New Geography

Author: Michael C. Macchiarola

  • What About Carmen?

    The national conversation in the wake of President Obama’s introduction of a mortgage relief plan has centered on “fairness” and the conditions to qualify for a mortgage modification. This misses the point. The effects of “innovative” mortgage products were felt far more broadly than the relationship between a single buyer (responsible or not) and his particular mortgage broker (despicable or not). To illustrate the point, meet Mrs. Conservative And Responsible Mortgage Neighbor (“Carmen” for short).

    In 2003, Carmen bid on a home and took a 30 year fixed mortgage with 20 percent down.

    Fast forward to today. Carmen has enjoyed her home and made all of her payments to the bank on time. Unfortunately, her home has dropped in value to the point where it is now significantly underwater . Her investment portfolio has fared just as poorly, losing 40 percent of its value in the last 18 months. All the while, her mortgage obligation has slowly amortized lower.

    If Carmen were to turn to her investments to pay off the loan today, she would come up short. Worldwide deflation has resulted in every asset in our little vignette having fallen by 40 percent. Carmen’s debt burden, however, remains the same,, struck in yesterday’s dollars.

    How does the current mortgage relief plan – which certainly excludes all of the Carmens out there — make sense? The short answer is that it doesn’t. It is neither fair nor effective. It lacks boldness, universality and an understanding of the problem.

    A far better answer to the problem is one time across-the-board principal reductions to all primary residence mortgages originated in the last ten years. Such a plan avoids the piecemeal approach of subjective formulae and doesn’t make personal bankruptcy a precondition to the reduction of principal. It acknowledges that the nation’s housing stock was overvalued because of unintelligent home buyers, products that have been discredited, fairly widespread fraud and inexcusable encouragement by naive government officials. Following the principal reduction, each loan can be re-amortized over its remaining life, resulting in the stimulus of a reduced monthly payment for every American homeowner.

  • Michael C. Macchiarola

  • Fantasy Default Scenarios

    Imagine the following scenario. John, Paul, Ringo and George are the only members of a society and each has amassed a pile of currency over his lifetime. John and Paul each have 100 utils, Ringo has 300 utils and George has 500 utils. All told, the size of the entire system is 1000 utils.

    John and Paul decide to enter into a private contract. Under the terms of their agreement and in exchange for an apartment on the ultra-hip Upper West Side, John will pay Paul 40 utils up-front, 1 util a month for 5 years, and 1,000 utils in a lump sum at year 5. While the insanity of such a contract is undisputed, there are two approaches for a government to take once the impossibility of its satisfaction becomes clear.

    The first, simpler and more sane approach allows the two parties to work out an eventual default between themselves. In fact, most economic systems, like ours, anticipate these types of failures and have time-honored methodologies for dealing with them once they occur.

    Approach two — the one that seems to be favored by our government at every turn — turns on the printing press, prints enough additional money and hands it to Paul (the non-defaulting party) in satisfaction of John’s (the defaulting party) obligation. While the second approach appears charitable and seems noble enough, it has ramifications throughout the entire society. John and Paul might both be satisfied that their contract can be completed. Ringo and George, however, will each have their share of the society’s resources seriously diluted by the government’s action.

    By virtue of the government’s actions in our little story, George’s ownership of the society’s resources falls by half from 500 of 1000 utilts at the beginning of our story to 500 of 2000 utils at the end — all by virtue of the bad behavior of other societal actors and the government’s choice of response.

    I bet that, upon reflection, George might favor of the first approach!