New Geography

Category: Urban Issues

  • Moving to Reloville, America’s Cross-Country Careerists

    Peter T. Kilborn’s Next Stop, Reloville: Life Inside America’s New Rootless Professional Class documents an important piece of social history: the lives of relocating corporate executives. These modern-day ­nomads—overwhelming white, well-educated and middle-class—maintain the business machine of large companies. They include the technicians, marketing executives and professional managers who accept a rootless life in exchange for handsome remuneration.

    Most of these people live in what Mr. Kilborn calls ­Relovilles, an archipelago of mostly newer, upscale suburban communities that includes places such as Alpharetta, Ga., Highland Ranch, Colo., Overland Park, Kan., and a series of Texas locales from Plano, outside Dallas, to the Woodlands on the periphery of Houston.

    In the many vignettes he provides, Mr. Kilborn portrays these executives and their families in a dispassionate, even sympathetic manner. We meet Jim and Kathy Link, who have moved seven times in a little more than 10 years as Mr. Link pursued a career in selling ­employee-benefit services. The author rides along with Kathy as she shuttles the kids to ­soccer practice,and he tracks the buying and selling of the Links’ homes. “The basement is approximately the same size as my parents’ entire house,” says Jim, marveling at how much house his $200,000 annual ­income bought in Alpharetta.

    We also meet Matt Fisher and his family. He’s an inventory-management specialist who, we’re told, has “averted dead-ending his career by mining his network of contacts to move from Chicago to Cleveland, to Columbus, to Houston, and ­finally to Flower Mound,” in Texas. Matt explains: “You can escalate your career if you want to move around. The ones who don’t move around don’t get the calls . . . because ­nobody knows who they are.”

    Although Mr. Kilborn is clearly an advocate for the ideal of rooted, organic ­communities—a value shared by many of the “Relos” in his book—he evinces none of the snobbish dismissal of middle-class values and aspirations that one finds in the work of new urbanists such as James Howard Kunstler or Andres Duany. Yet despite the appealingly sensible outlook of ­“Reloville,” the book does not rise to the level of the great social histories, such as ­Herbert Gans’s “Levittowners” or even Alan Wolfe’s “One ­Nation.” Mr. Kilborn’s work lacks both the statistical rigor and deep historical perspective found in the best such works.

    Mr. Kilborn also falls into something of the old journalist’s trap: trying to sell your story as something bigger than it is. He calls the Relos “a disproportionately influential strain of the vast middle class.” Yet in many ways they may not be as important as he suggests.

    Overall, Mr. Kilborn estimates the total Relo population at around four million in 2007. The number includes something like 800,000 households that are moved every year by companies in the U.S.—not an insignificant group but hardly a major one in a country of more than 300 million people.

    Despite his claims of their significance, Mr. Kilborn ­acknowledges that the Relos are far from “masters of the universe” who actually shape economies and societies. In fact, most are more the servants of top management than people in control of their own destinies. They are, Mr. Kilborn notes, “twenty-first-century heirs of William S. Whyte’s ­‘Organization Man,’ who ­exchanged the promise of job security and a pension for his loyalty and toil.”

    Yet it seems clear that the whole world of “The Organization Man” of the 1950s—predicated on stable employment— is shrinking, and rapidly. The days of large corporate ­organizations with a secure cadre of midlevel executives seems ­itself an anachronism. Companies routinely restructure their bureaucracies and outsource—to smaller independent firms domestically as well as to firms overseas. Relos may represent less the wave of the future than a stubborn ­hangover from the past.

    One critical reason for the reduced need to uproot workers is new telecommunications technology. For generations, IBM was instrumental in shaping the Relo group that Mr. Kilborn describes. After all, this was a company with initials that, executives joked, really meant “I’ve been moved.” Yet today IBMers are not as mobile as in the past—not in terms of physical movement anyway. As much as 40% of the IBM work force operates full-time at home or remotely at clients’ businesses. For members of the company’s highly regarded consulting practice, the percentage is even higher—they’re logging frequent-flyer miles, and piling up points at ­Residence Inns, not putting down even shallow roots.

    Perhaps even more important may be social changes that could make Relos less relevant in the future. For decades in the post-World War II era it was believed that “spatial mobility” would increase, hastening social disintegration. This vision was epitomized in Vance Packard’s 1972 best-seller, “A Nation of Strangers,” with its vision of America as “a society coming apart at the seams.”

    But in fact, far from becoming ever more nomadic, Americans are becoming less so, as the population ages and as ­formerly urban amenities are more widely dispersed and ­accessible. As recently as the 1970s, 20% of Americans moved annually; by 2004 the number had dropped to 14%— the lowest since 1950. By 2008, barely 10% were relocating.

    These days human-resource executives complain that workers are increasingly unwilling to move even for a promotion, citing family and other concerns. With the recent economic downturn, worker ­mobility in the U.S. has waned further. The decline in the relocation tradition seems likely to persist in good times or bad.

    Even the denizens of ­Relovilles who bought houses under the assumption that they’d be selling and moving on after a few years are now deciding to stay put. And formerly transient communities are evolving into something more permanent. Recent interviews that I conducted in the Woodlands, near Houston—one of the Relovilles identified by the author—revealed a growing sense of community, with some three-generation families now settled in the area.

    Over the past 40 years the institutions of community have emerged in the Woodlands. For example, a well-managed and expansive social-service organization called Interfaith has risen to take care of many needs, from welcoming new families to providing services to children and seniors. A well-attended cultural center has grown up in the town, as has something of a Main Street shopping district. The Woodlands is shedding its past as a generic Reloville and becoming its own place.

    Urban critics might see these evolving Relovilles as too faux for their tastes, but they do hint at a more rooted, less mobile suburban world, far more human than that envisioned by many futurists over the past few decades. Mr. ­Kilborn’s “Reloville” may turn out to be less about America’s social future than a fair and well-written chronicle of a ­phenomenon that is slowly, but inexorably, relocating into the history books.

    This article first appeared in The Wall Street Journal.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Rural-Urban Rift on Healthcare Reform

    While much of the media coverage on the ongoing healthcare reform debate has focused on partisan division, a less mentioned point of conflict exists between rural and urban healthcare interests.

    Rural healthcare providers have long received lower Medicare reimbursement rates than their urban counterparts. Such geographic disparities are set by complex formulas that take into account (among other things) prevailing wage rates and assume higher costs of care provision in urban areas. Rural providers have argued that while wage rates may be lower in their communities, they face challenges in providing care not seen in urban environments, and are less able to take advantage of economies of scale potentially available in higher volume urban settings.

    Rural concern over reimbursement rates has now become a point of contention in the heated healhcare reform debate. At issue is a proposal to have the so-called ‘public option’ “pay health care providers at reimbursement rates used by Medicare”. Rep. Earl Pomeroy (D-North Dakota), a member of the House Ways and Means Committee, voted against what he stated was “a very urban bill.” Another Democrat, Ron Kind of Wisconsin’s 3rd District, also voted against the reform bill in committee, arguing that the proposed reimbursement rates were unfair, and that he didn’t “want to lock our providers into a system where they continue to be penalized”.

    Perhaps sensing a growing threat to their healthcare agenda, the Obama administration appears to be making conciliatory moves to placate rural Democrats. On Tuesday, House “Blue Dog” Democrats, representing the more conservative wing of the Democratic Caucus, met with President Obama to discuss their concerns. On the table were proposed changes to the legislation focused on “protecting rural areas and small businesses.”

    Upon leaving the White House, Rep. Mike Ross (D-Arkansas) expressed hope that the meeting had yielded progress towards creation of an “independent Medicare advisory council”. Such a council would, reports the Wall Street Journal, be empowered to “to make binding recommendations on how Medicare pays doctors and hospitals.” This would appear to be a concrete step towards addressing rural concerns over potential geographic disparities under the public option. However, it remains to be seen if the proposed changes will be acceptable with representatives from more urban districts.

  • The Blue-State Meltdown and the Collapse of the Chicago Model

    On the surface this should be the moment the Blue Man basks in glory. The most urbane president since John Kennedy sits in the White House. A San Francisco liberal runs the House of Representatives while the key committees are controlled by representatives of Boston, Manhattan, Beverly Hills, and the Bay Area—bastions of the gentry.

    Despite his famous no-blue-states-no-red-states-just-the-United-States statement, more than 90 percent of the top 300 administration officials come from states carried last year by President Obama. The inner cabinet—the key officials—hail almost entirely from a handful of cities, starting with Chicago but also including New York, Los Angeles, and the San Francisco area.

    This administration shares all the basic prejudices of the Blue Man including his instinctive distaste for “sprawl,” cars, and factories. In contrast, policy is tilting to favor all the basic blue-state economic food groups—public employees, university researchers, Silicon Valley, Hollywood, Wall Street, and the major urban land interests.  

    Yet despite all this, the blue states appear to be continuing their decades-long meltdown. “Hope” may still sell among media pundits and café society, but the bad economy, increasingly now Obama’s, is causing serious pain to millions of ordinary people who happen to live in the left-leaning part of America.

    For example, while state and local budget crises have extended to some red states, the most severe fiscal and economic basket cases largely are concentrated in places such as New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Oregon, and, perhaps most vividly of all, California. The last three have among the highest unemployment rates in the country; all the aforementioned are deeply in debt and have been forced to impose employee cutbacks and higher taxes almost certain to blunt a strong recovery.

    The East Coast–dominated media, of course, wants to claim that we have reached “the twilight” of Sunbelt growth. This observation seems a bit premature. Instead, traditional red-state strongholds such as the Dakotas, Idaho, Texas, Utah, and North Carolina, dominated the list of fastest-growing regions recently compiled for Forbes by my colleagues at www.newgeography.com.

    When the recovery comes, job growth also is most likely to resurge first in the red states, while the blue states continue to lag behind. For reasons as diverse as regulatory policy, aging infrastructure, and high levels of taxation, blue states continue to be more susceptible to recessions than their red counterparts.

    This assumption is borne out by an analysis of economic cycles by the website JobBait.com, which has found that since 1990 the states most vulnerable to economic downturns include the Great Lakes states of Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, and New York as well as Connecticut and California. Those most resistant have been generally red bastions such as the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Texas, and resource-rich states such as Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, and Wyoming.

    This suggests that even the hardest-hit red states, notably Florida and Arizona, are likely better positioned in the long term for a recovery. A generation of out-migration may be slowing down temporarily due to the recession, but many people moved to places such as Arizona, Florida, Texas, and Georgia over the first seven years of the decade; in contrast, the high-tax blue states, including New York, New Jersey, and California, lost 1,100 people every day between 1998 and 2007. Most of them headed to the red states.

    “When the economy comes back,” notes veteran California-based economist and forecaster Bill Watkins, “there will be a pent-up demand. People will compare and move to the places that are affordable and don’t have the fundamental tough tax and regulatory structures.”

    Devolution in Blue

    These demographic and economic trends will have a long-term political impact. The net in-migration states—almost all of them red—will gain new representatives in Congress after the next census while New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and perhaps even California could see their delegations shrink.

    In fact, amidst the Blue Man’s current political ascendency, the devolutionary process is likely to continue. Its roots are very deep, and will prove more difficult to reverse than media and policy claques suggest. In historic terms, blue states’ relative decline represents one of the greatest shifts of political and economic power since the Civil War.

    In the modern period that starts with the end of the Second World War, the states that are now blue were also, to a large extent, the best. They included the undisputed centers of finance, industry, culture, and education. Blue-state politicians also dominated both parties, either directly or behind the scenes.

    In contrast, the Red Man was disdained. As late as the 1940s, Los Angeles—still then very much in its red period—as well as Houston, Dallas, Charlotte, and Phoenix, were all not listed on the Social Register, the ultimate list of the socialite elite. You might visit Texas or invest in its oil, buy Los Angeles real estate, or winter in Scottsdale, but these were not places of consequence. These cities were not for civilized, serious people.

    Yet demographic forces changed this balance of power forever. In sharp contrast to Europe, often the preferred model for the Blue Man, the United States’ population exploded in the postwar era. This expansion could not be comfortably accommodated in the old cities.

    New demographics and timing shaped America’s urban patterns in largely unforeseen ways. Urban theorist Ali Modarres notes that America’s population over the second half of the 20th century grew by 130 million, essentially doubling, while the populations of France, Germany, and Britain together increased by 40 million, or 25 percent.

    In Europe slower population growth meant that planners could accommodate expansion through gradual expansion of existing cities. In contrast, America’s huge growth could only be accommodated by creating new places and vastly expanding others. This led to the growth of suburbs everywhere, but the bulk of expansion took place in vast emerging metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, and later Phoenix, Dallas, Houston, Atlanta, Miami, and Las Vegas.

    This trend held up through much of the past decade. Nevada’s s population grew at four times the national increase of 8 percent while Arizona expanded three times as much and Florida twice the average. In contrast, growth in the blue states of the Northeast and Midwest generally stood well behind the national average.

    More important still, the new regions experienced a broad entrepreneurial explosion that reshaped the whole economy. In many cases, this growth came directly at the expense of the blue states. When major companies relocated they tended to leave places like New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago for the burgeoning red cities.

    In 1950 Atlanta did not rank among America’s most important economic centers; 50 years later it stood among the most popular cities for large corporations and their subsidiaries. The same could be said for places like Houston, Dallas, and Charlotte. It was the quintessential American story, evidence, as Marxist scholar William Domhoff observed, that America’s “open class system is almost the opposite of a caste system.”

    Blue Man Economics

    Today two principles now drive the political economy of the blue states—and so shape the Obama administration today. The first one is the relentless expansion of public sector employment and political power. Although traditional progressives such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Fiorello La Guardia, and Pat Brown built up government employment, they never contemplated the growth of public employee unions that have emerged so powerfully since the 1960s.

    Public sector employees initially played a positive role, assuring that the basic infrastructure—schools, roads, subways, sewers, water, and other basic sinews of society and the economy—functioned properly. But as much of the private economy moved out of places such as New York, Illinois, and, more recently, California, public sector employment began to grow as an end to itself.

    Some blue-state theorists, columnist Harold Meyerson among them, have identified this new, highly unionized public sector workforce not so much an adjunct to the middle class but its essence. This has become very much the reality in many core blue regions—particularly big cities like New York, Chicago, and Detroit—as the private-sector middle class has drifted to the suburbs or out to the red states.

    Even before the recession these public-sector unions and their lavish benefits had become a major burden for blue states and cities. In California alone state pensions are now $200 billion underfunded. San Francisco has more than 700 retirees or their survivors earning pensions in excess of $100,000 per year. In New York, despite Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s occasional utterances about the city’s expanding pension system being “out of control,” city contributions to the pension system have grown fivefold under his watch. They now consume roughly one in ten dollars in the city budget.

    The only way to pay for these expenditures rests on the second key blue economic principle—the notion of an ever expanding high-end “creative economy.” This conceit is based on the notion that tangible things matter little and that, as former Wired magazine editor Kevin Kelly put it, “communication is the economy.”

    New York pioneered the idea that the economy could depend totally on the efforts of the talented few, mostly those on Wall Street but also those in the media and other “creative” industries. This formula has been widely accepted since New York Mayors John Lindsay and Ed Koch allowed New York City’s public sector to expand, often with borrowed money.

    Sadly this focus has tended to leave little room for a diverse economy that might employ an expanding, upwardly mobile middle class. Instead, companies and employees in these high-value industries tend to dominate almost all the attention of blue-state policy makers.

    Since this class had less need than traditional industries for basic infrastructure, a confluence of interest has emerged between the post-industrial elites and the public employees. Money raised from the monied post-industrial elite would essentially buy social peace by funneling largesse not into improving the roads, subways, or ports but into the pockets of the public employees.

    The Great Delusion and Its Blue-State Victims

    This elite strategy has served to bifurcate most blue states into an affluent core and a rapidly declining periphery. For example, California, a state whose shift from red to blue has given some heft to “progressives” everywhere, has experienced an increasing gap between a small sliver of wealthy metropolitan residents along the coast and an increasingly marginalized interior populated largely by middle- and working-class Hispanics.

    And then there is the imposition of increasingly stringent environmental regulation. This has hit hardest the essential sectors of the non-“creative class” economy such as manufacturing, warehousing, and agriculture. Basic industries depend more than finance or “creative” ones on reasonably priced energy and land, access to raw materials, and a sane regulatory regime. “In California,” notes economist Watkins, “everything has priority over the economy.”

    You can see the effects clearly in California. Climate change regulations work to constrain new construction of homes, particularly suburban single-family homes. Manufacturing industries, even relatively “clean” ones, make easy targets for carbon-hunting regulators. A recent Milken Institute report found that between 2000 and 2007 California lost nearly 400,000 manufacturing jobs, all this while industrial employment was growing in major competitive rivals such as Texas and Arizona.

    Trucking firms, saddled with harsh new deadlines to shift to cleaner vehicles, also are going out of business. Like manufacturers, many of these have historically been sources of upward mobility for largely Latino entrepreneurs and workers.

    Perhaps the most searing disaster is unfolding in the rich Central Valley. Large areas are about to be returned to desert—due less to a mild drought than to regulations designed to save obscure fish species in the state’s delta. Over 450,000 acres have been allowed to go fallow. Nearly 30,000 agriculture jobs—mostly held by Latinos—were lost just in May. Unemployment, 17 percent across the Central Valley, reaches to more than 40 percent in some towns such as Mendota.

    “We are getting the sense some people want us to die,” notes native son Tim Stearns, a professor of entrepreneurship at California State University at Fresno. “It’s kind of like they like the status quo and what happens in the Central Valley doesn’t matter. These are just a bunch of crummy towns to them.”

    A similar process of secular decline can also be seen in the peripheries of other blue states such as upstate New York, which has ranked near the bottom of job growth nationwide over the past 40 years. But nowhere has this occurred more completely than in Michigan.

    Under the leadership of Governor Jennifer Granholm, Michigan has sought to reinvent itself from an industrial powerhouse to a center of the “creative economy.” For much of her first term, Granholm focused on such inanities as promoting a “cool cities” program, following the notion that creating places for the terminally hip would help turn around her state’s economy.

    Yet in the end, Michigan stands at the worst end of almost every calculator, with the highest unemployment and rates of out-migration, and the worst cities for business. Its per capita income, which was 16th in the nation shortly before Granholm ascended as governor, has now dropped to 33rd, the lowest since the federal government has been keeping records.

    Detroit now suffers a 22 percent unemployment rate, the highest of any major city. Nearly one in three residents is on food stamps. But the pain goes well beyond Motor City. Altogether Michigan communities account for a remarkable six of the nation’s ten worst job markets, according to the most recent Forbes–New Geography survey.

    Waiting for Obama

    Many in the true blue states greeted Barack Obama’s election like the coming of a Messiah who would redress these serious problems. After all, it is widely believed in blue states that the red-state barbarians had looted the Treasury for their clients in the energy, industrial, home-building, pharmaceutical, and defense industries. Now the blue states, and their industries, would get payback. A vast expansion of public infrastructure, more emphasis on basic industry, and incentives for new entrepreneurial ventures could now help rapidly declining areas in the blue states.

    Yet hopes that Obama would emphasize such basic infrastructure now have been dashed. Instead, the stimulus has been largely steered to social service providers, “green” industries, and academic research. One reason, as we now know, is that feminists saw such an approach as too favorable to “burly men” who might not have been among the president’s core fan base.

    Sadly, many of those “burly men,” particularly the unemployed, still reside in the blue states. They might not be in the places inhabited by the post-industrial elites but they do live in the hardscrabble neighborhoods, industrial suburbs, and small towns from Michigan and upstate New York to California’s vast interior.

    Another group that may be unexpectedly hurt by the Obama policies will be the middle and upper middle classes in blue states. Already burdened by high rates of taxation locally and higher costs for everything from housing to education, these hardy souls—making more than $125,000 to $250,000 a year—now are about to find themselves heaped in with the “rich.” Higher federal tax rates, as proposed by the administration, could prove disastrous for many blue-state middle-income families.

    The Chicago Model: Obama’s ‘Closed Circle’

    This skewed allocation of resources reflects the administration’s roots in contemporary Chicago. It derives from a pattern of rewarding core constituencies as opposed to lifting up the whole economy.

    The financial bailout reflects one part of this. Money lavished on bankers and lawyers, most of them in New York and Chicago, represents relief to what is now a core Obama constituency. Indeed the whole Troubled Asset Relief Program mechanism is being run by what Simon Johnson, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, has described as a “wonderfully closed circle.”

    This approach, notes University of Illinois political scientist Dick Simpson, comes naturally for an administration dominated by veterans of the Chicago machine. Politicians in the Windy City do not worry much about opposition—49 out of 50 aldermen are Democrats—and follow policies adopted by the small central cadre.

    Once the message is set upon, notes Simpson, Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley operatives such as David Axelrod set about spinning things. This system is ideal for cultivating both media skill and political discipline during election season—something so evident in Obama’s brilliant campaigns against first Hillary Clinton and then John McCain, Simpson observes.

    But machine politics do not necessarily work out so well for the rest of the population. “The principle problem is that the machine is not subject to democracy,” notes Simpson, who remains hopeful for the Obama presidency. “There’s massive patronage, a high level of corruption . . . There’s a significant downside to authoritarian rule. The city could do much better.”

    To be sure, there has been considerable gentrification in Chicago, as in many cities. Chicago’s “revival” also has been a classic case of blue-state economics, driven largely by a now fading real estate boom, the financial industry, a growing college and university population, and tourism. But overall, from the point of view of most middle and working class residents, Chicago’s political system has proved inefficient and costly. This can be seen in demographic trends that show Chicago as the only one of few large U.S. cities to lose population. At the same time, the middle class, particularly those with children, continue to flee to the suburbs. Roughly half of all white families (as of 2005) leave when their children reach school age.

    Is There Hope for Blue America?

    Ultimately, waiting for Obama will not revive the blue states. Instead the best prospect lies in blue states healing themselves. Fortunately, there are some tentative signs of unrest. The same regime failure that stuck to Republicans in the wake of the Bush presidency soon may be felt by Democrats burdened with the failed legacy of Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine, or New York Governor David Paterson. Even Illinois, the president’s home state, could go Republican, suggests political scientist Simpson, if the Republicans put up a viable, middle-of-the-road candidate.

    Powerful signs of mounting resistance have emerged in the most important state of all, California. The massive rejection of the budget agreement last spring was a blow to not only its architects, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the Democrats in the legislature, but the general conventional wisdom that holds increased taxes as the key to addressing the state’s budget problem.

    Even in deep blue Los Angeles, the public sector machine built around onetime union organizer and current Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa has lost some recent battles, including an attempt to create a public sector union monopoly over the city’s solar industry. There is now greater appreciation of soaring public sector pension obligations as groups like the California Foundation for Fiscal Responsibility expose lists of public employees enjoying mega-pensions.

    Similar efforts have started in other states, and with private-sector pensions being cut around the country, anger over the emerging privileged class of public workers may well gain traction. Ultimately, more people in blue states will begin to realize that their states need to learn again how to compete against both their red counterparts and the rest of the world.

    There is no intrinsic reason blue states should continue to decline. They have created much of the industrial enterprise, technological innovation, and cultural vitality that made the United States the world’s preeminent country. The prospects for these places can certainly be brighter than they are today.

    This article originally appeared at the American.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

    *State map courtesy of Mark Newman: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/election/2008/

  • The Next Culture War

    The culture war over religion and values that dominated much of the last quarter of the 20th century has ended, mostly in a rout of the right-wing zealots who waged it.

    Yet even as this old conflict has receded , a new culture war may be beginning. This one is being launched largely by the religious right’s long-time secularist enemies who are now enjoying unprecedented influence over our national politics.

    For all the manifest differences between these two groups, these culture warriors have much in common. Each represents an effort by a highly motivated minority to impose a particular vision of life on a population that does not share either their level of conviction or specific policy preferences.

    The Christian right saw its mission as using government policy to restore family and faith to a country they saw losing adherence to both. Not content with hometown pieties, they wanted to use government power to regulate areas ranging from abortion and gay marriage to stem cell research, in ways reflecting their values and agenda.

    For a while, their agenda also appealed to white ethnics in urban areas, largely Catholics, who recoiled against the crime and disorder in city streets. When they moved en masse to the suburbs, the religious right’s social base narrowed further.

    One critical weakness of the movement stemmed from the fact that many prominent figures like Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell and Jesse Helms rose from the segregationist South. This limited their appeal outside the white Confederate ethnic enclaves in small towns and some Southern suburbs. They were notably less successful in the fastest-growing, more ethnically and socially diverse communities, where the future of evangelical Christianity now is being shaped.

    Many of the goals espoused by Christian political activists are clearly commendable – promoting charity and respect for human life. In some areas, such as abortion, they have made real inroads on influencing broader society’s attitudes. But overall, their political attempts to impose a narrow religious agenda has fallen into disrepute even among Republicans.

    Today, the locus of the culture war has shifted to the secularist left, whose primary geographic base lies in our densest, most elite cities. This group has evolved into its own version of what the Calvinists would call “the elect” – those chosen to thrive amid a sinful nation. They might also be called “the cognitive elite,” since their self-image comes not from religious worship but from a sense of higher intelligence, greater rationality and even superior healthfulness.

    Perhaps the most honest description of this largely urban grouping was made in the Seattle alternative paper The Stranger shortly after George Bush’s 2004 re-election. Shocked by John Kerry’s defeat, The Stranger defined their preferred constituency as “islands of sanity, liberalism and compassion.” The red regions, they concluded, were the abode of “people [who] are fatter and slower and dumber.”

    At the time, The Stranger’s solution was to secede in spirit from the red states and build a new America hewing to what they considered humane and scientific values. Yet four years later, the self-proclaimed “islands of sanity” now dominate the government in a manner unprecedented in recent American history.

    The rapid ascendancy of the new culture warriors has everything to do with class and caste. The religious right’s base lay predominately in the small towns and lower middle class. They may have had more votes than the sophisticated city-dwellers, but in the end they had little influence among Bush-era policy-makers, whose greater allegiance was to Wall Street, energy and other corporate interests.

    In sharp contrast, the cognitive elites rise straight from the critical bastions of Obama-era power. They draw strength from the mainstream media, the vast “progressive” non-profit community, the universities, and the professional policy elites. University and think-tank denizens, according to a recent National Journal survey, constitute 37 percent of the top 366 appointees by the Obama administration, far more than under the Bush regime.

    One group, not surprisingly far less well-represented, are white Christians, whose number, according to the National Journal, has dropped from 71 percent under Bush to 46 percent. It’s not that the Obamites lack faith, just that they lean less to conservative Christianity and more toward the gospel according to Al Gore.

    Like their Christian right counterparts, the cognitive elite’s agenda does address some important issues. You do not have to embrace the theology of global warming (aka climate change) to favor incentives for reducing energy use and cleaning up pollution. Advocating healthier outcomes through more walking, bike riding and better school lunches also make sense as public goals. And a planning approach that allows for more housing options in suburbs and better access to transit also could be useful.

    The problem here, as with the Christian right, lies with overzealousness and intolerance. Whether environmentalism qualifies as a religion or ideology for legal purposes, it is clearly being embraced in a quasi-theological way. As Bjorn Lomborg and others have pointed out, any objection to the Gorite carbon emissions agenda invites scorn and denunciation for, as Paul Krugman recently suggested, “treason against the planet.” Even mild skeptics can expect to be treated like a strident atheist at a mega-church – although probably with likely far less compassion or politeness.

    Critically, the climate-change zealots likely will be in our faces and wallets far more than the religious fulminators. Although the public is widely skeptical of the whole climate change agenda, they will have to confront a huge new bureaucratic apparatus that could impact millions of businesses and local planning decisions down to the household level.

    This desire to micromanage in the public interest also extends well beyond climate change. There is clear desire now to influence everything from how we live to what we eat. You can see the beginnings in everything from ever-higher cigarette taxes to bans on trans-fats at your local hot dog stand.

    San Francisco, always ground zero for such intrusive lunacy, now has determined to find ways to shove healthy foods on the plates of city residents, preferably from urban gardens. The city is even taking steps to prevent city workers from ordering donuts for meetings. Now bureaucrats must follow guidelines from the Health Department.

    City workers even have to cut bagels into quarters or halves, presumably so that workers may all look as svelte as Mayor Gavin Newsom. “We have an eating and drinking problem in America,” declared Newsom, a candidate for governor with an admitted former alcohol problem of his own.

    But perhaps the most intrusive changes may come in terms of planning and development. The Obama administration has already declared its desire to “coerce” people out of their cars and discourage sprawl in order to promote its health and carbon-cutting agendas.

    This could evolve into a concerted attempt to force more Americans into the high-density housing as opposed to the single family suburban homes they prefer for reasons ranging from cost to privacy and safety. It may be questionable how much these steps will improve health or the environment, but this may not matter much given the current theological consensus.

    What we now see is policy enacted in the name of scientific dogma, even though science’s essence lies in open inquiry and debate. In the process, agendas are often conflated; reports even mildly contrary to the received wisdom of climate change are ridiculed or ignored. For some urbanists, climate change also provides a convenient excuse to reverse the dispersion to suburbs that they have railed against for decades.

    What we need now is not self-interested dogma, but open, wide-ranging debate designed to find the most effective ways to achieve energy efficiency in both cities and suburbs. Amid the worst economic downturn in a half-century, we also might want to weigh the impact of some “green” policies on the employment, income and wealth prospects for middle- and working-class Americans.

    The anointed secular clerisy seems destined to become very unpopular. Americans do not like to be preached to by their political leaders about how to manage the details of their lives, particularly when the preachers often fail to follow their own precepts; this was a core problem with those who aligned with the religious right. Environmental and health activists would do better to focus more on suasion as opposed to coercion and to offer incentives rather than dictates to achieve their goals.

    They should also learn that problems are addressed most effectively at the local, community and familial levels. The wide access to information through the Internet undermines the very logic for relentlessly centralized solutions; the best “green” policies may be those that evolve organically and fit specific local conditions.

    Basically, cultural warfare makes for stupid politics, as the Republicans should have – but likely have not – learned by now. The new culture war now developing could pose similar dangers for the Democrats, if they are not careful.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.

  • Housing the Next Generation with Old Shipping Containers

    If the predictions are accurate, America will have to house some 100 million more people by 2040 to mid-century than is now the case. Despite the current round of foreclosures and rising apartment vacancy, over the long term the demand for humane, affordable, sustainable housing is going to escalate dramatically in the coming years.

    In this recessionary time, it may be tempting to ignore the coming boost in housing demand. Yet eventually growth will pick up and the housing market will become re-invigorated. Nonetheless, the problem of meeting the demand for affordable housing will remain. For now, the federal government is trying to help state and local governments acquire, renovate and sell foreclosed properties, and individual homeowners to reduce their mortgage payments to 31 percent of their income. Federal efforts are also being aimed at increasing funds to redevelop public housing and at giving first-time homebuyers an $8,000 tax credit.

    But these are short-term measures. Others, with more lasting impact, may be more effective. One will be the size of houses. Although some may still choose to build large lot homes and McMansions, the longer-term trend will be for somewhat more compact houses. Contrary to the visions of some urban boosters, Americans will continue to favor single family homes over apartments. But these houses seem likely to trend back to the more traditional, modest scale. Between 2006 and 2007, after years of expanding, the size of a median single-family house actually decreased slightly.

    Another critical element of a housing solution lies in building workforce housing close to the workplace. For years, many moderate income Americans have been forced to “drive ‘til they qualify.” Throughout the nation’s metropolitan areas, teachers, police officers, firefighters, salesclerks, municipal workers, and young people, among others, are being elbowed out of the local housing market. In a recent survey conducted by the Urban Land Institute in cooperation with Harris interactive, of the 110 larger firms (over 100 employees) surveyed, fifty-five percent reported a lack of affordable housing nearby, sixty-seven percent of the workers interviewed (who earned less than $50,000 per year) said they would move closer to work if more housing in their price range were available, and fifty-eight percent of the companies reported having lost employees due in part to long commute times.

    For most Americans, particularly between ages 30 and 70, the demand for affordable homes near workplaces will be paramount. In some areas, there may also be greater demand for apartments, even though these too are suffering due to the recession.

    Many zoning and building codes are obsolete and need to be updated, because as written they restrict the construction of low and moderate income housing and segregate residential, retail, and industrial/commercial land uses. Changing zoning to permit and provide incentives for mixed use development, more intense land uses, and higher density development would make workforce housing more affordable.

    The steps above do not apply only to city living. Through good design, suburban living can be made slightly more compact without sacrificing quality of life. Accessory buildings can often be added on a lot, “granny flats” can be built, large old single family homes can be converted into duplexes, empty spaces could be filled in, and other steps can be taken to meet the need for more housing when that need materializes.

    But perhaps the biggest gains can come by using innovative approaches to expanding housing. One novel idea that has begun to emerge is to use old shipping containers that have been transformed into building blocks for home-building materials. Actually, one can hardly call the idea novel, because shipping crates have been used in construction for thousands of years. But today, the old practice is being revived with entrepreneurial, innovative, outside-the-box thinking.

    These reconfigured containers have the advantages of being more economical and durable than conventional materials, speedier to construct, highly customizable, fire-, termite-, water-, and earthquake/hurricane-resistant, strong, safe and green, with a lower carbon footprint. Hence the name of one of the companies working in this field, one with which I am associated, SG Blocks LLC (SG stands for “safe and green”). As the company puts it, “We are in the business of converting instruments of trade into instruments of construction.”

    Shipping containers are big: each weighs 9,000 pounds and measures 8 feet wide by 40 feet long by 9 feet tall. Hundreds and thousands of them are sitting empty in ports around the country. What possible use could they be, one may wonder, in building a new residential or office complex?

    Consider, therefore, that these steel-on-steel containers, when used as re-fabricated “blocks,” are stronger than conventional house framing. They can be cut, fabricated, re-modeled, and turned into a basic home structure for approximately $25-$27 a square foot. Stevan Armstrong, COO of SG Blocks, has pointed out that multi-family mid-rise units built with containers cost 10 to 15 percent less than typical “stick frame” houses. When appropriate coatings are installed, says Dan Rosenthal, a principal with the Lawrence Group, “we have an envelope that reflects about 95 percent of outside radiation, resists the loss of interior heat, provides an excellent air infiltration barrier and does not allow water to migrate in. Because of the superior roof structure, it is easier to incorporate ‘green’ roof systems.”

    Using shipping containers also saves energy on the front end. It takes 6,481 kilowatt-hours to make a ton of steel from virgin materials, 9,000 kilowatt hours of energy to melt down a container, but only 400 kilowatt-hours of energy to convert shipping containers into SG Blocks.

    The possibilities for utilizing this type of construction – infill housing in urban and suburban communities, new construction for residential, commercial, industrial and retail buildings, single- and multi-family homes – are practically limitless. From a design perspective, SG Blocks claims that their modified containers “can be used to build virtually any style of construction, from traditional to modern and all in between…from traditional Main Street to ultra-contemporary.” In short, they can provide people with an opportunity for ownership and economic mobility in a decent community environment.

    To cite a few examples:

    • A continuing care community for seniors on the historic Mission San Luis Rey grounds in Oceanside, CA, 340,000 square feet with 450 SG Blocks, is going up.
    • In Salt Lake City, the first mid-rise container building is being planned for downtown; it will be called City Center Lofts, with eight units and a ground level art gallery.
    • In Ft. Collins, CO, discussions are being held about creating “block” homes for 500 families as part of the city’s Homeless Shelter Program.
    • John Knott, the guiding light in the Noisette Community in North Charleston, SC, wants to build a six- to eight-story “container” building, retail on the first floor with residential units above, topped with a green roof. He proposes using ninety prison re-entry men to do the construction.
    • Work is in process on a three- to four-story student housing and recreational mixed use facility at Lubbock Christian University in Texas.
    • In Panama, “blocks” are being used to build four buildings that will house community and education centers for the U.S. Southern Command.
    • Attached to the top of this article is a photo of a house built with SGBlocks in St. Petersburg, FL.

    Demography is destiny, as has been said so many times. With 100 million more people in the pipeline, we have to find humane, innovative, affordable ways to house them and provide them with opportunity for advancement. Salvaging empty shipping containers to address this problem is only one step, but a most interesting one that is well worth the trying.

    William H. Hudnut III, former Member of Congress and sixteen-year Mayor of Indianapolis, is the principal in his firm, Bill Hudnut Consultants LLC, and an associate of SG Blocks LLC. His email address is: bhudnut3@gmail.com.

  • Urban Backfill vs. Urban Infill

    By Richard Reep

    Wendell Cox recently reported on the state of so-called “urban infill” efforts, and analyzed which cities are experiencing an increase in their density. This report shows some surprising trends. Cities such as Pittsburgh, which claim to be successful at “infilling”, are actually dropping in density, in part because of low birth rates and lack of in-migration.

    What may be the next trend might be called urban agriculturalization or “urban backfill”. In the past, urban infill used to make sense. Where a concentration of people already existed, and where infrastructure was in place, development between existing structures seemed inevitable. With the accessibility allowed by the car, urban infill became a choice among others, including the suburban frontier. Urban infill became, for most cities, a rarity.

    Current attempts to encourage infill over fringe development may be too little too late, as the cost and regulatory environment favors fringe development. Expenditures on public safety rose as building codes dictated an increasing level of safety in urban cores, not just for the occupants of the building, but for the building itself. Driven higher because of the perceived desirability of a downtown, costs soared out of control as elaborate, complex zoning processes meant high fees to a team of consultants necessary to steer projects through multiple public hearings. These generated some pricey computer graphics, but often no guaranteed outcome.

    Aesthetics also have become highly regulated as well, with design boards composed of interested citizens, reducing the design process to design-by-committee. By the early part of this century, urban infill became an Olympian sport, leaving most of an urban area’s empty lots and dilapidated buildings vacant.

    To further burden the urban infill developer, right now a new form of regulation is entering the scene, that of the so-called smartcode which regulates the last untouched part of the exterior of a structure: its overall form. With rigid codes and design staffs, cities can now create for themselves a vision, supplemented with pretty pictures, of the imagined future, where building patterns need to be just-so. An urban infill developer must now adhere to someone else’s opinion of where his front door is, and whether he has a front porch.

    So, in reality, these urban parcels sit abandoned and income-free, with the biggest real estate growth market being in “for sale” signs, as owners try to unload these properties on a greater fool ready to do battle for the cause of urban infill. It is a no-win scenario for cities.

    Back fill provides an alternative below the line. Overlooked spaces are being discovered by many people as ideal for temporary use, and with only a small cost for a license or permit, new marketplaces, street performances, and other people-intensive activities are rushing in to fill the void. Again, a city with any savvy will try to apply a regulatory and fee drag on this activity; fortunately for the citizens, this usually takes a long time, and in the meantime, many cities are acquiring the look of a genteel form of Blade Runner, with person-to-person commerce taking place among the currently decaying and abandoned edifices and infrastructure.

    Still other parts of the city are trying to beautify their abandoned spaces by planting them, sometimes with gardens, figuring lush landscapes can hide the fact that their core is not as desirable as it once was. And still others fence them off, creating a new canvas for graffiti artists and advertising, and returning the abandoned spaces into wilderness.

    All of this belongs to the study of old field succession, which traditionally has been an agricultural science. For urban cores, this approach suggests a new way to reuse abandoned space. Increasingly, agriculture may not belong exclusively to the rural condition, but can be adapted to the city itself.

    In some areas such as Orlando, entrepreneurs have discovered this reverse-flow effect, which has been useful in so many other endeavors. By applying the standards of agriculture to the urban core, interesting and useful businesses are springing up. Near Orlando’s downtown area, for example, Dandelion’s Café is licensed not as a restaurant but as an agricultural kitchen, allowing it to operate under the Florida Department of Agriculture rather than the Florida Department of Health. This freedom does not compromise public safety – people still get sick from food in Department of Health regulated restaurants – but cleverly avoids the intensive state oversight, permits and fees associated with most restaurants.

    In College Park, the City’s empty land has been converted into a community garden, offering small plots of land for rental to surrounding property owners to cultivate produce. This is not a new idea; urban community gardens exist in cities worldwide. But as the current economic conditions squeeze incomes, creative use of outdoor space to reduce the grocery bill has engendered a new microfarming movement, and may have staying power as people rediscover a sense of shared purpose.

    All this creates a new form of development, which might be characterized as urban backfill. Urban backfill projects include any temporary uses of space for food, commerce, or entertainment. These even include temporary sacred places – the streetcorner preacher, for example, and his congregation. Still other abandoned spaces seemed destined for decay: overgrown weeds, saplings, and mice are turning urban vacant lots into true pastoral scenes that provide surrounding buildings with glimpses of unregulated nature.

    Cities can hold off this backfill for only so long. If Twitter can enable a revolution, ad hocracy can certainly enable free commerce and discourse in a democracy. Temporary uses suggest a vitality that cannot be denied or regulated to death, and suggest that cities consider a new way of looking at these spaces. Urban backfill provides an opportunity to reinvent the American city and create economic and social value where now none exists. It can also help establish both a renewed sense of place that can also nurture new ways for a city to evolve organically and naturally.

    Richard Reep is an Architect and artist living in Winter Park, Florida. His practice has centered around hospitality-driven mixed use, and has contributed in various capacities to urban mixed-use projects, both nationally and internationally, for the last 25 years.

  • Forcing Density in Australia’s Suburbs

    Australia is a continent sized country with total urbanized area of only 0.3%.  As is the case with the USA, the population is increasing as a result of natural growth and immigration. The country is blessed with a sunny climate and enough space to enable its inhabitants to enjoy a relaxed, free lifestyle.

    Given this, one would expect there would be little support for the higher density housing ideology of the Smart Growth advocates. Yet since the early 1990s the Australian Federal Department of Housing has been pushing exactly this approach.

    Sydney, located in the state of New South Wales, has been the forefront for this densification policy. Sydney (population 4.34 million) is subdivided into local municipalities, each run by a popularly elected council. Traditionally these councils have had the responsibility of planning their own areas. Over the years council zoning plans have complied with the expressed preference of over 80% of Australians to live in free-standing homes. In an effort to alter this long-standing pattern the New South Wales Government has resorted to the use of authoritarian processes to force densification, whether areas like it or not.

    High-density regulations from the Planning Minister come about by ministerial fiat without discussion in the State Parliament. These regulations require municipal councils to submit planning strategies to the Planning Minister that increase density, to his/her satisfaction, under threat of removal of a council’s planning powers. In a blatant conflict of interest, half of the members of the minister’s assessment panel are developers who stand to gain from the implementation strategies being assessed and the other half are bureaucrats. There is no community representation.

    Most councils have meekly complied with the coercive demand to submit high-density planning strategies.  As a result previously attractive suburbs with their flowers and foliage are being overcome by the relentless march of grey concrete and bitumen. Bewildered long-time residents find themselves isolated amongst the drab shadows of upward-rising, smothering unit blocks.

    One leafy, mainly single-residential council area in the northern part of Sydney (Ku-ring-gai) insisted that the submission of their residential strategy be delayed until studies could be conducted of the effects of the resulting higher density on infrastructure, traffic, the environment and heritage. This cheekiness was dealt with savagely. Its traditional planning powers have been taken away and given to a planning panel appointed by the Planning Minister.

    This planning panel organised a plan that will increase the population density of the municipality by some 50%. The plan proposes that the traditional village centres and numerous surrounding homes in the area be replaced by massive high-rise tower developments, many spreading deep into surrounding residential streets.

    In a token show of democracy the panel arranged for a public consultation meeting on the draft plan. During the meeting, resident after resident excoriated the high-density plan as grossly excessive, defiant of independent studies and contemptuous of environmental and heritage constraints. Speaker after speaker denounced the panel’s processes – as “failures of transparency and due process”, “patronising and condescending of community concerns”, “pandering to developer interests”, being “part of a process to impose a policy that was not in the greater public interest” and a “sham”. The panel ended the meeting when only half of those who registered to speak had done so. Despite tumultuous scenes of uproar, the planning panel resolved to adopt the high-density plan.

    One would think that such dictatorial impositions on a community could be warranted only by indisputably being in the wider public interest. The Planning Department has attempted to justify its stance by alleging benefits for the greater public good. Chief among these are claims that high density is better for the environment and that the policy saves on infrastructure cost.

    In Australia the evidence points to the contrary. On the question of greenhouse gas emissions, a recent study which allocates greenhouse gas emissions to final consumption at the household level1 shows that on average per person emissions in the high-density inner city areas are nearly twice that in the outer low density areas. Another study shows that there are more greenhouse emissions from domestic energy use in high-density living (5.4t/person/year) than in detached dwellings (2.9t/peson/year)2. This results from lifts, clothes dryers, air-conditioners and common lighted areas such as parking garages and foyers. What is more, the energy required to construct high-rise is nearly five times the energy needed to build single-residential, per resident. 

    In Australia high density hardly reduces travel intensity at all. Research on Melbourne areas shows that the people squeezed into newly converted dense areas did not use public transport to any greater extent than before and there was little or no change in their percentage of car use3.

    There is not nearly enough difference in the greenhouse gas emissions of public versus private transport to counter the increased emissions of high-density dwelling. Greenhouse gas emission per passenger km on the Sydney rail network is 105 gm. The figure for the average car is 155 gm – but for  modern fuel efficient vehicles is as low as 70 gm.

    Adding more people to existing infrastructure results in overload. After 15 years of high-density policies, the quality of Sydney suburban roads, rail service, water supply and electricity has noticeably deteriorated. High-density retrofit is hugely more expensive than laying out new infrastructure on greenfield sites. Infrastructure costs quoted by the authorities almost always omit the cost of restoring the standard of infrastructure back to the level of service people enjoyed before high-density was imposed. One example of these “forgotten” costs – the augmentation of electricity supplies in downtown Sydney, necessitated by 4900 additional apartments, will eventually cost $A429 million ($US340 million) – or $A80,000 per new apartment.4

    The effect of high density policies on the cost of housing has been devastating to the younger generation. In attempting to force people into higher density on existing land, the authorities have drastically cut down the supply of new land for housing. This has resulted in the cost of land now comprising 70% of the cost of a place to stay, instead of the traditional 30%. A new dwelling on Sydney’s outskirts should cost about $A210,000 ($U168,000) but is actually more than $A500,000.

    The cost of commercial land in Sydney has also rocketed out of control. Employers take their business elsewhere. Back in 2000, the New South Wales proportion of the national economy was 35%. This has now plunged to barely 30%.5  The proportion of bankruptcies has increased from 25% to 38%.6

    Besides ostensible “green” ideology, perhaps the powerful driver for high-density policies lies with the resulting opportunities for infill developers to make huge profits. Over the last five years, the ruling New South Wales Labor Party received donations from the development industry of $A9 million while the opposition party netted $A5 million. These donations exceeded the total contributions for all political parties over the same period from the gambling, tobacco, alcohol, hotel, pharmaceutical and armaments industries combined7.

    The political donations gain donors favoured access to government.  This inevitably results in policies sympathetic to them, which in turn result in more profits and more donations.  

    Other Australian states also have implemented high-density policies but not to the degree of New South Wales. Recently in Victoria8 and in Western Australia9 carefully couched announcements have revealed that policies are moving away from excessive high-density.

    Mistaken ideology and financial rewards to a minority have made high-density an enduring feature of New South Wales planning policy. The results are not pretty: more greenhouse gases, high traffic densities, worse health outcomes, a creaking and overloaded infrastructure, a whole generation locked out of owning their own home and business fleeing the state for the greener, less congested pastures elsewhere.

    (Dr) Tony Recsei has a background in chemistry and is an environmental consultant. Since retiring he has taken an interest in community affairs and is president of the Save Our Suburbs community group which opposes over-development forced onto communities by the New South Wales State Government.

    1 Australian Conservation Foundation Consumption Atlas, ,http://www.online.org.au/consumptionatlas/

    2 Myors, P. O’Leary, R. and Helstroom, R.,2005, Multi-Unit Residential Building Energy and Peak Demand Study, Sydney, New South Wales Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources

    3 Christopher Hodgetts, 2008,Thesis: Urban Consolidation And Transport, University of Melbourne

    4 EnergyAustralia website accessed October 2008

    5 Sydney Morning Herald 15 November 2008

    6 Sydney Morning Herald 29 March 2009

    7 Sylvia Hale, Member of NSW Legislative Council, 29 April 2009, Speech to the National Trust Breakfast

    8 http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/opposition-to-a-bigger-melbourne-smacks-of-cultural-snobbery-20090624-cwpv.html?page=-1

  • Subsidies, Starbucks and Highways: A Primer

    At a recent Senate Banking Committee hearing, Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, responding to comments about large transit subsidies, remarked that the last federal highway bill included $200 billion in subsidies for highways.

    The Senator should know better. The federal highway bill builds highways with fees paid by highway users, not by subsidies. Perhaps the Senator was frustrated at having just heard an effective fact-based dismantling of transit lore in testimony by the Cato Institute’s Randal O’Toole and felt it necessary to strike out at the mode by which nearly all travel occurs in the United States.

    In fact, virtually all of Senator Menendez’s $200 billion for federal highway spending come from user fees, which are paid by people and companies that use the highways, not subsidies. The Menendez comment might simply result from ignorance. But often the error appears to be the purposeful muddying of an issue that has become so common in public affairs.

    The “subsidy” litany is accepted by many in the public, who have better things to do than to check the veracity of statements by public “servants”. As a result, we offer this primer on the subject, not only for casual observers of public policy, but also for any members of Congress who might have an interest in veracity.

    What is A Subsidy?

    A government subsidy occurs when taxpayers are forced to pay for a government service, whether or not they use it. Subsidies are legitimate. Subsidies are needed to fund government services demanded by the electorate, such as welfare services and education. On the other hand, payments made by users of a government service (or private goods and services) in proportion to their use are not subsidies. They are user fees, including taxes on the use of gasoline and other fuels.

    This point can be illustrated by looking at the electricity industry. No one would suggest that Potomac Power, Pacific Gas and Electric or other privately owned utilities that are supported by payments from consumers are subsidized. Similarly, government owned utilities like the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Austin Energy and the Tennessee Valley Authority are not subsidized, since they receive their funds from users. It would have been no more absurd to characterize user payments to electricity companies as subsidies than to characterize the federal highway program as subsidized (Note 1).

    There is a simple way to tell the difference between subsidies and user payments. With subsidies you pay whether or not you use the service. In contrast, with user fees, you don’t pay if you don’t use. People who don’t use electricity from the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power don’t pay and people who don’t use the highways don’t pay either.

    Transit Subsidies

    Everyone agrees that transit is subsidized. Approximately one-quarter of transit’s operating and capital funding comes from passenger fares. Nearly all of the rest is subsidies. Moreover, an “open and shut” case can be made for subsidies to transit as a welfare service in core cities where it provides the only mobility for some lower-income residents who do not have access to cars. The case is, however, less than “open and shut” with respect to the substantial subsidies for upper-middle income commuters such as those from Connecticut, the Hudson Valley and New Jersey to Manhattan, or from tony East Bay suburbs to San Francisco, or for well-paid Maryland and Virginia commuters into the District of Columbia.

    A 2004 United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) report indicated that federal subsidies to transit amounted to $0.16 per passenger mile in 2002. Our update of this report estimated that the federal subsidy had risen to $0.17 per passenger mile by 2006. Overall, federal subsidies to transit were $7.7 billion in 2002, which increased to $8.6 billion in 2006 (Figure 1).

    Subsidies to Highways

    Virtually all federal highway spending was financed by fees paid by users in proportion to their use of the highways. There was no taxpayer subsidy.

    Indeed, the USDOT report indicates that in 2002, the federal government made a profit on automobile use of highways of $0.001 and had made a profit in every year since 1990, the first year reported upon. Overall, automobile use of the highways earned the federal government a profit of $4.5 billion in 2002 and $5.5 billion in 2006 (Figure 1).

    The profits made by the federal government on highways indicate that highways are, in fact, subsidizing other government services. Senator Menendez neglected to mention, of course, that last highway bill (called “SAFETEA-LU,” its predecessor was called “ISTEA,” pronounced by insiders as “ice tea”) included $34 billion in subsidies by highway users for transit. For more than 25 years, federal law has required an add-on to highway user fees to support transit. Today nearly 15 percent of highway user fees are used to subsidize transit. In fact, road users pay 15 times as much in gas taxes per passenger mile on transit as they paid for highway expenditures (Figure 2).

    The profits do not stop at the federal level. Federal Highway Administration data indicates that user fees exceed the federal and state share of money spent on state highways, these being intercity highways, urban freeways and some other urban roadways. Only at the local government level are expenditures more than highway user fees, indicating subsidy.

    A real world parallel: Most of us have had Starbucks coffee. Our Starbucks coffee is not subsidized; rather we pay for it, 100% of it (Note 2). We can call this a price or we can use the public policy synonym, a user fee. As in the case of highways, those who do not drink Starbucks coffee do not pay for it. However, if Starbucks were financed like the federal highway program, 15 percent of the price of the coffee would be taken to subsidize tea drinkers (the authorizing legislation might be called ICECAFE).

    Airports

    While Senator Menendez did not refer to airports, those afflicted with a love affair with trains frequently claim that airports are subsidized in order to argue for massive expenditures on high speed rail, intercity rail and Amtrak. They are nearly as wrong as Senator Menendez. The air transportation system is overwhelmingly paid for by users, through taxes on tickets and airport fees. As in the case of highways, only those who use airports and the commercial air system pay for them.

    There are relatively small subsidies to commercial air transportation. The USDOT report found subsidies per passenger mile of approximately one-half penny.

    By comparison, the nation’s intercity passenger rail system (Amtrak) was subsidized to the extent of $0.21 per passenger mile in 2002, according to the USDOT report. Our report found that the figure had edged up to $0.24 in 2006, more than 50 times the subsidy to the commercial air system (Figure 1).

    These commercial air subsidies, however small, should be eliminated. Failing that, train proponents have grounds to ask for up to a half-penny per passenger mile of subsidy for high speed rail and intercity rail. Beyond that, equity requires that high speed rail and intercity rail be financed the same way as the commercial air system: with passenger fares, taxes on rail tickets and fees for the use of railroad stations.

    The Bottom Line

    The bottom line is that you pay for your coffee from Starbucks, you pay for your electricity from the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power and you pay for your federal highways with your own money, not with subsidies by people who do not use them.

    Note 1: Of course, if general taxpayer funding is provided to electric utilities, such payments would be subsidies, whether the utility is privately owned or owned by government.

    Note 2: All of this assumes that the local Starbucks is not the recipient of special tax incentives or abatements that might have been used by local government as enticement to locate in the community.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

  • The Next Global Financial Crisis: Public Debt

    The cloud of the global financial meltdown has not even cleared, yet another crisis of massive proportions looms on the horizon: global sovereign (public) debt.

    This crisis, like so many others, has its root in the free flow of credit from the preceding economic boom years. The market prices of assets were rising steadily. Rising valuations, especially where they were based on improving revenues from robust economic activity, led to rising income streams for governments. This encouraged governments to borrow more, perhaps often to expand services – and the bureaucracy required to offer services – although sometimes to improve infrastructure.

    At the same time, rising market prices for financial assets encouraged more savers and investors into the market. That led to an increasing supply of investable funds, which drove demand for sovereign and municipal debt (in addition to the mortgage-backed securities). This process, driven by the financial services industry instead of the real economy, is eerily similar to the driving forces behind the “subprime crisis.” The demand for public offerings pulled more debt issuance out of borrowers with seemingly little concern for repayment: the financial sector gains its profits from issuance fees, trading fees, underwriting fees, etc. As in the case of mortgages, it will be those who buy and hold the debt, along with the borrowers, who will suffer the consequences.

    Certainly, emerging nations took advantage of the depth of rich nation capital markets to increase their debt through public offerings. At the end of June 2009, only Italy, Turkey and Brazil were covered by more credit default swap contracts than JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America. In addition to those two global banks, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Telekom AG, France Telecom and Wells Fargo Bank all have more credit derivate coverage than the Philippines.

    Yet there is clearly a potential default problem here. Gross credit default swaps outstanding for the debt of Iceland are equal to 66 percent of GDP, about 20 percent of GDP for Hungary and the Philippines and around 18 percent for Latvia, Portugal, Panama and Bulgaria. If these countries default on their debt, those global banks who sell credit derivatives will be making enormous payments – whether or not the defaulting countries receive any support or bailouts from international donor organizations (like World Bank or International Monetary Fund).

    The table below shows the GDP for the countries named in the most credit default swap contracts (as most recently reported to Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation). For each sovereign (country, state or city), we show the value of their public debt both as a figure and as a percent of GDP. The telling factor here is that the “financial markets,” if they are to be believed, judge these entities as more likely to experience “a credit event” than others. A credit event, as we learned when the AIG saga unraveled can be anything from a decline in the market price of debt to an outright default on payments.

    Sovereigns named in most credit default protection*
    Sovereign Entity  GDP (2008)  Share World GDP (est) Public Debt (current) Debt % GDP
    JAPAN  $     4,348,000,000,000 8.6%  $  7,408,992,000,000 170.4%
    REPUBLIC OF ITALY  $     1,821,000,000,000 3.4%  $  1,888,377,000,000 103.7%
    HELLENIC REPUBLIC (Greece)  $        343,600,000,000 0.4%  $      309,583,600,000 90.1%
    KINGDOM OF BELGIUM  $        390,500,000,000 0.6%  $      315,524,000,000 80.8%
    STATE OF ISRAEL  $        200,700,000,000 0.4%  $      151,929,900,000 75.7%
    REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY  $        205,700,000,000 0.3%  $      151,806,600,000 73.8%
    FRENCH REPUBLIC  $     2,097,000,000,000 3.8%  $  1,404,990,000,000 67.0%
    PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC  $        237,300,000,000 0.4%  $      152,346,600,000 64.2%
    FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  $     2,863,000,000,000 4.7%  $  1,792,238,000,000 62.6%
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  $   14,290,000,000,000 21.4%  $  8,688,320,000,000 60.8%
    REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA  $        325,000,000,000 0.5%  $      191,100,000,000 58.8%
    REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES  $        320,600,000,000 0.5%  $      181,139,000,000 56.5%
    KINGDOM OF NORWAY  $        256,500,000,000 0.3%  $      133,380,000,000 52.0%
    ARGENTINE REPUBLIC  $        575,600,000,000 0.8%  $      293,556,000,000 51.0%
    REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  $           73,360,000,000 0.1%  $        35,873,040,000 48.9%
    REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA  $        399,400,000,000 0.6%  $      191,712,000,000 48.0%
    UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND  $     2,231,000,000,000 3.5%  $  1,053,032,000,000 47.2%
    REPUBLIC OF PANAMA  $           38,490,000,000 0.0%  $        17,859,360,000 46.4%
    KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS  $        670,200,000,000 0.3%  $      288,186,000,000 43.0%
    MALAYSIA  $        386,600,000,000 0.3%  $      165,078,200,000 42.7%
    KINGDOM OF THAILAND  $        553,400,000,000 0.9%  $      232,428,000,000 42.0%
    REPUBLIC OF POLAND  $        667,400,000,000 0.7%  $      277,638,400,000 41.6%
    FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL  $     1,990,000,000,000 2.7%  $      809,930,000,000 40.7%
    SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  $        241,800,000,000 0.5%  $        93,334,800,000 38.6%
    KINGDOM OF SPAIN  $     1,378,000,000,000 1.8%  $      516,750,000,000 37.5%
    REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  $        906,500,000,000 1.1%  $      336,311,500,000 37.1%
    KINGDOM OF SWEDEN  $        348,600,000,000 0.6%  $      127,239,000,000 36.5%
    SLOVAK REPUBLIC  $        119,500,000,000 0.2%  $        41,825,000,000 35.0%
    REPUBLIC OF FINLAND  $        195,200,000,000 0.3%  $        64,416,000,000 33.0%
    REPUBLIC OF KOREA  $     1,278,000,000,000 1.4%  $      417,906,000,000 32.7%
    IRELAND  $        191,900,000,000 0.4%  $        60,448,500,000 31.5%
    REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA  $        915,900,000,000 1.7%  $      275,685,900,000 30.1%
    REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  $        489,700,000,000 0.5%  $      146,420,300,000 29.9%
    CZECH REPUBLIC  $        266,300,000,000 0.5%  $        78,292,200,000 29.4%
    REPUBLIC OF PERU  $        238,900,000,000 0.2%  $        57,574,900,000 24.1%
    REPUBLIC OF ICELAND  $           12,150,000,000 0.0%  $          2,794,500,000 23.0%
    REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA  $           59,140,000,000 0.1%  $        13,010,800,000 22.0%
    KINGDOM OF DENMARK  $        204,900,000,000 0.4%  $        44,668,200,000 21.8%
    UNITED MEXICAN STATES  $     1,559,000,000,000 1.9%  $      316,477,000,000 20.3%
    BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA  $        357,900,000,000 0.6%  $        62,274,600,000 17.4%
    REPUBLIC OF LATVIA  $           39,980,000,000 0.1%  $          6,796,600,000 17.0%
    REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA  $           93,780,000,000 0.2%  $        15,661,260,000 16.7%
    PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  $     7,800,000,000,000 7.7%  $  1,224,600,000,000 15.7%
    ROMANIA  $        271,200,000,000 0.3%  $        38,239,200,000 14.1%
    REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA  $           63,250,000,000 0.1%  $          7,526,750,000 11.9%
    UKRAINE  $        337,000,000,000 0.6%  $        33,700,000,000 10.0%
    REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN  $        176,900,000,000 0.3%  $        16,097,900,000 9.1%
    RUSSIAN FEDERATION  $     2,225,000,000,000 4.3%  $      151,300,000,000 6.8%
    STATE OF QATAR  $           85,350,000,000 0.2%  $          5,121,000,000 6.0%
    STATE OF NEW YORK  $     1,144,481,000,000 2.1%  $        48,500,000,000 4.2%
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA  $     1,801,762,000,000 3.4%  $        69,400,000,000 3.9%
    REPUBLIC OF CHILE  $        245,300,000,000 0.3%  $          9,321,400,000 3.8%
    REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA  $           27,720,000,000 0.1%  $          1,053,360,000 3.8%
    STATE OF FLORIDA  $        744,120,000,000 1.4%  $        24,100,000,000 3.2%
    THE CITY OF NEW YORK  $     1,123,532,000,000 2.1%  $        55,823,000,000 **
    *List from Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation. [www.dtcc.com] Dubai was also on this list, but debt and GDP data were not available.
    **NYC GDP includes entire NY-NJ-PA metropolitan statistical area; debt is for City of NY only.
    Countries in Italics have never failed to meet their debt repayment schedules (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008); Thailand and Korea received IMF assistance to avoid default in the 1990s.

    The obvious consequence is that a crisis in sovereign debt would cause problems not just within those nations, states or cities – but also among their trading and economic partners, among their lenders (banks, sovereigns or international donor organizations) as well as the global financial institutions who sold default protection through the credit derivatives markets. The financial impact would be more than anything we have seen so far: most global financial institutions received bailouts from their sovereign governments to soften or at least delay the impact of the September 2008 financial crisis. Yet, I believe the more dire consequence of a widespread sovereign debt crisis, if there is one, will be civil unrest fomented by the deterioration in governments’ critical functions that will result from their weakened financial positions.

    Policy makers will have few options available across the globe to combat this crisis. The rich world’s governments have not been able to contain their debt burdens through budgetary discipline alone. Between Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, they’ve done everything except load the helicopter with dollar bills to finance the bailout with freshly-minted U.S. dollars.

    Policymakers are just as likely to precipitate a financial crisis as any other investor or borrower – they seem to have no prescient knowledge of the dangers associated with over-speculation, lack of solid accounting practices, balancing a budget, etc. How else do we explain their dependence on borrowing? Basic accounting principles – not to mention ideas going back at least to the biblical story of Joseph and the Pharoah – would guide users to monitor income and spending; actuarial analysis directs us to save during times of “feast” and spend the surplus during times of “famine.”

    Yet the United States government and others have already decided to monetize their financial problems at levels not seen before. I shudder to even think what sovereign default would mean to a large-country (G8, for example); however, I deem such a scenario as highly unlikely. A quick look at the table indicates the countries that have never defaulted or even rescheduled a debt payment in their history. The defaults will more likely come from spendthrift small countries, or big states like California.

    The world economy has encountered these debt situations before. But in this environment, a sovereign debt crisis would be unlike anything we have experienced in the past. Not only have financial markets become more globally integrated – with countries borrowing and lending across national borders with ease – but the use of credit derivate products has increased the chance of a default turning into a global catastrophe. These derivatives will have a multiplier effect on every sovereign debt default. We know for a fact that credit default swap contracts are written without being limited to the total value of the underlying assets. Therefore, there could be nine to fifteen times as many credit default contracts to be paid by global banks as there is debt in default.

    Today there are outstanding about $2 trillion of credit default swaps contracts on just fifty of the world’s 200 nations. These contracts could come payable under even the most modest credit event, spreading the damage globally even before debt-service payments are missed. For example, it is now known that AIG’s Financial Products Division wrote contracts that became payable when the market price of debt decreased, regardless of whether or not the borrower had missed a payment. These circumstances did not exist during any previous debt crisis, including the most recent default cycle, the emerging market debt crises of the 1980s and the 1990s. If widespread sovereign defaults happen, we can expect to see something new and potentially much more damaging.

    Susanne Trimbath, Ph.D. is CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services. Her training in finance and economics began with editing briefing documents for the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. She worked in operations at depository trust and clearing corporations in San Francisco and New York, including Depository Trust Company, a subsidiary of DTCC; formerly, she was a Senior Research Economist studying capital markets at the Milken Institute. Her PhD in economics is from New York University. In addition to teaching economics and finance at New York University and University of Southern California (Marshall School of Business), Trimbath is co-author of Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets.

  • Tracking Business Services: Best And Worst Cities For High-Paying Jobs

    Media coverage of America’s best jobs usually focuses on blue-collar sectors, like manufacturing, or elite ones, such as finance or technology. But if you’re seeking high-wage employment, your best bet lies in the massive “business and professional services” sector.

    This unsung division of the economy is basically a mirror of any and all productive industry. It includes everything from human resources and administration to technical and scientific positions, as well as accounting, legal and architectural firms.

    Overall there are roughly 17 million professional and business services jobs, 4 million more than manufacturing. This makes it twice as big as the finance sector and five times the size of the much-ballyhooed tech sector. While its average salary – roughly $55,000 a year – is somewhat lower than in those other elite sectors, its wages are still higher than those in all the other large sectors, like health. The sector’s $1 trillion in total pay per year accounts for nearly 20% of all wages paid in the nation; finance and tech together only account for $812 billion.

    More than that, the business and professional services sector has encompassed the fastest-growing part of the high-wage economy. Employment in lower-wage sectors like education has also grown quickly. But employment in other sectors that pay their employees well, such as technology, has remained stagnant; jobs in some, such as manufacturing, have fallen sharply. Critically, the business services sector – particularly at the better-paying end – seems to have weathered the current recession better than these other high-wage sectors.

    The crucial question remains: In what regions is this critical economic cog booming? In a new analysis with my colleagues at the Praxis Strategy Group, we examined Bureau of Labor Statistics employment data for this sector, keeping an eye on trends over both the last year and the last decade. Some of the metropolitan areas that boasted short-term growth in this sector also maintained steady employment success over the long-term, which suggests that these particular cities have sturdy economies that aren’t as prone to intense boom-bust cycles.

    At the top of our list of best places is greater Washington, D.C., and its surrounding suburbs in Virginia and Maryland. Government jobs may drive that economy, but it is the lawyers, consultants and technical services firms who harvest the richest benefits. As New York University public policy professor Mitchell Moss observes, Washington has emerged as the “real winner” in the recession – not just for public-sector workers but private-sector ones too.

    Fastest Growing Professional and Business Services Sectors
    Area Name Jobs in Sector 2009
    (thousands)    		 Sector Share of Jobs 2009
    (percent of total)    		 Growth 2008 – 2009
    (percent growth)    		 Cumulative Growth 2001 – 2009
    (percent growth)    		 2001-2009 Job Change (thousands) 2008-2009 Job Change (thousands)
    Northern Virginia, VA 355.2 27.2% 1.5% 22.4% 65.0 5.2
    Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 558.7 23.0% 0.9% 22.8% 103.6 5.1
    Austin-Round Rock, TX 112.4 14.4% 3.3% 18.7% 17.7 3.6
    Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 382.3 14.7% 0.9% 19.2% 61.5 3.2
    Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 106.6 14.0% 2.8% 8.0% 7.9 2.9
    Bethesda-Frederick-Rockville, MD 125.7 21.9% 2.1% 9.0% 10.4 2.6
    Wichita, KS 31.5 10.1% 3.5% 16.4% 4.4 1.1
    Chattanooga, TN-GA 25.9 10.6% 4.3% 11.8% 2.7 1.1
    Peoria, IL 23.0 12.1% 4.5% 43.2% 6.9 1.0
    Rochester, NY 61.8 11.9% 1.5% 1.9% 1.1 0.9
    Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 31.0 14.5% 3.0% 7.5% 2.2 0.9
    Mansfield, OH 5.1 9.1% 19.4% 4.1% 0.2 0.8
    Kennewick-Pasco-Richland, WA 20.8 22.2% 4.2% 20.2% 3.5 0.8
    St. Louis, MO-IL 195.4 14.6% 0.4% 3.9% 7.4 0.8
    Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO 33.5 16.2% 2.2% 34.2% 8.5 0.7
    Macon, GA 12.1 11.9% 5.5% 31.2% 2.9 0.6
    Pittsburgh, PA 158.9 13.9% 0.4% 14.5% 20.1 0.6
    Fresno, CA 30.7 10.3% 1.9% 23.3% 5.8 0.6
    Provo-Orem, UT 23.3 12.4% 2.5% 16.7% 3.3 0.6
    Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC 42.2 14.3% 1.3% 31.1% 10.0 0.5

    Over the past year, parts of northern Virginia – ground zero for the so-called “beltway bandits” who work in industries the government depends on to do its job – have enjoyed the fastest growth in business and professional services, adding over 5,200 jobs despite the current downturn.

    Other areas around the nation’s capital have also seen strong growth. The Washington D.C.-Arlington-Alexandria area, for example, came in second on our list, gaining nearly 5,100 positions, while No. 6 the Bethesda-Frederick-Rockville, Md., metro area added 2,600. In addition, yet another Virginia area – No. 5-ranked Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, a center for military-related industries – gained nearly 2,900 jobs in this sector.

    It’s far too early to thank the free-spending ways of Barack Obama’s administration for all this growth. As anyone can tell you, the Bush White House and its Republican Congress were not exactly models of fiscal restraint. Plus, Washington and Northern Virginia have seen growth in their business services sectors over the last several years, in the period stretching from 2001 to 2009. Together those two metros added over 165,000 new jobs in this critical, high-wage sector.

    Of course, you don’t have to head to Washington to find a high-paying job – although you might not be able to escape unpleasant summer weather. The other major group of business-services hot spots includes Austin, Texas, at No. 3, and Houston, at No. 4. These Lone Star local economies have continued to thrive not only during the current recession but also over the last decade.

    The others winners include farther-afield locales in Kansas, Tennessee, Illinois and New York. These areas could be gaining both from companies seeking to lower costs and from the new capabilities for remote work due to the Internet. Even though they didn’t make our list, a host of smaller communities – like Mansfield, Ohio; Provo, Utah; and Charleston, S.C. – also enjoyed significant growth in the business services sector over the past year.

    So if these are the places where this segment of the economy is growing and high-paying jobs are easier to come by, where is the opposite true? The worst cities on our list span three archetypes: Rust Belt basket cases, Sunbelt flame-outs and expensive big cities. Perhaps the toughest losses were in Michigan: Detroit and the Warren-Troy metro area suffered big setbacks both in the last year and over the last decade.

    Fastest Declining Professional and Business Services Sectors
    Area Name Jobs in Sector 2009
    (thousands)    		 Sector Share of Jobs 2009
    (percent of total)    		 Growth 2008 – 2009
    (percent growth)    		 Cumulative Growth 2001 – 2009
    (percent growth)    		 2001-2009 Job Change (thousands) 2008-2009 Job Change (thousands)
    Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 289.2 16.0% -10.8% 7.9% 21.2 -35.1
    Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI 202.5 18.5% -12.0% -21.2% -54.4 -27.7
    Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL 633.6 16.8% -4.1% -2.9% -19.0 -27.0
    Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 574.7 14.3% -4.2% -3.4% -20.4 -25.2
    Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 390.3 16.4% -5.9% -1.3% -5.1 -24.4
    Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 170.9 16.2% -8.5% 7.7% 12.3 -16.0
    Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 261.9 18.0% -4.7% 4.0% 10.2 -12.8
    Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 253.4 14.4% -4.6% -4.6% -12.2 -12.3
    Edison-New Brunswick, NJ 164.5 16.3% -6.7% -2.6% -4.4 -11.9
    Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI 108.9 14.7% -9.5% -20.9% -28.8 -11.4
    Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 120.3 13.4% -8.3% 13.6% 14.4 -10.8
    Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 133.7 11.2% -6.5% 36.0% 35.4 -9.2
    Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 223.2 18.5% -3.7% 12.3% 24.5 -8.6
    New York City, NY 595.7 15.8% -1.4% -0.8% -5.1 -8.4
    Newark-Union, NJ-PA 163.5 16.0% -4.7% -0.5% -0.8 -8.0
    Bergen-Hudson-Passaic, NJ 130.6 14.6% -5.8% -9.1% -13.0 -8.0
    Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 107.6 12.9% -6.6% -1.7% -1.8 -7.6
    Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL 139.1 13.4% -4.7% 2.2% 3.0 -6.8
    Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 158.0 15.6% -4.0% -7.1% -12.2 -6.7
    Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 108.2 12.1% -5.8% 38.1% 29.9 -6.6
    Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA 308.8 18.2% -2.0% -6.8% -22.5 -6.4
    Sacramento–Arden-Arcade–Roseville, CA 106.1 12.3% -5.6% -1.8% -1.9 -6.3
    Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 137.8 13.3% -4.3% -5.2% -7.6 -6.1
    Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 207.0 16.9% -2.9% 4.0% 8.0 -6.1

    Consistent job losses in business services in these areas – some 54,000 in the Troy area since 2001 – reveal the clear connection between employment in business services and in the region’s fundamental auto industry. It turns out that elite services often prove dependent on basic industry. When industrial plants shut down, it’s not just blue-collar workers and company executives that suffer; as a result, these firms will use fewer lawyers, accountants, architects and technical consultants.

    A similar picture emerges in cities like Phoenix, which lost about 35,000 business-services jobs in just one year. This loss stems from the collapse of the housing bubble, which powered the rest of the regional economy. The same meltdown caused smaller but still significant reversals in one-time boomtowns like Orlando, Fla., Atlanta and Southern California’s Santa Ana region, which encompasses Orange County, where business service employment dropped by double-digit rates over the past year.

    Yet these same areas should see some recovery, perhaps more so than the traditional auto manufacturing-focused towns. Phoenix, Orlando and other Sun Belt locations – including a host of other areas in Florida – all saw increasing employment in business services over the past decade. If the economy comes back, along with a stabilization of the residential real estate market, business-services job growth will likely begin to take off again. After all, the fundamental reasons for the success of these areas, such as warm weather, lower costs and the need to serve a growing population, have not fundamentally changed.

    Perhaps most perplexing is the fate of some of the other places on our worst cities list, particularly the biggest metropolitan areas. The professional and business services sector is widely considered ideal for large, cosmopolitan centers, since lots of industries require support. But Chicago experienced a huge chunk of job losses – almost 25% – in this sector during the last year. Other big cities, including Los Angeles, Minneapolis and New York, also suffered.

    This is not a new phenomenon. These and other big cities, like Boston and San Jose, San Francisco and Oakland in California, have been shedding these types of jobs since 2001. These losses, however, have been concentrated at the lower-wage end of the business service pyramid, in areas like human resources and administration. These are the positions that companies can fill more easily and cheaply using the Internet or by hiring in less expensive outposts.

    That’s why Washington and its environs, which has seen across-the-board business growth, remain the great exception. Many business-services jobs outside the beltway appear to be becoming more nomadic, based in places where firms face lower costs and where workers can afford to live well on middle-income salaries. Even the long-term resiliency of higher-wage employment like law and accounting in traditional business hubs like New York could be at risk over time, with some jobs shifting to less expensive locales or even overseas.

    The changing nature of business services presents a boon to some communities and a challenge to others as they seek to survive and thrive in spite of the current recession. How some cities manage to grow this segment of their economies may well presage which parts of the country will thrive best during the years of recovery – and beyond.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin early next year.