New Geography

Author: Richard Morrill

  • Industry, inequality and the middle classes

    The financial collapse dominates the news, but its unregulated rise is not unrelated to the relative decline of manufacturing over the last quarter century, and the outsourcing of much of industrial production. One consequence of this de-industrialization and financialization of everything has been an astounding increase in inequality, a massive concentration of wealth at the very top and the squeezing of the middle classes.

    Places that remained strong in manufacturing tend to have had and still have lower inequality than places more dependent on services, lowly to professional, and experienced a smaller change in inequality. This case has been argued by many, perhaps most eloquently by Zimmermann and Beal (2002) in Manufacturing Works, and by Scott (2003) The High Price of Free Trade.

    Zimmermann argues the importance of industrial production for national and local prosperity. In Part 2, “Changing geography and what it means”, he treats the relocation of industry, and then follows with “Counties gaining momentum:, Counties losing momentum, and Big City Blues (Philadelphia and beyond)”. He notes the huge northeastern losses in industry coincided with increased inequality, e.g., New York, St. Louis, Philadelphia, and Rochester and in large numbers of smaller metropolitan counties. In contrast decreased inequality in many places in the South, Mountain states and plains (e,g, ND, SD, WY, UT, NE) with rapid industrial growth.

    Local economies dominated by manufacturing generally have had less inequality than ones dominated by services. Although this is particularly true in mostly northern states with a long history of labor unrest and successful unionization, even the more recent largely nonunionized industrialization in the South has reduced income inequality, although statewide levels remain a high, a hangover from their long pre-industrial and even feudal histories.

    What distinguishes lower levels of inequality? In my work using Census data these areas generally experience female labor force participation, higher shares of manufacturing and a larger population with only a high school education (i.e., not overloaded with us professionals!), but lower shares of government and of services. Manufacturing is just one of many factors, but it is a powerful one.

    It is instructive to look at some example areas of higher and of lower inequality in 2000 relative to the composition of their labor forces. The most unequal large areas/counties are New York (Manhattan) and Washington DC – by far, both with high levels of professional services and government, and low levels of industry. Also very unequal are many retirement and environmental service areas, with almost no manufacturing, such as St. Petersburg, Naples, Vero Beach and many other growing Florida cities, Jackson, Wyoming, and several ski dominated areas in Colorado and Utah.

    In stark contrast, inequality is quite low in such strong manufacturing communities as Kansas City, Worcester, Appleton-Green Bay, Fond du Lac (and several other Wisconsin cities), Duluth, Grand Rapids, Davenport-Rock Island, Manchester, NH, Lancaster, PA and Tacoma, WA.

    In sum, economic characteristic variation is real: egalitarian regions exhibit higher labor force participation, especially of women, and high levels of manufacturing – this is probably the most meaningful economic variable to account for lower inequality – and conversely higher inequality is associated with service and government job dependency. High shares of both managerial-professional occupations and service jobs, with lower shares of craft and manufacturing jobs are typically characteristic of elite metropolitan areas and helps account for their higher inequality.

    Change in inequality 1970-2000
    Since the 1970s most major metropolitan areas became less industrial and far more dominated by professional, finance, and other services, and by trade, and concomitantly, have become far more unequal. Prominent examples are Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit Minneapolis, Dallas, Houston, St. Louis, Atlanta, Rochester, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Indianapolis, Birmingham, Baltimore and Boston – a roster of historic giants of industry.

    There are probably only limited opportunities for these areas – particularly in California and the Northeast – to reindustrialize. Yet there may be more opportunities in dozens of smaller metropolitan areas, in all parts of the country, but especially in the historic Midwestern and Northeastern “urban-industrial” heartland, that have suffered varying degrees of deindustrialization. These places enjoy low costs and often retain concentrations of skilled labor. Places like Florence and Gadsden, AL; Pueblo CO; Peoria and Rock Island, IL; Evansville and Muncie, IN; Dubuque, IA; Shreveport, LA; Saginaw, Midland, Benton Harbor, Flint and Muskegon, MI; Binghamton, NY; Toledo, Akron, Dayton, and Canton OH; Tulsa, OK; and Charleston and Wheeling, WV all could benefit from a new emphasis on productive enterprise. But the question remains: does Congress or the next President possess the will to make this happen?

    Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist)

  • The Geography of Inequality

    The global financial crisis has drawn greater attention to the world of the super rich and to the astounding increases in inequality since 1980, returning the country to a degree of inequality last seen in 1929 or perhaps even 1913. In the year 2006 alone, Wall Street executives received bonuses of $62 billion. Financial services increased from 10 percent of all business profits in 1980 to 40 percent in 2007, an obscene and indefensible development that now threatens the rest of the ‘real economy’.

    Here’s what happened to income and wealth between 1970 and 2005

    These figures reveal an inexorably growing concentration of income and wealth, which has taken place under both Democratic and Republican regimes. Conversely, given inflation over the last 35 years, lower and middle classes receive smaller shares. Only the affluent – the top 10% – and the rich – the top 1% – have gained ground.

    This pattern of inequality also has a geography with variations across the country between different places (here counties). Generally between 1970 and 2000 the greatest inequality has developed in the largest metropolitan regions and their suburbs.


    Large metropolitan core counties are by far the most likely to have higher inequality. In contrast other geographies have much lower inequality, with small metropolitan, small city and rural counties near the national average. In other words, core metropolitan counties are skewed toward greater inequality (higher shares of very rich and of very poor), while suburban and exurban areas generally exhibit lower inequality (values bunched centrally, with fewer extremely rich or poor households).

    Overall the greatest inequality lies in the very largest metropolitan cores (Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, Houston, etc), areas with large racial or ethnic minorities (e.g., in FL, TX, CA and much of the South), as well as in selected large northeastern metropolises (suburb as well as core, as in Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington DC) and across the southern half of the country more generally. Lower inequality occurs mainly in suburban or small metropolitan counties, and mainly in the north.

    Among smaller metropolitan (< 50,000 households) and non-metropolitan counties there emerges a truly dramatic north-south cleavage just around the Iowa border and along the Ohio River divide. A more mixed pattern prevails in the west and in the northeast, where intermediate levels of inequality are common. Especially high rates of inequality characterize racial and ethnic minority areas and Appalachia, as could be expected, but also many environmental amenity areas, especially in the west. Low inequality is fairly extensive in the hinterlands of selected Great Lakes and upper Midwest metropolises, like Omaha, Minneapolis and Chicago. Generally more egalitarian areas boast higher incomes, female labor force participation, more shares in manufacturing, greater incidence of husband-wife families, of whites, of home ownership, but lower percentages of government and service jobs, fewer residents with less than a 9th grade education, people 18-24, singles, single parent families, and less Blacks and Hispanics. High levels of inequality are generally the opposite of the egalitarian areas: more minorities, single parent families, less manufacturing and dependence on government as well as service sector jobs. Inequality varies by both kinds of settlement geography and by the social and economic character of areas. The most obvious and visible attributes that signify greater inequality are social characteristics: racial and ethnic minorities, low levels of education, low proportions of traditional husband-wife families (partly because of fewer earners), and high dependency (many of the very young and very old). Unequal places tend to be those with low concentrations of manufacturing and higher shares of both managerial-professional occupations and service jobs. Geographic impacts vary. Most rural, newer suburban and exurban areas tend to have lower inequality because they tend to maintain middle income homogeneity. Yet rural areas that are isolated and have weak economies, like Appalachia, suffer high inequality. Large metropolitan areas with the highest inequality also tend to have large concentrations of racial minorities and of non-families, especially young singles Overall it is clear that inequality has been on the rise since 1970. This was a time when the nation was prosperous, manufacturing was strong, as were unions, income taxes fairly progressive, while “war on poverty” legislation had helped those at the bottom, the baby boom was still on and families dominant. But if the extent of inequality has grown, its geography has changed far less. Large metropolitan cores had the highest inequality in 1970 and 2000, and metropolitan suburbs and exurbs the lowest, with small cities in between. Yet inequality grew fastest in large metropolitan cores and suburbs. Small metropolitan areas (many were small cities in 1970) had the next highest increase (80 percent) and rural small town areas the lowest (69 percent). Sadly, only a few counties had decreases in inequality. Many were military base counties, mainly in the south. Another group of counties with lower inequality are new suburban counties, which have become more uniformly middle class as a result of significant urban growth, mainly in the South with more rapid urban and industrial growth. Overall, the change in inequality between 1970 and 2000 was substantial and wide ranging. The causes for this tend to be national and structural, including deindustrialization, the rise of a service economy, the decline of the traditional family and tax changes favoring the very wealthy. Areas that traditionally were most unequal – notably the great global cities – have simply become more so. It is here, in the command and communication centers of the economy, that the greatest wealth has been accumulated and where we can see the rise of a new aristocracy nevertheless dependent on a large low wage service class. The next Administration and Congress should start to address these trends or the traditional American dream will become, for most citizens, no more than that. Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist)

  • Restless Americans: Migration and Population Change, 2000-2007

    Americans may be less mobile than in the past, but millions since 2000 have continued to be on the move, reshaping the landscape and economy of the nation. Three maps will be briefly discussed: one of population change by county, 2000-2007, one of net internal migration by county, and one of net immigration from abroad. We will then focus on the “extremes”, unusually large levels or intensities of net internal migration and of immigration.

    Overall population growth

    As was true in the 1990s, big growth has concentrated overwhelmingly in selected metropolitan regions — and within them, primarily in their suburbs and exurbs. The big growth areas are concentrated in Texas (Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, San Antonio, Austin), greater Atlanta, North Carolina (Charlotte-Raleigh), most of Florida, the Virginia and Maryland suburbs of Washington-Baltimore, the desert Southwest (Riverside-San Bernardino, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Tucson). Substantial exurban or spillover growth was common, with the Bay Area extending into California Central Valley, in far exurban New York and Pennsylvania as well as in largely once rural counties around such places as Salt Lake City, Denver, Portland, Seattle, Minneapolis, Chicago, Kansas City, Nashville, Indianapolis and Columbus.

    Many smaller metropolitan areas grew, especially in the south and west. Many counties with universities appear to have also grown, notably in the South. Many rural or small-town counties with substantial growth boasted environmental amenities and a strong ‘quality of life’ appeal.

    The only big population losses were New Orleans and vicinity, but there were also vast rural small town areas with small losses, characterized by continuing out-migration, but often also by natural decrease, more deaths than births (870 counties), and covering the Great Plains, but also much of the Midwest, Appalachia and the Northeast.

    Overall the population grew by 20 million, 12 million from natural increase, and 8 million from immigration. Around 80 million Americans “migrated” (moved across a county line), 28 percent of the population, resulting in net gains of over 10 million in gaining areas, and net losses of the same 10 million to losing areas.

    Immigration

    Net immigration into the US was almost 8 million in seven years, raising the legal/known share of the foreign born to almost 12 percent of the population. There were hundreds of counties — rural, small town and small metropolitan — where immigrants landed to take agricultural and industrial jobs or to work in service jobs or in construction. This trend is exemplified by a set of counties in far southwestern Kansas (which also had high internal out-migration—mostly Hispanics moving to meat-packing jobs) and to environmental amenity ski-resort counties in Colorado (construction, service).

    The largest immigration flows continued to flow to metropolitan areas, including many large core central counties, many of which were losing heavily among domestic migrants to their suburban and exurban fringe counties. The 21 largest losing counties lost a net of 4.7 million, but gained 3.5 million immigrants. Some 40 percent of the 8 million immigrants were destined for just 8 metropolitan cores, most notably Los Angeles-San Diego, New York City, Miami-Fort Lauderdale, San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston.

    Internal Migration

    The story of gains and losses from internal migration is a little more complex. Gaining counties attracted around 45 million migrants and sent out around 35 million, for a net gain of over 10 million. One obvious feature from the maps is the “donut” phenomenon, the prevalence of large central county net out-migration, surrounded by a ring of substantial suburban and exurban net in-migration (about two-thirds of which is from the central core counties).

    This pattern is particularly marked in Houston, Dallas, Miami, Minneapolis, Washington, DC., Atlanta, Denver, Portland, Kansas City, Memphis, Nashville, and Indianapolis. In the cases of Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, New York and Philadelphia, the ring of growth has pushed beyond the suburban counties to adjacent areas – as to the Central Valley of California or to NE Pennsylvania and Delaware.

    Some core areas did gain, mostly and Southern communities such as Phoenix, Las Vegas, San Antonio, Charlotte and Raleigh, NC, and Knoxville, TN — southern and of more recent importance. In many of these areas the “core” county also includes many areas which might be considered suburban. In this sense, the fastest “urban growth” took place in relatively low-density, auto-dominated regions as opposed to traditional urban cores. Finally, and most obvious on the map, is the continuing high growth of central Florida across most counties.

    In contrast there are places so hurt by de-industrialization that the entire (or most) of the metropolitan areas have substantial out-migration. These include places like Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Rochester, and Boston. In some places, notably Pittsburgh, even suburban areas are losing population.

    Rural and small towns also show their own dynamics. There is also continued net-out-migration for almost half of rural small –town counties in all parts of the country, but especially in the Great Plains and Midwest and in the Mississippi delta. But on the other hand, we can see continuing f net in-migration to environmentally attractive areas, often for retirement or recreation, notably in parts of the west, but also in the Ozarks and other areas in the south, upper Midwest and Northeast.

    Conclusion

    The constants here are (1) the restless mobility of the population, (2) the dominance of suburban growth; and (3) the continuing decline of more than half of rural small-town counties. Prominent in recent years, but uncertain in the longer run are (4) our strong dependence on immigration (40 percent of net national growth), (5) the locus of fastest growth in exurbia, (6) the decline of northeastern and Midwestern industrial regions; (7) the rapid growth or rural environmental amenity counties and (8) the specific set of fast-growing metropolitan areas.

    Given the severity of economic conditions, immigration could begin to slow as a result of declining employment opportunities or political opposition. Similarly exurban expansion could slow because of the housing credit collapse. It is not impossible that older industrial areas could partially recover (ample plant and housing stock) while environmental amenity areas could be hurt by recession and the housing collapse. This could also apply to some of the fastest gaining areas 2000-2005 — notably Florida and southern California — that have been the hardest hit in the 2007 on housing debacle.

    But I believe American society is resilient, and even with needed constraints on excessive housing finance abuses, and even if we are indeed approaching the era of “peak oil,” the geographic settlement pattern of recent decades most likely will persist. People will continue to migrate for the same reasons they have for decades — in search of cheaper, larger houses, for jobs, warmer weather or scenic beauty. So we can expect, as the financial crisis gradually recedes, continued growth in suburban, exurban and satellite zones of metropolitan areas, and a net flow southward and to amenity areas.

    Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist)

  • United States Net Domestic Migration Map, 2000 – 2007

  • United States Immigration Map, 2000 – 2007

  • United States Population Change Map, 2000 – 2007

  • The future of urban settlement? Look in the suburbs

    Let’s look at general urban settlement and suburbia from a geographic and demographic, not a planning or ideological viewpoint. There’s really no point to the fruitless and unscientific harangues about how people ought to live or about allegedly better or poorer forms of settlement. This is really trying to understand what is happening in the metropolitan level of settlement, agglomerations of at least 50,000 and their commuter hinterlands — where at least 80 percent of Americans live.

    Definitions: I will use terms precisely. The central city is the historic, largest core incorporated place (OK, there are a few with 2 or 3 core cities). Suburbs are the rest of the urbanized area and may be usefully be differentiated between older, inner and newer, outer suburbs. Exurbia is the area of intense commuting to the urban core from beyond the urbanized area boundary, and it can be differentiated between rural territory (a.k.a. “sprawl”) and satellite towns.

    As of 2000 “central cities” had 70 million persons (25 %) of the population, suburbs 120 million people (43 %) and exurbia up to 36 million (12 %). That puts the suburban and exurban share to well over 50 percent of the US total population, not even including the suburbs or smaller towns and cities.

    Even worse for urban boosters, the suburbs — and particularly the exurbs — is where the growth is. In the Seattle metropolitan area, which is under unusually strong growth management restrictions and has a stronger than usual urban core, growth continues to head outwards, with inner, outer suburbs, as well as exurbs easily adding many more people than the central city.

    The question now is whether this pattern will hold for a longer term or whether significant change can be expected. My sense is that these trends will broadly continue —that suburban and exurban growth will continue to be greater than central city growth, despite the passing of peak oil, the passion of anti-suburb intellectual currents, the energy crisis and new urbanist planning policies. But central cities will probably do somewhat better than they have in the last 20 years. So it is sensible to ask: what are forces for and against central city, suburban and exurban growth; and, as important, how will the character of these components of urban settlement change?

    Demography

    The combination of many suburban empty nesters, later marriage and fewer children for generation X’ers (those born 1965-1981) should foster selective central city growth . But this appears to apply only for the subset of more glamorous cities with a well-developed amenity structure. . But these cities often suffer housing price inflation and strong anti-growth lobbies which constrain may constrain growth. Many, perhaps most, cities lack the appeal to attract population in from lower-density areas.

    Older inner suburbs represent a zone of significant change between and the traditional newer middle class family suburbs and the gentrifying or stagnant central cities. Some are receiving the displaced poor and minorities; some have matured into quality communities, and, like parts of the central city 50 years earlier, are still attractive to families, with or without children, as well as many recent immigrants.

    Housing prices and taxes vary greatly across the US, which will like push movement toward lower cost places, including to non-metropolitan small towns and rural areas. This may be particularly true for those with adequate retirement income. But middle class families remain a huge demographic component for far suburban and exurban living (see market forces below).

    On balance, demographic forces seem to reinforce existing patterns rather than favor either central cities or suburbs, or more rapid non-metropolitan growth.

    Economic factors

    Economic changes are even more uncertain. The vast expansion of producer services to replace the huge decline in primary and secondary (manufacturing) jobs clearly is in some jeopardy, as evidenced by the problems evident finance and insurance sector. The key is whether American entrepreneurs can partially restore a greater industrial base. In general, suburban and exurban sites are likely to be cheaper, more politically pliable and more available than central city sites, particularly compared to more elite gentrified core cities. A partial recovery of production in some less glamorous cities with available idle plant could occur but does not seem very likely.

    Energy, technology, environment, and cars

    Most observers concerned with the “end of oil” and with global warming argue that these will inevitably drive people to denser concentrations of settlement in central cities and older inner suburbs. They even predict a decline in far suburban and exurban settlement. US technological history, however, suggests that if innovation and investment take place anywhere, it will likely be on alternative energy sources, conspicuously including the continued popularity and dominance of trucks and cars. Nevertheless, persistent high energy prices could yield some acceptance of moderately higher densities for housing and business, and a slightly higher growth in central cities and older inner suburbs.

    Market forces

    Markets refer to preferences and needs, and the willingness to pay among households and businesses. There is relatively little uncertainty as to preferences. Even in the biggest metropolises, no more than 30 to 40 percent of households prefer denser urban settings and enjoy apartment or townhouse living. For the nation as a whole, the share is only 10-15 percent! Those who prefer it tend to be younger, unmarried persons and empty nesters without children and are (or will be) more educated and professional than the US norm. But 60 to 70 percent of households, and not just families with children, prefer single family homes and cars. These households will pay or MOVE in order to act on these preferences. At the same time perhaps 35 to 45 percent of jobs thrive in dense urban settings, as downtown towers, leaving 55 to 65 percent to seek less dense suburban and exurban settings, often by logistic necessity. These are the continuing and overwhelming facts that created and will sustain suburban living.

    Planning

    Intellectual hatred of suburbia is a century old and has been especially fervent in the last 60 years. From the late 1970s the planning profession has embraced what has come to be called “new urbanism,” advocating urban containment, urban redevelopment, densification, urban villages, and a new wave of rail transit, now under the broad rubric of growth management. These efforts often have been strongly supported by environmental groups concerned with the loss of open space as well as by central city political and business interests.

    Several metropolitan areas are becoming increasingly regulated by such planning ideology. But to date the movement has not been successful at significantly slowing suburban or exurban growth. A few central cities, such as San Francisco, Seattle, New York, San Francisco and Portland, have gentrified, but have not grown much in population, since the mass of new housing is occupied by much smaller non-family households. Costs of growth management include displacement of minority and less affluent families, often to the older suburbs or to other neighborhoods of the core city.

    Conclusions

    Market preferences have prevailed. Businesses as well as households have resisted substantial concentration or been priced out of the gentrifying core. So the suburbs persist. But they have changed, especially in those more regulated metropolises. The older inner suburbs have become more central-city like, with more diversity in ethnicity and class. But this has not slowed the long-standing trend of net growth of housing and of jobs at the suburban edge – even in the most growth managed cities, and even in the most recent 2000-2007 period.

    Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist).

  • Richard Morrill

  • Geography, Class, and Red and Blue Voting

    Consider the following two apparently contradictory sets of statistics:

    From the Republican convention and much of the media, you’d get the impression that class voting has turned upside down—that the Democrats are the party of the “elite” and the Republicans the new friends of the “working class”.

    But the ACTUAL voting behavior in 2004, when Republicans did especially well at making inroads among socially conservative, less affluent households. Consider the accompanying chart, where Bush dominated Kerry in households making more than $100,000.

    And according to McCain, $200000 is solidly middle class!
    This looks like “economic class“ still matters!

    But then look at the following equally CORRECT statistics, (courtesy of Fred Shelley, U Oklahoma:

    The purple states are the current tossup states: CO, FL, IN,MI, NH, NV, NM, NC,OH,VA

    So is it true, contrary to the 2004 national data, that states that are richer and more educated tend Democratic (blue) and those with less educated and poorer folks lead Republican (red)? How can both sets of data be true?

    The answer lies in the math. The first set uses INDIVIDUALS, while the second uses average, aggregate values. Making inferences from averages risks what statisticians call the “ecological fallacy” , attributing to everyone the value of an average, from what in reality is probably a very heterogeneous (highly variable) population.

    Blue states like CA, WA, NY or MA have high average levels of income and education, but we do not know the distribution of votes for D and R by varying levels of education and income. So to reconcile the two sets of statistics, it is reasonable to assume that despite high average levels, the more educated and wealthier are more likely to vote Republican, the less educated and poorer more likely to vote Democratic.

    For example, consider state A (big metropolitan) and state B (non-metro, small town, rural):

    A has a larger share of richer than average voters than B, but it’s a big metro state while B is a smaller rural, small city state. Richer voters tend R in both and poorer voters tend to vote D in both states, but the R share is higher for all classes in the non-metro state and D shares higher for both classes in the big metro state.

    The other part of the story is geography, largely about the split between large metropolitan and small and non-metropolitan America. Over half the population lives in large metropolitan areas. These tend to have above average levels of education and income, as they are the control centers of society, but they also have the large majority of racial and ethnic minorities and of the poor— which are the real numerical base of the Democratic vote. Not that you would know it from either party’s rhetoric!

    Now it is certainly true that a significant and increasing share of the educated affluent has shifted Democratic in the last decade or so; these folks are powerful and articulate and have effectively taken over the Democratic Party. We know from precinct level data that Democrats swept areas with highly educated professionals, especially around universities, but Republicans continued to dominate wider areas, especially suburban and exurban, of the more managerial affluent.

    Generally speaking, the Democratic “elite” overestimates its own numbers, and often unintentionally pursues policies hurtful to the poor and lower middle classes. This can be seen in the elite’s indifference to the less affluent and educated Democratic base as demonstrated by their emphasis on the virtues of dense urban, “green” living. This agenda often results in gentrification, displacement of the poor and minorities. Elite democrats also ignore —except perhaps at election time — job competition from massive immigration, legal and illegal, the ravages of excess globalization, and out of sight housing prices.

    The 2004 election data shows that the historic base of the Democratic party is not gone, at least in large metropolitan America. Middle and working class white voters in the suburbs and exurbs still matter. Obama cannot win unless that base is reassured and respected.

    Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist).

  • 2004 Presidential Vote by Household Income