New Geography

Author: Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus

  • Shale Revolution Challenges the Left and the Right

    In his State of the Union address, President Obama invoked the 30-year history of federal support for new shale gas drilling technologies to defend his present day investments in green energy. Obama stressed the value of shale gas—which will create thousands of jobs and billions in profits—as part of his "all of the above" approach to energy, and defended the critical role government investment has always played in developing new energy technologies, from nuclear to solar panels to wind turbines.

    The president’s remarks unsurprisingly sparked a strong response from some conservatives (here, here, here, and here), who have downplayed and even attempted to deny the important role that federal investments in hydrofracking, geologic mapping, and horizontal drilling played in the shale gas revolution.

    This is an over-reaction. In acknowledging the critical role government funding played in shale gas, conservatives need not write a blank check for all government energy subsidies. Indeed, a closer look at the shale gas story challenges liberal policy preferences as much as it challenges those of conservatives, and points to much-needed reforms for today’s mash of state and federal clean energy subsidies and mandates.

    The Government’s Role

    Some have pointed to the fact that fracking dates back to the 19th century and hydraulic fracking to the 1940s as evidence that federal funding for today’s fracking technologies was unimportant. But dismissing the importance of federal support for new shale gas technologies in the ’70s and ‘80s because private firms had succeeded in fracking for oil in the ’40s and ’50s is like suggesting that postwar military investments in jet engines were unnecessary because the Wright Brothers invented the propeller plane in 1903.

    Enhancing oil recovery from existing wells in limestone formations by injecting various combinations of water, sand, and lubricants, as was done by private firms starting in the 1940s, is a vastly different and less complicated technical challenge than recovering widely dispersed gas methane in rock formations like shale that are simultaneously porous but not highly permeable.

    Recovering gas from shale formations at a commercial scale requires injecting vastly more water, sand, and lubricants at vastly higher pressures throughout vastly larger geological formations than anything that had been attempted in earlier oil recovery efforts. It requires having some idea of where the highly diffused pockets of gas are, and it requires both drilling long distances horizontally and being able to fracture rock under high pressure multiple times along the way.

    The oil and gas industries had no idea how to do any of this at the time that federal research and demonstration efforts were first initiated in the late 1960s—indeed, throughout the 1970s the gas industry made regular practice of drilling past shale to get to limestone gas deposits.

    This is not just our opinion, it was the opinion of the natural gas industry itself, which explicitly requested assistance from the federal government in figuring out how to economically recover gas from shale starting in the late 1970s. Indeed, shale gas pioneer George Mitchell was an avid and vocal supporter of federal investments in developing new oil and gas technologies, and regularly advocated on behalf of Department of Energy fossil research throughout the 1980s to prevent Congress from zeroing out research budgets in an era of low energy prices.

    Early Efforts

    The first federal efforts to demonstrate shale gas recovery at commercial scales did not immediately result in commercially viable technologies, and this too has been offered as evidence that federal research efforts were ineffective. In two gas stimulation experiments in 1967 and 1969, the Atomic Energy Commission detonated atomic devices in New Mexico and Colorado in order to crack the shale and release large volumes of gas trapped in the rock. The project succeeded in recovering gas, but due to concerns about radioactive tritium elements in the gas, the project was abandoned.

    These projects are easy to ridicule. They sound preposterous to both anti-nuclear and anti-government ears. But in fact, the experiment demonstrated that it was possible to recover diffused gas from shale formations—proof of a concept that had theretofore not been established.

    A few years later, the just-established Department of Energy demonstrated that the same result could be achieved by pumping massive amounts of highly pressurized water into shale formations. This process, known as massive hydraulic fracturing (MHF), proved too expensive for broad commercialization. But oil and gas firms, with continuing federal support, tinkered with the amount of sand, water, and binding agents over the following two decades to achieve today’s much cheaper formula, known as slickwater fracking.

    Early federal fracking demonstrations can be fairly characterized as big, slow, dumb, and expensive. But when it comes to technological innovation, the big, slow, dumb, and expensive phase is almost always unavoidable. Innovation typically proceeds from big, slow, dumb, and expensive to small, fast, smart, and cheap. Think of building-sized computers from the 1950s that lacked the processing power to run a primitive, 1970s digital watch.

    Private firms are really good at small, fast, smart, and cheap, but they mostly don’t do big, slow, dumb, and expensive, because the benefits are too remote, the risks too great, and the costs too high. But here’s the catch. You usually can’t do small, fast, smart, and cheap until you’ve done big, slow, dumb, and expensive first. Hence the reason that, again and again, the federal government has played that role for critical technologies that turned out to be important to our economic well-being.

    Drilling Down into Innovative Methods

    In fact, virtually all subsequent commercial fracturing technologies have been built upon the basic understanding of hydraulic fracturing first demonstrated by the Department of Energy in the 1970s. That included not just demonstrating that gas could be released from shale formations, but also the critical understanding of how shale cracks under pressure. Scientists learned from the large federal demonstration projects in the 1970s that most shale in the United States fractures in the same direction. This led government and industry researchers to focus their efforts on technologies that would allow them to drill long distances horizontally, in a direction that situated the well hole perpendicular to the directions that fractures would run, which allowed firms to capture much more gas from each well.

    Government and industry researchers also focused on developing the ability to create multiple fracks from each horizontal well, and in 1986 a joint government-industry venture demonstrated the first multifrack horizontal well in Devonian Shale. During the same period, government researchers at Sandia Laboratory developed tools for micro-seismic mapping, a technique that would prove critical to the development of commercially viable fracking. Micro-seismic mapping allowed firms to see precisely where the cracks in the rock were, and to modulate pressure, fluid, and proppant in order to control the size and geometry of each frack.

    George Mitchell, who is widely credited with having pioneered the shale gas revolution, leaned heavily upon these innovations throughout the 1990s, when he finally put all the pieces together and figured out how to extract gas from shale economically. Mitchell had spent over a decade consolidating his position in the Barnett Shale before he asked for technical assistance from the government. “By the early 1990s, we had a good position, acceptable but lacking knowledge base,” Mitchell Energy Vice President Dan Steward told us recently.

    Mitchell turned to the Gas Research Institute and federal laboratories for help in 1991. GRI paid for Mitchell to attempt his first horizontal well. The Sandia National Laboratory provided Mitchell with the tools and a scientific team to micro-seismically map his wells. It was only after Mitchell turned to GRI and federal laboratories for help that he finally cracked the shale gas code.

    A Counterfactual?

    But so what? Federal investments in new gas technologies may have proved critical to the shale gas revolution, but could they have happened without those investments? Where is the counterfactual?

    Constructing a counterfactual can be a useful analytical method, but it can be abused. In this case, the counterfactual has been asserted as a kind of faith-based defense against the inconvenient history of the shale gas revolution. Nobody has offered a real world example—for instance, a country where private firms developed economical shale gas technology without any public support.

    Nor has anyone offered a detailed historical analysis to justify the claim that private entrepreneurs would have done the critical applied research, developed the fracking technologies, funded the explorations in new drill bits and horizontal wells, and created the micro-seismic mapping technologies that were all required to make the shale revolution possible. A close look at the development of those technologies reveals private sector entrepreneurs, like Mitchell, who were loudly and clearly asking for help because they knew they had neither the technical knowledge nor the ability to finance such risky innovations on their own.

    The Implications for Renewable Energy Subsidies

    In the end though, we are mostly having this debate now because historical federal investments in shale gas are being compared to current investments in renewables. There is much that is in fact comparable—the federal role in the shale gas revolution went well beyond basic research, as some have claimed, and matches up with current renewables programs virtually demonstration for demonstration, tax credit for tax credit, and dollar for dollar when comparing the scale and nature of present federal support for renewables with past support for unconventional gas. But that doesn’t mean that President Obama’s subsidies for green energy are immune to criticism.

    Indeed, once we acknowledge the shale gas case as a government success, not a failure, it offers a powerful basis for reforming present clean energy investments and subsidies. Federal subsidies for shale gas came to an end, and so should federal wind and solar subsidies, at least as blanket subsidies for all solar and wind technologies. In many prime locations, where there is good wind, proximity to transmission, state renewable energy purchase mandates, and multiple state and federal subsidies, wind development is now highly profitable.

    If federal investments in wind and solar are really like those in unconventional gas, then we ought to set a date certain when blanket subsidies for wind and solar energy come to an end. Imposing a phase-out of production subsidies would encourage sustained innovations and absolute cost declines. We might want to extend continuing support for some newer classes of wind and solar technologies, those that are innovating new technological methods to generate energy, or those that are specifically designed to perform better in lower wind or marginal solar locations. But in the ’80s and ’90s we did not provide a tax credit to all gas wells, only those using new technologies to recover gas from new geologic formations—and we should not continue to provide subsidies to wind and solar technologies that are already proven and increasingly widely deployed with no end in sight.

    Another key lesson is that many of the most important research and demonstration projects in new shale gas technologies were funded and overseen by the Gas Research Institute, a partnership between Department of Energy laboratories and the natural gas industry that was funded through a small Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-administered fee on gas prices. GRI had both independence from Congress and the federal bureaucracy, and strong representation from the natural gas industry, which allowed it to focus research and dollars on solving key technical problems that pioneers like George Mitchell were struggling with. Federal investments in applied research and demonstration of new green energy projects ought to be similarly insulated from political meddling and rent seeking.

    These and other lessons from the shale gas revolution point to far-reaching reforms of federal energy innovation and subsidy programs. If the history of the shale gas revolution challenges the tale of a single lone entrepreneur persevering without help from the government, it also challenges the present federal approach to investing in renewables in important respects. The history of federal support for shale gas offers as much a case for reform of current federal clean energy investments as it does for their preservation.

    This piece originally appeared at The American.

    Shellenberger and Nordhaus are co-founders of the Breakthrough Institute, a leading environmental think tank in the United States. They are authors of Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility.

  • The Secret of Where Good Energy Comes From

    In the wake of Solyndra’s failure, pundits have latched on to a simple, compelling narrative: government can’t do energy right.

    From synfuels to solar panels to "clean coal" (written, inevitably, with knowing quotation marks), demonstration projects funded by the Department of Energy are described as one failed white elephant after another. Today the DOE is the agency everyone loves to hate (and, at least in Texas Gov. Rick Perry’s case, the agency to forget).

    What gets left out (and forgotten) is that virtually every one of today’s major energy technologies exists thanks to sustained US government investments in research, development, and demonstration. Consider:

    To be sure, not every DOE investment has succeeded. But even the projects frequently named as failures were often secret successes.

    Take synfuels. After the oil shocks of the 1970s, the US government created the synthetic fuels program. The program worked to produce fuel competitive with oil at $60 a barrel — the program’s objective. But when the price of oil dropped to $10 a barrel in the early 1980s, Congress sensibly abandoned the program. The total amount spent by Congress on SynFuels ended up being just $2 billion — cheap insurance against future oil embargoes and price shocks, which had sent the United States into a costly recession.

    Most people are surprised to learn that the SynFuels program was a success in another way: it led to the development of the technologies today used for coal gasification and carbon capture and storage, which captures coal plant emissions.

    Clean coal is ridiculed by greens and libertarians alike as pie-in-the-sky. In fact, carbon capture and storage has been demonstrated around the world. One descendent of SynFuels, Dakota Gasification, is to this day still producing gas and sequestering several million tons of CO2 each year at Weyburn in Canada.

    Or consider the case of an abandoned next generation nuclear plant on the Clinch River. The Washington Post singled it out to make a sweeping case against all public investments in advanced energy. What the Post didn’t mention is that, since 1949, the U.S. government has successfully demonstrated and tested more than 50 experimental reactor designs at the National Reactor Testing Station (now Idaho National Labs). One of them — the EBR-II — ran for 30 years at the testing station and was the technological predecessor to the integral fast reactor (IFR), which is increasingly viewed by experts as promising since it is so efficient, burning conventional nuclear reactor waste as fuel.

    Sometimes pundits point to natural gas drawn from shale as an example of how the private sector does the job better. They claim fracking and horizontal drilling were developed by a solitary entrepreneur named George Mitchell in the 1980s. In fact, the key breakthroughs in the development of shale gas technologies occurred thanks to intensive DOE demonstration efforts pursued by President Jimmy Carter, the frequent butt of energy-related jokes, in response to the 1970s oil embargoes.

    Look at what industry and independent experts say. "The Department of Energy was there with research funding when no one else was interested," said the head of Julander Energy, a member of the National Petroleum Council, "and today we are all reaping the benefits." A Senior Director at Halliburton said, "In the early 1980s, the industry as a whole did not have a clear vision for producing gas from shales, and benefited from DOE involvement and funding of [electro-magnetic telemetry] EMT technology… there is a clear line of sight between the initial research project and the commercial EMT service available today." Dr. Terry Engelder of Penn State calls the DOE’s Eastern Gas Shales Research Program "one of the great examples of value-added work led by the DOE."

    In the case of the "shale gas revolution," as in so many examples of breakthrough American innovations, it is this key interplay between public sector research, demonstration, and testing and private sector ingenuity and entrepreneurship that drives major advances in technology.

    To be sure, US investments in energy must be reformed. We should stop bluntly subsidizing the deployment of more of the same energy technologies — whether current-generation wind, solar, biofuels, or nuclear — and retool energy incentives to demand steady and continual innovation and cost improvements. Firms that out-innovate their competitors with next-generation clean energy improvements should be rewarded, and clean tech industries should put themselves on a clear path to subsidy independence over time. The big story about energy innovation remains unwritten. For most insta-experts on energy, it’s easier to just recycle the old one.

    Shellenberger and Nordhaus are co-founders of the Breakthrough Institute, a leading environmental think tank in the United States. They are authors of Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility.

    Image from BigStockPhoto.com

  • Australia’s Carbon Tax Battle: Where it Fits into the Global War

    Next week Australia’s Parliament is set to pass a carbon tax that has proven so divisive it may bring down the Labor-Green government. By setting a low price on carbon, returning the money raised to industry and consumers, and relying so heavily on offsets, the legislation is further proof of the iron law of climate policy. A better way forward would be for Australia to impose a modest fee on coal mining and use the money to support its advanced manufacturing industries and innovation to make clean energy cheap. Below is our take on the legislation in Australia’s news magazine, Crikey.

    As two Americans watching from the sidelines as Australia tears itself apart over a carbon tax, it is impossible not to be reminded of our own country’s self-destructive battle over cap and trade in 2009 and 2010. And little wonder why: the Left and Right parties in Australia have adopted virtually wholesale the positions taken by Left and Right parties in America.

    The Labor Party has borrowed from American Democrats the strategy of giving out money to win over consumers, powerful industries, and unions. The Liberal Party has borrowed from American Republicans the strategy of attacking climate scientists and mobilising a populist backlash.

    Of course, the great difference is that while Democrats did not get their cap and trade law, it now seems that the Australian Labor-Green coalition will get its carbon tax. But Australia’s populist backlash against the legislation will, at minimum, slow its implementation and, at most, result in a change of government and its ultimate repeal.

    Not that its rapid implementation would have any effect on emissions. The carbon tax will be far too small to make clean energy cost-competitive with coal. And the government has announced it will give back to consumers more than it collects through redistributive tax policies. As in Europe, Australia can meet its emissions targets only by purchasing dubious carbon offsets.

    While the Liberal Party has, like the Republican Party, behaved badly and rejected good science in reaction to bad policy, the real blame for the inevitable policy failure lies with the green movement. In Europe, the US and Australia, environmental NGOs and the center-left generally has grossly oversold the impact of pricing carbon, the readiness of renewable energy, and the political sustainability of their schemes.

    Though some greens try to fudge the numbers, no climate or energy analyst today can credibly claim that renewables are cheap enough to compete broadly with fossil fuels. Solar is three to five times more expensive than coal, and that’s not counting the high cost of storage and transmission. No nation — not Australia, not Germany, not China — will raise carbon prices significantly enough to make solar and wind competitive with coal, much less natural gas.

    For this reason, every framework to mandate emissions reductions — whether Europe’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), cap and trade, or Labor’s carbon tax — contains numerous loopholes designed to rebate or otherwise blunt higher energy costs to industry and consumers, greatly lowering the effective carbon price.

    The right-wing everywhere blusters that efforts to price carbon will destroy the economy. This is nonsense. Everywhere the carbon prices have been too low to have any discernible impact. Australia’s carbon price would cost households less than $5 per week more in groceries. Many households will get back in assistance more than the carbon tax costs. If the plan applied to petrol, it would raise the cost per litre by a few cents. In any case, in recent years the price of most fossil fuels has already increased by much more than any proposed carbon tax, and we still see economic growth coupled with increasing use of those fuels.

    Climate analyst Roger Pielke, Jr. calls this “the iron law of climate policy.” Governments might impose a carbon tax, but never high enough to actually send the “market signals” the Labor-Green alliance has come to believe it will. That would be political suicide.

    Europe has convinced Labor and the Greens that it has reduced its emissions, but it can only make this claim because it arranged for Kyoto to count reductions beginning in 1990, not in 2000, when the treaty was implemented. This allowed Britain to count as part of its reductions its move to natural gas and Germany to count the closure of inefficient Eastern Bloc coal plants — both of which happened for reasons that had nothing to do with global warming.

    To avoid the economic pinch, the carbon tax legislation will allow half of emissions reductions to come from offsets. But it is hard, after more than three years of investigative reporting and reports by independent auditors, to conclude that carbon offsetting is little more than an elaborate scam — some companies and landowners get paid for doing what they would have done anyway, and others game the system.

    Advocates for the carbon tax defensively insist that, though Australia’s contribution to global emissions is, for all practical purposes, nil, it is important to join up with the international community.

    But the international community is more divided than ever, with China, the world’s largest emitter and energy user, insisting that only rich countries should be required to reduce its emissions, so it supports extending the Kyoto protocol, which exempts China from making any reductions. Europe mostly sides with China on extending Kyoto, but Japan and Canada side with the United States on the need for any agreement to include China.

    These differences will not be resolved in Durban, later this year. The idea that the United Nations will oversee shared economic sacrifice through higher energy prices — the idea that captivated greens in the developed world over the last decade — is dead.

    While the carbon tax allows the Labor-Green coalition to show Australia’s cosmopolitan face to the world, the loopholes and carve-outs reveal the reality of Australia’s mining economy. Australia exports more emissions every year in the form of coal sent to Japan, China and elsewhere than it generates domestically. Given the importance of coal to the Australian economy, it’s little wonder that Labor will allow coal exports to double over the next 10 years.

    But Labor need not worry that Europe will make note of its hypocrisy. The German environment minister famously boasted that the great thing about carbon offsets is that they allowed Germany to keep building coal plants. Over the last decade Germany has brought 11 gigawatts of coal-fired generation online, about six times the electricity it gets from its much-vaunted solar panels. Today, having shut down its nuclear plants in a reaction to Fukushima, Germany’s dependence on fossil fuels will only deepen.

    There is a better way. Instead of trying to make fossil energy more expensive, Australia should work to make clean energy cheap. This can be done through a concerted R&D and innovation push funded by the government. A much smaller fee levied on coal production could generate $10 to $20 billion a year for Australia to spend on research labs, prizes, and procurement contracts with private firms, all aimed at getting the technological breakthroughs needed for renewables to be in a position where they can compete with fossil fuels. Such a strategy might also help Australia reduce its dependence on mining and start to engage in more advanced technology manufacturing and innovation.

    The climate war between greens and skeptics will rage on, but there is no reason a reasonable bloc of centrist thinkers inside and outside of the Labor and Liberal parties cannot put forward a new, more pragmatic approach. Perhaps Australia can be the first to move the international focus away from unrealistic dreams and economic sacrifice and toward technological innovation and economic opportunity.

    Shellenberger and Nordhaus are co-founders of the Breakthrough Institute, a leading environmental think tank in the United States. They are authors of Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility, and will be appearing at the Adelaide Festival of Ideas, which runs Oct 7 – 9. Check out the full festival program here, most sessions are free.

    Photo by Jarrod Carruthers

  • Why the Green Jobs Movement Failed

    "Federal and state efforts to stimulate creation of green jobs have largely failed," the New York Times reported last week, drawing similar conclusions to the ones we drew in our essay for The New Republic last October. Silicon Valley, home to the green jobs movement, actually saw the number of green jobs decline from 2003 – 2010.

    The signature green jobs program was retrofitting homes and buildings to become more energy efficient, which boosters thought would create "millions" of jobs in the inner-city. In 2009 the Center for American Progress claimed that $5 billion in stimulus funding for weatherization and a price on carbon would lead to the retrofitting of every building in America in ten years, generating 900,000 jobs. In reality, we noted in TNR, the weatherization program had created just 13,000 jobs. "Two years after it was awarded $186 million in federal stimulus money to weatherize drafty homes," the Times reported, "California has spent only a little over half that sum and has so far created the equivalent of just 538 full-time jobs in the last quarter… the program never really caught on as homeowners balked at the upfront costs."

    Most of the approximately $70 billion in green stimulus money went to retrofitting or stimulating the old economy and just one-third went to building a new one. Notably, even those modest investments in manufacturing and technology had a salutary effect, saving the American renewables industry, which was in free fall after the 2008 financial crisis, and giving a boost to U.S. manufacturers of electric car batteries. 

    Obama could have focused on winning a long-term commitment to public investment in green innovation and manufacturing. Instead, he threw his political capital behind cap-and-trade, a pollution control program that was never imagined by the economists who invented it to be a means for creating vibrant new industries.

  • Green Jobs for Janitors: How Neoliberals and Green Keynesians Wrecked Obama’s Promise of a Clean Energy Economy

    In August 2008, then-candidate Barack Obama traveled to Lansing, Michigan, to lay out an ambitious ten-year plan for revitalizing, and fundamentally altering, the American economy. His administration, he vowed, would midwife new clean-energy industries, reduce dependence on foreign oil, and create five million green jobs. “Will America watch as the clean-energy jobs and industries of the future flourish in countries like Spain, Japan, or Germany?” Obama asked. “Or will we create them here, in the greatest country on earth, with the most talented, productive workers in the world?”

    Two years later, the answer to that second question appears to be no. Obama’s environmental agenda is in tatters. His green jobs plan has done little to make a dent in unemployment, which persists at close to 10 percent. Obama’s signature environmental initiative, cap-and-trade, died in the Senate in July. And, during the first year of Obama’s tenure, China massively outspent the United States on clean-energy technology.

    The story of how Obama’s green agenda came up empty is more complicated than the one conventionally told by Democrats and greens, who imagine that cap-and-trade would have been transformational had Republicans and global-warming deniers not gotten in the way. In truth, the president’s strategy was flawed from the start. Cap-and-trade would not have birthed a domestic clean-energy economy — indeed, it wasn’t designed to. Meanwhile, the administration’s green stimulus spending was split between short-term, if worthy, investments in green technology, to which far too little money was allocated, and over-hyped public-works projects that would never have delivered the new industrial economy Obama promised as a candidate.

    Voodoo Economics

    Shortly before the House passed its version of cap-and-trade legislation last year, the Center for American Progress (CAP), headed by Obama transition director John Podesta, released a study claiming that the cap-and-trade bill and the stimulus combined would create 1.7 million new jobs. Democrats repeatedly pointed to the CAP report to support their jobs claims. Extrapolating from the report’s analysis, it seems that over half of the new jobs, almost 900,000, were supposed to come from building retrofits. The study’s authors apparently believed that a mere $5 billion in stimulus funding for weatherization, plus a price on carbon, would leverage $80 billion annually in private investment and lead to the retrofitting of every single commercial and residential building in America in just ten years.

    Alongside the CAP report, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the leading green jobs group, Green For All, released another study written by two of the same authors, claiming that roughly half of the jobs would benefit low-wage workers and would offer “decent opportunities for promotions and rising wages over time.” Indeed, environmentalists such as Van Jones — who had come to prominence calling upon young people to “put down those handguns and pick up some caulking guns” and briefly served as Obama’s green jobs czar — claimed that building retrofits and cap-and-trade legislation could save both the planet and the inner city.

    In reality, the stimulus’s $5 billion weatherization program, according to the Department of Energy, created or saved just 13,000 jobs during the last reported quarter. But, even if more of these jobs had been created, the idea that inner-city youth should see what are essentially janitorial jobs as a pathway out of poverty was always far-fetched. America’s black middle class emerged from the steel, ship, and automobile factories of the postwar industrial heyday. Those jobs were high-skill, high-wage, and long-term. They manufactured products that could be sold on domestic and foreign markets, and they provided the economic basis for a dramatic improvement in black America’s standard of living. Jobs retrofitting buildings and weatherizing homes are, by contrast, low-skill and short-term.

    To be fair, Democrats in Congress and White House officials always believed that while the stimulus expenditures represented a down payment on the clean energy economy, the real action would ultimately be driven by private investments in response to cap and trade, not sustained public investments in innovation and manufacturing.

    In this way the green Keynesianism that characterized the stimulus comfortably accommodated itself to the neoliberal policy predilections that have, over the last 20 years, become Democratic Party orthodoxy. Born of fashionable neoclassical economic theory and political expediency after the Reagan revolution, Democratic neoliberalism embraces the notion that private firms are better and more efficient at “picking winners,” technological and otherwise, than government. This cliche was never based on the real-world history of technological innovation or economic growth but rather upon the neoclassical assumption that governments must do a worse job than private actors since they are not motivated by profit and cannot act rationally.

    Even Jones, who spent recent years railing against neoliberal economic policies, accepts this neoliberal conceit. “The real solution to this whole thing is to put a price on carbon,” Jones told Pacifica’s Democracy Now in the fall of 2008. “The biggest economic stimulus I can imagine would be a carbon tax or a cap and trade… so that suddenly there is a market signal for private capital to start moving aggressively in a clean energy, low carbon direction.”

    But cap and trade could never deliver the millions of new jobs that Obama, Congressional Democrats, and greens promised. The primary obstacle to private sector investment in clean energy technologies is not the absence of modest carbon price signals such as those in the Congress’ cap and trade proposals and currently in place in Europe. Rather, it is the vast price gap between fossil fuels and clean energy technologies. While fossil fuels are energy dense, widely available, easy to consume, and supported by a well-developed infrastructure, the alternatives are costly, cumbersome, intermittent, or all of the above.

    Yet cap and trade enjoyed mainstream credibility for as long as it did in spite of these hard technological realities because economic models seemed to show that a rising carbon price would cause technological innovation and hence emissions reductions. Cap and traders used these models to argue that once we have a carbon price, the market would magically deliver technology innovation because private firms would have an incentive to invest to make those technologies better and cheaper.

    But the magic wasn’t in the market, it was in the models constructed by neoclassical economists, which simply assume substantial rates of technological change. Innovation — non-linear, unpredictable, and ephemeral — is understandably difficult to model. Perhaps more significantly, important innovations have as often as not been the result of public investments in technology which economists, following neoclassical doctrine, are loathe to acknowledge, much less include in their models.

    The real world gives us ample reason to be skeptical of carbon pricing claims. The European Union has had a cap-and-trade system in place since 2005, and Norway and Sweden have had carbon taxes since the early ’90s. None have spurred much innovation. On the contrary, much of Europe has been on a coal-plant-building binge over the last decade. Where European nations have advanced clean-energy technologies–whether wind in Denmark, nuclear in France, or solar in Germany–they did so through direct investments in those technologies that dwarfed the economic incentive provided by carbon pricing.

    The Ideology of Decline

    In late May, President Obama told employees at a solar panel factory in California, “I’m not prepared to cede American leadership” in clean energy. But that is in effect what his policies have done. While U.S. policymakers have fetishized carbon pricing and energy efficiency retrofitting, America’s competitors have been investing heavily to deepen their domination of solar, wind, nuclear, electric car, and high-speed rail technology and manufacturing.

    China, Japan and Korea have moved forward with aggressive plans to out-manufacture, out-innovate, and out-compete the United States in clean tech. China alone plans to spend more than $740 billion (5 trillion yuan) over the next 10 years. While neoclassical economists and their disciples in Washington have presided over the deindustrialization and financialization of the American economy, our economic competitors have used long-term investments to establish dominant positions in advanced, high value manufacturing sectors such as automobiles, electronics, information technology, and now clean tech.

    Obama too could have focused on winning a similarly long-term commitment to public investment in green innovation and manufacturing. Instead, he threw his political capital behind cap-and-trade. Despite the fact that the rising domination of key clean energy technologies by our economic rivals could in no way be attributed to a price on carbon — China, Japan, and Korea don’t even have one — Obama, his Congressional allies, and their cheerleaders in the media such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, have continued to insist that cap and trade legislation was the key to reestablishing U.S. competitiveness in clean tech.

    In truth, cap and trade was conceived as a strategy to minimize the cost of reducing emissions, not to create domestic industries or jobs. Indeed, economists typically argue that government should not even concern itself with such issues. To the neoclassical mind, making microchips is no better than making potato chips, as innovation expert Rob Atkinson wryly observes. If China is better at making solar panels and we are better at making foam insulation, then we should just buy our solar panels from China. From this point of view, creating low-skill construction jobs installing compact fluorescent light bulbs in old buildings has the same economic utility as creating high-skill jobs manufacturing solar panels and nuclear reactors for export.

    Apply these assumptions to climate and energy policy, and what you get is the failed Democratic agenda. Governments should cap carbon emissions and auction the right to pollute. Doing so would establish a price on carbon pollution that will make fossil fuels increasingly expensive and thus drive private investment and consumption to efficiency and renewables. If all those solar panels and windmills get made in China — so be it. America will still lead the world in potato chips or something else.

    This is not a recipe for American economic competitiveness in clean energy technology and manufacturing. America’s nascent clean energy industries need sustained public investments to survive and prosper. While neoliberal greens and their allies were hyperventilating over the death of cap and trade, the stimulus investments in technology and manufacturing were hard at work laying the foundations for a competitive clean economy. Though overshadowed by the public works-style efficiency programs, stimulus-funded investments in clean technology arguably saved the American renewables industry, which was in free-fall after the 2008 financial crisis.

    In contrast to the green public works projects, stimulus investments in manufacturing and innovation have largely done what they were intended to do — support an embryonic domestic industry and help improve clean energy technologies so that they can become competitive with fossil fuels. Those investments helped put American clean energy manufacturing back on a competitive footing globally, and, ironically, created more jobs at less cost than the green public works investments that were supposed to put millions of Americans back to work. Already, Deutsche Bank estimates that the stimulus grew U.S. battery manufacturers production capacity from two percent of the global market to 20 percent by 2012, and the story is similar for other technologies.

    Those technologies still have a long way to go before they will be good enough and cheap enough to become the basis for a sustained American economic renewal. But the road map for getting there looks a lot more like what America began through the stimulus investments in technology and manufacturing than through the green public works programs and carbon market making that have distracted the Administration and Congress for the better part of the last two years.

    This should not particularly surprise us as the history of industrialization and technology innovation in America is the history of government investment in technology. In the postwar era, the federal government made investments in the development and commercialization of new technologies such as nuclear power, computers, the Internet, biomedical research, jet turbines, solar power, wind power and countless other technologies at a scale that private firms simply could not have replicated. Those investments “crowded in” rather than crowded out private investment and the result was high growth and prosperity that benefited virtually every American.

    Unfortunately, neither Obama nor his fellow Democrats still seem to get it. While White House officials, in the wake of the collapse of cap and trade, tout the impressive short-term accomplishments of the stimulus investments in technology and manufacturing, they have done little to date to prevent them from expiring next year.

    Change We Can Believe In

    Obama appears genuinely moved by the vision of a clean-energy economy. He seems to have convinced himself, however, that America’s energy economy can be transformed through carbon markets and efficiency retrofits.

    The president’s proposal to “make clean energy the profitable kind of energy” — which was always code for making fossil fuels more expensive — today needs to be replaced by a focused effort to make clean energy cheap through innovation. Doing so will require large, direct, and sustained federal investments in new energy technologies. This focus on innovation may seem like an indirect way to create jobs, but history shows it is also the one with the strongest record of producing whole new industries — industries that have driven America’s long-term economic expansion.

    There is a growing consensus in favor of such an effort, which includes some conservatives and Republicans who opposed cap-and-trade. Support for greater investment in energy innovation includes corporate chieftains, such as Bill Gates, GE’s Jeff Immelt, and Intel founder Andy Grove, as well as dozens of Nobel laureate scientists and energy policy experts across the ideological spectrum.

    The failure of cap-and-trade to make it through the Senate may thus turn out to be a blessing in disguise. It spares the country a program that would have done little to help either the economy or the environment. And it gives Obama and the Democrats an opportunity to reconsider how they might build the clean-energy economy they were elected to deliver. With the right policies, the answer to the question Obama posed two years ago in Lansing — will the United States lead the way in creating clean-energy jobs? — can still be yes.

    This piece originally appeared at Breakthrough Blog.

    Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus are co-founders of the Breakthrough Institute and authors of Break Through.

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  • Freeing Energy Policy From The Climate Change Debate

    The 20-year effort by environmentalists to establish climate science as the primary basis for far-reaching action to decarbonize the global energy economy today lies in ruins. Backlash in reaction to “Climategate” and recent controversies involving the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s 2007 assessment report are but the latest evidence that such efforts have evidently failed.

    While the urge to blame fossil-fuel-funded skeptics for this recent bad turn of events has proven irresistible for most environmental leaders and pundits, forward-looking greens wishing to ascertain what might be salvaged from the wreckage would be well advised to look closer to home. Climate science, even at its most uncontroversial, could never motivate the remaking of the entire global energy economy. Efforts to use climate science to threaten an apocalyptic future should we fail to embrace green proposals, and to characterize present-day natural disasters as terrifying previews of an impending day of reckoning, have only served to undermine the credibility of both climate science and progressive energy policy.

    The Endless Weather Wars

    The habit of overstating the current state of climate science knowledge, and in particular our understanding of the relationship between global warming and present-day weather events, has been difficult for environmentalists to give up because, on one level, it has worked so well for them.

    Global warming first exploded into mass public consciousness in the summer of 1988, when droughts, fires in the Amazon, and heat waves in the United States were widely attributed as warning signs of an eco-apocalypse to come. Former U.S. Senator Tim Wirth held the first widely covered congressional hearing on the subject that summer and admits having targeted the hearing for the hottest day of the year and turned off the air conditioning in the room to ensure that the conditions would be sweltering for the assembled media.

    Such tactics have only intensified over the past two decades. In the run-up to U.N. climate talks in Kyoto in 1997, the Clinton Administration recruited Al Roker and other weathermen to explain global warming to the public. In 2006, Al Gore used his “Inconvenient Truth” slide show to link Hurricane Katrina, droughts, and floods to warming. And some environmental groups have routinely implied that present-day extreme weather and natural disasters are evidence of anthropogenic warming.

    But it turned out that both sides could play the weather game. Skeptics also started pointing to weather events like snowstorms as evidence of no warming. While environmental advocates frequently criticize opponents such as Sen. James Inhofe for conflating weather with climate, the reality is that both sides abuse the science in the service of their political agendas. Climate change models, created in an effort to understand the potential long-term effect of global warming on regional weather trends, can no more tell us anything useful about today’s extreme weather events than last month’s snow storms can inform us as to whether global warming is occurring.

    Climate Science Disasters

    For more than 20 years, advocates have simultaneously overestimated the certainty with which climate science could predict the future and underestimated the economic and technological challenges associated with rapidly decarbonizing the energy economy. The oft-heard mantra that “All we lack is political will” assumes that the solutions to global warming are close at hand and that the primary obstacle to implementing them is public ignorance fed by fossil-fuel-funded skeptics.

    Environmental advocates — with help from pollsters, psychologists, and cognitive scientists — have long understood that global warming represented a particularly problematic threat around which to mobilize public opinion. The threat is distant, abstract, and difficult to visualize. Faced with a public that has seemed largely indifferent to the possibility of severe climactic disruptions resulting from global warming, some environmentalists have tried to characterize the threat as more immediate, mostly by suggesting that global warming was already adversely impacting human societies, primarily in the form of increasingly deadly natural disasters.

    The result has been an ever-escalating set of demands on climate science, with greens and their allies often attempting to represent climate science as apocalyptic, imminent, and certain, in no small part so that they could characterize all resistance as corrupt, anti-scientific, short-sighted, or ignorant. Greens pushed climate scientists to become outspoken advocates of action to address global warming. Captivated by the notion that their voices and expertise were singularly necessary to save the world, some climate scientists attempted to oblige. The result is that the use, and misuse, of climate science by advocates began to wash back into the science itself.

    Little surprise then, that most of the recent controversies besetting climate science involve efforts to move the proximity of the global warming threat closer to the present. The most
    explosive revelations of Climategate involved disputed methodological techniques to merge multiple data sets (e.g., ice cores, tree rings, 20th century weather station readings) into a single global temperature trend line, the “hockey stick” graph. Whatever one thinks of the quality of the data sets, the methods used to combine them, or the efforts by some to shield the underlying data from critics, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that those involved were trying to fit the data to a trend that they already expected to see – namely that the spike in global carbon emissions in recent decades tracked virtually in lockstep with a concomitant spike in present-day global temperatures.

    Other faulty or sloppy claims in the IPCC’s voluminous reports — such as the contention that global warming could melt Himalayan glaciers by 2035 — followed the same pattern.

    Perhaps most problematic of all, with some environmentalists convinced that connecting global warming to natural disasters was the key to climate policy progress, researchers felt enormous pressure to demonstrate a link. But multiple studies using different methodologies and data sets show no statistically significant relationship between the rising cost of natural disasters and global warming. And according to a review sponsored by the U.S. National Science Foundation and Munich Re, researchers are unlikely to be able to unequivocally link storm or flood losses to anthropogenic warming for several decades, if even then. This is not because there is no evidence of increasing extreme weather, but rather because the rising costs of natural disasters have been driven so overwhelmingly by social and economic factors — more people with more wealth living in harm’s way.

    Yet prominent environmental advocates, including Al Gore, have continued to make claims linking global warming to natural disasters. And in its 2007 report, the IPCC — ignoring evidence to the contrary — misrepresented disaster-loss science when it published a graph linking global temperature increases with rising financial losses from natural disasters.

    Action in the Face of Uncertainty

    It was only a matter of time before such claims would begin to undermine public confidence in climate science. Weather is not climate and linguistic subterfuges, such as the oft-repeated assertion that extreme weather events and natural disasters are “consistent with” climate change, do not change the reality that advocates and scientists who make such assertions are conflating short-term weather events with long-term climactic trends in a way that simply cannot be supported by the science.

    For 20 years, greens and many scientists have overstated the certainty of climate disaster out of the belief that governments could not be motivated to act if they viewed the science as highly uncertain. And yet governments routinely take strong action in the face of highly uncertainty events. California requires strict building codes and has invested billions to protect against earthquakes even as earthquake science has shifted its focus from prediction to preparedness. Recently, the federal government mobilized impressively and effectively to prevent an avian flu epidemic whose severity was unknown.

    In the end, there is no avoiding the enormous uncertainties inherent to our understanding of climate change. Whether 350 parts per million of CO2 in the atmosphere, or 450 or 550, is the right number in terms of atmospheric stabilization, any prudent strategy to minimize future risks associated with catastrophic climate change involves decarbonizing our economy as rapidly as possible. Stronger evidence of climate change from scientists was never going to drive Americans to demand economically painful limits on carbon emissions or energy use. And uncertainty about climate science will not deter Americans from embracing energy and other policies that they perceive to be in the nation’s economic, national security, and environmental interest. This was the case in 1988 and is still largely the case today.

    But the danger now is that having spent two decades demanding that the public and policy-makers obey climate science, and having established certainty and scientific consensus as the standard by which climate action should be judged, environmentalists risk undermining the case for building a clean-energy economy. Having allowed the demands of advocacy efforts to wash back into the production of climate science, the danger today is that the discrediting of the science will wash back into the larger effort to transform our energy policy.

    Now is the time to free energy policy from climate science. In recent years, bipartisan agreement has grown on the need to decarbonize our energy supply through the expansion of renewables, nuclear power, and natural gas, as well as increased funding of research and development of new energy technologies. Carbon caps may remain as aspirational targets, but the primary role for carbon pricing, whether through auctioning pollution permits or a carbon tax, should be to fund low-carbon energy research, development, and deployment.

    No longer conscripted to justify and rationalize binding carbon caps or the modernization and decarbonization of our energy systems, climate science can get back to being primarily a scientific enterprise. The truth is that once climate science becomes detached from the expectation that it will establish a standard for allowable global carbon emissions that every nation on earth will heed, no one will much care about the hockey stick or the disaster-loss record, save those whose business, as scientists, is to attend to such matters.

    Climate science can still usefully inform us about the possible trajectories of the global climate and help us prepare for extreme weather and natural disasters, whether climate change ultimately results in their intensification or not. And understood in its proper role, as one of many reasons why we should decarbonize the global economy, climate science can even help contribute to the case for taking such action. But so long as environmentalists continue to demand that climate science drive the transformation of the global energy economy, neither the science, nor efforts to address climate change, will be well served.

    Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger are the authors of Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility and a recent collection of energy and climate writings, The Emerging Climate Consensus, with a preface by Ross Gelbspan, available for download at www.TheBreakthrough.org. In previous articles for Yale Environment 360, they have written about what they consider flaws in the cap-and-trade debate and why public concern in the U.S. about global warming has declined.

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  • Hyper-Partisans on the Green Politics Battlefield

    America is more polarized today than at any time since Reconstruction. A major quantitative analysis by social scientists Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal found today to be the most polarized period in 130 years.

    If you want to understand how it is that the debate over — for example — global warming policies became so shrill, consider the recent pattern of behavior by the country’s second-most read climate blogger, Joe Romm. We will argue – against those who pooh-pooh his influence – that Joe Romm is, in fact, far more influential today than Joe McCarthy was in the 1950s, a fact that, unfortunately, has proven poisonous to creating the consensus needed for serious action on climate.

    Today’s fractured and polarized media environment has allowed Joe Romm to become the most influential liberal climate activist in the country, largely because he has convinced liberals and Democrats that he is an energy and climate science expert. This explains why Nobel Prize Winner and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman says “I trust Joe Romm,” Thomas Friedman calls ClimateProgress.org “the indispensable blog,” Al Gore relies on him for technical analysis, and the Center for American Progress makes him the organization’s chief spokesperson on climate and energy issues.

    Partisan Identity as a Mental Short-Cut
    It’s no coincidence that America’s Climate McCarthyite-in-chief is a blogger at the largest liberal think tank and not a U.S. Senator. Busy fundraising and campaigning, members of Congress have largely outsourced the deliberative process of legislating to partisan interest groups and think tanks.

    Much has been written about the ideological echo chamber conservatives like Sen. James Inhofe, Rush Limbaugh, and Glen Beck have created to enforce anti-environmental orthodoxy on the Right. Less remarked upon has been the creation of its analog on the Left – an accomplishment in which Romm has taken a leading role. Romm has mastered the echo chamber in its liberal expression and creates a reassuring green womb for his growing cadre of loyal readers.

    Most importantly Romm functions to inform his readers of the partisan identity of any given thing, whether it be a new technology, policy, or analysis. Thus, when it came time for Romm to criticize a rather technical piece on the rising carbon intensity of the global economy that appeared in the journal Nature he attacked it not as inaccurate or incorrect, but rather as Republican:

    It will be no surprise to learn the central point of their essay, ironically titled “Dangerous Assumptions” is “Enormous advances in energy technology will be needed to stabilize atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations at acceptable levels,” which is otherwise known as the technology trap or the standard “Technology, technology, blah, blah, blah” delayer message developed by Frank Luntz and perfected by Bush/Lomborg/Gingrich.

    In other words, the Nature article was not what it claimed to be. It wasn’t an analysis suggesting that the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change should revisit its assumptions about decarbonization. It wasn’t an argument for stronger technology policies. No, it was a devious Republican message – one designed by Republican pollster Frank Luntz during the Bush years – to delay action.

    How then did Romm become convinced that, rather than being genuine, the “Dangerous Assumptions” analysis was, in fact, Republican propaganda? Because Romm’s Climate McCarthyism is, in large measure, the product of his Hyper-Partisan mind, one which sees everything through the gaze of Republican or Democratic, “climate denier” or “climate science advocate,” and “climate destroyer” or climate savior.

    Elsewhere Romm attacked Robert Mendelsohn, another leading environmental economist:

    When the global warming deniers and delayers at right wing think tanks like the Hoover Institute agree with your analysis, you should start to ask yourself whether you really know what you’re talking about.

    Get it? The economists in question should rethink their work not because their assumptions are wrong, or their findings invalid, but rather because a conservative think tank agrees with them.

    If You Do Not Agree Then You Must Be A Republican
    Romm does not simply enforce the existing Democratic discourse, he also seeks to narrow it, effectively reducing its appeal by making it more hysterical, shrill, and apocalyptic. Little surprise, then, that Romm felt the need to attack the views of environment writer Gregg Easterbrook for writing a critical review of Friedman’s book, which relied heavily on Romm’s apocalyptic interpretation of the climate science.

    Here’s Easterbrook:

    Why does the cocktail-party circuit embrace claims about a pending climate doomsday? Partly owing to our nation’s shaky grasp of science–many Americans lack basic understanding of chemicals, biology, and natural systems. Another reason is the belief that only exaggerated cries of crisis engage the public’s attention; but this makes greenhouse concern seem like just another wolf cry.

    Romm responded by calling Easterbrook – wait for it – Republican:

    Thanks to the Gregg Easterbrooks of the country — otherwise known as Reagan, Gingrich, Bush and McCain – the United States became only a bit player in a global industry it helped create and once dominated, a bit player in what will certainly be one of the largest job-creating industries in the world.

    Reading Romm, one would be hard pressed to conclude that Easterbrook was anything other than an opponent of action to reduce carbon emissions. In fact, Easterbrook is an advocate of the dominant Democratic and environmental approach to climate change, cap and trade. “Government should regulate greenhouse emissions,” he wrote in his review, “then let the free market sort out the details, including by funding the research.”

    Easterbrook’s policy agenda turns out to be closer to most national environmental groups than to Bush’s, Gingrich’s, or Luntz’s. If Easterbrook is recycling partisan talking points, they are mostly Democratic, not Republican ones, save for his view that global warming’s threat is real but not apocalyptic.

    McCarthyism in a Hyperpartisan Era
    Some readers have complained to us that Joe Romm is no Joe McCarthy. They are right. Joe Romm is far more influential. Others wonder why we criticize Romm, who believes passionately that global warming is occurring and that we must take action to address it, rather than Limbaugh or Inhofe, who reject climate science and oppose action.

    And yes, to be fair, McCarthy had the ability to get people fired and put on blacklists. In this way he was more powerful. But Romm shapes how a whole generation of Democratic leaders, liberals, and greens think about the most serious environmental problem in the world, climate change, and about the master resource, energy, in the most powerful economy humankind has ever created. In this way Romm is more influential. Those who wave away Romm’s influence are disconnected from our new hyper-partisan and fractured media reality.

    “The nation grows more politically segregated,” Nicholas Kristof quoted Bill Bishop, the author of the Big Sort, saying, “and the benefit that ought to come with having a variety of opinions is lost to the righteousness that is the special entitlement of homogeneous groups.”

    Joe Romm has the trust of liberals and Democrats, but not on the force of his arguments, the weight of his evidence, or the success of his agenda, for all are spectacular failures. As terrible as it may turn out to be, global warming is not “apocalypse now.” No, Joe Romm has won the trust of partisans because he tells them the story they want to hear better than anyone else. Unfortunately, hyper-partisans like Joe Romm are part of the problem, not the solution. Effective solutions to global warming cannot be enacted in our extremely divided political environment.

    Democratic partisans, liberals and greens have spent much of the last eight years tearing out our hair about all the ways the hyper-partisan it’s-all-a-hoax! Republicans have blocked action on climate. These complaints may have been cathartic, but they have not been productive. We have not had and cannot have any impact on Republicans, and our partisan apocalypse talk and our sacrifice-now agenda are obviously alienating the vast, moderate middle.

    The work of holding Republican obstructionists, anti-government extremists, and right-wing conspiracy mongers to task is work for principled conservatives, not liberals. The work of greens and liberals is to challenge the Democratic demagogues, the left-wing bullies, and the Climate McCarthyites who narrow and polarize the debate in ways that make effective policy action all but impossible. If we can hold our own hyper-partisans to account then fair-minded conservatives might do the same. For until the establishment and the grassroots on both left and right learn to say no to Joe Romm and to Glenn Beck, hyper-partisanship is here to stay.

    An earlier version of this article appeared at The Breakthrough Institute blog.

    Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus are co-founders of the Breakthrough Institute and authors of the seminal essay The Death of Environmentalism in 2004 and the controversial and critically acclaimed Break Through: Why We Can’t Leave Saving the Planet to Environmentalists in 2007. They are widely recognized experts on climate and energy policy and their work has deeply influenced a new generation of clean energy advocates.