Author: Nicole Gelinas

  • Eminent Domain as Central Planning

    Free markets are out of vogue. The unfortunate lesson that policymakers have learned over the past two years is that a big, brainy government that supposedly creates jobs is superior to irrational, faceless markets that just create catastrophic errors. So Washington has seized on the financial and economic crises to enlarge its role in managing the economy—controlling the insurance giant AIG, for example, and trying to maintain high housing prices through tax credits and “mortgage modification” programs.

    But when it comes to central economic planning, New York City and State are way ahead of the feds. Empire State politicians from both parties already believe that it’s their responsibility to replace people and businesses in allocating the economy’s resources. They’re even confident that their duty to design a perfect economy trumps their constituents’ right to hold private property. Three current cases of eminent-domain abuse in New York show how serious they are—and how much damage such government intrusiveness can wreak.

    Brooklyn’s Prospect Heights, industrial and forlorn for much of the late twentieth century, was looking better by 2003. Government was doing its proper job: crime was down, and the public-transit commute to midtown Manhattan, where many Brooklynites worked, was just 25 minutes. That meant that the private sector could do its job, too, rejuvenating the neighborhood after urban decay. Developers had bought 1920s-era factories and warehouses and converted them into condos for buyers like Daniel Goldstein, who paid $590,000 for a place in a former dry-goods warehouse in 2003. These new residents weren’t put off by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s railyards nearby, and they liked the hardwood floors and airy views typical of such refurbished buildings. They also settled in alongside longtime residents in little houses on quiet streets. Wealthier newcomers joined regulars at Freddy’s, a bar that predated Prohibition. Small businesses continued to employ skilled laborers in low-rise industrial buildings.

    But Prospect Heights interested another investor: developer Bruce Ratner, who thought that the area would be perfect for high-rise apartments and office towers. Ratner didn’t want to do the piecemeal work of cajoling private owners into selling their properties, however. Instead, he appealed to the central-planning instincts of New York’s political class. Use the state’s power to seize the private property around the railyards, he told Governor George Pataki, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and Brooklyn borough president Marty Markowitz. Transfer me the property, and let me buy the railyards themselves below the market price. I’ll build my development, Atlantic Yards, around a world-class basketball arena.

    New York, in short, would give Ratner an unfair advantage, and he would return some of the profits reaped from that advantage by creating the “economic benefits” favored by the planning classes. Architecture critics loved Frank Gehry’s design for the arena. Race activist Al Sharpton loved the promise of thousands of minority jobs. The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (Acorn) loved the prospect of administering the more than 2,000 units of “affordable” housing planned for the development, as well as the $1.5 million in loans and grants that Ratner gave it outright. When the state held public hearings in 2006 to decide whether to approve Atlantic Yards, hundreds of supplicants, hoping for a good job or a cheap apartment, easily drowned out the voices of people like Goldstein, who wanted nothing from the government except the right to keep their homes.

    Can New York legally seize private property and transfer it to a developer purely for economic development? The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution allows the government to take property for a “public use,” long understood to mean such things as roads and railways, so long as it makes “just compensation” for them. Starting around the 1930s, a number of court cases began to broaden “public use” to include more nebulous “public purposes,” such as slum clearance. And in 2005, in Kelo v. New London, the Supreme Court decided that these “public purposes” could even include economic development. But New York’s constitution theoretically holds the state to a higher standard. In 1967, Empire State voters voted not to add a “public purpose” clause to their constitution, preferring to stick with the stricter requirement of “public use.”

    The state hasn’t let this inconvenience derail its plans for Prospect Heights, however. For seven decades, courts have let New York seize and demolish slum housing if it’s blighted—which New York State defines as “substandard” and “unsanitary.” So the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), a public entity of New York State, decided that the “public use” of Atlantic Yards would be blight removal. The city had already designated part of the neighborhood as “blighted” 40 years earlier, long before its resurgence. As for the rest, the UDC commissioned consultants—previously employed by Ratner—who soon returned the requisite blight finding.

    But wait, you say: people don’t buy half-million-dollar apartments in “substandard” or “unsanitary” neighborhoods. You’re right; that’s why the consultants had to stretch. In the 1930s, as Goldstein’s attorney, Matthew Brinckerhoff, pointed out, “substandard” and “unsanitary” meant “families and children dying from rampant fires and pestilence” in tuberculosis-ridden firetraps. In 2006, by contrast, the UDC’s consultants found “substandard” conditions in isolated graffiti, cracked sidewalks, and “underutilization”—that is, when property owners weren’t using their land to generate the social and economic benefits that the government desired.

    In New York, this creative definition of blight is the new central-planning model. Consultants have also cited “underutilization” in West Harlem, where the city’s Economic Development Corporation wants to take land from private owners and hand it to Columbia University for an expansion project. Says Norman Siegel, who represents the owners: “A private property owner has the right to determine the best productive use of his property. It’s not a right to be ceded to any government.”

    And in Queens, the Bloomberg administration is preparing a similar argument to grab swaths of Willets Point, an area adjacent to Citi Field that’s populated with auto-repair shops. The city’s recent “request for qualifications” from would-be developers drew a sharp response from the people who owned the land: “We . . . hold the most significant qualification of all: we own the properties. We are motivated to improve and use our own properties, consistent with the American free market system. We would have done so in spectacular fashion already, had the city upheld its end of the bargain by providing our neighborhood with essential services and infrastructure.” Instead, the city has done the opposite, letting streets disintegrate into ditches to bolster its blight finding. The perversity is astonishing: rather than doing its own job of maintaining public infrastructure and public safety, the government wants to do the private sector’s job—and is going about it by starving that private sector of public resources.

    Property owners have looked to the judiciary to check the overweening grasp of the legislative and executive branches. But courts can be wrong for longer than it takes to save a neighborhood. In Brooklyn, Goldstein and his neighbors have lost their lawsuits—most recently, in New York’s highest court, the court of appeals. In November, the court decided 6–1 that “all that is at issue is a reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the area in question is in fact substandard and insanitary. This is not a sufficient predicate for us to supplant [the state’s] determination.” The court essentially abdicated its duty to protect property owners from the governor and the Legislature.

    Nine days later, the West Harlem owners fared better in a lower court. The first department of the state supreme court’s appellate division found, 3–2, that the blight studies that the city and state had commissioned to justify their rapacity were “bereft of facts”—and further tainted by the fact that one blight consultant also worked for Columbia. The blight designation “is mere sophistry,” the majority concluded, “hatched to justify the employment of eminent domain.” The court further noted that “even a cursory examination of the study reveals the idiocy of considering things like unpainted block walls or loose awning supports as evidence of a blighted neighborhood. Virtually every neighborhood in the five boroughs will yield similar instances of disrepair.”

    The selective and arbitrary process that deems one neighborhood blighted while leaving a similar neighborhood alone also violates due process, the justices went on, as “one is compelled to guess what subjective factors will be employed in each claim of blight.” Another violation: the government responded poorly to property owners’ document requests under the state’s freedom of information law, hampering their right to mount a solid case. Such requests are particularly important in eminent-domain cases because New York property owners don’t enjoy the right to a trial with a discovery phase, but must go straight to appeals court—a seventies-era “reform” meant to speed up development projects.

    The Harlem owners were able to convince the lower court partly because they had commissioned their own “no-blight” study. “We said, ‘Let’s create our own record . . . as a counterweight,’ ” said Siegel. The owners also presented as evidence a government study, performed before Columbia showed interest in the land, that West Harlem was revitalizing itself. This is all very well—but property rights shouldn’t depend on owners’ creativity and resourcefulness in proving beyond all reasonable doubt that their land isn’t blighted.

    Further, the lower-court ruling is a tenuous victory. The case is proceeding to the court of appeals, and though Siegel is “cautiously optimistic” that it will rule in his clients’ favor, there’s no way to be sure. Meantime, Goldstein and fellow residents and business owners in Brooklyn have asked the court of appeals to reconsider its Atlantic Yards ruling after it rules on Harlem. But the starkly different decisions in the Harlem and Brooklyn cases, coming so close together, have pointed up the need for the Legislature and Governor David Paterson to create clear standards for the government’s power to seize property.

    An obvious step is to dispense with “underutilization” as a justification for a taking. As the court noted in the Harlem case, “the time has come to categorically reject eminent domain takings solely based on underutilization. This concept . . . transforms the purpose for blight removal from the elimination of harmful social and economic conditions . . . to a policy affirmatively requiring the ultimate commercial development of all property.”

    But the state should go even further and eliminate blight itself as a justification for property seizure. Since the sixties, when creeping blight seemed to threaten the city’s existence, New York has learned that the real remedy for “substandard” conditions is good policing and infrastructure, which create the conditions for people and companies to move to neighborhoods and improve them. As for 1930s-style “unsanitary” conditions, modern health care, infrastructure, and building codes have eliminated them. Today, the biggest risks to public health are often on government property: dangerous elevators in public housing, for instance, or the 2007 fire that killed two firefighters in the Deutsche Bank building in lower Manhattan, owned by the city and state since 9/11. Unless it needs property to build a road, a subway line, a water-treatment plant, or a similar piece of truly public infrastructure—or unless a piece of land poses a clear and present danger to the public—the state should keep its hands off people’s property.

    Eminent-domain abuse, dangerous though it is, is a symptom of a deeper problem: government officials’ belief that central planning is superior to free-market competition. That’s what New York has decided in each of its current eminent-domain cases. In Brooklyn, high-rise towers and an arena are better than a historic low-rise neighborhood; in Harlem, an elite university’s expansion project is better than continued private investment; and in Willets Point, Queens, almost anything is better than grubby body shops.

    To cure yourself of the notion that the government can do better than free markets in producing economic vitality, stroll around Atlantic Yards. You’ll walk past three-story clapboard homes nestled next to elegantly corniced row houses—the supposedly blighted residences that the state plans to demolish. You’ll see the Spalding Building, a stately sporting-goods-factory-turned-condo-building that, thanks to Ratner and his government allies, has been slated for demolition and now stands empty. You’ll peer up at Goldstein’s nearly empty apartment house, scheduled to be condemned and destroyed.

    And you’ll see how wrecking balls have already made the neighborhood gap-toothed. A vacant lot, for example, now sprawls where the historic Ward Bakery warehouse was, until recently, a candidate for private-sector reinvestment. Today, Prospect Heights finally shows what the state and city governments want everyone to see: decay. The decay, though, isn’t the work of callous markets that left the neighborhood to perish. It’s the work of a developer wielding state power to press property owners to sell their land “voluntarily.” It’s also the result of a half-decade’s worth of government-created uncertainty, which stopped genuine private investment in its tracks.

    Such uncertainty offers a crucial lesson to the rest of the nation, and not just in the area of eminent domain. Whenever government fails to confine itself to a limited role in the economy, it creates similar uncertainty. Even when the results aren’t as poignantly obvious as they are in Brooklyn, the private economy suffers—whether it’s financial or auto bailouts unfairly benefiting some firms at the expense of others, or mortgage bailouts unfairly benefiting some home buyers at the expense of others. Free markets may be imperfect, but they’re far better than the alternative—the blight of arbitrary government control and the uncertainty that it creates.

    This article originally appeared at City Journal. Research for this article was supported by the Brunie Fund for New York Journalism.

    Nicole Gelinas, a City Journal contributing editor and the Searle Freedom Trust Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, is a Chartered Financial Analyst and the author of After the Fall.

    Photo: Tracy Collins

  • New York’s Next Fiscal Crisis

    Mayor Bloomberg needs to prepare the city for the crash of the Wall Street gravy train.

    New York City, dependent on Wall Street for a quarter-century, has gotten used to harsh cyclical economic downturns, including the lending contraction in the early nineties and the bursting technology bubble in 2000. But today’s turmoil may be not a cyclical downturn for Wall Street but instead the beginning of an era of sharply lower profits as it rethinks its entire business model. If so, it will produce the biggest economic adjustment and fiscal challenge that New York has confronted in more than three decades. If the city’s leaders don’t recognize this challenge and move quickly to meet it, New York could soon face an acute fiscal crisis rivaling its near-bankruptcy in the mid-seventies.

    Such a fate—almost unthinkable to a city that has grown complacent about its world-class standing—could set Gotham back in the colossal strides that it has made over the past two decades in restoring its citizens’ quality of life. As Mayor Michael Bloomberg said in May, we must “pray that Wall Street does well.” But we’d better have a plan if it doesn’t.

    Wall Street bankrolled New York’s long recovery from the seventies because New York, through its long economic, fiscal, and social deterioration, managed to keep its position as the nation’s financial capital just as finance was about to take off. In the early eighties, the nation’s financial industry—particularly Wall Street—was feeling its way toward a sweet spot where it would stay for two decades. As Federal Reserve chief Paul Volcker brought inflation under control, creating a stable environment for financial innovation and a stable currency for the world’s savings, baby boomers and international investors flocked to U.S. markets. The Dow Jones Industrial Average tripled between 1982 and 1990, despite the ’87 crash, while the assets of securities brokers and dealers more than doubled as a share of America’s financial assets. The financial industry also saw a huge opportunity in Americans’ increasing love of debt, creatively packaging it into everything from mortgage-backed securities to junk bonds and then selling it to investors. Between the early 1980s and the early 1990s, the financial sector’s profits as a percentage of the nation’s income more than doubled. The sector’s pretax income as a percentage of all national income started a similar march upward. Profits at securities firms, while choppy, easily doubled between the early eighties and the end of the decade (all numbers are inflation-adjusted unless indicated otherwise).
    Graph by Alberto Mena.

    New York reaped massive rewards from Wall Street’s good fortune. The city’s financial-industry employment grew by 14 percent in the eighties—more than triple the job growth in its other private-sector industries. Jobs in the securities industry in particular, which had decreased in the seventies, grew by more than a third. Since these positions were high-paying, they had an outsize impact: by the late eighties, according to the

    Fed, financial services contributed nearly 23 percent of New Yorkers’ wages and salaries, up more than 60 percent from the previous decade. And financiers’ heavy spending supported other jobs, from restaurant workers and interior decorators to teachers and nurses.

    For evidence of how Wall Street started to lure newcomers to New York, look to Hollywood. Movies chronicling Gotham’s grim decline, like Taxi Driver (1976) and Escape from New York (1981), gave way to films portraying the heady excitement of making millions in the city, like Wall Street (1987) and Working Girl (1988). While much of the city remained grimy and dangerous, the excitement outweighed those factors for young, child-free baby boomers who paid high taxes without requiring many city services. The result: after hemorrhaging nearly 10 percent of its population between 1970 and 1980, New York gained nearly 4 percent back between 1980 and 1990. The city’s tax take in 1981 had been slightly lower than its take a decade before; but by 1991, it was raking in a third more than in 1981.

    This money allowed New York to reverse some of its bone-scraping seventies-era budget cuts and to invest in infrastructure without making the politically difficult choice of cutting deeply into social services. In the seventies, the city had laid off nearly 3,000 police officers and 1,500 sanitation workers; in 1985, Mayor Ed Koch hired 5,300 cops and almost 1,000 sanitation workers. In the 1990s, it was largely Wall Street’s breakaway success that gave Mayor Rudy Giuliani the financial resources to focus on making New York City safe again.

    If high finance found its sweet spot in the eighties, it reached dizzying sugar highs starting in the late nineties and continuing, after recovering from the tech bust and 9/11, until last year. The nation was awash in the world’s money, encouraging record lending and speculation as well as the creation of more financial products, which yielded banks massive profits. By 2006, the financial industry’s corporate profits as a percentage of the nation’s income had doubled once again.

    It seemed that nothing could go wrong for Wall Street once it had bounced back from the tech bubble’s burst. With the dollar serving as the expanding global economy’s reserve currency, banks had oodles of money to lend. Cheap Asian imports were keeping prices and inflation expectations low, allowing central bankers to justify low interest rates. Beginning in the nineties, traditional consumer banks—previously tightly regulated to protect government guarantees for their depositors—began taking investment risks that once had been confined to Wall Street. As time went on, investment banks became more dependent on fees from debt backed by home mortgages and other consumer products, further blurring traditional lines between investment and consumer banking.

    The financial world took advantage of the easy money and better technology. It booked high fees by designing ever more complicated “structured finance” products, backed by riskier home mortgages as well as corporate loans. Wall Street sold these products to international investors, who couldn’t get enough of American debt, by making a seductive pitch: the products were structured so intricately that even risky mortgages were as safe as government bonds, and they paid better interest rates. Further, if an investor ever had to sell a mortgage-backed security after he had purchased it from a bank, it was a cinch, since Wall Street had “securitized” individual loans—that is, taken thousands of them at a time, sliced them up, and turned them into easily tradable bonds of different risk levels.

    In addition to lending, Wall Street was borrowing at record levels so that it could take bigger and bigger risks with its shareholders’ money, making up for lower profit margins on businesses like equity underwriting and merger advisories. Wall Street’s borrowing as a multiple of its shareholders’ equity was 60 percent above its long-term average by the end of last year (with sharp increases over the past few years). Firms were taking even more risks than that figure indicates, setting up arcane, off-the-books “investment vehicles” with shareholders still vulnerable if something went wrong.

    As banks and financiers got unimaginably rich, so did the city. The finance industry’s contribution to New Yorkers’ wages and salaries topped out at over 35 percent two years ago. Last year, the city took in 41 percent more in taxes than it did in 2000, capping off an era of unprecedented revenue growth. While the city’s stratospheric property market—itself a function of Wall Street bonuses and easy money—drove much of that increase through property-related taxes, corporate tax revenues rose by 52 percent, personal income tax revenues by nearly 20 percent, and banking tax revenues by nearly 200 percent.
    Graph by Alberto Mena.

    But today, the financial industry may be entering a wilderness period of lower profits, employment, and bonuses. “Whether it’s financials as a share of the stock market or financials as a share of GDP, we’ve peaked,” ISI Group analyst Tom Gallagher told the Wall Street Journal in April. One measure of how this downturn differs from those in the recent past: some Wall Street firms, after their disastrous miscalculations, are operating today only because the Fed, as Bear Stearns melted down in March, decided to start lending to investment banks, which it doesn’t normally regulate or protect.

    A new alignment of global demographics, inflation expectations, and interest rates may spell long-term trouble for the city’s premier industry. A decade ago, cheap Asian goods kept prices and inflation expectations down; today, Asia’s growth is pushing them up. Ballooning energy prices and too-low interest rates threaten to yield sustained inflation. America now faces intense competition—particularly from the euro—for the world’s savings and investment, meaning that it can’t depend on attracting as large a portion of the world’s nest egg to keep interest rates down. “It is not credible that the world will revert to the same level of capital flow to the U.S. after the credit crunch is over,” Jerome Booth, research head of U.K.-based Ashmore Investment Management, noted recently. The Fed can keep official rates low only at the risk of inflation and more capital flight. The end of cheap money means that the market for future debt may shrink, squeezed by tougher borrowing terms, cutting off a crucial profit line for banks.

    Regulators, too, will be harder on the banks. Because investment banks now benefit from taxpayer-guaranteed debt, taxpayers must be protected. The feds probably won’t let firms borrow from private lenders at the levels that they have over the past decade, and it’s unlikely that they’ll let banks rely so intensely on short-term debt—which is cheaper, but riskier, than long-term debt. (Short-term lenders can flee quickly, as the Bear Stearns crash showed, because they have the option of yanking their money out of investments, often overnight, while long-term lenders are stuck with the bets that they’ve made.) Less borrowing means lower profits, and not just temporarily. Regulation might also curtail Wall Street’s lucrative business of complex derivatives, another huge area of risk. Plus, international stock listings continue to bypass New York for Asia and Europe because of the six-year-old Sarbanes-Oxley law, which imposes an unnecessary regulatory burden on companies publicly traded in the U.S., and also because the world’s growth has moved east. Such losses could be ignored only when debt and derivatives were making up for it.

    The skepticism of Wall Street’s own investors and clients, though, is the real deal-breaker. The most startling news out of the current crisis is that Merrill Lynch, UBS, and others didn’t know that they had taken certain risks for shareholders, lenders, and clients until they were already reporting tens of billions in losses. Clients and investors shouldn’t mind losses when they understand the risks that they’re taking. They do mind if, after the firm that they’re investing in or doing business with has insisted that its careful models and safeguards protect them, it turns out that its only protection from bankruptcy is Uncle Sam.

    International investors will not again blindly trust Wall Street’s ability to assess and allocate risk. “Market participants now seem to be questioning the financial architecture itself,” Fed governor Kevin Warsh said recently. Don’t forget the stock market’s performance, either: it hasn’t been impressive over the past eight years.

    New York City, so dependent on the financial industry’s continued growth, should shudder.

    If Mayor Bloomberg and his successor view the current downturn as another short blip, rather than a long readjustment of the financial industry’s share of the economy, and they turn out to be wrong, the decisions that they make could prove ruinous. Over the past two and a half decades, whenever the financial industry underwent one of its periodic downturns, New York stuck to the same playbook: jack up taxes to make up for lower tax revenues, cut spending a bit, and wait for the financial industry to come roaring back. During the early nineties’ credit crunch, Mayor David Dinkins slapped two temporary surcharges on the income tax; one still persists. In 2002 and 2003, after the tech bust and 9/11, Bloomberg temporarily hiked income and sales taxes and permanently hiked the property tax.

    Those tax increases were never wise because they kept less profitable industries and their lower-paid employees out, making New York ever more dependent on finance. Even the financial industry didn’t ignore the tax hikes; partly in response, it sent back-office, five-figure-a-year jobs to cheaper cities, and as a result, New York today has less than one-fourth of the nation’s securities-industry jobs, down from one-third two decades ago. Still, the industry was growing so fast that it and its workers could withstand the higher costs posed by the tax increases.

    But what was once merely unwise could be calamitous today. Consider the last time that New York tried raising taxes when its premier industry was about to shrink—the mid-sixties, when the city’s leaders arrogantly believed that its record population of 7.9 million people, in the middle of a record economic boom, wouldn’t mind paying for a breathtaking array of Great Society social programs, as well as fattened public-employee benefits. In 1965, the New York Times had reminded city leaders that “New York City’s economy is prospering,” and its editorialists decreed a year later that “strong medicine, specifically higher taxes, is the remedy for restoring New York’s financial health.”

    Mayor John Lindsay, with state support, enacted the city’s first personal income taxes, as well as new business taxes, in 1966. New York went on to lose half of its 1 million manufacturing jobs between 1965 and 1975—a trauma as great as Wall Street’s troubles today, because in 1960, manufacturing had accounted for more than a quarter of New York’s jobs. At the same time, the city was also losing its collection of corporate headquarters and their legions of well-paid employees. By the end of the seventies, half of its 140 Fortune 500 companies had fled the city.

    New York didn’t anticipate this change or understand its significance as it was happening. Well into the early seventies, the city thought that it could keep taxing and spending because the future was bound to mirror the “Soaring Sixties.” City officials argued that fleeing companies were evidence of New York’s success because some companies just couldn’t afford to be here any longer. Worse, the city’s leaders didn’t understand how quickly urban quality of life could deteriorate: as they focused on social spending rather than vital public services like policing, murders shot up from 645 in 1965 to 1,146 just five years later. Nor did they realize how quickly middle-class residents would flee, taking their tax dollars with them.

    For a while, the city and its lenders found a way around these miscalculations. New York stepped up its borrowing against future tax revenue in the late sixties and early seventies, paying the banks back when the following year’s tax receipts rolled in. The foolishness of such a plan was always obvious: three years before the city skirted bankruptcy, the Times reported, Albany skeptics warned that large-scale temporary borrowing was folly. But even as economic and fiscal conditions worsened, the city kept spending and spending. In 1970, city leaders were heartened by the judgment of bond-rating agency Dun & Bradstreet, which noted New York’s “extraordinary economic strength . . . and long-range credit stability.” (Then, as now, ratings agencies weren’t good at predicting acute crises.) In 1972, as what had once seemed like a short downturn stretched on, Times editorialists encouraged complacency, noting that “after all the years of . . . warnings of imminent municipal bankruptcy, it is reassuring to find investors . . . bullish about the outlook for New York City’s long-term financial soundness.”

    By late 1974, however, as rising spending outpaced tax receipts, a crisis was inevitable. It came the following spring, when New York wrestled with a budget deficit that equaled 14 percent of its expected spending and creditors cut the city off. Forced to throw itself at the mercy of the state and federal governments for emergency funding, Gotham gutted trash pickup and policing, murders climbed to 1,500 annually, and more residents left.

    Millennial New York likes to think of itself as vastly superior to the troubled city of the 1970s. But once again, on the brink of what may be a major economic upheaval—this time, involving the financial sector rather than manufacturing—it is reacting with disturbing complacency. And yet again, the mayor has allowed the budget to swell dangerously during the good times, which could push leaders to make the same mistakes as were made in the sixties and seventies: raising taxes at precisely the wrong time and slashing vital services under pressure to keep up social and public-employee spending.

    During the past decade, New York used the cash that Wall Street was showering on the city not to ease its long-term problems but to make them worse. In 1974, under Lindsay, the city devoted one-quarter of its budget to social spending: welfare, health services, and charities. Today, the city continues to spend one-quarter of its budget on social services (not including the public schools’ vast social-services component). Nor has New York reformed the pensions and size of its still-huge public workforce, reduced debt costs, or cut Medicaid costs fueled by Albany’s powerful medical lobby, which helps ensure that New York’s per-capita Medicaid spending—rife with waste and fraud—is the highest in the nation. Even after adjusting for inflation and considerable population recovery, the city’s tax-funded budget for 2008 is 22 percent higher than it was at its Lindsay-era peak. While spending rose just 9 percent or so during the Giuliani era, it has risen three times as fast since—the highest rate since Lindsay left office.

    Echoing a time when people said that New York was ungovernable, Mayor Bloomberg often calls these costs “uncontrollable.” But there was no better time to start controlling them than during the past half-decade, an era of unparalleled prosperity and public safety when Bloomberg had an opportunity available to no other modern mayor. If he had successfully bargained with Albany and union employees to require new workers to contribute more to their pensions and health benefits, we would have seen the results by now. Likewise, if he had worked with Albany to rein in Medicaid spending—now nearly $6 billion a year—the city could have spent some of that money to build schools and fix roads, reducing debt costs. Instead, we’ve got a politically powerful public workforce that commands benefits belonging to another era and that remains vulnerable to corruption despite this generosity, as recent construction investigations show.

    The mayor has also sharply increased spending in one area that was easily controllable: the city’s public schools budget, up by more than one-third since 2001 even though enrollment is down 4 percent. Much of that spending funds plusher teachers’ salaries and the higher pensions that follow, plus borrowing costs for school construction and rehab, making it harder to cut than it was to increase. Today, the education budget is nearly $21 billion: one-third of the entire budget, and more than police, fire, and sanitation combined.
    Graph by Alberto Mena.

    Bloomberg’s failure to control costs during the boom means that big trouble looms. The city projects that spending over the next three years will increase by more than 20 percent, while revenues will increase by just 13 percent (neither figure is adjusted for inflation). If that happens, a $5 billion–plus deficit—more than 11 percent of tax-funded spending—will result in two years’ time. Moreover, that’s the best-case scenario, based on the city comptroller’s prediction of low growth this year and next and a quick, though weak, recovery after that. But the mayor expects a 7.5 percent economic contraction this year, followed by a smaller contraction. If that happens, revenues might not rise as much as 13 percent; in fact, they might shrink, as they often did in the seventies (and again in 1990 and 2002).

    This risk is especially acute because our progressive tax structure and the growth in wealth of our richest citizens over the past two decades make New York highly dependent on the rich, whose income is volatile. Two years ago, the top 1 percent of taxpayers paid nearly 48 percent of the city’s personal income taxes even after adjusting for the temporarily higher tax rate, up from 46 percent in 2000, 41 percent a decade ago, and 34 percent two decades ago, according to economist Michael Jacobs at the city’s independent budget office. A few bad years for the city’s wealthiest translate into a few terrible years for their home base.

    Cutting a $5 billion deficit—let alone an even larger one—is a formidable task even when done slowly. Cutting such a deficit in a hurry two years from now, under an inexperienced mayor, will endanger the city’s vitality. It’s not too late for Bloomberg to prepare the budget for a painful economic adjustment, and not just by cutting around the edges of the “controllable” budget, as he’s prudently done this year and last.

    The first principle is to do no harm on the tax side. Bloomberg will allow a temporary property-tax cut to expire, and he has told the Times: “If all else fails, we’re not going to walk away from providing services, and only then would I think about a tax increase, and my hope is that we’ll avoid it.” He’ll have to: while the city has proved that it can squeeze higher taxes out of a phenomenal growth industry, that trick won’t work on an industry that’s stagnant or in decline. New York’s sky-high income taxes for businesses and residents already put the city at a huge disadvantage, since they keep away lower-paying jobs from media, technology, and other industries that otherwise might be attracted by lower housing costs and commercial rents in the coming years. The city can’t afford to make this disadvantage any worse.

    Second, the mayor must carefully manage his budget cuts. This year, he proposed largely across-the-board cuts of about 6 percent in projected spending, covering everything from police and sanitation to homeless services and education. He also enacted a 20 percent slash to the long-term capital budget, which funds physical infrastructure. But this strategy won’t work for long. Vital services can’t withstand deep cuts. The mayor must not alienate the middle class, whose tax revenues he needs, and that means protecting the police department, cleaning streets, and keeping libraries open. (His May delay in hiring 1,000 new police officers for more than a year, even as New Yorkers are becoming wary of crime again, is worrisome.) Further, failing to fix decaying infrastructure isn’t a way to save money. It’s no different from borrowing to pay for other expenses, since waiting will worsen deterioration and mean more expenses later.

    So as Bloomberg readies his final budget over the next year, he’ll have to choose the deepest cuts to projected spending carefully, even though it requires fighting the city council, which nixed half his proposed cuts this year and especially protected education. Rising education spending under both Bloomberg and Giuliani hasn’t improved scores on national tests, after all. And within the capital budget, the city should reduce its spending on economic-development and affordable-housing subsidies in order to fund things like roads and transit adequately. Furthermore, New York pols should stop regarding the operating and capital budgets as unrelated. Ten percent of Medicaid’s $6 billion annual take would go a long way toward upgrading the city’s roads and subways. Last, tens of millions of dollars in politically connected earmarks by both the mayor and the council are unsavory in good times and unconscionable in bad.

    But ultimately, the mayor can’t fix the city’s budget without addressing its “uncontrollable” half, whose growth will be responsible for three-fourths of the deficit in three years’ time. Bloomberg—and his successor—can use fiscal stress to advantage in bargaining for changes in city contracts. In the past, in fact, the city’s biggest bargaining gains have come during fiscal turmoil. As Charles Brecher and Raymond D. Horton noted in their 1993 book, Power Failure: New York City Politics and Policy Since 1960, the city won sanitation productivity gains in 1981, while it was suffering the fallout from the fiscal crisis of the 1970s, and a less costly pension tier two years later. While police officers won a raise this year that was necessary to attract recruits, the mayor must not let the city’s other unions bring home similar gains through contract renegotiation.

    The city’s contract with more than 100,000 non-uniformed workers expired this spring, presenting an opportunity. New York should negotiate to get this union, DC-37, to allow new employees to accept a pension plan in which the city contributes to workers’ private accounts, rather than guarantees a pension for life. The independent budget office estimates sizable budget savings here—nearly $100 million annually—within half a decade. Requiring health-insurance-premium payments of 10 percent from these workers and retirees would save half a billion dollars more; extending the workweek from 35 and 37 hours to 40 (imagine!) would net another half-billion, savings that the next administration will dearly need if Wall Street doesn’t roar back. The mayor (and his potential successors) must impress upon unions that their members won’t get a better deal if they wait.

    But why the urgency? After all, New York has huge advantages today. Half a century ago, suburban growth was driven by cheap fuel, fast commutes, and low crime. Today, suburbs are choked off by congestion, $5-a-gallon gas, and bad public schools. The city’s governance approach is also different. If crime starts to rise, we know what to do: aggressively police neighborhoods and prosecute and sentence defendants appropriately. And the city’s new citizens—many of whom have invested their lives’ savings in their homes—should help politicians keep some focus, counterbalancing to some extent the organized pressure to sacrifice all else for education spending. The city’s budget has safety latches, too. New York’s fiscal near-death in the seventies spurred the state to impose extraordinary oversight and brought about local changes. The city can’t borrow much today for operating spending. It must balance its budget annually and project four years’ worth of expected spending and revenues, submitting the results to a state board.

    Yet these advantages aren’t limitless, as recent high-profile shootings in Harlem and Far Rockaway indicate. If a mayor lets crime spiral out of control over a crucial one- or two-year period, it will be harder to control later. The middle class won’t be patient for long if its voice isn’t heard, and the city’s “global” upper class is much more transient than it was 40 years ago. Plus, with one-third of the population leaving every decade, New York must continually attract new residents. As for city finances: no amount of regulation can guard against complacency. The city couldn’t have balanced its budget this year and reduced next year’s deficit if not for the huge surplus that Wall Street provided last year, before it ran out of steam. The city doesn’t have to default on its bonds to get into trouble, as it nearly did three decades ago, moreover. Sacrificing quality of life so that it can pay those bonds would do as much damage. Finally, if the city does need help, it can’t look to New York State to bail it out, as it did 33 years ago: this time around, Albany might be in equally dire straits.

    Even if we do all the hard work of fixing the budget and in two years’ time, Wall Street is defiantly humming along, once more channeling record tax revenues into the city’s coffers, the steps that we take today won’t have been wasted. By acting now, Bloomberg will enable his successor to consider income tax cuts and infrastructure investment. Just as we prepare for a terrorist attack that we hope will never come, we have to prepare for a fiscal and economic crisis that we hope will never come. The risk is real.

    Nicole Gelinas, a City Journal contributing editor and the Searle Freedom Trust Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, is a Chartered Financial Analyst. This article appeared in the Summer 2008 City Journal.