New Geography

Category: Demographics

  • Mobility on the Decline

    Faced with an economic downturn and a bursting real estate bubble, Americans look to be staying put in greater numbers. According to Ball State demographer Michael Hicks, interviewed in an article examining the trend in the San Francisco Chronicle, “Property values have dropped so much, people can’t pick up and move the way they used to.”

    In April, the Census Bureau reported that in 2008, the “national mover rate,” declined to 11.9 percent, down from 13.2 percent in 2007. This marks the “lowest rate since the bureau began tracking these data in 1948.” As William Frey, a demographer at the Brookings Institute, puts it, “the most footloose nation in the world is now staying put.”

    According to Frey, the middle of the decade was marked by a “mobility bubble,” spurred on “by easy credit and superheated housing growth in newer parts of the Sun Belt and exurbs throughout the country”. As the recession took hold through 2008, migration to suburbs and exurbs fell “flat in a hurry,” showing “just how rapidly changing housing market conditions can affect population shifts.”

    While, as Frey suggests, people may be moving into suburbs and exurbs at a slower rate, central cities within metro areas continue to lose population. The Census Bureau reports that during 2008 “principal cities within metropolitan areas experienced a net loss of 2 million movers, while the suburbs had a net gain of 2.2 million movers.” While the downturn in migration may help central cities hold onto some of their population, Frey contends that “it remains to be seen whether the migration-fueled engines of the early 2000s—especially the Sun Belt and outer metropolitan suburbs—will regain their former status.”

  • Exurban Growth Greater than Central Growth: Census Bureau

    The US Bureau of the Census has just released an analysis of suburbanization showing that the nation continues to suburbanize, despite the consistent media “spin” that people are leaving the suburbs to move to core cities.

    The report, Population Change in Central and Outlying Counties of Metropolitan Statistical Areas: 2000 to 2007, goes further than our previous 2000 to 2008 analysis that showed strong domestic outmigration from central counties to suburban counties and beyond.

    Our report compared trends between the core county (such as the 5 county New York City core) of each major metropolitan area. The new report compares population trends between what it terms “central counties” and outlying counties. The Bureau of the Census considers any county in the metropolitan area that is generally beyond the urban area (urban footprint) to be outlying. Thus, in Chicago, the report considers not only the core county of Cook, but also 9 additional counties as around it as central (Figure 1). Not surprisingly this means the bulk of the metropolitan area population is in the central counties (92%), however there is rapid movement even further out to the outlying counties.

    This Bureau of the Census report tells us more about exurbanization than suburbanization. Exurbanization might be thought of growth that occurs outside the urban area, including its historic suburban periphery. It represents, if you will, “sprawl beyond sprawl”. You usually can tell when you are in an exurb because you have to drive through countryside to get to the “city” (For definition of urban terms, such as metropolitan area, urban area and city, see this document).

    Between 2000 and 2007, these outlying counties grew 13.1 percent, nearly double that of the central counties, which includes the suburbs, at 7.8 percent (Figure 2). The report goes on to compare detailed results for the 12 metropolitan areas with more than 2,500,000 population that have outlying counties. In every case, the outlying counties grew faster than the central counties. On average, the outlying counties grew at 2.3 times the rate of the central counties (Figure 3).

    • In San Francisco, the outlying county growth was 25 times that of the central counties.
    • In New York, the outlying county growth was 10 times that of the central counties.
    • In Boston and Minneapolis-St. Paul, the outlying country growth was between four and five times the growth in the central counties.
    • In Baltimore, the outlying county growth was 3.5 times the growth in the central counties.
    • In St. Louis, Washington (DC) and Chicago, the country growth was between two and three times the growth in the central counties.

    The strongest central county performance occurred not in the much ballyhooed “cool” dense urban areas of the Northeast or Pacific Coast but in the largest metropolitan areas of the south, Atlanta, Houston and Dallas-Fort Worth.

    • In Dallas-Fort Worth the outlying county growth was 1.9 times the growth in the central counties.
    • In Houston the outlying county growth was 1.3 times the growth in the central counties.
    • In Atlanta, the outlying county growth was 1.1 times the growth in the central counties.

    The worst central county performance occurred in Detroit, where there was a net population loss. The outlying counties grew nearly 9 percent.

    It may seem surprising that the Bureau of the Census analyzed only 12 metropolitan areas. Regrettably, Census metropolitan area definitions makes a broader analysis virtually impossible. Many metropolitan areas do not have outlying counties. That does not mean they do not have outlying or exurban areas. Riverside-San Bernardino is a good example. At the eastern end of this metropolitan area, a recluse might live less than 40 miles from the Las Vegas strip, yet be separated by 175 miles of desert and mountains from the edge of the Riverside-San Bernardino metropolitan area. The problem is that most metropolitan areas are defined by counties, and some counties contain much more area than can reasonably be considered as part of the labor market.

    This fixation with county boundaries is unnecessary. Decades ago Statistics Canada figured out how to define metropolitan areas below the county level. The Bureau of the Census approach tends to obscure the growth of outlying areas, particularly in the largest counties. This is illustrated by our analysis of the Riverside-San Bernardino area from 2000 to 2006, which showed outlying areas to be growing at 2.5 times the rate of the core urban area.

    Nonetheless, the conclusion of the new report is clear. The nation’s most remote suburbs – its exurbs – are growing much faster than the central counties. Whether this trend will now reverse, of course, is up to debate. Perhaps demographic changes and higher energy costs will slow expansion on the outer fringes. More likely, the current recession may well lead to less exurban growth, but history suggests this may prove only a short-lived trend.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

  • The Geography of Class in Greater Seattle

    Most readers may not be initially very interested in the detailed geography of “class” in Seattle, but it actually matters not only for our area but for the whole debate over the shape of the urban future. Academics, perhaps Americans in general, are loath to admit to class differences, yet they remain very crucial to the understanding of how cities and regions evolve.

    Seattle is a great example of the transformation of a 20th century model of the American metropolis to a 21st century-cum-19th century “old World” model of metropolis. It is often held up as one of the role models for other cities, so its experiences should be considered seriously not only for American cities but for regions throughout the advanced world.

    Many readers, including those afflicted with political correctness, probably many upper and lower class folk uncomfortable with their home areas being labeled as of a particular class, or others, might feel that class is an obsolete Marxist term. They may prefer I use the safer term “socio-economic status” rather than “class.” Let’s admit it: “class” is used widely, as in “the middle class is getting squeezed” or the “tax burden on the lower classes.” As it has been for hundreds of years, class remains a meaningful descriptor of areas of obviously differing well-being.

    We should understand by identifying upper or middle or lower classes this does not imply “better than.” Class simply reflects the mix of inheritance, education, biology, experience, discrimination, and life events that lead to variability in economic well-being. Class is real. But there is certainly a legitimate concern with the identification of heterogeneous areas like census tracts as of a particular class, based on average or median values for the in fact diverse households in a tract. This method is far from perfect but nevertheless we and others find such generalization common, meaningful and useful.

    This map plots “factor scores,” a statistically constructed variable or index divided into six levels of “class:” two upper, two middle and two lower. It is timely to do this, since it was 50 years ago when Calvin Schmid, demographer in Sociology at the University of Washington, and my early mentor, performed a pioneering factor analysis of crime in Seattle – and this was before modern computers! The derived scores most reflect high weighting of the variables: percent of adults with a BA or more, percent in professional versus laboring occupations, median house value and median household income.

    As you look at the map, it’s clear how Seattle reflects very strongly what is generally described as gentrification. This means the reclaiming of the central core by the highly educated and professional, eschewing the suburban metaphorical desert. In the case of Seattle, this process occurring between 1985-2005 resulted in the displacement of over 50,000 less affluent and often minority households to south King county. The city begins to resemble the historic pattern of the rich and important occupying the vibrant core of the city, relegating the working poor to the suburbs, with poor access and inadequate services. Indeed, even now I am involved in a project to assess the lack of access of poor children, often minority or foreign born, to health care in south King county.

    The dominant “upper class” area is the Eastside, east of Lake Washington, and location of the affluent “edge city” of Bellevue, home of the Microsoft campus. A second set of upper class areas are waterfront and view neighborhoods, taking advantage of the Seattle area’s broken topography. The third is simply the University of Washington immediate hinterland. I suspect the location of a large research university with 42,000 students and 22,000 staff increasingly propels Seattle’s unusually high status, income and popularity. I think this is increasingly more important a factor than the presence of an increasingly less important downtown Seattle business center.

    Conversely, lower class areas include traditional zones of mixed housing, industry and transport, such as south Seattle, the older satellite cities of Everett (north), Bremerton (west), and especially Tacoma (south). The largest area of lower class neighborhoods extends from south Seattle through south King county to Tacoma, marked by historical development, displacement from Seattle and high minority population. The second large zone of lower class settlement is the rural fringe, especially in Pierce (south) and Snohomish (north) counties, and may surprise those who think all rural areas are the home of rich estates.

    Then there is the middle class. This is where the suburbs matter most. On the map, middle class areas (yellow and green) are intermediate in location as well and dominate the outer suburban areas as well as some older inner neighborhoods of Seattle and Tacoma. It is unfortunately true that race, ethnicity and class remain highly correlated especially within the core cities of Seattle and Tacoma, reflecting the continuing history of unequal education and job preparation and prospects.

    This analysis suggests one possible future of urban development following something of a European model, with most middle class people in the suburbs, while the rich and poor concentrate either in the urban core or in selected locales in the periphery. As for the city itself, it’s clear that the total landscape is not simply becoming wealthier but increasingly bifurcated between the affluent and the long-term poverty population. And suburbia, home to the vast majority of the region’s population remains the predominant home of the middle and working classes, with pockets of both wealth and poverty.

    Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist)

  • Europe: No Longer A Role Model For America

    For decades many in the American political and policy establishment–including close supporters of President Obama–have looked enviously at the bureaucratic powerhouse of the European Union. In everything from climate change to civil liberties to land use regulation, Europe long has charmed those visionaries, particularly on the left, who wish to remake America in its image.

    “There is much to be said for being a Denmark or Sweden, even a Great Britain, France or Italy,” wrote political scientist Andrew Hacker in his 1971 book The End of the American Era .This refrain has been picked up again more recently by the likes of Washington Post reporter T.R. Reid and economist Jeremy Rifkin. Just last year, international relations scholar Parag Khanna shared his vision of a “shrunken” America lucky to eke out a meager existence between a “triumphant China” and a “retooled Europe.”

    But the tendency to borrow from the European toolbox may be somewhat questionable, particularly given that a growing number of Europeans are either uninterested–barely 40% bothered to vote in E.U. Parliament elections last week–or in open revolt against their own system of government. In the elections, for example, parties generally opposed to expanding E.U. power gained ground in countries as diverse as Hungary, Slovakia and the Netherlands. In Britain, the relatively small U.K. Independence Party, which even opposed membership in the U.N., out-polled the Labour Party and trailed only the Conservatives, who announced their own shift toward a more euro-skeptic point of view.

    Although the E.U.’s current top-down bureaucratic approach is clearly losing support, these recent events don’t necessarily mean the E.U. is doomed. It’s just that people who might be happy to accept a customs union and perhaps even a common currency are simply proving loath to hand over land use controls and environmental standards, much less foreign policy, to Brussels-based bureaucrats. At its root this move represents both a cry against control and a cry for greater autonomy.

    For the Obama administration, there may be some significant lessons here. Compared with Europeans, Americans are disposed to dislike too much central control. Turning Washington into a new Brussels, with regulations to cover virtually any human activity, could backfire both on the president and his party.

    But it’s also critical not to see Europe’s new tilt as affirming Reaganite cowboy capitalism. Many European countries, particularly the northern ones, are justly proud of the “social” models of capitalism they embrace. There are many policies–such as Danish incentives for industrial firms to greenify themselves, efficient universal health care and tough fuel economy standards for cars–that should be discussed and perhaps even adopted in some form in the U.S.

    In one sense, we should understand that Europeans are trying to protect their preferred standards when it comes to culture, social structure and lifestyle. They remain, if you will, fundamentally conservative in their efforts to preserve their well-established welfare states.

    But overall the anti-E.U. vote should make it clear that Europe’s overall economic system makes for a poor role model for our country. When the current economic crisis first hit, many European leaders–and their American fans, like Harvard economist Ken Rogoff–saw vindication for the E.U.’s economic policy and a much tougher road for the U.S. over the next year or two. Yet in reality, Europe already has suffered as much as we have from the downturn, and recovery there may also be even slower to emerge. In some countries, such as Greece and France, social unrest has been far more evident than here in the U.S.

    Simply put, European models do not necessarily work better–and when they do, they have occurred in part due to shifts away from strict welfare-state policies. As Sweden’s Nima Sanandaji and Robert Gindehag have argued the recent return to growth in places like Sweden came only after some modest reforms in both taxes and social benefits.

    Yet at the same time, even successful European countries–as well as the whole E.U.–generally experience slower growth than the U.S. with respect to measures like gross domestic product and job growth. This makes it an example of limited utility for America, a country that needs strong economic growth in order to maintain both its quality of life and overall social sustainability.

    The biggest source of divergence between the U.S. and the E.U. lies in demographic trends. For the most part, Europe is aging far more rapidly, and its workforce is shrinking. As demographer Ali Modarres notes, America’s population over the second half of the 20th century grew by 130 million, essentially doubling, while the populations of France, Germany and Britain together increased by 40 million, or 25%.

    As a result, there is virtually no European equivalent for cities like Houston, Phoenix, Las Vegas or Atlanta. American cities sprawl–and will likely continue to do so–because they are newer and because they are growing much faster in a country that is much vaster. Even with 100 million more people, the country will still be one-sixth as crowded as Germany.

    These differences will only become more stark. Opposition to immigration–from both Muslim countries and the E.U.’s own eastern periphery–is growing even in historically tolerant places like Great Britain, Denmark and Holland. Over time, migration into Europe is destined to slow. In Barack Obama’s wildly multicultural America, strong restrictionist sentiments have not gained much political ground, and, at most, efforts are directed not at reducing legal immigration but rather shifting it toward a more meritocratic model.

    So we can expect America’s population to continue growing at close to the highest rate in the advanced industrial world while Europe remains among the most rapidly aging places on earth. America’s fertility rate is 50% higher than Russia’s, Germany’s and Italy’s. By 2040, for example, the U.S. could have a greater population than the first 15 member nations of the European Union. Compare that prediction to 1950, when America had only half the population of Western Europe.

    These numbers point toward separate destinies for the U.S. and the E.U. Throughout history, low fertility and societal and economic decline have been inextricably linked, affecting such once-vibrant civilizations as ancient Rome, 17th-century Venice and, now, contemporary Europe.The desire to have children also reflects a fundamental affirmation of faith in the future and in values that transcend the individual. This is particularly true in affluent societies, where it is socially acceptable to remain childless and technology has made the decision not to have children easier to enforce.

    The U.S.’ demographic vitality will allow it to emerge from the current economic doldrums with more rapid growth than Europe–continuing a trend that has generally held for most of the past two decades. Innovation, largely a product of youthful indiscretion, also will continue to emerge more quickly stateside. Indeed, according to one recent European Commission survey, at the current rate of innovation, it would take 50 years for the E.U. to catch up to the U.S.

    Largely thanks to these demographic pressures, we could see an American economy twice the size of the E.U.’s by 2050. Unlike Europe, we have better prospects for growth, since there’s really no sustainable alternative for our society. In contrast, 40 years from now Europe’s economic growth rate is expected to fall 40%, due directly to the shrinking size of both its labor force and its internal market.

    We can ultimately expect two very different courses to develop. In America, the emphasis needs to be on sustained growth to prevent a massive decline in living standards. In contrast, Europe may be able to maintain a steady level of prosperity–even with lower growth, since its population will be either stagnant or declining–at least until the looming costs of maintaining a welfare state impose onerous economic burdens.

    Environmentally, Europe will become a “green” hero–because lower economic growth means a natural reduction in energy consumption and dreaded greenhouse gas emissions. Americans, on the other hand, will need to depend more on technological fixes–some of them from Europe–and embrace less economically damaging paths to growth. (These include promoting such things as working close to or at home and developing more fuel-efficient cars.)

    Neither Europe nor America–particularly given a much-reduced E.U. bureaucracy–has a better or worse model. We just have to recognize that these are, in the end, increasingly different societies: The former is focused on preservation of its hard-won peace and prosperity; the latter is challenged more by constant, major and sometimes even frightening change.

    Some may still hold out the hope that wise men in the old continent will present us with a road map to the future. But given the revolt going on against this mega-European ideal, we should understand that even many across the pond are having second thoughts about a future controlled by Brussels. Perhaps it’s better to recognize that most solutions to America’s problems–now and in the future–will be concocted not in Brussels, Berlin or Paris, but at home.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Special Report: Infill in US Urban Areas

    One of the favored strategies of current urban planning is “infill” development. This is development that occurs within the existing urban footprint, as opposed that taking place on the fringe of the urban footprint (suburbanization). For the first time, the United States Bureau of the Census is producing data that readily reveals infill, as measured by population growth, in the nation’s urban areas.

    2000 Urban Footprint Populations

    The new 2007 estimates relate to urban areas or urban footprints as defined in 2000 and are produced by the American Community Survey program of the Bureau of the Census. Urban areas are the continuous urbanization that one would observe as the lights of a “city” on a clear night from an airplane. It is the extent of development from one side of the urban form to the other. Further, urban areas are not metropolitan areas, which are always larger and are defined by work trip travel patterns. Metropolitan areas always include adjacent rural areas, while urban areas never do.

    The Process of Infill

    Although embraced with often religious passion within the urban planning community, infill is neither good nor bad in terms of social or environmental impact. Infill always increases population densities and that means more traffic. If road capacity is increased sufficiently, traffic congestion can be kept at previous levels. If on the other hand, nothing is done, traffic congestion is likely to increase along with population. This means slower traffic and more stop and go operations, which inevitably increases the intensity of air pollution with the potential to cancel out any reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) that might occur if average car trip lengths decline. Similar difficulties can occur with respect to other infrastructure systems, such as sewer and water. Expanding roads, sewer and water systems in already developed areas can be far more expensive than new systems on greenfield sites. Regrettably, boosters of infill routinely ignore these issues.

    But infill has been going on for years, along with suburbanization, both in the United States and in other first world nations. This is indicated by the general densification trend that occurred in US urban areas between 1990 and 2000 and the longer term densification trends that occurred in a number of southwestern urban areas, such as Los Angeles, San Jose, Riverside-San Bernardino, Phoenix, Dallas-Fort Worth and Las Vegas. All these traditionally “sprawling” areas have, in fact, been densifying since 1960 or before. Since 2000, 33 of the nation’s 37 urban areas with a population exceeding 1,000,000 population experienced population infill to their 2000 urban footprints.

    Infill in Traditionally Regulated Markets (More Responsive Markets)

    Infill is a natural consequence of the traditional post-World War II land use regulation, which tends towards accommodating both demographic growth and market forces. This has been replaced by more prescriptive (often called “smart growth”) land use regulation in some urban areas. Under traditional regulation, suburban development followed a “leap frog” process, moving ever further out. This is roundly condemned in today’s planning literature and among leading academics and policy makers.

    Leap frog development occurs where urban development skips over empty land and creates a less continuous urban fabric. Land is developed based upon the interplay between sellers and buyers. Due to fewer planning restrictions, no seller can be sure that their land will be purchased since there is always plenty of land that buyers can otherwise purchase. This keeps land prices down. In the more responsive markets, it is typical for land and site infrastructure costs to be 20 percent of the total price land and house price.

    Infill occurs as land that has been “leaped” over is subsequently purchased for development. Again, because buyers have plenty of choices, prices of the infill land remains low, so that land and infrastructure costs remain relatively affordable in relationship to the overall new house purchase price.

    The result is an urban area that is generally continuous, though with a transitional “ragged edge.” The ragged edge enabled the broad expansion of home ownership that occurred in the decades following World War II by keeping house prices low.

    Infill in More Prescriptive Markets (Smart Growth)

    The infill process is quite dramatically different in more prescriptive markets. Infill might be mandated as a percentage of total development or by severely limiting the development allowed to occur closer to the urban fringe. Sellers of land on which development is permitted have disproportionate power to charge higher prices because the planning regime seriously limits the availability of alternative sites for buyers. This, of course, flows through to house prices. The share of land and site infrastructure can rise to two-thirds of the house and land cost. The urban area may have a “clearer” edge, but at a significant loss in housing affordability.

    Infill Trends in the 2000s

    The new infill estimates indicate that American urban areas continue to densify. Between 2000 and 2007, the 33 of the 37 urban areas of more than 1,000,000 population experienced densification in their 2000 urban footprints. The average population infill increase was 5.6 percent (See Table the following table).

    Population Infill in 2000 Urban Footprints
    2000-2007
      Population Change: 2000 Urban Footprint Population Density of 2000 Urban Footprint in 2007  
    Urban Area 2000 Census 2007 Estimate Change % Rank Rank
    Riverside–San Bernardino, CA       1,506,816      1,800,117     293,301 19.5% 1         4,110 8
    Atlanta, GA       3,499,840      4,118,485     618,645 17.7% 2         2,100 36
    Austin, TX         901,920      1,051,962     150,042 16.6% 3         3,308 17
    Las Vegas, NV       1,314,357      1,518,835     204,478 15.6% 4         5,311 5
    Houston, TX       3,822,509      4,370,475     547,966 14.3% 5         3,377 16
    Portland, OR–WA       1,583,138      1,779,705     196,567 12.4% 6         3,755 12
    Phoenix, AZ       2,907,049      3,254,634     347,585 12.0% 7         4,078 9
    Dallas–Fort Worth, TX       4,145,659      4,549,281     403,622 9.7% 8         3,236 18
    Orlando, FL       1,157,431      1,267,976     110,545 9.6% 9         2,799 24
    San Antonio, TX       1,327,554      1,440,794     113,240 8.5% 10         3,540 14
    Tampa–St. Petersburg, FL       2,062,339      2,209,067     146,728 7.1% 11         2,754 25
    Sacramento, CA       1,393,498      1,488,647       95,149 6.8% 12         4,034 10
    Seattle, WA       2,712,205      2,896,844     184,639 6.8% 13         3,040 21
    Miami, FL       4,919,036      5,243,679     324,643 6.6% 14         4,703 6
    Washington, DC–VA–MD       3,933,920      4,174,187     240,267 6.1% 15         3,611 13
    Denver, CO       1,984,887      2,087,803     102,916 5.2% 16         4,192 7
    Indianapolis, IN       1,218,919      1,278,687       59,768 4.9% 17         2,316 34
    Columbus, OH       1,133,193      1,175,132       41,939 3.7% 18         2,960 22
    Kansas City, MO–KS       1,361,744      1,408,900       47,156 3.5% 19         2,413 31
    Virginia Beach, VA       1,394,439      1,442,494       48,055 3.4% 20         2,742 26
    San Jose, CA       1,538,312      1,588,544       50,232 3.3% 21         6,110 2
    Los Angeles, CA     11,789,487    12,171,625     382,138 3.2% 22         7,302 1
    Cincinnati, OH–KY–IN       1,503,262      1,546,730       43,468 2.9% 23         2,305 35
    Baltimore, MD       2,076,354      2,133,371       57,017 2.7% 24         3,128 19
    San Diego, CA       2,674,436      2,747,620       73,184 2.7% 25         3,514 15
    New York, NY–NJ–CT     17,799,861    18,223,567     423,706 2.4% 26         5,440 4
    Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN       2,388,593      2,438,359       49,766 2.1% 27         2,727 27
    Chicago, IL–IN       8,307,904      8,467,804     159,900 1.9% 28         3,992 11
    St. Louis, MO–IL       2,077,662      2,103,040       25,378 1.2% 29         2,540 30
    Milwaukee, WI       1,308,913      1,324,365       15,452 1.2% 30         2,719 28
    Boston, MA–NH–RI       4,032,484      4,077,659       45,175 1.1% 31         2,350 33
    Providence, RI–MA       1,174,548      1,183,622        9,074 0.8% 32         2,353 32
    Philadelphia, PA–NJ–DE–MD       5,149,079      5,178,918       29,839 0.6% 33         2,880 23
    San Francisco, CA       3,228,605      3,214,137      (14,468) -0.4% 34         6,099 3
    Detroit, MI       3,903,377      3,831,575      (71,802) -1.8% 35         3,041 20
    Pittsburgh, PA       1,753,136      1,687,509      (65,627) -3.7% 36         1,981 37
    Cleveland, OH       1,786,647      1,705,917      (80,730) -4.5% 37         2,641 29
    Total  116,773,113  122,182,066  5,408,953 5.6%
    Data from US Bureau of the Census

    Riverside-San Bernardino, long castigated as a “sprawl” market, had the largest population infill, at 19.5 percent. Atlanta ranked number two, at 17.7 percent. This is a real surprise, since Atlanta was the least dense major urban area in the world in 2000, ranked second in 2000s infill. As a result, it is likely that Pittsburgh- often held up as a model of urban regeneration – is now the world’s least dense major urban area. On the other hand, if Atlanta’s infill rate continues, its 2000 urban footprint will be more dense than that of Boston by 2015.

    Austin ranked third, adding 16.6 percent population to its 2000 urban footprint. Las Vegas ranked fourth, with a 15.6 percent increase in its 2000 urban footprint. The density of Las Vegas is increasing so rapidly that by the 2010 census its 2000 urban footprint will be more dense than the 2000 New York urban footprint, should the current rates continue.

    Perhaps most surprising of all is that Houston ranked fifth, added 14.3 percent to its 2000 urban footprint. This may surprise those who have denounced Houston’s largely deregulated regulatory environment, both in the city and in unincorporated county areas in the suburbs. Yet overall Houston’s infill exceeded that of smart growth model Portland. The Rose City stood at sixth, adding 12.4 percent to its 2000 urban footprint.

    Perhaps equally surprising, Portland remains less dense than average for a western urban area. Its 2000 urban footprint density trailing Los Angeles, San Jose, San Francisco, Las Vegas, Denver, Riverside-San Bernardino, Phoenix and Sacramento, while leading only San Diego and Seattle.

    The top ten were rounded out by Phoenix (7th), Dallas-Fort Worth (8th), Orlando (9th) and San Antonio (10th). It is worth noting that like Houston, the unincorporated suburbs of Austin, Dallas-Fort Worth and San Antonio have largely deregulated land use regulation, yet these urban areas ranked high in infill.

    Interestingly some of the greatest infill growth also took place in the fastest growing, traditionally “sprawling” cities. Atlanta also had the largest numeric increase in the population of its 2000 urban footprint, at more than 600,000. Houston was a close second, at nearly 550,000.

    In contrast, population losses since 2000 in the urban footprints of Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Detroit and San Francisco, means these urban areas experienced no population infill. San Francisco’s loss enabled San Jose to move into second position nationally after Los Angeles in the population density of its 2000 urban footprint.

    How the Core Cities Fared

    The core cities (municipalities) attracted, on average, their population share. Approximately 30 percent of the infill growth occurred inside the core cities. Even this figure may be a bit high, due to the impacts of annexation

    All of the infill in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, Providence and Minneapolis-St. Paul occurred outside the core cities. The city of Portland attracted barely 10 percent of its urban area infill, despite highly publicized (and subsidized) infill projects such as the Pearl District. Core cities attracted the largest share of infill growth in such diverse cities as San Antonio, San Jose, Columbus, Phoenix and New York.

    Note: Additional information available at http://www.demographia.com/db-uzafoot2007.pdf

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

  • A New Story for Timeshare

    By Richard Reep

    More employment sectors are increasingly migratory and less fixated on a particular place. Many of us are instead working from home, or from places where we prefer – it might be a coffeeshop, or it might be a vacation condo. Housing’s rigid systems belong to the Old Economy.

    Meanwhile, a new form of housing less than 2 generations old has quickly gained ground as a part of the luxury leisure lifestyle of the middle class: timeshare. Unfortunately, during the real estate boom in the last several years, timeshares have been severely overbuilt, and the market is years, perhaps even decades, away from filling this oversupply. This form of housing is based not on real estate mortgages – although one or two companies still practice this – but based upon points. And the genius of the points-based residence is its transportability, which served the vacation market extremely well.

    By applying a points-based approach to primary housing, a developer will be able to take advantage of the increasing percentage of workers that move frequently for their careers. This unchains workers from their mortgages and lawnmowers, and enables the nomadic nature that has defined several segments of our economy where project-based employment has replaced company-based employment.

    Most timeshare developers privately agree: “The party’s over. It won’t be anything like it was, even if the economy comes back. At least not for a long, long time,” confessed one senior developer for an international timeshare company privately. Meanwhile, many of the communities who assumed a vast market of affluent customers need to start asking big questions.

    One of them is to refocus on the quality of places. Gated condominium developments, with little or no connection to the communities where they reside, are a study in self-absorbed lifestyles. Turning these into real homes and communities will require opening them up, integrating them into the local culture and civic life of their places, and making timeshares something other than…well, simply a commodity.

    It will also require some fundamental changes that are overdue in the timeshare industry itself. The points-based system was originally fabricated as a customer-loyalty system. It will need to be adapted to suit a worker wishing the flexibility to travel from place to place and stay for longer periods of time. Perhaps a more ominous dilemma that the timeshare developers have created for themselves, however, is the crushing maintenance fees, running often $750 to $1000 a week or more.

    The credit-backed future dreams of luxury and leisure remain idle, but the physical properties sit on some pricey and fundamentally attractive real estate at ski area bases, golf courses, desert getaways, and beaches. Few may be in the mood these days to buy a bunch of ephemeral points for a vacation, but the same system would serve well any project-based endeavor that assembles workers for an assignment and disbands these workers when the assignment is completed.

    The movie industry has operated on this model for years, and other industries have begun working in this same manner. In the Old Economy, this was rare, and most pursuits encouraged a young college graduate to put down roots as fast as possible: Start a career, start a family, and buy a house. Increasingly, however, entry-level workers have resisted this, preferring instead to experiment with multiple careers, often moving from place to place, sometimes until well into their thirties. In the technology industry, software developers have tended to work on this model, and especially in digital media, the permanent nature of jobs and companies has given way to temporary alliances and co-ops to get things done – the so-called Digital Nomads.

    Yet even as the workforce and its physical plants adapted, the housing industry instead has trudged along its same path, with mortgages or rental property as the two options. It is time for timeshare to fill the gap in between these two extremes and offer this as a third option. At this point, the timeshare industry has little to lose. Market contraction and the loss of its credit foundation have rendered these companies dormant. There needs to be a paradigm shift to recover at least some of these investments and, over time, create long-term value.

    Timeshare developers built plenty of beach resorts, which are still fairly active, but still can be turned into more semi-permanent communities. Their interior resorts – desert, golf, and ski areas – have an even more urgent need for reinvention. A stronger and more stable sense of community, safety and security, and higher quality of life could draw more workers away from the large metropolitan areas, as baby boomers downshift and global corporations onshore their workers.

    All this adds up to an opportunity for a timeshare developer who wants to fill his units with paying customers. When digital media employment is studied, it might resemble the timeshare model more closely than one thinks. Dominated by no one single old-economy company, digital media assignments are often accomplished by a temporary alliance of multiple small studios that work together, then decamp and move to the next assignment. This is a perfect scenario for a points-based housing system. Freed from the chains of the mortgage banks and from the landlord-lease situation, the points-based system enables free flow of workers who enjoy sampling the tastes of different cities and have no real interest in setting down roots, mowing lawns, and fixing leaky gutters.

    Ski timeshare properties in particular are quite ready for this shift in focus. Ski towns were built upon timber or mining town functions. They already have reinvented themselves and need to do this again. If these towns were to partner with their timeshare properties and incentivize technology and research employers, a new story and a new model could revitalize them.

    Marrying this desire to move to more low-density regions combines what timeshare developers do best – create amenity-laden residential communities – with a free-flow form of ownership. This approach is worth a closer look. We need to thaw the frozen residential concepts and look at new models and new stories that are happening in America and elsewhere. By adapting timeshare to the New Economy at this critical point, an industry can be repurposed and a new sustainable housing option can be born.

    Richard Reep is an Architect and artist living in Winter Park, Florida. His practice has centered around hospitality-driven mixed use, and has contributed in various capacities to urban mixed-use projects, both nationally and internationally, for the last 25 years.

  • City & Suburban Trends: Sometimes it Helps to Look at the Data

    Jonathan Weber writes that “Most demographic and market indicators suggest that growth and development across the country are moving away from the suburban and exurban fringe and toward center-cities and close-in suburbs,” in an article for MSNBC entitled Demographic trends now favor downtown: Growth across the country moves away from suburban and exurban fringe.

    One might wonder what country Weber is writing about. In the United States, growth and development continues to be concentrated in suburban and exurban areas. Moreover, strong domestic migration continues away from the center cities and close-in suburbs, as evidenced by the fact that between 2000 and 2008, 4.6 million domestic migrants left the core counties of the metropolitan areas over 1,000,000 population, while 2.0 million moved into the suburban counties.

    The case is apparently furthered by the obligatory reference and photograph of The Model, Portland, Oregon. However, even in Portland, the suburbs are doing far better than the core. Since 2000, the suburbs have gained 106,000 domestic migrants, while the core county (Multnomah) has lost 4,000 domestic migrants. The IRS micro-data further indicates that the core continues to lose net domestic migration to the suburban counties.

    It appears that the only trend indicating that the suburbs are losing out to central cities is the exponential increase in articles blindly parroting “death of the suburbs” dogma.

  • The Successful, the Stable, and the Struggling Midwest Cities

    The Midwest has a deserved reputation as a place that has largely failed to adapt to the globalized world. For example, no Midwestern city would qualify as a boomtown but still there remain a diversity of outcomes in how the region’s cities have dealt with their shared heritage and challenges. Some places are faring surprisingly well, outpacing even the national average in many measures, while others bring up the bottom of the league tables in multiple civics measures.

    Let us examine the health of various cities, using population growth as a heuristic proxy for overall civic health. Looking at population change from 2000 to 2008, we will classify a city as “successful” if its metro area population growth exceeded the national average growth rate of 8% during that period, as “stable” if it had a population growth rate between 3% and 8%, and as “struggling” if its growth was less than 3%. Let us also put Chicago into its own category of “global city”. It is simply one of a kind in the Midwest, a colossus of nearly 10 million people, and not easily measured against the other cities. Indeed, it is really three cities in one, a prosperous urban core, an archipelago of successful upscale suburbs and edge based growth to the west and north, with a sea of deteriorating city neighborhoods and stagnant to declining suburbs surrounding them. On our scale, Chicago would be “stable” – its inner core has grown but the city overall has lost population, while the outer ring has grown strongly. As a region, it has grown somewhat below the national average.

    Here are the results of our tiering, including all cities in the Midwest* with metro areas exceeding 500,000 in population:

    Global City
    Chicago (5.2%)

    Successful Cities
    Des Moines (15.6%)
    Indianapolis (12.5%)
    Madison (11.9%)
    Columbus (9.9%)
    Kansas City (9.0%)
    Minneapolis-St. Paul (8.8%)

    Stable Cities
    Cincinnati (7.2%)
    Grand Rapids (4.9%)
    St. Louis (4.4%)
    Milwaukee (3.2%)

    Struggling Cities
    Akron (0.5%)
    Detroit (-0.6%)
    Dayton (-1.4%)
    Toledo (-1.5%)
    Cleveland (-2.8%)
    Youngstown (-6.1%)

    These tiers, based only on a single criterion and arbitrary boundaries, nevertheless basically conform to how these cities are performing both economically and in terms of perceptions.

    A few interesting things emerge:

    1. There are a surprisingly large number of Midwestern cities that are growing faster than the US average population. This indicates pockets of strength, in its larger metros at least, seldom associated with the Midwest.
    2. The clear dominance of the successful list by state capitals. This is so pronounced that I have put forth what I call the “Urbanophile Conjecture”, which is that if you want to be a successful Midwestern city, it helps to be a state capital with a metro area population of over 500,000. The only successful city on the list that is not a state capital is Kansas City.
    3. The 500,000 barrier seems to be important as well. The state capitals below that threshold – Lansing, Springfield, and Jefferson City – would not qualify as successful on this list. Note too that the presence or absence of the major state university does not appear to be a decisive factor. Des Moines and Indianapolis are not home to their states’ flagship universities. The home of the academic powerhouse that is the University of Michigan is the Ann Arbor metro area, which was not included in this list because its population is only about 350,000. Notwithstanding, its growth rate would have put it into the stable category.
    4. In a region in which there is such divergence between the performance of cities, a diversity of city specific policies are required. There is no one size fits all for the Midwest. There may indeed be a base of pan-Midwest policies worth pursuing – improvements in education, attractiveness to migrants, better conditions for innovative entrepreneurship, etc – but successful approaches will be those most tailored to uniquely local conditions. For example, a state capital or University town may have different needs than a place that has neither.

    Some suggested areas to investigate by city tier are:

    • Chicago. How can it ease the gap between the thriving global city of Chicago – largely located around the Loop as well as the northern and western suburbs – and the parts of the region that are falling behind, largely the western city neighborhoods and southern edge of metropolis? How do you do this without sacrificing its overall competitiveness? Can the policies appropriate to each be reconciled?
    • Successful Cities. Their policy focus should be on maintaining favorable demographic and economic conditions, and dealing with decaying areas of their urban cores and the potential for decay in some inner ring suburbs. Should the civic aspiration be desirous of it, tuning the engine to attempt to shift the growth rate into high gear to target a profile closer to the Sunbelt boomtowns would be a further focus area. Each city would need to examine which specific policy levers it could pull to attempt to do this. Clearly modernizing and expanding infrastructure to keep up with growth in these places and maintain their high quality of life is a clear imperative.
    • Stable Cities. Their challenge is to bring growth rates up to average or above average levels. It would be worthwhile for them to study the successful areas, and ask what policies and approaches might be adopted. Kansas City offers the best encouragement here. It has managed to maintain a strong growth rate despite not being a state capital and being part of a bi-state metro region. Kansas City features lows costs, high quality of life, a relatively stable housing marketing, and a pro-business culture. It is clearly a standout and worthy of further study for that reason. It may hold the key for moving the stable cities up into the successful tier. Geographically, it is notable that Kansas City is a border state on the far edge of the Midwest, and could arguably be called a Great Plains city. Is that a factor? Some type of peer city comparison with the successful cities, and especially Kansas City, might be warranted here.
    • Struggling Cities. Unfortunately, there isn’t a magic bullet to solve the long festering problems in these places. All of them were heavily industrialized and have borne the brunt of globalization, particularly in manufacturing. This is especially the case in cities linked to the domestic automobile industry, which is clearly in a state of crisis. Until the automobile industry completes its restructuring, and out migration right sizes some of these areas, there does not seem to be a clear path to restart growth. Youngstown, which brings up the bottom of our league table, perhaps offers the best road forward. It is trying to right-size itself to a permanently smaller, but more sustainable, future population based on an aggressive controlled shrinkage plan that has received extensive national notice. This type of plan is likely something all of these cities need to be actively considering as the large fixed costs support a population base that no longer exists will become increasingly unaffordable as the population further shrinks. These cities likely also will need special state and federal help to back this shrinkage plan.

    * The Midwest is defined as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile.

  • Suburbs and Cities: The Unexpected Truth

    Much has been written about how suburbs have taken people away from the city and that now suburbanites need to return back to where they came. But in reality most suburbs of large cities have grown not from the migration of local city-dwellers but from migration from small towns and the countryside.

    It is true that suburban areas have been growing strongly, while core cities have tended to grow much more slowly or even to decline. The predominance of suburban growth is not just an American phenomenon, but is fairly universal in the high income world).

    This is true in both auto-oriented and transit oriented environments. Suburbs have accounted for more than 90 percent of growth in Japan’s metropolitan areas with more than 1,000,000 residents, both those with high transit market shares and those with high auto market shares, The same is true in Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

    In Western Europe, where vaunted transit systems carry a far smaller share of travel than cars, all growth and then some has been in the suburbs, as overall core city populations have declined. Indeed, the same trend is well underway in middle and lower income world urban areas. In such places as Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Manila, Shanghai, Kolkata, and Jakarta, nearly all population growth has occurred in the suburbs, rather than the core cities.

    As the world faces a more expensive energy future and as efforts are intensified to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it is sometimes suggested that people need to “move back” to the cities. This is a dubious and needless strategy, which reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the dynamics of metropolitan growth.

    Most suburban growth is not the result of declining core city populations, but is rather a consequence of people moving from rural areas and small towns to the major metropolitan areas. It is the appeal of large metropolitan places that drives suburban growth.

    Larger metropolitan areas have more lucrative employment opportunities and generally have higher incomes than smaller metropolitan areas. This is particularly the case in developing countries. As a result, the big urban areas attract people seeking to escape what are often the stagnant or even declining economies in smaller areas.

    There are, of course, significant individual exceptions. Virtually all of the first world core cities that have achieved a population of more than 400,000 – if they have not expanded their boundaries and did not have substantial empty land for development – experienced losses to 2000. Yet even in most of these cases, the majority of suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan areas, rather than from the core cities. For example:

    • St. Louis is a champion among the ranks of population losers, having lost the greatest percentage of its population of any large municipality in the world, (dropping from nearly 860,000 in 1950 to 350,000 in 2000). Indeed, it may be fair to say that St. Louis has lost more of its population than any city since the Romans sacked Carthage. Yet, even in St. Louis, 60 percent of suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan area, rather than from the city.
    • Few core cities have lost the nearly 1,000,000 residents that have fled Detroit since 1950. Yet, even in Detroit, 65 percent of suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan area, rather than from the city.
    • The city of Chicago lost 725,000 residents between 1950 and 2000, yet 82 percent of the suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan area.
    • The city of Philadelphia lost 550,000 residents between 1950 and 2000, yet 76 percent of the suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan area (See lead picture of Philadelpia downtown).
    • The central city of Paris lost approximately one-quarter of its population from 1965 to 2000 (675,000), while the suburbs gained nearly 3,850,000 residents. More than 80 percent of suburban Paris growth came from outside the region.
    • The central city of Lisbon experienced a 30 percent population decline from 1965 to 2000. Yet suburban Lisbon’s growth was 80 percent from outside.
    • Stockholm was another losing core city, yet more than 90 percent of the suburban growth came from smaller towns and cities.
    • Despite Zurich’s nearly one-quarter population loss 83 percent of the suburban gains derived from outside the region.
    • The core city of Tokyo (which really doesn’t exist except as 23 separate subdivisions or kus of a city abolished during World War II) lost more than 700,000 residents from 1965 to 2000. Tokyo’s suburbs, however, attracted more than 90 percent of their growth from region.

    In some metropolitan areas, smaller towns and rural areas contributed less to suburban growth. In Amsterdam, 50 percent of the suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan area. In Copenhagen, the number was 40 percent of the suburban growth while in Birmingham (UK) only 30 percent of the suburban gain was from outside.

    In a few cases, both the core city losses were greater than the suburban gains, such as in Pittsburgh, Liverpool and Manchester. In these cases, it is fair to attribute all of the suburban gains to core city losses.

    Unlike the cases above, however, most core cities gained population. This includes all in Canada, Australia and New Zealand and many in the United States. As a result, none of the suburban growth in the corresponding metropolitan areas can be attributed to an exodus from the city, because there, on balance, was no exodus.

    Suburbanization is often characterized as reducing densities, but in fact it has done just the opposite. Most suburbanites come from smaller places; they may prefer suburbs because they are less dense, safer, or simply more manageable than the core cities. But they are also, almost invariably, more dense than where they lived before. Suburbanization is thus a densifying dynamic, albeit one that is less dramatic than preferred by many planners and architects.

    In this sense, suburbs have to be seen not as the enemies of the city, as just a modern expression of urbanization. They are neither the enemies of the city, nor are their residents likely to move “back” there. You cannot move back to someplace you did not come from.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

  • Falling Off Bicycles in Portland

    It has become customary for the fawning print media to lazily repeat whatever information is provided them by the urbanist lobby. The result is all manner of puff pieces that report as reality what is nothing more than hopes, or even delusions.

    The latest puff piece is about Portland and is in today’s Wall Street Journal. The article indicates that 8 percent of Portlanders commute to work by bicycle, based upon data from a bicycle advocacy group. That number is more than five times the figure reported by the United States Bureau of the Census, (which is not a bicycle advocacy group). In 2007 (latest data available), 1.5 percent of Portland metropolitan area workers commuted by bicycle according to the Bureau of the Census.

    It is, of course, possible that there is confusion about the definition of Portland. Domestic migration is the principal subject and it is clear from the data cited that the article is citing metropolitan area data, rather than municipal (city of Portland) data.

    However, even if we allow that the editors might have erroneously substituted municipal for metropolitan data and that the advocacy group bicycle market share of 8 percent applies to the city of Portland; it would still be off by at least 100 percent. The Bureau of the Census data indicates that 3.9 of workers rode bicycles to work in 2007 in the city of Portland.

    Of course, it is always possible that three quarters of metropolitan Portland’s bicycle commuters have fallen off their bikes or that, if the editors were confused as to the difference between metropolitan and municipal, that half have fallen off.