of state for much of the past decade. Politically, they have proven no match for the power of the wealthy trustfunders of the left, the powerful public employee union as well as a small, but determined right wing.

    The good news is that the middle class shows signs of stirring. The nearly two-to-one rejection of the governor’s budget compromise reflected a groundswell of anger toward both the Terminator and his allies in the legislature.

    Simply put, California voters sense we need something more than an artful quick fix built to please the various Sacramento interest groups. Required now is a more sweeping revolutionary change that takes power away from the state’s most powerful lobby, the public employees, whose one desired reform would be ending the two-thirds rule for approval of new taxes and budgets.

    Middle-class Californians are asking, with justification, why we should be increasing taxes–we’re ranked sixth-highest in the nationto pay for gold-plated state employee pensions as well as an ever-expanding social welfare program. Although state spending has grown at an adjusted 26% per capita over the past 10 years, it is hard to discern any improvement in roads, schools or much of anything else.

    As an opening gambit, the right’s solution–strict limits on state spending–makes perfect sense. However, long-lasting reform needs to be about more than preserving property and low taxes. To appeal to the state’s increasingly minority population, as well as the younger generation, a reform movement also has to be about economic growth and jobs.

    Not surprisingly, local leaders of the “tea party” movement gained some profile from last week’s vote. Yet the right, which has exhibited strong nativist tendencies, is not likely to win over an increasingly diverse state.

    In my mind, California’s revival depends on three key things. First, the lobbyist-dominated Sacramento cabal needs to be shattered, perhaps turning the legislature into a part-time body, as proposed by one group. Perhaps the cleverest plan has come from Robert Hertzberg, a former Speaker of the Assembly who heads up the reformist California Forward group.

    Hertzberg proposes a radical decentralization of power to the state’s various regions, as well as cities and even boroughs in urban areas like Los Angeles. This would break the power of the Sacramento system by devolving tax and spending authority to local governments.

    Secondly, California needs to develop a long-term economic growth strategy. Over the past decade, California’s growth has become ever more bubblicious, dependent first on the dot-com bubble and then one in housing. The basic economy–manufacturing, business services, agriculture, energy–has been either ignored or overly regulated. Not surprisingly, we could see 20% unemployment, or worse, in places like Salinas and Fresno by next year.

    Third, both political reform and an economic strategy aimed at restoring upward mobility depends on a revival of middle-class politics in this state. It would include building an alliance between the more reasoned tea partiers and saner elements of the progressive community.

    The new alliance would not be red or blue, liberal or conservative, but would represent what historian Starr calls “the party of California.” At last there could be a political home for Californians who are angry as hell but still not yet ready to give up on the most intriguing, attractive and potentially productive of all the states.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Let’s Snooker The TARP Babies

    Snook, Texas, a town of less than 600 souls, is best known for being the home of Sodalak’s Country Inn, the originator of country fried bacon. It may seem an odd place to launch a return to financial health, but that’s exactly what Dean Bass has in mind.

    Bass, a veteran banking entrepreneur from Houston, in November bought the tiny First Bank of Snook as part of his plan to build a new financial powerhouse amid the worst economic downturn in a generation. The old bank, which also had a branch 15 miles away in College Station, home to Texas A&M, provided Bass with his charter, as well as access to a strong market on the far periphery of his home town.

    Since buying into Snook’s bank, now renamed the Spirit of Texas Bank, Bass opened a new branch in the Woodlands, northwest of Houston. Over the past six months, the new bank’s assets have doubled to over $70 million, and by the end of the year he expects to break $100 million. Longer-term plans include expanding as well into Austin, Fort Worth and other major Texas markets.

    Bass’ basic strategy: Take advantage of the stumbling TARP-funded banking giants and steal what he calls their “disenfranchised customers.” This approach has implications well beyond the Lone Star State. Like other successful community bankers across the country, Bass believes that the mega-banks have been hopelessly tarred by TARP taxpayer funds. They have been revealed to be, if too big to fail, also too incompetent and poorly run to trust.

    “This is one of the worst banking markets I have ever seen–but the best for people like me,” said Bass, who sold his last venture, Houston-based Royal Oaks Bank, for $38.6 million in 2007. “When else would you see A+ customers fleeing places like Bank of America, Chase and Citi? People can’t even understand their balance sheets and stress tests. Their customers are ready to move on.”

    Over the next few years, the emergence of banks like Spirit of Texas could prove the silver lining in the largely bungled Bush-Obama bail out of the big financial companies. Ironically, the attempt to shore up the mega-dinosaurs has revealed these mega-banks to be creatures of little brain and even less principle. They now seem more akin, as economist Simon Johnson has pointed out, to Third World crony capitalists than paragons of free enterprise.

    In comparison, independent, non-TARP banks like the Spirit of Texas appear like paragons of traditional capitalist virtue and homespun values. For the time being, their rise will be most notable in “the zone of sanity,” the vast range of territory between south Texas to the Great Plains, which largely resisted the housing and stock asset bubbles of the past decade.

    In this region, most homes are well above water and many businesses–in everything from agriculture and energy to manufacturing and high-end business services–remain on solid footing. Of course, notes Randy Newman, president and CEO of Grand Forks, N.D.-based Alerus Financial, many local companies have been slowed by the recession. However, for the most part, places like the Dakotas and Texas enjoy relatively low unemployment and foreclosure rates, making them relatively good places for cultivating new customers.

    Politics and a sense of propriety also may play a role for resurging community banks. In places like the Great Plains, people prefer old-fashioned shots of banking fundamentals to the exotic financial cocktails concocted by the “genius” financiers on the coast. Politicization of banking is even less popular than elsewhere.

    “For the government to come out and stimulate the economy seems OK, but you think, jeepers, this TARP business makes little sense,” says Newman, whose bank enjoys assets of roughly $750 million. “TARP,” he adds, “is simply prolonging or delaying what has to happen. The walking dead will have to die sometime.”

    Uncertainty about the big banks, Newman believes, is leading customers, particularly smaller firms, to rediscover the merits of old-fashioned relationship banking. At banks like his, each loan is scrutinized not only by formula but also by things such as character, markets and a firm’s record of accomplishment.

    “The big banks will tweak their standards system-wide. There are no individuals in their book,” says Newman.” The big banks are geared to mass markets and big customers. But if you are looking at the $1 to $5 million loan a small business wants, the big bank does not look at you as an individual.”

    This up close and personal approach may seem laughably archaic to the once-celebrated “genius” quant jocks and bonus baby M.B.A.s on Wall Street–and perhaps also the brainy financial types running the Obama economic team. Yet if a sustainable private sector economic recovery is to take hold, the key may well lie with smaller bankers who can help small firms survive the recession

    Of course, the administration’s favoritism of the big boys also creates some real problems to community banks. Some fear the mega-banks will use TARP funds to acquire better-run, local institutions. Newman calls this prospect a “travesty.” Given their awful real balance sheets, Newman believes, banks like Citicorp and Bank of America “really shouldn’t be in a position to grow, much less expand.”

    So here’s a better course. Let these giants shrink or even fail. Let their insured depositors seek out new banking relations; with the stronger, well-run community banks. It’s widely believed that some 500 to 1,000 smaller banks may fail in the next year or so, so why not some big boys, too?

    Many economists, both right and left, including Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz, have urged this course. It would pave the way for well-run banks to expand at the expense of the incompetent and venal. Competition, after all, is supposed to be the basis of capitalism.

    Right now, the zone of sanity probably offers the best chance for this capitalist revolution. However, the shift to smaller banks may prove even more important in reviving the epicenters of lunacy, such as my adopted home state of California. Here, little banks like the privately held Montecito Bank and Trust are quietly expanding as customers leave the TARP babies for an institution a little more personal and grounded in sound banking principles. “Better boring than broke,” jokes Janet Garufis, Montecito’s president and CEO.

    It also helps to be local, she notes, even in a mega-state like California. Much of the damage to the TARP banks came when they bought into sliced and diced mortgages in locations they didn’t know. It turns out that local knowledge counts–not only in real estate, but in deciding about the right business to back.

    “The differences between a big-box bank and community are the difference of night and day,” suggests Garufis, who spent 35 years with Security Pacific, a onetime L.A. area powerhouse. “People like to see the whites of the eyes of the people they are doing business with. We know the community. We are part of it, and we understand what is going on here.”

    Of course, being local, smart and disciplined may not be enough for all these upstart banks. The failures of the mega-banks have increased the costs of things like FDIC insurance for even well-run institutions–in Montecito’s case, from $400,000 to $1.2 million over the past year. Equally challenging, TARP funds are helping the big boys offer slightly higher rates for mass-market products like CDs.

    Rather than focus on saving their Wall Street friends, the administration needs to allow an upsurge in smarter, smaller and better-run banks. Let us give these grassroots capitalists a chance and see what they can do.

    The road to a financial and economic recovery does not run through Wall Street and K Street, which, after all, are the primary originators of our distress. It lies in places that look more like Snook–even if country fried bacon is not to your taste.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • The Luxury City vs. the Middle Class

    The sustainable city of the future will rest on the revival of traditional institutions that have faded in many of today’s cities.

    Ellen Moncure and Joe Wong first met in school and then fell in love while living in the same dorm at the College of William and Mary. After graduation, they got married and, in 1999, moved to Washington, D.C., where they worked amid a large community of single and childless people.

    Like many in their late 20s, the couple began to seek something other than exciting careers and late-night outings with friends. “D.C. was terrific,” Moncure recalled over lunch near her office in lower Manhattan. “It was an extension of college. But after a while, you want to get to a different ‘place.’”

    The “place” Ellen and Joe looked for was not just a physical location but something less tangible: a sense of community and a neighborhood to raise their hoped-for children. Although they considered suburban locations, as most families do, ultimately they chose the Ditmas Park neighborhood of Brooklyn, where Joe had grown up.

    At first, this seemed a risky choice. While Joe was growing up in the 1980s, the neighborhood — a mixture of Victorian homes and modest apartments — had become crime-infested. The old families were moving out, and newer ones were not replacing them. Yet Joe’s Mom still lived there, and they liked the idea of having grandma around for their planned-for family.

    In a city that has been losing middle-class families for generations, the resurgence of places like Ditmas Park represents a welcome change. In recent years, child-friendly restaurants and shops have started up along once-decayed Cortelyou Road. More important, some local elementary schools have shown marked improvement, with an increase in parental involvement and new facilities.

    Even in hard economic times, the area has become a beacon to New York families, as well as singles seeking a community where they will put down long-term roots. “There’s an attempt in this neighborhood to break down the city feel and to see this more as a kind of a small town,” notes Ellen. “It may be in the city, but it’s a community unto itself, a place where you can stay and raise your children.”

    The Decline of the Urban Middle Class

    The rise of neighborhoods like Ditmas Park suggests that cities can still nurture and accommodate a middle class. Yet sadly this trend continues to fight an uphill battle against a host of forces from high taxes and regulation to poor schools, highly bifurcated labor markets, and the scourge of crime.

    These problems can be seen in the migration numbers. A demographic analysis conducted by my colleagues at the Praxis Strategy Group over the past decade found that New York and other top cities — including Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston — have been suffering the largest net out-migration of residents of virtually all places in the country, albeit the pattern has slowed with the recession.

    It’s astonishing that, even with the many improvements over the past decade in New York, for example, more residents left its five boroughs for other locales in 2006 than in 1993, when the city was in demonstrably far worse shape. In 2006, the city had a net loss of 153,828 residents through domestic out-migration, compared to a decline of 141,047 in 1993, with every borough except Brooklyn experiencing a higher number of out-migrants in 2006.

    Since the 1990s virtually all the gains made in the New York economy have accrued to the highest income earners. Overall, New York has the smallest share of middle-income families in the nation, according to a recent Brookings Institution study; its proportion of middle-income neighborhoods was smaller than any metropolitan area, except for Los Angeles.

    Much the same pattern can be seen in what has become widely touted as America’s “model city,” President Obama’s adopted hometown of Chicago. The city has also experienced a rapid loss of its largely white middle class at a rate roughly 40 percent faster than the rest of the country.

    Although there has been a considerable gentrification in some pockets around Lake Michigan, Chicago remains America’s most segregated big city. In contrast to the president’s well-integrated cadre of upper-class African Americans, Chicago’s black population remains among the poorest, and most isolated, of any ethnic population in America.

    And like other American cities, Chicago now has a growing glut of “luxury” condos, a pattern that became evident as early as 2006 and has now, as Chicago magazine put it, “stalled” as a result of a “perfect storm” of toughened mortgage standards, overbuilding, job losses, and rising crime.

    Yet there could be some good from the current crisis. Considerable drops in urban rents and residential housing prices should ease the burdens on those who struggle with extremely high prices and taxes. Younger people, including families, may now be able to consider whether a home in Brooklyn, Chicago’s Wicker Park, or Los Angeles’ Studio City might now be affordable and desirable enough to eschew the move to the suburbs.

    The Cost of Being Urban

    In doing scores of interviews recently for a report on New York’s middle class, my coauthor Jonathan Bowles of the Center for an Urban Future and I ran into many people who were considering moving out of the city or had friends who had recently left. This seems particularly true in the remaining middle-class enclaves in the outer boroughs.

    “Almost all the friends I grew up with have moved to Mahopac or Yorktown [in the Hudson Valley],” says Jimmy Vacca, a member of the City Council who represents communities in the Northeast Bronx such as Throgs Neck and Pelham Parkway. “There’s a flight out by many middle-class people because of the schools. A couple gets married and by the time their children gets to age five, they move.”

    Costs, particularly relating to child-raising, are killing the urban middle class. Urban residents generally pay higher taxes and more for utilities, insurance, trash, and sewer than those living elsewhere. Manhattan is by far the most expensive urban area in the United States, with an average cost of living that is more than twice as much as the national average; San Francisco, another city that has seen large-scale middle-class flight, ranks second. The Washington, D.C. area, Los Angeles, and Boston also suffer extremely high living costs.

    These costs are most onerous on the middle class, particularly those with children. This can be seen in the rapidly declining numbers of students in most urban school districts, including such hyped success stories as Chicago, Seattle, Portland, Washington, and San Francisco. Over the past seven years, for example, Chicago’s school system, which was run by new Education Secretary Arne Duncan, has declined by 41,000 students.

    America’s core cities — including the borough of Manhattan in New York — boast among the lowest percentage of children under 17 in the nation. Although Manhattan had a much discussed “baby boomlet” (the borough’s number of toddlers under the age of 4 grew 26 percent between 2000 and 2004), once children over 5 are taken into account, Manhattan’s under-age population is well under the national average. This indicates there may be a process of exhaustion — both mental and financial — as the costs of raising children drain family resources.

    The real issue for the urban middle class is not having babies but being able to sustain their families as the children age and as families expand. One reason: many middle class urbanites spend tens of thousands of dollars a year in additional expenses that those in other cities as well as surrounding suburbs often avoid. For instance, since most middle-class families in big cities today need to have two working parents just to get by, child care becomes a necessity for those without grandparents or other relatives to look after young children. In places like Chicago, Washington, Boston, San Francisco, New York, or Los Angeles these costs typically run from $13,000 to $25,000 per child annually.

    Later many of these same families, if they choose to stay, must then contemplate shelling out considerable sums to send their children to private schools, particularly after the elementary level. This can add from a few thousand dollars to $30,000 a year to their annual costs — and with no tax benefit.

    Do Cities Need a Middle Class?

    Ultimately, in good times or bad, cities have to want a middle class to have one. And politicians, if asked, will genuflect to the idea of maintaining a middle class, yet their actions — on taxes, regulations, schools, development — suggest otherwise.

    Indeed, in reality most urban areas have focused on creating what New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg famously dubbed the “luxury city.” To pay for often inflated public employee costs, the luxury city can only survive off the wealthy and on other groups — empty nesters, singles and students — who demand relatively little in the way of basic services like schools and public health facilities.

    City planners and urban developers favor the unattached: the “young and restless,” the “creative class,” and the so-called “yuspie” — the young urban single professional. Champions of the unattached suggest that companies and cities should capture this segment, described by one as “the dream demographic,” if they wish to inhabit the top tiers of the economic food chain.

    Another key group coveted by cities are the legions of baby boomers who have already raised children. No longer cohabiting with offspring, they are expected to give up their dull family existence and rediscover the allure of a fast-paced, defiantly “youthful” lifestyle. The new retirees, suggests luxury homebuilder Robert Toll, “are more hip-hop and happening than our parents.” They are more interested in indulging “the sophistication and joy and music that comes with city dwelling, and doesn’t come with sitting in the ’burbs watching the day go by.”

    A Demographic Dead End?

    This whole approach has severe limitations. Despite an enormous amount of publicity about empty nesters moving back to the city, surveys conducted by the housing industry find that most aging boomers — upwards of 70 percent — are aging in place, mostly in the suburbs. The numbers moving back into the urban core remain negligible, except in the pages of urban booster publications like The New York Times.

    The young singles provide a more promising demographic for cities. But even here time may be running out. This will be even more evident between 2010 and 2020, when the millennial generation hits their 30s and early 40s and enter the prime years for family formation. Surveys of the cutting edge of this group — the other large age cohort in the population — show that most prefer a single-family home and, like their parents, seem most likely to head to the suburbs.

    But perhaps most troubling of all is what this means in terms of the historic role of cities as incubators of upward mobility. Back in the 1960s, Jane Jacobs could still predict that Latino immigrants to New York, mainly from Puerto Rico, would inevitably make “a fine middle class.” Yet four decades later in the Bronx, the city’s most heavily Latino county, roughly one in three households lives in poverty, the highest rate of any urban county in the nation.

    On the other extreme, in Manhattan, where the rich are concentrated, the disparities between the classes have been rising steadily. In 1980 it ranked 17th among the nation’s counties for social inequality; today it ranks first, with the top fifth of wage earners earning 52 times that of the lowest fifth, a disparity roughly comparable to that of Namibia.

    The University of Chicago’s Terry Nichols Clark, one of the most articulate advocates for this new urban pattern, says cities should focus on acting not so much as vehicles for class mobility, but as “entertainment machines” for the privileged. For these elite residents, the lures are not economic opportunity, but rather “bicycle paths, beaches and softball fields,” and “up-to-the-date consumption opportunities in the hip restaurants, bars, shops, and boutiques abundant in restructured urban neighborhoods.”

    In this formulation cities become the domicile primarily of the young, the rich (and their servants), as well as those members of the underclass who persist in hanging around. What emerges, in the end, is a city largely without children, particularly of school-age, and with a diminishing middle class. Ironically, these are places that, despite celebrating diversity, actually could end up as hip, dense versions of the most constipated suburb imaginable.

    This shift will also limit the economic functions of certain elite cities. Cost pressures, for example, have already helped Houston to replace New York and Los Angeles as the nation’s energy capital; in the future, although now humbled by the collapse of Wachovia, more middle class-oriented Charlotte, as well as other cities, could continue to gain jobs in the post-bust financial sector. Charlotte real estate developer John Harris suggests the city can compete against an expensive metropolitan region not only at the top levels of management but across the board. “It’s hard to be a mass employer in San Francisco,” he notes.

    Joe Gyourko, a real estate professor at the Wharton School, suggests this elite model of urbanism will spread to other favored places such as Portland, Seattle, and possibly Austin. In all these places, we may be seeing the emergence of a European-style pattern of elite urbanism in the core, with a growing concentration of low-wage workers in the least favored parts of the urban periphery.

    The City of Aspiration

    Even if such a model proves sustainable, it certainly means a major change for American urbanism. Unlike most urban cultures, that of the United States has been dominated not by the dictates of princes or priests, but by the efforts of ambitious entrepreneurs and migrants.

    American cities have been driven by a protean, ever-shifting commercial and middle-class culture, willing to break the bonds of tradition. As the great sociologist E. Digby Baltzell noted, the population in New York and other American cities has been “heterogeneous from top to bottom.” Social mobility, Baltzell said, constituted the fundamental reality of American urbanism.

    In this country, cities emerged as the principal North American bastion for those who sought to improve their lives. As historians Charles and Mary Beard noted, “All save the most wretched had aspirations.”

    Such cities often were not inherently pleasant or culturally edifying. Although its wealth would propel it to one day become the world’s cultural capital, visitors from more genteel Philadelphia and Boston often regarded 19th-century New Yorkers as crass and money-oriented.

    The new cities on the opportunity frontier — Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati — were, if anything, even more egalitarian. After two years in Cincinnati, British writer Frances Trollope deplored how “every bee in the hive is actively employed in the search for honey…neither art, science, learning, nor pleasure can seduce them from their pursuit.” Chicago, a Swedish visitor commented in 1850, was “one of the most miserable and ugly cities” of America.

    Yet these places were ideal for taking advantage of new technologies from mass manufacturing to trains and the telegraph. They created dynamic societies that provided huge opportunities for vast waves of immigrants, who by 1890 accounted for as much as half of the nation’s urban dwellers.

    The newcomers were joined by others from rural America, including, by the early 20th century, many African Americans. The “Great Migration” of African Americans from the rural south, noted Gunnar Myrdal in 1944, created “a fundamental redefinition of the Negro’s status in America.” Urban life had its horrors, but in the cities it became increasingly difficult to restrict a person into “tight caste boundaries.” African-American migrants from the South may have been different in many ways from newcomers from Italy, Ireland, or Russia, but their fundamental aspirations were often very much the same.

    The Key to a Middle-Class Comeback: The Power of Plain Vanilla

    Compared to the dismal decline in the 1970s and early 1980s, urban prospects have improved, particularly in primary urban areas such as Chicago, New York, and San Francisco. Yet, if these and other cities are to sustain their momentum, they need to look beyond “the luxury city” to the potential of less glamorous neighborhoods that can attract the middle class and people with families.

    These “plain vanilla” neighborhoods include many places that managed to resist the urban decay of the 1970s and in many cases have begun to enjoy a steady resurgence. These include, for example, large swaths of Brooklyn and Queens, as well as the lovely, park-blessed sections of south and west St. Louis, or scattered Los Angeles neighborhoods in places like the San Fernando Valley.

    But these communities can only grow if cities focus on those things critical to the middle class such as maintaining relatively low density work areas and shopping streets, new schools, and parks.

    This would require a massive shift in urban priorities away from the current course of subsidizing developers for luxury mega-developments, new museums, or performing arts centers. To maintain and nurture a middle class, cities need to look at the essentials that have made great cities in the past and could once again do so in the future.

    The New Urban Middle Class

    Perhaps the other key question is what constitutes the economic base for the people who might settle and remain in cities. It’s clear that many traditional industries — heavy manufacturing, warehousing — as well as middle-management white collar jobs will diminish in the future. But it is possible to imagine the rise of a new kind of urban economy built around people working in small firms, or independently in growing fields such as information, education, healthcare, and culture, or as specialists in a wide array of business services.

    These are professions that continued to grow in many older cities, even as other fields declined. In San Francisco, for example, by 2006 there were an estimated 70,000 home-based businesses and a thriving culture of self-employed “Bedouins” working in post-industrial professions. These self-employed people, noted one study, were critical to helping the city withstand the ill effects of the post-2000 dotcom collapse.

    Similarly, the close-in communities of the San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles are home to large contingents of entertainment industry workers, many of them self-employed. According to studies by California State University’s Dan Blake, up to 60 percent of all L.A.-area workers in this highly dispersed industry reside somewhere in this sprawling urban region made up largely of post–World War II single-family houses. Workers in media, graphic arts, and other specialized services have also been among the few groups of middle and upper-middle income earners to see rapid growth in New York’s outer boroughs.

    These post–industrial age artisans — along with more traditional parts of the middle class such as civil servants, teachers, nurses, and other service workers — could provide the critical residential base for the plain vanilla urban neighborhoods’ work. Neither rich nor poor, these artisans could use the new telecommunications net to access clients who may exist in the sprawling suburban rings, throughout the United States, or overseas.

    Cities of the Future

    You can see this emerging reality in places like Ditmas Park, Brooklyn. Nelson Ryland, a film editor with two children who works part-time at his sprawling turn-of-the-century Flatbush house, suggests that the key to an urban revival lies not in the spectacular but in the mundane. “It’s easy to name the things that attracted us — the neighbors, the moderate density,” he says over coffee in a house close to that occupied by Ellen and Joe. “More than anything it’s the sense of community. That’s the great thing that keeps people like us here.”

    This “sense of community” will become the key currency of sustaining urban communities. Such middle-class sensibilities get short shrift by urban scholars such as Richard Florida, who argue that in the so-called “creative age” places of residence should be “leased” like cars. In his mind, single-family homes, the ideal of homeownership, should be replaced “by a new kind of housing” that embraces higher forms of density without long-term commitment to a particular residence or location.

    In fact, the sustainable city of the future will depend precisely on commitment and long-term residents. It also will rest on the revival of traditional institutions that have faded in many of today’s cities. Churches — albeit often in reinvented form — help maintain and nurture such communities. Similarly, extended family networks will be critical to future successful urban areas. As Queens resident and real estate agent Judy Markowitz puts it, “In Manhattan people with kids have nannies. In Queens, we have grandparents.”

    The modest and mundane ties between people that exist in such places represent the key to reviving America’s urban regions in the coming generation. It is in our urban neighborhoods — not in the glamour zones and high-end downtowns — that our country’s cities can find a new life and purpose in the 21st century.

    This article originally appeared at American.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.