New Geography

Category: Policy

  • The Death of Earmarks

    Record deficit spending in Washington has many faces: Defense, Medicare, Social Security. But none has received more criticism in recent months than the infamous and notorious earmark. Conjuring up images of “Bridges to Nowhere” or “Teapot Museums”, earmarks, or Congressionally Directed Funding, have become the poster child for irresponsible, out of control, big government spending. But is the earmarking practice by Congressional representatives really pushing our country to the brink of bankruptcy? That is what many critics would have the public believe. By playing on the public’s disgust with overspending and sensationalizing it with examples of wasteful projects that abuse the system, earmarks have been turned into a proverbial whipping boy for all forms of government spending.

    Sources of criticism are not limited to the media or political newcomers trying to make a name by misdirecting supporters from the true causes of our spending crisis. President Obama has recently come out in strong opposition to the earmarking process. During the State of the Union speech, he called for a ban of all earmarks and has threatened to veto any bill that contains them.

    Senator Daniel Inouye (HI), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, issued a statement on February 1 announcing the Committee will place a moratorium on earmarks for the current session of Congress. Yet he does not concede and end the war on earmarks, later committing to revisiting the issue once “the consequences of the decision are fully understood”. I think that what Senator Inouye is trying to say is be careful what you wish for because you just might get it.

    Certainly, I am not suggesting that the current level of our federal expenditures is acceptable. But it seems a bit disingenuous to target a spending practice that makes up three tenths of one percent of our federal budget. By comparison, Social Security and Defense spending make up 21 and 20 percent of the federal budget, respectively. Much of the political grandstanding to abolish earmarks is merely distraction from the real cause of damage.

    Eliminating earmarks does not actually curb spending at all. It merely moves the decision of which projects get funded from Congressional members to the administrators of federal agencies. By the time earmarking occurs through the appropriations process, the budgets of the federal agencies have already been authorized. Earmarks merely provide legislators the ability to further divvy up a very small portion of those budgets to meet local needs of those they represent.

    The good projects that benefit our nation and local communities are often overshadowed by the abuses and frivolous projects of a few. But for every “Bridge to Nowhere” there are examples of projects and program that fulfill a specific national interest and uplift local economies. Unfortunately, the examples of money well spent do not garner as much attention as the more rare occasions when taxpayer dollars are frivolously wasted on pet projects.

    Forget about funding directed for regions in need of important flood control projects or high tech vaccine research and development to create life-saving Staph vaccines (the number one killer of wounded soldiers in the battlefield) for the military. These things are not important as long as an abomination like the “Bridge to Nowhere” has been perpetrated upon the taxpaying public. Small businesses and startup companies capable of producing high tech products that the government wants will now suffer as large corporate interests with unfair advantages deploy extensive resources to access fresh funding that now flows through federal agencies located far from Middle America.

    It’s terrible timing for small business. Whispers in the U.S. House of Representatives of the impending doom of the federal Small Business Innovation Research Program could be a double gut punch for small research and manufacturing companies. Small companies get only 4.3% of federal research dollars, but produce five times as many patents per dollar as large companies and 20 times as many as universities.

    What does this mean for local community leaders? Communities and small businesses must become more competitive. With the departure of earmarking, much of this funding will be redirected through agency grant programs. Unfortunately, the pool of recipients is often smaller and is more concentrated in large east and west coast interests. How do small interests compete? Companies may need to invest more time and money into pursuing procurement and contracting opportunities with the federal government. They may need to consider hiring experts to write grants, monitor agency program funding, or hire consultants to broker connections with program directors, contract managers, and decision makers within federal agencies. Often times, half the battle can be won by conveying your message to the proper audience.

    If beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then I would suggest that wasteful spending is in the eye of those not receiving it. It has been my experience that the same people denouncing earmarks and government spending are the first ones with their hands out when they catch the slightest whiff of federal funding that may benefit their own interests. “It is not wasteful spending until it goes to someone who isn’t me”.

    The future of earmarks remains an uncertain one. What is certain, however, is that the debate will rage on and good projects, small business and high tech startups will bear the consequences of tired rhetoric and political showmanship.

    Ryan Aasheim is an Associate with Praxis Strategy Group where he works extensively with the Red River Valley Research Corridor technology-based economic development initiative. He was formerly Economic Development Director for U.S. Senator Byron Dorgan.

    Photo by Nick Ares

  • Why Most Americans are Both Liberal and Conservative

    American politics is consumed by a bitter, at times violent, debate about the overall role of government and specific governmental programs.

    Pundits often frame this divide in terms of geography (red states versus blue states), ethnicity (Hispanics and blacks versus whites), class (rich versus poor), or age and gender. Those factors matter, but seeing polarization only in terms of group versus group misses an important paradox about Americans: Most of us have both deep conservative instincts and liberal instincts.

    This personal inner conflict need not calcify our national divide. Instead, it could form the basis for a new and unifying consensus or civic ethos. To do this, though, our political leaders must build on the quintessentially American politics of today’s Millennials (those born between 1982 and 2003), who prize individual initiative at the local level to achieve national goals.

    Why we look left and right at the same time
    American political opinion looks in two directions – both left and right, or liberal and conservative – at the same time. Social scientists Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril were the first to use survey research to describe and analyze this paradox of public opinion that has always shaped US politics.

    In their book, “The Political Beliefs of Americans” (1967), they maintained that Americans consistently demonstrate a conflict between their general attitudes toward “the proper role and sphere of government,” (which drove the big GOP gains last November) and their attitudes toward specific governmental programs (which helps explain broad American support for “big government” programs like Medicare).

    According to Mr. Free and Mr. Cantril, most Americans have conservative attitudes concerning the size of government, and liberal beliefs in support of programs to protect themselves economically. This leads majorities to favor smaller government, individual initiative, and local control while endorsing major governmental programs ranging from Social Security to student grants and loans.

    Tensions go back to our founding
    This tension has always been a part of American politics. The US Constitution was itself the product of fierce debate in the wake of the failed Articles of Confederation. The ingenious solution the Founders gave us was both a strong central government and equally powerful guarantees of individual liberty embodied in the Bill of Rights. Notably, that solution was largely the product of that era’s young adults, the so-called Republican Generation.

    Still, the Constitution didn’t settle the question of the government’s role in the economy and personal welfare. That wasn’t resolved, at least temporarily, until the Great Depression, when Americans gave their strong support to FDR’s New Deal programs. Again, it was that period’s young adults – the “greatest generation” – that led the new consensus.

    Small government, big programs
    Such consensus, of course, doesn’t erase our conflicting convictions. Even in the depths of the Great Depression, Gallup revealed this conflict between the public’s programmatic liberalism and conservative ideology. On the one hand, large majorities believed that the government should provide free medical care to the poor (76 percent), extend long-term, low-interest loans to farmers (73 percent), and implement the newly created Social Security program (64 percent). By contrast, only a minority wanted the government to take over railroads (29 percent) and banks (42 percent), or limit private fortunes (42 percent).

    In 1964, as President Johnson was announcing his Great Society initiatives, Free and Cantril, using the results of commissioned Gallup polls, determined that within the electorate, ideological conservatives outnumbered liberals by more than 3 to 1 (50 percent to 16 percent). But in those very same surveys, support for liberal government programs exceeded conservative opposition by a ratio of 4.6 to 1 (65 percent to 14 percent).

    Using data from four of the Political Values and Core Attitudes surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center over the past two decades, we confirmed their research. Across four Pew surveys, from 1987 to 2009, ideological conservatives outnumbered liberals by a ratio of 3.5 to 1, but liberal supporters of specific programs outnumbered conservative opponents by a 2.2 to 1 margin.

    In every Pew survey, there were always more conservatives than liberals regarding the overall role of government and a greater number of liberals than conservatives in support of programs designed to promote equality and economic well-being. In effect, the United States is neither a center-right nor a center-left nation; it is, and always has been, both at the same time.

    Not surprisingly, voters who identify as Republicans have tended toward the conservative side of these two tendencies. And Democratic identifiers have leaned toward the liberal side. Although the gap between the identifiers of the two parties has widened recently, during most of the time since Free and Cantril first published their findings, the greatest number of both Democratic and Republican identifiers, as well as independents, has been ideologically conservative and programmatically liberal.

    Moderates driven out
    Today, driven by more liberal attitudes among the Democrats’ young Millennial Generation and minority supporters, and the more conservative beliefs of the Republicans’ older, white base, the leadership of the two parties is more polarized than at any time since the Great Depression.

    For the first time ever, among Democrats in the House of Representatives, the liberal Congressional Progressive Caucus contains more members than the moderate New Democrats and conservative Blue Dogs combined.

    Across the aisle, few congressional Republicans are willing to call themselves moderates, and liberals, once a meaningful bloc in the GOP, have entirely disappeared.

    Despite these divisions, the leaders of each party must find a way to work together to synthesize both strands of America’s political DNA – a belief in the importance of a strong national community and equality of opportunity as well as a strong desire to limit government’s encroachment on individual liberty – into a new civic ethos that is broadly acceptable to most Americans.

    Millennials can foster a new consensus
    The belief of America’s youngest adult generation, Millennials, in the efficacy of individual initiative at the local level to achieve national goals provides a basis for just such a solution. To once again bind the wounds of internal discord, our political leaders should adopt this approach and successfully appeal to the ideological conservatism and programmatic liberalism of the American people.

    This piece originally appeared at the Christian Science Monitor.

    Morley Winograd and Michael D. Hais are fellows of the New Democrat Network and the New Policy Institute and co-authors of Millennial Makeover: MySpace, YouTube, and the Future of American Politics (Rutgers University Press: 2008), named one of the 10 favorite books by the New York Times in 2008.

    Photo by Zach Stern

  • Chicago: The Cost of Clout

    The Chicago Tribune has been running a series on the challenges facing the next mayor. One entry was about the Chicago economy. It described the sad reality of how Chicago’s economy is in the tank, and has been underperforming the nation for the last few years. I’ll highlight the part about challenges building an innovation and tech economy in Chicago:

    The region also has lagged in innovation, firm creation and growth in productivity and gross metropolitan product over the past decade, according to economic development consultant Robert Weissbourd, president of RW Ventures LLC. Daley’s two long-held dreams of Chicago emerging as a high-tech center and a global business center remain just out of reach… “We haven’t made the real global jump yet, and we have not made the tech jump either, but we are finally poised,” said Paul O’Connor, who for many years ran World Business Chicago, the city’s economic development affiliate. “We are still a major contender, but, yeah, we can blow it.” Or, as [Chicago Fed Economist William] Testa put it, “Given the poor performance of this decade, we need to rethink the challenges for Chicago.”
    …

    “If I could wave a magic wand, I would get government to start thinking differently about … what are the levers that we need to push, away from the traditional (tax increment finance district) thinking and away from the traditional thinking of, ‘Let’s just get a big company to move here,’ and toward thinking about how to foster innovation and creativity,” Christie Hefner, former chairman and chief executive of Playboy Enterprises Inc., said at a recent economic forum.

    It has been extremely rare to see people with establishment positions ever say a discouraging word about the city. Most honest observers would have to rate Daley highly has a leader, but certainly not perfect. Yet any criticism at all of him (directly or implicitly by that of the city he runs) has been studiously avoided by most. They are terrified of being excommunicated or broken on the wheel if they deviate from the script. To have corporate executives asking tough questions is unusual, and hopefully an example of a forthcoming “Great Thaw” we need to have here in the wake of Daley’s retirement.

    Chicago’s inability to build an innovation/tech economy is pretty remarkable if you think about it. Here’s third largest city in the country, one with enormous human capital, tremendous wealth, incredible academic institutions, and above all an ability to execute that far outclasses virtually any city I know. How is it then that Chicago has been unable to execute on this?

    Believe it or not, a lot of it goes back to that bane of Chicago politics: Clout. People in Chicago tend to write off clout and political corruption in Chicago with a shrug, as a unique or even amusing local affectation, or just part of the character of purely political life of the city, but one that doesn’t fundamentally change its status as the “City That Works.” But nothing could be further from the truth. Chicago’s culture of clout is a key, perhaps the key, factor holding the city back economically.

    Chicago’s Ambition: Clout

    In Paul Graham’s essay Cities and Ambition, he writes about the subtle messages cities send about what you should try to achieve, and how that shapes their fortunes:

    “Great cities attract ambitious people. You can sense it when you walk around one. In a hundred subtle ways, the city sends you a message: you could do more; you should try harder. The surprising thing is how different these messages can be. New York tells you, above all: you should make more money. There are other messages too, of course. You should be hipper. You should be better looking. But the clearest message is that you should be richer.

    What I like about Boston (or rather Cambridge) is that the message there is: you should be smarter. You really should get around to reading all those books you’ve been meaning to. When you ask what message a city sends, you sometimes get surprising answers. As much as they respect brains in Silicon Valley, the message the Valley sends is: you should be more powerful.
    …
    How much does it matter what message a city sends? Empirically, the answer seems to be: a lot. You might think that if you had enough strength of mind to do great things, you’d be able to transcend your environment. Where you live should make at most a couple percent difference. But if you look at the historical evidence, it seems to matter more than that.

    Chicago’s ambition, the message it sends is: “You should have more clout.” Does that matter? You bet it does.

    What Is Clout?

    Clout is a term of art in Chicago that normally refers to the ability to use connections to obtain jobs, contracts, subsidies or other favors from government. But more broadly, we can think of clout as the ability to influence organizational action within the context of a particular power structure.

    But if that’s the definition, isn’t saying you should have clout the same thing as saying you should have power like Graham said of Silicon Valley? No. Having power, like that held by Mark Zuckerberg or Larry Page and Sergey Brin, is about being autocephalous. It’s about have an independent base of authority or ability to act others are forced to respect. Clout, by contrast is all about petty privileges. Clout can be given, but it can also be taken away. That’s what makes it so corrupting. Tellingly, no one ever talks about Mayor Daley as having clout. That’s because he has real power instead. Having power is like being a king or a duke or a baron. Clout is all about being a courtier.

    To see this in action, just contrast Jesse Jackson with Al Sharpton. Both are prominent national civil rights leaders and black ministers. But Jackson rarely goes hard after anyone in Chicago, at least not anymore. Jackson has clout. One son is a congressman. Another somehow managed to acquire ownership of a lucrative beer distributorship. Jackson bought into the system in Chicago.

    By contrast, Sharpton wants to be a power player in New York, to be someone to whom even a would-be mayor has to come visit and, as they say, kiss the ring. He’s not interested in being bought off. Sure, he’ll make alliances. But he’ll never give up his independent base of power that makes him someone to be reckoned with. That’s the difference between power and clout.

    The Chicago Nexus

    John Kass likes to talk about clout in terms of the “the Combine,” or the bi-partisan system in Illinois in which the Democrats and Republicans have often proven less rivals than partners in crime, sometimes literally. But I prefer to think of “the Nexus” – a unitary social structure that pretty much everyone who’s anyone in Chicago is part of, one that goes far beyond the world of politics.

    Ramsin Canon had a good illustration of the Nexus in a piece he wrote over at Gapers Block:

    With big city economies cratering all around him, the Mayor was able to raise in the neighborhood of $70 million dollars to fund the Olympic Bid. At the same time he was able to get everybody that mattered–everybody–on board behind the push for the Olympics. Nobody, from the largest, most conservative institutions to the most active progressive advocacy group, was willing to step out against him on that issue.
    …
    The list of big donors to the Chicago 2016 bid committee is a comprehensive list of powerful Chicago institutions. I mean, it’s exhaustive. Economy be damned, when the Mayor called, they listened. Why? What did those conversations sound like? And do we believe that the Mayor is so powerful–or that their relationship with him is so close–that they must obey him? Or–more likely–is it a mutual back-scratching club with an incentive to protect the status quo? Chicago’s political infrastructure isn’t about the Democratic Party or “the Machine” or special interest groups or labor unions. Those are elements of varying importance. It’s real power lives in the networks that tie that list together.

    …
    Replace the man on the Fifth Floor–Bureaucracy Man, the superhero who keeps our alleys clear–and will these networks evaporate? Will they just disappear? How long would it take them to reorganize around the new personalities that moved in there?

    All cities have elite networks, but I have never seen a city that has a unitary power nexus to the extent Chicago does. I believe the Nexus resulted from the culture of clout combined with the fact that, with the exception of the interregnum between Daley pere and fils, power has been centralized on the 5th floor of city hall for decades. The Nexus may have come into being around the mayor, but now it has become a feature of civic life, one that practically longs for what Greg Hinz has labeled a “Big Daddy” style leader to sustain the system.

    Clout’s Effect on the Culture of Chicago

    The emergence of the Nexus is one of the key cultural impacts of clout in Chicago. If clout is only effective within a given power structure, then clearly the clouted want to see their power structure expand. The ultimate dream of the clout seeker is a centralized unitary state like Louis XIV’s France. In Chicago, we’ve come amazingly close to achieving it. It’s not that there’s no conflict, but it is all of the palace intrigue variety, not true conflicts between rival power centers. Without centralized political power and a tradition of clout, the Nexus would never have come into being.

    There are many other cultural impacts as well. As Douglas and Wildavsky note in Risk and Culture, “An individual who passes his life exclusively in one or another such social environment internalizes its values and bears its marks on his personality.”

    People are bought into and defend the system. They mapped these social environments along the axes of “grid” and “group” – the degree of hierarchy in the system and the degree of group cohesion. The Chicago Nexus is a high-grid, high-group structure, or collective hierarchy, with centralized decision making and a high cost of defection. Even groups that in other cities tend to be more oppositional to government will say something like, “Decisions get made in the mayor’s office here, so we have to play that game” and buy into the system. I’ve lost track of the number of times I’ve heard, “That’s just how it works here.” Of course, this means the basis of their own ability to make things happen then becomes influence – clout – within the Nexus. Thus they defend the system, because if it went away, so would their ability to make things happen because they’ve cultivated no alternative vectors for action. Also, the Council Wars period of the 1980’s still looms large in many leaders’ minds. Chicago remains heavily segregated and racially balkanized, as the recent quest for a single black mayoral candidate illustrates. There’s a lot of worry about what might happen if the current system breaks down.

    Conservatism and favoring of the establishment. Following on from that, the system fosters a sort of generalized conservatism, one dominated by a desire for institutional stability. It takes a heavy hitter to get the mayor’s attention or even access to the mayor, which reinforces establishment control, an inherently conservative model. This conservatism is even visible the realm of public design, as I’ve noted in discussion the retro-nostalgia design of the city’s streetlights and other streetscape elements. The evidence of clout-fed conservatism is literally graven in into the very streets of the city.

    Parochialism. Though fancying itself a cosmopolitan burg, I don’t see that Chicago is that much less parochial than most other Midwest cities. You see this in a thousand little ways. For example, in the way beloved long time personalities dominate the local airwaves. As the New York Times noted about turmoil at long time ratings leader WGN-AM, “Chicago tends to be unforgiving to newcomers. And with WGN pulling in the second- most radio revenue in the market behind WBBM, its moves are fraught with risk. ‘It was always difficult to bring someone in from out of town,’ said Bob Sirott, a longtime Chicago broadcaster.” (Longevity seems particularly prized here generally, as unless you are fortunately enough to be born to the right family or in the right parish, it takes time to accumulate clout). Or in the focus on local and hyper-local news in the local internet journalism community.

    Fear. As a high-group social structure, people are terrified of being kicked out of the club. Hence the unwillingness to cross the party line on almost any issue. As Tocqueville put it: “That which most vividly stirs the human heart is not the quiet possession of something precious, but rather the imperfectly satisfied desire to have it and the continual fear of losing it again.” People are even afraid of collateral damage if others near them cross the line. As Mike Doyle said, “In systems like Chicago’s, people don’t just refrain from rocking the boat, they do their best to keep anyone else from rocking it either.”

    Total Rejection of the Other. Anyone who exists outside the structure is a potential threat. Hence they are either co-opted or marginalized. The best illustration of this is the very title of that wonderful book on Chicago politics, We Don’t Want Nobody Nobody Sent. Or as Steve Rhodes said to me:

    One of the bartenders at the Beachwood says it took her awhile to figure this city out. In other cities you apply for a job with a resume, talk about your experience, etc. Here they just want to know who you know, who sent you – even at the bartender level….I’m not naive enough to believe this doesn’t happen elsewhere, but nowhere near as it does here, where it’s in the DNA. …Here, merit counts for next to nothing…In New York, everyone wants to know: “What do you do?” In Chicago, everyone wants to know: “Who do you know?”

    Why Clout Is Toxic to the Innovation Economy

    When you think about these cultural impacts of clout on Chicago, it becomes obvious why the city has failed to build an innovation economy. Innovation is fundamentally about new ideas, new ways of doing things, new players in the game, those from the outside, about merit, about dynamism. Clout is about what happened yesterday, the fruits of long years of efforts, and the same old – sometimes really old – players, about insiders, about connections, about stasis. As Jane Jacobs noted, “Economic development, no matter when or where it occurs, is profoundly subversive of the status quo.” Innovation driven economic development is fundamentally about disrupting the status quo. Clout is all about preserving it. Innovation welcomes the outsider, the clout-fueled Nexus abhors the Other. Innovation and clout are enemies.

    Think about the innovation hubs in America. They are all places that welcome the new. Not that it’s easy to make it in them. In fact, these place are often brutally competitive. And of course they have elite networks where the scions of the rich and powerful have a leg up and such. But the new is an important part of what makes them tick. In Silicon Valley, they are always looking for the tomorrow’s HP, Apple, Cisco, Google, Facebook, or Twitter, not just celebrating the past. They know that success today is ephemeral and, as Andy Grove put it, “only the paranoid survive.” DC loves its establishment, but the very nature of the place assures there will always be new players in the game. President Obama comes out of nowhere to gain the White House. But two years later it is the upstart Tea Party’s turn. Possibly because of their entertainment industry clusters, NYC and LA are always on the lookout for the fresh face and the next big thing.

    But Chicago? What do you think is going to happen when an ambitious 20-something with a great idea for a new business but no clout shows up in Chicago trying to make it happen and knocks on the door?

    I may not be 20 anymore, but at the risk of making this post sound like merely a bit of personal pique, I’ll share a true personal story to illustrate one example of how this plays out in real life in Chicago. In 2009 I received an award from the Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce for innovative thinking on public transit, winning first prize in a global competition they ran to solicit ideas for boosting public transit ridership in Chicago.

    I was thinking at the time that I might want to do something more entrepreneurial. I knew that the Chamber ran a sister organization called the Chicagoland Entrepreneurship Center chartered with boosting startups in Chicago. In the wake of my award I decided to check them out and see how they might be able to help me.

    There was just one problem: they wouldn’t return my phone calls. I made many attempts to get in touch with them by phone and email, and couldn’t even get them to give me a “No Thanks” or pawn me off on a peon. Now I’m a guy who a) had significant business experience, who b) built up one of America’s top urbanist sites from scratch, an inherently entrepreneurial act, and a successful one, if you think about it, and c) just got an award for innovation from the Chamber itself. Yet they wouldn’t even give me the time of day.

    What’s more, the Chamber mothership never showed any interest in engaging with me post-competition either. It was clearly just a PR exercise for them. Now don’t get me wrong, I’m delighted to report it was a very successful one. I got my picture on the front page of the Chicago Tribune above the fold. It exceeded my wildest expectations. I think the folks at the Chamber are nice people and I was extremely pleased with how it went. But clearly from their perspective, that’s where it ended. Actually uncovering innovators or something was not part of the agenda.

    From standpoint of the the Chicago system, this experience actually makes perfect sense, as I don’t have clout, nor can I bestow it on anyone. So why burn cycles on me?

    If you think about my profile and the treatment I got, can you imagine what a 23 year old armed with nothing but a crazy idea would get? A lot of ink has been dedicated to talking about how far Chicago and Illinois have come since they days when Mark Andreesen was actively harassed while trying to commercialize his web browser, then run out of town on a rail. But there is no doubt in my mind that if the next the next Andreesen showed up today, he’d get the exact same treatment. (I’m not familiar enough with Andrew Mason’s history to know how he was treated pre-Groupon, and pre-his association with the likes of big money Eric Lefkofsky. It would make an interesting case study to look at the history there – though he is a possible exception. I don’t know. In any case, his major local profile came after Groupon was already a huge success).

    This is what clout in Chicago hath wrought. The culture of the establishment Chicago is simply incompatible with an innovation economy. It’s not just about money or resources. It’s about respect. It’s about what this town respects, and more importantly what it doesn’t. It’s about what Chicago whispers to you about what you should aspire to achieve, what success means in this city, and the subtle – and not so subtle – messages about how you get ahead here.

    Until you’ve already made your millions or somehow wormed your way into connections or up through the hierarchy, establishment Chicago has no use for you in its economic plans, no matter what talent, ideas, or ambitions you might harbor. (Ironically, the biggest exception is Daley himself, who was famous for seeking out and rapidly promoting young talent like Ron Huberman and Richard Rodriguez. That’s another example of how he is head and shoulders above your average leader).

    By contrast, the local entrepreneurial tech community gets it, is energized, knows where the city is and where it needs to be, and is working hard to make progress with a sense of legitimate optimism backed up by recent good news. Grass roots and “by tech for tech” institutions ranging from Technori, to the Chicago Lean Startup Circle, to the folks at Groupon – which is a huge, inspirational success story, with people who get it and are committed to trying to build up Chicago’s tech scene – are hugely supportive of anyone trying to make a go at it no matter what stage they are in, and providing legitimately useful info and help along the way. Every single person in this group I’ve talked to has been more that willing to do anything to try to help me out, sometimes even more than I’d hoped or asked for – 100% of them. (Yes, this does mean I am starting an internet business myself – watch this space).

    I’ve long said Chicago isn’t going to be the next Silicon Valley and should seek only to get its “fair share” of tech. Having said that, as the third largest city in America, a fair share is still pretty big. If Chicago’s going to make it, this collaborative effort by the local tech community is what is going to get it there – not the Nexus.

    The Way Forward

    Pretty much every report out of officialdom – from Gov. Quinn’s Illinois Economic Recovery Commission Report to CMAP’s Go To 2040 Plan – suggests the public and quasi-public sectors need to do more to boost innovation. But what’s really needed is cultural change in the establishment. Until that happens, I’d suggest that what’s really needed is to take a page from the Getting Real playbook and for them to do less.

    Think about it. If Joe Investor shoots you down, you know the odds were probably long in the first place. While you might not come away feeling good about him, you probably don’t feel any worse about Chicago. But if you approach an official or quasi-official organization chartered with promoting “innovation”, “entrepreneurship”, “clusters”, “technology” or whatever in Chicago and they shoot you down, it’s not just them but your city you feel has rejected you. It’s one thing to generate a negative interaction with a private entity, but with an official entities that hurts the very thing they’re trying to promote. If an official or quasi-official organization can’t say Yes, or at least make sure that well over 50% of the people it says No to feel good about the experience, it should be shut down, because it’s doing more harm than good.

    What’s more, these organizations and leaders glom on to these hot phrases du jour and, as someone put it, “suck the oxygen out of the room.” They hog the microphone and the real stories and the real discussion that need to happen out there don’t get told in the press because big names are the default easy answer for reporters. Just look at the number of big titled civic folks and such quoted in the Tribune piece, for example. Startup blog Technori has already told me more in two months about things that matter in tech than the Tribune and the Sun-Times combined did all last year. As Mike Madison said of Pittsburgh:

    Tech-based economic development is not something that can be conjured in  meetings of mayors and CEOs.   That’s top-down, old-school, clear-the-skies, ACCD thinking.  In fact, I would guess that the more that the Downtown Duquesne Club crew gets in the middle of this process, the more the real entrepreneurs and innovators and risk-capital investors get turned off.

    Or as Paul O’Connor put it in that Tribune piece I led off with:

    “What we have now, to some extent, is a stodgy Midwest establishment, and underneath them are the kids who moved here, some of them in their 30s now,” he said. “They get it; they know how to do it. … We either give them permission and invite them to the table, which the next mayor should do and which Mayor Daley has begun to do a little bit lately, or we let them do it themselves.”

    Blowing Up the Culture of Clout

    Clout is so persistent in Chicago not just because of the people who personally benefit from it, but because there’s little perception of the ways the culture of clout affects Chicago outside the political realm. Indeed, to the extent people regard the Chicago Way at all, it’s often positively, because it enabled the city to “get things done.” It’s the same thing that causes Thomas Friedman to have his schoolgirl crush on China.

    But unfortunately for Chicago (and likely China too down the road) it doesn’t just matter if you can get things done, it matters what it is you do. And it also matters how you do it and who is involved. Until people understand the linkage between clout and other parts of the city like its economic under-performance, and care enough to change it, the non-political members of the Chicago Nexus are not going to feel the need to change the way things are done here. It’s not that these folks are corrupt by any means. Far from it. I believe they are completely sincere in their desire to better the city. But they don’t perceive the issue at the level that will collectively move them to action, or else feel the status quo is better for their institutional interests.

    Changing the culture is mission critical to Chicago realizing its ambitions as a global city and a center of the innovation economy, and a lot of other things too. The notion that you can have a centralized, top-down, clout driven Nexus infusing your civic culture but that somehow you’ll have an innovation driven economic culture – that’s just impossible. The attempt to fix and transform Chicago’s economy with a bunch of behind the scenes maneuvering and initiatives by a few heavy hitters has failed. We need to try a different way. That doesn’t mean Chicago has to become paralyzed with dysfunction of in-fighting or civic anarchy. But there need to be multiple power centers and a receptivity to everything innovation is all about. And it will be a bit messier. I think that’s a good thing. There’s no doubt Chicago is a great city with incredible assets and capabilities. There’s no reason it can’t join the ranks of the innovation elite – if it’s willing to start jettisoning the culture of clout the so hobbles its ambitions and embracing a more dynamic future for the city. What will it be, Chicago?

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile, where this piece originally appeared.

    Photo by Bryce Edwards

  • Middle America: Problems and Prospects

    Undoubtedly, America is a middle class nation. But are there problems in the middle? It would certainly seem so: reduced employment, income and wealth (more worryingly, reduced employment, income- and wealth-building opportunities); reduced prospects for generational advancement (kids are supposed to do better than their parents, right?); general feelings of stagnation, “on the wrong track,” pessimism, frustration and anger.

    Are these cyclical or structural changes? What are the causes, and what are the cures?

    Many analyses say the cause is the breakdown of family structure and all that engenders; others say it’s that we can’t seem to get education right. But if it’s family and/or schools, trends are not favorable. On the other hand, maybe these problems are overblown. Let’s have a look.

    The Upward Mobility Gap
    According to the Brookings Institution, more than two-thirds of children born into low-income households grow up to earn a below-average income, and only 6% ever make it into the top one-fifth of income earners. Why is there an upward mobility gap in America, land of opportunity? The usually cited culprits are globalization, the decline of public schools, and the decline of intermarriage between people of different classes.

    As a group, adults with college degrees have an unemployment rate of 5%, steady or rising incomes, relatively stable families (their divorce rate declined over the last 10 years) and few children out of wedlock. Adults without a high school education, by contrast, face an unemployment rate over 15%, declining incomes, a higher divorce rate, and have lots of kids out of wedlock. (Among black women who didn’t finish high school, 96% of childbirths are outside marriage; among white women who didn’t finish high school, 43%).

    Can anything improve this troubling picture? It is now acknowledged across the political spectrum that people who do just three things – complete high school, work at any job, and not have children out of wedlock – will have a pretty good chance of making it into the middle class. Not easy, but simple. How do we help young people understand that?

    Bad Students, Not Bad Schools
    The conventional wisdom to address these issues has been to spend more on public education. That may be the proverbial barking up the wrong tree. According to Robert Weissberg, author of Bad Students, Not Bad Schools (2010), school reform is hopeless.

    His main points:

    • Academic achievement requires intelligence and motivation. School resources, pedagogy and instructional quality are important but secondary. Unfortunately, both liberal and conservative reformers have ignored brains and work ethic and concentrate on secondary factors.
    • “Bad schools” are not created “bad.” Indifferent, anti-intellectual, often violent students make schools bad, and pouring in more resources will fix nothing unless the students themselves change.
    • Academic achievement requires motivation, and today’s educators foolishly believe in making learning fun and “relevant.” This approach is doomed. Learning inescapably involves pain, and without a struggle, personal advancement is impossible. Substituting cheap self-esteem to avoid agony is particularly harmful to the intellectually less able.
    • American educators have long obsessed over closing racial gaps in learning and every attempt, regardless of the billions spent or tactics Yet trying to close these gaps undermines learning for both whites and blacks. The futile effort will only dumb-down education so as to provide the illusion of progress.
    • Recent efforts to uplift the least able students have harmed smart kids. Programs for the intellectually gifted have been decimated under No Child Left Behind. This is the opposite of what occurred in the late 1950s and early 60s when the US responded to Sputnik by concentrating on bright students. What rescues America from self-imposed education collapse is importing smart youngsters plus scientists born overseas. This may not last forever.
    • Reformers often insist that education should be treated as a business with clear standards and strict accountability to insure progress. Total nonsense. The parallel is inappropriate – you can’t “fire” non-performing students no matter how rotten or disruptive. The business-like infatuation on test scores and accountability almost inevitably subverts quality education, promotes cheating and steers less capable students away from more practical education.
    • School choice – vouchers and charter schools – infatuates “conservative” educators. This approach has seldom succeeded. More important, it falsely assumes that if students and parents were given ample choice, they would crave academic excellence. More likely, they prefer sports and country club-like facilities, not tough academics.
    • Education spending has sky-rocketed with little to show for these billions. Reformers misunderstand what today’s fixes are about. Schooling has become the reincarnation of the 1960s Great Society, a cornucopia of social welfare jobs and contracts. It is less about boosting learning than securing the social peace by preventing urban unrest.

    When Marriage Disappears
    Among the affluent, marriage is stable and may even be getting stronger. Among the poor, marriage continues to be fragile and weak. But the most consequential marriage trend of our time concerns the broad center of our society, where marriage, that iconic middle-class institution, is foundering. Marriage is in trouble in Middle America.

    So finds Brad Wilcox, director of the National Marriage Project at the University of Virginia, in his latest report. The numbers are clear; over the last 30 years:

    • Among “Middle Americans” (the 58% of moderately educated Americans who have a high school degree), the proportion of children born outside of marriage skyrocketed from 13% to 44% while the portion of adults in an intact first marriage dropped from 73% to 45%.
    • Among financially well-educated Americans (the 30% who have a college degree or higher), the proportion of children born outside of marriage climbed only slightly from 2% to 6%, the divorce rate dropped from 15% to 11%, and intact first marriages dropped from 73% to 56%.

    In sum, due to a shift in attitudes, values and behavior, the relationships of Middle Americans increasingly resemble those of the poor, while marriages among upscale Americans are getting better in many respects. For reasons both cultural and economic, there is a growing disengagement from societal institutions among large portions of the middle class.

    The retreat from marriage in Middle America cuts deeply into the nation’s hopes and dreams, writes Wilcox. He believes that if marriage is increasingly unachievable for our moderately educated citizens, then it is likely that we will witness the emergence of a diminished society. Economic mobility will be out of reach, their children’s life chances will diminish, and large numbers of young men will live apart from the civilizing power of married life.

    Wilcox says it is not too far-fetched to imagine that the United States could be heading toward a 21st century version of a traditional Latin American model of family life, where only a small oligarchy enjoys a stable married and family life – and the economic and social fruits that flow from strong marriages. In this model, the middle and lower-middle classes would find it difficult to achieve the same goals for their families and would be bedeviled by family discord and economic insecurity.

    Millennials and Hope
    Another view is offered by Joseph Lawler, managing editor of The American Spectator, who writes in the current issue that the idea that the middle class is in a “slow-burning crisis” is badly overstated. Middle-class college graduates must be doing fine, he surmises, if, as a recent New York Times article on the subject relates, they are turning down starting salaries of $40,000!

    The economic downturn has certainly caused widespread hardship, Lawler writes, but it would be a serious mistake to attribute the country’s economic woes to a prolonged erosion of middle-class opportunity. The fact that the American economy still provides opportunity on a vast scale should be evident from what Americans themselves are saying about their prospects. In early 2009, at the depths of the recession, the Economic Mobility Project, an initiative funded by Pew Charitable Trusts, commissioned a survey of Americans’ economic sentiments. The poll showed that 58% of people aged 18-29 thought that they would have an easier time moving up the economic ladder than their parents did. Seventy-two percent of those polled thought that their economic circumstances would be much or somewhat better in 10 years. Seventy-nine percent expressed confidence in the possibility that people could improve their economic standing even during the recession, and among youth the number rose to 88%.

    They could be all wrong, but optimism in the face of uncertainty should itself be considered a strength of American society!

    This clear expression of optimism among young workers conflicts with the grim trends echoed endlessly throughout political commentary, notes Lawler. The reason the polls don’t reflect such sentiments is that those malign developments are overblown, and are to a significant degree artifacts of the way statistics on income and inequality are kept.

    For instance, economic mobility – the ease with which young workers move up the economic ladder – is as healthy as the polls would suggest. Middle- and lower-class wages have not progressed as they did a couple of generations ago, but still about 65% of children go on to out-earn their parents, including 80% of those in the lowest income quintile, according to a study by Julia Isaacs of the Brookings Institution.

    It is hard to reconcile the fact that young generations are still advancing economically with the general phenomenon of stagnating wages until one factor is taken into account: immigration. Because immigrants earn less on average than others, including them in the sample makes it appear as though mobility is not as prevalent as it really is. And of course for many of them, even in lower income, they are doing far better than their own parents back home.

    Minnesota Federal Reserve economist Terry Fitzgerald, in a contrarian 2008 paper, separated some of the frequently repeated misleading facts from the reality that the middle class has made steady gains. A key finding was that while households in the middle of the distribution have fallen behind top-earning households since the 1970s, in fact almost all households have enjoyed substantial income gains since then.

    Middle America is troubled, economically and socially, and trends are not favorable. But the middle class is our strength, our hope. So what can we do to shore up the middle?

    We know that the answer is fostering human capital, and we have always thought the way to do this was through education. But we are finding that educational success is correlated with and dependent upon strong family structure. Which comes first, educational achievement or strong family structure? Now we know: strong family structure.

    What public policies to pursue to encourage and enhance stronger families? Answer: fewer of them.

    The usual policy prescriptions — intervention and redistribution — have not worked, will not work, cannot work. We actually need less public policy, less intervention, less redistribution. If stronger families are best, also the most natural, then we should leave resources to families.

    Dr. Roger Selbert is a trend analyst, researcher, writer and speaker. Growth Strategies is his newsletter on economic, social and demographic trends. Roger is economic analyst, North American representative and Principal for the US Consumer Demand Index, a monthly survey of American households’ buying intentions.

    Photo by: scarlatti2004

  • Agglomeration Vs. Isolation for Science Based Economic Development

    Earlier this month President Obama signed the reauthorization of the COMPETES Act, which provides federal funding for science initiatives aimed at enhancing economic competitiveness. In addition to shoring up agencies like the National Science Foundation, the bill called on the Department of Commerce to create a new program charged with supporting the development of research parks and regional innovation clusters. Unheard of before World War II, these entities today represent the cutting edge in what insiders call TBED: technology-based economic development. By leveraging existing strengths and promoting cooperation between universities and private industry, TBED-minded regions seek to attract outside investment and carve out a niche in the global economy.

    Research parks and innovation clusters both draw on the logic of agglomeration: when smart people (or up-and-coming firms) gather in a concentrated area, the story goes, they bounce ideas off each other and push each other to innovate and eventually outperform other people or firms who are more widely dispersed. This is the logic at the heart of Geoffrey West’s grand unified theory of urbanism featured in the New York Times back in December. It’s the logic of Silicon Valley. But is agglomeration always good for science? What assumptions do clusters and science parks make about how research gets carried out? That is, does science cluster of its own accord? Or can the political and economic arguments for clustering come into conflict with strains of science that are best kept at arm’s length?

    An instructive case to consider is that of the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), an animal disease research facility set to be built in Manhattan, Kansas. After the anthrax attacks of 2001, bioterrorism experts convinced the Bush administration that biological agents and, specifically, diseases affecting American livestock could constitute a threat to the nation’s security. American agriculture was, in the words of one presidential directive, “an extensive, open, interconnected, diverse and complex structure providing potential targets for terrorist attacks.” So the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) dreamed up a new, state-of-the-art laboratory for animal disease research, and after a long, involved site selection process, Kansas was selected to host the new lab in December 2008. As the Daily Yonder recently reported, concerns persist about whether it’s a good idea to conduct research on deadly livestock diseases smack in the middle of cattle country.

    Then what brought NBAF to Kansas, if DHS acknowledged that a mainland location was riskier than a lab located offshore? The answer, as far as I can tell, is agglomeration. NBAF’s predecessor, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, was located in the middle of Long Island Sound to minimize the risk of an accidental pathogen release. Scientists took a ferryboat to work in the morning, and in the early years nothing could leave the island, not even library books. NBAF, on the other hand, was always envisioned as part of a constantly circulating network. DHS’s request for proposals explicitly mentioned “proximity to other related scientific programs and research infrastructure” as one of the selection criteria. Others included proximity to vaccine manufacturers and access to an international airport. If the geographical logic of animal disease research after World War II was one of isolation, then the new logic of post-9/11 science was one of hyperconnection.

    The sites that were well connected—literally—were the ones that moved forward in the NBAF site selection process. Georgia and North Carolina offered access to nearby veterinary schools, while Mississippi vowed to work with contract research giant Battelle to drum up the necessary workforce. Backers in San Antonio proposed locating the lab in, you guessed it, the Texas Research Park. But it was the Kansas bid that best exemplified the new logic of agglomeration, by envisioning NBAF as the anchor for an emerging Kansas City Animal Health Corridor. Kansas State University, where the lab would be located, offered DHS “surge capacity” in its new Biosecurity Research Institute if a crisis were to ensue. And as for the half-million cattle in nearby counties? Those, too, became part of the cluster, with the Kansas Livestock Association issuing a letter of support arguing that “having this facility in close proximity to the nation’s geographic concentration of meat production is extremely logical.” The proximity that a previous generation of researchers understood as a vector of contagion was now being repackaged as a source of reassurance and a boon to scientific discovery.

    You can’t fault Kansas, of course, for wanting to secure its slice of the knowledge economy. In a report for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Mark Drabenstott argues that Midwestern states need to be looking beyond silos and smokestacks, and the Kansas Bioscience Authority estimates that NBAF will have a positive economic impact of $3.5 billion over the next two decades. That’s pretty good. Except, according to a 2009 report from the Government Accountability Office, the cost of a large-scale outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease would be even greater. There are no easy answers here. The point is that science-driven development carries risks, and concentrating brainpower in one place can also mean concentrating the harmful substances that those knowledge workers handle each day. Without being hobbled by irresponsible fearmongering, states and regions pursuing an innovation agenda need to be honest about the associated risks—and to ensure that the people who bear those risks also stand to reap the rewards.

    After all, confining science to uninhabited islands means asking scientists to live like monastics, and risks isolating them in an echo chamber of their own assumptions. That’s neither desirable nor practical. So, if the science cluster is here to stay, then the question becomes how to build a research infrastructure that maximizes the benefits of clustering and minimizes the drawbacks.
    Brazil’s Ministry of Science and Technology just put forward a promising template, which calls for decentralizing scientific research from the southern cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro to other parts of the country. Too much concentration in the south, the ministry concluded, could actually quash innovation and exacerbate existing inequalities. But a growing research economy in the north could ease the strain on the region’s natural resources and help incoming president Dilma Rousseff to make good on her pledge to combat poverty in the South American nation.

    Let’s be clear: there’s no neatly replicable way of manufacturing scientific breakthroughs, and people around the world will continue to have good ideas without ever setting foot in an innovation cluster. Still, modern science thrives on linkages, and managing those linkages has become an increasingly central part of modern statecraft. As policymakers use the new tools at their disposal to promote cooperation between universities, companies, and local economies, they would do well to think of agglomeration, not as an inherent good, but as a means of securing real, sustainable prosperity.

    Marcel LaFlamme is a graduate student in the Department of Anthropology at Rice University. His research focuses on science-driven development on the American Great Plains.

    Photo: NBAF draft rendering, K-State.edu

  • Rise of the Hans

    When Chinese President Hu Jintao comes to Washington this week, there aren’t likely to be many surprises: Hu and Barack Obama will probably keep their conversation to a fairly regulated script, focusing on trade and North Korea and offering the expected viewpoints on both. But seen from a different angle, everything in that conversation could be predicted, not from current events but from longstanding tribal patterns.

    With China’s new prominence in global affairs, the Han race, which constitutes 90 percent of the Chinese population, is suddenly the most dominant cohesive ethnic group in the world — and it is seeking to remain that way through strategic alliances, aggressive trade policy, and attacks on racial minorities within the country’s boundaries. The less tribally cohesive, more fragmented West is, meanwhile, losing out.

    Almost 20 years ago, I wrote a book called Tribes that sought to trace the role of ethnicity, race, and religion in economic and geopolitical affairs. At the time, there was some skepticism about the continuing influence of ethnicity; some considered the work, frankly, regressive and racist. Now, however, my thesis from 1992 has really come to fruition. We are living in the age of tribes — and China is just the start.

    Such primitive racial instincts were supposed to be long ago passé: We’re supposed to be living in Thomas Friedman’s “flat” world or Kenichi Ohmae’s “borderless world.” By now, supposedly, everyone is increasingly interconnected and undifferentiated. Affairs should be managed neatly by deracinated professionals, working on their iPads from Brussels, Washington, or any of the other “global” capitals.

    But most people do not really see themselves as members of a large multinational unit, global citizens, or “mass consumers.” Instead the drivers of history remain the essentials: the desire to feed one’s family, support the health of the tribe, and shape the immediate community. The particularistic continues to trump the universalistic.

    This has only become more evident as our world becomes more multipolar. During the 19th and much of the 20th century, the world was dominated by a European capitalist mindset that glossed over many of the ethnic and racial differences simmering under the surface in the regions under its rule. Particular groups, including Chinese, Muslims, or Hindu Indians, might have harbored a sense of unique identity but, for the most part, either melded into the Euro-American mold, or, after the Russian Revolution of 1917, into the alternative Soviet one.

    Today this has changed dramatically, as once suppressed racial and ethnic groups express their power on a global level. The rise of Chinese national identity, increasingly stripped of its socialist clothing, must be seen as the driving force behind the new tribalism. The country’s re-emergence as a great world power expresses the cultural ascendency not so much of Marxism or Maoism but of the Han race, which in only a few decades could control the world’s largest economy.

    This represents a major shift in the identity of the Chinese tribe, a combination of political and economic power with a very homogeneous worldview. The best way to explain China’s economic and foreign policy is most accurately seen as a tribal expression of what Friedrich Nietzsche called a “will to power.” Essentially, the Han has become a tribal superpower that treats other groups — from China’s non-Han minority to much of the rest of the world — as a vast semi-colonial periphery. And with its growing economic and military might, Han China may soon be able to impose its will on some of these “lesser” cultures, should it desire.

    China may be setting the underlying tone of our new world, but many other groups have responded in similarly tribal fashion. Like China, Russia has abandoned internationalist communism for a kind of Leninist state-capitalism with racial overtones, as evident both in the increasingly rough treatments of darker-skinned ethnic minorities such as Chechens and an aggressive ethnic Russian retro-imperialism — once disguised in socialist trappings — toward “near abroad” countries like Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

    The state-sponsored restoration of everything from the Orthodox Church to Stalin — as well as the consolidation of state ownership over the lucrative energy sector — reflects the deeply nationalist core of the modern Russian state, which, for historical, geographical, and cultural reasons, has, with few exceptions, always bent toward authoritarianism. The end of the Soviet Union, it turns out, did not usher in a wider embrace of universal capitalism so much as engender various forms of ethnicity-based irredentism and, in Russia itself, a renewed Slavic nationalism.

    As they have modernized and globalized, other races — Persians, Arabs, Brazilians, for just a few examples — have turned out to be far less cosmopolitan and more tribal. These nationalisms, or tribalisms vary widely. Some, like China and Russia, are specifically racial in character. Others, such as Brazil, are remarkably multi-racial. In some cases historic resentments are at the base. But all are less interested in adopting globalized norms of free markets or capitalism than using state power (through sovereign wealth funds and state-controlled corporations) to increase their influence and wealth.

    The new tribalism is also increasingly evident in Europe. Just a few years ago Europhiles like French eminence grise Jacques Attali or left-wing author Jeremy Rifkin could project a utopian future European Union that would stand both as a global role model and one of the world’s great powers. Today, Rifkin’s ideal of a universalistic “European dream” is collapsing — a process accelerated by the financial crisis — as the continent is torn apart by deep-seated historical and cultural rifts.

    Europe today can best be seen as divided between three cultural tribes: Nordic-Germanic, Latin, and Slavonic. In the north, there is a vast region of prosperity, a zone of Nordic dynamism. Characterized by economies based on specialized exports, a still powerful Protestant ethic, and a culture that embraces authority, these countries — including Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Germany, and, arguably, the Baltic states — are becoming ever more aware of the cultural, fiscal, and attitudinal gulf between them and the southern countries.

    At the same time, the attempt to build a new European identity fused with immigrants appears to be failing. As Chancellor Angela Merkel noted, Germany has failed at “multi-culturalism.” Such sentiments may be reviled by the media, academics, and even business leaders in Northern Europe, but they are clearly popular at the grassroots. Once considered paragons of liberalism, countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands have incubated potent anti-immigration movements.

    In a world dominated increasingly by Asia, northern Europe cannot be anything more than a peripheral global power, which may explain its new introversion. Instead these resilient cultures more accurately represent a revival of the old Hanseatic League, a network of opportunistic and prosperous trading states that ringed the North and Baltic seas during the 13th century. This new league increasingly battles over issues of trade and fiscal policy, often with ill-disguised contempt, with the southern European countries I call “the Olive Republics”: a region typified by dire straits, with rapidly aging populations, enormous budget deficits, and declining industrial might. Southern Europe now constitutes a zone of lassitude that extends from Portugal and Spain through the south of France, Italy, the former Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria.

    The last European tribe includes the Slavic countries, centered by Russia but extending to parts of the Balkans as well, places like Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, and Moldova that historically have looked east as well as west and are currently defined by shrinking populations and weak democratic institutions. A historic pattern of Russian domination is evident here, based in large part on a revived Slavic identity that embraces similarities in religion, culture, history, and language with countries living under Russia’s shield. In this sense the czars are back, not a great development for the rest of the world or for the fading chimera of a “common European home.”

    What does this resurgence of tribalism mean to the foreign policy community? Clearly more attention needs to be played to such issues as cultural vibrancy, birthrates, and economic “animal spirits.” In some sense, we need to return to the perspectives of ancient writers like Herodotus and Ibn Khaldun, who attributed the rise and fall of nations to the vitality of what the latter called “group feeling.”

    Tribalism will also threaten the efficacy of international organizations, which tend to assume common interests between groups. Instead we have to think of future international cooperation in more traditional terms, balancing distinct sets of tribal interest. As tribes continue to pursue their own interests ever more zealously, the idealistic rhetoric of multinational organizations will become ever more risible. The way China and other developing countries snarled up the Copenhagen climate conference reflects this shift.

    Similarly, the problems with controlling trade to Iran have to do with long-standing economic relationships that are closely linked to cultural ties. Sanctions imposed from the West cannot compete with far more long-standing trade relations between Iran and places like Dubai. In the future, the best hope may lie in more temporary, ad hoc alliances based on the self-interest of individual tribes, such as how the U.S. and Russia may cooperate in space exploration as a means to preserve their hegemony in that field against newcomers such as China.

    In essence, we need to shift from seeking labored, politically correct commonalities among cultures and work more on learning to reconcile and co-exist with people who always, inevitably, will remain strangers. This means, for example, throwing out the idea that any international model — say, the Anglo-American version — can be imposed or grafted onto other cultures.

    “What about us?” Anglo-Americans may ask. In a globalized world that speaks and writes in English, the Anglosphere retains some natural advantages. This is where the most elite colleges and universities are located, and where the top financial firms are concentrated. Equally important, the Anglosphere also controls much of what the developing countries will most need in the future — food — through the unsurpassed fecundity of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

    Demographics and a unique ability to absorb a wide range of immigrants make the Anglosphere economically and demographically vibrant — a point often missed by political scientists like the late Samuel Huntington and some elements on the political right. By 2050, the Anglosphere will be home to upwards of 550 million people, the largest population grouping outside China and India. English-speakers may not straddle the world like the 19th century empire-makers, but they are likely to remain first among equals well into the current century.

    Ultimately, this will depend on how the English-speaking world evolves and learns to embrace its multiracial population without losing its sense of a common identity. Ideally, the Anglosphere can offer an alternative that embraces not merely a language but a set of historically achieved values such as democracy and freedom of speech, religion, and markets. Already many of the English-speaking world’s exemplary writers, artists, industrialists, and entrepreneurs hail from a vast and ever expanding array of backgrounds. It is in the melding of many into one dynamic culture that the Anglosphere may retain a powerful influence over our emerging world of tribes.

    This piece originally appeared in Foreign Policy.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Photo Peter Fuchs

  • The Poverty Of Ambition: Why The West Is Losing To China And India – The New World Order

    The last 10 years have been the worst for Western civilization since the 1930s. At the onset of the new millennium North America, Europe and Oceania stood at the cutting edge of the future, with new technologies and a lion’s share of the world’s GDP.  At its end, most of these economies limped, while economic power – and all the influence it can buy politically – had shifted to China, India and other developing countries.

    This past decade China’s economic growth rate, at 10% per annum, grew to five times that U.S.; the gap was even more disparate between China and the slower-growing  E.U.,  Yet periods of slow economic growth occur throughout history — recall the 1970s — and economies recover. The bigger problem facing Western countries, then, is a metaphysical one — a malady that the British writer Austin Williams has dubbed “the poverty of ambition.”

    This lack of ambition plagues virtually every Western country. The ability to act has become shackled by a profound pessimism that according to a recent Gallup survey contrasts with the optimism found not only in rising states like China, India and Brazil, but also deeply impoverished places like Bangladesh.

    Attitudes have consequences. The rising stars of the non-Western world — from the United Arab Emirates to Singapore and China — are building cities with startling new architecture and bold infrastructure. Their entrepreneurs are expanding their operations across the planet.

    Of course, you can chortle at the outrageous overbuilding in places like Dubai, but the Western world might do better to appreciate the scope of their ambition. Indeed, for years New York’s Empire State building, erected  during the Depression, was derided as  ”the empty state building.” Today it’s visionary developers like Iraqi-born Istabraq Janabi who are planning unlikely  new structures even  in  troubled places like Ramadi, Iraq.

    The difference in ambition can be seen clearly at airports, which now serve as the entry halls of the global economy. A traveler to John F. Kennedy Airport, Heathrow, Charles De Gualle LAX or Dulles passes through decayed remnants of fading late 20th century buildings and technology. In contrast, airports in Dubai, Hong Kong and Singapore offer clean, ultra-modern facilities with often impressive design.

    The West’s retreat from space exploration further underscores its metaphysical poverty. Today, Europe and the U.S., the world’s historic leader in the field, are cutting back on plans to explore the cosmos, which has included a manned operation to the moon. President Obama wants NASA to focus more on issues regarding climate change instead. In contrast, the rising countries of Asia, notably China and India, have begun plans for manned flights to the moon and beyond.

    This divergence is not about resources; it is about the growing conviction in the West that moving forward is an illusion or, as the British academic John Gray’s puts it, “progress is a myth.”  Victorian empire-makers and intellectuals, like their republican American successors, believed perhaps naively in the potential of humanity, economic and technological progress. Today our intellectual and political classes have gone to the other extreme.

    The West’s politics are in the grips of two profoundly retrograde mentalities. One, a small-minded conservatism, harks back to the “golden” age of the 1950s when Western power faced only a flawed Soviet challenge. The idealistic but flawed commitment to imposing democracy by force of the Bush years has faded; it has been replaced by an obsession with taming a bloated public sector. While this focus may be justified, it is fundamentally more reactive than proscriptive.

    The Left, which once portrayed itself as the bastion of scientific rationalism, increasingly embraces neo-druidism, a secular form of nature worship. This tendency’s roots can be traced back to the “Limits to Growth” ideology of the early 1970s which projected, mostly mistakenly, that the planet was about to run out of everything from food to oil. Concerns over climate change have transformed this dismal sentiment into a theology, with carbon emissions treated as a form of original sin.

    The anti-progress nature of the new Left is unmistakable. Rather than seek ways to control climate change, suggests The Guardian’s George Monbiot, environmentalism is engaged in “a battle to redefine humanity.” Monbiot believes the era of economic growth needs to come to an inevitable denouement; that “the age of heroism” will be followed by the decline of the “expanders” and the rise of the “restrainers.”

    Europe, particularly the U.K., suffers acutely from metaphysical angst.  Once touted as the new great power by its leaders and their American claque, the E.U. is quickly dissolving along cultural and historical lines; this is especially evident in the division between the  resilient countries of the north (something like the Hansa trading states of the late Middle Ages) and the weaker countries along the periphery. For the most part, Europe no longer seems capable of doing much more than finding ways to control an unaffordable welfare state without tearing about its social net. The once cherished notion of a multi-racial “new” Europe largely has dissolved as immigration has devolved from a source of demographic and cultural salvation to a widely perceived threat to the E.U.’s economic and social health as well as security.

    Such defeatism usually has less success in the United States. But America’s “progressive” left increasingly resembles its European cousins.  Obama’s science advisor, John Holdren, has been a long-time advocate of the idea of “de-development,” the purposeful slowing of growth in advanced countries in order to protect the environment. The critical infrastructure needed to accommodate upward of another  100 million Americans — new dams in the west, intelligent development of our vast natural gas reserves and building new cities, airports and ports  – are not at the center of either party’s platforms. These could be financed largely with private sources, given the right incentives.

    Fortunately the West’s decline is not at inevitable. China, India, Vietnam, Brazil, South Africa all deserve their day in the sun, but this does not mean that Americans or Europeans should cower in the shadows. Western countries still possess much of the world’s cutting-edge technology and leading companies; the combined GDP for the E.U., North America and Oceania stands at over $33 trillion, almost five times that of India and China together.

    More important still, the political and cultural institutions of the West — with their liberal values — represent the best hope for a stable world of self-governing peoples. Does anyone in the West, particularly the progressives in the media and academia, really want a world run by Chinese despotism?

    The current financial crisis should serve as both a warning and a spur for a new focus on economic expansion. But this can only occur if the West can restore its belief in its future. This does not necessitate a return to the colonial attitudes of the past, but rather a keener appreciation of our unique human, physical and political advantages.

    Only the United States – by far the richest, largest and most populous Western nation — can lead such a revival. For one thing, the U.S. remains the world’s leading immigrant magnet and most diverse large country, all of which makes it the natural center of an evolving global society. Although immigrants pose some serious issues, University of Chicago scholar Tito Sananji notes that the U.S., along with Canada and Australia, seems to be doing a better job educating their newcomers than the continental European states.

    The U.S., Canada and Australia also possess resources, most critically food, that could benefit from growing demand in developing countries. Both North America and some European nations — notably the new Hansa of the Netherlands, Germany and Scandinavia – remain world leaders in scores of industrial endeavors, as well as technology- and culture-based industries.

    Together these Western countries can do much more to shape the global future than is commonly understood. But to do so this century they will need how to recover the animal spirits that drove their remarkable rise in the last.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Photo by Wally Gobetz

  • Toronto: Three Cities in More than One Way

    The issue of income disparity in Toronto has once again been brought into the public eye by a December 15th report by University of Toronto Professor David Hulchanski. The report, “The Three Cities Within Toronto,” points to a growing disparity in incomes between Downtown Toronto, the inner suburbs, and the outer suburbs of the city. The report demonstrates that between 1970 and 2005 the residents of the once prosperous outer suburbs have been losing ground compared to the now wealthy downtown core. The results for the inner suburbs have been mixed.

    In 1970, 66% of city neighbourhoods were considered middle income. Only 15% were considered high or very high, and 19% were low or very low. In 2005, only 29% of neighbourhoods were considered middle income. The number of high or very high income neighbourhoods rose to 19%, while low and very low income neighbourhoods made up a staggering 54% of neighbourhoods.



    The news isn’t all bad. After all, the downtown core is now one of the most desirable places to live in North America, and many of the formerly low income neighbourhoods have gentrified, or are in the process of doing so. However, many of the city’s traditional suburbs have been decimated. The former cities of Etobicoke and Scarborough used to be middle class. Not so much anymore.

    In real dollar terms, even the majority of the very low income areas have become wealthier. The trouble with poverty statistics is that they focus on relative poverty, rather than absolute poverty. This means that if Etobicoke’s average income doubled tomorrow, the downtown core would all of a sudden be considered poor. This is a major limitation. Toronto isn’t exactly turning into a Canadian Detroit.

    The report rightly points to the need for greater mobility in the outer suburbs. Given that the most lucrative jobs are typically downtown, many young professionals and recent graduates living outside of the core need to be able to get downtown cheaply and quickly in order to build their careers. Where the report goes wrong is that it recommends stricter land use regulations, stronger rent controls, and the revival of the flawed Transit City plan that Mayor Ford vigorously campaigned against in the recent election.

    It is easy for academics to blame a lack of social welfare spending, or suburbanization for the problem. The real problem is the loss of local policy making power resulting from amalgamation. For the most part, the areas losing ground the fastest are the formerly middle class suburbs amalgamated into the city. In contrast the “exurbs” just outside of city boundaries have thrived. This is no coincidence. The real takeaway from this study is that the suburbs have different needs than the central core. By attempting to accommodate the needs of both, the megacity has benefitted neither. Short of de-amalgamation, the only hope for the city is to substantially decentralize policy making. No amount of spending can make up for the loss of local autonomy.

    Policies have different effects in different types of cities. Take the treatment of automobiles. It might make sense to discourage automobile usage in downtown Toronto, but the benefits of doing so in Vaughan or Pickering would be questionable at best. Similarly, mandating that every commercial establishment have a public washroom probably makes sense as a public health measure in downtown, where public urination is an issue, but not so much in suburban Markham, or Richmond Hill.

    Making sensible regulations for a small, relatively homogenous area isn’t all that difficult. Applying these regulations to a large, demographically diverse area can help some areas and hurt others. It’s not that regulations need to be a zero sum game. People in Etobicoke wouldn’t be affected if, say, maximum parking allotments were tightened in the downtown core. They would be affected if they were tightened throughout the entire megacity. Similarly, increasing maximum parking allotments might hurt the core and help the suburbs. The current one size fits all approach sometimes benefits the core and sometimes benefits the suburbs, but ever both.

    Perhaps more important than city wide regulations is the centralization of taxing power. Since the merger, the city now sets tax rates across the entire megacity. This also allows the city to control the ratio of residential to non-residential taxes. The city of Toronto has the highest ratio of non-residential to residential taxes in Ontario. This means that businesses carry a higher share of the tax load in the city than anywhere else in the province. The combination of tax and regulatory policies in the city have lead the Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses to rank Toronto as the second least business friendly city in Canada. On a scale of 1-100, Toronto came in at 33, slightly ahead of Vancouver’s 31. Meanwhile, the rest of the (Greater Toronto Area) GTA is near the top, at 61. Neighbouring Oshawa took the top spot in Ontario with 69.

    GTA Area Cities by CFIB Entrepreneurial Cities Policy Score

    Rank (Ontario)

    City

    Score

    Driving Distance to Yonge and Bloor

    1

    Oshawa

    69

    0:45

    6

    GTA (Excluding Toronto)

    61

    		  
     

        Mississauga

    61

    0:27
     

        Brampton

    61

    0:41
     

        Richmond Hill

    61

    0:32
     

        Markham

    61

    0:32
     

        Vaughan

    61

    0:32

    16

    Hamilton

    55

    0:58

    19

    Guelph

    54

    1:15

    24

    Barrie

    52

    1:16

    27

    Brantford

    51

    1:20

    30

    Kitchener

    48

    1:23

    33

    Toronto

    33

    		  
     

        Etobicoke

    33

    0:20
     

        Scarborough

    33

    0:21

    Now the share of non-residential to residential taxes in Toronto may actually make sense downtown. The core is home to the third biggest financial sector in North America. These jobs are heavily concentrated in the downtown core.

    Downtown Toronto isn’t competing with low tax Vaughan or Barrie for these jobs. They are competing with high tax cities like New York and Chicago. This means that employment in the core is not as easily chased off by taxes and regulations than in the suburbs. But in industries like wholesale and manufacturing, which are far more important outside of the core, employment can easily relocate to Barrie, Mississauga, Oshawa, and so forth. Indeed, jobs have been leaving the city since before the recession hit.

    Since 2004 Downtown and North York have prospered but the rest of the city has lost jobs. This should make the results of the Professor Hulchanski’s report unsurprising. The financial sector isn’t enough to keep the entire city employed or lift wages in the city-controlled suburban rings. As a a result despite the thriving financial sector, Toronto was dead last in the GTA in terms of median incomes.

    To turn this around, the city must decentralize decision making power so the suburban communities can come up with their own economic development strategies. No matter how much the city improves transit to the outer suburbs, they will not be able to significantly increase median incomes without creating more jobs. The financial sector will continue to grow, but many of jobs created in this sector require specialized training, and thus go to people from outside of the city. This doesn’t do much for former manufacturing workers in Scarborough and Etobicoke. Growth of the financial sector combined with the dispearance of blue collar jobs together guarantee continuing income disparities in the city.

    Below is previously published data from Professor Hulchanski that highlights how badly blue collar sections of the city have been hit.



    Fundamentally, a strong focus on financial and other so-called “creative class” jobs will do little for these areas. The above map was created by Richard Florida’s Martin Prosperity Institute. It shows that most creative class jobs are clustered around the subway, but this doesn’t mean that expanding rail transit will expand creative class employment. Building a light rail line through a neighbourhood doesn’t suddenly transform the residents into artists and physicians. It may attract more artists and physicians, but this could actually hurt local residents by driving up rent and property values without creating jobs for them. Below is a map of educational attainment by ward. The darker the colour, the higher the number of residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher.

    The real problem is that a focus on elite jobs creates exactly the kind of bifurcation that progressive complain about. Given that city wide business policies are tailored towards creative class type occupations, it is unlikely that price sensitive manufacturers will find any reason to locate within city boundaries, rather than setting up shop in Mississauga or Barrie.

    Indeed, for all the temptation by urbanists to point to Toronto’s suburban ring as an example of the decline of suburbia, the peripheral suburban areas outside of city limits have been booming. Here is a map of growth in the GTA between 2001-2006. While Toronto grew modestly, suburban cities Milton, Brampton, Vaughan, Richmond Hill, Markham, Ajax, and Whitby all grew by at least 20%. Even Oshawa, which was hit hard by the decline of the auto sector, has managed to survive, and indeed maintained a higher median income than Toronto during this period. Regional rival Mississauga eclipsed Toronto’s growth rate, and emerging regional player Barrie grew by over 20%.

    In short, despite its strong financial core, Toronto is losing its standing as the go-to destination in the GTA. And it could get worse. Mississauga is working hard to lure financial services and advanced manufacturing jobs from Toronto. Several other cities, such as Guelph and Waterloo are actually competing for the very creative types that Toronto’s policies are tailored to attract. Other cities, such as Barrie are working hard to cannibalize what is left of Toronto’s manufacturing and distribution sectors. Were it not for amalgamation, Etobicoke or Scarborough could just as easily have undertaken a similar strategy to attract blue collar jobs.

    The Three Cities report identifies serious regional disparities in Toronto. Unfortunately, it doesn’t provide much insight into how to fix the problem. Expanding transit options will only go so far towards this. Building more light rail may raise median incomes by attracting wealthier people to these neighbourhoods. Ironically, this will only widen the income gap. The real challenge is finding out how to create opportunities for blue collar jobs in suburban Toronto. Unfortunately, amalgamation has imposed one size fits all policies that may work downtown, but utterly fail in the suburbs and continue to drive people to the periphery outside the city limits. Ironically, the very policies that seek to halt “sprawl” may well end up exacerbating it.

    Toronto Skyline photo by Smaku

    Steve Lafleur is a public policy analyst and political consultant based out of Calgary, Alberta. For more detail, see his blog.

  • 2011: Jobs Vs The Deficit

    The roadmaps showing the way out of our 1.4 trillion dollar federal deficit almost always begin at the same starting points. During 2010, it became taken-for-granted that today’s record-setting red ink is a result of unrestrained government spending — especially stimulus spending. And the idea that the economic upturn in jobs and growth will begin with deficit reduction has become widely perceived as ‘common sense’.

    The December release of the federal debt panel’s Simpson-Bowles report crystallized a mass re-set of priorities, with politicians and pundits freely equating solutions to ‘the deficit crisis’ with economic recovery. While conservatives and liberals reacted differently to the report’s specifics, the assumption that immediate deficit reduction would be healthy and virtuous was largely accepted. The president has also pledged to follow this path.

    The media, meanwhile, geared up with a national debt counseling forum. November ended with three out of four of the lead columns in the Washington Post providing advice on the subject. US News and World Report called on the president to get busy and “name a deficit Czar”. Deficit reduction? There’s an app for that. A prominent New York Times feature titled “You Fix the Budget” included an interactive Iphone/Ipad application that urged readers to “Make your own plan and share it online”. Jobs and growth have inspired no such apps thus far.

    Are congressional free-spending ways really the problem? Counter-intuitive though it may seem, the strongest evidence indicates that the deficit is tied to many political expenditures that are mandated and locked in place, and not to any ‘spending spree’.

    Consider the sharp increase in expenditures for SNAP (the old “food stamps” program), or for unemployment benefits. While the guidelines to qualify for these benefits have stayed roughly the same, payments have ballooned — in the case of SNAP, 72 percent from 2007 to 2009, as detailed in a report from The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. The federal government did not choose to increase this spending. And the financial threshold for receiving benefits was not lowered. But many more families slid out of the middle class and into the safety net. As the economy tanked, the recession itself automatically triggered increased federal outlays, which in turn fed the deficit.

    In other words, the system is performing as we originally intended, and hoped, that it would. Like a truck engine suddenly expected to haul a much heavier load, the federal budget is burning more gas… and by doing so, is able to continue uphill, carrying individuals, families, and businesses out of financial disaster.

    If calls to drastically reduce the deficit succeed, and federal spending is radically turned down now, the result will be comparable to cutting the engine’s fuel supply. The roll back downhill will be swift, horrific, and potentially out of control.

    For a glimpse of how deficit slashing could play out, take a look at Portugal. Already, there are signs that recent austerity measures will actually increase its government’s fiscal deficit, a consequence of falling tax revenue and rising social needs as a result of increased unemployment. Portugal’s central government lost ground in the first nine months of this year as its deficit rose by about $280 million, even as actions to restrain it were set in motion. The pursuit of yet more deflationary spending cuts and tax increases could continue the vicious cycle.

    Crisis-related spending, whether oriented toward businesses or households, has been trashed as costly. But shouldn’t it be obvious that business and household income and spending help the private sector, which needs to thrive for the economic growth we need?

    Liberal think-tanks are not alone in their view that running deficits is a logical and necessary response to a severe recession. Even David M. Walker, former CEO of the Peter G. Petersen Foundation, an anti-deficit think tank dedicated to austerity, has joined Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute in acknowledging that the United States must address “jobs now and deficits later”; Mishel and Walker have called for two years of elevated deficits.

    And the public does not disagree, despite the Tea Party street-theater shows. In this autumn’s CBS News Poll, 54 per cent saw the Economy/Jobs as the nation’s most important problem, compared to 3 per cent for the Budget Deficit/National Debt; the CNN/ Opinion Research Corp figures were almost the same. Fox News and Bloomberg polls also showed that concerns about the economy and jobs considerably — by about 20 per cent — trumped the deficit and spending.

    Gestures to counteract deficits with measures such as the pay-freeze on federal salaries, or with anti-earmark legislation, are purely symbolic at best and, in the case of salaries, counterproductive.

    Similarly, calls for the deficit to be pegged to no more than 21 percent of Gross Domestic Product, as in the Simpson-Bowles report, or 20 percent, as suggested by Representative Mike Pence (R-Indiana), make no sense, and provoke one simple and as yet unanswered question: Why?

    We are indeed in a crisis. But the crisis is jobs, and the solution is to grow the economy. Deficit reductions would have a negative impact on both. The deficit hawks who demand chicken feed-sized cuts have yet to provide data — let alone logical arguments — that show how these cuts could lead to job creation and growth.

    The deficit should not be treated as the main problem when it is, in reality, only the product of a poorly functioning economy. There are many good reasons that a reasonable deficit reduction plan should be early on the agenda when the US economy is once again strong. But the austerity measures being floated today range from meaningless to ludicrously dangerous. There is no reason that this so-called crisis needs to be acted on while the economy is weak. In deficit reduction — as in navigating turns in the road — timing is everything.

    Photo by Premshree Pillai

    Dimitri B. Papadimitriou is President of The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. He recently co-edited, with L. Randall Wray, The Elgar Companion to Hyman Minsky.

  • Washington Opens The Virtual Office Door

    On December 9, President Obama signed into law the Telework Enhancement Act, a bill designed to increase telework among federal employees. Sponsored by Representatives John Sarbanes (D-MD), Frank Wolf (R-VA) and Gerry Connolly (D-VA), the legislation gives federal agencies six months to establish a telework policy, determine which employees are eligible to telework, and notify employees of their eligibility. Agency managers and employees are required to enter written telework agreements detailing their work arrangements and to receive telework training. Under the Act, teleworkers and non-teleworkers must be treated equally when it comes to performance appraisals, work requirements, promotions and other management issues. Each agency must designate a Telework Managing Officer, and must incorporate telework into its continuity of operations plan.

    Supporters of the measure, including the National Treasury Employees Union and the Telecommunications Industry Association, rightly tout its potential to improve the productivity of federal employees, reduce the government’s overhead expenses, decrease energy consumption and cut carbon emissions. Indeed, the Telework Research Network estimates that if the eligible federal workers who wanted to telecommute did so once a week, agencies would increase productivity “by over $4.6 billion each year” and save “$850 million in annual real estate, electricity, and related costs.” The country would save nearly six million barrels of foreign oil and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by one million tons per year. The bill would enable agencies to continue functioning during emergencies (federal telecommuters saved the government an estimated $30 million per day when D.C.-area snow storms shut down offices last winter), and it would decrease traffic congestion.

    Increasing the number of federal telecommuters is a good first step towards empowering the nation to tap telework’s many benefits. However, a diverse group of advocates would like to see telework become widely available for all workers. The Obama Administration endorses this goal. Proponents of broad access to telework include champions for small businesses and for energy independence, transportation alternatives, work/life balance, homeowners, environmental protection, disabled Americans, and rural economic development. To maximize telework’s promise — including its potential to open employment opportunities for 17.5 million people — Congress must enact comprehensive legislation offering employers, workers and other stakeholders in both the public and private sectors a wide array of cogent reasons to expand the practice.

    Comprehensive legislation would need to offer either carrots or sticks to constituencies that may resist telework’s growth: organizations with telework-shy managers; commercial landlords worried about telework-induced vacancies; and cities and states afraid that reducing the number of commuters will decrease their revenue. A few key elements:

    Remove Regulatory Barriers
    Perhaps the single greatest regulatory barrier to telework is the threat interstate, part-time telecommuters face of being taxed twice at the state level on the wages they earn at home: once by their home state and then again by their employer’s state. New York has been especially aggressive in taxing nonresidents on the wages they earn at home even though their home states can tax those wages, too. The double tax risk makes telework unaffordable for many Americans.

    Proposed federal legislation called the Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act would eliminate this roadblock to telework, prohibiting states from taxing the income nonresidents earn in their home states. This bill, introduced in the 111th Congress by Representatives Jim Himes (D-CT) and Frank Wolf, enjoys bi-partisan support from lawmakers representing states across the country. It must be included in any package intended to accelerate telework’s adoption.

    Simplify the Home Office Deduction
    The complexity of the current home office deduction discourages home-based workers from taking advantage of it. Potent telework legislation would give both home-based business owners and telecommuting employees the option to take a standard home office deduction.

    Offer Incentives To Employers
    Employers should be allowed to treat as nontaxable income the dollar savings they realize as a result of telework. Alternatively, they should receive a tax credit based either on the cost they incur for equipping employees to telecommute or on the percentage of workers who telecommute. They should receive a payroll tax break when they hire new teleworkers

    Because managerial resistance is a significant obstacle to telework’s growth, and because managers who telecommute themselves may have a more positive view of telework than their office-based colleagues, businesses should receive added incentives to allow managers to telecommute.

    Offer Incentives To Workers
    Workers should be allowed a tax credit based on the amount of time they spend telecommuting or on the cost they incur to purchase equipment and services necessary for telecommuting. They should have the option to treat the value of all equipment and services the employer provides to facilitate telework as a fringe benefit excludable from their taxable income, even when personal use of the tools is also permitted.

    Officer Incentives To Insurers
    Insurers covering losses that telework can minimize should be recruited to promote telework with tax advantages. Because experienced teleworkers enable their companies to continue operating even when emergencies render the main office unusable, business continuity insurers can limit their exposure by increasing the number of their policyholders that maintain strong, well-designed telework programs. They should receive incentives to do so.

    Automobile insurers should also be enlisted. The less frequently people drive, the fewer accidents occur and the less liability car insurers face. To motivate these insurers, Congress should offer them tax advantages based on 1) the proportion of their corporate policyholders that have both significant telework programs and aggressive policies to replace work-related driving with Web-based or telephone conferencing; and 2) the proportion of their individual policyholders who telecommute regularly.

    Offer Incentives To Commercial Property Owners
    Because businesses with dispersed workers need less office space, commercial landlords may wince at decentralization. However, the landlords able to fill their buildings with a greater number of tenants requiring less space – rather than fewer tenants requiring more – can thrive. In addition to operating greener and more cost-efficient sites, these landlords can reduce their risk of loss: Because each tenant represents a smaller proportion of a landlord’s total revenues, a single tenant’s default or decision to relocate is less likely to deal the landlord an insurmountable blow.

    To entice commercial property owners to encourage their tenants to adopt telework, Congress should offer the owners tax incentives based on the proportion of their tenants that have either vigorous telework programs or well-enforced policies requiring employees to replace business travel with remote conferencing.

    Make State and Local Efforts To Promote Telework A Condition Of Federal Transportation Funding
    By reducing the demand for roads and mass transit, telecommuting minimizes the cost of repair, maintenance and expansion of such infrastructure. Before the federal government subsidizes state and local transportation investments, the funding recipients should be compelled to mitigate costs by promoting telework.

    One step that states receiving federal aid should be required to take is to eliminate tax barriers to interstate telework. For example, they should be prohibited from subjecting a nonresident company to business activity taxes when the company’s sole connection to the state is its employment of a few in-state telecommuters. States could also allow car insurers to offer pay-as-you-drive policies.

    States and municipalities could require their agencies to develop telework programs for their own workers and to engage only those contractors that make the maximum possible use of telework. They could require agencies seeking funds to increase their car fleets or facilities to submit an assessment of whether telework could eliminate or reduce the need. They could compel their employees who seek approval for business travel to demonstrate that remote conferencing would not be an adequate substitute. They could authorize agencies to retain the funds the agencies save as a result of telework.

    States could create offices that promote telework and provide technical/legal support for both public and private employers developing telework programs; designate high traffic and pollution days as telework days and publicize them; and conduct public awareness campaigns to encourage telework, including campaigns specifically targeting businesses. Municipalities could eliminate telework-hostile zoning rules.

    All of these proposals would go a long way towards minimizing needless travel. Some would cost the federal government nothing or save it money. Others require a federal investment, but the investment would be made via business and individual tax breaks — welcome incentives for many members of the incoming Congress. Together, these suggestions would create jobs and strengthen the nation’s energy security. They would reduce traffic, carbon emissions and transportation costs; enable workers to meet conflicting job and family responsibilities; help businesses lower expenses, and drive profits. These are fundamentally important goals with bi-partisan support. Congress should act quickly and forcefully to unleash telework’s potential to meet them.

    Photo by By Rae Allen, “My portable home office on the back deck”

    Nicole Belson Goluboff is a lawyer in New York who writes extensively on the legal consequences of telework. She is the author of The Law of Telecommuting (ALI-ABA 2001 with 2004 Supplement), Telecommuting for Lawyers (ABA 1998) and numerous articles on telework. She is also an Advisory Board member of the Telework Coalition.