Author: Susanne Trimbath

  • The Continuing Debate on AIG

    The House of Representatives is debating a 90 percent tax on executive bonus payments made to companies receiving bailout funds. Anything they pass will still have to get through the Senate and past the President’s desk. They are “upset about something they already did,” according to Dan Lungren (R-CA). Congress ignored the opportunity to deal with this back when you and me and 100,000 other voters were telling them not to pass the bailout legislation.

    Executive compensation schemes at American International Group (AIG) have been under investigation by the New York State Attorney General, Andrew Cuomo since last fall. He is ramping up the investigation now, given the news over the weekend of new bonus disbursements, to determine if the bonus contracts are unenforceable for fraud under New York law. AIG agreed with Cuomo last October not to use their own “deferred compensation pool” to pay bonuses – and then bargained with executives to make the payments anyway! AIG execs got contracts in early 2008 that guaranteed their bonuses – information that former Treasury Secretary Paulson and current Treasury Secretary Geithner (former President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank) had when they initiated the original bailout.

    It’s pretty amazing 1) that taxpayers are bailing out a company that’s under criminal investigation; 2) that Treasury didn’t negotiate compensation schemes before they wrote the first check (like they do with auto workers?); and 3) that the bonuses are a bigger story than the fact that more than one-third of the bailout money was shipped overseas.

  • Digging into AIG bonuses and other aid recipients

    On Sunday March 15, 2009, American International Group, Inc. revealed the identities of some of the beneficiaries of about half of the nearly $180 billion the US government has committed ($173 billion actually paid out so far) to support the ailing international financial giant. As we now know, AIG sold credit default swaps (CDS) that paid off if the market value of some bonds fell. (I use the term “bond” here generally to refer to the alphabet soup of CDO, CLO, MBS, etc. – all of which are debt that is sold to the public.) Most CDS only pay off if the borrower fails to make payments – something that hasn’t happened in the case where AIG is making payments. The geniuses at AIG – and we know they are geniuses because they earned $165 million in bonuses for the effort – took on completely unknown risks for, apparently, insufficient premiums, resulting in the need for an emergency $85 billion loan last September from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (courtesy of my buddy Tim Geithner) to “avoid severe financial disruptions”… as if that worked!

    Whatever. So, now AIG is letting us know who got our money: $22.4 billion for payouts on the CDS and $27.1 billion to buy the bonds underlying the CDS (so some of the CDS could be cancelled). That’s about $50 billion so far for derivatives – no one knows how much more they’ll need. Here’s a summary by the country where the recipients are based:

    Country

    CDS
    Payout

    US

    $16.0

    France

    $13.3

    German

    $8.1

    Switzerland

    $3.3

    UK

    $2.0

    Canada

    $1.1

    Netherlands

    $0.8

    Scotland

    $0.5

    Spain

    $0.3

    Denmark

    $0.2

    Numbers in billions. $4.1 billion paid to “other” not included here. Numbers won’t total to $49.5 billion due to rounding.

    There was also $12.1 billion paid to US municipalities (states, cities, school districts, etc.) – where states invested, for example, bond proceeds prior to expenditure. In those cases, the municipalities invested in assets with guaranteed rates of return (another genius idea at AIG!). The bigger numbers belong to the states that had recent large bond issues – for example, $1.02 billion to California which has yet to distribute a dime of the bond money raised for stem cell research (due to on-going litigation).

    AIG took $2.5 billion for their own business needs – like the bonuses? The $165 million bonuses were just for the London-office that specialized in selling those very special CDS. Total bonuses paid were $450 million for all the geniuses at AIG – the AIG who made $6.2 billion in 2007 and lost $37.6 billion in the first 9 months of 2008!

    The most interesting bit, perhaps, are payments of $43.7 billion to securities lenders – those stock and bond holders who lend out their shares to enable short sellers. This means that AIG borrowed stocks so they could short sell them – make an investment that paid off only if the prices fell. (If you don’t know what short selling is, here’s a five minute video that explains it in a light-hearted way.) Bottom line – it gave AIG incentives to push down market prices. And their announcements and actions at the end of 2008 certainly achieved that goal. Way to go, geniuses!

  • Buffett Update: Downgrade from Oracle to Seer?

    A day or so after he was on CNBC, Warren Buffett went on Bloomberg Television and told them that he’ll continue to sell derivatives contracts. He’s getting deeper into investments that he has called “financial weapons of mass destruction.” Apparently he’s betting that there will not be a crash (which would require a payout) in corporate junk bonds, muni bonds or stock markets in the UK, Europe and Japan. Here’s the punch line: his stock is up 17.2% since he started talking!

    Berkshire Hathaway shares peaked last year at $147,000 each when Buffett was buying energy companies. The price is so very high because they have a policy of never paying dividends. Therefore, all the company’s earnings are put back into investments. If you tried to use a standard finance model to determine the appropriate price for these shares, the answer would be “infinity” because you can’t divide by $0 dividends. Anyway, two months after the peak, the shares were in the tank – relatively speaking – at $77,500 per share. By the end of the week before his TV appearances, the shares were even lower, at $72,400. The day of the CNBC interview: Berkshire Hathaway shares closed at $84,844 – a cool 17.2% gain. Remember, this is the man who said he is fearful when people are greedy and greedy when people are fearful.

    On March 12, Berkshire Hathaway lost its triple-A credit rating from Fitch Ratings because of potential losses from those derivatives. Not that we should believe everything Fitch says – Fitch is among the credit rating agencies that gave triple-A ratings to subprime mortgage bonds, and look what happened to those investments! For what it’s worth, Fitch gives Berkshire a “negative” outlook, meaning another cut is possible within a couple of years. The two other big ratings agencies, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s, still rate Berkshire triple-A.

  • We Need a New Oracle

    Warren Buffett was on CNBC for three hours on March 9, 2009, dishing out his wisdom. All this fanfare despite having lost $24 billion in value last year, and handing the title of Richest Man in the World over to Bill Gates. Buffett made multiple references to “war” in describing the current financial crisis.

    There are several problems with Buffett’s comparison of the current state of the economy to war, as pointed out in this story in the Omaha World-Herald, which ran the day after the interview. What we are seeing is less like war – in which an outside enemy attacks you – and more like arson, except the people who burned down the house are now collecting the insurance too!

    Warren Buffett – the widely revered Oracle of Omaha, where I live – is one of those who built the boom in the capital markets and are benefiting from the bust. No surprise then that Buffett whose primary business vehicle is Berkshire Hathaway, a financial holding company, supports the bailout of financial institutions. Their business includes, among others, property and casualty insurance and a financial holding company. When Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE) told me that he talked with Warren before voting for the first bailout package, I button-holed him after lunch and gave him an ear full.

    Of course Buffett was in favor of the bailout – his companies directly benefited as did the investments made by his companies. He put $5 billion into Goldman Sachs preferred stock with a 10% dividend – a substantially better rate of return than the US government got on our $10 billion bailout, er, I mean “investment.” Berkshire Hathaway was the largest shareholder in American Express Co. when they received $3.4 billion from Uncle Sam.

    Buffett appeared on CNBC a year ago (March 3, 2008). At that time he was forthcoming about the risks Berkshire Hathaway was taking. He told CNBC at the time that he had “written 206 transactions in the last three weeks” which were default swaps on municipal bonds – the financing used by cities and states to fund everything from building schools to general obligations.

    Buffett bragged that “the municipality has to quit paying” before any losses would have to be covered. This gives him incentive for another payout from Uncle Sam in addition to the Wall Street bailout – he also has incentive to support the stimulus package. If the cities and states default on their debt, then Buffett (Berkshire Hathaway companies) would be on the hook to make good on the full value of the bonds. At that point in March 2008, after just 3 weeks of investing, Buffett said he made $69 million in premiums for guaranteeing payment on $2 billion of municipal bonds. The primary insurer received about $20 million, an amount significantly less but that carries more risk. If that doesn’t seem to make sense, then you understand – the pricing of risk and premiums did not make sense. This systematic irrationality was also a contributing factor to the current financial mess.

    The scheme of buying and selling bond payment guarantees is very much dependent on rising asset prices (and no recession), just like any Ponzi scheme. Describing his investment strategy in March 2008, Buffett clearly said that what he and the other insurers in this market are “hoping for is new money.” He even admitted that getting new money was preventing he and others in the market from having to “totally face(d) up to the mistakes that they’ve made.”

    By now, Bernie Madoff has shown you how a Ponzi Scheme falls apart in a down market. In the 2008 interview, Buffett gave us a preview of what keeps him awake at night. Cities and states don’t go broke very often, but when they do “it could be contagious.” Luckily for Buffett, the Congress – “the best Congress that money can buy”, according to Sen. Kennedy – voted to send “stimulus” money to the cities and states.

    In fact, Buffett wouldn’t have to pay on any of those bonds unless the primary bond insurer went broke, too. That primary bond insurer is Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Ambac is the first to pay in the event of default on the municipal bonds that Buffett is guaranteeing. If any of the bonds go bad, Ambac has to pay the bondholders. If Ambac got into financial trouble Buffett said he would “be out trying to help them raise money” – otherwise Berkshire Hathaway would have to pay off the bonds. Now, in March 2009, Buffett talks about the economy going over a cliff while Ambac teeters on the edge of junk bond status. When it falls, it could take Berkshire Hathaway with it. The table below shows what happened to Ambac’s credit rating between Buffett’s two appearances on CNBC.


    Timeline of Ambac Credit Rating Slide

    Date Event
    3/3/2008 Buffett appears on CNBC discussing investment scheme relative to Ambac
    3/12/2008 Moody’s confirms Ambac’s Aaa rating; changes outlook to negative
    4/24/2008 Moody’s reiterates negative outlook on Ambac’s Aaa rating following earnings announcement
    5/13/2008 Moody’s says worsening second lien RMBS could impact financial guarantor ratings
    6/4/2008 Moody’s reviews Ambac’s Aaa rating for possible downgrade
    6/19/2008 Moody’s downgrades Ambac to Aa3; outlook is negative
    9/18/2008 Moody’s places ratings of Ambac on review for possible downgrade
    11/5/2008 Moody’s downgrades Ambac to Baa1; outlook is developing
    3/3/2009 Moody’s reviews Ambac’s ratings for possible downgrade
    3/9/2009 Buffett appears on CNBC; no discussion of Ambac

    Acting selfish and self-serving is what got us into this mess in the first place. We’ve been witness to bloated executive compensation in the face of lousy corporate performance. We’ve seen mega-billionaires living lavish lifestyles for years on the proceeds of Ponzi schemes and fraud. Maybe it’s time for a new Oracle, in Omaha or elsewhere, because this one has been giving us bad advice.

    Susanne Trimbath, Ph.D. is CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services. Her training in finance and economics began with editing briefing documents for the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. She worked in operations at depository trust and clearing corporations in San Francisco and New York, including Depository Trust Company, a subsidiary of DTCC; formerly, she was a Senior Research Economist studying capital markets at the Milken Institute. Her PhD in economics is from New York University. In addition to teaching economics and finance at New York University and University of Southern California (Marshall School of Business), Trimbath is co-author of Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets.

  • Many Investors Have More to Gain by Letting Your Mortgage or Company Fail

    I hate to say “I told you so” but… I told you so. The holders of the credit default swaps (CDS) have more to gain from the failure of the borrower than from accepting payments.

    Bloomberg is reporting a strategy at Citigroup, Inc. to do just that. In one example, they can buy up Six Flags bonds at 20.5 cents on the dollar, pay a small premium to get the CDS and then collect the full face value of the bonds when Six Flags files for bankruptcy – which the CDS holder can be sure happens.

    Normally, before a company goes into bankruptcy, they would meet with the debt holders to try to re-negotiate their debt. Debt holders will usually do this because they have more to gain from the company remaining in operation than otherwise. Sometimes, the company may even get them to exchange their debt for equity, provided there is a good business model that has the potential for future earnings.

    Now, as I’ve described repeatedly, the CDS holders have more to gain from the bankruptcy because they will get their entire investment paid back, with interest, not from the company that issued the debt but from another company that issued the CDS – some company like, for example, AIG!

    Speaking of AIG, there was very little coverage of the Senate Committee hearing Thursday (3/5/2009): “American International Group: Examining what went wrong, government intervention, and implications for future regulation.” It was a stunner! Bottom line? Senator Jim Bunning (R-KY) told the panelists that if they asked for another dime for AIG, “You will get the biggest ‘no’” ever heard. The entire committee was incredulous that Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Donald Kohn point-blank refused to tell them 1) who is benefiting from the AIG payouts on CDS and 2) how much more is it going to cost to bailout AIG.

    Stand by, because home foreclosures are on the same course as Six Flags: homeowners attempting to re-negotiate their debt will find that somewhere in the background, a CDS holder has more to gain from the foreclosure because they will get their entire investment paid back, with interest, not from the homeowners but from some company that issue CDS – some company like, for example, AIG!

  • Want to Foreclose? Show Me the Paper!

    Since October 2008 I’ve been writing here about problems in mortgage backed securities (MBS). There is more evidence surfacing in bankruptcy courts that the paperwork for the underlying mortgages wasn’t provided correctly for the new bond holders, leading to delayed or denied foreclosure proceedings.

    New York Times’ Gretchen Morgenson is reporting new successes in cases from Florida and California. A judgment on a home in Miami-Dade County (FL) was set aside on February 11 when the new mortgage holder could not produce evidence that the original mortgage lien had been assigned. In one of the California cases, the lender tried for foreclose on a mortgage that had previously been transferred to Freddie Mac!

    The earliest decision I’ve seen is from Judge Christopher A. Boyko in Cleveland. Plaintiff Deutsche Bank’s attorney argued, “Judge, you just don’t understand how things work.” In his October 31, 2007 decision to dismiss a foreclosure complaint, Boyko responded that this “argument reveals a condescending mindset and quasi-monopolistic system” established by financial institutions to the disadvantage of homeowners. The Masters of the Universe were anxious to pump out mortgages into MBS so they could continue to earn fees – making money at any cost.

    One element of the newest Homeowner Bailout program is to allow bankruptcy court judges to modify mortgage loans. If the types of cases decided in OH, FL and CA continue to spread, that may not be necessary. The first question in any foreclosure procedure will become: can you prove a lien?

    This raises further questions about those “toxic assets” that Geithner and Bernanke are so anxious to buy up at taxpayer expense. According to the Morgenson article, some MBS holders are trying to force the mortgage originator to take back the paper. However, many of the worst offenders are already defunct.

  • The bailouts payments mount, the budget expands, the deficit widens, the national debt increases. How high is up?

    How far can the totals go? Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke testified before the Senate Budget Committee on March 3, 2009. He believes that the markets will be “quite able” to absorb the debt issued by the US government over the next couple of years to cover all the bailout and stimulus payments “if there is confidence that the US will get it [the economy] under control.” When Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) suggested an “outer limit” at which the national debt was three times gross domestic product, Bernanke said that “it wouldn’t happen because things would break down before that.” They’ll be lending to homeowners who have higher debt ratios than that. Frankly, I’d rather lend to the US government at that ratio, and I suspect a lot of investors – both domestic and foreign – feel the same way.

    On the one hand, Bernanke spoke like a “Master of the Universe” when he told the Senators that he wasn’t worried that printing all this extra money would generate future inflation. He said that when the economy begins to grow again, the Federal Reserve is “very comfortable” they will be able to deflate their bloated balance sheet. On the other hand, he did not sound like a Federal Reserve Chairman when Bernanke said “We don’t know for sure what the future will bring.” Of the two Bernankes I like the second one better: no one knows exactly what the future will bring. Why pretend that you know what the best action to take three years from now will be – or what impact it will have. I find it disconcerting, to say the least.

    There are a few things we can watch for in the coming weeks and months. The President’s budget came out yesterday and will go through Congress now for approval. Don’t get too distracted by it though – virtually everything in it can change. Instead, work with what you know. The stimulus package was passed and the states are getting details now on how much and for what they can expect money from Washington. Focus on where that money is going. The best way to minimize the damage being done by the Federal Reserve’s printing presses is to be sure that money is spent in the real economy. That means roads, bridges, schools, sewer systems – and not research and development on sources of alternative fuel or studies on global warming. We are in the middle of a crisis. This is not the time to spend on wishes and dreams. If the money is spent on real infrastructure projects, it can help to mitigate the potential inflationary effects later.

    The Treasury and the Federal Reserve have no choice but to keep their foot planted fully on the accelerator. Setting infrastructure in place now means we’ll get good traction later when the economy starts moving forward.

  • Bernanke: Junkmeister Hides the Truth

    Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke testified before the Senate Budget Committee on Tuesday (March 3, 2009), the day after it was announced that AIG would be back at the federal teat for another $30 billion. The generally subdued Senate was nonetheless forceful in getting Bernanke to admit several things:

    • The Fed and Treasury are using the same three rating agencies to help them select triple-A collateral for bailout lending as were used to get triple-A credit ratings for junk mortgage bonds;
    • Neither the Fed nor the Treasury will tell us all the companies that are getting bailout money;
    • There is no “outer limit” to how much money the US government can print;
    • No one knows the “outer limit” of how much money the US government can borrow;
    • The “too big to fail” policy is a bigger problem than anyone thought it could be;
    • No one was in charge of AIG – not bank regulators, insurance regulators or capital market regulators.

    When asked about AIG several times, Bernanke replied that it’s “uncomfortable for me, too.” Through some hole in the regulations, the insurance regulators had no authority to monitor the financial products activities of AIG. Explained simply and bluntly, the world’s largest insurance company sold credit default swaps (CDS, insurance against default) on the junk bonds issued from mortgages and consumer purchases. Many of those mortgages and consumer purchases were made foolishly – when the borrowers failed to repay the loans the bonds also failed. The people and companies that bought CDS on those bonds did not look too closely at AIG to see what would happen if the bonds failed. As it turns out, they didn’t have to worry about AIG failing – AIG was deemed too big to fail.

    When the bonds defaulted and the buyers of CDS protection (“counterparties”) turned to AIG for payment, AIG turned to the federal government for help. The AIG bailout has cost $180 billion so far for which the US government owns 80 percent of a company that lost $61.7 billion in three months (for a total of $99.29 billion in 2008, an amount equal to all of their profits back to about 1990).

    Here’s a tough question: Why won’t the Fed disclose who is benefitting from the CDS payoffs? Bernanke made a comparison between your grandmother and AIG: like the owners of life insurance policies, the purchasers of financial insurance “made legal legitimate financial transactions. They have a right to privacy about their financial condition.” In other words, no one should know how much life insurance your grandmother has. That’s why the Fed won’t tell us who bought the CDS insurance on junk bonds! Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) asked him to “come clean.” Senator Bernard Sanders (I-VT) asked point blank: tell us who got the $2.2 trillion loaned by the Fed. He got a one word response for his troubles: “no.”

    Bernanke said, “AIG made me angry…This was a hedge fund attached to an insurance company. We had to step in, we really had no choice. It’s a terrible situation, but we aren’t doing this to bailout AIG, we’re doing it to protect the broader economy.”

    Here’s how you connect the dots from AIG to main street: AIG is an insurance company and insurance companies are among the “safe” investments that money market mutual funds are allowed to invest their cash in – in fact most funds are required to keep some portion of their assets in these supposedly risk-free investments.

    Basically, this requirement is there to make sure that cash will be available to meet the withdrawal requests from investors. Now, money market mutual funds and mutual funds are a favorite investment for retirement money, including the 401k plans that many people have through their employers. But also, your employer’s retirement plan money is likely also invested in these funds. Pensions can hold stocks and bond directly, but as the size of these plans gets bigger and bigger, it becomes increasingly difficult for one or a few investment managers to handle everything. The California State Teachers Retirement System and the California Public Employees Retirement System (Cal STRS and Cal PRS, for short), the largest pension funds in the world, have $160 billion and $180 billion in assets to invest. So, propping up AIG means that the investments made in the stocks, commercial paper, policies, etc. issued by AIG will not collapse and take with them the retirement assets of many millions of Americans.

    In the final round of questions, Senators Warner (D-VA) and Wyden (D-OR) were especially clear on the point of finding out who is benefitting from the bailout of AIG. AIG was a good insurance company, Warner said, but their London-based financial products division started selling CDS into Europe. Now, American taxpayers are being asked to pick up the tab. Why does AIG continue to make the payouts when they require federal money to continue to exist? The Senators suggested that, at a minimum, Americans deserve to know who is benefitting from the CDS payouts. “It’s time for some sunlight.”

    Susanne Trimbath, Ph.D. is CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services. Her training in finance and economics began with editing briefing documents for the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. She worked in operations at depository trust and clearing corporations in San Francisco and New York, including Depository Trust Company, a subsidiary of DTCC; formerly, she was a Senior Research Economist studying capital markets at the Milken Institute. Her PhD in economics is from New York University. In addition to teaching economics and finance at New York University and University of Southern California (Marshall School of Business), Trimbath is co-author of Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets.

  • Why Homeownership Is Falling – Despite Lower Prices: Look to the Job Market

    By Susanne Trimbath and Juan Montoya

    There’s something about “Housing Affordability” that makes it very popular: Presidents past and present set goals around it. The popularity of this perennial policy goal rests on the feel-good idea that everyone would live in a home that they own if only they could afford it. Owning your own home is declared near and far to be the American Dream.

    Recently, however, it seems that Americans’ aren’t all having the same dream. Despite improving conditions of affordability, home sales continue to decline. Affordability is balanced on a tripod of prices, incomes and interest rates. As incomes become unstable because of mounting job losses, housing falls further out of balance – no change in price or mortgage interest rates will be enough to rebalance the tripod within the next twelve to eighteen months,

    In a new study on Homeownership Affordability we identify two anomalies in the data: home sales are falling as housing affordability is rising; and the rate of homeownership since 2004 has fallen despite the apparent “boom” in housing.

    Rising Affordability with Falling Sales

    In the last three years, the average mortgage interest rate was 6.14%. Such historically low rates should improve affordability compared to, say, the time of the 1990s credit crunch when mortgage rates averaged 9.3%. Leading up to 2007, median income in the US rose by 0.6% and median home prices fell by 3.1% – also a positive indicator for affordability. The mortgage payment to income ratio at the median has fallen to about 23%. Compared to 32% in 2002 and even 40% in 1988, just before the 1990s credit crunch, this should be a very positive indicator for homeowner affordability. Yet, new home sales have plummeted from a rate of about 1.4 million per year in the summer of 2005 to less than 500,000 by the end of 2008.

    In 2007, for every 1% improvement in affordability, home prices fell by 2%. There clearly has been a breakdown in the fundamental relationship between supply and demand. Why? It appears potential buyers are concerned that homes are over-priced and, worse yet, that home price declines will increase in the future. There are indications that some households think that homes are over-priced regardless of affordability and, furthermore, not everyone who can afford a home is interested in buying one. Some communities, some jobs and some lifestyles are better suited to renting.

    Ownership Policies with Falling Ownership

    All this has occurred in the face of conscious federal policy. Expanding homeownership opportunities, especially for minorities, was a fundamental aim of the Bush Administration’s housing policy – one strongly supported by Democrats in Congress. In June 2002, HUD announced a new goal to increase minority homeownership by 5.5 million by the end 2010. Hispanics were the only minorities to have clear gains in homeownership through 2008: a 4.1 percentage point increase compared to the end of the last decade. The gains in homeownership for black Americans was about the same as for the nation as a whole. Yet the ownership rate for the nation as a whole declined by almost 1 percent during the more recent “housing bust” years.

    Some regions saw bigger losses in homeownership than others, especially those outside the urban areas and particularly in the Midwest.

    Where do we go from here?

    We believe the analytical focus needs to shift to employment when analyzing housing for individual states, regions or cities. The accompanying table shows where, at the state level, the workforce is shrinking as unemployment is rising. These are the areas, much like Southern California at the end of the Cold War or Houston after the 1980s bust in oil prices, that will suffer potentially devastating drops in home prices as a result of forced sales by departing labor.

    Supply, demand and pricing, the cost of financing, household income and home prices – all are critical factors in the equation of homeownership. But more than anything we believe that mounting job losses, in addition to a declining stock market, will now play the critical role. Over time, the current credit crisis will not only make funds more scarce – which must eventually drive up the price of credit – but also drive up the risk premium demanded by lenders. Growing job uncertainty will increase the price of credit even further.

    These factors alone will negatively impact affordability in the future. Keeping mortgage rates artificially low (for example, as the Federal Reserve buys up mortgage-backed securities as proposed in Congress) will create upward pressure on prices, which in turn will hurt affordability. Additionally, we see continued imbalances in the supply-demand equation as foreclosures add inventory to the market.

    In the coming 12 to 18 months, we believe that interest rates will rise and incomes will, at best, remain flat in the face of the global recession. More importantly, as job losses mount, “affordability” will be less important and “maintainability” – the ability of homeowners to keep their homes in the face of unemployment – will emerge as a major factor. In the meantime, housing affordability will hang precariously out of balance due to falling incomes and decreasing jobs as well as surging real interest rates.

    State Change in Total Workforce and Unemployed
    State
    %change in number of workforce
    %change in number of unemployed
    Unemployment rate as of Dec. 2008
    Michigan -1.9% 39.7% 10.6%
    Rhode Island -1.8% 88.1% 10.0%
    Alabama -1.8% 75.3% 6.7%
    Illinois -1.5% 40.3% 7.6%
    West Virginia -1.3% 4.6% 4.9%
    Mississippi -1.1% 25.6% 8.0%
    Missouri -0.8% 37.6% 7.3%
    Tennessee -0.4% 59.4% 7.9%
    Ohio -0.3% 33.8% 7.8%
    Arkansas -0.1% 12.7% 6.2%
    New Hampshire -0.1% 33.6% 4.6%
    Utah -0.1% 51.8% 4.3%
    Delaware 0.0% 75.3% 6.2%
    Wisconsin 0.1% 27.8% 6.2%
    Maryland 0.1% 63.4% 5.8%
    Kentucky 0.3% 48.4% 7.8%
    Iowa 0.3% 20.7% 4.6%
    Massachusetts 0.4% 61.1% 6.9%
    Idaho 0.4% 142.6% 6.4%
    Colorado 0.4% 53.8% 6.1%
    Georgia 0.5% 78.3% 8.1%
    Montana 0.5% 68.9% 5.4%
    Maine 0.6% 44.5% 7.0%
    Minnesota 0.6% 47.6% 6.9%
    South Dakota 0.6% 35.4% 3.9%
    North Carolina 0.7% 87.4% 8.7%
    Indiana 0.7% 86.0% 8.2%
    Connecticut 0.7% 48.0% 7.1%
    Florida 0.8% 80.9% 8.1%
    New York 1.0% 51.9% 7.0%
    North Dakota 1.0% 8.5% 3.5%
    Vermont 1.1% 66.9% 6.4%
    Nebraska 1.2% 46.0% 4.0%
    Wyoming 1.3% 12.4% 3.4%
    New York City 1.4% 47.2% 7.4%
    Kansas 1.5% 27.4% 5.2%
    South Carolina 1.6% 55.3% 9.5%
    California 1.8% 60.4% 9.3%
    Virginia 1.8% 69.2% 5.4%
    New Jersey 1.9% 72.8% 7.1%
    Hawaii 2.0% 82.9% 5.5%
    Oklahoma 2.1% 21.7% 4.9%
    Louisiana 2.2% 52.6% 5.9%
    New Mexico 2.2% 56.2% 4.9%
    Alaska 2.4% 22.4% 7.5%
    Pennsylvania 2.4% 55.7% 6.7%
    Washington 2.6% 60.0% 7.1%
    Texas 2.6% 45.9% 6.0%
    Oregon 2.8% 70.4% 9.0%
    Arizona 3.4% 72.0% 6.9%
    Nevada 4.9% 84.6% 9.1%
    Average 0.8% 53.2% 6.7%
    Median 0.7% 52.6% 6.9%

    Dr. Trimbath is a former manager of depository trust and clearing corporations in San Francisco and New York. She is co-author of Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets (Oxford University Press, 2003), a review of the post-Drexel world of non-investment grade bond markets. Dr. Trimbath is also co-editor of and a contributor to The Savings and Loan Crisis: Lessons from a Regulatory Failure (Kluwer Academic Press, 2004)

    Mr. Montoya obtained his MBA from Babson College (Wellesley, MA) and is a former research analyst at the Milken Institute (Santa Monica, CA) where he coauthored Housing Affordability in Three Dimensions with Dr. Trimbath. He currently works in the foodservice industry.

  • Oh, Canada? A Safe-Haven for Banking Investments

    Looking for a safe haven for your banking investments? The Royal Bank of Canada is about three times the size of Citigroup, Royal Bank of Scotland or Deutsche Bank – and they haven’t cut their dividend in more than 70 years. Although Canadian banking profits declined double-digits last year, they actually had profits. Pretty much the rest of the world’s banks are reporting massive losses.

    It seems the folks above the 49th parallel have been fiscally responsible. According to a story on Bloomberg.com “not one government penny” has been needed to support any Canadian bank “from British Columbia to Quebec” since the financial meltdown began in 2007. Not that the Canadian government left them out in the cold, either. A $C218 billion fund was set up last October – ostensibly to be sure Canadian banks could compete in international markets with all the government-backed banks in the rest of the world – but none of the banks took any of it.

    According to Bloomberg, European governments “committed more than 1.2 trillion Euros ($1.5 trillion) to save their banking systems from collapse.” As close as I can tell, between the Federal Reserve and Treasury, the US has poured over $3 trillion down the drain of financial institutions.

    (To understand the complications in calculating an exact U.S. amount, see my earlier articles for more information on how the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, under now-Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner, funneled money through Delaware limited liability companies to non-bank entities.)

    Only 7 banks in the world have triple-A credit ratings – 2 of them are Canadian. While the rest of the developed, industrial nations are pouring hundreds of billions each down the black hole that is their financial systems, our Neighbors to the North were engaging in “solid funding and conservative consumer lending.”

    Canada is the only member of the G-7 to have balanced their budget 11 years in a row. Immigrating to Canada is looking like a better idea all the time.