Category: Economics

  • The Aging of Paradise in Ventura County California

    You could say that Ventura County, just north of Los Angeles, represents what is best about California. Some people believe that its amenities – beaches, gorgeous interior valleys and parks – assure perpetual economic growth for Ventura County and California. They are wrong. There is trouble in paradise.

    Ventura County has changed, and not for the better. It is aging, losing its demographic as well as economic vitality. This represents a relatively new phenomenon, the slow decline of even formerly healthy suburban areas.

    The current recession illustrates the change. In the past Ventura County suffered mild recessions even as the country and the region suffered mightily. The County saw no annual net job losses in the 2001 recession. The early 1990s recession was more painful, but Ventura County did far better than California as a whole.

    All of that has changed with the current recession. Ventura County has recently been losing jobs at a faster pace than California. In 2007, the County lost jobs while California gained jobs.

    The picture is even worse when Ventura County’s economy is compared to the Los Angeles County economy. In 2008, Ventura County’s economy shrank at a rate about five times faster than did Los Angeles’s economy.

    What is going on here? In the past, Ventura County has been buffered by its twin giants, Amgen and Countrywide. Amgen’s Ventura County growth has slowed. Countrywide has done much worse than Amgen, and its demise has been well documented.

    But you can’t blame all of Ventura County’s weakness on Countrywide. It has contributed, but it is not Ventura County’s sole source of economic weakness. The weakness is quite general, spanning the construction sector, non-durable manufacturing, retail trade and other services. Each lost over 1,000 jobs in 2008. By contrast, the finance, insurance, and real estate sectors, where Countrywide resides, lost just fewer than 900 jobs, accounting for about 4 percent of the job losses.

    My sense is the real underlying problem is demographic, and this may not go away even if the economy recovers. One clue is that more people have been leaving Ventura County than moving in from all sources, and this has been happening long enough to be a trend. It reflects still-high housing costs and limited opportunity. It implies a weak future.

    This chart shows that in exactly half of the past 16 years, migration has been negative. That is total migration, not just domestic migration.

    Think about this for a moment. More people are leaving Ventura County than are moving in. That is certainly counter to what has happened in most of the past 150 years.

    Ventura County’s net out migration has impacts beyond its effect on the size of the population. The composition of the county is also changing, away from working age people and families and towards people either close to retirement or already there.

    The above chart compares relative changes, by age cohort, in Ventura County’s population since the 2000 census with changes in the United States population since the 2000 census. The County’s population between 25 and 44 years of age and their children has been collapsing. At the same time, the County’s populations of both young adults and people over 45 have been growing as a percentage of the total population. The bulk of that growth has occurred in the over 55 cohort.

    The migration out of Ventura County has also resulted in changes to the County’s income distribution. The following chart compares changes in the County’s income distribution to changes in the United States income distribution since the 2000 census:

    The comparisons are telling. The County has been losing very-low-income people at a slower pace than has the United States. At the same time, the growth in population with incomes over $100,000 has been spectacular. The local population with incomes between $25,000 and $75,000 has fallen far more rapidly than that of the United States. The County’s population with incomes between $75,000 and $100,000 is relatively unchanged, while that of the United States has shown significant growth.

    People – particularly in the late 20s and early 30s – aren’t leaving Ventura County because amenities have suddenly disappeared. They are leaving because of a deficit in opportunity. Their leaving has consequences. Ventura County’s population is aging more rapidly than it otherwise would. The net result of these demographic changes is that Ventura County’s median real per-capita income is declining, while the County’s median age is rising. Real per-capita personal income has fallen almost $1,000 in only eight years, to $32,718 (Constant 2000 dollars) from $33,797 in 2000.

    Ventura County’s demographic changes can be easily summarized. It is losing its middle class and becoming bi-modal. The young families that provide a community’s vigor and future have been leaving. There is no reason to believe that the trend will reverse itself. Ventura County home prices are still relatively high, while opportunity is declining.

    The County is left with an aging and increasingly wealthy population along with the lower-income people that service the wealthy aged and the very-low-income farm workers. In a sense, it now resembles what we see in many expensive city cores – even if it is on the periphery!

    This creates enormous risks. Most amenities are luxury goods. Poor people don’t invest in luxury goods. Generally, the lower-income population does not have the resources to provide leadership or invest in a community’s future. They have their hands full just taking care of their families, particularly in an expensive place like Ventura County. Their children will likely join the middle class, but in someplace more affordable like Texas, Arizona, or Nevada.

    High concentrations of older people and declining incomes are often associated with deteriorating schools, amenities and increasing crime. The aged wealthy are not in Ventura County to invest in its future. They are there to consume it. They will not invest in the future – particularly if their children and relatives have gone elsewhere.

    Ventura County is not unique. It is fairly representative of Coastal California. Communities like Ventura, Goleta, and San Luis Obispo used to be middle-class communities that valued opportunity. Things are even more extreme in California’s elite playgrounds: Monterey, Malibu, and Santa Barbara. Populations in Monterey and Santa Barbara have actually declined over the past several years. Similar phenomena may be noticeable in other formerly elite suburbs within our most favored metropolitan areas.

    These changes present serious challenges to California’s workers, businesses, and those policy makers who still care about something other than greenhouse gases and public employee pensions. Something needs to be done, and quickly. But the immediate prognosis is less than encouraging. Like Ventura County, California is suffering its worst recession in decades, and policy makers don’t seem to be focusing on policies that may help the area return to its previous status as a region of opportunity.

    Portions of this essay have previously appeared in a UCSB-EFP Ventura County Forecast.

    Bill Watkins, Ph.D. is the Executive Director of the Economic Forecast Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is also a former economist at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington D.C. in the Monetary Affairs Division.

  • Why Homeownership Is Falling – Despite Lower Prices: Look to the Job Market

    By Susanne Trimbath and Juan Montoya

    There’s something about “Housing Affordability” that makes it very popular: Presidents past and present set goals around it. The popularity of this perennial policy goal rests on the feel-good idea that everyone would live in a home that they own if only they could afford it. Owning your own home is declared near and far to be the American Dream.

    Recently, however, it seems that Americans’ aren’t all having the same dream. Despite improving conditions of affordability, home sales continue to decline. Affordability is balanced on a tripod of prices, incomes and interest rates. As incomes become unstable because of mounting job losses, housing falls further out of balance – no change in price or mortgage interest rates will be enough to rebalance the tripod within the next twelve to eighteen months,

    In a new study on Homeownership Affordability we identify two anomalies in the data: home sales are falling as housing affordability is rising; and the rate of homeownership since 2004 has fallen despite the apparent “boom” in housing.

    Rising Affordability with Falling Sales

    In the last three years, the average mortgage interest rate was 6.14%. Such historically low rates should improve affordability compared to, say, the time of the 1990s credit crunch when mortgage rates averaged 9.3%. Leading up to 2007, median income in the US rose by 0.6% and median home prices fell by 3.1% – also a positive indicator for affordability. The mortgage payment to income ratio at the median has fallen to about 23%. Compared to 32% in 2002 and even 40% in 1988, just before the 1990s credit crunch, this should be a very positive indicator for homeowner affordability. Yet, new home sales have plummeted from a rate of about 1.4 million per year in the summer of 2005 to less than 500,000 by the end of 2008.

    In 2007, for every 1% improvement in affordability, home prices fell by 2%. There clearly has been a breakdown in the fundamental relationship between supply and demand. Why? It appears potential buyers are concerned that homes are over-priced and, worse yet, that home price declines will increase in the future. There are indications that some households think that homes are over-priced regardless of affordability and, furthermore, not everyone who can afford a home is interested in buying one. Some communities, some jobs and some lifestyles are better suited to renting.

    Ownership Policies with Falling Ownership

    All this has occurred in the face of conscious federal policy. Expanding homeownership opportunities, especially for minorities, was a fundamental aim of the Bush Administration’s housing policy – one strongly supported by Democrats in Congress. In June 2002, HUD announced a new goal to increase minority homeownership by 5.5 million by the end 2010. Hispanics were the only minorities to have clear gains in homeownership through 2008: a 4.1 percentage point increase compared to the end of the last decade. The gains in homeownership for black Americans was about the same as for the nation as a whole. Yet the ownership rate for the nation as a whole declined by almost 1 percent during the more recent “housing bust” years.

    Some regions saw bigger losses in homeownership than others, especially those outside the urban areas and particularly in the Midwest.

    Where do we go from here?

    We believe the analytical focus needs to shift to employment when analyzing housing for individual states, regions or cities. The accompanying table shows where, at the state level, the workforce is shrinking as unemployment is rising. These are the areas, much like Southern California at the end of the Cold War or Houston after the 1980s bust in oil prices, that will suffer potentially devastating drops in home prices as a result of forced sales by departing labor.

    Supply, demand and pricing, the cost of financing, household income and home prices – all are critical factors in the equation of homeownership. But more than anything we believe that mounting job losses, in addition to a declining stock market, will now play the critical role. Over time, the current credit crisis will not only make funds more scarce – which must eventually drive up the price of credit – but also drive up the risk premium demanded by lenders. Growing job uncertainty will increase the price of credit even further.

    These factors alone will negatively impact affordability in the future. Keeping mortgage rates artificially low (for example, as the Federal Reserve buys up mortgage-backed securities as proposed in Congress) will create upward pressure on prices, which in turn will hurt affordability. Additionally, we see continued imbalances in the supply-demand equation as foreclosures add inventory to the market.

    In the coming 12 to 18 months, we believe that interest rates will rise and incomes will, at best, remain flat in the face of the global recession. More importantly, as job losses mount, “affordability” will be less important and “maintainability” – the ability of homeowners to keep their homes in the face of unemployment – will emerge as a major factor. In the meantime, housing affordability will hang precariously out of balance due to falling incomes and decreasing jobs as well as surging real interest rates.

    State Change in Total Workforce and Unemployed
    State
    %change in number of workforce
    %change in number of unemployed
    Unemployment rate as of Dec. 2008
    Michigan -1.9% 39.7% 10.6%
    Rhode Island -1.8% 88.1% 10.0%
    Alabama -1.8% 75.3% 6.7%
    Illinois -1.5% 40.3% 7.6%
    West Virginia -1.3% 4.6% 4.9%
    Mississippi -1.1% 25.6% 8.0%
    Missouri -0.8% 37.6% 7.3%
    Tennessee -0.4% 59.4% 7.9%
    Ohio -0.3% 33.8% 7.8%
    Arkansas -0.1% 12.7% 6.2%
    New Hampshire -0.1% 33.6% 4.6%
    Utah -0.1% 51.8% 4.3%
    Delaware 0.0% 75.3% 6.2%
    Wisconsin 0.1% 27.8% 6.2%
    Maryland 0.1% 63.4% 5.8%
    Kentucky 0.3% 48.4% 7.8%
    Iowa 0.3% 20.7% 4.6%
    Massachusetts 0.4% 61.1% 6.9%
    Idaho 0.4% 142.6% 6.4%
    Colorado 0.4% 53.8% 6.1%
    Georgia 0.5% 78.3% 8.1%
    Montana 0.5% 68.9% 5.4%
    Maine 0.6% 44.5% 7.0%
    Minnesota 0.6% 47.6% 6.9%
    South Dakota 0.6% 35.4% 3.9%
    North Carolina 0.7% 87.4% 8.7%
    Indiana 0.7% 86.0% 8.2%
    Connecticut 0.7% 48.0% 7.1%
    Florida 0.8% 80.9% 8.1%
    New York 1.0% 51.9% 7.0%
    North Dakota 1.0% 8.5% 3.5%
    Vermont 1.1% 66.9% 6.4%
    Nebraska 1.2% 46.0% 4.0%
    Wyoming 1.3% 12.4% 3.4%
    New York City 1.4% 47.2% 7.4%
    Kansas 1.5% 27.4% 5.2%
    South Carolina 1.6% 55.3% 9.5%
    California 1.8% 60.4% 9.3%
    Virginia 1.8% 69.2% 5.4%
    New Jersey 1.9% 72.8% 7.1%
    Hawaii 2.0% 82.9% 5.5%
    Oklahoma 2.1% 21.7% 4.9%
    Louisiana 2.2% 52.6% 5.9%
    New Mexico 2.2% 56.2% 4.9%
    Alaska 2.4% 22.4% 7.5%
    Pennsylvania 2.4% 55.7% 6.7%
    Washington 2.6% 60.0% 7.1%
    Texas 2.6% 45.9% 6.0%
    Oregon 2.8% 70.4% 9.0%
    Arizona 3.4% 72.0% 6.9%
    Nevada 4.9% 84.6% 9.1%
    Average 0.8% 53.2% 6.7%
    Median 0.7% 52.6% 6.9%

    Dr. Trimbath is a former manager of depository trust and clearing corporations in San Francisco and New York. She is co-author of Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets (Oxford University Press, 2003), a review of the post-Drexel world of non-investment grade bond markets. Dr. Trimbath is also co-editor of and a contributor to The Savings and Loan Crisis: Lessons from a Regulatory Failure (Kluwer Academic Press, 2004)

    Mr. Montoya obtained his MBA from Babson College (Wellesley, MA) and is a former research analyst at the Milken Institute (Santa Monica, CA) where he coauthored Housing Affordability in Three Dimensions with Dr. Trimbath. He currently works in the foodservice industry.

  • The Panic of 2008: How Bad Is It?

    Just how bad is the current economic downturn? It is frequently claimed that the crash of 2008 is the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. There is plenty of reason to accept this characterization, though we clearly are not suffering the widespread hardship of the Depression era. Looking principally at historical household wealth data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, summarized in our Value of Household Residences, Stocks & Mutual Funds: 1952-2008, we can conclude it’s pretty bad, but nothing yet like the early 1930s.

    But this Panic of 2008 is no picnic. And in some key areas, notably housing, it could be even worse than what was experienced in the Great Depression.

    Housing: It all started with the housing bubble that saw prices in some markets rise to unheard of levels, principally in California, Florida, Phoenix, Las Vegas and the Washington, DC area. Mortgage lenders, unable to withstand the intensity of losses in these markets caused by declining prices, collapsed like a house of cards. This precipitated the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on Meltdown Monday (September 15, 2008) and a far broader economic crisis since that time.

    Before the bubble, housing had been a stable store of wealth (equity or savings) for Americans. According to federal data, the value of the US owned housing stock increased in every year since 1935. The bursting of the housing bubble, however, brought declines in both 2007 and 2008, the longest period of housing value decline since between 1929 and 1933. The value of the housing stock was down 20 percent from its peak at the end of 2008. In some markets the losses amounted to more than double this amount. By comparison, the 1929 to 1933 house value decline was 27 percent. However, only one Great Depression year (1932) had a larger single-year decrease than 2008.

    Indeed, between 1952 and 2006, the value of the housing stock never declined for more than a three month period. The bubble changed all that. The value of the housing stock has now fallen eight straight quarters. An investment that has been safe for most middle class Americans – the house in the suburbs – suddenly experienced the price volatility usually associated with the stock market, as is indicated in the chart below.

    The resulting losses have been substantial. By the end of 2008, the value of the housing stock has fallen $4.5 trillion. In Phase I of the housing downturn, before Meltdown Monday, the largest losses were concentrated in the markets with the biggest “bubbles,”. But since that time the market has entered a Phase II decline, while a more general decline has characterized housing markets around the country in the fourth quarter of 2008. The decline continues.

    California, the largest of all the states, has been particularly hard hit. New data for both the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas show price drops of approximately 10 percent in January, 2009 alone, as prices fall like the value of a tin-pot dictatorship’s currency. This decline, it should be noted, has spread from the outer ring of these areas – places like the much maligned Inland Empire region and the Central Valley – into the formerly more stable, and established, areas closer to the larger urban cores, which some imagined would be safe from such declines.

    Sadly, there may well be some time before house price stability can be achieved. To restore the historic relationship between house prices and household incomes to a Median Multiple (median house price divided by median household income) of 3.0 would require another $3 trillion in losses, equating to a more than 15 percent additional loss. Losses are likely to be greater, however, not only in the “ground zero” markets of California and Florida but also other hugely over-valued markets, such as Portland, Seattle, New York and Boston. Of course, these are not normal times, and an intransigent economic downturn could lead to even lower house values than the historical norm would suggest.

    Stocks and Mutual Funds: As noted above, stocks and mutual funds have been inherently more volatile than housing values. According to Federal Reserve data, the value of these holdings fell 24 percent over the year ended September 30. Based upon later data from the World Federation of Exchanges, we estimate that the value declined sharply after September 15, and at December 31 stood at 45 percent below the peak.

    The household value of stocks and mutual funds has declined for five consecutive quarters, as of December 2008. There was a more sustained drop over six quarters in 1969-1970, although the decline in value was less than the present loss, at 37 percent. A larger decline (47 percent) was associated with the four quarter decline of 1973-1974. Comparable data is not available for household stocks and mutual fund holdings before 1952. The less complete data available indicates that the gross value of common and preferred stocks fell 45 percent from 1929 to 1933. As late as 1939, a decade after the crash, the loss had risen to 46 percent, indicating both the depth and length of the Great Depression.

    The present downturn seems on course at a minimum to break the post-depression loss record with an overall decline at 55 percent as of February 20. This would correspond to a household loss of $8 trillion from the peak.

    Consumer Confidence: The Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index reached an all time low of 25.0 in February, down a full one-third in a month. Even with its gasoline rationing, the mid-1970s downturn saw a minimum Consumer Confidence Index of 43.2. Normal would be 100; as late as August of 2007, consumer confidence was above 100. Consumer confidence is important. Where it is low, as it is today, there is fear and even people with financial resources are disinclined to spend. Confidence is a major contributor to economic downturns, which is why they used to be called “panics.” Restoring confidence is a requirement for recovery.

    Government Confidence: If there were a federal government index of confidence, it would probably be near zero. This is demonstrated by the trillions that both parties in Washington have or intend to throw at banks, private companies and distressed home owners to stop the downturn. Never since the Great Depression have things become so bad that Washington has opened taxpayer’s checkbooks for massive financial bailouts.

    How Much Wealth has been Lost: The net worth of all US households peaked at $64.6 trillion in the third quarter of 2007, according to the Federal Reserve Board. Since that time, it seems likely that the housing, stock and mutual fund losses by the nation’s households could be as high as $12 trillion – $4 trillion in housing and $8 trillion in stocks and mutual funds. This is a major loss and is unlikely to be recovered soon. Yet it makes sense to consider these losses in context. Unemployment is far lower than in the 1930s, when it reached 25 percent, and the Dust Bowl is not emptying into California (indeed, more than 1,000,000 people have migrated from California to other states this decade).

    Born Yesterday Jeremiahs: It is fashionable to suggest that the current economic crisis is the result of over-consumption and an unsustainable lifestyle. The narrative goes that the supposed excesses of the 1980s and 1990s have finally caught up with us. In fact, however, even with the huge losses, the net worth of the average household is no lower than in 2003 and stands at 70 percent above the 1980 figure (inflation adjusted). This may be a surprise to “born yesterday” economic analysts.

    The reality is that the country achieved astounding economic and social progress since World War II. The reality remains that even after the losses we are not, objectively speaking, experiencing Depression-like conditions. Critically, the answer to the question, “Are you better off today?” in 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and even 2000 is “yes”. This is a critical difference with the situation in the 1930s when the country overall was much poorer, and far less able to withstand such punishing losses.

    Beware the Panglossians: Even so, it seems premature to predict that the economy will turn around soon. Some Panglossian analysts predict recovery later in the year or in 2010 seem likely to miss the mark by years. Remember analysts – particularly those tied to both the real estate and stock sectors – who have discredited themselves with their past cheerleading. In addition, the international breadth and depth of this crisis cannot possibly be fully comprehended at this time. Last week the Federal Reserve predicted a declining economy over the next year.

    And even when the recovery starts, it is likely to be slow because of the public debt run up to stop the bleeding. When the recovery begins, the nation and the world will have to repay the many trillions in bailouts one way or the other. This can take the form of higher taxes, inflation, rising real interest rates or, if you can imagine, all three.

    How Bad Is It? Bad Enough. The present downturn is not as serious as the Great Depression. Nonetheless, the Panic of 2008 is without question, the most serious economic downturn since the Great Depression. The real question is whether the government will react as ineffectively as it did back then, and prolong the downturn well into the next decade.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.

  • The Decline of Los Angeles

    Next week, Antonio Villaraigosa will be overwhelmingly re-elected mayor of Los Angeles. Do not, however, take the size of his margin – he faces no significant opposition – as evidence that all is well in the city of angels.

    Whatever His Honor says to the media, the sad reality remains that Los Angeles has fallen into a serious secular decline. This constitutes one of the most rapid – and largely unnecessary – municipal reversals in fortune in American urban history.

    A century ago, when L.A. had barely 100,000 souls, railway magnate Henry Huntington predicted that the place was “destined to become the most important city in this country, if not the world.” Long run by ambitious, often ruthless boosters, the city lured waves of newcomers with its pro-business climate, perfect weather and spectacular topography.

    These newcomers – first largely from the Midwest and East Coast, and then from around the world – energized L.A. into an unmatched hub of innovation and economic diversity.

    As a result, L.A. surged toward civic greatness. By the end of the 20th century, it stood not only as the epicenter for the world’s entertainment industry, but also North America’s largest port, garment manufacturer and industrial center. The region also spawned two important presidents – Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan – and nurtured a host of political and social movements spanning the ideological spectrum.

    Now L.A. seems to be fading rapidly toward irrelevancy. Its economy has tanked faster than that of the nation, with unemployment now close to 10%. The port appears in decline, the roads in awful shape and the once potent industrial base continues to shrink.

    Job growth in the area, notes a forecast by the University of California at Santa Barbara, dropped 0.6% last year and is expected to plunge far more rapidly this year. Roughly one-fifth of the population depends on public assistance or benefits to survive.

    Once a primary destination for Americans, L.A. – along with places like Detroit, New York and Chicago – now suffers among the highest rates of out-migration in the country. Particularly hard hit has been its base of middle-class families, which continues to shrink. This is painfully evident in places like the San Fernando Valley, where I live, long a middle-class outpost for L.A., much like Queens and Staten Island are for New York.

    In such a context, Villaraigosa’s upcoming coronation seems hard to comprehend. By most accounts, he has been at best a mediocre mayor, with few real accomplishments besides keeping police chief Bill Bratton, a man appointed by his predecessor. So far, Bratton has managed to keep the lid on crime, a testament both to his skills and to the demographic aging of much of the city.

    Besides this, virtually every major initiative from Villaraigosa has been a dismal failure; from a poorly executed program to plant more trees to a subsidized drive to refashion downtown Los Angeles into a mini-Manhattan. Instead of reforming a generally miserable business climate, Villaraigosa has fixated on fostering “elegant density” through massive new residential construction. This gambit has failed miserably, with downtown property values plunging at least 35% since their peak. Many “luxury” condominiums there, as well as elsewhere in the city, remain largely unoccupied or have turned into rentals.

    More recently the mayor has presided over a widely ridiculed scheme to hand over the solar business in Los Angeles to a city agency, the Department of Water and Power (DWP), whose workers are among the best paid and most coddled of any municipal agency anywhere. Most solar plans by utilities focus more on competitive bidding by outside contractors. Villaraigosa’s plan, which recent estimates suggests will cost L.A. ratepayers upward of $3.6 billion, would grant a powerful, well-heeled union control of the city’s solar program.

    This has occurred despite years of overruns on previous DWP “clean energy” projects. Not surprisingly, the plan was widely blasted – by the city’s largest newspaper, the rapidly shrinking Los Angeles Times, the feistier LA Weekly and the last independent voice at City Hall, outgoing City Controller Laura Chick, who proclaimed that the whole scheme “stinks.” Yet despite the criticism, a ballot measure endorsing the plan – opponents have little money to stop it – seems likely to be approved next week.

    With his firm grip on political power, Villaraigosa likes to think of himself as a West Coast version of New York’s Michael Bloomberg or Chicago’s Richard Daley. Yet at least they have demonstrated a modicum of seriousness about the job.

    In contrast, Villaraigosa, according to a devastating recent report in the LA Weekly, spends remarkably little time – about 11% – actually doing his job. The bulk of his 16-hour or so days are spent politicking, preening for the cameras and in other forms of relentless self-promotion.

    So how is this person about to be re-elected with only token opposition? Rick Caruso, the developer of luxury shopping center The Grove and one of L.A.’s last private sector power brokers, ascribes this to a growing sense of powerlessness, even among the city’s most important business leaders.

    “People feel it’s kind of hopeless. It’s a dysfunctional city,” Caruso, who once considered a run against Villaraigosa, told me the other day. “They don’t think there’s anything to do.”

    Certainly, odds against changing the current political system seem long to an extreme. The once-powerful business community has devolved into a weak plaintive lobby who rarely challenge our homegrown Putin or his allies in our municipal Duma.

    Of course, entrepreneurial Angelenos still find opportunities, but largely by working at home or in one of the city’s surrounding communities. They tend to flock to locales like Ontario, Burbank, Glendale or Culver City, all of which, according to the recent Kosmont-Rose Institute Cost of Doing Business Survey, are less expensive and easier to do business in than L.A.

    “It’s extremely difficult to do business in Los Angeles,” observes Eastside retail developer Jose de Jesus Legaspi. “The regulations are difficult to manage. … Everyone has to kiss the rings of the [City Hall politicians].”

    Legaspi, like many here, still regards Southern California as an appealing place to work, but takes pains to avoid anything within the purview of City Hall. As the economy recovers, I would bet the smaller cities around L.A. and even the hard-hit periphery rebounds first.

    The only immediate chance of relief for us Angelenos is if Villaraigosa (who will soon face term limits) takes off to run for governor. As the sole southern Californian and Latino candidate, he could prevail in a crowded Democratic primary. But the idea of this empty suit running the once great state of California – not exactly a paragon of good governance – may be enough to push even more people to the exits or, at very least, think about taking a very strong sedative.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Death of the California Dream

    For decades, California has epitomized America’s economic strengths: technological excellence, artistic creativity, agricultural fecundity and an intrepid entrepreneurial spirit. Yet lately California has projected a grimmer vision of a politically divided, economically stagnant state. Last week its legislature cut a deal to close its $42 billion budget deficit, but its larger problems remain.

    California has returned from the dead before, most recently in the mid-1990s. But the odds that the Golden State can reinvent itself again seem long. The buffoonish current governor and a legislature divided between hysterical greens, public-employee lackeys and Neanderthal Republicans have turned the state into a fiscal laughingstock. Meanwhile, more of its middle class migrates out while a large and undereducated underclass (much of it Latino) faces dim prospects. It sometimes seems the people running the state have little feel for the very things that constitute its essence — and could allow California to reinvent itself, and the American future, once again.

    The facts at hand are pretty dreary. California entered the recession early last year, according to the Forecast Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and is expected to lag behind the nation well into 2011. Unemployment stands at roughly 10 percent, ahead only of Rust Belt basket cases like Michigan and East Coast calamity Rhode Island. Not surprisingly, people are fleeing this mounting disaster. Net outmigration has been growing every year since about 2003 and should reach well over 200,000 by 2011. This outflow would be far greater, notes demographer Wendell Cox, if not for the fact that many residents can’t sell their homes and are essentially held prisoner by their mortgages.

    For Californians, this recession has been driven by different elements than the early-1990s downturn, which was largely caused by external forces. The end of the Cold War stripped away hundreds of thousands of well-paid defense-related jobs. Meanwhile, the Japanese economy went into a tailspin, leading to a massive disinvestment here. In South L.A., the huge employment losses helped create the conditions conducive to social unrest. The 1992 Rodney King verdict may have provided the match, but the kindling was dry and plentiful.

    This time around, the recession feels like a self-inflicted wound, the result of “bubble dependency.” First came the dotcom bubble, centered largely in the Bay Area. The fortunes made there created an enormous surge in wealth, but by 2001 that bust had punched a huge hole in the California budget. Voters, disgusted by the legislature’s inability to cope with the crisis, recalled the governor, Gray Davis, and replaced him with a megastar B-grade actor from Austria.

    Yet almost as soon as the Internet bubble had evaporated, a new one emerged in housing. As prices soared in coastal enclaves, people fled to the periphery, often buying homes far from traditional suburban job centers. At first, it seemed like a miraculous development: people cheered as their home’s “value” increased 20 percent annually. But even against the backdrop of the national housing bubble, California soon became home to gargantuan imbalances between incomes and property prices. The state was also home to such mortgage hawkers as New Century Financial Corp., Countrywide and IndyMac. For a time the whole California economy seemed to revolve around real-estate speculation, with upwards of 50 percent of all new jobs coming from growth in fields like real estate, construction and mortgage brokering.

    As a result, when the housing bubble burst, the state’s huge real-estate economy evaporated almost overnight. Both parties in the legislature and the governor failed miserably to anticipate the impending fiscal deluge they should have known was all but inevitable.

    To many longtime California observers, the inability of the political, business and academic elites to adequately anticipate and address the state’s persistent problems has been a source of consternation and wonderment. In my view, the key to understanding California’s precipitous decline transcends terms like liberal or conservative, Democratic and Republican. The real culprit lies in the politics of narcissism.

    California, like any gorgeously endowed person, has a natural inclination toward self-absorption. It has always been a place of unsurpassed splendor; it has inspired and attracted writers, artists, dreamers, savants and philosophers. That’s especially true of the Bay Area—ground zero for California narcissism and arguably the most attractive urban expanse on the continent; Neil Morgan in 1960 described San Francisco as “the narcissus of the West,” a place whose fundamental asset was first its own beauty, followed by its own culture of self-regard.

    At first this high self-regard inspired some remarkable public achievements. California rebuilt San Francisco from the ashes of the great 1906 fire, and constructed in Los Angeles the world’s most far-reaching transit system. These achievements reached a pinnacle under Gov. Pat Brown, who in the 1960s oversaw the expansion of the freeways, the construction of new university, state- and community-college campuses, and the creation of water projects that allowed farming in dry but fertile landscapes.

    Yet success also spoiled the state, incubating an ever more inward-looking form of narcissism. Even as the middle class enjoyed “the good life” — high-paying jobs, single-family homes (often with pools), vacations at the beach — there was a growing, palpable sense of threats from rising taxes, a restless youth population and a growing nonwhite demographic. One early expression of this was the late-1970s antitax movement led by Howard Jarvis. The rising cost of government was placing too much of a burden on middle-class homeowners, and the legislature refused to address the problem with reasonable reforms. The result, however, was unreasonable reform, with new and inflexible limits on property and income taxes that made holding the budget together far more difficult.

    Middle-class Californians also began to feel inundated by a racial tide. This was not totally based on prejudice; Californians seemed to accept legal immigration. But millions of undocumented newcomers provoked fear that there were no limits on how many people would move into the state, filling emergency rooms with the uninsured and crowding schools with children whose parents neither spoke English nor had the time to prepare their children for school. By 1994, under Gov. Pete Wilson, the anti-immigrant narcissism fueled Proposition 187. It was now OK to deny school and medical services to people because, at the end, they looked different.

    Today the politics of narcissism is most evident among “progressives.” Although the Republicans can still block massive tax increases, the predominant force in California politics lies with two groups — the gentry liberals and the public sector. The public-sector unions, once relatively poorly paid, now enjoy wages and benefits unavailable to most middle-class Californians, and do so with little regard to the fiscal and overall economic impact. Currently barely 3 percent of the state budget goes to building roads or water systems, compared with nearly 20 percent in the Pat Brown era; instead we’re funding gilt-edged pensions and lifetime guaranteed health care. It’s often a case of I’m all right, Jack — and the hell with everyone else.

    The most recent ascendant group are the gentry liberals, whose base lies in the priciest precincts of San Francisco, the Silicon Valley and the west side of Los Angeles. Gentry liberalism reflects the narcissistic values of successful boomers and their offspring; their politics are all about them. In the past this was tied as much to cultural issues, like gay rights (itself a noble cause) and public support for the arts. More recently, the dominant issue revolves around environmentalism.

    Green politics came early to California and for understandable reasons: protecting the resources and beauty of the nation’s loveliest landscapes. Yet in recent years, the green agenda has expanded well beyond that of the old conservationists like Theodore Roosevelt, who battled to preserve wilderness but also cared deeply about boosting productivity and living standards for the working classes. In contrast, the modern environmental movement often adopts a largely misanthropic view of humans as a “cancer” that needs to be contained. By their very nature, the greens tend to regard growth as an unalloyed evil, gobbling up resources and spewing planet-heating greenhouse gases.

    You can see the effects of the gentry’s green politics up close in places like the Salinas Valley, a lovely agricultural region south of San Jose. As community leaders there have tried to construct policies to create new higher-wage jobs in the area (a project on which I’ve worked as a consultant), local progressives — largely wealthy people living on the Monterey coast — have opposed, for example, the expansion of wineries that might bring new jobs to a predominantly Latino area with persistent double-digit unemployment. As one winegrower told me last year: “They don’t want a facility that interferes with their viewshed.” For such people, the crusade against global warming makes a convenient foil in arguing against anything that might bring industrial or any other kind of middle-wage growth to the state. Greens here often speak movingly about the earth — but also about their personal redemption. They have engaged a legal and regulatory process that provides the wealthy and their progeny an opportunity to act out their desire to “make a difference” — often without real concern for the outcome. Environmentalism becomes a theater in which the privileged act out their narcissism.

    It’s even more disturbing that many of the primary apostles of this kind of politics are themselves wealthy high-livers like Hollywood magnates, Silicon Valley billionaires and well-heeled politicians like Arnold Schwarzenegger and Jerry Brown. They might imagine that driving a Prius or blocking a new water system or new suburban housing development serves the planet, but this usually comes at no cost to themselves or their lifestyles.

    The best great hope for California’s future does not lie with the narcissists of left or right but with the newcomers, largely from abroad. These groups still appreciate the nation of opportunity and aspire to make the California — and American — Dream their own.

    Of course, companies like Google and industries like Hollywood remain critical components, but both Silicon Valley and the entertainment complex are now mature, and increasingly dominated by people with access to money or the most elite educations. Neither is likely to produce large numbers of new jobs, particularly for working- and middle-class Californians.

    In contrast, the newcomers, who often lack both money and education, continue in the hierarchy-breaking tradition that made California great in the first place. Many of them live and build their businesses not in places like San Francisco or West L.A., but in the increasingly multicultural suburbs on the periphery, places like the San Gabriel Valley, Riverside and Cupertino. Immigrants played a similar role in the recovery from the early-1990s doldrums. In the ’90s, for example, the number of Latino-owned businesses already was expanding at four times the rate of Anglo ones, growing from 177,000 to 440,000. Today we see signs of much the same thing, though it often involves immigrants from the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, Mexico or South Korea. One developer, Alethea Hsu, just opened a new shopping center in the San Gabriel Valley this January — and it’s fully leased. “We have a great trust in the future,” says the Cornell-trained physician.

    You see some of the same thing among other California immigrants. More than three decades ago the Cardenas family started slaughtering and selling pigs grown on their two-acre farm near Corona. From there, Jesús Sr. and his wife, Luz, expanded. “We would shoot the hogs through the head and sell them off the truck,” says José, their son. “We’d sell the meat to people who liked it fresh: Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans and Hispanics…We would sell to anyone.” Their first store, predominantly a carnicería, or meat shop, took advantage of the soaring Latino population. By 2008, they had 20 stores with more than $400 million in sales. In 2005 they started to produce Mexican food, including some inspired by Luz’s recipes to distribute through such chains as Costco. Mexican food, notes Jesús Jr., is no longer a niche. “It’s a crossover product now.”

    Despite the current mess in Sacramento, this suggests some hope for the future. Perhaps the gubernatorial candidacy of Silicon Valley folks like former eBay CEO Meg Whitman (a Republican), or her former eBay employee Steve Wesley (a Democrat), could bring some degree of competence and common sense to the farce now taking place in Sacramento. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, who’s said to be considering the race, would also be preferable to a green zealot like Jerry Brown or empty suits like Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa or San Francisco’s Gavin Newsom.

    But if I am looking for hope and inspiration, for California or the country, I would look first and foremost at people like the Cardenas family. They create jobs for people who didn’t go to Stanford or whose parents lack a trust fund. They constitute what any place needs to survive: risk takers who are self-confident but rarely selfish. These are people who look at the future, not in the mirror.

    This article originally appeared at Newsweek.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Deconstructing the Meltdown, National Job Losses by Sector

    Here’s a look at national employment change in the United States over the past 10 years. Nonfarm employment peaked in the US in December of 2007 at 138.1 million jobs. After a record loss of 598,000 jobs in the last month, we’re now at 134.5 million. Thats a loss of more than 3.5 million jobs over the past year. Conveniently, 3.5 million jobs is exactly what Obama administration economists plan to create or save with the stimulus package.

    If we cut it by sector, recent job losses in manufacturing, construction, and professional and business services are striking. Over this same time period, we’ve added roughly 4.5 million jobs in education and health and another 2.5 million in government jobs. Perhaps the president is planning to hire those 3.5 million new employees directly?

    If we index each sector back to January 1999, we can begin to see the trajectory of each industry over time. For this chart, the height of each line at a given point of time indicates percent growth over the January 1999 level. The heavy black line shows growth for all sectors.

    From here, the dot-com bust is obvious, as is the fact that the information sector has not recovered to pre-2000 levels. Information may be even more trouble in the short term, as that sector includes media and publishing.

    The construction employment boom began in mid 2003 and eventually reached more that a 20% premium over 1999 before falling back to mid 2003 levels last month.

    Manufacturing has fallen precipitously with this bust, we are now seeing marked declines in other goods-supporting industries: wholesale trade and transportation and warehousing.

    Again, institutional sectors of Government (up 12%) and eds and meds (up 30%) lead the way. The other fastest growing sector since 1999? Leisure and hospitality. Staycation, anyone?

  • Oregon Fail: With Hard Times Ahead for Business and Real Estate, It’s Time to Look Small

    There is something about Oregon that ignites something close to poetic inspiration, even among the most level-headed types. When I asked Hank Hoell recently about the state, he waxed on about hiking the spectacular Cascades, the dreamy coastal towns and the rich farmlands of the green Willamette Valley.

    “Oregon,” enthused Hoell, president of LibertyBank, the state’s largest privately owned bank, from his office in Eugene, “is America’s best-kept secret. If quality of life matters at all, Oregon has it in spades. It is as good as it gets. It’s just superb.”

    As developer Shelly Klapper, a rare skeptic in the Beaver State, reminded me: “This is a state that buys its own hype.”

    Hype or not, however, Oregon is hurting – something that’s clear to even the most self-respecting narcissist. Over the past year, Oregon’s economy has fallen off a cliff just about as fast as any state in the union.

    A year ago, things seemed very different. Sunbelt boom states like California, Arizona and Nevada were already heading into deep recession, but green Oregon seemed oddly golden. Both its small cites and one big town, Portland, were outperforming the national norms. Oregonians saw their state as better – not only in terms of green and good, but also in terms of basic job growth.

    But since last winter, Oregon’s unemployment rate has soared from barely 5.5% to well over 8%, the sixth worst in the nation. Indeed, according to a recent projection by the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB), Oregon’s jobless rate could reach close to 10% by the end of the year.

    Well into 2010, Oregon’s overall economy will shrink more rapidly than the nation’s as a whole, notes UCSB forecaster Bill Watkins. He traces a sharp downturn there to many factors, including one of the toughest regulatory regimes in North America.

    In tough times, companies generally expand in localities that are friendly to commerce – say, states like Texas or nearby Idaho. Few would rate Oregon highly in that regard.

    “Oregon is mostly a place that focuses on the enjoyment of its space, and that makes [it] very vulnerable in these conditions,” Watkins says.

    The other big problem has to do with a lack of economic diversity. Oregon has been through tough times before. For much of its history, the state’s economy depended largely on harvesting its vast forests. Then, in the 1980s, the state developed a green bug, and decided it shouldn’t chop down Mother Nature for a living.

    In the ensuing decade, Oregon pioneered tough land-use regulations, curbing industries that relied on forest products and declaring war on suburban sprawl. Its main city, Portland, became the poster child of the “smart growth” movement by forcing up density, building an extensive light-rail system and restoring its urban core.

    Although widely praised, these stringent regulations also drove up land prices and, ironically, prompted many middle-class residents to move away, including across the border into Washington. Businesses, rather than cluster in the state’s core, continued to migrate to the outer rings; in the relatively healthy year of 2005, for example, barely 10% of Portland’s office space growth took place in the central district.

    “We give lip service to the economy here,” admits Klapper, a longtime Portland entrepreneur and a former official with the Port of Portland. “But, really, business is not a priority here.”

    For a while, Klapper notes, the tech sector seemed to offer the solution. In the ’80s and ’90s, chip makers fleeing even higher costs in California flooded into Oregon, which was proudly dubbed the “Silicon Forest.” In an unusual move, the state provided tax breaks to the chip makers, which helped. The state’s suburbs also proved attractive to tech workers who could afford a far better quality of life there, in terms of schools and housing, than they could in the Golden State.

    But as regulations tightened and costs to businesses and families increased, even the high-tech industry began to fade. Always a political bellwether state, Oregon has moved inexorably left, increasingly dominated by both its public sector and the particularly strong green movement. Semiconductor expansion soon started to go south – or in this case, further east (to Idaho) or across the Pacific to Asia.

    Only one thing remained to drive the economy: housing. A torrent of Californians were heading north – cashing out of the overpriced Bay Area, Sacramento and Los Angeles – and buying new homes in Oregon. Some sophistos sashayed their way into trendy places like Portland’s Pearl District, but many others looked to the charming smaller towns of the Willamette Valley and central Oregon.

    “When all else failed, it was people moving here that kept us going,” says Klapper, who was a major investor in the Pearl District renaissance. “California became our biggest industry.”

    This dependence turned into a debilitating addiction. When in 2007, the great California housing bubble collapsed, the inflow of people and dollars dropped off. Meanwhile, the remnants of lumber industry fell victim to the housing bust.

    Nowhere are the effects of this clearer than in Bend, a spectacular town of 75,000 located amid volcanic peaks in the center of the state. Californians had considered Bend a favorite spot for second homes and relocation. About a year ago, notes real estate appraiser Steve Pistole, prices were rising 2% a month, while those in Portland were “only” rising 8% a year.

    But to visit Bend now is to be in the eye of the housing hurricane, with nearly deserted housing tracts, woefully empty hotels and residential second-home developments. Unemployment in the housing arena, according to the UCSB, could reach 15% next year.

    We can also expect a further slide in housing prices. Oregon’s bubble, notes analyst Wendell Cox, inflated later than California’s, so prices, which have dropped more than 10% in the last year, could fall by that much or more in the next.

    Yet despite all these problems, many Oregonians remain optimistic. Some of this seems, at least fundamentally, a reflection of ideology. The inevitable huge surge of “green jobs” promised by the Obama administration has long been an article of faith in the state; it seems something like a story we’d tell our children to put them to sleep. State officials, for example, speak wistfully of replacing a recently shuttered Korean-owned Hynix chip plant with a facility to make solar panels.

    The bad news is this: 49 other states – some of which don’t pose such strong regulatory challenges – also hope to bring home some of these green jobs. So if business logic applies, the new factories that manufacture wind turbines, propellers or solar panels will end up in states like North Dakota or Texas, which have been the most successful, thus far, at attracting other manufacturing jobs.

    So what trail should Oregon blaze now? Pistole, the real estate appraiser, says it may be time to think small. Places like Bend, he notes, already attract former Silicon Valley veterans who like living close to trout streams, hiking trails and golf courses.

    “There is no magic bullet for Oregon,” says Pistole, who himself moved from California just three years ago. “But there could be lots of onesies, twosies, mom-and-pops. People still want to live here. We have to make it synergistic to live where you want and still make money. That’s the way we need to go.”

    Some entrepreneurs, like 38-year-old Michael Taus, are already setting up such small shops, some of them in their homes. A recent arrival from Los Angeles, Taus made it big as one of the founders of Rent.com, which was sold to eBay in 2005. He’s only lived in Bend for a few months, but he has already launched his own start-up and consults for several other local firms.

    Taus believes others of his generation will want to establish businesses in Oregon, lured by both its lifestyle and affordability. Some of the new business may be in software, Taus says, but others could sprout in specialty agriculture, wood products and other industries.

    “People are here for a reason. There’s a good amount of talent, and you can get more here,” he says earnestly. “There’s a great potential. We just have to get down to business.”

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • The Recession: Fuzzy Thinking Delays A Recovery

    I keep hearing how the current recession will end in 2010 because the average United States recession from 1854 to 2001 has been 17 months. This is silly for a variety of reasons.

    One reason is that there is no average recession. Post-World War II recessions have lasted from a minimum of six months to a maximum of only 16 months. If we were to apply the “average recession” logic to post World War II recessions, the current recession, which the NBER — the National Bureau of Economic Research — says started December 2007, would have ended 10 months later, last October.

    Another reason is that few previous recessions have been accompanied by the financial sector collapse that we witnessed in September. Worldwide experience indicates that recessions associated with financial sector panics tend to be longer than those without panics.

    Since 1854, five United States recessions have been accompanied by financial panics. These are the recessions of 1857, 1873, 1893, 1907, and 1929. The average duration of these recessions was 31 months. The 1907 recession was the shortest, at only 13 months. The 1873 recession was the longest, at 65 months. For comparison, the 1929 recession was 43 months. Interestingly enough, J.P. Morgan was instrumental in ending the financial panics of the two shortest recessions, 1893 and 1907.

    If we were to engage in the same sort of fuzzy thinking as the “average recession” analysis applied to “financial Panic” recessions, and assuming we use the NBER recession start date of December ‘07, the current recession could be expected to end 31 months later in July 2010. Is that too long for you? You could use the average 20th Century recession accompanied by a financial panic length. That is 28 months, so maybe the recession will end in April 2010.

    Maybe we should look at foreign data? The point is that if you play this game long enough, you can find a date you like.

    Finally, the method of dating recessions changed with the 2001 recession. The new method is much more likely to declare an economy in recession. If the old method had been used — if previous criteria were applied to the current situation — I believe the recession would have commenced no sooner than July 2008. Recent data revisions increase my confidence that the NBER was wrong when they said the recession commenced in December 2007. If you have the wrong start date, any “average recession” method will be wrong.

    The facts are that we have a serious recession accompanied by a financial panic and continuing massive job losses. The correct way to analyze the current recession is to recognize that it was accompanied by financial panic, and that means we had a regime shift from a good equilibrium to a bad equilibrium.

    Game theory tells us that we can have multiple Nash Equilibria to certain games. A Nash Equilibrium is one where knowing your opponent’s decision you would not change your decision.

    Bank runs provide an excellent example. Suppose you have a bank that does not have deposit insurance. Most of the time things plug along. People make deposits, borrow, and the like. Everybody is happy with their decisions. Call this the good equilibrium. However, in the event of a bank run, everyone wants to participate in the run, because those who do not end up loosing. Call this the bad equilibrium. Furthermore, nothing real has to change. We can switch from the good equilibrium to the bad equilibrium on unfounded rumors.

    The financial panic we witnessed last September was exactly like a bank run. In an amazingly short time, we switched from a good equilibrium to a bad equilibrium. The bad news is that we have no idea how to switch from a bad equilibrium to a good equilibrium. It will surely happen, but we don’t know how to cause it. We don’t know what will cause it. We can’t predict when it will happen.

    We do know that a lot of assets need to change hands. These include financial assets, auto factories, and homes. Recessions are periods when assets are reallocated to better uses.

    Current policy, with its obsessive pursuit of bailouts, seems to be focused on delaying those reallocations. That will delay the recovery. So-proposed government efforts to limit the impact will be ineffective, if not counterproductive. That is why I don’t see any reason to expect a recovery in 2009.

    Bill Watkins, Ph.D. is the Executive Director of the Economic Forecast Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is also a former economist at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington D.C. in the Monetary Affairs Division. All recession dating data in this article is from the NBER website.

  • Dubai, Mumbai, Shanghai : Destiny or Hype?

    The assonant phrase “Dubai, Mumbai, Shanghai or Goodbye” was credited to Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times in late 2007 at the beginning of the financial crisis on Wall Street. For years, New York, London and Tokyo held sway as the world’s financial capitals. Then the tectonic plates of the financial world began to move and these new cities were going to be the prime beneficiaries.

    Global shifts of financial power are not uncommon in history but they are dramatic. In the 15th Century, we saw the rise of Western Civilization. In the 19th Century, we experienced the emergence of the United States of America, followed by the rise first of Russia, Germany and Japan, and then China and India.

    The question now: has the time of London, New York and Tokyo come to an end? The basis for this assertion certainly exists. In 2008, the United States trade deficit with China topped $246 billion. In this new century, just eight years old, the United States trade deficit sent $1.4 trillion to China. This pattern alone would seem to secure Shanghai’s future preeminence.

    So it would also seem for Dubai. Crude oil hit $147/barrel in July, 2008. At that level, western democracies were sending $1 trillion per year to the Persian Gulf in exchange for 20 million barrels of oil. Dubai claimed possession of the tallest building in the world when the Burj Dubai topped 165 floors. This title, along with the world’s largest airport, world’s tallest hotel, and world’s tallest apartment are just a few of the superlatives used to describe Dubai.

    India’s trade surplus with the United States grew to $80 billion in 2008 as their economy exploded. An Indian car company shocked the world by purchasing legendary marquees Jaguar and Land Rover from Ford Motor Company. Mumbai was working towards becoming a true contender.

    At the beginning of the financial crisis “Dubai, Mumbai, Shanghai or Goodbye” did seem to identify the future locus of job openings in the financial world. Look at some of the records once owned by United States companies and who owns them today:

    • Tallest building : Dubai
    • Largest publicly traded company : China
    • Largest passenger airplane : Europe
    • Largest investment fund : Abu Dhabi
    • Largest movie industry : India
    • Largest casino : Macao
    • Largest shopping mall : Dubai

    So it looked in 2008. It is now early 2009. Lehman Brothers is gone. Wachovia was swallowed by Wells Fargo. Merrill Lynch was eaten by Bank of America. Citicorp lost 90% of its equity and struggles for its own survival. The Fed has pumped $700 billion to rescue the system and fears it may take $2 trillion to finish the job. The CEOs of General Motors and Chrysler publically beg Congress for a bailout as their share prices hit 60-year lows. Wall Street has lost 40% of its value in less than six months.

    London is no better off. The British pound has hit a 23 year low. The Royal Bank of Scotland required a $142 billion bailout to stave off collapse. Lloyds Banking Groups slid 42% in value to its lowest levels since the 80s. Jim Rogers, chairman of Singapore-based Rogers Holdings, said in an interview with Bloomberg Television, “I would urge you to sell any sterling you might have. It’s finished. I hate to say it, but I would not put any money in the U.K.”

    Tokyo fell from financial power in the 1990s and never recovered. They steered clear of the subprime fiasco, holding just $8 billion of the world’s $1 trillion subprime portfolio. Yet Japan has not been immune: Toyota suffered its first operating loss in 71 years. Its export-centered economy is now reeling.

    Yet if the old standbys are reeling, it now seems that the new guys are not as ready for prime time as was widely believed. The price of crude oil tumbled from $147/barrel in July 2008 to $32/barrel in December and the global economy was rocked. The loss of revenue had differing impacts worldwide.

    Suddenly the new players in the game seemed weaker. Russia, whose cost of production in the frozen tundra of Siberia is more than $60/barrel, lost its swagger. Prime Minister Putin became silent and Russia’s Backfire bombers stopped flying sorties to the American coastline. Russia is effectively bankrupt.

    But the biggest impact was in the Middle East. The drop in oil prices eliminated $839 billion per year from the income ledgers of the Persian Gulf alone. Some in the Middle East can tolerate the temporary loss of revenue. The Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund, for example, already held $850 billion in surplus and the cost of producing a barrel of oil remains just $4/barrel.

    But what of the new financial center of the Middle East? Dubai has seen its global market of new condominium buyers evaporate. Prices have collapsed and there is no end in sight. Price declines of 40% have been reported in the last two months. The mighty Burj Dubai, proud symbol of Dubai, has seen its values plummet 50% in the last two months. Sales in Dubai have simply come to a halt. More than half of the construction projects in the United Arab Emirates – worth $582 billion – were put on hold in 2008 according to the Dubai Chronicle. Look for further weakening in 2009.

    The impact on China has been arguably the most dramatic. More than 10,000,000 Chinese have been thrown out of work in the last 90 days. This is a new phenomenon in China, which has experienced 9% growth for years. Thousands of factories have been closed and civil unrest is rising. China has raised 400,000,000 people out of poverty in just one generation by moving them from villages into the cities. There are 24 million new workers added to the labor market each year. A slowdown in their export-driven industry will have a disastrous effect on these new workers.

    India has not been as adversely impacted as the western economies. Like Japan, India was not a player in the subprime mess. But this economic immunity did not protect the people of Mumbai from terrorist attack. Its global importance made it an attractive target to Islamic terrorists. On November 26th, 2008, eighty innocent people were killed in a series of coordinated attacks on Mumbai.

    So will the tectonic plates keep shifting? Will the financial power return to New York, London and Tokyo? Or will new financial power centers emerge? As of now the financial crisis has humbled everyone. Who will emerge when the bleeding stops is something we still cannot predict.

    Robert J. Cristiano Ph.D. has more than 25 years experience in real estate development in Southern California. He obtained financing from the Middle East following the collapse of the savings & loan industry in the early 90s and has become an expert on that region. He is a resident of Newport Beach, CA.

  • Industry And The Urge To Cluster

    What drives industry to locate in one region and not in the next?

    Economic geography – the distribution of economic activity over physical space – has always been central to economic development. Policy-makers trying to encourage economic activity to locate in under-developed regions want answers: Is it infrastructure? Fiscal incentives? Good business environment? Or could it be agglomeration – the compounding effect of industry clustering in a particular location?

    And if the key factor is indeed this critical mass, can the effect run from one type of industry to another? Do existing, more traditional manufacturing clusters attract newer services industry?

    The question of where and how services firms decide to locate themselves has become exceedingly central to understanding economic growth and development. Services, and especially knowledge-based services, now account for a greater proportion of advanced-country GDPs, and increasingly so for emerging economies.

    New Economic Geography (NEG) theory would argue that agglomeration advantages lock business activity into core regions. The core also supports the existence of intermediate industry in the periphery, and so specialized input-suppliers co-locate close by. For instance, think of Detroit’s production of automobiles and the auto-parts manufacturers who locate in geographically proximate Michigan, Ohio and Indiana.

    The theoretical business-economics literature would also argue that manufacturing and services are intricately linked in the production chain. For example, marketing services add the finishing touches in the final stages of a manufacturing process, or research and development services result in increased production within the “real” economy. Service inputs into production, such as design, technological refinements, and branding, account for a major part of value added in manufacturing industries. The result is that it is becoming difficult to identify where the product ends and where the service begins.

    These theories have been challenged by claims that services, as compared to manufacturing, are liberated from the tyranny of space, owing to advances in information and communication technologies. In addition, the ability to splice the service production chain more thinly, goes the argument, means that proximity may cease to be an important factor with regard to these industries.

    But some empirical research suggests that agglomeration forces may actually be stronger in the case of services – that service industries actually tend to cluster more strongly and more closely to existing urban or manufacturing agglomerations.

    How do we know this? It is true that while the interest in urban, regional and spatial economic theory has grown dramatically in the last few decades, empirical research has followed in fits and starts. Some historical evidence shows that manufacturing does indeed precede services, specifically producer services, in a city or city-region. Research in the United States in the mid-1990s, and then more recently, also demonstrates that financial and professional services firms often chose to locate themselves in geographic proximity to established manufacturing industrial areas.

    More macro-level North-South models of development also seem to lend credence to the idea that services cluster close to existing manufacturing companies. Research on firm location in Sweden has shown that producer services locate themselves close to manufacturing industry to benefit from accessibility to their customers, but that many producer services also look to supply other service industries. Similar research in Denmark shows that manufacturing and services can be so intricately linked in their production chains that firms across both types may decide simultaneously to choose one location over another.

    And there is yet another possibility. Research in Japan’s urban areas revealed that the presence of a large and growing service sector in an existing urban cluster could lead to the displacement of manufacturing units.

    There are two basic causes of clustering. The first is regional endowments such as land, climate, and waterways. The second is circularity in location choice, implying that firms want to be where large markets are, and large markets are where many firms are located.

    This logic may seem obvious now, but, as economist Paul Krugman notes, that wasn’t really the case before 1991. In the latter half of the 19th century, the emergence of the manufacturing belt in the United States was a turning point in the economic geography of the country. The belt – mainly New England, Middle Atlantic and east-North-Central regions – contained the majority of manufacturing employment up until the first half of the 20th century. It was a classic example of how concentration of firms in one region increased local demand and thus made the area attractive for other firms. Services industries, catering to both final consumption and to manufacturing, soon followed.

    What does all this tell us about how governments should focus their energies? If the whole point of policy were to encourage industrial growth in regions that were not previously favored by economic activity, then a multitude of factors would need to be considered: investments in educational infrastructure, and training and development of skilled labor are just some examples.

    If policy was aimed at the development of producer services industries, then it seems that a healthy manufacturing sector is vital to a healthy services sector. There is, however, an ongoing blurring of the distinction between what constitutes manufacturing and what constitutes services, and this transformation has stimulated new support functions that feed the production processes of both.

    If so, and if the different types of industry do simultaneously co-locate, then…the discussion is akin to going round the Mulberry bush.

    Megha Mukim is currently reading for a Ph.D at the London School of Economics. Prior to this she was a visiting fellow at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University.