New Geography

Category: Policy

  • Legal but Still Poor: The Economic Consequences of Amnesty

    With his questionably Constitutional move to protect America’s vast undocumented population, President Obama has provided at least five million immigrants, and likely many more, with new hope for the future. But at the same time, his economic policies, and those of the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, may guarantee that many of these newly legalized Americans will face huge obstacles trying to move up in a society creating too few opportunities already for its own citizens, much less millions of the largely ill-educated and unskilled newcomers.

    Democratic Party operatives, and their media allies, no doubt see in the legalization move a step not only to address legitimate human needs, but their own political future. With the bulk of the country’s white population migrating rapidly to the GOP, arguably the best insurance for the Democrats is to accelerate the racial polarization of the electorate. It might be good politics but we need to ask: what is the fate awaiting these new, and prospective, Americans?

    In previous waves of immigration, particularly during the early 20th Century, there were clear benefits for both newcomers and the economy. A nation rapidly industrializing needed labor, including the relatively unskilled, and, with the help of the New Deal and the growth of unions, many of these newcomers (including my own maternal grandparents) achieved a standard of living, which, if hardly affluent, was at least comfortable and moderately secure.

    Demand for labor remained strong during the big immigrant wave of the 1980s until the Great Recession. The country was building houses at a rapid clip, which required a large amount of immigrant labor. Service industries, particularly before the onset of digital systems, such as ipads for ordering, that replace human staff in fast-food restaurants, tend to hotels and provide personal services, although often at low wages.

    More recently, this wave of undocumented migration has diminished, as economic prospects, particularly for the low-skilled, have weakened. Yet the undocumented population remains upwards eleven million. Largely unskilled and undereducated, roughly half of adults 25 to 64 in this population have less than a high-school education compared to only 8 percent of the native born. Barely ten percent have any college, one third the national rate.

    This workforce is being legalized at a time of unusual economic distress for the working class. Well into the post-2008 recovery, the country suffers from rates of labor participation at a 36 year low. Many jobs that were once full-time are, in part due to the Affordable Care Act, now part-time, and thus unable to support families. Finally there are increasingly few well-paying positions—including in industry—that don’t require some sort of post-college accreditation.

    Sadly, the legalization of millions of new immigrants could make all these problems worse, particularly for Latinos already here and millions of African-Americans.

    African-American unemployment is now twice that of whites. The black middle class, understandably proud of Obama’s elevation, has been losing the economic gains made over the past thirty years.

    Latino-Americans have made huge strides in previous decades, but now are also falling behind, with a gradual loss of income relative to whites. Poverty among Latino children in America has risen from 27.5 percent in 2007 to 33.7 percent in 2012, an increase of 1.7 million minors.

    Logically, many Latinos and African-Americans might suspect that amnesty won’t be a great deal for them. There are occasional signs of disquiet. A recent Pew survey found that not only half of all whites, but nearly two-fifths of African Americans and roughly even a third of Hispanics approved of increased deportations of the undocumented. A Wall Street Journal-NBC poll found that well less than half of Latinos supported the President’s action.

    This ambivalence may reflect the reality that legalization of the undocumented may be felt hardest in those places, such as California, that have attracted the most newcomers, and also have highly developed welfare states. Today public agencies in Los Angeles, with an estimated one million undocumented immigrants, are bracing from large increases in the demand for state provided services.

    One LA Supervisor estimates the County, facing “an already impossible fiscal dilemma,” will need to spend an additional $190 million, without hope of federal compensation, on the newly legalized population. Ultimately, the newest migrants will be competing with existing residents—particularly poorer ones—not only for jobs but also social services.

    The President’s action on immigration requires a profound shift in economic policy, particularly in the large urban centers where most undocumented are clustered, to avoid creating a squeeze on scarce jobs and services. But Obama’s other big agenda—addressing climate change—has slowed the expansion of fossil fuel development. Meanwhile, it’s the energy sector that creates precisely the kinds of high-paying blue collar jobs, averaging upwards of $100,000 annually, that immigrants might be eager to fill and could give low unskilled workers a foothold into the middle class.

    Similarly, efforts by Obama’s allies at Federal agencies like HUD to encourage dense housing and discourage suburban growth means far less construction employment, one of the largest generators of good blue collar jobs and opportunities.

    Ironically, the places where the cry for amnesty has been the loudest—New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Chicago—also tend to be those places that have created the least opportunity for the urban poor. This is in part due to the fact that these areas have tended to de-industrialize the most rapidly, discourage fledgling grassroots businesses through high taxes, environmental and housing, regulations.

    Whatever their noble intentions, these cities generally suffer the largest degree of income inequality, notes a recent Brookings study. In fact, according to an analysis by Mark Schill at the Praxis Strategy Group, African-American incomes in New York are barely half those of whites and, in San Francisco somewhat below half. In contrast, cities with broader economies like Dallas and Houston, have black populations earning sixty five percent of white incomes. Similarly, Latinos in Boston, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco do far worse, relative to incomes, than their Sunbelt counterparts, compared to whites.

    These trends could worsen in precisely those areas with the biggest concentrations of undocumented immigrants covered by Obama’s executive order.

    Take, for example, the borough of the Bronx in New York City. The most Latino of all New York’s counties, in the Bronx, roughly one in three households live in poverty, the highest rate of any large urban county.

    In the country. It’s doubtful that legalization absent job growth will improve conditions , as it adds more potential claimants for local benefits without creating new income sources.

    For reasons that can’t be purely economic, most Latino political leaders, and much of the group’s electorate, are in favor of policies that, over time, could doom prospects for Those who receive amnesty. Of course, there are other factors that play into support for these policies, like the emotional pull to reunite families, but whatever their appeal such measures could leave the very people they are meant to help as legal paupers.

    My adopted home region of Southern California has seen an almost 14% drop in high-wage blue-collar jobs since 2007. Deindustrialization has continued, and construction employment lagged, even while the country as a whole, sparked by more secure and now cheaper energy supplies, has seen industrial production improve since 2010.

    Herein lies the great dilemma then for the advocates of amnesty. In much of the country, and particularly the blue regions, they will find very few decent jobs but often a host of programs designed to ease their poverty. The temptation to increase the rolls of the dependent—and perhaps boost Democratic turnouts—may prove irresistible for the local political class.

    So what should we do under these circumstances? Constitutional arguments aside, there do seem to be some better ways to create conditions for upward mobility among newcomers.

    Higher minimum wages may help some of the legal residents, but arguably at the cost of new jobs for others including the newly amnestied. However popular with most voters, such redistributive measures will not address the fundamental economic challenge posed by amnesty.

    Perhaps a sounder strategy would be to adopt policies that encourage broad-based economic growth, including energy, manufacturing, logistics and home construction. This would, of course, require some moderation of regulatory standards, particularly in reference to climate change.

    The President’s recent deal with China, which essentially allows the Chinese to keep boosting emissions until 2030 while we reduce ours steeply, could make things worse. In some states like California, where the global warming consensus is beheld with theological rigidity, “green,” anti-suburban policies largely guarantee that most of the urban poor will never enter the middle class. In San Francisco, Boston and New York, the percentage of Latino and black homeowners is roughly one-third to one-half that seen in redder regions like Houston, Dallas, Phoenix and Atlanta.

    In essence, the deepest blue states have created the worst of all conditions for the urban poor, and will be particularly tough on undocumented residents granted amnesty.

    All this suggests that, if we are to make new Americans economically successful, we need to concentrate not on racial redress but find ways to spark broad based economic growth. Increasing use of inexpensive natural gas, for example, would not only help continue to reduce emissions but would spark an industrial expansion that would create more blue collar jobs. Similarly, policies that allowed for affordable, energy efficient new homes could create not only more blue collar employment possibilities, but a brighter future for young families, many of whom are themselves immigrants or their children.

    The current amnesty could benefit both the country overall as well as recent immigrants if it is tacked to a broad based economic growth strategy. But that doesn’t seem to be in the cards. Instead, continuing policies that inhibit broad-based economic growth are increasing the numbers of Americans who must depend on government, not the economy, to take care of themselves and their families.

    This piece originally appeared at The Daily Beast.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and Distinguished Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures at Chapman University, and a member of the editorial board of the Orange County Register. His newest book, The New Class Conflict is now available at Amazon and Telos Press. He is author of The City: A Global History and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. His most recent study, The Rise of Postfamilialism, has been widely discussed and distributed internationally. He lives in Los Angeles, CA.

    Photo by telwink

  • 10 Steps to Financial System Stability: Lessons Not Learned

    Recently, BloombergView writer Michael Lewis called attention to tape recordings made by a Federal Reserve Bank of New York bank examiner who was stationed inside Goldman Sachs’ offices for several months during 2011-2012. She released the tapes to This American Life who aired her story on September 26, 2014. Every media article I’ve seen on this begins with a prelude warning how complicated and hard to follow the story will be. Regular readers of New Geography are several steps ahead in their understanding of these causes and consequences of the financial crisis. If you are new here, you can follow the links in this piece to earlier NG articles.

    Central to the theme of the story is the release of a 2009 report by Columbia University professor David Beim on why the Federal Reserve – especially the New York office which was supposed to be watching the banks – failed to act to prevent the crisis. Beim listed about a dozen “Lessons Learned” by bank supervisors after the financial crisis. In this article, we list the Lessons not Learned before the financial crisis. These lessons come from decades-old studies of financial regulation from around the world. If any US policy makers had paid attention in school, we would have avoided the global financial collapse of 2008. The United States – which was at the center of that storm – had been preaching these steps to emerging market nations for decades. Unfortunately, they just were not following them for us. In the fall of 1998, those emerging market economies seriously threatened the financial stability of the West. In the fall of 2008, it was the West that brought the threat upon itself and the rest of the world.

    Four Policies, Five Tasks and One Idea

    Policies not implemented

    1. Have private, independent rating agencies: US rating agencies were technically independent because they were not owned by the government. However, with the creation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization” or NRSRO designation, three big credit rating agencies were the only ones accepted for use to meet regulatory requirements – they were issuing 98% of all credit ratings. This gave a government imprimatur to selected businesses, creating undue reliance by financial markets globally. By 2008, the “NRSRO” term appeared in more than 15 SEC rules and forms (not including those directly used for NRSROs), plus rules in all 50 states. NRSROs are also referenced in 46 Federal Reserve rules and regulations. Even though the SEC sanctioned and required the use of the NRSROs they had no say in the process used to establish the ratings.

    Despite even pseudo-independence from the government, the NRSROs were not independent of the financial institutions that paid them to issue credit ratings. The government sanction gave them more power to wield against – or in favor of – the banks and companies they rated. They made money consulting for the same firms, resulting in pressure to rate bonds higher than they should have been rated.

    2. Provide some government safety net but not so much that banks are not held accountable:  Many banks – and all of the New York Feds “primary dealers” – achieved “too big to fail” status through the Wall Street Bailout Act. A few were allowed to fail in the months leading up to the passage of the Bailout – most notably Lehman Brothers – in what amounted to the federal government picking winners and losers without accountability. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was nearly bankrupted in late 2009, removing the safety net that protected depositors. The FDIC was so depleted by the epidemic of collapsing banks, they eased the rules on buyers of failing banks, opening the door for hedge funds and private investors to gain access to “bank” status – and the protections that go with it. At the end of September 2009, the FDIC’s fund was already negative by $8.2 billion, a decrease of 180% in just three months. FDIC is projected to remain negative over the next several years as they absorb some $75 billion in failure costs just through the end of last year.

    At the same time, bailed-out banks, brokers and private corporations received additional financial support from the Federal Reserve in a move unprecedented in US history. Billions of dollars in loans were made to the banks without proper documentation. The lack of transparency in the process used by the Treasury to decide who would receive bailout funds and what the recipients have done with the hundreds of billions of dollars was the subject of a GAO audit we wrote about in 2011.

    3. Allow very little government ownership and control of national financial assets: Four years after the crisis, the U.S. Treasury still owned more than half of American International Group, Inc., (AIG). AIG was the world’s largest insurance company – giving the government ownership in international financial assets, too. The U.S. government took ownership positions in virtually every major financial institution during the bailout, plus some non-banks that had lending arms (like General Motors Acceptance Corporation). The GAO audit of the Fed shows we loaned money to and took ownership stakes in a slew of non-regulated businesses like Target and Harley Davidson. The lack of transparency in these transactions is dangerous. Austrian Economist Ludwig von Mises warned decades earlier that market data could be “falsified by the interference of the government,” with misleading results for businesses and consumers.

    4. Allow banks to reduce the volatility of returns by offering a wide-range of services: Until the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, banks were restricted to buying securities defined as investment grade by the NRSROs. Given what we now know about these ratings and the actual riskiness of some AAA-rated investments, the requirement actually made bank investments more dangerous. The process followed in the years (even decades) leading up to the collapse of credit markets was not one that would meet the definition of “unrestricted.” Although there appeared to be a wide range of activities available to US banks, the restriction on credit ratings would eventually increase volatility by concentrating risk instead of dispersing it. Just because a bank can deal in a particular investment does not mean that they should.

    The steps outlined here are a comprehensive program, not a menu of options.  There is no sense allowing banks wide latitude to make risky investments if proper supervision and enforcement is not in place. That leads us to the next steps: the necessary tasks for prudent regulation.

    Tasks Not Taken

    Ten years before the most recent financial crisis (1998), the international financial system had already entered a new era. Speaking at the Western Economics International Association in 2001, Lord John Eatwell said, “The potential economy-wide inefficiency of liberalised financial markets was indisputable.” Eatwell had been writing about these problems for decades.

    5. Require financial market players to register and be authorized: US regulators failed to act on establishing registration for hedge funds, failed to establish requirements for registering who can issue collateralized mortgage obligations (mortgage-backed securities), and failed to act on loopholes in regulations prohibiting insurance companies like AIG from issuing credit default swaps through subsidiaries – the list goes on. Dodd-Frank established the Financial Stability Oversight Council to designate “Systemically Important Nonbank” – yet another government imprimatur for unregulated entities. Instead of making sure only authorized businesses perform financial activity they are only making sure those big financial firms are bailed-out faster in the future.

    6. Provide information, including setting standards, to enhance market transparency: There were no standards for issuing derivatives. Nor for collateralized debt like the mortgage-backed bonds where there was no link from homes/real estate. Because the financial issuers had no standard for reporting changes in ownership to land offices who keep track of liens on homes (usually county-level property office), probably one-third of the bonds the Fed is buying in their monthly “quantitative easing” purchases are truly worthless.

    7. Routinely examine financial institutions to ensure that the regulatory code is obeyed: Without registration and standards, of course, they can be no surveillance by any regulator. Congress admitted that while “most of the largest, most interconnected, and most highly leveraged financial firms in the country were subject to some form of supervision” it proved to be “inadequate and inconsistent.” The story described to This American Life by Carmen Segarra is not news – it is only one more in a long history of problems.

    8. Enforce the code and discipline transgressors: Despite existing rules allowing regulators to prohibit offenders from engaging in future financial activity, only minimal fines have been issued.  “Too big to fail” practices allow regulators to “look the other way” on money laundering and other issues that put our national security at risk. According to the Special Inspector General’s Quarterly Report (September 2012), the “Treasury [is] selling its investment in banks at a loss, sometimes back to the bank itself” allowing even banks who have the ability to pay to get out of the program for less than they owe. Those responsible for creating the situation that required the Bailout have not been called to discipline. Quite the contrary, many were paid elaborate bonuses at the same time their financial institutions were receiving bailout funds.

    9. Develop policies that keep the regulatory code up to date: More than a decade before the crisis, Brooksley Born raised enormous concerns over derivatives in the US – including credit default swaps – during her tenure as chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (1996-1999).  Both the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board objected to her ideas.  On June 1, 1999, Congress passed legislation prohibiting such regulation, ushering in a long period of growth in the unregulated market. Five years after the financial crisis began, rules are still not implemented. AIG became subject to Federal Reserve supervision only in September 2012 when they bought a savings and loan holding company. By October 2, 2012, AIG had been notified that it is being considered for the “systemically important” designation – the “too big to fail” stamp of approval for everything they do.

    One Way Out

    Which leads us to one old idea that every student who ever took economics 101 should remember:

    10. Create specialized financial institutions: In the context of what we know about the policies and tasks that support financial stability, only one additional factor needs to be considered, and that is an old theory on the economic gains from specialization. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith told us that the bigger the market the greater the potential gains from specialization. With equity markets alone reaching a global value of $46 trillion, the potential gains are enormous.

    Peter Drucker made this point on specialization in 1993 in his prophetic book “Post-Capitalist Society.” While diversification is good for a portfolio of financial investments, in large systems it means “splintering.” In a system as large as financial markets, diversification “destroys the performance capacity.” If financial institutions are tools to be used in furthering the efforts of the broad economy, then as Drucker writes “the more specialized its given task, the greater its performance capacity” and therefore the greater the need for specialization.

    The rise of the financial sector has been tied to economic expansion throughout our modern business history. The more robust the flow of finance, the more robust is the potential for economic activity. Greater efficiency in capital markets can lead directly to greater efficiency in industry. Our economy, our livelihood and our well-being are inextricably related to finance at home and around the world. It is now necessary to return to the basics and recognize the long run value of economically efficient specialization. We are living in the post-capitalist society described by Drucker. US regulators have been overly focused on the financial theory of portfolio diversification, ignoring the economic importance of gains through specialization. Drucker’s forecast was accurate: “Organizations can only do damage to themselves and to society if they tackle tasks that are beyond their specialized competence.”

    None of this is to say that our long-term failure is guaranteed. What happens next will be an experiment on a grand scale. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded: “The captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial system ignored warnings and failed to question, understand, and manage evolving risks within a system essential to the well-being of the American public.” Carmen Segarra did not tell us anything new: hopefully what she told us – and what ProPublica and others are writing about it – will help a wider public to understand the problem.

    Susanne Trimbath, Ph.D. is CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services. Dr. Trimbath’s credits include appearances on national television and radio programs and the Emmy® Award nominated Bloomberg report Phantom Shares. She appears in four documentaries on the financial crisis, including Stock Shock: the Rise of Sirius XM and Collapse of Wall Street Ethicsand the newly released Wall Street Conspiracy. Dr. Trimbath was formerly Senior Research Economist at the Milken Institute. She served as Senior Advisor on United States Agency for International Development capital markets projects in Russia, Romania and Ukraine. Dr. Trimbath teaches graduate and undergraduate finance and economics.

    Wall Street bull photo by Bigstockphoto.com.

  • Long Island Suburbs: How Planners Should Treat Age Spots

    Long Island is the birthplace of suburbia, from colonial-period Brooklyn to Levittown and beyond, and its economy has survived booms and busts since the 1950s. As stagnant as it may be, if it’s anything, it is resilient. Today, its problems mirror those of many older suburban areas scattered across the country, and, like many other suburbs, its problems cannot be solved by simply shoehorning in more development – and more tax revenue. Are policymakers addressing the true thorns in the region’s side: Affordable housing, cost-of-living, taxes, racism and fear of change? Planners nationwide could learn much from Long Island if they looked closely at its successes and its failures, and how both evolved.

    In the push to expand housing after WWII, Long Island’s potato fields became subdivisions that, with the passage of time, became increasingly monochromatic, as well as increasingly expensive. The planners of yesteryear crafted strategies that set national precedents in farmland and open space preservation, while simultaneously working to manage unprecedented residential and commercial expansion. During these boom years, planners urged municipalities to protect open space, resulting in yet another set of national benchmarks in regard to groundwater protection.

    Yet the recommendations for an overtly aggressive open space acquisition program were pared down and never fully capitalized upon. Few, if any, of other recommendations leapt from the leather-bound pages of the academic planning texts to become fully implemented. Planning had its moment in the sun on Long Island, but it was quickly eclipsed by special interests with money to spend and projects to greenlight. Today,the academic approach of the previous decades is mostly gone, with the Island’s growth being managed by development firms and nonprofit stakeholder groups. Our current long-term strategies lack a detached professionalism that is unhindered by political forces and agenda-driven ideas.

    The solution being currently proposed is a call for more “responsible” growth. The question is, if growth got Long Island into this mess, how can it eventually get us out? Multifamily units are being proposed under the umbrella of responsible growth, as is the placement of additional sewers. With the arrival of sewers, it is said that growth will be allowed to flourish, helping to keep the wealthy Millennials, stop the cries of “brain drain” and subsequent regional death, and generate jobs.

    At last month’s Destination LI conference (#LIREDI hashtag on Twitter), a group of Millennials spoke about the need for sewers as well as the need for additional growth of multifamily-type units. It was nice to see a new generation become interested and invested in Long Island, and even go so far as to say that this next generation will “fight” to stay in the region. But there was little mention of the fact that there has been an overall 89% increase of units from 1989 to present, or that groundwater quality is compromised as a direct link to overdevelopment, or about the region’s sole source aquifer that dictates appropriate density levels.

    What are the realities of building truly affordable housing in suburban Long Island’s aging suburbs? How can costs be pared down so developers are enticed to build without relying on density to generate profit?

    Planners by trade have to be optimistic, but they must also be realistic when assessing a region’s needs and growth strategies. The current approach by developers and stakeholders is fueled by optimism, but studies the issues on a shallow level instead of working to solve our long-established problems.

    The biggest one? In each town and village hall across Long Island, and in our Nassau-Suffolk region, municipalities often grant density in places where it is simply not appropriate. If an area has a comprehensive plan in place, development should follow the usage that was already determined. But, more often than not, local government awards variances that drastically increase density under the guise of “responsible growth”. These variances add up to a high density sprawl that is worse than the traditional sprawl that they were meant to replace in the first place. They fly in the face of the professional planning efforts undertaken on Long Island over the previous decades. We need a return to professionalism if we are going to create legitimate and workable solutions.

    Urban planning is not merely saying that development is “responsible,” it’s assessing our regions needs by quantifying market trends, environmental data and resident feedback. Planning for our future should not be about catering to one age demographic, but rather, about addressing the needs of all Long Islanders over the course of the future decades. Instead of planning sessions focused on urging downtown development to attract jobs, planners should be justifying why development should be placed in a given downtown, or anywhere else.

    Many tout the expansion of transit, but few address the marked lack of population density that’s necessary to drive the demand and fiscal support of such expansions, or discuss the MTA’s frequent capital budget shortfalls. Planning should be crafted from a scientific and methodological approach, not from buzzwords, faulty surveys or ideal conditions that are neatly summed up on a PowerPoint slide.

    Saying we need affordable housing is easy. Execution of the concept on Long Island has been extremely difficult for decades. Yet this uncomfortable reality is not discussed on panels. Our regional problems require us to confront our balkanized districts, dissect the unbalanced economics of our real estate development, and deal with a heritage of racism furthered by exclusionary municipal jurisdictions.

    Sheer density won’t change sixty years of racial division, jumpstart our stagnant economy , or upgrade our infrastructure to 21st century standards. And, despite what county officials and a myriad of developers are saying, more sewers alone will not solve our woes. We need a sewer plan that works in conjunction with a robust open space plan, which in turn works to complement our approaches to economic development.

    In other words, we need true regional planning.

    To execute our plans, we need professionals. In recent years, municipalities have cut planning staff, and outsourced critically important planning functions to politically-connected boards and stakeholder groups. In Suffolk, the County merged a once nationally-acclaimed department of planning with the economic development department. Despite what anyone says to the contrary, crafting strategies for economic development is not planning. It is a piece of the puzzle, but there are important distinctions that have been forgotten in recent years.

    The convenient narratives of ‘brain drain’, downtown revitalization, and smart growth make it easy to stand behind a podium and tout the benefits of pure, unhindered economic development. But the elephant-sized problem in the room remains. Only this time, instead of being in a single-family home, the elephant’s room will be in in a shiny, new multi-family complex.

    Richard Murdocco regularly writes on land use and policy issues. A collection of his published work can be found on www.TheFoggiestIdea.org, and you can follow him on Twitter @TheFoggiestIdea.

    Flickr photo by Sean Marshall, Weber House in Hempstead, Suffolk County, on Long Island. A plaque in front of the house, built 1947, commemorates one of the first homes in Levittown, New York, considered America’s first planned suburb.

  • California’s Southern Discomfort

    We know this was a harsh recession, followed by, at best, a tepid recovery for the vast majority of Americans. But some people and some regions have surged somewhat ahead, while others have stagnated or worse.

    Greater Los Angeles fails to make the grade. In per capita growth of gross domestic product since 2010, according to analyst Aaron Renn, our region ranks a very mediocre 38th out of 52 metro areas, with a measly 1.5 percent, well below the national average of 3.8 percent. It places behind up-and-comers among the Texas cities, Oklahoma City and some tech-oriented clusters – Silicon Valley ranked second, after Houston. These places have growth rates roughly twice those of the Southland.

    When we wanted to drill down to the more local level, and analyze what is happening by county, we needed to go to the Census Bureau, as opposed to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, where we could glean what is happening in our communities. Our analysis is based on those figures, and neither of us hopes the Southern California region continues to stagnate or decline.

    Poverty

    One of the saddest results of the Great Recession and the weak recovery has been the expansion of poverty across the country. The poverty rate among the country’s 52 largest metropolitan areas, according to the most recent census numbers, grew from 14.9 percent in 1999 to 15.8 percent in 2013, a 7 percent rise. At least one-quarter of that rise has taken place since the recovery began.

    Southland politicians, like those in much of California, often decry income inequality and poverty, but they have not been very effective in combatting it. The region has had higher-than-average poverty for well over a decade, and things have not gotten better recently. Since 2009, the Los Angeles region, which includes Orange County, has seen its poverty rate grow by 1.8 percent, 80 percent higher than the national norm. The area ranked 47th out of 52 in terms of increased poverty. Riverside-San Bernardino saw a similar jump, 1.7 percent, in poverty.

    The scale of the poverty problem in the Southland is much greater than many imagine. When we broke down the figures, Los Angeles County remained the area with the highest concentration of poverty. L.A. saw a slight reduction in poverty from 1999-2010, but has moved in the other direction more recently. From 2010-13, poverty in L.A. County rose from 17.5 percent to 18.9 percent, an 8 percent increase. Poverty now afflicts a considerably larger portion of the population of Los Angeles than it did in 1999.

    But if Los Angeles County endures the largest pocket of poverty, there’s not much for the surrounding counties to shout about. San Bernardino and Riverside counties have each seen rapid 20 percent increases in their poverty rates since 1999; in fact, San Bernardino’s 19.1 percent poverty rate is slightly higher than that of Los Angeles County.

    Orange County fares better, but the curse of poverty is spreading even here. Although its 13.5 percent poverty rate lies below the national average, the ranks of the O.C. poor have jumped 30 percent relative to the entire population since 1999. The expansion of poverty as a share of the population has grown by more than 10 percent since 2010.

    Low Income Growth and High Housing Prices: A Bad Combination

    As befits a region with relatively low GDP growth, incomes in Southern California have stagnated. Median household incomes have dropped in every county in the region, including Ventura and Orange, whose residents boast median household incomes above $70,000, well above the $50,000 range found in Los Angeles, San Bernardino and Riverside. Since 2010, the biggest income drops have happened in the Inland Empire, where real incomes have fallen by nearly 7 percent. Los Angeles also has experienced a drop, with real incomes down 3 percent since 2010.

    For the most part, the more-affluent suburban counties have done better, consistent with the two-speed U.S. economy. Orange and Ventura enjoy median household incomes a full $20,000 above those of Los Angeles County and the Inland Empire. This is after the smaller 2.1 percent reduction (2010-13) in Orange County real incomes. Real incomes have recovered, albeit slightly, only in Ventura. The biggest hit has been concentrated in those parts of Southern California – Los Angeles County and the Inland Empire – historically most dependent on blue-collar professions in manufacturing, logistics and construction. These are, for the most part, also the most heavily Latino and African American areas of the region.

    So, why can’t the Southland replicate the economic boom in the San Francisco Bay Area? Simply put, the Los Angeles region is not the Bay Area, or Seattle. The share of Los Angeles’ jobs that are tied to manufacturing and logistics is twice that of the San Francisco area. Our population is far less well-educated, particularly in the Inland Empire and much of Los Angeles County, and is also far more heavily African American and Latino, groups that have fared particularly poorly. Nationwide, Latino poverty rates, notes a recent Pew study, stand at 28 percent, the highest for any ethnic group.

    Alongside the stagnant economy, growing Latino poverty – which is really the key challenge for Southern California – also reflects a high cost of living. This is most profound in terms of housing costs. Overall, the Southland counties – most notably Los Angeles and Orange – suffer among the highest housing cost burdens, relative to income, than virtually anywhere in the country.

    This can be seen by looking at what parts of the country have the highest percentages of people paying more than 50 percent of pretax income for housing. According to the Center for Housing Policy and National Housing Conference, 39 percent of working households in the Los Angeles metropolitan area spend more than half their incomes on housing, a somewhat higher rate than in the pricier San Francisco and New York areas and much higher than the national rate of 24 percent of households spending more than half of income on housing, itself far from tolerable.

    New Policy Imperatives

    Our current mix of state and local policies are neither reviving the regional economy nor reducing poverty. One key reason is that the current political environment – fostered and perpetuated by greens, urban land interests and organized public workers – places little priority on promoting the growth of the tangible economy that tends to employ blue-collar workers. High energy costs, largely due to the state’s Draconian commitment to renewable fuels, are a direct threat to any kind of industrial growth, while highly restrictive housing policies slow any hope of meeting the needs of renters and prospective homeowners.

    Of course, one could point out that the Bay Area, the one large region in California experiencing above-average income growth, labors under the same progressive policy regime. But the Bay Area, particularly San Francisco, is already largely deindustrialized and its population far more attractive to digitally based companies. It boasts a far larger pool of venture capital, and a unique network to support tech.

    A Google or an Apple can easily move its energy-hungry arrays of computer servers to less-expensive states, along with its device manufacturing. The more grass-roots based, small-business-oriented Southland economy is far less able to adapt to regulatory strictures from Sacramento.

    Southern California leaders clearly need to understand that the region is not winning under the current policy environment in the state. Steps to re-energize our basic industries and restart new housing, particularly single-family housing desired by most young families, need to be taken. Other steps, from reforming the schools and rebuilding basic infrastructure to modernizing higher education, also are imperative. At risk is not just a comfortable way of life, but also the legacy of opportunity that has been so critical to this region from its earliest days, a legacy now at extreme risk.

    This piece first appeared at the Orange County Register.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and Roger Hobbs Distinguished Fellow in Urban Studies at Chapman University, and a member of the editorial board of the Orange County Register. His newest book, The New Class Conflict is now available at Amazon and Telos Press. He is author of The City: A Global History and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. His most recent study, The Rise of Postfamilialism, has been widely discussed and distributed internationally. He lives in Los Angeles, CA.

    Wendell Cox is principal of Demographia, an international public policy and demographics firm. He is co-author of the “Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey” and author of “Demographia World Urban Areas” and “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.” He was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, where he served with the leading city and county leadership as the only non-elected member. He was appointed to the Amtrak Reform Council to fill the unexpired term of Governor Christine Todd Whitman and has served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, a national university in Paris.

  • The Demographics That Sank The Democrats In The Midterm Elections

    Over the past five years, the Democratic Party has tried to add class warfare to its pre-existing focus on racial and gender grievances, and environmental angst. Shortly after his re-election in 2012, President Obama claimed to have “one mandate . . . to help middle-class families and families that are working hard to try to get into the middle class.”

    Yet despite the economic recovery, it is precisely these voters, particularly the white middle and working classes, who, for now, have deserted the Democrats for the GOP, the assumed party of plutocracy. The key in the 2014 mid-term elections was concern about the economy; early exit polls Tuesday night showed that seven in 10 voters viewed the economy negatively, and this did not help the Democratic cause.

    “The Democrats have committed political malpractice,” says Morley Winograd, a longtime party activist and a former top aide to Vice President Al Gore during the Clinton years. “They have not discussed the economy and have no real program. They are offering the middle class nothing.”

    Winograd believes that the depth of white middle- and working-class angst threatens the bold predictions in recent years about an “emerging Democratic majority” based on women, millennials, minorities and professionals. Non-college educated voters broke heavily for the GOP, according to the exit polling, including some 62% of white non-college voters. This reflects a growing trend: 20 years ago districts with white, working-class majorities tilted slightly Democratic; before the election they favored the GOP by a 5 to 1 margin, and several of the last white, Democratic congressional holdovers from the South, notably West Virginia’s Nick Rahall and Georgia’s John Barrow, went down to defeat Tuesday night.

    Perhaps the biggest attrition for the Democrats has been among middle-class voters employed in the private sector, particularly small property and business owners. In the 1980s and 1990s, middle- and working-class people benefited from economic expansions, garnering about half the gains; in the current recovery almost all benefits have gone to the top one percent, particularly the wealthiest sliver of that rarified group.

    Rather than the promise of “hope and change,” according to exit polls, 50% of voters said they lack confidence that their children will do better than they have, 10 points higher than in 2010. This is not surprisingly given that nearly 80% state that the recession has not ended, at least for them.

    The effectiveness of the Democrats’ class warfare message has been further undermined by the nature of the recovery; while failing most Americans, the Obama era has been very kind to plutocrats of all kinds. Low interest rates have hurt middle-income retirees while helping to send the stock market soaring. Quantitative easing has helped boost the price of assets like high-end real estate; in contrast middle and working class people, as well as small businesses, find access to capital or mortgages still very difficult.

    The Republicans made gains in states in New England and the upper Midwest where the vast majority of the population, including the working class, remains far whiter than the national norm of 64% Anglo, such as Massachusetts, where a Republican was elected governor, Michigan, Arkansas and Ohio. Anglos constitute 89% of the population in Iowa and 93% in the former working-class Democratic bastion of West Virginia, two states where the Republicans picked up Senate seats. In Colorado, another big Senate pickup for the GOP, some 80% of the electorate is white. In Kentucky, where Senator Mitch McConnell won a surprisingly easy re-election, only 11% of voters were non-white, down 4% from 2008.

    A more intriguing danger sign for Democrats has been the surprisingly strong GOP performance among the educated professionals that embraced Obama early on. This can be seen in gubernatorial victories in deep blue Massachusetts and Maryland,  and a close race in Connecticut; in all three states concerns over taxes have shifted some voters to the GOP. Voters making over $100,000 annually broke 56 to 43 for the GOP, according to NBC’s exit polls. College graduates leaned slightly toward the Republicans, but among white college graduates the GOP led by a decisive 55 to 43 margin.

    In Colorado, Senator-elect Cory Gardner, like many successful GOP candidates, also did well with middle-income voters (annual salaries between $50,000 and $100,000), who basically accounted for his margin of victory. These are voters that some Republicans are targeting to instigate a new “tax revolt,” like the one that helped catapult Ronald Reagan into the presidency. The potential may be there if the Republicans can wake up from their blind instinct to protect large corporations and big investors. Certainly Obama’s call for higher income taxes on the wealthy has alienated small business owners and professionals, though barely impacting tech oligarchs, whose wealth is taxed at far lower capital gains rates.

    It can be argued that changing demographics will make this year’s blowout a temporary setback. Among Latinos, a key constituency for the Democrats’ future, economic hardships and disappointment at the Democrats’ failure to achieve immigration reform have blunted but hardly reversed voting trends. This year, according to exit polls, Latinos remained strongly Democratic, but down from the nearly three-quarters who supported President Obama in 2012 to something slightly less than two-thirds.

    One encouraging sign for Republicans: Texas Governor-elect Abbott won 44% of the Hispanic vote.

    Perhaps the more serious may be shifts among millennials, a generation that, for the most part, stands most in danger of proleterianization. Once solidly pro-Democratic, this generation has become increasingly alienated as the economy has failed to produce notable gains. In states across the country, the Republican share of millennial votes grew considerably. According to exit polls, their deficit with voters under 30 has shrunk to 13%. The Republicans actually won among white voters under 30, 53% to 44%, even as they lost 30- to 44-year-olds, 58 to 40. If these trends hold, the generation gap that many Democrats saw as their long-term political meal ticket may prove somewhat less compelling.

    If they are losing the middle and working classes, and even some millennials, what are the Democrats left with? They did best in states like California and New York, where there is a high concentration of progressive post-graduates and non-whites, and where many of the sectors benefiting most from the recovery have thrived, notably tech, financial services, and high-end real estate.

    Yet these areas of strength could also prove a problem for the Democrats. A party increasingly dominated by progressives in New York, Los Angeles, the Bay Area and Seattle may embrace the liberal social and environmental agenda that captivates party’s loyalists but is less appealing to the middle class. Unless the Democrats develop a compelling economic policy that promises better things for the majority, they may find their core constituencies too narrow to prevent the Republicans from enjoying an unexpected, albeit largely undeserved, resurgence.

    This piece originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and Roger Hobbs Distinguished Fellow in Urban Studies at Chapman University, and a member of the editorial board of the Orange County Register. His newest book, The New Class Conflict is now available at Amazon and Telos Press. He is author of The City: A Global History and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. His most recent study, The Rise of Postfamilialism, has been widely discussed and distributed internationally. He lives in Los Angeles, CA.

    Illustration by Flickr user DonkeyHotey.

  • Choosing Fortune Over Freedom

    “If the 19th [century] was the century of the individual (liberalism means individualism), you may consider that this is the ‘collective’ century, and, therefore, the century of the state.”

    Benito Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism” (1932), translated by Barbara Moroncini.

    Where goes the 21st century? Until recently, it could be said that, with the defeat of fascism, in 1945, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union about a half century later, that we had seen the demise of what the Italian dictator Mussolini envisioned as “a century of authority.” But, now, liberalism’s global triumphal march, as was so brazenly predicted in some corners just two decades ago, seems to have slowed, and may even be going into reverse.

    Increasingly, authoritarian regimes are rising around the world, led by a pesky, resource-rich Russia and a new full-blown superpower, China. Today, few regimes are becoming more democratic, and many, such as Turkey, are evolving toward one-party, voter-blessed, autocracies. These regimes, like their fascist and communist antecedents, often show a kind of contempt for the messy work of pluralistic decision-making and constitutional restraint.

    Elections, long iconic for Americans, are increasingly beside the point. The regimes in Russia and Iran, like that of Turkey, can claim voter mandates, even if their electoral process is twisted by government control of the media and occasional outright repression. Adolf Hitler liked to boast that he, too, took power in Germany in 1933 through legal means.

    But, China, the most important authoritarian country, has little pretense of free elections, so it has become inconceivable that anyone other than the Communist Party will be in control for the foreseeable future. For Chinese whose concerns extend beyond material benefit to such concepts as secure property rights, artistic, political or religious freedom, the obvious option is not to agitate but migrate to one of a diminishing number of spots where such rights are guaranteed.

    But most people in China, like their counterparts elsewhere, are more concerned with their well-being than the freedom of a handful of writers, artists or even businesspeople. Having witnessed a remarkable shift from poverty to growing prosperity and power, the Chinese model, rather than seen as anachronistic, has evolved into the gold standard for many countries, particularly in the developing world.

    This is not surprising, given the rapid progress that country has made in recent years. China has expanded its share of global gross domestic product from 2 percent in 1995 to 12 percent in 2012. Its economic model – communist control of thought and politics but welcoming to most enterprise – has vastly outperformed that of the strongest democracies, the United States, the European Union and Japan, particularly in light of the Great Recession. This recalls the 1930s, where Germany’s state-directed economy and that of the Soviet Union seemed to cope far better with the Depression than their Western democratic counterparts.

    As in the 1930s, we are even seeing the emergence of a new authoritarian Axis. We can see this with Turkey’s decision to increase food exports to Russia to make up for sanction-tightened imports from the U.S. and the EU. Argentina, an increasingly authoritarian democracy, is also set to increase food exports to Moscow.

    Right now, the new Axis is changing global politics. Vladimir Putin’s break with the West reflects, in part, his confidence that his nation’s future lies more with the Middle Kingdom than with the whining democracies of the EU. For less-developed countries, it is more compelling to see in the Chinese model the quickest way to achieve a strong economy.

    Even in democratic and pluralistic India, the new government has sought stronger ties to China, under new Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has a strongly authoritarian bent, which previously worked well in his management of Gujarat state.

    Chinese success has made it painfully clear that globalization of capitalism does not require pluralism or Western standards of legality. Nor has it done much to promote global understanding, in the China Sea or elsewhere in the world. Religious and ethnic divisions are, if anything, ever more pronounced. The failure of the much-heralded Arab Spring to create anything remotely pluralistic epitomizes this trend, leaving the West with the dilemma of selecting which repressive regimes to ally with to defeat even more heinous entities, like Hamas or the Islamic State.

    This rise of authoritarianism is not limited to the developing world. In the West, these tendencies are also getting stronger, and from both right and left. One powerful spur has been the growing sense among a once-comfortable middle class – beset by 15 years of flat or shrinking incomes – that they are being “proletarianized.”

    Such fear leads normally conservative or moderate people to look at more extreme solutions. Historian Eric Weitz notes that such fears abetted the rise of the National Socialist movement in Germany. Today, across Europe, nativist parties, albeit still far less terrifying than the Nazis, are on the upswing, from traditionally liberal and prosperous Scandinavia to increasingly impoverished Greece.

    Ukraine, facing dismemberment by Putin’s Russia, also has seen the rise internally of the neofascist and anti-Semitic Svoboda movement. The most notable example can be found in France, where the National Front’s Marine Le Pen is leading in the polls to become the Fifth Republic’s next president.

    Perhaps the first neoauthoritarian to gain power in Europe, Hungary’s Prime Minister Victor Orban, has suggested that the recession of the past decade marked the end of what he called “the era of liberal democracies.” For Hungary, he claims, inspiration in the future won’t come from America or the rest of the EU, but from such authoritarian countries as China, Russia, Turkey and Singapore.

    Far less discussed has been the rising authoritarianism on the Left. President Obama’s excessive use of federal regulations to circumvent troublesome Republicans in Congress demonstrates a new surge of executive and bureaucratic power. After the November election, there is good reason to suspect that, particularly if his party loses the Senate, the president’s approach in his final two years in office will increasingly resemble Louis XIV’s L’etat c’est moi.

    If the Right’s authoritarian priorities, including those of some elements aligned with the Tea Party, seek to protect traditional culture, values and the middle classes, the Left favors centralized control to redress wrongs done to selected groups – women, gays, undocumented immigrants – through regulation and taxation. Environmental activists, notably those mobilized around climate change, increasingly despair of addressing their concerns through legislative action, where support is often limited, relying mostly on executive action.

    When liberals abandon liberal principles, we lose one of the most important brakes on expanding central power. As we can see already in California and other places, decisions on virtually everything about how we live – from transportation, to housing and, most particularly, how we generate energy – are increasingly being made not by our elected representatives but through the administrative bureaucracy. The notion of “checks and balances,” of getting buy-in from the opposition and dissenters in your own party, means little to those who have found the “truth” and are determined to impose it on everyone else.

    In some ways, Mussolini, executed by his fellow Italians in 1945, may have been more prescient than his enduring image as a posturing buffoon might suggest. In 1934, Mussolini noted that “as civilization becomes more and more complex, individual freedom is more and more restricted.”This was clearly true in the industrial era, but may also characterize our current transition to a post-industrial, information economy.

    This view diverges from the popular wisdom that information technology is inherently liberating. The visionary MIT analyst Nicholas Negroponte maintained that “digital technology” could turn into “a natural force drawing people into greater world harmony.”

    It turns out that technology is not liberating by itself and can be corralled just as easily for authoritarian purposes. The media’s emphasis on young people posting on Facebook in places like Egypt, Iran and Russia gave us a false impression of how those societies operate. Governmental suppression and organized violence subsequently proved more powerful than digital technology. Smartphones, the Internet and the increasing reach of information technology are not sufficient to spawn conditions for pluralistic democracy. As anyone who spends time in China can attest, great things can be achieved without fundamental individual freedom.

    The sad truth is that we may be entering an era where classical liberalism – market capitalism, freedom of speech and safety from government intrusion – may be somewhat in retreat. As during most of world history, pluralistic democracy remains a fragile achievement that thrives only in a relative handful of places. For that reason, we need – more than ever – to cherish it.

    This piece originally appeared at The Orange County Register.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and Roger Hobbs Distinguished Fellow in Urban Studies at Chapman University, and a member of the editorial board of the Orange County Register. His newest book, The New Class Conflict is now available at Amazon and Telos Press. He is author of The City: A Global History and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. His most recent study, The Rise of Postfamilialism, has been widely discussed and distributed internationally. He lives in Los Angeles, CA.

    Benito Mussolini photo by Bundesarchiv, Bild 102-08300 / CC-BY-SA [CC-BY-SA-3.0-de], via Wikimedia Commons

  • Brain Drain Hysteria Breeds Bad Policy

    Desperate times call for desperate measures. The Rust Belt, a region familiar to the air of anxiety, knows this all too well, particularly the “desperate measures” part.

    A case in point: During the 1990’s, Pittsburgh, like many of its Rust Belt peers, was in the midst of a fit of brain drain hysteria. Strategic policy was needed. So the powers that be thought of a marketing campaign meant to saturate the minds of the educated “young and the restless” who were thinking about exiting the Steel City. Pittsburgh demographer and economist Chris Briem, in a 2000 op-ed in the Post-Gazette, picks it up from here:

    “The focus on retaining vs. attracting workers is pervasive in local policies. One marketing character thought of by the Pittsburgh Regional Alliance, whose mission is to promote Pittsburgh, was the genial "Border Guard Bob." The image was of an older, uniformed sentinel on Pittsburgh’s borders keeping our citizens, in particular the younger workers, from leaving the region. This is the same logic that inspired the East Germans to build a wall around Berlin and is likely to have as much success in the long-run.”

    Luckily for Pittsburgh, Border Guard Bob never materialized. Policy-wise, building walls is terrible form in the age of information. Still, the aura of desperation remained in the region, despite its illogicality. For instance, in his 2002 piece called “Young people are not leaving Pittsburgh”, Briem crunched the numbers to find the region’s brain drain wasn’t. Yet he found it hard “to convince Pittsburghers that the outmigration of youth is not the problem it once was,” blaming “a persistence of memory” stemming from the regional exodus in the 1980’s.  

    As a demographer and economic thinker in Cleveland, I can sympathize with Briem. Cleveland, too, is prone to bouts of brain drain hysteria. A recent report highlighted in the New York Times called “The Young and Restless and the Nation’s Cities” was enough set off a flare-up. The report found that between 2000 and 2012, Greater Cleveland added less than 800 25- to 34-year-olds with a college degree—an increase of 1%. The metro ranked second last out of 51 metros, behind only Detroit.

    Obviously, those numbers are not good. That said, from a methodological standpoint, the study has its limitations. Specifically, the analysis cuts through four economic eras: 2000, the end of a prolonged expansionary period; 2005 to 2007, the middle of a jobless economic recovery; 2008 to 2010, the throes of a deep global recession; and 2011 to 2012, a period of economic recovery.

    Why does this matter? Migration patterns are affected by quite different economic circumstances nationally. This is especially true for the 25- to 34-year-old cohort, who are the most mobile, if not fickle, group.

    For example, Greater Cleveland’s lack of a young adult brain gain from 2000 to 2012 resulted from a substantial decrease of nearly 16,000 25- to 34-year-olds with a 4-year college degree from 2000 to 2006. The 2001 recession and subsequent jobless recovery hit Cleveland hard. However, my research at the Center for Population Dynamics at Cleveland State University showed that Greater Cleveland recouped the losses from earlier in the decade, gaining approximately 17,000 25- to 34-year-olds with a 4-year degree from 2006 to 2012—an increase of 23%.

    Moreover, the Census recently released data for 2013, which allows a comparison of the nation’s top big-city metros for 2011 to 2013: the current era of economic recovery. Put simply, what large metros have the momentum? Has there been a shift in where the “young and the restless” are attempting to settle down?

    The results are surprising. Cleveland ranks 3rd in the nation, with a 19.85% increase in the number of young adults with a college degree, behind the Sun Belt metros Nashville and Orlando. And no, this percentage “pop” for the region is not simply due to the fact that Cleveland had a really small base of young college graduates. In fact, the region’s 3-year gain of 15,557 ranks Cleveland 15th in total gains, despite being the 29th largest metro in the nation. To put this in perspective, Greater Cleveland had a larger total growth than Chicago, and nearly seven times the gain of Portland: the nation’s poster child for where the “young and restless” go to “live, work, play”.

    Table 1: 25-to-34-year-olds with at least a Bachelor’s degree, Change, 2011 to 2013
    Metro Area 2011 2013 % Change 2011 to 2013 Total Change 2011 to 2013
    Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin, TN 82,588 103,239 25.01% 20,652
    Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 83,706 101,066 20.74% 17,361
    Cleveland-Elyria, OH 78,392 93,949 19.85% 15,557
    Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 97,804 116,767 19.39% 18,963
    Jacksonville, FL 47,792 56,256 17.71% 8,464
    Austin-Round Rock, TX 119,482 138,240 15.70% 18,758
    Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 208,647 240,267 15.15% 31,620
    Sacramento–Roseville–Arden-Arcade, CA 77,075 87,435 13.44% 10,360
    Salt Lake City, UT 55,036 62,124 12.88% 7,088
    Pittsburgh, PA 117,402 131,770 12.24% 14,368
    Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 306,271 341,220 11.41% 34,948
    Columbus, OH 106,144 118,224 11.38% 12,080
    Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 266,289 295,230 10.87% 28,941
    Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY 52,231 57,727 10.52% 5,496
    Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 296,927 327,330 10.24% 30,403
    New Orleans-Metairie, LA 54,104 59,616 10.19% 5,512
    San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 135,306 148,978 10.10% 13,672
    Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI 154,542 170,122 10.08% 15,580
    San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 320,585 350,490 9.33% 29,904
    Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 150,003 163,941 9.29% 13,938
    New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 1,216,127 1,327,778 9.18% 111,651
    Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 631,960 688,057 8.88% 56,098
    St. Louis, MO-IL 134,267 145,978 8.72% 11,710
    Oklahoma City, OK 58,027 63,084 8.71% 5,057
    San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 85,240 92,524 8.55% 7,284
    Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 59,780 64,784 8.37% 5,004
    Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 163,026 176,237 8.10% 13,211
    Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 79,404 85,793 8.05% 6,390
    Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 50,790 54,849 7.99% 4,060
    Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 67,664 72,888 7.72% 5,224
    Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 99,316 106,504 7.24% 7,187
    San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 167,735 179,850 7.22% 12,114
    Birmingham-Hoover, AL 47,340 50,675 7.04% 3,335
    Kansas City, MO-KS 102,284 109,455 7.01% 7,171
    Rochester, NY 48,844 52,212 6.90% 3,368
    Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 348,490 371,303 6.55% 22,813
    Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 163,995 174,694 6.52% 10,699
    Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 64,205 68,349 6.45% 4,144
    Raleigh, NC 76,164 80,447 5.62% 4,283
    Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN 91,083 95,827 5.21% 4,744
    Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 59,998 63,058 5.10% 3,060
    Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 95,084 99,225 4.36% 4,142
    Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 214,755 223,640 4.14% 8,885
    Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 460,693 477,706 3.69% 17,013
    Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 558,464 572,324 2.48% 13,860
    Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 272,907 279,232 2.32% 6,325
    Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 119,490 121,794 1.93% 2,304
    Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL 221,294 224,388 1.40% 3,094
    Richmond, VA 59,907 59,289 -1.03% -618
    Memphis, TN-MS-AR 52,911 49,412 -6.61% -3,499
    Source: ACS 1-Year, 2011, 2013 Note: Charlotte was removed from the analysis due to substantial geographic changes in the MSA designation from 2011 to 2013. Created by the Center for Population Dynamics at Cleveland State Univeristy, October, 2014. 

     

    What gives?

    Part of the answer may be economic. For example, my colleagues Joel Kotkin and Aaron Renn recently analyzed the growth in per capita GDP from 2010 to 2013 for Forbes in a piece entitled “The cities that are benefiting the most from the economic recovery”. Cleveland ranked 15th in the nation, with a 6% increase. In terms of income, the metro is 5th in the nation in the total per capita income increase from 2010 to 2012, behind Houston, San Jose, Oklahoma, and San Francisco.

    In understanding Cleveland’s nascent young adult brain gain, the broader economic performance is important. Healthier economies make metros “stickier” for those here and more of a magnet for those who aren’t. And while there also is the element of “Rust Belt Chic”, or the lure of so-called “authentic” places that counter the “Brooklynization” of American cities, Cleveland as a destination, or a “consumer city”, will always take a back seat to Cleveland as a “producer city”, which is a metro of good jobs, good schools, and affordable housing. The producer city focuses on the creation of value, not simply the consumption of things. This is not to say amenities, such as a good culinary and microbrew scene, are not important, it only says that if the talent you attract has nothing to produce or nowhere to live, well, all play and no work makes Jack a dull boy.

    Talent attraction, then, is only part of the formula in Cleveland’s ongoing and difficult economic restructuring. Talent production is also needed, for both natives and newcomers, regardless of the age group. But emphasizing the latter entails knowing the score on the former. Brain drain hysteria breeds desperation.

    And desperate times call for desperate measures—and bad policy.

    This piece first appeared at Crains Cleveland.

    Richey Piiparinen is a Clevelander, writer, and Senior Research Associate heading the Center for Population Dynamics at Cleveland State University.

  • Silicon Valley’s Chips off the Old Block

    Silicon Valley long has been hailed as an exemplar of the American culture of opportunity, openness and entrepreneurship. Increasingly, however, the tech community is morphing into a ruling class with the potential for assuming unprecedented power over both our personal and political lives.

    Rather than the plucky entrepreneurs of legend, America’s rising tech oligarchy constitutes a narrow emerging elite. They are primarily beneficiaries of the limited pools of risk capital – nearly half of which is concentrated in Silicon Valley. They also have access to a highly incestuous club of skilled professional managers, lawyers, PR mavens and accountants that counterparts elsewhere are unlikely to enjoy.

    In contrast to the intense competitive environment that defined industries such as semiconductors, disc drives and personal computers in the 1980s, today’s “lords of cyberspace,” as author Katherine MacKinnon describes them, enjoy oligopolistic market shares that would thrill the likes of John D. Rockefeller. Google, for example, accounts for more than two-thirds of the market for Internet search. The fantastic wealth amassed by Bill Gates, like that of the other oligarchs, stems in large part from these kinds of “monopoly” rent; in his case, for consistently mediocre but dominant software.

    Of course, these oligarchs, like feudal lords or rival gangs, sometimes fight among themselves, say, Google versus Apple over operating systems or, increasingly, over hardware segments of the industry. Yet, this struggle between oligarchs is far from a competitive free for all: Together, these two firms provide almost 90 percent of the operating systems for smartphones.

    Faux Progressivism

    Normally, progressives would be expected to decry such concentrations of wealth and power. But Silicon Valley has largely insulated itself from such criticism by taking “progressive” policy stances, notably on climate change, and by cultivating both a “hip” image and close ties to the Obama administration. When Steve Jobs died in 2011 during the Occupy Wall Street movement, the passing of this brilliant, but often ruthless, 0.00001 percenter was openly mourned as if he was a counterculture hero.

    But this should not mask the fact that Silicon Valley entrepreneurs have turned out to be every bit as cutthroat – and odious to the individual – as any industrial group in modern American history. As technologist and author Jaron Lanier has suggested, the current oligarchical ascendency rests not on improving productivity or sparking broad-based growth, but mining the private lives of every consumer in order to reap riches from advertisers.

    Google, while a prime offender, is hardly alone in pursuing violations of privacy. Consumer Reports has detailed Facebook’s pervasive, and often deepening, privacy breaches. Ironically, as one blogger noted, even as Facebook has been loosening privacy restrictions for teenage users of its site, company founder Mark Zuckerberg acquired property around his Palo Alto estate to better-protect his privacy.

    Once seen as a liberating force, the social media firms are morphing into an overweening Big Brother. Apple’s new devices, the tech publication Wired recently noted, are aimed at “building a world in which there is a computer in your every interaction, waking and sleeping.” The ambition for control is remarkable. As Google’s Eric Schmidt put it: “We know where you are. We know where you’ve been. We can, more or less, know what you’re thinking about.”

    Political, social implications

    In the emerging era of the tech oligarchs, the rights of the individual computer user look increasingly like those of farmers or small-business people shipping products by rail at the turn of the 20th century; sitting at a home office or kitchen table, the individual computer user has precious little leverage.

    These odds will be made even longer as Silicon Valley leadership pursues sweeping ambitions to influence the political class. “Politics for me is the most obvious area [to be disrupted by the Web],” suggests former Facebook president Sean Parker.

    The success with which technology assisted President Obama’s re-election effort offers clear support to Parker’s assertion. And, not surprisingly, when Obama’s top aides leave government, several have landed lucrative jobs with the tech elite.

    Some see this ascendency as a positive. One tech booster foresees the old “nexus” between Wall Street and Washington being replaced by one between Silicon Valley and the federal leviathan, which will usher the world into a “new age of abundance, connectivity, innovation and sharing.” This viewpoint is beyond naïve, and closer to delusional.

    We often forget that, despite their green and counterculture allure, the tech oligarchs are, indeed, oligarchs, who live fantastically luxurious and consumptive lives. Google executives, for example, have burned the equivalent of upward of 59 million gallons of crude oil – for many years at subsidized federal rates – from 2007-13 on their private jets, even as they hectored regular consumers to cut back on energy use.

    But nothing so mimics the arrogance and hubris of the tech oligarchs as their largely successful efforts to avoid taxation. Bill Gates had voiced public support for higher taxes on the rich but tech companies, including Microsoft, have bargained over, and legally avoided paying, their own taxes while higher taxes fell on affluent, but hardly megarich, taxpayers.

    Similarly, the founders of Twitter have developed elaborate plans to avoid taxation and protect their suddenly vast estates. Facebook paid no taxes in 2012, despite making a profit of over $1 billion. Apple, which the New York Times described as “a pioneer in tactics to avoid taxes,” has kept much of its cash hoard abroad to keep it away from Uncle Sam.

    The Road to Oligarchy

    Emboldened by their access to individual data, the tech oligarchs could form the core of what a recent report from the professional services giant PWC described as virtual “ministates,” with control over markets and employees that more resemble an Orwellian nightmare than a technological utopia.

    This influence will be enhanced by growing control of the media. In the past, more hardware-oriented companies provided the “pipelines” through which traditional media disseminated their products. But, increasingly, the oligarchs – taking advantage of the online shift – are devastating traditional media. Google’s ad revenue in 2013 surpassed that of newspapers.

    The Valleyites are also moving into the culture business, with both YouTube (owned by Google) and Netflix getting into the entertainment content business. The oligarchs may need to source content from more-established vendors on the East Coast or in Hollywood, but they increasingly will control the financial purse strings as well as the critical pipelines.

    Diminishing benefits to society

    Tech industry boosters, such as UC Berkeley’s Enrico Moretti, claim the new tech oligarchs represent the key to a growing economy and greater regional well-being. This claim, however, is dubious, even in Silicon Valley. Tech companies restrain their employees’ wage growth through informal agreements to prevent poaching of each others’ employees and by importing relatively low-paid “technocoolies” to do their programming. Expanding this category of workers has become a major priority for tech firms – despite a surplus of American IT workers – such as Facebook.

    Rather than enhancing middle-class opportunities, high-technology industries have promoted an economy with sharp divisions between the top employees and low-wage workers in retail and other service industries such as janitors, clerks and cashiers. The mostly white and Asian employees at firms like Facebook and Google enjoy gourmet meals, child-care services, even complimentary housecleaning; but wages for the region’s African-American and large Latino populations, roughly one-third of the total, have actually dropped, notes a 2013 Joint Venture Silicon Valley report. As Russell Hancock, the group’s president, observed, “Silicon Valley is two valleys. There is a valley of haves, and a valley of have-nots.”

    In San Francisco, Silicon Valley companies provide free and more luxurious transport for the privileged few they employ, providing a daily reminder of the growing segregation between rich and poor. Increasingly large sections of the Bay Area resemble a gated community, where much of the working and middle classes fork over a large portion of their incomes in rent and often are forced to commute huge distances to jobs serving the Valley’s upper crust.

    There is no denying that the tech oligarchs will continue to play a critical role in the American economy; and, as Mike Malone, among others, suggests, they likely may become even more dominant in the years ahead. This will not be all bad; the country similarly benefited from the often-ruthless actions of the industrial moguls. But, at some point, the public has to weigh how much power and money can be concentrated in a relative handful of companies and people without posing a threat both to our individual rights and democracy itself.

    This piece first appeared at the Orange County Register.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and Roger Hobbs Distinguished Fellow in Urban Studies at Chapman University, and a member of the editorial board of the Orange County Register. His newest book, The New Class Conflict is now available at Amazon and Telos Press. He is author of The City: A Global History and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. His most recent study, The Rise of Postfamilialism, has been widely discussed and distributed internationally. He lives in Los Angeles, CA.

    Photo by TechCrunch (4S2A2079Uploaded by indeedous) [CC-BY-2.0], via Wikimedia Commons

  • RIP, NYC’s Middle Class: Why Families are Being Pushed Away From the City

    Mayor de Blasio has his work cut out for him if he really wants to end New York’s “tale of two cities.” Gotham has become the American capital of a national and even international trend toward greater income inequality and declining social mobility.

    There are things the new mayor can do to help, but the early signs aren’t promising that he will be able to reverse 30 years of the hollowing out of the city’s once vibrant middle class.

    As the cost of living has skyrocketed while pay has stagnated except for those at the very top, New York has shifted from a place people go to make it to a place for those who already have it made, or whose families have.

    And once here, the rich are indeed getting richer even as the rest of the city is barely holding on.

    Manhattan is now the most unequal county in America (it was 17th in 1980), with a Gini coefficient — which measures the disparity between the richest and poorest residents — higher than that of Apartheid-era South Africa.

    Between 1990 and 2010, the city’s 1% saw their median income shoot up from $452,415 to $716,625 in 2010 dollars, even as the bottom 60% hardly saw their incomes budge at all, according to a recent City University study. The trend precedes Michael Bloomberg, the billionaire mayor who envisioned New York as a “luxury city,” and it won’t be easy for de Blasio to reverse — especially as he rolls out pricey new public-employee contracts and programs like universal pre-K that further expand the city’s dependence on its wealthiest citizens.

    In 2009, the 0.5% of New Yorkers who made $1 million or more accounted for 27% of the city’s income (nearly three times their share nationally), and an even higher share of its tax take. But while the smart set that attends President Obama’s frequent Manhattan fundraisers has prospered, in no small part thanks to low-interest Federal Reserve policies that have helped big banks more than working people, just across the Harlem River roughly one in three Bronx households lives in poverty — making it the nation’s poorest urban county.Over the Bloomberg years, New York was the national leader in both luxury housing and in homelessness — with a 73% jump in the number of homeless families here. Last January, an unprecedented 21,000 children were in the city’s shelter system each night. This year, that number is rising.

    And as the city becomes more economically unequal, it’s also become more racially segregated. Demographer Daniel Herz’ census analysis shows New York is now America’s second most racially divided city, behind only Milwaukee.African-American incomes in New York are barely half those of whites, as compared to nearly 70% in Phoenix and Houston.

    And New York City now has the nation’s single most segregated public school system, according to a devastating report from the Civil Rights Project at UCLA.

    As the 2014 report put it: “In 2009, black and Latino students in the state had the highest concentration in intensely-segregated public schools (less than 10% white enrollment), the lowest exposure to white students, and the most uneven distribution with white students across schools.”

    Nowhere are these divergences more obvious than in nouveau hipster and increasingly expensive Brooklyn. In my parents’ native borough, the average income has actually dropped between 1999 and 2011, despite huge increases of wealth in areas closer to Manhattan.

    Roughly one in four Brooklynites — most of them black or Hispanic — lives in poverty.

    Bloomberg’s notion that if “we can find a bunch of billionaires around the world to move here, that would be a godsend,” with prosperity trickling down, hasn’t panned out, at least for most New Yorkers. The billionaires came, bought and flourished, but the same can not be said for Gotham’s middle and working classes.

    Using Bureau of Economic Analysis data, analyst Aaron Renn estimates that the city’s per capita GDP has grown a bare 2.3% since 2010, below the mediocre 3.8% national rate and behind such traditional hard-luck cases as Buffalo, Cleveland and Baltimore.

    The percentage of New Yorkers living in poverty has actually gone up by 1.1% since 2010, while household income has been flat.

    Rather than forge a more upwardly mobile society, New York epitomizes what Citigroup researchers have labeled a “plutonomy,” an economy and society driven largely by the investment behavior and spending of the uber-rich. This creates great demand for low-end service workers — dog-walkers, baristas and waiters — but not much for New York’s middle or aspiring middle class.

    Adjusting for the cost of living here, the average paycheck in New York is one of the lowest of any major metropolitan area. Put otherwise, working New Yorkers pay a huge premium to live in the five boroughs, one that repels middle-class individuals and families who aren’t compelled to be here.

    The exodus of the middle class has been ongoing for 30 years, with New York by one measure now having the second lowest share of middle-income neighborhoods of America’s 100 largest cities.As the middle class has waned, even exemplars of the celebrated creative class — musicians, artists, writers — find the going increasingly rough, and unrewarding. Laments rock icon Patti Smith: “New York has closed itself off to the young and the struggling. New York City has been taken away from you.”

    This is the dynamic New Yorkers elected de Blasio to fix. And he’s right the reality of rising inequality and, more important, diminishing opportunity, must be confronted.

    Critically — and here de Blasio has better instincts than his predecessor — more emphasis needs to be placed on the outer boroughs. Even if Manhattan remains the prototypical luxury city, the rest of New York can be reinvented as a generator of middle-class jobs and opportunities.

    One approach that’s paid dividends for workers in cities such as Houston, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Nashville and Pittsburgh is to concentrate on diversified economic growth.

    Certainly some middle class jobs could be created by boosting such things as the port and logistics, resuscitating industries such as food processing and specialized household goods, and rolling out policies that encourage, rather than overregulate, smaller firms in the business-service industry.

    But de Blasio’s press to bring in more tax revenue to pay for ambitious new programs, more generous social services and new contracts for city workers have the perverse effect of doubling down on Bloomberg’s bet on the wealthy.

    His ambitious ramping up of green-energy policy could be the straw that breaks the back of what remains of the logistics and manufacturing industries in New York, something that has already occurred in California.

    And his kowtowing to the teachers union and attempted assaults on charter schools threaten to further undermine the effectiveness of public education, something vital to middle and working class residents.

    In fact, the effect of de Blasio’s policies may turn out to be more neo-Victorian than progressive. Rather than new homeowners, the city may see a greater concentration of people dependent on government largesse.

    The poor-door phenomena, with a few lucky members of the lower class winning subsidized units in buildings for the rich, but with separate entrances and no access to luxury amenities, recreates not social democracy but the Victorian upstairs-downstairs society.

    The critical point is this: New York is losing its role as a place of opportunity, and the de Blasio toolbox is unlikely to put back the ladder that’s been pulled up.

    A great city does not only serve the rich, transforming others into their servants or recipients of noblesse oblige. New York need to be, as Rene Descartes described Gotham’s founding city, 17th century Amsterdam, “an inventory of the possible.”

    That must hold true for most New Yorkers, not just for the very rich.

    This piece first appeared at the New York Daily News.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and Roger Hobbs Distinguished Fellow in Urban Studies at Chapman University, and a member of the editorial board of the Orange County Register. His newest book, The New Class Conflict is now available at Amazon and Telos Press. He is author of The City: A Global History and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. His most recent study, The Rise of Postfamilialism, has been widely discussed and distributed internationally. He lives in Los Angeles, CA.

    Photo by Kevin Case from Bronx, NY, USA (Bill de Blasio) [CC-BY-2.0], via Wikimedia Commons

  • Should the Gas Tax Go Local?

    After approving yet another general budget stopgap for highway construction in July, legislators across the country are acknowledging the obvious: The Federal Highway Trust Fund, the primary pot of federal roadway dollars, is nearly out of gas.

    The fund has been fed for decades by the federal taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel. But the gas tax hasn’t been raised in 21 years. At the same time, people are driving less, and using more fuel-efficient cars. As a result, federal fuel tax revenues have fallen to just 60 to 70 percent of gross federal highway expenditures.

    The resulting fiscal dilemma has kickstarted a debate among policymakers on how to get the fund solvent again. Simultaneously, it’s also attracted attention from many planners looking for an opportunity to stress what they perceive as the unsustainability of America’s suburban low-density development.

    The core of the argument by these critics is that current infrastructure funding policies do not hold drivers accountable for the costs of the roads. Nationally, gas taxes and vehicle fees cover just half of total local, state, and federal road spending. They contend that if roads had to be paid for directly by those who used them, we’d likely have denser development and fewer cars, and that planning policy should embrace an ambitious course to implement that future through centralized land use regulation and urban design.

    But this approach is neither desirable nor necessary. Instead, there are ways to restructure infrastructure funding to make roads accountably solvent without turning society upside down.

    A first step would be to reduce the enormous control the federal government has over road construction. When first created, the federal highway trust fund was designed to ensure only the maintenance of the national interstate highway network.

    But today, the fund, which accounts for a quarter of all American roadway spending, is used for numerous other projects that can’t be justified as national priorities. As of 2011 20 percent of federal highway spending went to federal priority DOT projects. The remaining 80 percent was divvied out to states and communities via grants, many of them for capital outlays for new roads at the suburban edges of expanding regions. Communities should be expected to pay for these kinds of roads themselves, especially as the number of local projects continues to grow.

    This federal spending has encouraged a lack of accountability at the local level. While it has given the federal government the freedom to address concerns about existing infrastructure projects — since 1990 Washington has reduced the share of bridges deemed “structurally deficient” from 25 percent to 11 percent – it has done little to ensure that local projects will be prioritized responsibly in the future. Instead, cities and states have accrued federal dollars primarily on the basis of marketing, regardless of whether the costs and benefits actually add up.

    Balancing those costs and benefits is a crucial issue because, in the eyes of many planners, auto-dependent suburbanites are getting a free ride while urbanites who drive less are being unfairly taxed. Meanwhile, there is no clear answer to the question of how much people would be willing to pay for infrastructure in order to live at low densities if they were shouldering the costs directly.

    Polling data does little to resolve the uncertainty. When asked, a majority say that they like their commutes, that they would rather drive than travel by other modes, and that they greatly value the positive attributes of living at low densities in detached homes with yards and privacy from their neighbors. This suggests they would be hard-pressed to relinquish the status quo. Simultaneously, however, they also overwhelmingly oppose raising the federal gas tax.

    So where do the public’s priorities really fall? This question could be better answered if more infrastructure were funded locally. Not only would it allow more accountability between those providing the funding and those accruing the costs and benefits, it would more democratically help solve the density issue by letting people vote with their feet. People would be free to choose between the wide-ranging densities and tax rates that compose the many competitive municipalities of most regions.

    There are other benefits to concentrating road spending locally. Foremost among them is that communities and states are better equipped than the federal government to tackle congestion, one of the costliest contributors to road degradation

    Since 1982, the primary federal approach to combat congestion costs through the gas tax has been to redirect an increasing portion of revenues to a Mass Transit Account under the principle of encouraging alternative modes of transportation. It hasn’t worked. Between 1978 and 1995 transit funding increased eightfold, while ridership increased just two percent. And by 2005 Americans indicated they still overwhelmingly rejected transit, even when both driving and transit were available.

    Much of the gas tax has been wasted. The American Public Transit Association reports that about 15 percent of the gas tax is used for mass transit. Roads carry just 51 percent of their own costs. Ports, airports, and parking facilities, by contrast, paid for 80 to 100 percent of their own costs when measured the same way.

    Cutting off the transit syphon would free up significant capital to patch gaps in the Highway Fund. Meanwhile, more effective approaches to reducing congestion could be tackled at the state and local level. These include regulations to stagger travel times and routes, clearing breakdowns more quickly, improving traffic light engineering, providing better traffic alerts, and limiting truck traffic (one of the worst congestion offenders) at certain times of day.

    Most of the public debate has been on ways the gas tax itself could be restructured to keep the highway fund afloat. In addition to simply raising the gas tax, universal tolling and taxing people per mile driven are popular ideas for directly funding roads.

    While popular, such “miles-based” approaches may not improve a roadway system that is a crucial tool for facilitating economic growth. Housing prices in the United States are lower than nearly anywhere else in the world in part because of roads that facilitate cost-efficient transportation between locations more efficiently than places where most residents are dependent on transit. This creates choice in where to live and work, and facilitates ladders out of poverty.

    There are practical concerns as well. When polled, people have overwhelmingly indicated that their primary personal method for alleviating congestion is to take a less direct route to work. Discouraging indirect travel by taxing drivers per mile could actually end up exacerbating congestion, rather than relieving it.

    The way the tax is designed now is a solid middle-ground approach, simultaneously charging users while incentivizing fuel-efficiency. If only the revenues were spent more efficiently, recent dips in Highway Fund revenues due to a drop in driving and an uptick in miles per gallon might be celebrated, not maligned.

    It’s clear that roadway funding needs a second look. And while a more accountable approach would be a breath of fresh air, accountability may not resemble the high-density, high-tax, transit-rich future that some planners assume.

    Roger Weber is a city planner specializing in global urban and industrial strategy, urban design, zoning, and real estate. He holds a Master’s degree from the Harvard Graduate School of Design. Research interests include fiscal policy, demographics, architecture, housing, and land use.

    Flickr photo by Neff Conner: Highway traffic jam and construction in Bedford, Texas.