New Geography

Category: planning

  • The Dispersionist Manifesto

    We live in an era of the heady drumbeat of urban triumphalism. In a world that is now, by some measures, predominately urban, observers like historian Peter Hall envision a “coming golden age” of great cities. It is time to look at such claims more closely, replacing celebratory urban legends with careful analysis. Although the percentage of people living in cities is certain to grow, much of this growth will be in smaller cities, suburbs and towns. And it is unclear whether extreme centralization and densification are either inevitable or desirable, for as cities get larger—both in the developed and developing world—they display a tendency to become increasingly congested, bifurcated by class and economically inflexible.

    It may be time to propose a less gargantuan vision that is more humane for the vast majority of people. This alternative view embraces not cramming and concentration— the favored strategies of most planners, pundits, architectural stars and their urban land-owner enablers—but the protean development of more dispersed and less concentrated cities and suburbs. This is what is happening in most cities in the world today, and has been the pattern of urban areas throughout history.

    There are numerous signs that this reality is taking root, both in the developing world and in high-income countries. Shlomo Angel, a lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, has shown that as the world’s urban population has grown, the percentage living in the 100 largest cities has declined. Between 1960 and 2000, the share of the largest cities declined from nearly 30 percent to closer to 25 percent. Since the nineteenth century, notes Angel, urban population densities have declined, as people have sought out less dense, more appealing, and usually less costly locations on the periphery. This is true, he points out, in London and even to some extent Mumbai, as well as in the United States. As the World Bank has noted: “Cities became more packed and more sprawling at the same time.”

    What may be best is to forge not an agenda for centralization, but policies that promote both smaller cities and villages. This, notes Ashok R. Datar, chairman of the Mumbai Environmental Social Network and a long-time advisor to the Ambani corporate group, may represent the most practicable strategy for relieving the unbearable congestion that threatens so many mega-city environments.

    Down from the Commanding Heights

    The dispersionist viewpoint challenges the assumption that the bigger, more densely packed a city is, the better. This approach appeals to prominent urbanists, such as the University of Chicago’s Saskia Sassen, who see such places as the inevitable occupiers of the (Leninist) “commanding heights” of the global economy. To spread out economic growth, a World Bank report asserts, is to discourage it.

    The dispersionist view begs to differ. In many important ways, the largest urban agglomerations can also be seen as gradually losing their edge to more smaller cities. One of the ironies of this Age of Cities lies in the fact that relative size is no longer the overwhelming critical advantage as was the case in the less urbanized past. Before the late twentieth century, big cities were efficient and economically viable. The greatest urban centers of history—Babylon, Rome, Constantinople, Paris, London, Kaifeng, Baghdad, New York, Tokyo—grew in part because concentration provided the best, and sometimes only, way to support the basic infrastructure for commerce, cultural development, state religion or the exercise of power. But increasingly size not only matters less, but actually can be seen as a detriment to efficient, sustainable urbanism. This is particularly evident in the developing world where urbanization is spreading most rapidly. With the exception of Tokyo, the world’s most populous urban agglomerations—Delhi, Mumbai, São Paulo, Mexico City—have evolved into almost unspeakably congested leviathans, plagued by both deepening class divides and environmental problems.

    By 2025, cities in developing countries are projected to account for eight of the ten world’s largest cities. Four will be located in the Indian subcontinent alone, and each will accommodate twenty million or more residents. They may be seen as “colorful” by what one writer calls “slumdog tourists,” and “exciting” for those working within the confines of their “glamour zones,” but for most of their citizens life will be very difficult, and better only compared to what are even more dismal conditions in the countryside.

    Over the past forty years, the percentage of Mumbai’s population living in slums has grown from one in six to a majority. One indicator of the conditions there: the average Mumbaiker’s lifespan is now seven years less than the national average. This is all the more remarkable since most Indians still live in villages with very limited sanitation and even less access to quality health care. Concentrating more people in Mumbai or other developing mega-cities represents a form of lunacy. Much the same can be said for Kolkata, Manila, Cairo, Mexico City, and Lagos.

    On the other hand, the dispersionist notion emphasizes second and third tier city development. Already many Indian businesses and skilled workers are moving to smaller, less congested, often better-run cities such as Bangalore, whose density is roughly one-fourth of Mumbai’s, or Ahmadabad in the state of Gujarat. Much of this new growth takes place in campuslike settings on the edge of the city that take advantage of newer infrastructure and offer workers a less harried way of life. Many of India’s key industries—auto manufacturing, software and entertainment— are establishing themselves in such smaller cities, which are far less dense and less populated than Mumbai or Kolkata.

    In a more planned fashion, China is embracing decentralization, encouraging growth in smaller interior cities such as Chengdu, Wuhan and Xi’an. Such cities, notes Chengdu-based architect Adam Mayer, offer a healthy alternative to the coastal megacities of Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou. China’s bold urban diversification strategy hinges both on forging new transportation links and on nurturing businesses in these interior cities.

    Such commitment, and the resources to fund it, are lacking in much of the developing world. Africa, for example, now boasts many huge, and rapidly growing, cities, but it is hard to describe Lagos in Nigeria, Luanda in Angola, and Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as places with particularly bright prospects. One exception may be Capetown, the beautiful South African coastal city that shone so well during the recent World Cup. Latin America, too, has a plethora of huge and growing cities, but it is hard to imagine Mexico City and São Paulo as likely hot-spots for future economic growth. Instead the best prospects lie in smaller cities like Santiago, the capital of resource-rich Chile, or Campinas, a growing smaller Brazilian city with three million residents that lies outside the congested São Paolo region.

    This shift to smaller cities, as Michigan State’s Zachary Neal points out, has been conditioned by rapid improvements in telecommunications and transportation infrastructure. But perhaps the most conclusive evidence that smaller can be better and more efficient can be found in other parts of the developing world. Cairo, Baghdad, and Tehran are the biggest cities in the Middle East, but they are hardly economic successes. In contrast, Tel Aviv, whose total metropolitan population is only three million, has emerged as a major center for technology as well as one of the world’s premier diamond centers. The other leading candidates in the region hail from the United Arab Emirates, notably oil-rich Abu Dhabi and perhaps also its now financially weakened neighbor, Dubai.

    No place illustrates the principle that smaller can be better as well as Singapore. With roughly four million residents, Singapore ranks only sixtieth in terms of population among the world’s cities. But its economy clocks in at twenty-seventh, ahead of much larger Mumbai. In per capita terms, by purchasing power parity, it boasts an income of $62,200, one of the highest in the world, and behind only Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Bermuda, and Qatar (and roughly the same as the United States). This is a remarkable achievement for a city-state whose per capita income at the time of its independence in 1965 was equal to those of other developing countries. Today Singapore boasts one of the world’s largest ports, a highly efficient subway system, and among the world’s most impressive skylines. It is easily the cleanest, most efficient big city in all of Asia. It is noteworthy that Singapore has employed its collective intelligence to develop a socially, economically and increasingly environmentally viable city in a space of only 268 square miles.

    The High-Income World

    The dispersionist reality is also evident in the high-income world. Even though some city cores have improved markedly, the largest and densest urban regions have performed somewhat worse than newer, smaller and often less compact urban areas. This decentralizing trend can also be seen in the western United States. In 1965, New York presided over the American economy like a colossus, accounting for more than 150 of the nation’s 500 largest companies; today that number is fewer than fifty. Not far behind New York are Los Angeles and Chicago, which also claim the coveted status of “world city.” In the meantime, a host of smaller and far more dispersed Texas cities have come to the fore. Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, and Austin enjoy the most rapid job and population growth of the nation’s largest metropolitan regions. Houston, which replaced New York as the center of the global energy industry, now has more Fortune 500 companies than Chicago. Together, the four Texas cities boast more large company headquarters than greater New York.

    But this movement from large dense cities to less dense ones represents only part of the dispersionist trend. A more critical one involves the movement from larger cities to smaller ones. In fact, between 2000 and 2008, notes demographer Wendell Cox, regions of more than ten million suffered a 10 percent rate of net outmigration. The big gainers were cities between 100,000 and 2.5 million residents. The winners included not only cities in Texas, but also southern urban regions such as Raleigh-Durham, now the fastest growing metro area over one million in the nation, and Nashville, and rising Heartland cities such as Columbus, Indianapolis, Des Moines, Omaha, Sioux Falls, and Fargo. Among urban areas of over one million, Columbus, Raleigh, Indianapolis, Denver and Kansas City all rank considerably ahead (in terms of growth of educated migrants between 2007 and 2009) of megacities such as New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco, according to the most recent American Community survey. One key advantage for these smaller cities is the price of housing. Even after the real estate bust, according to the National Association of Home Builders, barely one in three Los Angeles median-income households can afford a median-priced house; in New York, that ratio falls to one in four. In contrast, in regions such as Raleigh, Austin, San Antonio and Indianapolis, between two in three or four in five can afford the American dream. Advocates of dense cities mega-regions often point out that many poorer places, including old Rustbelt cities, enjoy high levels of affordability while regions such as New York do not. But that does not mean that affordability itself is a problem; areas with the lowest affordability, including New York, also have suffered among the high rates of domestic outmigration. The formula for a dynamic region mixes affordability with a growing economy.

    The smaller cities also are often easier for workers and entrepreneurs in which to do business. Despite the presence of the nation’s best developed mass transit system, the New York area has the longest commuting travel times; the worst are in Queens and Staten Island. As a general rule, average commuting time also tends to be longest in some of the biggest denser cities, notably New York, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. In contrast, the average commutes in places like Salt Lake City and Kansas City are slightly above twenty minutes. Over a year, moving to these smaller cities can save roughly 70 hours a week in commuting time.

    Finally there is the critical social issue. The largest cities such as New York and Los Angeles also tend to suffer the most extreme polarization of incomes. New York, for example, now has a distribution of wealth roughly twice as concentrated at the top than the national average. In 1980 Manhattan ranked seventeenth among the nation’s counties for social inequality; by 2007 it ranked first, with the top fifth of wage earners earning fifty-two times that of the lowest fifth, a disparity roughly comparable to that of Namibia. This is not only an American phenomenon. A study of the core city of Toronto, for example, found that between 1970 and 2001 the portion of middle-income neighborhoods in the city had dropped from two thirds to one third, while poor districts had more than doubled to 40 percent. By 2020, according to the University of Toronto researchers, middle-class neighborhoods could fall to barely less than 10 percent, with the balance made up of affluent and poor residents.

    Increasingly, one sees income gaps in high-income country megacities that one normally associates with developing countries. This is particularly true in expensive megacities whose finance-driven economies create high costs but lesser opportunities for middle and working class families. Once cost of living is factored in, more than half the children in inner London live in poverty, the highest level in Great Britain. More than one million Londoners were on public support in 2002.

    The Triumph of Suburbia

    We can see the impact of dispersion not only in the movement between cities but also in population shifts within them. Even the great metropolitan areas are, for the most part, de-concentrating. They increasingly boast not one center but a series of smaller ones, some far from the urban core. This can also be seen in both developing and high-income cities. The new business center of Mexico City, for example, is located in suburban Santa Fe and not the historic core. Much of the Mumbai entertainment complex known as Bollywood long ago migrated to the northern suburbs, with their malls and less dense neighborhoods.

    This pattern can be seen even more in the high-income countries. In virtually every major city in Europe, the urban core now represents a smaller percentage of the metropolitan population than two decades ago. Cities such as London, Paris, Frankfurt and Madrid, despite the presence of excellent mass transit, are far more suburbanized and decentralized than they were two decades ago. Since 1965, virtually all European major metropolitan area growth has been in the suburbs. Indeed, the share of the metropolitan area population gains in the suburbs has been greater in Western Europe than in the United States. As in the United States, this reflects in part the shift of technology industries into suburban areas. The reasons for this may have much to do with the family-oriented nature of many engineers and scientists, and their preference for campus-like settings. This is true both in the Grande Couronne around Paris, where many French tech firms cluster, and in Great Britain. The dynamic growth in fields such as technology and high-value-added and design-led manufacturing are concentrated not in the core, or even the surrounding suburbs, but in the outer reaches of the Thames Valley and around Cambridge. New home-work opportunities and attractive housing concentrates workers in such places, as well as in cities such as Bath and Taunton. “Cities,” concluded one recent report by the British Urban Regeneration Association, “are no longer the main source of new enterprises.”

    This statement will be familiar to people who study North America. For all the talk about new media and other tech related fields clustering in “hip and cool” urban cores, the greatest concentrations of technology industries are in predominately suburban areas, such as those on the periphery of Ottawa, Montreal, and Toronto, or Route 128 around Boston, Orange County, California and the hill country around Austin, Texas. One reason is that the brain power is there. According to the United States Census, eighteen of the nation’s twenty counties with the highest percentage of college-educated people over twenty-five are in either suburban or small cities.

    Silicon Valley, the world’s predominant high-tech concentration, remains to a large extent a vast suburb. The headquarters of such firms such as Intel, Apple, and Google are not in urbanized, transit-oriented San Francisco, but in sprawling, car-dominated places like Santa Clara, Cupertino and Mountain View. Although there are some pockets of density, the Valley essentially functions along suburban lines with no significant real urban core. Transit ridership in the Valley now stands at 3 percent, closer to a Phoenix or Houston than a New York or San Francisco.

    These economic trends are also reflected in demographics. Nationwide, over the past decade, suburbs have accounted for 85 percent of all metropolitan growth. Over the past decade, out of the forty-eight metropolitan areas, suburban counties gained more migrants than core counties in forty two cases; virtually all the fastest-growing communities in the country over the past decade have been located on the suburban fringe. Another indicator: Despite all the talk of people moving “back to the city” to experience the joys of density, between 2000 and 2008, the share of households living in detached housing rose from 61.4 percent to 63.5 percent.

    The Urban Future

    Whether in the high income or developing world, the evidence suggests our urban future will be more diverse—and dispersed—than commonly assumed. Like the housing around some suburban areas, there has also been a crash in many inner city markets.

    As a result of overestimating the demand for high density, there are sad stretches of abandoned or drastically devalued highrise and mixed-use areas in Miami, Kansas City, Chicago, Los Angeles and even the core of Portland, where condo prices have tumbled by at least 30 percent since 2007.

    Rather than force a density agenda on a largely unwilling population, it is better to consider how to make the more dispersed urban future more workable and sustainable. In the developing world, this might include the development of regional employment centers to reduce the often unbearable congestion of the urban core. At the same time, more thought should be given to allowing for houses on small lots, which could serve as gardens or placing for small household industry. In the high-income countries, there will be new opportunities in what may have once been considered second-tier markets to develop new urban amenities. There will be similar openings in the suburbs and even exurbs. Although these areas will not become densely packed, they will become more urban in many ways.

    Much also can be done to make our dispersing geography more environmentally friendly. Recent studies by environmental scientists in Australia suggest that the carbon footprint of high-rise urban residents, contrary to the conventional wisdom, is higher than that of medium and low-density suburban homes, due to the cost of heating common areas such as parking garages, and the highly consumptive lifestyles of more affluent urbanites, a considerable number of whom own second residences in the countryside. Even if these claims are exaggerated, there is no question suburbs and lower-density cities can be made more environmentally sustainable by such relative low-cost, relatively unobtrusive steps, these including insulation and tree-planting as well as the adoption of more fuel-efficient automobiles and a greater embrace of telecommuting, which is by far the fastest form of commute to work.

    Instead of clinging to the idea that density and concentration are best, planners, architects and developers would do better to focus what appeals to the vast majority of the population, particularly the middle and working classes. Nurturing smaller, more efficient cities, as well as expansive suburbs and revived small towns, may prove far more practical and beneficial to society than imposing the manic agenda among planners, pundits and urban land speculators for relentless centralization.

    This piece originally appeared in Wharton Real Estate Review.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Photo by Paul Sapiano

  • How China’s Megacities Have Avoided Problems of Other Developing Cities

    Urbanist media can’t seem to get enough of the megacity these days. Much of the commentary surrounding this topic is disconcertingly celebratory about these leviathans despite such phenomena as overcrowding, high levels of congestion and sprawling slums.

    Yet absent from most of the commentary is any mention of cities in China. This is perhaps due in large part to the lack of serious social problems in comparison to its developing city counterparts in other countries. If a megacity is defined as a city with a population of more than 10 million, then China is home to 5 megacities: Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Dongguan. As the country continues to urbanize, more Chinese cities are bound to join the ranks of these megacities.

    How has China been able to avoid the pitfalls facing other developing megacities? No one is denying that Chinese cities don’t have problems including unequal income distribution, pollution and growing traffic congestion. Yet China’s megacities seem to have largely avoided social dangers such as violent crime, disease and slum proliferation that plague urban areas of other developing countries.

    How have China’s cities avoided these issues?

    1. Construction of New Housing Units

    Western media continues to bawl over the amount of new residential construction in China, calling it the ”biggest bubble ever.” I have pointed out before how this might be an overestimation of the problem and that the housing market is actually more stable than many think. One thing is clear: the ample construction of new housing units in cities across China remains the essential component leading the way in the country’s development. The ability to provide modern accommodations for millions of aspiring urban dwellers has also directly prevented the proliferation of slums and large-scale shantytowns.

    2. Development of Public Transportation

    The ability to move efficiently through an urban area is paramount to opportunity and quality of life. When one thinks of megacities such as Jakarta or Mexico City, automobile gridlock often comes to mind. Beijing might have its traffic problems as well, but China’s development of public transportation, including extensive underground subway networks, ensures citizens will have other options to move around besides motor vehicles. The more connected by different forms of a transportation a city is, the more opportunity people have to live where they want and have access to a wider geographic range of job options.

    3. Land-Use and Zoning Flexibility

    The often-overlooked reality of zoning and land-use regulations plays a much greater role in the shaping the character of megacities then it is given credit for. Mumbai’s draconian 1.33 floor-to-area ratio (FAR) throughout most of the city means that it is limited to construction of low-rise buildings,leading to the growth of overcrowded sprawling slums. Chinese cities, in contrast, allow for high FAR, promoting construction of high-rise buildings that leave room for ample green space.

    Furthermore, Chinese cities are not limited by ”urban growth boundaries” and allow development to occur on newly annexed land outside of traditional urban cores. Even traditionally ”dense” cities like Shanghai and Hong Kong allow for new development outside of their traditional centers: the Pudong New Area in Shanghai and the New Territories in Hong Kong are huge areas that are still largely underdeveloped when compared to their respective downtown areas.

    Critically, these nominally suburban or even “exurban” expansions are not mere bedroom community; they are frequently attached to areas of intense commercial, industrial and technical development. In many cities, including Chengdu, where I reside, most of the new economic growth takes place in such communities.

    4. Providing Economic Incentives with Special Trade Zones

    As China enters its third decade of rapid development, competition is heating up between its cities for domestic and foreign investment. The winners will ultimately be cities that are most business friendly and offer incentives like tax breaks to companies looking to set up operations. Many of China’s cities have gone about this by establishing special ‘economic and trade zones’, usually outside of traditional urban cores. As a matter of fact, one of new China’s most economically successful cities, Shenzhen, largely started as a ‘Special Economic Zone’ (SEZ). Special economic and trade zones that are not actual cities, but part of a larger city, thrive because they usually built on more affordable land on urban peripheries, opening up more investment for construction of state-of-the-art manufacturing and R&D facilities.

    5. Willingness to Learn from Outside Experts

    When it comes to political issues at the Central Government level, it is clear that China does not want to be told how to run its country by outside diplomats and foreign policy experts. Yet at the municipal level, Chinese government and business leaders are earnestly open to listening to experts in planning and development from outside its borders. One only needs to take a look at the countless architecture and urban planning practices from the West, Singapore and even Taiwan who currently work in China. This open exchange of ideas taking place is what allows best practices to come to fruition.

    Adam Nathaniel Mayer is an American architectural design professional currently living in China. In addition to his job designing buildings he writes the China Urban Development Blog, where a version of this piece originally appeared.

    Photo by xiquinhosilva

  • Washington State’s Evolving Demography

    Population change in the state of Washington has relevance to the nation and to other states because it tells us something about market preferences of households versus the orientation of planners (e.g., “smart growth”). It tells us much about gentrification and America’s changing racial and ethnic diversity.

    The summary will be in two parts. This piece will look at population growth and redistribution. A second article will review the growth of the minority population and its (surprising to some) redistribution and its relation to the gentrification of the city of Seattle, plus a look at the implications of ethnic change to Washington’s new 10th congressional district.

    Washington state and the greater Seattle region grew fairly vigorously 14% (838,000 new residents) in the decade, as they have most decades for over a century. This growth is unusually high for a “non Sunbelt” state. This growth is due not just the engine of Seattle, as eastern and western Washington also experienced substantial growth.

    Most smaller metropolitan areas across the state grew faster than the Seattle metropolitan core. Fast-growing counties are found in the east (Franklin 50%, the easy winner, Benton 23; Kittitas, 22; and Grant 20); all associated with Latino in-migration, as well as in the west (Clark, 23 %; suburban Portland, Mason, 23 percent; suburban Olympia, Thurston (Olympia) 22; Whatcom (Bellingham), 20; and Snohomish, finally, suburban Seattle, 18.

    There are two Washingtons: greater Seattle and the rest of the state, marked by a love and hate relationship. But the balance of power – and demography – is clearly changing in both. There were a few areas of slow growth or decline, as in the heart of the wheat country, but significant growth took place in other metropolitan areas, most notably the Tri-Cities, Vancouver (suburban Portland), Bellingham, Olympia (the state capitol) as well as Spokane, Yakima, and Wenatchee.

    There has been considerable population growth associated with the Columbia Basin project, fueled by heavy Latino in-migration and high birth rates. At the same time there has been population expansion in selected environmental amenity areas – often with retiree in-migration – in many counties across the state. Amenity fueled growth was dramatic in all directions beyond the metropolitan central Puget Sound core, but was also impressive in several areas in eastern Washington, as in Okanogan, Pend Oreille, and Stevens, the far north and northeast, and in Kittitas. Some of this growth comes from migration east from Seattle. Fourth, despite a growth management plan, metropolitan exurbs continue to expand, especially around Vancouver, Spokane, Bellingham and the Tri-Cities (black on the map, over 100% growth).

    Turning to central Puget Sound, the most dramatic growth (often over 100 percent), occurred at the far edge of the urban growth areas, and just beyond as exurban growth. This is true in absolute numbers as well as rates. Growth management and upzoning have been unable to stem this tide, for two main reasons rarely acknowledged by planners: the preference of families with children for single family houses and greater housing affordability, at least in some areas (for example, King county south and east of Seattle, and south into Pierce county). Growth was also impressive in most rural and exurban areas, especially in Pierce, Snohomish and Kitsap counties, but far less in King county, which has by far the strictest growth controls

    At the same time, there was concentrated growth in already urban areas, city and suburban, as higher density apartment sprang up across much of Seattle, Tacoma, south King county, in some Eastside cities, and in the SR 99 corridor of Snohomish county north from Seattle.

    In Pierce, Snohomish and south King, some single family and small apartment growth occurred in less affluent areas, attracting many people, including young families who cannot afford to live closer to Seattle. Areas of slower growth tended to be military areas, some urban non-residential tracts, and some more affluent, older settled single family home areas, with an aging population. Growth in downtown Seattle and Bellevue, even Tacoma, was substantial, if not quite as great as planners envisioned. The current shift from home ownership to renting is leading some to project a projected apartment boom in or near downtown Seattle.

    It’s also interesting to look at density as a measure of “urban-ness”. The third map for density is at a finer block group level. Moderate urban densities from 1000 to 5000 per square mile are dominated by single family homes, areas between 5000 and 7000, by a mix of single family homes and apartments, and over 7000 by apartments, essentially the density goal of urbanist smart growth planning. Seattle really has achieved a substantial degree of such urbanness, dominating central Seattle, but spreading to all corners of the city. Other areas of higher density include the SR99 corridor in Snohomish county, especially south Everett, high tech suburbs to the east, and in south King county the SR 99 corridor again, in some less affluent suburbs, and in Pierce county, downtown Tacoma, and some of South Tacoma toward Ft. Lewis.

    But still more than half the urban footprint resists the officially preferred urban densities. Even with densification, redevelopment and the opening of the first light rail line, these higher density areas housed only 34 percent of the population of King county (up from 32 % in 2000), and only 10 % of the population of the people of the three suburban counties. The city of Seattle is exceptional, containing 52 percent of the high density tracts on the metropolitan area, although it has only one-sixth of the population.

    As the late great UW economist Charlie Tiebout told a seminar 50 years ago, “People vote with their feet” This is certainly true about residential choices. While perhaps twenty percent at most of Americans may prefer higher density living, for reasons of age, family status or ideology, the large majority does not and likely will not.

    To a leftist like me, the tragedy is how smart growth transfers wealth and the vaunted “quality of life” to the rich and the professionals, at the expense of the poor and of minorities. Sadly the Democratic party seems totally blind to the fact that the fixation on new urbanism contributes to the rightward backlash. Folks do not want to be told how to live, especially, dare I assert, when those hectoring them have already cornered the nicest parts of the region for themselves. Middle and working class families are not likely to embrace policies – beloved by affluent professionals – that would deny them a chance to own their preferred kind of residence at a reasonable price.

    Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist).

  • The Evolving Urban Form: Manila

    The Urban Area: The Manila urban area ranks as the world’s fifth largest urban area (area of continuous urban development) with a population of approximately 21,000,000 (Note 1) covering a land area of 550 square miles (1,425 square kilometers). The urban population density sits at approximately 38,000 people per square mile (14,500 per square kilometer).

    Like nearly all major urban areas of the world, Manila has experienced substantial suburbanization over recent decades and substantially falling urban population densities. In 1950, the core municipality of Manila had a population of under 1 million people, and it represented approximately 60 percent of the urban area population. Over the intervening years, the core of Manila grew by approximately 700,000 people, while the balance of the urban area added nearly 20,000,000 people (Figure 1).

    A Forbes article indicates that Manila is the highest density major municipality in the world with a population density of nearly 115,000 per square mile (45,000 per square kilometer). This is more than double the population density of ville de Paris. The core has a population of approximately 1.7 million in a land area of 15 square miles (39 square kilometers).

    The densest district reaches nearly 180,000 people per square mile (70,000 per square kilometer). Even so, this is far less dense than some parts of Hong Kong (more than 1.1 million per square mile and more than 400,000 per square kilometer). Even higher densities existed in the early 20th century Lower East Side in New York (according Jacob Riis, author of A Ten Years’ War: An Account of the Battle with the Slum in New York). Even higher densities were reached during the late 1980s in Hong Kong’s now demolished Kowloon Walled City, variously estimated at up to 5 million per square mile (2 million per square kilometer).

    The inner suburbs, the balance of the National Capital Region now have approximately 10,600,000 residents. The population density drops substantially from the core to the inner suburbs to approximately 45,000 per square mile (18,000 per square kilometer).  The outer suburbs, which are composed of the portions of the urban area outside the National Capital Region, have a population of more nearly 8.5 million and a considerably lower density at 28,000 per square mile or 11,000 per square kilometer (Figure 2).

    As early as the 1950s, the suburbs have captured most of the urban areas growth. Between 1950 and 1980, the core municipality attracted between 10 percent and 20 percent of the urban area growth. The core municipality of Manila reached a population peak of nearly 1.6 million in 1980, which it has only been recently exceeded. From 1980 to 2000, virtually none of the urban growth took place in the core of Manila, though it captured roughly 2 percent of the growth from 2000 to 2010 (Figure 3).

    As of 2010, it is estimated that eight percent of the population lives in the core municipality of Manila, 51 percent in the inner suburbs and 40 percent in the outer suburbs (Figure 4).

    The Metropolitan Area: Unlike urban areas, there are no international standards for the delineation of metropolitan areas (labor markets including extensions beyond urban areas). Serious attempts to compare international metropolitan area data have been rare (Note 2). Nonetheless, the evolution of Manila as a metropolitan area can be independently reviewed based upon a provincial level analysis.

    The Manila urban area occupies all or part of six provincial level jurisdictions. The largest population is in the National Capital Region, which is somewhat misleadingly referred to as "Metro Manila", despite being only a part of the metropolitan area. This is similar to Tokyo, where the prefecture of Tokyo is referred to as the "Tokyo Metropolis," yet represents only one third of the metropolitan area population. The metropolitan area also extends into the provinces of Rizal (from which the National Capital Region was carved in 1976), Cavite, Laguna, Bulucan and Batangas. The total population was estimated at 26.5 million in 2010 (Note 3).

    The metropolitan area’s population growth is strongly moving toward the outer suburbs (the five provinces outside the National Capital Region). Between 1970 and 1990, the inner suburbs captured 61 percent of the metropolitan area growth, compared to 36 percent in the outer suburbs. Between 1990 and 2010, the outer suburbs accommodated 64 percent of the metropolitan areas population growth, compared to 34 percent for the inner suburbs.

    Commercial Development: The suburbanization of Manila has not been limited to residences. New, world class commercial cores have been developed that have displaced many of the traditional functions of the older commercial core of Manila. Makati, a municipality to the east of Manila and within the National Capital Region now has the largest business district (photo), while a nearly as large commercial core has developed in Ortigas, just to the north (photo). There are other developing office centers such as the somewhat more distant commercial center near the southern border of the National Capital Region in Muntinlupa. This is similar to the kinds of newer commercial developments that have supplanted traditional business districts in urban areas such Mexico City (Reforma and Santa Fe) Sao Paulo (Paulista and Luis Carlos Berrini) and Istanbul (Levant).These developing country cities have experienced an economic decentralization of business that surpasses that of American edge cities.


    Makati


    Ortigas

     

    Manila’s Ominous Future? Manila faces an especially difficult future. The Philippines is projected to have one of the strongest urban growth rates in the world over the period to 2050. Since 1950, the Manila urban area has captured nearly 50 percent of the urban population growth of the nation. If this rate were to continue, the Manila urban area would reach a population of between 45 and 50 million by 2050. This is approximately 10,000,000 more than live in Tokyo, the world’s largest urban area today.

    But Manila faces even greater problems, related to the intense poverty of much of the population migrating to the urban area from the countryside. The Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) estimated that 4 million of the 11.5 million residents in the National Capital Region lived in slums (shantytowns or informal settlements) in 2010 (Photo).  PIDS indicates that this population is increasing at a rate of eight percent annually and is expected to reach 9 million by 2050. This would be nearly 60 percent of the projected population at that time, and does not include slum populations in the extensive suburbs beyond the limits of the National Capital Region.

    As if the poverty were not enough, Manila has been plagued by disastrous slum fires, the most recent within the past week. According to the Manila Times up to 10,000 people were left homeless by this most recent fire, which was in Makati, home of the metropolitan area’s largest and most prestigious business district.

    Manila also experiences some of the world’s worst traffic congestion, as people increasingly travel by car on its largely substandard road system. Perhaps even more surprisingly, a substantial number of detached housing communities have been developed, especially on the urban fringe.

    Manila’s challenge will be to accommodate the millions more who will seek a better life in the urban area and to do so while materially improving the standard of living as urgently as possible.

    ———

    Note 1: This urban area population is considerably above the figure reported by United Nations (11.6 million). United Nations figure is for the National Capital Region, which is also referred to as Metro Manila. In fact, the urban area stretches well beyond Metro Manila. This population estimate is based upon a build-up of smaller area population totals within the continuously develop urban area.

    Note 2: By far the most comprehensive attempt to apply consistent criteria to international metropolitan areas, was by urban expert Richard L. Forstall (who ran the Rand McNally "Ranally" international metropolitan area program), Richard P. Green and James B. Pick. The complexity of the research is indicated by the fact that their list is limited to the top 15 in the world. 

    Note 3: The metropolitan population is estimated by applying the 2000 to 2007 annual growth rate to from 2007.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life”

    Lead Photograph: Urban fringe development: Laguna province (outer suburbs). All photographs by author.

  • Pickles Plans a Pogrom

    Pogróm is a word with Yiddish origin, and is a Russian word meaning “to wreak havoc, to demolish violently, to destroy, or to devastate a town."

    Eric Pickles, British Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, is planning to demolish, destroy, and devastate half of Dale Farm, on Oak Lane, Crays Hill, near Billericay. Situated to the North of the now established "plotlands" around the post-war New Town of Basildon in Essex, Dale Farm is home to around 1000 people. It is not a farm. It is a 5 hectare former scrapyard off the A127, outside the M25, owned by the Gypsies and Travellers themselves. They have built their own chalet homes in around 100 plots, large enough to include caravan pitches for their families and friends. The problem they have is that the Local Authority has changed it’s attitude to letting Gypsies and Travellers stay to make something of this redundant Brownfield site. Today the Local Authority is mostly against the residents of Dale Farm. But it was not always so in this part of Essex with a long history of "plotlands".

    In the 1960s there were fewer than 10 plots on Oak Lane. Over time the Local Authority, Basildon Council, granted planning permission for around 40 additional plots. Then attitudes hardened in 2000. The Local Authority decided that the Dale Farm plots could not be added to, and that having allowed earlier building on the scrapyard was a mistake. Residents faced opposition to new building on their own land, and the 50 or so homes that were built in the twenty-first century were never going to be granted planning permission by the Local Authority that now wished none of them were there. Half the homes are legal. The other half have had to be built on land the residents legally own, but which the Local Authority now sees as "Green Belt". The Gypsies and Travellers face a Local Authority that, despite Basildon’s history of "plotlands", has nastily turned against them.

    For more information see http://dalefarm.wordpress.com

    Plotlands as a measure of affordability 75 years on 05.04.2009

    Googling plotlands at 10 to 30 homes a hectare 22.04.2009

    On Google Earth look for the rectangle of family housing built in poor quality Green Belt land at Dale Farm, Oak Lane, Crays Hill, Billericay, Essex, CM11 2YJ. The Dale Farm Gypsies and Travellers have shown how people can meet their own housing needs, if only the Local Authority will give them planning permission. Now Basildon Council is planning to spend £8.0 million in demolishing their homes, plus the cost of policing the action. The Daily Mail claimed that Essex Police has asked the Home Office for £10.0 million to cover that policing cost. (1) What kind of crazy planning tyranny is it when people – just like you and I – are prevented from planning and building a field of family houses for themselves?

    Faced with a challenge to 1947 legislation the planning system is acting desperately in forcing the demolition of the Dale Farm homes. The Coalition government has pledged up to £1.2 million to help Basildon Council clear the Gypsies and Travellers away. (2) Basildon Council had asked the department for Communities and Local Government for £3.0 million to help fund an eviction. (3) It’s not the money, but the bigger principle that bothers Eric Pickles, who is now going further. He promises that the CLG will be consulting on new planning guidelines intended to strengthen the hand of Local Authorities in dealing with "unauthorised developments". Dale Farm may be unauthorised, but it is the Local Authority, the CLG, and ultimately Eric Pickles as Secretary of State, who refuse to grant planning approval. If planning approval was likely this conflict would not exist, and 1000 people would be left in peace.

    Pickles is determined to clear the Gypsies and Travellers away. He told the Evening Standard that ‘… we are giving councils the power and discretion to protect the environment and help rebuild community relations’. (2) What he means, of course, is that he sees no place in the local community for Gypsies and Travellers. He is blaming them for any strained local relationships when all they want is to be left alone. He appeals to green ideologues, when the Green Belt that engulfs Dale Farm is waste land. James Heartfield made that point on Spiked! in 2009, when the Dale Farm residents were, once again, unable to overcome the planning legal system. The Dale Farm residents face eco-elitism:

    ‘The law that the Basildon Council is upholding is the law that protects the so-called "Green Belt", which is supposed to stop our towns and cities from sprawling over the unspoilt countryside. Sheridan and his fellow travellers have not taken anyone else’s land; they have built their own homes on their own land. But they are being punished because they have sinned against the sacred cow that is the English Countryside.’ (4)

    Even Pickles will probably admit that vast swathes of the Green Belt, and particularly in Essex, is poor quality, but like New Labour before him, he will not let it be used to live in, and particularly not by working people. He sees an opportunity to get the "law abiding" working people of Basildon to turn on the hard working and independent Gypsies and Travellers for breaking the stupid planning law, and challenging the very idea of an ecology in need of his protection. So Pickles is now going deeper into the green prejudice that people are sprawling over the countryside, and need to be contained. At Dale Farm he is tapping into the prejudice amongst environmentalists that large families are a problem. Many Gypsies and Travellers like to have large families, and look after each other, but their sociable culture is evidently at odds with the anti-human idea amongst greens that population growth is threatening the planet.

    The anti-human prejudice is common to environmentalists, but is being directed by Pickles as he pushes the planning system towards a legal presumption in favour of "sustainable development". Pickles is saying that Gypsies and Travellers building homes represents the unsustainable development his National Planning Policy Framework aims to stop.

    Large families flouting the planning law, and building on the Green Belt in ways that government defines as unsustainable are unacceptable to Pickles. He encourages the local community to organise to move them on, and to use the police to forcibly clear their homes from their own land. Pickles plans a pogrom against Gypsies and Travellers in 2011. As even The Guardian recognised, anticipating "The Battle of Basildon", Pickles ‘… is fast turning his personal track record of vehement opposition to unauthorised Traveller sites into government policy’. (5)

    Pogróm originally meant attacks on Jews in the Russian Empire. The first was anti-Jewish rioting in Odessa in 1821. The term "pogrom" gained common use with anti-Jewish riots across the Ukraine and southern Russia between 1881 and 1884, after Narodnaya Volya terrorists assassinated Tsar Alexander II in St. Petersburg. The "People’s Will" anarchists were responsible, but the reaction to the assassination took the form of anti-semitic attacks, lootings, evictions, and expulsions. The perpetrators were organized locally, often with government and police encouragement. Between 1903 and 1906 there were further pogroms, while the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution was widely denounced as a Jewish conspiracy. The British "Khaki" General Election after the First World War returned David Lloyd George as Prime Minister in December 1918, and Winston Churchill became War Minister and Air Secretary. No strangers to anti-semitism, and fearing a spread of mutinous internationalism throughout Europe, they sent the British Expeditionary Forces to help the Tsarist "White" Russians attack the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union.

    Nationalists and the Tsarist Army, backed by Expeditionary Forces from Britain, France, and the United States of America, engaged in pogroms in Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, Romania, and Western Russia, killing tens of thousands of Jews between 1918 and 1920. Pogroms continued in Romania to 1921. Anti-semitism went systematically with racism against Gypsies across Europe between the wars, and did not end with the massacre of the Gypsy Camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau on 2 August 1944.

    Eric PicklesEric Pickles is a socially divisive nationalist, but he is no fascist, and would probably hate to be thought of as racist. He believes he is working to protect the planet, while talking about a "Big Society" to businessmen, (6) but he really wants a sustainable Little Britain that makes a virtue out of parochial intolerance. Pickles is adept at exploiting political division. This is of course not a new dispute, nor one limited in consequence to Dale Farm. Much depends on the outcome. The residents were ordered to leave in February 2007 when Ruth Kelly was running the CLG, but they appealed against the decision. (7) The Dale Farm case has gone on since 2001. The leader of Basildon Council Tony Ball insists that ‘… wrong is wrong and there can’t be one rule for one group, and one for another. The law of the land must be upheld’. (8) He knows that the planning law stops everyone from building on their own land unless the Local Authority accepts their design. Ball knows that if the Dale Farm Gypsies and Travellers are not made an example of, then there are plenty of other people around Basildon, Essex, and Britain who would like to build on their own land. Councillors like him would no longer have the power of refusal and demolition that Eric Pickles expects to be exercised on behalf of national government. Ball can’t imagine a planning system based on pursuasion rather than a universal denial of development rights:

    ‘Look at the alternatives. If a council turns a blind eye to law-breaking what moral right do we have to enforce against anybody else who breaches planning laws? Green belt is there for a reason. It is to stop urban sprawl’. (9)

    If the Dale Farm residents win, the denial of the Right to Build can be challenged by many more people around Britain than there are Gypsies and Travellers. Planners would need to win support for something positive to be built by freeholders, having lost the power to say "No".

    Basildon Council Leader Tony Ball defended the eviction plan on 15 March 2011 in a television interview, posted on www.bbc.co.uk.

    Tony BallBall no doubt wants the Dale Farm residents to move on. He seems willing to allow at least a limited window of opportunity for residents to find alternative locations. (10) Yet Ball also appears utterly insensitive to the fact that the Dale Farm residents want the freedom of choice to stay on their own land, at Oak Lane, Crays Hill. Until Secretary of State Pickles intervened it seemed that the 28-day notice of eviction might not be delivered to residents quickly. However Pickles is publicly recommending that all Local Authorities watch for movements of Gypsies and Travellers over the Spring holiday. Rosa Prince, writing for The Telegraph, was not slow to repeat the pre-holiday alarm from Pickles, when she screamed:

    ‘Travellers have been known in the past to take advantage of bank holidays to launch “land grabs,” setting up home on land which they do not have authorisation to camp on, and applying for retrospective planning permission once the council offices reopen… Councils are also being allowed to resist retrospective planning applications submitted by gipsies and other home builders, and give more rights to enforce removal notice against those who act illegally’. (11)

    This eco-anxiety is getting to the truth of the matter. Pickles is blaming Gypsies and Travellers for their independence, but is really worried about "other home builders" who might break the planning law on their own land. ‘It’s time for fair play in the planning system’, he said, ‘… standing up for those who play by the rules and tougher action for those who abuse and play the system’. (12) Gypsies and Travellers know the planning system is not fair. It is stacked against them, and if they try to do anything to solve their own housing predicament the planning system will be used by "the wider community" to demolish, destroy, and devastate their homes. Locals who are not Gypsies and Travellers are asking "Why don’t we all start building extra houses, if they can get away with it?" As James Heartfield has observed, ‘… people usually mean it rhetorically. But actually, it is the right question, just put the wrong way around’. (4) If many more people broke the planning law, and argued to be free to build on their own land as a point of principle, Britain would not have a housing shortage. If Pickles persisted with evictions he would be exposed for his intolerance of Gypsies and Travellers, which in this impending pogrom is hard not to see as an expression of racism.

    It seems clear that eco-elitism can very easily slip into racism, and the ambition of "Localism" seems reduced to mobilising parochial hatreds.

    Talking up "Localism", Pickles told the Conservative Home blog readers that ‘… it’s up to you. Be as ambitious as you can. Be as radical as you like. Be as bold as you want. I’m not going to stand in anyone’s way’. (13) Pickles doesn’t mean Gypsies and Travellers. He will do more than stand in their way, and is whipping up racism against Gypsies and Travellers. Not everyone in Basildon will support what he is doing, but the problem is that locally, and nationally, the disparate working people who support the Gypsies and Travellers are not yet sufficiently organised to effectively stop Pickles. That need not remain a political weakness.

    Pickles will obstruct everyone challenging the 1947 planning law, but he will be viscious against Gypsies and Travellers. He wants "the wider community" to be involved in discussions in determining the number of traveller sites to be provided. (11) Gypsies and Travellers should be free to live on their own land without this sort of government backed locally perpetrated "community" discipline. Don’t be fooled by all the talk from this Coalition about "Big Society" or ending the "dependency culture".

    Britain can’t so easily stop the Dependency Culture 31.10.2010

    The Dale Farm Gypsies and Travellers are clearly being singled out for having the strength to demonstrate their desire for independence. In fact it is Pickles and his burdensome planning law that wants to keep them in a state of dependency. As James Heartfield argued in 2008, we should all applaud and follow the example of Britain’s Gypsies and Travellers:

    Forget Eco-towns – Let’s follow the example of Britain’s Gypsies 15.04.2008

    More urgently, the Dale Farm Gypsies and Travellers need to be defended against the destructive and socially divisive pogrom that Eric Pickles is planning. These family chalet homes should not be demolished. ‘We’re not wanted anywhere. We’re not wanted in the countryside. We’re not wanted in the town’, Candy Sheridan told The Guardian. An Irish Traveller, and Vice Chair of the Gypsy Council 2010, founded in 1966, she is busy trying to help others through the planning system. ‘Councillors don’t want to see us’, but ‘… we are part of the countryside and we have been for 600 years. We have more right to be there than they do’. (14) There is plenty of space for everyone in the 90 per cent of Britain that is not built on.

    Dale Farm Residents - courtesy of Mary Turner

    Britain should be pushing for a universal freedom to build, not forced demolitions, targeted against the few. Don’t be fooled by the awesome mendacity of Eric Pickles. He’s got it in for Gypsies and Travellers, and they threaten his planning system. For Pickles this is a long run battle.

    The awesome mendacity of Eric Pickles 31.03.2011

    Every planning initiative from this government and from the last one is in tatters. Pickles has no plan to build housing, only punish Gypsies and Travellers who refuse to wait around for the planning system to allow house building. They won’t go easily, and they should be supported. (15)

    The CLG looks to be about to demolish more homes built by Gypsies and Travellers than they have managed to deliver through the entire failed Eco-Towns programme. The CLG should be ashamed of their record, and of what Pickles is doing in the name of the planning system.

    Zero Eco-Towns 28.03.2011

    Grattan Puxon representing the Dale Farm Residents Association wrote an open letter to Pickles on the http://lolodiklo.blogspot.com, an organization dedicated to raising awareness about the history, culture and true lives of Romani people. Puxon told Pickles that ‘… forced eviction is always an ugly action but when it’s being taken against ninety families of one community and those families belong to a ethnic minority, then there must be cause for concern, alarm and shame’. (16) But Pickles is shameless. He says he is acting for the environment and the community of Basildon. In reality he is acting on his own prejudices from within a Coalition government sustained in power by Liberal Democrats.

    It is time to stand in the way of Eric Pickles as he plans a pogrom in 2011

    Ian Abley, Project Manager for audacity, an experienced site Architect, and a Research Engineer at the Centre for Innovative and Collaborative Engineering, Loughborough University. He is co-author of Why is construction so backward? (2004) and co-editor of Manmade Modular Megastructures. (2006) He is planning 250 new British towns.

    Notes:

    1. ‘Essex travellers facing eviction threaten Big Fat Gypsy War on the authorities’, 13 March 2011, Daily Mail, posted on www.dailymail.co.uk

    2. ‘Travellers face bank holiday crackdown’, 13 April 2011, Evening Standard

    3. ‘Not evicting gypsies will set "very bad precedent" ‘, 10 March 2011, This is Total Essex, Essex Chronicle

    4. James Heartfield, ‘Dale Farm rebellion against eco-elitism’, 26 January 2009, Spiked Online, posted here

    5. Patrick Barkham, ‘Dale Farm Travellers eviction: the battle of Basildon’, 25 March 2011, The Guardian

    6. Eric Pickles, speech to the ‘Home Builders Federation "One Year On" Conference’, London, 31 March 2011

    7. Andrew Levy, ‘Travellers build a £12,000 hall at illegal camp – with taxpayers’ cash, and without planning permission’, 1 May 2008, Daily Mail

    8. Joshua Farrington, ‘Basildon: Council votes for eviction despite travellers’ protests’, 16 March 2011, This is Total Essex, Essex Chronicle

    9. Tony Ball, quoted by Patrick Barkham, ‘Dale Farm Travellers eviction: the battle of Basildon’, 25 March 2011, The Guardian

    10. ‘Basildon Council votes to evict Dale Farm’, 16 March 2011, Travellers’ Times

    11. Rosa Prince, ‘Eric Pickles: gipsies could take advantage of Royal Wedding bank holiday to set up illegal camps’, 13 April 2011, The Telegraph

    12. Eric Pickles, quoted by Rosa Prince, ‘Eric Pickles: gipsies could take advantage of Royal Wedding bank holiday to set up illegal camps’, 13 April 2011, The Telegraph

    13. Eric Pickles, ‘It’s the local economy, stupid’, 30 July 2010, Conservative Home Blog

    14. Candy Sheridan, quoted by Patrick Barkham, ‘Dale Farm Travellers eviction: the battle of Basildon’, 25 March 2011, The Guardian

    15. Rachel Stevenson, ‘Dale Farm Travellers: ‘We won’t just get up and leave’, 27 July 2010, The Guardian

    16. Grattan Puxon, open letter to Eric Pickles, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, ‘UN calls for halt to UK Gypsy Evictions’, 22 July 2010, Lolo Diklo

  • Downtown China

    In Downtown: It’s Rise and Fall, 1880-1950, Robert M Fogelson says that downtowns are a uniquely American phenomenon. He refers to downtown as the commercial cores with high building densities that form "canyons" that, in some smaller urban areas, might be only a block long to a mile or more long.  Fogelson demonstrates that downtowns in the United States are largely a creation of rail transit (subways or metros, street cars and their predecessor horse cars). American urban areas grew at the same time that this mode of transport was reached its zenith.    

    This pattern was also evident in the pre-automobile cores of large urban areas in Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

    Since then, the downtown has been losing its preeminence. As late as 1950 virtually all of the nearly 50 US urban areas with more than 250,000 people had concentrated downtown areas of varying sizes. The unifying factor was the access to this one point in the urban area by transit from most or all of the rest of the urban area.   Smaller urban areas, after transit’s golden age, never developed downtowns as well-developed as those which grew during the transit oriented urban areas of the pre-World War II era.

    China’s emerging commercial cores bear little resemblance to these older American downtowns. Generally, what might be termed as downtown in the urban areas of China is far more dispersed. The tallest buildings do not stand across narrow streets from one another. You see little of the often spectacular high-rise canyons seen in great American downtowns such as Chicago and New York or even smaller ones, such as Pittsburgh and Seattle and many others.   

    Dominant Pattern: The Dispersed Central Business District: The most pervasive form of downtown China is a larger central business district consisting of dispersed high-rise buildings superimposed on lower rise residential buildings, the latter often being five floors or less.

    Perhaps the best example is Guangzhou, capital of Guangdong (12 million population) that now engulfs adjacent Foshan. The skyscrapers of central Guangzhou, some among the tallest in the world, are spread around an area of between 10 and 15 square miles (26 to 39 square kilometers). The largest concentration is near the Guangzhou East Railway Station, where the trains of the former Kowloon – Canton Railway terminate. Even so, this concentration is more sparse than would be expected in even a smaller US Pre-World War II transit oriented downtown.   Other, smaller concentrations of tall commercial buildings or skyscrapers are virtually isolated. The Guangzhou International Finance Center, the tallest building in Guangzhou and 10th tallest in the world dominates its generally low rise surroundings, soon to be joined by an even taller 116 floor building that is under construction.

    The pattern of dispersed and large central area development is also obvious in nearby Shenzhen, Guangdong (population 15 million, see Note), which rose from being fishing village to megacity status in less than 30 years. The central core occupies at least as much space as central Guangzhou. However, unlike Guangzhou, part of the Shenzhen central area has relatively dense high-rise buildings. This eastern section has a number of very tall buildings, and of the world’s second tallest skyscraper (and China’s tallest) is now under construction in this area (the Pingan International Financial Center).

    Other Chinese urban areas with generally dispersed core commercial development include Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan (5 million), Changsha, capital of Hunan (2.5 million), Taiyuan, capital of Shanxi (3 million), Kunming, capital of Yunan (3.2 million) Guiyang, capital of Guizhou (2.3 million), Ningbo, Zhejiang (3.2 million) and Tianjin (7 million), a provincial level municipality.

    Changsha and Taiyuan are near duplicates, with the core development in a wide area extending from the main railway station over a mile westerly to north-south rivers that dissect each urban area.

    Dongguan, Guangdong (12 million, see Note), like Shenzhen became a megacity (from a rural area) in less than two decades. Dongguan is located between Guangzhou and Shenzhen, and may have the most dispersed central business district in China, with little concentration except for an "edge city" development with comparatively large distances between buildings. Dongguan is unique for being the largest urban area in the world without an international airport (Dongguan is served by the nearby Shenzhen and Guangzhou international airports).

    Dual Cores Superimposed on Dispersed Central Areas: There is also a variation on this dispersed pattern in which the core commercial area includes two unusually high concentrations of buildings.

    The best example of this is Beijing (14 million) where an older concentration of high-rise buildings is to the west of Tiananmen Square and the Forbidden City in a corridor along the Second Ring Road (one of Beijing’s five freeway rings or beltways), and a sixth is under discussion. The newer concentration is to the east, in a corridor along the Third Ring Road. This area includes the CCTV Headquarters and the tallest building in Beijing, the 74th floor China World Trade Center III, on the other side of the Third Ring Road. These concentrations along the ring roads resemble more the post-World War II corridor form of Central Avenue in Phoenix than Manhattan, Seattle or Pittsburgh.

    Shenyang, in Manchuria, capital of Liaoning (5 million) also has two cores in the midst of a less concentrated central area.  The larger and newer core is adjacent to Shenyang North Railway Station, while the smaller and older core is near Shenyang Railway Station.

    Suzhou, in Jiangsu (3.3 million) is well known for its canals, as the Venice of the Orient. Suzhou too has two comparatively concentrated cores on either side of the older smaller low rise core. The largest concentration is to the west, adjacent to the Grand Canal, built between 1,500 and 2,500 years ago to connect Hangzhou with Beijing (1,100 miles or 1,700 kilometers), The smaller concentration is to the east. Even so the pattern of dispersion is dominant. The urban area’s tallest building, the Henghe Tower (photo) is well away from any other buildings of significant height.

    In Xi’an (5 million), capital of Shaanxi (and a historic capital of China known as Chang’an), the two more concentrated areas sit along a north-south spine on either side of the historic walled city, which includes an older, even less concentrated business district.

    Wuhan, capital of Hubei (5 million) also fits the dual model, but this is partially due to the post-war amalgamation of three cities (Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang), the first two of which have large and dispersed core areas, with some concentration.

    Hanghzou (capital of Zhejiang, 5 million) and Zhengzhou (capital of Henan, 2.3 million) exhibit a somewhat different pattern of the dual core superimposed upon the typical commercial dispersion. In Hangzhou, a new central business district is under development, well to the east of the older core area. A new central business district is also being developed, with major parts completed, on the periphery of Zhengzhou (the Zhengzhou "New Area"). This area was inaccurately characterized as China’s largest Ghost City by The Daily Mail (London).

    Shanghai: Shanghai (19 million) deserves special mention. A business center since the 1920s, Shanghai boasts one of China’s more concentrated central business districts, west of the Pu River (Puxi) as well as perhaps the world’s largest edge city development, across the river in Pudong. Puxi includes the famous Bund area along the river with its classic western architecture. The central business district continues westerly and to the south to beyond the north-south elevated freeway. This district has tall buildings widely dispersed throughout. Some of Shanghai’s tallest buildings are here, though few are close to one another. Pudong includes the Pearl of the Orient Tower (either loved or hated by architectural critics), the 101 story Shanghai International Financial Center and a number of other tall and unique skyscrapers (photo). This concentration, however, is separated by large streets and plazas and does not resemble the concentrated central business districts of the United States. Soon, this area will add a 128 story building, which will be the third tallest in the world (measured in feet or meters).

    Nanjing: Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu (4 million) has a more American looking central business district, by virtue of a number of tall buildings located close together at or near the Xinjieko intersection. Yet, Nanjing’s tallest building and seventh the tallest in the world (Nanjing Greenland Financial Center) sits well to the north of Xinjieko, while the other tallest buildings are a subway stop to the east.

    Chongqing: Chongqing, a provincial level municipality, has an urban area population of 7 million. Chongqing breaks the mold, with a central business district that would be familiar to urbanites in the United States (photo). The core of Chongqing sits on a peninsula formed by the confluence of the Yangtze River and the Jailing River. It bears a resemblance to Pittsburgh, down to a plaza similar to the Golden Triangle. Close by and up a hill may be China’s only US style-central business district. Here, the streets are narrow, the buildings are tall, and there are canyons like those of pre-World War II Pittsburgh, Seattle or even Manhattan. Much of this anomaly is probably due to the constrained geography of the central area. At the same time, commercial development is crossing the Yangtze River and spread to formerly rural areas west, such as Daping and Shapingba . These areas are up to forty-five minutes from the core.

    None of this, of course, is surprising, since China, like America and elsewhere, is like nowhere else in the world.

    ———

    Note: The population figures shown for Shenzhen and Dongguan are based upon unofficial estimates that include the non-permanent (migrant) population. Official figures in these two prefectures generally include only permanent residents, who may represent 50 percent or less of the population.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life”

    Lead photo: Second Ring Road Corridor, Beijing (by Author)

    All photos by author.

  • Malthusian Delusions Grip Australia

    Entrepreneur Dick Smith wants Australian families to be subject to China-like population doctrine. Families should be limited to just two children, the father of two and grandfather of six says, because our population growth is something like ‘a plague of locusts.’

    Yet in reality, as in many other advanced countries, our population crisis may have more to do with having too few — specifically younger — people than too many.

    The anti-population jihad is nothing new. Thomas Malthus was an 18th century economist and Anglican clergyman, whose ‘Essay on the Principles of Population’ (published 1798) popularised the notion that vice, plague and famine were natural forms of population control. In short, overpopulation would be subject to control by food scarcity.   

    Maulthusians almost 200 years later, in 1968, Paul Ehrlich wrote the blockbuster ‘The Population Bomb’ which warned of imminent mass starvations and famine due to overpopulation.  

    Now joining the fray is our very own Dick Smith, former super-nerd and founder of Dick Smith Electronics stores, aviator, publisher (of Australian Geographic), entrepreneur and 1986 ‘Australian of the Year.’  

    Dick’s a popular figure in Australia, and when he speaks people (and the media) listen. But Dick’s suggestion that Australia is overpopulated, and thus requires we need to limit our growth through a two child policy borders on the hysterical.

    First, let’s start with some global perspective. Overall, world population growth rates are slowing according to the United Nations and the US Census Bureau. Further, based on United Nations forecasts, populations by 2050 will be smaller than they are today in 50 countries – leading economies included. Here’s a useful article from The Economist which explains. And in this article from Bloomberg’s Businessweek, titled ‘Shrinking Societies: the other Population Crisis’, the massive economic and social problems of countries with falling populations are highlighted.

    Australia’s ageing population is not as severe as that looming in Europe and much of east Asia, but this country also faces a demographic implosion that, in the absence of more young people, will place unprecedented demands on a welfare system largely unfunded by the present tax system and those who fund it (namely, workers in the private sector).

    But strangely, discussions about our ageing population and how to fund it and concerns about the overpopulation of Australia take place largely without a logical connection drawn between the two. If we are to avoid a horrendous tax burden on the future generation of workers, in order to maintain our standard of living and support the needs of the boomers, we will need more workers. It’s either that or higher taxes. And the problem with higher taxes, as other countries with similar problems have found, is that they can lead to an exodus of the workforce seeking better opportunities elsewhere. This in turn reduces the tax base. No ‘win-win’ there.

    Doug Saunders is the author of ‘Arrival City,’ a book about the conflicts and change brought on by massive urban migrations. And in this article he explains, “by 2050, most Western countries will have to devote between 27 and 30 per cent of their GDP to spending on retirees and their needs”. This he adds, will produce fiscal deficits in most advanced countries of almost 25 per cent of GDP, making the current crisis seem minuscule by comparison.

    This is not a remote or abstract crisis. Countries like Canada will soon be fighting to attract anyone we can get to work – and squeezing as much as we can from the remaining few.

    Australia has been fond of comparing itself to Canada. We are both western democracies, operating under similar governance systems. We both have relatively small populations given our geographic size (Canada has 34 million people, we have 23 million) and abundant natural resources. The resource we both lack is people. If Saunders is right about Canada fearing the same demographic problems as Japan (population 127 million), Australia might want to take note.

    Dick Smith’s concerns for Australia rely on a second, also false, argument:

    "We are putting our kids into high-rise because we are running out of land, because people want and need to live close to the city. We pay $50 million a year for free range eggs for our bloody chooks to be free range – what about our kids? I was a free range kid. I had a backyard. We are starting to lose that now, and it’s only driven by the huge population increases." (full article here)

    But Dick, we aren’t running out of land. This argument is preposterous, on any valid domestic or global comparison. The reason we are denying future generations a backyard in preference over high density dwelling is not a land shortage brought on by population growth, but a planning philosophy which insists on growth boundaries and high density. This policy is embraced by most planners. Developers and land economists could explain this to Dick, if he were prepared to listen. Plenty of people, given the choice, would happily occupy suburban blocks far from CBDs because their work (which for 9 out of 10 Australians is not in the CBDs) and their lifestyle preferences (typically raising a family) are that way inclined. Those people though are not planners, and neither are they part of the current oligarchy which delivers decisions allegedly in their interests via the confines of inner city coffee shops.

    Even in the United Kingdom (population 62 million, in an area slightly larger than Victoria) there are those proposing the establishment of new urban centres to provide housing choice and to accommodate growth. Ian Abley’s Audacity.org has proposed a ‘250 New Towns’ movement, which seeks to do precisely that.

    If there are those prepared to venture such audacious ideas in a small place like the UK, one wonders why Australia has allowed itself to become preoccupied with the notion that we are somehow running out of land.

    Australia’s growth rate is currently a dizzying 1.6% per annum. It’s fallen from a high of 2%, as international migration was reduced. Neither rates of growth, on a global scale, are remarkable. By 2050, when global population growth is predicted to stop, our total population will reach an estimated 35 million people, of whom 23% – or nearly one in four – will be aged over 65.

    It reads not like a recipe for over population, but one of under population.  Perhaps it’s time the tiny thought bubbles of Dick Smith and his cohorts in this discussion were well and truly pricked by the sharp end of reality?

    Ross Elliott has more than 20 years experience in property and public policy. His past roles have included stints in urban economics, national and state roles with the Property Council, and in destination marketing. He has written extensively on a range of public policy issues centering around urban issues, and continues to maintain his recreational interest in public policy through ongoing contributions such as this or via his monthly blog The Pulse.

  • Cities and the Census: Cities Neither Booming Nor Withering

    For many mayors across the country, including New York City’s Michael Bloomberg, the recently announced results of the 2010 census were a downer. In a host of cities, the population turned out to be substantially lower than the U.S. Census Bureau had estimated for 2010—in New York’s case, by some 250,000 people. Bloomberg immediately called the decade’s meager 2.1 percent growth, less than one-quarter the national average, an “undercount.” Senator Charles Schumer blamed extraterrestrials, accusing the Census Bureau of “living on another planet.” The truth, though, is that the census is very much of this world. It just isn’t the world that mayors, the media, and most urban planners want to see.

    Start with the fact that America continues to suburbanize. The country’s metropolitan areas have two major components: core cities (New York City, for example) and suburbs (such as Westchester County, Long Island, northern New Jersey, and even Pike County in Pennsylvania). During the 2000s, the census shows, just 8.6 percent of the population growth in metropolitan areas with more than a million people took place in the core cities; the rest took place in the suburbs. That 8.6 percent represents a decline from the 1990s, when the figure was 15.4 percent. The New York metropolitan area was no outlier: though it did better than the national average, with 29 percent of its growth taking place within New York City, that’s still a lot lower than the 46 percent that the center region saw in the 1990s.

    This may be shocking to some. For years, academics, the media, and big-city developers have been suggesting that suburbs were dying and that people were flocking back to the cities that they had fled in the 1970s. The Obama administration has taken this as gospel. “We’ve reached the limits of suburban development,” Housing and Urban Development secretary Shaun Donovan opined in 2010. “People are beginning to vote with their feet and come back to the central cities.” Yet of the 51 metropolitan areas that have more than 1 million residents, only three—Boston, Providence, and Oklahoma City—saw their core cities grow faster than their suburbs. (And both Boston and Providence grew slowly; their suburbs just grew more slowly. Oklahoma City, meanwhile, built suburban-style residences on the plentiful undeveloped land within city limits.)

    All this suburbanization means that the best unit for comparison may not be the core city but the metropolitan area, and the census shows clearly which metropolitan areas are growing and which are not. The top ten population gainers—growing by 20 percent, twice the national average or more—are the metropolitan areas surrounding Las Vegas, Raleigh, Austin, Charlotte, Riverside–San Bernardino, Orlando, Phoenix, Houston, San Antonio, and Atlanta. These areas are largely suburban in form. None developed the large, dense core cities that dominated America before the post–World War II suburban boom began. By contrast, many of the metropolitan areas that grew at rates half the national average or less—San Francisco, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Boston, New York—have core areas that are the old, dense variety. Planners and pundits may like density, but people, for the most part, continue to prefer more space.

    If you do look at cities themselves, rather than at larger metropolitan areas, you’ll see that the census reveals three different categories. The most robust cities, with population growth over 15 percent for the decade—Raleigh, Austin, Charlotte, Las Vegas, Jacksonville, and Orlando—were located within the kind of metropolitan area that urbanists tend to dislike: highly suburbanized, dominated by single-family homes, and with few people using public transit. That’s partly because these cities developed along largely suburban lines by annexing undeveloped land and low-density areas. This has been the case in virtually all the fastest-growing cities. Raleigh has expanded its boundaries to become 12 times larger than it was in 1950; Charlotte and Orlando are nine times larger, and Jacksonville an astounding 25 times larger.

    At the opposite end of the spectrum are core cities, mostly in the Midwest and Northeast and often land-constrained, that have continued to shrink. These include longtime disaster zones like Detroit and Cleveland as well as newer ones like Birmingham in the South. They include Pittsburgh, a city much praised for its livability but one that is aging rapidly and whose city government, based disproportionately on revenue from universities and nonprofits, is among the nation’s most fiscally strapped. They even include Chicago, which lost some 200,000 people during the 2000s, its population falling to the lowest level since the 1910 census. The reasons aren’t hard to identify: despite all the hype about Chicago’s recovery and the legacy of Mayor Richard M. Daley, the Windy City is among the most fiscally weak urban areas in the country, its schools are in terrible shape, and its economy is struggling.

    Finally, there are cities that have grown, but not quickly. New York City’s population, for example, inched to a record high in the 2000s, but that growth was less than the national average. The population of Los Angeles grew a mere 97,000—the smallest increase since the 1890s. Many of the slow-growing cities (New York, San Francisco, and Boston, for example) suffer from high housing costs, which inhibit population growth. But they also host high-end industries—finance, technology, and business services—and enough well-paid workers in these industries to afford pricey housing and sustain a small rate of growth. The cities also attract already wealthy people from elsewhere.

    The census provides information on a smaller level, too, telling us not just which cities have grown, but where the growth has taken place within cities. Often, it has been in and around the historic downtowns. This is a trend in many cities that otherwise differ starkly (New York, St. Louis, Chicago, Los Angeles), and it reflects a subtle shift in the role of the downtown. Rather than reasserting themselves as dominant job centers, downtowns are becoming residential and cultural—a change that H. G. Wells predicted when he wrote that by 2000, the center of London would be “essentially a bazaar, a great gallery of shops and places of concourse and rendezvous.” What may have been an office, industrial, or retail zone morphs into a gentrified locale attractive to the migratory global rich, to affluent young people, and to childless households.

    This downtown recovery (which many cities subsidized heavily) was partly why so many urbanists and developers identified a broader back-to-the-city movement; but in reality, the phenomenon was usually limited to a relatively small population and a relatively small area. Since 1950, for example, St. Louis has lost a greater share of its population than any American city ever boasting 500,000 or more residents. The area from downtown to Central West End experienced strong growth during the 2000s, however, adding more people than Portland’s Pearl District, a favorite of urban planners. Yet this gain of 7,000 people was far from enough to offset the loss of 36,000 in the rest of St. Louis.

    It’s also worth noting that in economic terms, downtowns are losing their hold. For example, though the residential population of Chicago’s Loop tripled to 20,000 in the past decade, that famed business district lost almost 65,000 jobs; its share of the metropolitan area’s employment also fell. Los Angeles’s downtown, whose population has likewise grown, lost roughly 200,000 jobs from 1995 to 2005. Manhattan is losing employment share to the other four boroughs, as it has been for decades; but as a recent report from the Center for an Urban Future reveals, the process accelerated over the last ten years. From 2000 to 2009, Manhattan lost a net 41,833 jobs, while other boroughs saw net increases. This employment dispersion is even more evident in the suburbs. Of commuters who live in the inner-ring suburbs (such as Yonkers and East Orange), 60 percent work in their home counties and only 14 percent in Manhattan. Of commuters from such outer-ring suburbs as Haverstraw and Morristown, 73 percent work in their home counties and 6 percent in Manhattan.

    What, in the end, does the census tell us about America’s cities today? Certainly not that they’re dying, as they threatened to do in the 1950s, but equally certainly that they aren’t roaring back. Cities remain a successful niche product for a relatively small percentage of the population. Most people, though, even in the New York metropolitan area, continue to move toward the periphery rather than the core. That said, New York’s continuing growth over the past decade suggests that its recovery will likely prove durable. As for Senator Schumer’s “another planet” allegations, the census is simply confirming the fact that terrestrial Americans continue to disperse, both within and among metropolitan areas. So far, there’s little that planners, policy makers, and urban boosters can do about that.

    This piece originally appeared in City Journal.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life”

    Photo by caruba

  • Actually, Cities are Part of the Economy

    “The prosperity of our economy and communities is dependent on the political structures and mechanisms used to manage and coordinate our economic systems.”

    No politician expecting to be taken seriously would say that today. State intervention was discredited long before it collapsed in the 1980s. Even our prime minister in Australia pays lip-service to “flexible markets with the right incentives and price signals to maximise the value of our people and capital resources.” But how does that square with her government’s quiet push for a more intrusive urban policy agenda?

    Over the last twelve months, Infrastructure Minister Anthony Albanese has been laying the ground work for a grand National Urban Policy, to be announced later in the year. To this end, he released three dense documents. Last March we got State of Australian Cities 2010 (“Cities 2010”), a compilation of statistics confirming, amongst other things, that cities account for 80 per cent of our Gross Domestic Product. Then in December came a discussion paper and a background paper, both called Our Cities.

    Their general drift can be gauged from a line in the latter’s final chapter. It’s the sentence quoted at the top of this article, with the words “cities” and “urban” replacing “economy” and “economic.”

    Embarrassed to champion intervention at the macro level, progressives resort to carving chunks out of the national economy and relabeling them “the environment”, “social capital” or “urban planning” before turning reality upside down. As he moves urban policy to the environment ledger, Mr. Albanese promises to transform the “productivity, sustainability and liveability” of our cities. Intervention is bad for the national economy, it seems, but good for the 80 per cent of GDP generated by cities.

    Urban Myths

    The authors of Mr. Albanese’s documents are anonymous, but aficionados will recognize the handiwork of Curtin University’s Sustainable Policy Institute, Griffith University’s Urban Research Program, the Faculty of the Built Environment at NSW University, and other focal-points of green orthodoxy. The reference lists are full of their output. Their technique of persuasion, recycled by Mr. Albanese’s Department, is to evoke plausible images while perpetuating three myths: suburban growth worsens carbon emissions and traffic congestion, people are being forced to live far from jobs concentrated in CBDs, and denser development will make housing cheaper.

    The discussion paper says: “Australian cities generate very high carbon emissions and air pollution from our heavy reliance on carbon fuels for energy and transport. Carbon emissions from transport are principally due to the lengths of trips necessitated by our dispersed cities and our extensive use of private motor vehicles.” Variations of this passage recur throughout the documents. It sounds plausible enough. So many vehicles cris-crossing our wide open cities must be spewing out heaps of carbon dioxide. But the documents ignore evidence painting a different picture.

    There is the Australian Conservation Foundation’s Consumption Atlas, which found that dense, affluent, inner-suburbs account for more carbon than the dispersed fringe, suggesting that, as a factor in emissions, general consumption trumps settlement patterns; there is a 2007 study by Randolph and Troy confirming earlier findings that energy consumption per capita in high-density developments, like high-rise apartments, is notably higher than in detached housing; there is a recent report by Allen Consulting for the Victorian Building Commission, noting the absence of conclusive evidence that vertical living is more ‘sustainable’ than conventional homes; and there is more.

    None of these rate a mention in the documents. Chapter 5 of the background paper does reference a couple of studies by Alford and Whteman (2009) and Trubka, Newman and Bisborough (2010), but these focus on “transport energy consumption” and “transport greenhouse gases.” They don’t investigate the impact of urban form on general consumption, the real determinant of emission levels. And a study by Perkins et al (2009), cited in Cities 2010, actually contradicts the approved message: “overall, it cannot be assumed that centralised, higher density living will deliver per capita emission reductions for residents … ”

    There is no reliable evidence that suburban growth is worse for emissions. Even Griffith’s Brendan Gleeson, a very green urbanist, had to concede that “the faith … in residential density as a simple lever that can be used to manipulate urban sustainability appears to be misplaced. New Australian scientific analysis points to the consumptive lifestyle, not the nature of one’s dwelling, as the root of environmental woes.”

    In any event, transport accounts for 14 per cent of Australia’s 1.4 per cent share of global emissions, or a minuscule 0.197 per cent of the world’s carbon. We should retain a sense of perspective, even if the documents obsess about our high per capita emissions. If the climate is being affected (a big if), it’s absolute volumes that matter.

    Allied to the myth of carbon-spewing suburbs is the myth of centrally-located jobs. We read in Cities 2010 that “the impacts of outward expansion and low density residential development have been a greater separation between residential areas and locations of employment …” The discussion paper asserts, more directly, that “the trend to inner-city living reflects changing preferences for dwellings and location – living closer to employment that is concentrated in central areas.” Again, similar statements crop up throughout the documents. People shouldn’t have to drive or commute long distances to a “centre” where the jobs are.

    Evidence to the contrary is easy to find. According to the NSW Department of Transport, only 12 per cent of Sydney’s jobs are in the CBD, and second tier centres like North Sydney, Chatswood, Parramatta, Hustville and Penrith have no more than 1.8 per cent each. The rest are distributed throughout the metropolitan region. In the case of Melbourne, McCloskey, Birrell and Yip (2009) say it’s absurd to concentrate housing near transit lines since only 19 per cent of jobs within the Melbourne Statistical Division (MSD – Greater Melbourne) were located in the Melbourne Local Government Area (the CBD), while 81 per cent “are scattered throughout the rest of the MSD”.

    In fact, the background paper points out that a majority of the employed in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth live within 10 kilometres of their workplace, while around 15 per cent live more than 20 kilometres away. This is hardly a disaster in the making. Consistently, Cities 2010 refers to “evidence that commuting distances have been stable or even declining since the 1990s in a number of capital cities.”

    For green urbanists, these myths are indispensible. Their agenda hasn’t a hope unless the public accepts that suburban growth will spoil the climate, and hike congestion and transport costs. As for housing affordability, the documents take a leave-pass (social housing is another story). They promote the term “living affordability”, adding petrol prices and mortgage rates to the equation.

    Evidence linking costly housing to supply restrictions on the fringe, like the annual Demographia survey, is too inconvenient. When the background paper does get around to the subject, it says “multiple factors [impede] the delivery of an efficient supply of suitable and affordable housing.”
    These include “land zoning and building code regulations and other standards related to building quality.” A few pages later, however, canvassing some solutions to the problem, the paper proposes “reforming planning systems to … position a variety of residential development in close proximity to centres and transport infrastructure”. Doesn’t this mean a lot more inefficient “land zoning”?

    This is just one instance of disjointed logic and economic illiteracy; many others are scattered throughout the documents.

    The Invisible Hand and Land

    Actually, cities are part of the economy, and are subject to the same principles. The operations of demand, supply and prices are equally applicable to land and structures. They can’t be erased by regulation, even if it’s called planning and zoning. The inflationary effect of coercive zoning on land values is the elephant in the room. Nowhere is it acknowledged in the documents.

    Consider two recent press items. Retail tenants in Pitt Street Mall, the heart of Sydney’s CBD, are paying rents as high as $13,000 a square meter, while industrial tenants on the north-west outskirts pay around $237. These rent differentials are, of course, a function of distance, and influence the viability, not just the location, of various types of activities.

    Restricting expansion and other forms of coercive zoning place an escalating floor under peripheral rents and values. Mr. Albanese’s authors fail to appreciate the implications of this, not least for “urban productivity.” There is little call to dwell on economic mechanisms if you believe, as the discussion paper puts it, “the private sector, through a myriad of individual decisions and investments, guided and constrained by government investments, regulations or charges, is a powerful shaper of cities [emphasis added]”.

    In the documents, lifting productivity boils down to cutting the costs of traffic congestion, estimated to reach $20 billion a year by 2020, principally by reducing “car dependency” (another loaded term, echoing drug dependency).

    Ignoring the reality of high job dispersal, the background paper says “a key challenge is to reduce dependence on motor vehicles while maintaining access between and within locations … the Australian Government recognises that it has a role … in investing in major mass transit systems, identifying and protecting new transport corridors and supporting means to shift from private vehicles to public transport”. But as McCloskey, Birrell and Yip explain, “the high level of job dispersal around Melbourne [and other cities] cannot be easily unwound.” In those conditions, Mr. Albanese’s strategy is doomed to failure.

    Alternatively, when diseconomies from congestion start to outweigh economies from centrality, firms and commuters will move to other, less congested sites, easing congestion all-round. This is the only effective, long-term solution to congestion. However by mandating concentration rather than enabling dispersion, evidenced by a dim view of road-building, green planning stymies this process. The documents want to end it altogether.

    According to the background paper, “connectivity within cities can also be achieved by placing people closer to the jobs, facilities, goods and services they desire – or putting these closer to where people live. This highlights the important role of integrated land-use and infrastructure planning in managing the need for physical travel”. But this notion, that firms and residences can be “placed” by a central authority, is logically flawed. It suffers from something akin to a “coordination problem” (a concept from game theory).

    Suppose household A has, in existing circumstances, chosen its optimal location relative to (1) affordable housing, (2) employment and (3) services. How can the government arrange things so that A ends up in a more optimal location? Moving A closer to work may push it further from affordable housing and services. Moved closer to services, A may end up further from other factors, and so on. It’s unlikely that the government can ever place A in a better location relative to all three factors.

    Then suppose household B has chosen its own optimal location relative to the three factors, some distance away from the point chosen by A. How does the government improve the outcome for both households? Action benefiting A may hurt B and vice versa.

    The same problem can be framed for businesses locating relative to (1) competitive rents, (2) transport routes, (3) suppliers, (4) suitable labour and (5) customers (market). Our cities host hundreds of thousands of households and businesses. There is no way that a planning hierarchy can engineer a more efficient outcome than the people themselves, interacting freely in the marketplace. Official meddling is more likely to induce problems than solve them.

    Instances of disjointed logic abound. One paper talks about “micro-reforms to reduce costs to businesses and consumers”, but another urges “access to a range of [more expensive and less efficient] high-quality renewable energy sources”; a paper commends “the principle of subsidiarity, ensuring that the most local level of government is used …”, but then calls for “improving alignment and integration of planning and investment across all three levels of government to support the nationally agreed … objective”; a paper demands action to “reduce red tape”, but all three documents offer heaps more instruments and regulations.

    Ultimately, Mr. Albanese’s documents are the pretext for a new wave of intrusion into economic life. As such, they represent a glaring case of bureaucratic overreach. However much he may spruik flats, smaller houses, public transport and higher utility bills as an enhancement of urban “liveability”, most Australians will disdain them as anything but liveable.

    John Muscat is a co-editor of The New City, where this piece originally appeared. 

    Photo by Joseph Younis.

  • What kind of Cities do we Want, Sustainable, Liveable or Resilient?

    A critical issue from the dreadful earthquake that has severely damaged so much of central Christchurch, taken so many lives, and terrified so many residents of the whole urban area, lies in whether the Central Area should be rebuilt. Some believe it should be abandoned for some other location; others see an opportunity to set new standards in sustainability, urban design, energy efficiency, or whatever ideal urban form takes your fancy.

    Let’s put the issue of “sustainable cities” to one side because the can words means anything, and hence mean nothing.  It has become one of the most overused phrases in the English language.

    Not surprisingly, Many of Auckand’s leaders are thrilled by the recent official ranking of Auckland as the tenth most livable city in the world, and have announced their determination to make Auckland even more “liveable” than it is now. This target of livability is also surfacing in Christchurch, normally to bolster demands for urban rail, transit-oriented gentrification, promoting cycling and walking, and making the city attractive to the “creative class”.

    However this quote from a US urban blog should give the livability boosters pause:

    Much of the highly touted livability of Portland has come at the expense of making it unlivable, that is, unaffordable, to anyone without a six figure income. The creative and professional classes thrive in Portland because they are the only ones who can afford it, and they are the ones who appreciate the development style the city has tried to mandate.

    I first raised this issue of ‘rich folk’s livability’ in How Can Cities With Unaffordable Housing Be Ranked Among The Most Livable Cities In The World? here on NewGeography. Then Wendel Cox further quantified such city’s “unlivable reality" in Unlivable Vancouver, in NewGeography.

    Cities designed to be sustainable or livable are likely to be unaffordable for all but a few.

    The Case for Resilient Cities

    Many of us watched the devastation caused by the floods in Queensland, Australia, driven by major rainstorms inland, and Pacific Typhoons devastating the West Coast and the hinterlands. The combination of a strong El Nina with the Pacific Decadal Oscillation means such events will be more common and more extreme in this part of the world than we have become used to since the similar combination of 1917/18.

    However, Phil McDermott, on his blog Cities Matter was quick to comprehend the lessons to be learned by our political leaders and urban planners.

    He opens his blog comment Cities in Search of Resilience with:

    An age of extreme events?

    Without debating whether an increase in the frequency of extreme events reflects climate warming, such events can be catastrophic when they impact on densely populated areas. Natural disturbances, whether geophysical (tsunami, earthquakes, mudslides) or climatic (flooding, hurricane strength winds, tidal surges), become disasters if they strike heavily populated centres. 

    So do human acts of aggression. The tactic of terrorising civilian populations taken to new heights in the bombing raids of the Second World War and adopted by today’s extremists is most effective – and destructive – when directed at the heart of major cities.

    Later in the post Phil sets out the following vulnerabilities generated by the current "compact city" planning paradigm:

    It relies on sophisticated, centralised interdependent systems of services. This creates greater capacity for disruption when any one part fails. Economies of scale in utilities may come with increased risk of failure under duress.  This applies to sewage treatment infrastructure, communications, water, energy distribution, and power supplies. It also applies to public transport systems.

    Poorly designed intensification reduces permeable surfaces, intensifying flood impacts.

    Converting brownfield and even greenfield sites (such as undeveloped urban space) to housing or mixed use reduces the safety valve of open space and increases vulnerability associated with the concentration of buildings and populations.

    Crowding more people into smaller spaces around constrained road capacity reduces prospects for rapid evacuation from the city or into safe structures and areas.
    Lifting the density of buildings increases the consequential impacts of severe events by such things as the collapse of structures, the spread of fire, and the transmission of disease.

    Read the whole post here. You might think Phil was setting out a list of lessons to be learned from Christchurch – but that "extreme event" was still in the future. A few days later, Phil responded to this tragedy with a second blog post, that picked up the same theme, titled "A Cruel Blow to a Beautiful City" which offers this timely warning:

    We cannot resist the power of earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunami, and the like. But we can perhaps limit the devastation that accompanies them.

    The implosion of many of Christchurch’s beautiful heritage buildings is a tragedy on its own, the wiping from the landscape of much of the City’s and nation’s history. But seeing the collapse of more modern buildings is sobering. 

    What are the lessons of architecture and engineering that might be drawn from this?

    How much resistance can we realistically build into our structures?  Or should we be thinking less rigidly, and explore designs that deflect or reduce the impacts when buildings are faced with irresistible forces? Should we think more about the survival of the people in and around buildings and less about the survival of the structures? Are there innovations in design that offer refuge, protection, and escape even if walls crumble and floors collapse?

    This event in Christchurch must surely erode planners’ resistance to the decentralisation that is the mark of a prosperous, modern city, that makes it that little bit more liveable, and so much more resilient in the face of disaster?

    Surely, Hurricane Katrina, and these events in Australia and New Zealand suggest that planners should stop worrying about sea level rises that MIGHT, or might not, happen in 100 years – with plenty of warning – and start thinking more about making our cities resilient in the face of catastrophic events which we know can happen tomorrow – hurricanes, cyclones, blizzards, volcanoes, earthquakes and tsunami.

    However, the proper debate should not be as simple-minded as "high rise vs. low rise" or "old vs. modern". In Christchurch, liquefaction contributed to the collapse of some of the modern buildings. In the Kyoto earthquake some robust high-rise blocks simply fell over, because of the total collapse of the ground under the building, but remained in one piece.

    Such problems and issues are not solved by sets of simple rules but by the application of skill, experience and wisdom. 

    Owen McShane is Director of the Centre for Resource Management Studies, New Zealand.

    Photo by Kym Rohman