New Geography

Category: Demographics

  • Creating a Pearl River Delta Megapolis, The Growth Story of the 21st Century

    In Southern China, the Pearl River Delta is giving rise to an urban super-power in the first rank.

    In 2005, the wealthiest metropolises were still led by the thriving urban agglomerations of the leading advanced economies in North America, Western Europe and Japan; that is, Tokyo, New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Paris and London. The scale economies of these metropolises are as significant as those of many national economies. For instance, the estimated GDP of Tokyo and New York City, respectively, was not that different from the total GDP of Canada or Spain, whereas London’s estimated GDP was higher than that of Sweden or Switzerland.

    In contrast with 2005, when most of the top-100 wealthiest cities were in the G-7 economies, by 2020 a third of these wealthy cities will be in the large emerging economies. However, such rankings are based on linear extrapolations, which tend to downplay growth differences and the impact of rapid urbanization. One of such rapid-growth regions is the Pearl River Delta (PRD), or Zhusanjiao – Southern China’s low-lying area where the Pearl River flows into the South China Sea.

    This area includes Metropolitan Guangzhou, a city of 10 million, capital of the Guangdong Province, which has more than 110 million people; Shenzhen, one of the fastest-growing cities in the world; and Hong Kong, one of the most competitive cities worldwide. In this region, urban planners are joining forces to create a massive Pearl River Delta Megapolis – which includes half a dozen cities of more than 4 million people each (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Dongguan, Foshan, and Jiangmen).

    Since the economic liberalization in the late 1970s, the PRD has become one of the leading economic regions and a major manufacturing center of China. It is an ideal place for foreign investment. Hong Kong provides a world-class financial, logistics and service center, while Guangdong has first-rate electronics and manufacturing capabilities. It is these complementarities that are expected to drive the rise of the PRD region.

    Two Cities, Two Systems: Hong Kong and Shenzhen

    In 1997, Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty as a Special Administrative Region (SAR). China promised Hong Kong a 50-year autonomy; “one-country, two systems”, as Deng Xiaoping put it.

    Measured by purchasing power parity, Hong Kong’s GDP per capita today is about $42,600 (the U.S. average is $46,600). With its seven million people, it is almost as prosperous as Switzerland in terms of GDP per capita.

    This success is linked to China’s soaring economic growth, Hong Kong’s tax incentives, financial services, and its role in global trade. Despite Asia’s 1997 crisis, the technology sector slowdown, and SARS, Hong Kong’s economic engine has continued to hum. Today, the resilient city-state remains a globally important trade, shipping and the financial hub for the Greater Pearl River Delta.

    In the past, Hong Kong was the main gateway to mainland China. As the mainland has given rise to rapidly-growing and increasingly prosperous 1st tier metropolises, there are now almost 110 cities with more than 1 million people in China (by 2025 there will be more than 150 such cities in China). As a result, the role of gateway cities is becoming redundant.

    In 2008, Hong Kong International Airport handled almost 48 million people. However, since the opening of the Baiyun International Airport in Guangzhou, just one hour away from Hong Kong via a high-speed ferry, the region has been growing as an air transportation hub for the region. In 2008, it handled more than 33 million people and was the 2nd busiest airport in mainland China in terms of passenger traffic. Currently, Guangzhou is preparing for the Asian Games in late fall 2010, which will attract millions of visitors.

    Despite 30 million tourists in Hong Kong last year, the growth levels are highest in nearby Macau, China’s Las Vegas, where half of the $22 billion GDP is attributed to gaming, tourism and hospitality industries. It was shipping that initially made Hong Kong, still one of the world’s biggest container ports by output. Ever since Yangshan, a massive deepwater port off the southern coast off Pudong, opened its first phase in 2004, Shanghai’s role has risen rapidly. In 2008, the list of the world’s busiest container seaports – measured by total mass of shipping containers – was led by Singapore, followed by Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Guangzhou.

    Since Shenzhen was established as China’s first economic zone in 1979, the former fishing village has exploded into a prosperous city of 9 million; if, floating migrant population is included, the population base probably exceeds 14 million. Today, Shenzhen has been rated the fifth most crowded city in the world, following Mumbai, Calcutta, Karachi and Lagos – and the first in population density in China, according to Forbes magazine.

    The urban density of population in Shenzhen is 17,150 people per square kilometer, followed by Shanghai at 13,400 people. For a comparison, urban density in metropolitan Los Angeles and New York is 2,750 and 2,050 people, respectively. Unlike the U.S. cities, however, Chinese cities continue to grow – rapidly.

    Shenzhen lacks Hong Kong’s financial sophistication and global mindset. Hong Kong would like to take advantage of Shenzhen IT capabilities and manufacturing cost-efficiencies. Together, the two could evolve into the mainland’s technology hub and IPO venue.

    In 2008, Shenzhen’s GDP per capita was already $13,200 (almost approximate with Taiwan or South Korea). Combined, the total GDP of Hong Kong ($215 billion) and Shenzhen ($120 billion) would be about the same as that of Argentina or Iran.

    “Front Shop, Back Factory” Is No Longer Enough

    As the United States was swept by the global recession in late 2007, the Guangdong and Hong Kong governments intensified their high-level strategies for cooperation. The leaders of the province and the city-state see the next 20 years as a golden age in the acceleration of economic integration between the two territories, and in the creation of a world-class Pearl River Delta Megapolis.

    The proponents of the integration tend to use the term ‘metropolis.’ In fact, the PRD agglomeration would simply dwarf existing metropolises worldwide. Accordingly, the term ‘megalopolis’ may be more appropriate.

    The basic goal of this massive integration would be to enhance quality of life and status of the Greater Pearl River Delta agglomeration. Accordingly, the proponents of the GPRD seek to speed up the upgrading and restructuring of industries in the region. They hope to ensure Hong Kong’s continued prosperity and stability and increase the integrated competitiveness of the region. They also hope to develop an important engine for the development of China and the Pan-Pearl River Delta Region.

    Naturally, such objectives require substantial industrial restructuring and upgrading. In the course of 30 years of China’s reform and opening up, Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta region jointly created an economic miracle based on the model of “Front Shop, Back Factory”. In this model, the PRD region served as the factory of the world, while Hong Kong exploited its service capabilities.

    The growth model is no longer sustainable. It has been continuously weakened. At the same time, signs of change have already become apparent in Guangzhou.

    The Pearl River Delta manufacturing industry has entered an era of restructuring, consolidation, and upgrading in three major sectors; that is, the region’s key industries, the high-tech industry and industry supporting systems. Overall, future prospects for the manufacturing industry look bright.

    Megapolis-in-Progress

    In Guangdong, Party Secretary Wang Yang has called for new thinking on Guangdong-Hong Kong economic integration, while Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Donald Tsang has stressed the need to strengthen Guangdong-Hong Kong economic cooperation. Nearly 80 percent of the residents in the two territories surveyed express confidence in accelerated cooperation between the two territories.

    Still, the plan also poses monumental problems and obstacles, including differences between Guangdong and Hong Kong in their legal, economic, public administration and social services systems. In addition to these differences, the region’s rapidly-growing urban centers have strategic objectives of their own. Competitive strains also exist between the different cities in the region.

    Yet, the incentives for agglomeration are more powerful. The development of the PRD Megapolis would spur growth in the region’s GDP, trade and investment. Some think-tanks expect the GDP of the PRD Metropolis to exceed $2.7 trillion on the basis of the current exchange rates in the next 30 years. For all practical purposes, this would mean that, by 2038, the PRD GDP would be comparable to that of the New York or London metropolitan areas. It will no longer be and up-and-comer; like Tokyo, it will stand as an urban super-power in the first rank – but more than three times bigger.

    Dr. Dan Steinbock is research director of international business at the India, China and America Institute (USA). He currently also serves as senior fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), and visiting professor at the Shanghai Foreign Trade Institute. Dr Steinbock divides his time between New York City, Shanghai and Guangzhou, and occasionally Helsinki, Finland. His new book is Winning Across Borders: How Nokia Creates Strategic Advantage in a Fast-Changing World (Jossey-Bass/Wiley, April 2010) and his most recent policy brief is “Legacy and Globalization: Shanghai and Hong Kong as China’s Emerging Global Financial Hubs” (SIIS).

  • America’s European Dream

    The evolving Greek fiscal tragedy represents more than an isolated case of a particularly poorly run government. It reflects a deeper and potentially irreversible malaise that threatens the entire European continent.

    The issues at the heart of the Greek crisis – huge public debt, slow population growth, expansive welfare system and weakening economic fundamentals – extend to a wider range of European countries, most notably in weaker fringe nations like Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain (the so-called PIIGS). These problems also pervade many E.U. countries still outside the Eurozone in both the Baltic and the Balkans.

    But things are also dicey in some of the core European powers, notably Great Britain, which has soaring debt, high unemployment and very slow growth. Even solvent economies like France, the Netherlands and the continental superpower, Germany, have fallen short of expectations and are expected to experience meager growth for the rest of the year.

    Europe’s poor performance undermines the widespread view held by left-leaning American pundits, policy wonks and academics about Europe’s supposedly superior model. This Euro-philia has a long history, going back at least to the Tories during the Revolution. In better times America usually moves beyond European norms instead of retreating to its cultural mother.

    When the U.S. hits a rough spot, however, there’s a ready chorus urging us to emulate the old continent. During the psychological meltdown that accompanied the Vietnam War, some pundits looked longingly at the relatively peaceful and increasingly affluent Europe as a role model. “There is much to be said for being a Denmark or Sweden, even a Great Britain, France or Italy,” Andrew Hacker said in 1971.

    In the 1980s, as the country struggled to recover its historic competitiveness, numerous pundits suggested adopting European models, notably French and German, to restore our economic standing – a notion widely echoed by Euro-nationalists such as former French President Francois Mitterand’s eminence grise, Jacques Attali.

    Two decades later, with the U.S. reeling from the Great Recession, there’s been a rebirth of euro-mania. Author Parag Khanna, for his part, envisions a “shrunken” America that is lucky to eke out a meager existence between a “triumphant China” and a “retooled Europe.” And Jeremy Rifkin, in his The European Dream, promotes the continent as a morally preferable model – more egalitarian, open and environmentally sensitive – a sentiment recently echoed in my old New America colleague Steven Hill’s Europe’s Promise: Why the European Way Is the Best Hope in an Insecure Age.

    Yet over the past four decades Europe’s core economies – the E.U. 15 – have lagged behind the U.S. in terms of both gross domestic product and job growth. Overall, the E.U. 15’s share of the global GDP has declined to 26% from 35% while the U.S. has held on to its share, now roughly equal to that of its European counterparts. The big winners, of course, have been in East and South Asia.

    Some of this has to do with the difficulties of maintaining an elaborate welfare state. In a productive, efficient and still largely homogeneous country such as the Netherlands or Sweden, an expansive system of social insurance and a vast public sector remains an affordable luxury.

    In contrast, countries like Portugal, Greece and to some extent Spain have tried to create a Scandinavian-style welfare state based on Banana Republic economies. In addition, over-reliance on tourism and real estate speculation has proved no more viable there than in places like Las Vegas or Phoenix.

    Europe’s problems may prove even more profound in the long term. For example, Europe has some of the lowest birthrates in the world. Among 228 countries ranked in terms of birthrate, Europe accounts for 20 of the bottom 28. These include relatively prosperous Germany (No. 226) and Sweden as well as a range of the shaky fringe including Greece, Bosnia, Hungary, Latvia, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

    The shrinking population problem is complicated by the fact that the one growing source of new Europeans consists of Muslim immigrants who generally have not integrated well into continental society. Many European countries – Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland, for example – are taking steps to shut their doors, something that may promote harmony and security but could exacerbate the long-term demographic decline.

    With their state-driven economies pledged largely to support a growing population of aging boomers, it’s hard to see what new sources of growth will propel the continent in the coming decades. Overall, according to the European Central Bank, the Eurozone’s growth potential is now roughly half that of the United States.

    Meager economic growth may also be affecting one of Europe’s greatest achievements: its relative egalitarianism. The trend toward greater inequality, earlier evident in the U.S., has now spread to Europe, including such famously “egalitarian” countries as Finland, Norway and Germany, which was the only E.U. country to see wages fall between 2000 and 2008.

    In Berlin, Germany’s largest city, unemployment has remained far higher than the national average, with rates at around 15%. One quarter of the workforce earns less than 900 euros a month. In Berlin, 36% of children are poor, many of them the children of immigrants. “Red Berlin,” with its egalitarian ethos, notes one left-wing activist, has emerged as “the capital of poverty and the working poor in Germany.” [i]

    As in the U.S., the burden of recession has fallen most heavily on younger people. An OECD analysis found that older European workers enjoyed the best gains during the past 30 years, while children and young people fared worse. For E.U. workers under 25 the unemployment rate is well over 20%, slightly higher than that of the U.S. but a remarkable statistic given the far less rapid expansion of the European workforce.

    The situation is particularly dire in Europe’s exposed southern tier. Young people who rioted in Athens in 2008 suffer unemployment rates in excess of 25%. By the end of 2009 unemployment for those under 25 stood at 44% in Spain and 31% in Ireland. Even in Sweden the youth unemployment rate has reached 27%.

    If the pattern of the last decade holds, many of Europe’s most talented young people will end up in the U.S., particularly once the recession comes to an end. By 2004 some 400,000 European Union science and technology graduates were residing in the U.S. Barely one in seven, according to a recent European Commission poll, intends to return. “The U.S. is a sponge that’s happy to soak up talent from across the globe,” observes one Irish scientist.

    Of course, there is still much we can learn from Europe. Besides a sometimes enviable lifestyle, Europeans offer some intriguing health care models and have led the way in efficient fuel economy standards. But overall, profound differences in demographics and cultural traditions suggest that America cannot easily follow a European approach to social organization and planning.

    Indeed as the U.S. and Europe confront the challenge of the rising Asian powers, their approaches likely will have to diverge. To maintain its economy and pay its debts, America will have to focus on creating jobs and opportunities for a growing population. Europeans will struggle with declining workforces, radically skewed demographics and an increasingly burdensome welfare state.

    In the 21st century we will witness not so much a clash of civilizations, but a more subtle parting of the ways. Americans need to choose a path that makes sense for us, not one drawn from an aging society whose future seems unlikely to match its past achievements.

    [i] “Income inequality and poverty rising in most OECD countries,” OECD, Oct. 21, 2008; Nicholas Kulish, “In German Hearts, a Pirate Spreads the Plunger Again,” New York Times, Nov. 6, 2008; Sally McGrane, “Berlin’s Poverty Protect It From Downturn,” Spiegel on line, March 4, 2009; Emma Bode, “Unemployment and poverty on the rise in Berlin,” World Socialist Web Site, Aug. 30, 2008

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

    Photo: leucippus @Flickr

  • America on the Rise

    For much of the past decade, “declinism” – the notion that America is heading toward a deadly denouement – has largely been a philosophy of the left. But more recently, particularly in the wake of Barack Obama’s election, conservatives have begun joining the chorus, albeit singing a somewhat different variation on the same tune.

    In a recent column in The Washington Post George Will illustrates this conservative change of heart. Looking over the next few decades Will sees an aging, obsolescent America in retreat to a young and aggressive China. “America’s destiny is demographic, and therefore is inexorable and predictable,” he suggests, pointing to predictions by Nobel Prize economist Robert Fogel that China’s economy will be three times larger than that of the U.S. by 2040.

    Will may be one of America’s great columnists, but he – like his equally distinguished liberal counterpart Thomas Friedman – may be falling prey to a current fashion for sinophilia. It is a sign of the times that conservatives as well as liberals often underestimate the Middle Kingdom’s problems – in addition to America’s relative strengths.

    Rarely mentioned in such analyses is China’s own aging problem. The population of the People’s Republic will be considerably older than the U.S.’ by 2050. It also has far more boys than girls – a rather insidious problem. Among the younger generation there are already an estimated 24 million more men of marrying age than women. This is not going to end well – except perhaps for investors in prostitution and pornography.

    In the longer term demographic trends actually place the U.S. in a relatively strong position. By the end of the first half of the 21st century, the American population aged 15 to 64 – essentially your economically active cohort – are projected to grow by 42%; China’s will shrink by 10%. Comparisons with other competitors are even larger, with the E.U. shrinking by 25%, Korea by 30% and Japan by a remarkable 44%.

    The Japanese experience best illustrates how wrong punditry can be. Back in the 1970s and 1980s it was commonplace for pundits – particularly on the left – to predict Japan’s ascendance into world leadership. At the time distinguished commentators like George Lodge, Lester Thurow and Robert Reich all pointed to Europe and Japan as the nations slated to beat the U.S. on the economic battlefield. “Japan is replacing America as the world’s strongest economic power,” one prominent scholar told a Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1986. “It is in everyone’s interest that the transition goes smoothly.”

    This was not unusual or even shocking at the time. It followed a grand tradition of declinism that over the past 70 years has declared America ill-suited to compete with everyone from fascist Germany and Italy to the Soviet Union. By the mid-1950s a majority were convinced that we were losing the Cold War. In the 1980s Harvard’s John Kenneth Galbraith thought the Soviet model successful enough that the two systems would eventually “converge.”

    We all know how that convergence worked out. Even the Chinese abandoned the Stalinist economic model so admired by many American intellectuals once Mao was safely a-moldering in his grave. Outside of the European and American academe, the only strong advocates of state socialism can be found in such economic basket cases as Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela.

    So given this history, why the current rise in declinism? Certainly it’s a view many in the wider public share. Most Americans fear their children will not be able to live as well as they have. A plurality think China will be the world’s most powerful country in 20 years.

    To be sure there are some good reasons for pessimism. The huge deficits, high unemployment, our leakage of industry not only to China but other developing countries are all worrisome trends. Yet if the negative case is easier to make, it does not stand historical scrutiny.

    Let’s just go back to what we learned during the “Japan is taking over the world” phase during the 1970s and 1980s. At the time Dai Nippon’s rapid economic expansion was considered inexorable. Yet history is not a straight-line project. Most countries go through phases of expansion and decline. The factors driving success often include a well-conceived economic strategy, an expanding workforce and a sense of national élan.

    In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s Japan – like China today – possessed all those things. Its bureaucratic state had targeted key industries like automobiles and electronics, and its large, well-educated baby boom population was hitting the workforce. There was an unmistakable sense of pride in the country’s rapid achievements after the devastation of the Second World War.

    Yet even then, as the Economist’s Bill Emmot noted in his 1989 book The Sun Also Sets, things were not so pretty once you looked a little closer. In the mid-1980s I traveled extensively in Japan and, with the help of a young Japanese-American scholar, Yoriko Kishimoto, interviewed demographers and economists who predicted Japan’s eventual decline.

    By then, the rapid drop in Japan’s birthrate and its rapid aging was already clearly predictable. But even more persuasive were hours spent with the new generation of Japanese – the equivalent of America’s Xers – who seemed alienated from the self-abnegating, work-obsessed culture of their parents. By the late 1980s it was clear that the shinjinrui (“the new race”) seemed more interested in design, culture and just having fun than their forebears. They seemed destined not to become another generation of economic samurai.

    At the time though, the very strategies so critical to Japan’s growth – particularly a focus on high-end manufacturing – proved highly susceptible to competitors from lower-cost countries: first Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, and later China, Vietnam and more recently India. Like America and Britain before it, Japan exported its unique genius abroad. Now many companies, including American ones, have narrowed the technological gap with Japan.

    Today Japan, like the E.U., lacks the youthful population needed to recover its mojo. It likely will emerge as a kind of mega-Switzerland, Sweden or Denmark – renowned for its safety and precision. Its workforce will have to be ultra-productive to finance the robots it will need to care for its vast elderly population.

    Will China follow a similar trajectory in the next few decades? Countries infrequently follow precisely the same script as another. Japan was always hemmed in by its position as a small island country with very minimal resources. Its demographic crisis will make things worse. In contrast, China, for the next few decades, certainly won’t suffer a shortage of economically productive workers

    But it could face greater problems. The kind of low-wage manufacturing strategy that has generated China’s success – as occurred with Japan – is already leading to a backlash across much of the world. China’s very girth projects a more terrifying prospect than little Japan. At some point China will either have to locate much of its industrial base closer to its customers, as Japan has done, or lose its markets.

    More important still are massive internal problems. Japan, for all its many imperfections, was and remains a stable, functioning democracy, open to the free flow of information. China is a fundamentally unstable autocracy, led from above, and one that seeks to control information – as evidenced in its conflict with Google – in an age where the free flow of information constitutes an essential part of economic progress.

    China’s social problems will be further exacerbated by a huge, largely ill-educated restive peasant class still living in poverty. Of course America too has many problems – with stunted upward mobility, the skill levels of its workforce, its fiscal situation. But the U.S., as the Japanese scholar Fuji Kamiya once noted, possesses sokojikara, a self-renewing capacity unmatched by any country.

    As we enter the next few decades of the new millennium, I would bet on a more youthful, still resource-rich and democratic America to maintain its preeminence even in a world where economic power continues to shift from its historic home in Europe to Asia.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

  • Ryan Streeter Making Poverty History: A Short History

    Former chief economist of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development David Henderson coined the appellation, “Global Salvationism,” to describe the kind of behavior one witnesses at gatherings such as this past week’s World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. WEF was created in 1971 so that elites from around the world could gather to “map out solutions to global challenges,” according to WEF’s website. This year’s forum is entitled, “Improve the State of the World: Rethink, Redesign, Rebuild.” WEF’s program summary explains the urgency of the task facing those gathered in beautiful eastern Switzerland this way: “Improving the state of the world requires catalyzing global cooperation to address pressing challenges and future risks.” In an effort to compound jargon with alliteration, WEF uses “rethinking” in the titles of 29 conference sessions, “redesign” 16 times, and “rebuild” 9 times, for a total of nearly one-quarter of all the sessions. With all the turmoil created by the global recession and other “pressing challenges” in 2009, the world’s elites came together this week ready to re-do about everything.

    Central to WEF’s annual objectives is what to do about life’s inequities and imbalances. Hardly anything warrants “catalyzing global cooperation” more than the ongoing effort to make poverty history, reduce inequality, and correct global imbalances. WEF has announced that global development is taking center stage on the third day of the event.

    How ironic, then, that just prior to their gathering, Maxim Pinkovskiy and Xavier Sala-i-Martin updated findings from their 2009 National Bureau of Economic Research paper, “Parametric Estimations of the World Distribution of Income,” on the economics website VOX. Their findings show precipitous drops in global poverty since 1970—just about the same time WEF began meeting in Davos (Mark Perry wrote about the original paper here).

    Between 1970 and 2006, the global poverty rate fell nearly 75 percent. During this period, the percentage of the world’s population living on less than a dollar a day fell from 26.8 to 5.4 percent. The world’s population grew 80 percent during the same period, which makes the poverty reduction all the more astounding. The global Gini coefficient, a standard measure of inequality, fell from 67.6 to 61.2 percent, indicating a drop in inequality as well as poverty. The same trend is found in other measures of inequality besides Gini.

    And when one computes a measure of global “welfare” understood in the old-fashioned sense of well-being, we find that life has gotten better faster for a larger share of the world’s population than perhaps any time in history. By deriving a calculation of well-being from GDP and inequality measures, the authors show that between 1970 and 2006, global welfare more than doubled, growing faster than GDP.

    The authors also consider the World Bank’s new purchasing power parity (PPP)–adjusted measures of GDP and find that while global poverty increases overall, the rate of poverty actually drops faster since 1970 than it does under more conventional GDP measures. In other words, under the PPP model, the world looks a lot poorer in 1970 than it does using more traditional measures of poverty, but today, the poverty rate is nearly the same regardless of whether one uses the PPP or more traditional measures (see the graph below). Using the World Bank’s adjustment actually has the effect of making it look like we have been doing a better job of reducing poverty over the past three decades, despite how the world looks poorer in any given year.

    graph
    (Chart available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4508.)

    Now, just days before Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin published their VOX article, Princeton’s Angus Deaton shot to pieces the idea that one can accurately measure global poverty and inequality across countries in his presidential address to the American Economic Association. Deaton’s argument is persuasive and serves as a good reminder that economic measures across different societies are nearly impossible to establish with perfection and complete accuracy. That said, it is interesting that Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin find the same drops in poverty across the various methodologies they test. Something is going on here.

    One might draw the conclusion that the precipitous drop in poverty corresponds with the beginning of the WEF meetings in 1971. Maybe the elite gathering has worked! Or, one might conclude liberalization of states and economies is working. During roughly the same period covered by the authors, the percentage of free countries in the world increased from 29 to 46 percent, according to Freedom House’s annual ratings. Liberalization and economic growth go together. One might also conclude that China’s explosive growth, which has carried Asia as a whole from 19 percent to 28 percent of the global economy during this period, has had a significant impact on poverty reduction, not to mention India’s rapid rise in its share of global GDP.

    Instead of rethinking, redesigning, and rebuilding the world, WEF’s best minds might consider devoting a full day to understanding what worked the past forty years and figuring out how to “repeat” it.

    This post originally appeared at The Enterprise Blog at The American.

    Ryan Streeter is a senior fellow at the London-based Legatum Institute and can be followed on Twitter here.

  • The Gero-Economy Revs Up

    Green jobs? Great. Gray jobs? Maybe an even better bet for the new jobs bill. If there is a single graphic that everyone concerned with the nation’s future should have tattooed on their eyeballs, my vote goes to the one on your left. Here is its central message:

    Forty years from now, one out of four Americans will be 65 or older.

    Twenty million will be over 85.

    One million will be over 100.

    So far the Big Think on such numbers might be boiled down to a few reasonable conclusions: People will have to work longer and delay retirement. The government should underwrite serial job retraining and promote new kinds of annuity plans. These will boost tax revenue that would help pay the nation’s growing Social Security and Medicare tab. “[It] would constitute a kind of neo-welfare state—a new covenant—that promotes individual responsibility in alliance with the voluntary sector, the market, and government,” observes Robert Butler, the dean of modern gerontology. He calls his package “productive aging.”

    But there is a third rung: incentives to make aging an engine of economic growth. There’s gelt in that there gray! It’s the entire world that’s aging, after all, and that world’s in need of gero-tools, gero-think, gero-innovation. We’ve got it. Let’s sell it – to China, Europe, India.

    I spent some time recently with innovators in this realm. Perhaps the most exciting were those designing new-style senior housing—ranging from high end architects and builders to small time real estate entrepreneurs. They are pursuing ways for the elderly to live more comfortably and safely in their own homes and communities.

    In Palo Alto, one former real estate saleswoman, frustrated with the elder-scary housing stock in that uptown realm, took to providing what turned out to be a popular and profitable service: gero-fitting, or “prostheticizing,” those ultra-modern (and hard-edged) homes with senior-friendly accoutrements: hand bars everywhere in case of a fall, showers and water sources that adjust heat and flow automatically, wheel chair turns in halls and room-by-room phones and computer screens that activate by voice.

    Nursing homes – places where one normally sees neither – are also slowly emerging out from under decades of under-investment and institution-think. Architects and developers from Sweden (one of the fastest aging nations in the world), Japan (the fastest in Asia) and even Italy (one of the most unprepared gero-nations) have been retooling the unfulfilled promise of universal design to come up with new construction methods and new construction materials.

    Yet it’s American builders, with their vast experience and regional flexibility, who stand to be generational leaders in the most profitable arena: building new homes. Where are they?

    Then there is transportation. Cars–and our addiction to them–are perennially painted as villains in elder-world. Yet until they are in their early 80s, aged drivers far outperform their younger counterparts, with fewer injury accidents and fewer tickets. Nevertheless, finding ways to make driving safer and more comfortable suggests another major opportunity: prostheticizing the automobile and making highways less cognitively confusing.

    Here in Los Angeles, the original car capital, one company is using space program sensor technologies to make cars that warn drivers when they are tailgating, when they are weaving, when their off ramp is coming up. Roadways? Someone needs to use our state-of-the-art understanding of cognition to redesign everything from highway signs to lighting. A few farsighted firms are already trying to do so. We need more.

    The aging of the modern stomach could also drive food science to develop new staples that are less glycemic (high blood sugar being one of the biggest sources of chronic inflammation in the elderly) but still tasty and satisfying. And, instead of being peremptorily dismissed, the “anti-aging” medical movement could be scientifically (and systematically) plumbed for real medical advances, tested with gold standard clinical trials, and then sold to the rest of the arthritic world.

    Who, then, will lead? Who will become the Bill Gates of ElderWare, the Al Gore of GeroWarming, the Warren Buffett of AlterAssets?. Right now, we’re still waiting.

    “The boomers are going to have a rougher time in retirement than their parents,” says Robert Butler. “That can mean two things: they can complain about it, or they can retool it for their kids and take advantage of its promise.”

    Greg Critser’s new book is Eternity Soup: Inside the Quest to End Aging (Random/Harmony 2010).

  • Blame Their Parents, Not Us

    We appreciate Pete Peterson’s attention to our work, but in responding to his complaint that we are denigrating Generation X and underrating its civic participation, we should begin at the beginning, define our terms, and give credit where credit is due. In writing our book, Millennial Makeover: MySpace, YouTube, and the Future of American Politics, we borrowed heavily from the thinking of and acknowledged our intellectual debt to Neil Howe and the late William Strauss, the founders of generational theory. In their seminal books, Generations (1992) and The Fourth Turning (1997), Strauss and Howe described the four generational archetypes – Idealist, Reactive, Civic, and Adaptive – that have cycled throughout Anglo-American history. Stemming from the way each generation was reared by its parents, each generational type develops a characteristic set of attitudes and behaviors that is broadly similar regardless of where in American history it appears.

    It is the attitudes and behaviors of these archetypes, not our biases or disdain for Generation X, that underpin our comments. Those same archetypical attitudes and behaviors also shape the statistics that Peterson cites both selectively and somewhat out of context in his New Geography posting.

    One of Peterson’s contentions is that members of Generation X currently participate in voluntary or non-profit activities to at least the same extent as Millennials do. He cites a survey conducted by the National Conference on Citizenship (NCOC) to prove his point. It is clear, however, that the NCOC itself places great hope in the Millennial Generation, entitling a section in its reports, “The Emerging Generation: Opportunities with the Millennials” and stating that “In the 2009 Civic Health Index, Millennials emerge as the ‘top’ group for volunteers.”

    While the NCOC statistics do indicate that Millennials lead the way in civic engagement, to be fair the overall differences between the X and Millennial Generations are not large. What most distinguishes Millennials from other generations is the type of community activities in which they are involved. Not surprisingly, given the lower incomes normally associated with entry level jobs and the fact that the Great Recession has hit them to a far greater extent than other generations, Millennials are more likely than older generations to volunteer rather than make financial donations. While a plurality of those in all generations say they both volunteer and donate financially, Millennials are substantially more likely to engage solely as volunteers. Among those who only volunteer, Millennials do so at 3.25 times the rate of Baby Boomers, 2.6 times that of seniors, and 1.3 times more than members of Generation X. In effect, at least in the current economy, Millennials have more time than money.

    As Peterson points out, when respondents were asked whether they had increased their civic participation in the past year, Gen-Xers led the way with 39% answering “yes” surpassing Millennials (29%), Boomers (26%), and seniors (25%). He dismisses the possibility that this might reflect improvements in previously low engagement levels among Gen-Xers, but actually it does. According to the U.S. Department of Education in 1984, when all of them were Gen-Xers, only a quarter (27%) of high school students participated in community service. Twenty years later, when all high school students were Millennials about three times as many (80%) did so. It could be argued that this increase occurred simply because by 2004 students were required to be active in their communities while they weren’t previously. But, for whatever reason, Millennials better seemed to internalize the lessons about community service to which they were exposed in high school. In 1989, 13% of those participating in the National Service organizations like the Peace Corps and Teachers Corps were from Generation X, about the percentage contribution of the generation to the U.S. population at that time. In 2006, 26% of National Service participants were Millennials, twice their percentage in the population.

    Peterson also maintains the voting turnout of Generation X equals that of Millennials when the two generations were of similar age. To demonstrate this he compares youth turnout in the 1992 and 2008 presidential elections. According to CIRCLE, a non-partisan organization that studies and attempts to increase the political participation of young people, 18-29 years did indeed vote at similar rates in 1992 when those of that age were Gen-Xers (50%) and in 2008 when that age group consisted primarily of Millennials (52% overall and 59% in the competitive battleground states in which the Obama and McCain campaigns concentrated their efforts).

    What Peterson did not do is to report on what occurred in all of the elections between 1992 and 2008. This provides more nuanced data that is generally more favorable to Millennials. For example, in 1996, when again all young voters were members of Generation X, youth electoral participation fell to 37%, the lowest of any year for which CIRCLE reports data. Youth voting began to steadily increase starting in 2000 as the first Millennials attained voting age until, in 2008, it reached the highest level since 1972.

    But, Peterson’s biggest unhappiness with those of us who “gush” about the Millennials really seems to be his belief that we extol them for partisan reasons. It is true that Millennials lean heavily to the Democratic Party. They supported Barack Obama against John McCain by a greater than 2:1 margin (66% vs. 32%) and, according to Pew, last October identified as Democrats over Republicans by 52% vs. 34%. They are also the first generation in at least four to contain more self-perceived liberals than conservatives.

    We certainly don’t hide the fact that we are life-long Democrats, something we clearly pointed out in the introduction to our book even as we made every effort to be evenhanded in our examination of American politics. That evenhanded examination suggests that as a civic generation, at this point in American history, it is hard to imagine most Millennials being anything other than Democrats. Civic generations, like the Millennials, favor societal and governmental solutions to the problems facing America. At least since the New Deal, the Democratic Party has had more affinity for such approaches than the GOP. It is for this reason that the GI Generation (Tom Brokaw’s Greatest Generation) became lifelong Democrats in the 1930s and why we believe most Millennials now see themselves as Democrats and vote that way. For Peterson to wish that were different won’t make it so.

    But, in the end, all generational archetypes play key roles in the mosaic of American life. In truth, no generation is somehow “better” or “worse” than another. When the civic GI Generation served America so nobly and effectively in World War II, members of the idealist Missionary Generation like Franklin D. Roosevelt inspired it and it was commanded in battle by great generals from the reactive Lost Generation such as Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton. America now faces a new set of grave issues. It will take the concerted efforts of all generations to confront and resolve them.

    Morley Winograd and Michael D. Hais are fellows of the New Democrat Network and the New Policy Institute and co-authors of Millennial Makeover: MySpace, YouTube, and the Future of American Politics (Rutgers University Press: 2008), named one of the 10 favorite books by the New York Times in 2008.

  • A Race Of Races

    When Americans think of our nation’s power (or our imminent lack of it) we tend to point to the national debts, GDP or military prowess. Few have focused on what may well be the country’s most historically significant and powerful weapon: its emergence as the modern world’s first multiracial superpower.

    This evolution, after centuries of racial wrangling and struggle, will prove particularly critical in a world in which the power of the “white” race will likely diminish as power shifts to China, India and other developing countries. By 2039, due largely to immigrants and their offspring, non-Europeans will constitute the majority of working-age Americans, and by around 2050 non-Hispanic whites could well be in the minority.

    But this should not be seen so much as a matter of ethnic succession as multiracial amalgamation. The group likely to grow fastest, for example, will be made up of people, like President Obama himself, who are of mixed race. There is no more demonstrable evidence of the changing racial attitudes of Americans. As recently as 1987 slightly less than half of Americans approved of interracial couples. By 2007, according to the Pew Center, 83% supported them. Among the millennial generation, who will make up the majority of adults in 2050, 94% approve of such matches.

    Today roughly 20% of Americans, according to Pew Research Center, say they have a relative married to someone of another race. Mixed-race couples tend to be younger; over two-fifths of mixed-race Americans are under 18 years of age. In the coming decades this group will play an ever greater role in society. According to sociologists at UC, Irvine, by 2050 mixed-race people could account for one in five Americans.

    The result will be a U.S. best described in Walt Whitman’s prophetic phrase as “the race of races.” No other advanced, populous country will enjoy such ethnic diversity.

    The U.S. will likely remain militarily and even economically preeminent, but much of its power will stem from its status as the world’s only multiracial superpower. America’s global reach will extend well beyond Coca-Cola, Boeing and the Seventh Fleet and express itself in the most intimate cultural and familial ties.

    Our continuing relative success with immigration is key to this process. In the next decades the fate of Western countries may well depend on their ability to make social and economic room for people whose origins lay outside Europe. No Western-derived country produces enough children of European descent to prevent them from becoming granny nation-states by 2050.

    In other words, countries and societies need to become more racially diverse in order to succeed. Yet over the past few decades many countries, from Iran to the nations of the former Soviet bloc, have narrowed their definition of national identity. Even the province of Quebec, bordering the U.S., has imposed preferential policies devised to blunt successful minorities. Because of these restrictive policies, which in some places are accompanied by lethal threats, Jews, Armenians, Coptic Christians and diaspora Chinese have often been forced to find homes in more-welcoming places.

    In recent decades Europe has received as many immigrants as the U.S., but it has proven far less able to absorb them. The roughly 20 million Muslims who live in Europe have tended to remain segregated from the rest of society and economically marginalized. In Europe, notably in France, unemployment among immigrants – particularly those from Muslim countries – is often at least twice that of the native born; in Britain, as well, Muslims are far more likely to be out of the workforce than either Christians or Hindus. British Muslims, according to Britain National Equity Panel, possess household wealth one-fifth that of the predominant nominally Christian population.

    This is also a famously alienated and socially isolated population. For example, in Britain in 2001 up to 40% of the Islamic population believed that terrorist attacks on both Americans and their fellow Britons were justified. They are not mixing much; 95% of white Britons say they have exclusively white friends. In comparison, only 25% of American whites in 29 selected metropolitan areas reported having no interracial friendships at all.

    Despite scattered cases of terrorists in our midst, the contrast between U.S. Muslims and their counterparts overseas is particularly telling. In the U.S. most Muslims are comfortably middle class, with income and education levels above the national average. They are more likely to be satisfied with the state of the country, their own community and their prospects for success than are other Americans – even in the face of the reaction to 9-ll.

    More important, more than half of Muslims – many of them immigrants – identify themselves as Americans first, a far higher percentage than in the various countries of Western Europe. This alienation may be a legacy of the European colonial experience, but it can also be seen in Denmark and Sweden, which had little earlier contact with the Muslim world. In contrast, in the U.S. more than four in five are registered to vote, a sure sign of civic involvement. “You can keep the flavor of your ethnicity,” remarked one University of Chicago Pakistani doctorate student in Islamic studies, “but you are expected to become an American.”

    But the general success of American immigration extends beyond Muslims. Even the largely working-class immigrants from Mexico generally have had lower unemployment than white and other workers, at least until 2007; then with the housing-led recession their unemployment rate began to rise, since so many were involved in construction and manufacturing. Once the economy recovers the historical pattern should reassert itself. Other large groups, including Asians, Cubans, Africans and a still considerable number of Europeans, have performed even better.

    Immigrants by their very nature, of course, are a work in progress, reflecting the essential protean nature of this civilization. Yet they are clearly becoming Americans and transforming who we are as a people. Ideologues on the left and right often don’t understand what is going on in America. The left, locked on the racial past, looks for new grievances to stoke among newcomers. They envision the rise of a fractured country – precisely the same thing many conservatives fear.

    Yet Hispanics, and particularly their children, are not becoming serape-wrapped Spanish speakers. Among Hispanics in California, 90% of children of first-generation immigrants speak fluent English; in the second generation half no longer speak Spanish. Only 7% of the children of immigrants speak Spanish as a primary language.

    Over the next few decades this pattern of ethnic and racial integration will separate America from its key competitors. In 2005 the U.S. swore in more new citizens than the next nine immigrant-receiving countries put together. These newcomers will reshape the very identity of the country and allow the U.S. to continue growing its labor force.

    Our prime competitors of the future – India and China – are unlikely to evolve in this direction. India is a highly heterogeneous country itself and remains driven by ethnic and religious conflicts. China, like Japan and Korea, remains a profoundly homogeneous country with little appetite or capacity to accept newcomers.

    America’s relative openness is particularly critical in the worldwide struggle for skilled labor. Right now more than half of all skilled immigrants in the world come to the U.S., though Australia and Canada, which have much smaller populations, have higher percentages of them. Despite repeated press reports about return migration to home countries, understandable given our sometimes bizarre immigration policy and the deep economic downturn, the vast majority of skilled immigrants – at least 60% – from around the world are staying.

    America’s successful evolution to a post-ethnic society will prove particularly critical in U.S. relations with developing nations, our largest source of immigrants. Even those immigrants who return home to Europe, China, India, Africa or Latin America often retain strong familial and business ties to the U.S. They can testify that America maintains a special ability to integrate all varieties of people into its society.

    As we negotiate the next few decades, America’s growing diversity allows it to stand alone, a multiracial colossus unmatched by any in the evolving global economy. In the current world being a “race of races” represents not a dissolution of power but a new means for expressing it.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

  • Get Real About Generation X Stereotypes

    Pity Generation X, the Americans born between 1965 and 1981, who have been derided for years as “apathetic,” “cynical,” and “disengaged.” Meanwhile, the greatness of the Greatest Generation is clear in its very name. Much laudatory ink has been spilled on the Baby Boomers…usually by Boomers themselves. As for the Millennials, those born between 1982 and 1998, the quantity of reportage lauding their public-spiritedness has quickly become tiresome. But a new report casts doubt on the widely accepted stereotype of Gen X-ers as inferior to these other groups.

    Sociologists Morley Winograd and Michael D. Hais, authors of Millennial Makeover: MySpace, YouTube, and the Future of American Politics, offer a good example of the usual attitude. “Millennials are sharply distinctive from the divided, moralistic Baby Boomers (born 1946–1964) and the cynical, individualistic Gen-X-ers (born 1965–1981), the two generations that preceded them and who are their parents,” they write. “Millennials have a deep commitment to community and helping others, putting this belief into action with community service activities.”

    In a Boston Globe op-ed prior to last year’s presidential election, Harvard’s Robert Putnam took things a step further, comparing Millennials to the earlier cohort that survived the Depression and fought World War II: “The 2008 elections are thus the coming-out party of this new Greatest Generation. Their grandparents of the original Greatest Generation were the civic pillars of American democracy for more than a half-century, and at long last, just as that generation is leaving the scene, reinforcements are arriving.”

    Would it be unseemly at this point to groan, “Gag me with a spoon”?

    All of this stereotyping might be more bearable if it were true. But the latest Civic Health Index study from the congressionally chartered National Conference on Citizenship (NCOC) puts both the Millennials and Generation X in a different light. The report, entitled Civic Health in Hard Times, focuses on the impact of the economic downturn on nationwide civic participation. The results, organized by generational cohort, indicate that much of the derision heaped on Generation X’s withdrawal from the public square has been misplaced.

    While Gen X-ers fall slightly behind Millennials in volunteering (42.6 percent to 43 percent), the narrowness of the gap is surprising, given the vastly greater number of volunteering opportunities available to (and sometimes mandated for) Millennials in high school and college. Gen X-ers far outdistance Baby Boomers (35 percent) in volunteering, and even outperform the real “Greatest Generation” of retired seniors (42 percent). And when asked whether they had increased their participation in the past year, Gen-X respondents scored highest, with 39 percent answering yes. This far surpassed Millennials (29 percent), Boomers (26), and seniors (25).

    Certainly this outcome might partly reflect small changes in already low engagement levels among Gen X-ers, but a deeper look reveals that they flex considerable civic muscle. Boomer respondents took the top spot when asked whether they “had given food or money to someone who isn’t a relative” in the last year, with 52.9 percent responding affirmatively, but Gen X-ers finished second (51.2 percent), followed by seniors, with Millennials placing last. When asked about a range of civic involvement activities, from “giving money, food, shelter” to more direct “volunteering,” Gen X-ers finished second to seniors — ahead of both Boomers and Millennials — in stating that they had done “all of the above”.

    As for more general political participation, recently released data from the U.S. Census Bureau show that while Millennials had a statistically significant uptick in voter participation in the November 2008 elections, they still trailed every other generation in percentage turnout. In fact, 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds voted at the lowest percentages of any age surveyed—39.8 percent, 40.1 percent, and 43 percent, respectively. Gen X-ers far surpassed Millennials in percentage voting in 2008, 52.1 percent to 44.5. And the voter turnout for Millennials in 2008 was less than 1 percentage point higher than Gen-X-er turnout figures for 1992, the comparable election, age-wise, for the older cohort. These are hardly numbers befitting “a new Greatest Generation.”

    Moving from the issue of participation to that of trust in our largest governing institutions, the NCOC survey shows that there is some truth to the characterization of Gen X-ers as cynical. When asked, “Do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right?” Gen X-ers were the most dubious of all generations, with only 20.7 percent responding that they trusted the feds either “most of the time” or “just about always.” Compare this with Millennials (27.9 percent), Boomers (27.8), and seniors (26.2). The same trends pertain to questions about state government, though Gen X-ers’ level of trust in their local government was higher.

    This divergence between trust and participation makes sense when understood as a rational civic reaction to what are perceived as broken or distant political institutions. Gen X-ers, cautious about whether our politics can ameliorate significant societal ills, are nonetheless “voting” with their money and time to address these challenges. We may be skeptical, but we’re not apathetic.

    So why all the gushing about the Millennials? Part of the reason is the necessary examination of a new and very large generation’s coming of age, and of its participation in a democratic society. But it’s also difficult not to see a partisan element. In 2007, as researchers Winograd and Hais point out, Millennials self-identified as Democrats over Republicans by a margin of 52 percent to 30 percent. Winograd, a former adviser to Vice President Al Gore, uses this snapshot to forecast a Democratic “historic opportunity to become the majority party for at least four more decades.”

    Michael Connery, author of the recent Youth to Power: How Today’s Young Voters Are Building Tomorrow’s Progressive Majority, recently suggested, “If a ‘post-partisan’ politics is going to be ushered in on a wave of Millennial support, it will have a distinctly progressive character.” Connery concludes that it is “this optimism and belief in their own power to make positive change in the country — reflected in many polls and surveys of Millennials taken in the past few years — more than anything that accounts for the incredible surge in youth participation that we are seeing today.”

    These pundits should be careful, though, for while Millennials have registered predominantly Democratic, they’ve also shown a libertarian streak, expressing significant support for fiscally conservative policies.

    Winograd, Connery, and others (like the Center for American Progress’s Ruy Teixeira) seem less interested in touting the Millennials’ civic engagement than in celebrating their political leanings and what these might mean for the Democratic Party. In contrast, Gen X-ers began to participate politically as the youngest members of the Reagan Revolution, with most research finding us (to this day) more politically conservative than our Boomer parents.

    One wonders how much applause we would hear for Millennials if their current affiliation were reversed. As this year’s Civic Health Index demonstrates, Gen X-ers are proving to be deeply involved in civil society, even as we continue to be suspicious of big government. So while pundits keep handing out participation trophies to the Millennials, maybe this year they should save a few for the enlightened skeptics of Generation X.

    An earlier version of this article appeared in City Journal.

    Pete Peterson is executive director of Common Sense California, a multipartisan organization that supports citizen participation in policymaking (his views do not necessarily represent those of CSC). He also lectures on State and Local Governance at Pepperdine’s School of Public Policy.

  • Millennials Need to Stand Up and Be Counted

    As the campaign to ensure a complete and accurate count of every American in this year’s census gets off the ground, a new survey of American attitudes toward participating in the census shows that young Americans, members of the Millennial Generation, born 1982-2003, may prove least likely to stand up and be counted. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that roughly one-third of 18-29 year olds hadn’t heard of the census, and even after having the process described to them, 17 percent were still unaware of just what the census involved. This lack of knowledge translated directly into this key demographic segment’s unwillingness to participate, with only 36 percent of 18-29 year olds indicating that they “definitely” would respond to the form when it arrives, compared to large majorities in all other age segments who said they would do so.

    The Census Bureau has a plan to address this lack of knowledge, but it’s not clear yet if its approach will successfully reach, let alone motivate, this generation. This month the Bureau launched the first ad about the census as part of an overall $340 million public awareness campaign, $133 million of which will be spent on television advertising.

    The new ad features one of Hollywood’s best-known environmentalists, Ed Begley, Jr. in another of his satirical roles portraying a clueless corporate executive. In the Census Bureau ads he plays a Hollywood director pitching the idea of taking a literal snapshot of everyone in American all at once, even as others in the spot point out that the Census Bureau already has a plan to “get the shot.” All the actors in this humorous spot are white Baby Boomers, two generations older than Millennials and not exactly the demographic most needing to be educated about the census. Maybe even more serious, broadcast television is not the Millennials’ favorite way to absorb information.

    More promising is the allocation of much of the rest of the awareness campaign’s budget for social networking and appearances at major crowd events like the Super Bowl and Daytona 500. In addition, information on the need to respond to the census will be translated into 27 different languages, which will help with the very multi-ethnic Millennial generation as well as Latinos and Asian of all ages. Still, the campaign needs to go beyond awareness if it wants to convince Millennials to participate.

    Those who know what the census is used for, and that participation is required by law, are much more likely to say they will definitely participate. But the survey found that only 15 percent of Millennials knew that the law requires their participation. Only about half knew that the final count will be used to allocate government money to their community and determine its level of representation in Congress. They also represented the smallest group to know that the census will not be used to locate illegal immigrants. Millennials are more than willing to participate in civic activities and follow social rules, but right now they are dangerously uninformed about why they need to be a part of the nation’s most important decennial civic undertaking.

    Millennials continually share information with each other to reach a group consensus on what they should do next. Someone other than those with strictly Boomer sensibilities needs to engage the generation in a conversation about the census. If that happens, America will have gone a long way toward ensuring a complete and accurate snapshot of its increasingly diverse, and youthful, population.

    Morley Winograd and Michael D. Hais are fellows of the New Democrat Network and the New Policy Institute and co-authors of Millennial Makeover: MySpace, YouTube, and the Future of American Politics (Rutgers University Press: 2008), named one of the 10 favorite books by the New York Times in 2008.

    Photo: Travelin’ Librarian

  • The Death Of Gentry Liberalism

    Gentry liberalism, so hot just a year ago, is now in full retreat, a victim of its hypocrisy and fundamental contradictions. Its collapse threatens the coherence of President Barack Obama’s message as he prepares for his State of the Union speech on Wednesday.

    Gentry liberalism combines four basic elements: faith in postindustrial “creative” financial capitalism, cultural liberalism, Gore-ite environmentalism and the backing of the nation’s arguably best-organized political force, public employee unions. Obama rose to power on the back of all these forces and, until now, has governed as their tribune.

    Obama’s problems stem primarily from gentry liberalism’s class contradictions. Focused on ultra-affluent greens, the media, Wall Street and the public sector, gentry liberalism generally gives short shrift to upward mobility, the basic aspiration of the middle class.

    Scott Brown’s shocking victory in Massachusetts–like earlier GOP triumphs in Virginia and New Jersey–can be explained best by class. Analysis by demographer Wendell Cox, among others, shows that Brown won his margin in largely middle- and working-class suburbs, where many backed Obama in 2008. He lost by almost 2-to-1 among poor voters and also among those earning over $85,000 a year. He also won a slight margin among union members–remarkable given the lockstep support of their organizations for Brown’s Democratic opponent, Martha Coakley.

    Geography played a role, of course, but class proved the divider. Coakley did well in the wealthiest suburbs largely north and northwest of Boston. But Brown’s edge in the more middle- and working-class suburbs proved insurmountable.

    Obama, a genius at handling race, has always had problems with class. His early primary victories in 2008 resulted not only from superior organization but the preponderance of students and upper-income professionals in early primary states. Once Hillary Clinton morphed, just a bit late, into Harry Truman in a pants suit, she proved unstoppable, rolling over Obama in critical states like Pennsylvania, Texas, California, Florida, Michigan and throughout Appalachia.

    In the general election Obama succeeded in winning over a significant portion of these voters. Long-simmering disgust with the Bush administration and the Republican Congress, combined with a catastrophic economic collapse, undermined the GOP’s hold on middle-class suburbanites.

    Now that the ball is in his court, the president and his party must abandon their gentry-liberal game plan. The emphasis on bailing out Wall Street and public employees, supporting social welfare and manufacturing “green” jobs appealed to the core gentry coalition but left many voters, including lifelong Democrats, wondering what was in it for them and their families.

    In the next few elections there’s an even greater threat of alienation among millennial voters, who in 2008 accounted for much of the president’s margin of victory. Generational researchers Morley Winograd and Mike Hais note that millennials are starting to enter the workforce in big numbers. Right now their prospects are not pretty. The unemployment rate for those under 25 stands at 19%. Even for college graduates, wages are declining even as opportunities dry up.

    The greatest political danger is not so much a millennial switch to the GOP but a loss of enthusiasm that will diminish the youth vote. Winograd and Hais estimate only about one-third of those who voted in 2008 in Massachusetts voted in this last special Senate election. “Republicans will keep on celebrating victories until Democrats turn their attention to young voters and get them as excited as Obama did in 2008,” Winograd warns.

    Ever deepening disillusionment–not only among millennials–is inevitable unless Obama changes course and starts building a broad-based recovery. The president’s economic team is as pro-big-bank as any conjured up by the most rock-ribbed Republican. Its motto could be a reworking of that old notion by onetime GM CEO and Eisenhower Defense Secretary Charles Wilson: “What’s good for General Motors is good for the USA”–just substitute Wall Street for GM.

    But where GM brought jobs and prosperity to millions, the current Wall Street focus has forged a recovery that works for the gentry but fails to promote upward mobility. Bailed out from their disastrous risky bets and then provided with easy access to cheap credit, the financiers have had themselves a fine party while the rest of the private sector economy suffered. The partygoers have become so rarified that they are unable to lift even the New York City economy, whose unemployment rate now surpasses the national average.

    This spectacle has forced Obama to try locating his hidden populist, but dangers lurk in this shift. If he attacks Wall Street with any real ferocity, the only linchpin of the current weak recovery could crumple. An administration that has focused on finance as the essence of the economy may prove poorly suited to skewer its primary object of affection.

    Yet it may not be too late for the president to recover some of his economic mojo. Although his financial tax plan represents little more than petty cash at today’s absurd Wall Street rates, Obama’s endorsement of Paul Volcker’s more muscular reform agenda could rally Democrats while forcing Republicans into a doctrinal crisis. Some, like Sen. John McCain, may favor a policy to downsize the megabanks and limit their activities. But many others who hold up the holy grail of free markets über alles will expose themselves again as mindless corporate lackeys.

    But badmouthing the financial aristocracy is not enough. Obama also must jettison some of the lamer parts of the gentry agenda. Cap and trade, a gentry favorite that satisfies both green piety and Wall Street’s greedy desire for yet another speculative market, needs to be scrapped as a potential job-killer for many industries. Similarly, the administration needs to delay measures to impose draconian limits of greenhouse gas emissions through the Environmental Protection Agency, which could devastate large sectors of the economy, including manufacturing, agriculture and construction.

    Obama, particularly after the Copenhagen fiasco, needs to shift to more practical, job-creating conservation measures like tree-planting and reducing traffic congestion–notably by promoting telecommuting–while continuing research and development of all kinds of cleaner fuels. Measures that make America more energy-efficient and self-sufficient–without ruining the economy with ruinously high prices–would be far more saleable to the public than the current quasi-religious obsession with wind and solar.

    Obama also needs to stop his naive promotion of the chimera of “green jobs” as his signature answer to the country’s mounting employment woes. There is no way a few thousand, mostly heavily subsidized, jobs creating ever more expensive energy can turn around any economy. Just look at the economic carnage in Spain–where youth unemployment has now reached a remarkable 44%–which has bet much of its resources targeting “green” energy.

    More than anything the president needs to make the case that government can help the productive economy. This requires a scaling down of regulatory measures that are now scaring off entrepreneurs–including some aspects of health care reform–and beginning to demonstrate a direct concern for basic industries like manufacturing, agriculture and trade.

    Pivoting away from gentry liberalism will no doubt offend some of the president’s core constituencies. But if he does not do this soon, and decisively, he will find that the middle-class anger seen in Massachusetts will spread throughout the country. As a result Barack Obama, a man who would be Franklin Roosevelt and could settle on being the next Bill Clinton, will end up looking more like that sad sack of Democratic presidents, James Earl Carter.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin Press February 4th, 2010.