New Geography

Category: Demographics

  • Canada’s Immigration Dilemma

    The subject of immigration in Canada presents a great dilemma for many Canadians. Like other countries of the western world, Canadians do not have enough children of their own to maintain the population at its present level. At the same time, the overall population, which is around 33 million, is getting older. Baby boomers are looking at retirement. Many calculate the amount of income they will need in order to maintain a decent standard of living. Their calculations include government pensions. The absence of a sufficient younger, active, working population to continue paying for the system of pensions presently in place and on which our retirees depend is well known and understood in the country.

    Since the problem is staring us in the face, the evident solution is to turn to immigrants from other countries to make up for our shortfall. But Canada’s ethnic situation was already complex enough as, in addition to the original inhabitants known as the First Nations, the founding populations of Canada, the French and the English, have in the past been referred to as “The Two Solitudes”. The descendants of the original French settlers are concentrated mainly in the province of Quebec. There are French-Canadians in other provinces as well, though, generally, not in large numbers.

    Over the last few decades, many French Quebecers started worrying about their diminishing numbers in other provinces as former French speakers began primarily using English in their daily transactions and sending their children to English schools, either due to a lack of French schools in the area they lived in or to facilitate their own integration or that of their children. The net result was a steady decrease of that population declaring French as their mother tongue in Canadian censuses.

    Inside Quebec, after the English conquest in 1759, in order not to lose the French language and their religion (Catholicism), the French population of 60,000 people coalesced around the Church. The Church was seen as the unflinching defender of that population’s language and culture. Moreover, again under the influence of the Church, French-Canadian families were having many children, so much so that in the 1960s, Canada was home to approximately six million French-speaking people.

    This is when modernity set in. French-Canadians decided that the place of religion was to remain in the church and, parallel to what was taking place elsewhere in the democratic world, the birth rate plummeted. From 1956 to 1961, the birth rate was 4.2 children per 1,000 married women. In the 1990s, Quebec’s birthrate was the lowest of all Canadian provinces. From 1986 to 1991, the Quebec fertility rate was only 1.5, therefore very much less than the 2.2 children needed for a population to replenish itself.

    In the short term, recent government measures such as a generous parental-leave program have contributed to an increase in the birth rate. While in 2004, Quebec had 74,200 births, the birth rate rose in 2006 to 10.6 per 1,000 population, compared to the national rate of 10.5. According to government statistics, there was a further increase in 2007, albeit a small one. However, these small increases in the young population do not come close to remedy the wide gap with the need for replenishment of the work force.

    Consequently, for both Canada as a whole and Quebec in particular, the issue of immigration has become a crucial one. The question of who will support pensioners comes to mind immediately, according to a 2008 survey by the respected CROP polling firm 38% of Quebec workers say they plan to retire before age 60 and 61% plan to retire between the ages of 55 and 64. The implications are food for thought. European immigrants are now outnumbered by immigrants from the rest of the world.

    Strong arguments against discrimination have led to a system of points awarded in considering whether one qualifies as an immigrant. The philosophy behind that point system is that an immigrant should have the prerequisites likely to make for harmonious integration. Having skills needed for employment, a support system in terms of already established family or friends, and knowing one of the two official languages of Canada, either French or English, are a help in determining if one should be accepted as an immigrant.

    Many people arriving as immigrants came from countries that were once British colonies, such as Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Jamaica and Nigeria.

    There is also a large percentage of immigrants coming from China. If continued unabated, these substantial numbers would have drowned the diminishing numbers of French-speaking Canadians. Also worrisome to concerned defenders of the French language was the fact that most of these immigrants in Quebec could function effectively in English and never had to learn any French.

    The federal government has taken some measures to promote the language. For example, food packages must contain French as well as English. Although sometimes difficult to implement, federal government offices across the land must be able to offer their services also in French.

    In Quebec, restrictive laws on the English language have promoted the use of French, particularly in Montreal. The ultimate problem, however, remains the small French population within a surrounding sea of speakers of English in North America.

    Eager to maintain its predominately French speaking status, the province of Quebec came to an agreement with the federal government in 1978 and was given a measure of authority to select their immigrants. The Quebec government could select a percentage of immigrants based on the proportion of the population in Quebec versus that of Canada. The Quebec government decided to increase the number of French-speaking immigrants which it found mostly in Haiti and French-speaking Arabs from the Maghreb, mainly Algeria and Morocco. Quebec also looked for immigrants from Latin-American countries with the premise that they could adapt easily to the French language and culture.

    Canada and Australia are the two leading countries with the highest proportion of their total population born in other countries. In 2004, Canada received over 230,000 immigrants. Being a democratic society, Canada does not restrict immigrants to any one part of the country. People arriving in Quebec or any other province are free to move elsewhere if they choose to. It is not rare to find that immigrants arriving in Quebec who have an easier time with English than French will not stay long in that province, thereby causing havoc with all the calculations of the Quebec government.

    In the past, Canada prided itself on being different from the U.S. in its philosophy regarding the integration of its different ethnic populations.

    Where the U.S. favoured the “melting pot” approach, Canada favoured the “multi-cultural” approach, encouraging immigrant societies to perpetuate their own culture in this country. Supposedly this approach would contribute to harmonious relations with other ethnic groups, with the general population as a whole, and result in happy integration within Canadian society.

    Of late, the multi-cultural approach has been called into question. The issue under debate has been whether that concept of integration does, in fact, facilitate integration or whether, instead of contributing to unity, it tends to keep people apart and is contrary to Canadian unity, accentuating differences within the Canadian population. The question has not yet been resolved.

    There are many problems that come as no surprise as they exist in all western countries. Immigrants have always known that the first few years in a new country could be difficult years. I, myself, did not have an easy time when I came to Canada many years ago and neither did my friends also young European immigrants. Even the many well-educated immigrants struggle because their academic credentials are often not recognized as equal to similar credentials awarded by Canadian institutions. Unfortunately for them, their expectations of recognition of those credentials are disappointed more often than not.

    Stories abound of medical doctors, some with much previous experience, not granted the license needed to practice as doctors in Canada. There is much need for more medical practitioners in Canada, but both the medical lobby and the government budgets set strict restrictions on who can practice as a doctor. There is talk, of relaxing some of those restrictions, but one should not hold one’s breath. We’ve been there before.

    Of course, the example of doctors is often given prominence. But similar obstacles apply to many other professionals who also are told that they lack Canadian experience. However, they are supposed to have been informed before their departure that they will not be able to practice medicine, law and some other professions. Many believe that there is an element of subtle discrimination as many of them are members of what is termed visible — meaning non-white — minorities. Be that as it may, immigrants always faced difficulties in a new country. Yet, they keep coming, and in great numbers. The backlog of waiting, hopeful, would-be immigrants is estimated at somewhat below but close to one million.

    There are other problems. As in other occidental countries, many would-be immigrants use the back door to come in. They arrive, legally or not, and then claim refugee status. The traffic of would-be refugees ranges in the billions of dollars. As a result of a ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada, anyone in Canada applying for refugee status has the right to have his claim being heard in person. Many of those applying have had a story of persecution concocted for them before they arrive here. Some purchase their story once in Canada or have their history of persecution “improved” by newly-found friends in their community. That way, many applicants for refugee status are able to obtain the immigrant status that would otherwise be denied to them under normal conditions.

    In summary, Canada faces many of the same problems faced by several other western countries: a population growing older that needs to be replenished and the need to facilitate the integration of newcomers which are of a background different from the descendants of the earlier European population that used to constitute the backbone of the country.

    Leon Graub is a former member of the Immigration and Refugee Board recently retired. He came from France to Canada in 1951 and resides in Laval, Quebec.

  • The future of urban settlement? Look in the suburbs

    Let’s look at general urban settlement and suburbia from a geographic and demographic, not a planning or ideological viewpoint. There’s really no point to the fruitless and unscientific harangues about how people ought to live or about allegedly better or poorer forms of settlement. This is really trying to understand what is happening in the metropolitan level of settlement, agglomerations of at least 50,000 and their commuter hinterlands — where at least 80 percent of Americans live.

    Definitions: I will use terms precisely. The central city is the historic, largest core incorporated place (OK, there are a few with 2 or 3 core cities). Suburbs are the rest of the urbanized area and may be usefully be differentiated between older, inner and newer, outer suburbs. Exurbia is the area of intense commuting to the urban core from beyond the urbanized area boundary, and it can be differentiated between rural territory (a.k.a. “sprawl”) and satellite towns.

    As of 2000 “central cities” had 70 million persons (25 %) of the population, suburbs 120 million people (43 %) and exurbia up to 36 million (12 %). That puts the suburban and exurban share to well over 50 percent of the US total population, not even including the suburbs or smaller towns and cities.

    Even worse for urban boosters, the suburbs — and particularly the exurbs — is where the growth is. In the Seattle metropolitan area, which is under unusually strong growth management restrictions and has a stronger than usual urban core, growth continues to head outwards, with inner, outer suburbs, as well as exurbs easily adding many more people than the central city.

    The question now is whether this pattern will hold for a longer term or whether significant change can be expected. My sense is that these trends will broadly continue —that suburban and exurban growth will continue to be greater than central city growth, despite the passing of peak oil, the passion of anti-suburb intellectual currents, the energy crisis and new urbanist planning policies. But central cities will probably do somewhat better than they have in the last 20 years. So it is sensible to ask: what are forces for and against central city, suburban and exurban growth; and, as important, how will the character of these components of urban settlement change?

    Demography

    The combination of many suburban empty nesters, later marriage and fewer children for generation X’ers (those born 1965-1981) should foster selective central city growth . But this appears to apply only for the subset of more glamorous cities with a well-developed amenity structure. . But these cities often suffer housing price inflation and strong anti-growth lobbies which constrain may constrain growth. Many, perhaps most, cities lack the appeal to attract population in from lower-density areas.

    Older inner suburbs represent a zone of significant change between and the traditional newer middle class family suburbs and the gentrifying or stagnant central cities. Some are receiving the displaced poor and minorities; some have matured into quality communities, and, like parts of the central city 50 years earlier, are still attractive to families, with or without children, as well as many recent immigrants.

    Housing prices and taxes vary greatly across the US, which will like push movement toward lower cost places, including to non-metropolitan small towns and rural areas. This may be particularly true for those with adequate retirement income. But middle class families remain a huge demographic component for far suburban and exurban living (see market forces below).

    On balance, demographic forces seem to reinforce existing patterns rather than favor either central cities or suburbs, or more rapid non-metropolitan growth.

    Economic factors

    Economic changes are even more uncertain. The vast expansion of producer services to replace the huge decline in primary and secondary (manufacturing) jobs clearly is in some jeopardy, as evidenced by the problems evident finance and insurance sector. The key is whether American entrepreneurs can partially restore a greater industrial base. In general, suburban and exurban sites are likely to be cheaper, more politically pliable and more available than central city sites, particularly compared to more elite gentrified core cities. A partial recovery of production in some less glamorous cities with available idle plant could occur but does not seem very likely.

    Energy, technology, environment, and cars

    Most observers concerned with the “end of oil” and with global warming argue that these will inevitably drive people to denser concentrations of settlement in central cities and older inner suburbs. They even predict a decline in far suburban and exurban settlement. US technological history, however, suggests that if innovation and investment take place anywhere, it will likely be on alternative energy sources, conspicuously including the continued popularity and dominance of trucks and cars. Nevertheless, persistent high energy prices could yield some acceptance of moderately higher densities for housing and business, and a slightly higher growth in central cities and older inner suburbs.

    Market forces

    Markets refer to preferences and needs, and the willingness to pay among households and businesses. There is relatively little uncertainty as to preferences. Even in the biggest metropolises, no more than 30 to 40 percent of households prefer denser urban settings and enjoy apartment or townhouse living. For the nation as a whole, the share is only 10-15 percent! Those who prefer it tend to be younger, unmarried persons and empty nesters without children and are (or will be) more educated and professional than the US norm. But 60 to 70 percent of households, and not just families with children, prefer single family homes and cars. These households will pay or MOVE in order to act on these preferences. At the same time perhaps 35 to 45 percent of jobs thrive in dense urban settings, as downtown towers, leaving 55 to 65 percent to seek less dense suburban and exurban settings, often by logistic necessity. These are the continuing and overwhelming facts that created and will sustain suburban living.

    Planning

    Intellectual hatred of suburbia is a century old and has been especially fervent in the last 60 years. From the late 1970s the planning profession has embraced what has come to be called “new urbanism,” advocating urban containment, urban redevelopment, densification, urban villages, and a new wave of rail transit, now under the broad rubric of growth management. These efforts often have been strongly supported by environmental groups concerned with the loss of open space as well as by central city political and business interests.

    Several metropolitan areas are becoming increasingly regulated by such planning ideology. But to date the movement has not been successful at significantly slowing suburban or exurban growth. A few central cities, such as San Francisco, Seattle, New York, San Francisco and Portland, have gentrified, but have not grown much in population, since the mass of new housing is occupied by much smaller non-family households. Costs of growth management include displacement of minority and less affluent families, often to the older suburbs or to other neighborhoods of the core city.

    Conclusions

    Market preferences have prevailed. Businesses as well as households have resisted substantial concentration or been priced out of the gentrifying core. So the suburbs persist. But they have changed, especially in those more regulated metropolises. The older inner suburbs have become more central-city like, with more diversity in ethnicity and class. But this has not slowed the long-standing trend of net growth of housing and of jobs at the suburban edge – even in the most growth managed cities, and even in the most recent 2000-2007 period.

    Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist).

  • Suburbs will decide the election

    By Joel Kotkin and Mark Schill

    Suburbs may not have cooked up the mortgage crisis, but they absorbed much of initial damage. Now that Wall Street and the big cities are also taking the fall, suburbanites might feel a bit better — but there’s still lots of room for anger out in the land of picket fences, decent schools and shopping malls.

    Widely demeaned in the media and academe, suburbs still exercise their power at election time. Home to roughly half the country’s population, and likely a greater share of its voters, suburbs seem destined to remain — to borrow from that great wordsmith George W. Bush — “the decider” in this election.

    Indeed, as the campaign has evolved, the critical position of suburbs seems to have grown. Barack Obama’s stranglehold on the urban vote seems unshakeable — even against a maverick “moderate” such as John McCain.

    At the same time, after seeming unsettled, the rural and small-town electorate appears to be returning to the GOP fold. Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin’s place on the Republican ticket and, perhaps even more, the mainstream media’s snooty reaction to her, may have sealed the GOP deal in the countryside, at least at the presidential level. One sure sign: The small Obama strike team sent to reliably red North Dakota this summer has departed for more competitive terrain in nearby Minnesota and Wisconsin.

    So now it’s really up to the suburbanites, who come from the only geography that has grown faster than the national average over the past 30 years. But it’s critical to recognize that suburbs themselves have changed, becoming more reflective of America’s diversity, just as cities have grown more bifurcated between rich and poor. Once lily white, suburban America is now roughly 21 percent minority.

    Voting behavior among suburbs overall also has changed over the years. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan carried the suburbs in the key swing states by between 20 points and 40 points. Bill Clinton ended this dominance, essentially battling the GOP to a suburban standoff. He even beat the Republicans in the peripheral communities of Pennsylvania, Michigan, Missouri and Florida.

    In 2000 and again in 2004, President Bush recovered some of the Republican edge, running as much as 10 percent better than Sen. Bob Dole’s weak 1996 effort. But in the 2006 congressional elections, Democrats regained much of the ground Clinton had carried.

    As of now, polls suggest McCain, who lagged in the suburbs into the summer, has pushed back some of the Democratic momentum. He now enjoys, according to the latest Wall Street Journal poll, a 10-point edge among suburban voters, not far from what Bush garnered in those parts of the swing states. If McCain can combine this suburban group with his rural and small-town base, he could be in striking distance of staging an upset.

    But this may not be so easy. Democrats’ recent gains seem to be solidifying, particularly in older, metropolitan suburbs. Fairfax County, home to one out of seven Virginians, has been trending strongly Democratic in recent years, even supporting John F. Kerry in 2004.

    McCain, who appeals more to independents than Bush did, should be able to erode some of this advantage in such communities. But Palin’s social conservatism could turn off many generally well-educated, middle-of-the-road voters who are so prominent in many of the most upscale suburban communities.

    At the same time, Palin — herself a former mayor of an Anchorage exurb — could help McCain consolidate Bush’s gains in the fast-growing exurbs, which tend to be more heavily composed of traditional families and generally less ethnically diverse. In his 2004 victory, Bush won 97 of the nation’s 100 fastest-growing counties with roughly 63 percent of the vote. If McCain can duplicate that feat, he will be well-positioned.

    Several factors, notably the financial crisis, could work against these efforts. Foreclosure rates in many of these exurban suburban counties are well above the national average, particularly in Florida and the Virginia suburbs of Washington and also outside Denver, Detroit and Cleveland.

    The mortgage crisis affects not only foreclosed homeowners, but also homeowners who are still above water. First, foreclosures lower everybody’s home values and bring on the possibility of renters replacing owners — not a good development in a suburban context. Second, particularly in exurban counties, construction has often been the basis for a lot of job growth in this decade, because construction jobs and other employment related to the real estate industry has been centered there.

    All of this makes suburbs a theoretically good target for Obama. In places like Pennsylvania, as longtime Republican activist Dennis Powell suggests, Obama should try to duplicate Democratic Gov. Ed Rendell’s wildly successful performance in 2002 in the so-called collar counties around Philadelphia. By winning those counties, in addition to building up a huge margin in his native Philadelphia, Rendell built a margin of more than a half-million votes that helped him win, even while he was getting thrashed throughout most of the rest of the state.

    In 2004, Kerry also won Pennsylvania’s collar counties, not by a large margin but by enough to secure his victory in the state. If Obama does as well as Kerry in the collar counties, he will win the state — perhaps not at a Rendellian scale, but comfortably enough.

    For his part, McCain needs to emulate the success of maverick Republicans, such as Sen. Arlen Specter, who have won by winning the Philadelphia suburbs. If McCain can replicate Specter’s performance and add some of the disgruntled Clinton Democrats in the rural south and west of the state, he could pull off a game-changing upset.

    McCain also has an opportunity to win in the Detroit suburbs, where Obama’s ties to disgraced former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick could hurt him. Bush won those areas in 2000 and 2004, but not by enough to capture the state’s electoral votes. As in Pennsylvania, McCain needs to forge a rural-suburban coalition to capture this traditionally blue-tinged state.

    For Obama, suburbs in wobbly red states such as Ohio, Florida, Colorado, Virginia and Missouri offer similarly critical opportunities. Even traditionally conservative exurban voters may feel that under Bush they have been led down the bubble path only to have it pop painfully in their faces.

    Ultimately it may all come down to “body language.” In our estimation, Obama’s weakness stems not so much from his race — he may well run better in suburbia than did the very white Kerry — but with his close identification with Chicago and Mayor Richard Daley’s Democratic machine. Having spent his adulthood in college towns and big cities, Obama seems to lack the instinctive Clintonian understanding of the suburban mindset. You never got the sense that Clinton was too urbane to wolf down a Big Mac or get a Slurpee at the local strip mall — and he really seemed to “feel the pain” of an overstressed homeowner.

    In contrast, Obama and his team, including campaign manager David Axelrod, reflect the mentality of a totally urban political culture. Obama’s intellectual and media supporters also include elements — ensconced at publications such as The New York Times and The Atlantic Monthly as well as within the leftist Netroots — that often regard suburbs and their denizens as a form of social and environmental pestilence.

    Obama is simply too smart, as a candidate and perhaps also as a president, to publicly give in to this mindset. He’s certainly trying to appeal to suburban voters who are too concerned with issues such as health care and foreclosures to worry about his lack of geographic empathy.

    If he can convey this message effectively, Obama could benefit from the suffering now taking place in suburban communities. There may well be enough disgruntled suburban voters, even in the more peripheral areas, to blunt McCain’s suburban lead down to manageable numbers.

    If so, McCain’s rural and small town base will not be enough to win the critical swing states and the election. If the Republicans can hold their 2004 suburban base, though, McCain could yet triumph. Whatever the result, one thing is clear: Suburban voters will be the deciders.

    Joel Kotkin is a presidential fellow at Chapman University and executive editor of www.newgeography.com. Mark Schill is a principal at Praxis Strategy Group and the site’s managing editor.

  • Boomers Go Back to College? – A Letter from Pennsylvania

    The “boomers” is a generation born between 1946 and 1964. They gave us the youth culture, hippies, Woodstock, peace movement, women’s liberation, computers, flexible work environments, consumer electronics and consumption on the grand scale to mention only a few.

    Boomers have enjoyed a wonderful economy in the main that has enabled them to build wealth and live middle class lifestyles. They stay fit. They eat healthy foods. They look young compared to people of previous generations at their age.

    But alas they are graying and have reached the point in their lives where choices need to be made about how to continue to live lives that are both enriching and fulfilling.

    There were 78 million boomers in the United States in 2005 according the census data. By 2006, 330 of them an hour were turning 60. Growing older means different choices and greater financial challenges for them. Fidelity Investments estimates that “boomers” on average have less than $40,000 in retirement savings. Few will have traditional pensions. Most of their wealth is tied up in real estate.

    Medical costs will increase by nearly 50 percent as they pass 65. The Social Security Administration estimates that there will be only 2.1 workers for retiree by 2031. This is down from 3.3 today. As a result many boomers will continue to work out of necessity while they seek a simpler and scaled down lifestyles.

    An annual survey conducted on behalf of Del Webb, a developer of retirement communities, found that 36 percent of boomers plan to move when they become “Empty Nesters” and 55 percent of boomers plan to move when they retire. One interesting finding in the study is that, “boomers are twice as likely as those currently aged 59 – 70 to prefer an active adult community that is part of a multi-generational neighborhood.”

    One key question facing empty nester and retired “boomers” may be where can they go to find a quality lifestyle, affordable living, part-time employment opportunities and multi-generational interaction? The answer may well be college towns that proliferate in places like Pennsylvania – a state with more than one hundred institutions of higher education. Many are located in beautiful towns.

    Websites like www.collegetownlife.com provide links to college towns where boomers may consider relocating. At www.bestplaces.net you can compare the demographics of where you currently live to those of a college town. I currently live in suburban Philadelphia. If I were to move to State College, Penn., home of Pennsylvania State University’s main campus, here is what I would find.

    First, I would be living in a town that is six times larger than my current community, but less than one percent the size of my current region. The median age would fall from 42 to 23 years. In my current community, nearly 40 percent of the population is 50 years or older, but in State College only about 10 percent fall into this demographic.

    A lot of things would remain the same in terms of gender and racial mix, but I would have to get use to a community in which 75 percent of the population is single with no children and the number of people who are married drops from 60 percent to 15 percent.

    In my current community the median home prices is $344,000 while in State College it is $235,000. My current cost of living index in 126 while in State it would stand at 100. Average income in my current community is $66,500 while in State College it is $22,500. My school district spends more than $9,000 per student in State College it is a little over $7,500 which reflects real estate taxes.

    State College offers robust cultural activities through Pennsylvania State University. The University has schools of music and performing and fine arts and a number of concert halls, museums, lecture halls, libraries, theatres and auditoriums with near daily attractions and activities. Also, the community is safe and offers a host of recreational activities.

    Pennsylvania State University is the largest in Pennsylvania and adds to the vibrancy of State College, but there are also more than one hundred other college towns and communities in Pennsylvania where “boomers” may find everything they are looking for and more as they transition for work to active retirement and toward their golden years.

    These towns offer everything from wooded rural locations to stylish suburban or urban neighborhoods. They represent a great alternative to those boomers who want to do far more than fade away.

    Dennis M. Powell is president and CEO of Massey Powell an issues management consulting company located in Plymouth Meeting, PA.

  • Time to Reinvent College Towns?

    By Joel Kotkin and Mark Schill

    For much of their history college towns have been seen primarily as “pass through” communities servicing a young population that cycles in and out of the community. But more recently, certain college communities have grown into “knowledge-based” hot spots — Raleigh-Durham, Madison, Cambridge and the area around Stanford University — which have been able to not only retain some graduates but attract knowledge workers and investors from the rest of the country.

    But a large proportion of college towns do not seem to be doing so well. For one thing, they often lack the historically high levels of aerospace and other technology investment — and simply the scale — that characterize the most successful university communities. Simply put, there are not enough large-scale high-tech opportunities to seed and sustain significant growth in most college towns.

    This does not mean there are not great opportunities for college communities to evolve in the next century. Many more possess the potential to become legitimate centers of technology, innovation, risk capital and cultural efflorescence. The key, we believe, is tapping the energies of the baby boomer generation. The baby boom generation far outnumbers its successor, Generation X, by roughly 76 million to 41 million. Due largely to boomers, by 2030 nearly one of five Americans will be over 65.

    The ultimate locations chosen by those whom demographer Bill Frey calls “downshifting boomers” will be critical in terms of new residential and commercial development. This will be particularly true for college towns once the current “echo” generation — currently 15 to 25 — grows into adulthood and leaves college for other destinations.

    To understand the opportunity, we have to see the real situation of boomers. Despite the hype about a massive “back to the city” movement by aging boomers, this is a very small phenomenon, restricted largely to a small, usually highly affluent sub-set. Generally speaking, the further over the age of 35, the greater the chance an individual has of living in the suburbs or exurbs. Far more seniors, in fact, migrate from city to suburb than the other way around. It appears that a handful of relatively wealthy older suburbanites do establish residences in some inner-city locations, but overall the prime destination for those who move is the suburbs.

    Recent research by Gary Engelhardt found that if central city dwelling boomers without kids moved, only 35 percent would remain in a central city region. Of those moving from a suburban home, just more than 11 percent decided to move into the central city.

    The most critical factor is the boomers’ tendency to “age in place,” at least until they become too old to care for themselves. Roughly three-quarters of retirees in the first block of boomers, according to Sandi Rosenbloom, a professor of urban planning and gerontology at the University of Arizona, appear to be sticking pretty close to the suburbs, where the vast majority reside. Those who do migrate, her studies suggests, tend to head farther out into the suburban periphery, not back towards the old downtown. Most continue to use single-occu¬pancy vehicles; few rely on public transit.

    The reasons vary, Rosenbloom suggests, and include job commitments or the desire, as they age, to live close to and spend more time with children or grandchildren. Perhaps most importantly, the majority of boomers have spent most of their lives in sub-urban settings. They are, for the most part, not acculturated to the density, congestion and noise of inner city life.

    Yet if they are not heading en masse to the inner city, Rosenbloom and other experts see a significant proportion heading to smaller towns. Many of the areas with the fastest growth in senior populations are already on the outward fringes of the metropolitan areas, but also in some of the more remote areas of country, including parts of the Rocky Mountains, the Sierra Nevada, and even Alaska. Indeed by 2030 Montana and Wyoming are expected to have among the highest percentage of seniors in the country.

    Compared to most metropolitan areas smaller towns — including college communities in places like the Great Plains, the South and interior California — have remained remarkably affordable, and should continue to be so. Many baby-boomers may eventually consider an “equity migration” from the coasts. These households can enjoy a significant capital gain, and achieve a large reduction in debt, while still engaging in economic activities made possible by the Internet. [see Figure 2]

    As a rule, small town residents pay less of their income for housing than those in metropolitan areas, even though their incomes tend to be less. In 2003, even before the peak of the current housing boom, roughly 15 percent of all metropolitan households spent over half their income on housing while only 10 percent of those in non-metro areas suffered this same level of burden.

    Quality of life considerations also could play a critical role in attracting newcomers to college towns, both in terms of cultural institutions and providing walk-able communities. College towns can also offer “continuing education” opportunities for an economically active population, many of whom plan to remain engaged in the economy well into their 60s and 70s. They can become a source of useful expertise as well as capital for those recent graduates who seek to start or expand local companies.

    Colleges could maximize their real estate and financial position if they can bring in boomers as full or part-time residents. This is true not only in metropolitan areas but in broad parts of the country including the rural south, Midwest and places like Pennsylvania. Many boomers do not view retirement as a permanent vacation but as a place to start a “second life.” In many case they are turning to nontraditional and less expensive retirement spots.

    Successful college towns will connect with both the well educated, increasingly well connected younger workers already in town and the downshifting experienced professionals looking to balance livability with more urban amenities. Combined with well-educated boomers, this could create a powerful labor and knowledge base.


    Done correctly, in accordance with a sound economic strategy, many college communities could find a new way to prosper and thrive in the years until 2020 during which the number of potential students is likely to drop. It may also provide some protection against other forces that threaten college growth, notably the increase in on-line classes, private colleges with numerous satellite locations and the growing problems with student debt.

    Given these factors, college towns need to be reinvented in order to thrive in emerging environment. Most importantly, they must learn to take advantage of emerging demographic trends, particularly by taking advantage of the energies of an increasingly vital aging population.

    Joel Kotin is Executive Editor of NewGeography.com. Mark Schill is Managing Editor and a community strategy consultant with Praxis Strategy Group.

  • A New Model for New York — San Francisco Anyone?

    From the beginning of the mortgage crisis New York and other financial centers have acted as if they were immune to the suffering in the rest of country. As suburbs, exurbs and hard-scrabble out of the way urban neighborhoods suffered with foreclosures and endured predictions of their demise, the cognitive elites in places like Manhattan felt confident about their own prospects, property values and jobs. So what if the rubes in Phoenix, Las Vegas, Tampa and Riverside all teetered on the brink?

    Now only a deluded real estate speculator — or a flack for Mayor Michael Bloomberg — could deny that the mortgage crisis wolf is now at Gotham’s door. Having underwritten and profited obscenely from the loans that launched the crisis, Wall Street is now reeling from the collapse of several of its strongest linchpins, including Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, while Merrill Lynch has become little more than an annex to Charlotte-based Bank of America. AIG has been forced on the federal teat and other giants, even Citibank, could be next.

    With perhaps tens of thousands of high-paying jobs about to evaporate, and with them the rich bonuses that fueled Mayor Bloomberg’s grandiose vision of a “luxury city,” New Yorkers should brace themselves for hard times. Bloomberg’s brave talk about media, tourism, bioscience or the arts making up the difference should not be taken too seriously. In reality New York has never been more dependent on Wall Street than it is today, in large part because most other middle class sectors, like manufacturing and warehousing, declined massively over the past seven years.

    As a result, nearly one out of four dollars earned in New York — although accounting for less than five percent of all jobs — are tied to the financial sector. Overall job growth has been slow in finance, and stood well below historic highs even at the crest of the boom, and are now dropping radically. This means, as a result, a group of relatively few big earners are more and more important as overall employment in finance declines.

    Tourism certainly cannot make up the balance since it is a notoriously low wage sector and may soon be subject to a major decline in visitors due to higher airline prices and a growing downturn in Europe. New York has a decent bioscience sector, but Gotham is far as dominant here as in finance or media. There’s strong competition from a host of places, notably St. Louis, Houston, Boston, San Diego and Silicon Valley.

    So where can a plutocratic Mayor look for inspiration for the future? He may not like it but arguably the best model for New York may be San Francisco. More than any American city, San Francisco epitomizes one possible future for American urbanism of the “luxury” variety.

    The parallels between San Francisco and underlying trends in New York, and to some extent Chicago, are striking. Like New York on a smaller scale, San Francisco was once a corporate headquarters town and a powerful financial center. But starting in the 1980s and 1990s that all started to change. Corporations fled for the suburbs, or got merged with firms located elsewhere. It started with the exodus of Crocker Bank. In 1998 its most important company, started by an Italian immigrant in the city, the Bank of America, fled to North Carolina. Like New York, it has flushed away virtually its entire industrial sector and lost ground as a port.

    Yet through this all, San Francisco managed to reinvent itself. First it anchored itself to Silicon Valley, becoming the playground, advertising and media center for the nerdistan to the south. Then, after the collapse of the dot.com bubble, the city fell back on its intrinsic appeal as a place, relying largely on tourism and its ability to attract high-end residents.

    This discreet charm has allowed San Francisco to enjoy a reasonable economic comeback, not so much as a corporate or economic center, but as a high-end destination for the nomadic rich, the culturally curious and the still adolescent twenty and even thirty somethings. Many of this last group have strong skills sets and remain a powerful asset to the city.

    You can see the changes just by walking the streets. Three decades ago, when I worked in the City, San Francisco was still in large part a city of suits and blue-collar workers; today it’s black-garbed cool and casually elegant. There are more wealthy residents and decidedly less minorities, even Hispanics, and ever fewer children.

    This pattern could represent the future — and even the present — in parts of New York and even on the fringes of Brooklyn. We have seen that the “baby boom” in Manhattan does not last much past age five. When Wall Streeters lose their ability to pay for nannies, summer camps, private schools, etc, many affluent families may not be able to hang out that long.

    But then again there are those residents there will not lose their jobs. These include those tied to “luxury” industries, media, and non-profits. Not to be ignored also are the growing ranks of trustifarians, wealthy people living off their parents or grandparents’ labor. These are not the prototypical New Yorker on the make, like Charlie Sheen in “Wall Street,” but they have spending power, connections and often political influence.

    None of these groups are likely to disappear because of a mere trifle like a financial system collapse. These are committed denizens of the urban pleasure dome, content either to live minimally or (for the time being at least) pursue such generally non-remunerative activities like working in the arts or making documentary films.

    Of course, cities like New York and Chicago, also likely to be hard hit by the securities industry meltdown, may not be able to live as richly in hard times like San Francisco. Parts of Manhattan and Manhattanized Brooklyn might endure a metropolitan recession, but it may be tougher on the mostly minority, poor and working class residents who inhabit the outer reaches of the outer boroughs . These residents will suffer from the inevitable cutbacks in city services as well as the loss of retail, hospitality and construction jobs.

    In contrast, “The City,” as San Francisco likes to be known, is both small, compact and surrounded largely by affluent, low-density suburbs. It effectively has no real analogue to the outer boroughs. To see the dark side of America’s urban reality, you increasingly have to go east across the Bay to the crime-infested streets of Oakland, where the once proud dream of civic renaissance appears to be slowly fading.

    Of course, New Yorkers may reject this vision of their future. San Franciscans, have long prioritized joie de vive over imperial visions. In contrast, New Yorkers derive much of their civic self-esteem from their city’s role as the “capital of the world.”

    But if New Yorkers want to keep this slogan to be more than a marketing jingle, they will have to transcend the lame “luxury city” zeitgiest. Spending nearly four billion on new sparkling sports stadiums, and even Bloomberg’s media mastery, won’t get it done. It will take hard work, a commitment to infrastructure and broad-based job growth.

    It’s hard to know if New York still has the stomach for this kind of hard work. As someone whose familial roots in the city span over a century, I hope so. New Yorkers are a resilient lot, as they have shown many times in the past. But if they have lost their appetite for hard struggle, well, they can always consider becoming the next San Francisco.

    Joel Kotkin is Executive Editor of NewGeography.com

  • Geography, Class, and Red and Blue Voting

    Consider the following two apparently contradictory sets of statistics:

    From the Republican convention and much of the media, you’d get the impression that class voting has turned upside down—that the Democrats are the party of the “elite” and the Republicans the new friends of the “working class”.

    But the ACTUAL voting behavior in 2004, when Republicans did especially well at making inroads among socially conservative, less affluent households. Consider the accompanying chart, where Bush dominated Kerry in households making more than $100,000.

    And according to McCain, $200000 is solidly middle class!
    This looks like “economic class“ still matters!

    But then look at the following equally CORRECT statistics, (courtesy of Fred Shelley, U Oklahoma:

    The purple states are the current tossup states: CO, FL, IN,MI, NH, NV, NM, NC,OH,VA

    So is it true, contrary to the 2004 national data, that states that are richer and more educated tend Democratic (blue) and those with less educated and poorer folks lead Republican (red)? How can both sets of data be true?

    The answer lies in the math. The first set uses INDIVIDUALS, while the second uses average, aggregate values. Making inferences from averages risks what statisticians call the “ecological fallacy” , attributing to everyone the value of an average, from what in reality is probably a very heterogeneous (highly variable) population.

    Blue states like CA, WA, NY or MA have high average levels of income and education, but we do not know the distribution of votes for D and R by varying levels of education and income. So to reconcile the two sets of statistics, it is reasonable to assume that despite high average levels, the more educated and wealthier are more likely to vote Republican, the less educated and poorer more likely to vote Democratic.

    For example, consider state A (big metropolitan) and state B (non-metro, small town, rural):

    A has a larger share of richer than average voters than B, but it’s a big metro state while B is a smaller rural, small city state. Richer voters tend R in both and poorer voters tend to vote D in both states, but the R share is higher for all classes in the non-metro state and D shares higher for both classes in the big metro state.

    The other part of the story is geography, largely about the split between large metropolitan and small and non-metropolitan America. Over half the population lives in large metropolitan areas. These tend to have above average levels of education and income, as they are the control centers of society, but they also have the large majority of racial and ethnic minorities and of the poor— which are the real numerical base of the Democratic vote. Not that you would know it from either party’s rhetoric!

    Now it is certainly true that a significant and increasing share of the educated affluent has shifted Democratic in the last decade or so; these folks are powerful and articulate and have effectively taken over the Democratic Party. We know from precinct level data that Democrats swept areas with highly educated professionals, especially around universities, but Republicans continued to dominate wider areas, especially suburban and exurban, of the more managerial affluent.

    Generally speaking, the Democratic “elite” overestimates its own numbers, and often unintentionally pursues policies hurtful to the poor and lower middle classes. This can be seen in the elite’s indifference to the less affluent and educated Democratic base as demonstrated by their emphasis on the virtues of dense urban, “green” living. This agenda often results in gentrification, displacement of the poor and minorities. Elite democrats also ignore —except perhaps at election time — job competition from massive immigration, legal and illegal, the ravages of excess globalization, and out of sight housing prices.

    The 2004 election data shows that the historic base of the Democratic party is not gone, at least in large metropolitan America. Middle and working class white voters in the suburbs and exurbs still matter. Obama cannot win unless that base is reassured and respected.

    Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist).

  • America is More Small Town than We Think

    America has become an overwhelmingly metropolitan nation. According to the 2000 census, more than 80 percent of the nation’s population resided in one of the 350 combined metropolitan statistical areas. It is not surprising, therefore, that “small town” America may be considered as becoming a burdensome anachronism.

    Nothing could be further from the truth. America is more “small town” than we often think, particularly in how we govern ourselves. In 2000, slightly more than one-half of the nation’s population lived in jurisdictions — cities, towns, boroughs, villages and townships — with fewer than 25,000 people or in rural areas. Planners and geographers might see regions as mega-units, but in fact, they are usually composed of many small towns and a far smaller number of larger cities. Indeed, among the metropolitan areas with more than one million residents in 2000, the average sized city, town, borough, village or township had a population of little more than 20,000.

    Although local government consolidation and regional governance is all the rage in policy circles, most Americans seem content with a diverse, even fractured governmental structure. According to the 2002 U.S. Census of Governments, there were more than 34,000 local general-purpose governments with less than 25,000 residents and 31,000 local general-purpose governments with less than 10,000 residents (accounting, with rural areas, for 38 percent of the nation’s 2000 population). With so many “small towns,” the average local jurisdiction population in the United States is 6,200.

    Even in big metropolitan areas, citizens are often governed by small local institutions. People in Brecksville, Ohio (population 13,000), may tell their friends from far away that they live in Cleveland and residents of Woodway, Wash. (population 1,000), may claim to live in Seattle. But in reality their local governments are located not in the great City Hall downtown but in a usually quite modest nearby building.

    This large number of governments horrifies some organizations and people. Planners, the media and many often well-meaning local activists argue that local governments should be consolidated to eliminate waste and duplication. And so, in recent years there have been strong initiatives to force local government consolidations. Bigger, the argument goes, is usually better and more efficient — and certainly easier to cover if you are a journalist and influence if you are a big business interest.

    Yet the reality is that the claims of greater efficiency rarely confirm the theory. Both
    Pennsylvania and New York recently started initiatives to consolidate their governmental structure. They took to heart the usual mantra that there are thousands of governments in the state and that they must be consolidated to save money. In both states, the efforts were clothed in promises that local government consolidation would improve competitiveness relative to other states.

    However, the proponents never bothered to look at the data.

    We did and the results were stunning. In both states, an equivalent “market basket” of spending was compared. In Pennsylvania, the largest local jurisdictions spent (including a per capita allocation of county expenditures, so that Philadelphia could be included. Social service spending was excluded) 150 percent more per capita than jurisdictions with between 5,000 and 10,000 population. The largest jurisdictions — those over 250,000 people — spent 200 percent more than jurisdictions with under 2,500 residents.

    Moreover, it is not a matter of urban versus rural. In both the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh areas, there are literally hundreds of suburban jurisdictions that spent at less than one-half the per capita rate of the central cities.

    The story was little different in New York. The largest jurisdictions (those over 100,000) spent nearly double per capita as jurisdictions with between 5,000 and 10,000 population (this would have been even greater if it had been possible to include New York City). The big governments spent even more (more than 150 percent) compared to jurisdictions with between 1,000 and 2,500 population. The differences were even greater within metropolitan areas, where smaller jurisdictions were even more efficient relative to the largest jurisdictions.

    Why should this be? Perhaps it’s the old, all too often neglected Jeffersonian principle of downscaling government closer to the people. Elected officials who know more of their constituents are likely to be more responsive to their needs. Too often the principal economies of scale that occur from municipal consolidations are economies of scale for lobbyists and special interests.

    Further, this small town governance structure is not limited to the United States. Metropolitan Paris has approximately 1,300 general-purpose local jurisdictions, more than any U.S. metropolitan area. Milan has more than 600. By comparison, Tokyo-Yokohama, the world’s largest metropolitan area, is a model of government consolidation, with more than 200 general-purpose governments.

    America’s small town government structure engenders a sense of community, even as a part of larger metropolitan areas. They also save a lot of money, principally because democracy tends to work better when government is closer to home. It is not surprising that so many consolidation proposals fail and that when given the chance, voters usually reject consolidation proposals.

    America needs both its small towns and its bigger cities. But make no mistake about it, even much of what we call a “metropolis” functions more effectively as a network of small towns.

    The view of Main Street, Bramwell, West Virginia was photographed by Sandy Sorlien as part of her twenty-year project, The Heart of Town: Main Streets in America.

    New Geography apologizes for having initially published the image without permission or attribution.

    Resources:

    Report for the Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors

    Report for the Association of Towns of the State of New York

    General-purpose governments by metropolitan area (2002)

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

  • Rural America could bring boon to Dems

    By Joel Kotkin and Mark Schill

    Perhaps no geography in America is as misunderstood as small towns and rural areas. Home to no more than one in five Americans, these areas barely register with the national media except for occasional reports about the towns’ general decrepitude, cultural backwardness and inexorable decline.

    Yet in reality this part of America is far more diverse, and in many areas infinitely more vital, than the big-city-dominated media suspects. In fact, there are many demographic and economic dynamics that make this part of America far more competitive this year than in the recent past.

    Both parties have acknowledged the importance of this battlefield through their choices for vice presidential nominees. Barack Obama’s running mate, Sen. Joe Biden, is being touted not so much as a Washington foreign policy wonk but as the “scrappy kid from Scranton” — even though he has represented Delaware in the Senate for 35 years. Even more obvious is John McCain’s tapping of Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin, a former small-town mayor from a rustic state without anything close to a major metropolitan area.

    Even though many very small towns — with, say, fewer than 10,000 people — have continued to decline in population, there’s a significant demographic and economic rebound taking place in a host of somewhat larger communities. Places such as Sioux Falls and Fargo in the Dakotas as well as Asheville, N.C.; Wenatchee, Wash.; and Springfield, Mo., have been drawing a steady stream of people and businesses from both big cities and suburbs.

    This dynamic could provide some welcome surprises for Democrats and potential nightmares for Republicans. During the primaries, Obama startled observers with his ability to win over Democratic voters in places like the Dakotas, Montana, Kansas, Nebraska and Indiana. More importantly, according to recent polls, he is running between 10 points and 30 points ahead of John F. Kerry in 2004.

    Where are these new Democratic voters coming from? Most of Obama’s primary wins came in what may be seen as the new heartland, a widely dispersed group of fast-growing smaller towns and cities stretching from the Sierra Nevadas to the Appalachians. He did particularly well in college towns as well as those places where high-tech and cutting-edge manufacturing companies have set up shop over the past decade.

    This demographic and political dynamic has been building for years. In 2004, even Kerry came close to winning places such as Wisconsin Rapids, a small city of 17,500 in the central part of the state. Although the area has lost some high-paying blue-collar jobs in the paper industry, it has also attracted a growing number of sophisticated companies such as software firm Renaissance Learning, which employs more than 750 in the area.

    Some of these workers are originally from the area, but many others bring with them tastes and opinions forged in Silicon Valley, Raleigh-Durham or the Massachusetts tech corridor. Their politics may not be Chicago liberal, but people settling in such emerging “virtual suburbs” tend, like their tech-oriented counterparts, toward a pragmatic, mildly liberal politics.

    Other demographic groups are also changing the political complexion of some of these areas. Hispanics, for example, have been moving in large numbers to rural and manufacturing areas in the Great Plains and rural South which, until recently, were dominated by culturally conservative Anglos.

    At the same time, affluent baby boomers from the coasts and large Midwestern cities — some retired, some working via the Internet — are also flowing into some of these places. Surveys of older Americans find far more would prefer to resettle in small towns than in big cities. Some of the fastest growing towns for seniors include Missoula, Mont.; Eugene, Ore.; Moscow, Idaho; and Charlottesville, Va.

    As a result, these areas have become more cosmopolitan in their outlook. It is no longer unusual, for example, to see Indian, Chinese and other foreign-born professionals — or Asian restaurants or edgy coffeehouses. Fargo, once the very definition of staid, now boasts an excellent boutique hotel, a clothing store catering to metro­sexuals and several pricey restaurants.

    These shifts have not escaped the notice of the Obama campaign, which has put 50 campaign workers and 100 volunteer teams in North Dakota, long considered a lock for Republicans in November. Similar deployments are taking place in other rural states.

    Yet it may still be a stretch to see some of these places voting for a big-city liberal like Obama. It’s one thing to support homegrown populist Democrats such as North Dakota’s Sen. Byron Dorgan or Montana Gov. Brian Schweitzer, who have a fine sense of how to negotiate the sensibilities of their constituents on issues of farm subsidies, guns or gay marriage.

    McCain should hope Obama’s Hyde Park intellectualism and liberalism won’t play well beyond more affluent recent migrants and students. McCain may not win as big as President Bush did in 2000 and 2004, but he could hold on to enough rural and small-town voters to keep these states in the Republican column. McCain’s moderate image may hurt with some evangelical voters, but at least outside of the South, this may keep more moderate, younger and recently arrived voters in the fold.

    Finally, the fact that many small towns are doing relatively well may make voters somewhat less likely to bolt the GOP. Few places in the countryside are suffering anything like a Dust Bowl-level catastrophe, although some now worry about a looming decline in commodity prices. And on some issues, such as fossil fuel development, McCain can appeal to constituents of small towns that have been enjoying an energy-fed boom. Pushing American energy development will work well in these areas, although the Arizona senator’s opposition to ethanol subsidies could hurt in others.

    And even in rural places worst hit by the economy — such as traditional, manufacturing-dominated small towns in Indiana, Ohio, the Carolinas and Pennsylvania — Obama has yet to prove himself. In almost all these places, Hillary Rodham Clinton triumphed easily in the primary, usurping the grass-roots populist message. Obama has yet to show that knack.

    Rural and small-town areas have fewer very poor constituents and a greater concentration of middle-income voters than cities, and far fewer wealthy households than cities or suburbs. These mostly white, working-class voters — heavily concentrated in states like Wyoming, West Virginia, the Dakotas, Montana, Maine, Idaho and Kentucky — could be the key to winning the micropolitan and small-town electorate. And these places could prove a critical battleground.

    There are two regions where these voters might matter most. One is the sparsely populated Great Plains states that once represented a solid block of Republican strength. Obama not only has the chance to steal some electoral votes but also could divert McCain’s resources in more traditional battleground states.

    The other is a series of traditional battleground states: Ohio, Missouri and Indiana. If Obama can gain some of the traction Clinton achieved in these states’ small towns and cities, McCain’s chances fade to almost nil.

    Joel Kotkin is a presidential fellow at Chapman University and executive editor of newgeography.com. Mark Schill is an Associate at Praxis Strategy Group in Grand Forks, N.D., and the site’s managing editor.

    Other articles in the Three Geographies Series:
    The Three Geographies
    Urban America: The New Solid South

  • Keeping Kids Downtown – A Philadelphia Approach

    As children return to classes in Philadelphia this week, more than half of the kindergarteners attending three downtown public elementary schools will come from their immediate middle-income neighborhoods. Three private schools that also serve this area, drawing over 70 percent of their enrollment from downtown families, are bursting at the seams. Having doubled and tripled pre-school programs over the last half decade, each is now physically expanding to accommodate the 11,200 children, born to downtown parents between 2000 and 2005. But you don’t need birth or enrollment numbers to see what’s happening; just look for strollers, new toy and book stores, and parents and babysitters in the playgrounds.

    For almost two decades, journalists and academics have been heralding the return of the middle class to the downtown of American cities and their transformative effect on housing, retail and the use of public spaces. But there haven’t been many stories on children because, until recently, there haven’t been many kids downtown. Downtown markets have largely been driven by young, childless professionals and empty-nesters.

    In a detailed look at downtown demographics, Eugenie L. Birch’s “Who Lives Downtown” (The Brookings Institution, November 2005) also noted that the number of new housing units and residents downtown may be welcome, but still represent a quite small phenomena both in absolute and relative regional terms. As with any new product, most downtowns started with what’s easiest: catering to those who value proximity to work and have more interest in theaters and cafes than schools and playgrounds.

    In a typology of 45 central cities, Birch also highlighted five fully-developed downtowns – Boston, Midtown and Lower Manhattan, Chicago, and Philadelphia – which were relatively large (averaging 43,623 households), densely settled (averaging 23 households per acre) and were home to almost half of the nation’s downtown households. These cities share several characteristics: strong downtown employment, well-developed middle class neighborhoods with diverse housing options, and the fact that they’ve been at it awhile – adding households each decade since 1970. Terms like pioneers and early settlers went out of vogue in these cities more than thirty years ago.

    For mayors, business and civic leaders in places just beginning to repopulate downtown, these more developed places suggest an agenda for the coming decade. As cities got cleaner and safer in the 1990s, as employers sought more tech-savvy workers, downtown populations got larger and younger. In 2000, nearly a third of dwellers in the five fully-developed downtowns were between the ages of 25 and 34. It’s become a cliché to note how television programs like “Seinfield” and “Friends” reflected and influenced the attitude about cities among the generation that came of age in the 1990s. Well here’s another truism: when downtowns fill with young professionals who all have been watching “Sex and the City,” someone’s bound to get pregnant.

    The experience in Philadelphia is illustrative. Since the 1960s, the downtown population has been steadily growing. But as families had children, most moved to the suburbs. Some remained for pre-school, but the 2000 census counted 26 percent fewer 5-9 year olds downtown than the number of children under age five. But a citywide, ten-year tax abatement passed in 1997 altered the trend, prompting over 10,000 new units of city center housing and pushing downtown’s population over 90,000. Between 1970 and 2000 the number of 25-34 year-olds also doubled from 15 to 30 percent of downtown’s population.

    While young professionals and empty nesters initially defined the market, a 2006 survey of downtown residents found that 21.6 percent of 35-44 year olds and 22.3 percent of 45-54 year olds had children living with them. After deferring child-rearing for careers in downtown office buildings, hospitals and universities, a growing number were staying in town as they had children. A 2005 survey of 37 downtown day-care centers documented a 43 percent increase in enrollment.

    The state takeover of the Philadelphia school district in 2001 created an opening to capitalize on this trend. Like many big city school districts, the majority of Philadelphia public school students come from disadvantaged families. Underfunded schools were plagued by poor performance, inflexible bureaucracies and union rules. But the new School Reform Commission (SRC) was empowered and funded by the state to make dramatic change. A dynamic new superintendent, Paul Vallas, aggressively pushed diversified management, operating some schools as public, some as charter, contracting others out privately. But all schools were given new resources; principals were empowered to make change; and teachers and students were held equally accountable for improved performance.

    With school test-scores and public image rising, the Center City District (CCD), a business-supported improvement district, partnered with the Philadelphia School District on a downtown schools initiative. Recognizing that the primary mission of the public schools was to provide quality options for families with limited means and limited choice, both the SRC and the CCD saw advantages if public schools could capture a growing share of families who traditionally selected private schools or simply left the city.

    Working with school principals and parent groups, the CCD built websites for the first time for 13 elementary public schools in and adjacent to downtown. A master website, www.CenterCitySchools.com, highlights all public, private, charter and parochial schools that serve downtown and “the opportunity to be more involved in your child’s life through the unique shared experiences that come from working, playing, living and learning right here.” Ads placed in parent-oriented newspapers and civic association newsletters promote the website and school events. The CCD, school district and nearly all the private, parochial and charter schools participated in two well-attended school fairs in the fall of 2005 and 2006 that showcased the educational options available for parents.

    Five years on, the leadership of the school district has changed. But the momentum continues to build as energized parent groups this fall continue to reshape their schools, pushing for improvements to curriculum, arts programs and playgrounds. Demographic trends have provided an opportunity for Philadelphia and for all center cities to reinvent themselves again: this time as places for families and children.

    Paul R. Levy is President and CEO of the Center City District in Philadelphia. Information about the organization and reports on demographic and housing trends can be found on the website www.CenterCityPhila.org.