Category: Urban Issues

  • Portland: A Model for National Policy?

    United States Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood and Washington Post columnist George Will have been locked in debate over transit. Will called LaHood the “Secretary of Behavior Modification” for his policies intended to reduce car use, citing Portland’s strong transit and land use planning measures as a model for the nation. In turn, the Secretary defended the policies in a National Press Club speech and “upped the ante” by suggesting the policies are “a way to coerce people out of their cars.”

    These are just the latest in a series of media accounts about Portland, usually claiming success for its policies that have favored transit over highway projects as well as its “progressive” land use policies. Portland has also become the poster child for those who advocate planning restrictions and subsidies favoring higher density development in parts of the urban core.

    Indeed if Secretary LaHood has his way, Portland could become The Model for federal transportation policy. So perhaps it is appropriate to review what it has accomplished.

    Portland’s Mediocre Results

    Portland’s record of transit emphasis began more than 30 years ago, when the area “traded in” federal money that was available to build an east side freeway to build its first light rail line. The east side light rail opened in 1986. Since that time, Portland has significantly increased its transit service, especially opening three more light rail lines (West Side, North Side and Airport) as well as a downtown “streetcar.”

    Portland’s Static Transit Market Share: With these new lines and expanded service, Portland has experienced a substantial increase in transit ridership. Passenger miles have increased more than 130 percent since 1985, the last year before the first light rail line was opened. This is an impressive figure.

    However, over the same period, automobile use increased just as impressively. In 1985, approximately 2.1 percent of motorized travel in the Portland urban area was on transit and it remained 2.1 percent in 2007, the latest year for which data is available.

    Portland’s Declining Transit Work Trip Market Share: One of transit’s two most important contributions to a community is providing an alternative to the automobile for the work trip (the other important contribution is mobility for low income citizens). Work trip rider attraction is important because much of this travel is during peak periods, when roadways are operating at or above full capacity. In 1980, the last year for which data is available before the first light rail line opened, United States Bureau of the Census data indicates that transit’s work trip market share was 9.5 percent in the Portland area counties of Clackamas, Multnomah and Washington covered by Portland’s strong land use policies. Yet despite this, and the transit improvements, the work trip market share has not grown. By 1990, transit’s market share had dropped a third, to 6.3 percent. It rose to 7.6 percent in 2000 and by 2007 had fallen back to 6.8, despite opening two new light rail lines since 2000 (Figure 1). Remarkably, transit’s 2007 work market share was 28 percent behind its 1980 share and had fallen 10 percent since 2000.

    Figure 1:

    Yes, Portland did increase its transit use, but failed to increase the share of travel on transit and the proportion of people riding transit to work declined.

    Driving the Portland Evangelism: GHG Emissions

    Secretary LaHood’s affection for Portland appears to principally be that its policies can materially assist in the objective of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The data is available to test that claim.

    We examined GHG emissions per capita by transit in Portland and the urban personal vehicle fleet, including cars and personal trucks (principally sport utility vehicles). Overall, including upstream emissions (such as refining and power production), transit in Portland is about 50 percent more GHG friendly per passenger mile than the 2007 vehicle fleet. If all of the increase in transit passenger miles from 1985 to 2007 replaced automobile passenger miles, then reduction of approximately 50,000 GHG tons can be said to have occurred as a result in 2007 (though as is indicated below, things are not that simple).

    That sounds like a large number, until you consider that Portland traffic produces more than 8,000,000 GHG tons per year. Transit’s expansion has reduced GHG emissions by approximately 0.6 percent annually over 22 years. This pales in comparison to the 83 percent national reduction over a 45 year period that would be required by the Waxman-Markey bill being considered by Congress.

    The Cost of GHG Emission Reduction

    Moreover, GHG emission reduction requires a context. Not all GHG emission reduction strategies make sense. Given the widely held principle that GHG emission removal must not hobble the economy, it is crucial that costs (per ton of GHG removed) be a principal criteria. If excessively costly strategies are employed, the result will be wasted financial resources, which will translate into diminished economic growth and higher levels of poverty. According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), between $20 and $50 per ton is the maximum amount necessary to accomplish deep reversal of CO2 concentrations between 2030 and 2050. It is fair to characterize any amount above $50 per ton as wasteful and likely to impose unnecessary economic disruption.

    Even that cost may be high. The current “market rate” is about $14 per ton, which appears to approximate the amount that figures such as former vice-president Al Gore, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger pay to offset their GHG emissions from flying.

    Portland Costs of GHG Emission Reduction

    This $14 to $50 range provides the context for comparing the cost of GHG emission reduction through transit expansion in Portland. Annual transit costs in Portland more than tripled from 1985 to 2007 (including inflation adjusted operating costs and the annual capital costs of the light rail lines), an annual increase of more than $325 million. This figure is reduced to capture the consumer cost savings from reduced automobile gasoline and maintenance costs. The final result is a cost of approximately $5,500 per ton of GHG removed.

    This is 110 times the IPCC $50 maximum and nearly 400 times the Gore-Pelosi-Schwarzenegger standard. If the United States were to spend as much to remove each ton of the likely 83 percent national reduction target, the cost would be $30 trillion annually, more than double the gross domestic product. To call the Portland GHG cost reduction figure extravagant would be an understatement.

    Traffic Congestion Increases GHG Emissions

    There is not a one-to-one relationship between reduced driving levels and reduced GHG emissions. As traffic congestion increases, urban travel speeds decline and “stop-and-start” traffic increases, fuel consumption is reduced (miles per gallon declines). Some or even all of the supposed gain from reduced driving can be negated by the higher GHGs from traveling in greater traffic congestion.

    Portland’s traffic congestion has increased substantially since before light rail. Further, by 2007 Portland’s traffic congestion had become worse than average for a middle-sized urban area and worse than in much larger Dallas-Fort Worth, Atlanta, Philadelphia and Phoenix.

    Further, according to information in the Texas Transportation Institute’s Annual Mobility Report, the amount of gasoline wasted due to peak period traffic congestion in Portland rose 18,000,000 gallons from 1985 to 2005 (latest data available, adjusted for the population increase), simply due to greater traffic congestion. The increase in GHG emissions from this excess fuel consumption is estimated to be approximately 200,000 tons annually. This is four times the estimated reduction in GHG emissions that was assumed to have occurred from the increase in transit ridership.

    The bottom line: The Portland model inherently produces more congestion and increases GHG emissions. Failure to expand roadways to meet demand and forced densification increase traffic congestion.

    Better Models

    The ineffectiveness of Portland’s model strategies in GHG emission is in contrast to other strategies. Between 2000 and 2007, the share of people working at home in Portland rose more than one quarter. If transit and working at home should continue their 2000s rates, transit’s work trip share will be less than that of working at home by 2015. Working at home eliminates the work trip, resulting in substantial GHG emission reductions and does it at a cost of $0.00 per ton.

    Another approach is the Obama Administration’s automobile fuel efficiency strategy. About the same time as the LaHood-Will debate was heating up, the President announced that automobile manufacturers would be required to increase their corporate average fuel efficiency for cars and light trucks to 35.5 miles per gallon by 2016, a 75 percent performance improvement from that of the present fleet. If this fuel efficiency could be achieved in Portland today, the reduction in GHG emissions would be more than 40 percent. This new policy would eventually close 90 percent of the gap between personal vehicles and transit in Portland.

    President Obama indicated that this strategy is costless. The higher costs that consumers will pay for cars will be more than made up by the fuel cost savings. Thus, according to the President, this policy costs $0.00 per ton of GHG emissions removed, less than the IPCC’s $50 and less than Portland’s $5,500. Of course, it is not possible to achieve 35.5 miles per gallon now, but it will be (Figure 2).

    Figure 2:

    The best hybrid cars now achieve 50 miles per gallon, which makes them less GHG intensive than transit in Portland. President Obama has gone further, indicating the potential for developing 150 mile per gallon cars. The curtain could be rising on a future of cars that emit less GHG emissions per passenger mile than transit. People and officials genuinely concerned about GHG emissions should applaud these advances. On the other hand, people and officials who value coercive behavior modification more than GHG emission reduction are likely to resist.

    The Consequences of Coercing People Out of Cars

    Moreover, Portland policies ignore a crucial factor: how automobiles facilitate economic growth and employment. Generally, the research indicates that the economic performance of metropolitan areas is enhanced by greater mobility. Moreover, no transit system provides the extensive mobility made possible by the automobile, not in America and not even in Europe. Coercing people out of cars coerces some out of employment and into poverty.

    Even where transit service is available, it generally takes longer than traveling by car. In 2007, travel to work by transit took 3:50 (three hours and 50 minutes) per week longer than driving in the nation’s largest metropolitan areas. With all of Portland’s transit improvements, it still takes approximately 3:15 longer per week to commute by transit than by driving. It appears that Secretary LaHood would add more than three hours (time many don’t have) to our work trip each week.

    The Land Use Cost

    The second plank of The Model is strong land use regulation (smart growth), which economic research shows to materially increase house costs, which would lead to a lower standard of living.

    Time to Turn Off the Ideological Autopilot

    The policies of The Model Portland have no serious potential for reducing GHG emissions and could even make it worse. On the other hand, the rapidly developing advances possible from improved vehicle technology, something the Administration espouses, show great promise. Behavior modification a la The Model turns out not only to be undesirable, but also unnecessary.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.

  • Can California Make A Comeback?

    These are times that thrill some easterners’ souls. However bad things might be on Wall Street or Beacon Hill, there’s nothing more pleasing to Atlantic America than the whiff of devastation on the other coast.

    And to be sure, you can make a strong case that the California dream is all but dead. The state is effectively bankrupt, its political leadership discredited and the economy, with some exceptions, doing considerably worse than most anyplace outside Michigan. By next year, suggests forecaster Bill Watkins, unemployment could nudge up towards an almost Depression-like 15%.

    Despite all this, I am not ready to write off the Golden State. For one thing, I’ve seen this movie before. The first time was in the mid 1970s. The end of the Vietnam War devastated the state’s then powerful defense industry, leaving large swaths of unemployment and generating the first talk about the state’s long-term decline.

    An even scarier remake came out in the 1990s. Everything was going wrong, from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unexpected deflating of Japan to a nearly Pharaonic set of plagues, ranging from earthquakes and fires to the awful Los Angeles riots of 1992.

    Yet each time California came roaring back, having reformed itself and discovered new ways to create wealth. In the wake of the early ’70s decline came the first full flowering of Silicon Valley as well as other tech regions, from the west San Fernando Valley to Orange and San Diego counties. Much of the spark for this explosion of growth came from those formerly employed in the defense and space sectors.

    The ’90s recovery was even more remarkable. Amazingly, the politicians actually were part of the solution. Aware the state’s economy was crashing, the state’s top pols–Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, Sen. John Vasconcellos, Gov. Pete Wilson–made a concerted effort to reform the state’s regulatory regime and otherwise welcomed businesses.

    The private sector responded. High-tech, Hollywood, international trade, fashion, agriculture and a growing immigrant entrepreneurial culture all generated jobs and restored the state’s faded luster.

    These sectors still exist and still excel even under difficult conditions. The problem this time is that the political class seems clueless how to meet the challenge.

    Politics have not always been a curse to California. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Golden State’s growth stemmed in large part from what historian Kevin Starr describes as “a sense of mission” on the part of leaders in both parties. Starr chronicles this period in his forthcoming book, Golden Dreams: California in an Age of Abundance, 1950-1963.

    Under figures like Earl Warren, Goodwin Knight and Pat Brown, Starr notes, California “assembled the infrastructure for a great commonwealth.” Their legacy–the great University system, the California Water Project, the freeways and state park system–still undergirds what’s left of the state economy.

    Perhaps the best thing about these investments was that they helped the middle class. Sure, nasty growers, missile makers and rapacious developers all made out like bandits–which is why many of them also backed Pat Brown. But the ’50s and ’60s also ushered in a remarkable period of widespread prosperity.

    Millions of working- and middle-class people gained good-paying jobs, and could send their children to what was widely seen as the world’s best public university system. People who grew up in New York tenements or dusty Midwest farm towns now could enjoy a suburban lifestyle complete with single-family homes, cars, swimming pools and drive-through hamburger stands.

    “This was an epic success story for the middle class,” historian Starr notes. It’s one reason why, when people ask me about my politics, I proudly identify myself as a Pat Brown Democrat.

    That’s why California’s current decline is so bothersome. A state that once was home to a huge aspirational middle class has become increasingly bifurcated between a sizable overclass, clustered largely near the coast, and a growing poverty population.

    Over the past 40 years California’s official poverty rate grew from 9% to nearly 13% in 2007, before the recession. Three of its counties–Monterey, San Francisco and Los Angeles–boast large populations of the über rich but, adjusted for cost of living, also suffer some of the highest percentages of impoverished households in the nation.

    Most worrisome has been the decline of the middle–the increasingly diverse ranks of homeowners, small business people and professionals. The middle has been heading out of state for much of the past decade. Politically, they have proven no match for the power of the wealthy trustfunders of the left, the powerful public employee union as well as a small, but determined right wing.

    The good news is that the middle class shows signs of stirring. The nearly two-to-one rejection of the governor’s budget compromise reflected a groundswell of anger toward both the Terminator and his allies in the legislature.

    Simply put, California voters sense we need something more than an artful quick fix built to please the various Sacramento interest groups. Required now is a more sweeping revolutionary change that takes power away from the state’s most powerful lobby, the public employees, whose one desired reform would be ending the two-thirds rule for approval of new taxes and budgets.

    Middle-class Californians are asking, with justification, why we should be increasing taxes–we’re ranked sixth-highest in the nationto pay for gold-plated state employee pensions as well as an ever-expanding social welfare program. Although state spending has grown at an adjusted 26% per capita over the past 10 years, it is hard to discern any improvement in roads, schools or much of anything else.

    As an opening gambit, the right’s solution–strict limits on state spending–makes perfect sense. However, long-lasting reform needs to be about more than preserving property and low taxes. To appeal to the state’s increasingly minority population, as well as the younger generation, a reform movement also has to be about economic growth and jobs.

    Not surprisingly, local leaders of the “tea party” movement gained some profile from last week’s vote. Yet the right, which has exhibited strong nativist tendencies, is not likely to win over an increasingly diverse state.

    In my mind, California’s revival depends on three key things. First, the lobbyist-dominated Sacramento cabal needs to be shattered, perhaps turning the legislature into a part-time body, as proposed by one group. Perhaps the cleverest plan has come from Robert Hertzberg, a former Speaker of the Assembly who heads up the reformist California Forward group.

    Hertzberg proposes a radical decentralization of power to the state’s various regions, as well as cities and even boroughs in urban areas like Los Angeles. This would break the power of the Sacramento system by devolving tax and spending authority to local governments.

    Secondly, California needs to develop a long-term economic growth strategy. Over the past decade, California’s growth has become ever more bubblicious, dependent first on the dot-com bubble and then one in housing. The basic economy–manufacturing, business services, agriculture, energy–has been either ignored or overly regulated. Not surprisingly, we could see 20% unemployment, or worse, in places like Salinas and Fresno by next year.

    Third, both political reform and an economic strategy aimed at restoring upward mobility depends on a revival of middle-class politics in this state. It would include building an alliance between the more reasoned tea partiers and saner elements of the progressive community.

    The new alliance would not be red or blue, liberal or conservative, but would represent what historian Starr calls “the party of California.” At last there could be a political home for Californians who are angry as hell but still not yet ready to give up on the most intriguing, attractive and potentially productive of all the states.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Life After Sunrail

    With their tails between their legs, Central Florida’s leaders returned from Tallahassee in early May without funding from the Florida Senate for Sunrail, the region’s proposed commuter rail system. This failure to convince the state Senate to fund Sunrail is a major political defeat for the 1.8 million people who were said to be served by this train. This failure now gives Central Florida a chance to recreate its growth scenario from scratch, without relying on commuter rail to cure the region’s ills.

    Blame bad timing: In a low-tax state with a down economy, asking for that kind of money takes nerve. “The loss of Sunrail may…have implications for efforts to reconstruct Interstate 4,” stated Harold Barley, Executive Director of Metroplan Orlando, a publicly funded organization that studies and advocates transportation projects in the region. Barley’s understatement is almost droll, for the defeat signals a significant political loss, years of wasted effort, and a rejection (for the second time) of massive federal startup money. In short, the calculus of Central Florida’s growth must start again almost from zero.

    The leaders now will lick their wounds, but is it really time to ask “what comes next?” Many of the arguments in favor of Sunrail echo the arguments that Wendell Cox devastated earlier in The New Geography. After their first defeat in 1999, the leaders of the region spent ten years convincing themselves of the merits of commuter rail, but without selling the same goods to others in the state of Florida. This region’s population now waits, while the leaders decide whether to sink ten more years into trains, or abandon this dream and begin writing a new story for Orlando.

    It is time to find a growth vision that is viable, and can be implemented within the power of the region’s leadership. Commuter rail’s biggest claim was to take one lane off the region’s only north-south highway (Interstate 4), replacing this lane with trains on an existing track. The track runs like a twisty, bent stick right up through the center of the region, and the track’s original usage as a freight system has been largely passed by the region’s growth. Sunrail’s other claims included significant travel time savings, encouragement of transit-oriented development, and retainage of 20 percent of the region’s federal gas taxes (why aren’t we getting this money now?). These claims will never be tested against reality; meanwhile, many of the smaller towns served by the system are likely expressing quiet relief that commuter rail’s financial burden will not be turned over to them in 2017.

    No doubt, this loss is disappointing to those who envision Washington DC, Atlanta, New York, Boston, or other entrained cities as a model. Yet it constitutes a perfect signal to create a unique vision for Orlando. Unlike the regions mentioned above, Orlando’s economy is shockingly monocultural, devoted mostly to tourism and supporting industries. The most significant way Central Florida can better its future is to attract and retain other forms of employment, rather than build another rigid transportation spine of questionable sustainability.

    Of course, transportation choices can help, but the question of rail seems academic at this point. Diversification of transportation away from a single imagined commuter rail means, for one thing, that the regional bus system should become more effective than it currently is. Lynx currently operates one bus type (huge), and this “one size fits all” solution misses opportunities and makes for slow rides with multiple transfers. Lynx is referenced in commuter rail’s promotional literature, which vaguely promised “enhanced bus service” to feed commuter rail stops. If Lynx was indeed poised to enhance bus service, then that act is more important now than ever. What are we waiting for?

    Instead of a rigid stick up the center of a dispersed, multipolar city, the new wave of commuter transportation might look more like an octopus, which has no backbone and multiple wiggly arms. No backbone means the system may resemble a network, rather than a trunk with branches. Wiggly might mean that smaller vehicles service localized neighborhood routes, and it also might mean that the routes could change depending on development and growth patterns. If either of these sounds questionable from a cost point of view, weigh them against the cost of commuter rail and they will look like amazing bargains. Whether a bureaucratic government agency like Lynx can handle this assignment may also be questionable. Perhaps the solution could involve private services, much like the commuter systems that were born in earlier times – the streetcars in San Francisco, for example – which operated for profit.

    Some will argue that trains are sexy compared to buses, but it is time to look at what really is sexy: having a real choice to commute while saving money. The form of this new transportation system may be electric jitneys, rubber-tired trolleys, or lake-hopping hovercraft; what is more important than form is their functional qualities. The transportation planners, from the federal level down to the local level, need to truly understand the needs of people and respond to them in a more fine-grained way. Diversification may mean trying different ideas until one is found that works.

    Diversification could also mean less transportation. If the goal of a commuter rail system was to take cars off the interstate, then perhaps the leadership could meet this goal by promoting employment-based growth, rather than growth for its own sake. Neighborhoods that support an employment center are what built the region – think Lake Eola around downtown, or Winter Park around Rollins College. Getting back to that will allow density clusters that have sustainable value, rather than be form-based simulacra of antique small towns.

    Density clusters can be positive parts of a city, where residential and employment bases are intertwined, and need not drive affordability up out of reach. Orlando, as an aspirational city, is currently more affordable than most, and the multiple-center model of Orlando never seemed to quite fit the single-spine commuter rail model. Cluster spacing allows for lower-density infill regions which can appeal to both middle class and affluent families. True commuter rail serviced the late 19th century single-center city quite well, but it would be hard to effectively service the late 20th century multiple-center, edge-city conditions of Orlando. With no natural boundaries, the region will continue to grow in all directions, and continue to regenerate itself within the urban centers that collapse and renew themselves through generations.

    Losing a battle could mean winning a war. The Orlando region has for too long been thought of as an ephemeral city composed of theme parks. Losing its commuter rail system will reinforce this perception, but it can also shock the region’s leadership into more profound thinking and action. By taking advantage of this loss, and shaking off the distraction of trains, the region can truly concentrate on diversification of its population and creating a flexible, cost-sustainable, multi-centered transportation system that could ably serve Central Florida’s needs for the future.

    Richard Reep is an Architect and artist living in Winter Park, Florida. His practice has centered around hospitality-driven mixed use, and has contributed in various capacities to urban mixed-use projects, both nationally and internationally, for the last 25 years.

  • The Successful, the Stable, and the Struggling Midwest Cities

    The Midwest has a deserved reputation as a place that has largely failed to adapt to the globalized world. For example, no Midwestern city would qualify as a boomtown but still there remain a diversity of outcomes in how the region’s cities have dealt with their shared heritage and challenges. Some places are faring surprisingly well, outpacing even the national average in many measures, while others bring up the bottom of the league tables in multiple civics measures.

    Let us examine the health of various cities, using population growth as a heuristic proxy for overall civic health. Looking at population change from 2000 to 2008, we will classify a city as “successful” if its metro area population growth exceeded the national average growth rate of 8% during that period, as “stable” if it had a population growth rate between 3% and 8%, and as “struggling” if its growth was less than 3%. Let us also put Chicago into its own category of “global city”. It is simply one of a kind in the Midwest, a colossus of nearly 10 million people, and not easily measured against the other cities. Indeed, it is really three cities in one, a prosperous urban core, an archipelago of successful upscale suburbs and edge based growth to the west and north, with a sea of deteriorating city neighborhoods and stagnant to declining suburbs surrounding them. On our scale, Chicago would be “stable” – its inner core has grown but the city overall has lost population, while the outer ring has grown strongly. As a region, it has grown somewhat below the national average.

    Here are the results of our tiering, including all cities in the Midwest* with metro areas exceeding 500,000 in population:

    Global City
    Chicago (5.2%)

    Successful Cities
    Des Moines (15.6%)
    Indianapolis (12.5%)
    Madison (11.9%)
    Columbus (9.9%)
    Kansas City (9.0%)
    Minneapolis-St. Paul (8.8%)

    Stable Cities
    Cincinnati (7.2%)
    Grand Rapids (4.9%)
    St. Louis (4.4%)
    Milwaukee (3.2%)

    Struggling Cities
    Akron (0.5%)
    Detroit (-0.6%)
    Dayton (-1.4%)
    Toledo (-1.5%)
    Cleveland (-2.8%)
    Youngstown (-6.1%)

    These tiers, based only on a single criterion and arbitrary boundaries, nevertheless basically conform to how these cities are performing both economically and in terms of perceptions.

    A few interesting things emerge:

    1. There are a surprisingly large number of Midwestern cities that are growing faster than the US average population. This indicates pockets of strength, in its larger metros at least, seldom associated with the Midwest.
    2. The clear dominance of the successful list by state capitals. This is so pronounced that I have put forth what I call the “Urbanophile Conjecture”, which is that if you want to be a successful Midwestern city, it helps to be a state capital with a metro area population of over 500,000. The only successful city on the list that is not a state capital is Kansas City.
    3. The 500,000 barrier seems to be important as well. The state capitals below that threshold – Lansing, Springfield, and Jefferson City – would not qualify as successful on this list. Note too that the presence or absence of the major state university does not appear to be a decisive factor. Des Moines and Indianapolis are not home to their states’ flagship universities. The home of the academic powerhouse that is the University of Michigan is the Ann Arbor metro area, which was not included in this list because its population is only about 350,000. Notwithstanding, its growth rate would have put it into the stable category.
    4. In a region in which there is such divergence between the performance of cities, a diversity of city specific policies are required. There is no one size fits all for the Midwest. There may indeed be a base of pan-Midwest policies worth pursuing – improvements in education, attractiveness to migrants, better conditions for innovative entrepreneurship, etc – but successful approaches will be those most tailored to uniquely local conditions. For example, a state capital or University town may have different needs than a place that has neither.

    Some suggested areas to investigate by city tier are:

    • Chicago. How can it ease the gap between the thriving global city of Chicago – largely located around the Loop as well as the northern and western suburbs – and the parts of the region that are falling behind, largely the western city neighborhoods and southern edge of metropolis? How do you do this without sacrificing its overall competitiveness? Can the policies appropriate to each be reconciled?
    • Successful Cities. Their policy focus should be on maintaining favorable demographic and economic conditions, and dealing with decaying areas of their urban cores and the potential for decay in some inner ring suburbs. Should the civic aspiration be desirous of it, tuning the engine to attempt to shift the growth rate into high gear to target a profile closer to the Sunbelt boomtowns would be a further focus area. Each city would need to examine which specific policy levers it could pull to attempt to do this. Clearly modernizing and expanding infrastructure to keep up with growth in these places and maintain their high quality of life is a clear imperative.
    • Stable Cities. Their challenge is to bring growth rates up to average or above average levels. It would be worthwhile for them to study the successful areas, and ask what policies and approaches might be adopted. Kansas City offers the best encouragement here. It has managed to maintain a strong growth rate despite not being a state capital and being part of a bi-state metro region. Kansas City features lows costs, high quality of life, a relatively stable housing marketing, and a pro-business culture. It is clearly a standout and worthy of further study for that reason. It may hold the key for moving the stable cities up into the successful tier. Geographically, it is notable that Kansas City is a border state on the far edge of the Midwest, and could arguably be called a Great Plains city. Is that a factor? Some type of peer city comparison with the successful cities, and especially Kansas City, might be warranted here.
    • Struggling Cities. Unfortunately, there isn’t a magic bullet to solve the long festering problems in these places. All of them were heavily industrialized and have borne the brunt of globalization, particularly in manufacturing. This is especially the case in cities linked to the domestic automobile industry, which is clearly in a state of crisis. Until the automobile industry completes its restructuring, and out migration right sizes some of these areas, there does not seem to be a clear path to restart growth. Youngstown, which brings up the bottom of our league table, perhaps offers the best road forward. It is trying to right-size itself to a permanently smaller, but more sustainable, future population based on an aggressive controlled shrinkage plan that has received extensive national notice. This type of plan is likely something all of these cities need to be actively considering as the large fixed costs support a population base that no longer exists will become increasingly unaffordable as the population further shrinks. These cities likely also will need special state and federal help to back this shrinkage plan.

    * The Midwest is defined as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile.

  • Housing Downturn Update: We May Have Reached Bottom, But Not Everywhere

    It is well known that the largest percentage losses in house prices occurred early in the housing bubble in inland California, Sacramento and Riverside-San Bernardino, Las Vegas and Phoenix. These were the very southwestern areas that housing refugees fled to in search of less unaffordable housing in California’s coastal metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego and San Jose).

    Yet now the prices in these hyper-expensive markets are beginning to fall. Once considered widely immune from the severe housing slump, the San Francisco area now has muscled its way into the list of biggest losers. The newly published first quarter 2009 house price data from the National Association of Realtors indicates that prices are down 52.5 percent from the peak. Only Riverside-San Bernardino and Sacramento have experienced greater losses out of the 49 metropolitan areas with a population of more than 1,000,000 for which there is data (see table below). Other metropolitan areas that have seen prices drop more than 50 percent include Phoenix, Las Vegas and, for very different reasons, that rustbelt sad sack, Cleveland.

    Table 1
    Median House Price Loss: Metropolitan Areas Over 1,000,000 Population
    Rank Metropolitan Area
    Median House Price % Loss from 2000-2008 Peak
    Median House Price Loss from 2000-2008 Peak
          1 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA -57.7% $235,600
          2 Sacramento, CA -56.5% $219,600
          3 San Francisco, CA -52.5% $444,800
          4 Phoenix, AZ -51.9% $139,200
          5 Cleveland, OH -51.5% $74,300
          6 Las Vegas, NV -51.3% $163,800
          7 Los Angeles, CA -48.8% $289,400
          8 San Jose, CA -48.0% $415,000
          9 San Diego, CA -47.5% $291,900
        10 Miami-West Palm Beach, FL -47.3% $185,200
        11 Orlando, FL -43.1% $117,200
        12 Tampa-St. Petersburg, FL -42.2% $98,800
        13 Washington, DC-VA-MD-WV -37.3% $165,900
        14 St. Louis, MO-IL -35.8% $56,300
        15 Chicago, IL -35.2% $100,900
        16 Atlanta, GA -34.4% $60,600
        17 Memphis, TN-MS-AR -34.0% $49,400
        18 Providence, RI-MA -33.6% $102,600
        19 Boston, MA-NH -32.5% $140,200
        20 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN -28.6% $42,600
        21 Richmond, VA -27.9% $66,800
        22 Indianapolis, IN -26.6% $34,300
        23 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -25.9% $60,800
        24 Columbus, OH -24.5% $38,400
        25 Denver, CO -24.1% $61,200
        26 Birmingham, AL -23.2% $39,300
        27 Jacksonville, FL -22.4% $44,600
        28 Charlotte, NC-SC -22.1% $48,700
        29 New York, NY-NJ-PA -21.9% $104,700
        30 Virginia Beach-Norfolk, VA -21.2% $54,000
        31 Kansas City, MO-KS -20.4% $32,400
        32 Seattle, WA -20.1% $79,500
        33 Pittsburgh, PA -19.0% $24,300
        34 Hartford, CT -17.7% $47,800
        35 Portland, OR-WA -17.0% $51,100
        36 Baltimore, MD -16.3% $47,900
        37 New Orleans, LA -15.6% $27,800
        38 Philadelphia, PA-NJ-DE-MD -15.2% $37,000
        39 Louisville, KY-IN -15.1% $21,500
        40 Rochester, NY -14.5% $18,000
        41 Houston, TX -13.6% $21,800
        42 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX -13.5% $21,100
        43 Buffalo, NY -13.1% $15,000
        44 Milwaukee, WI -12.1% $27,800
        45 Salt Lake City, UT -6.7% $16,500
        46 San Antonio, TX -6.2% $9,800
        47 Austin, TX -6.1% $11,900
        48 Raleigh, NC -5.3% $12,600
        49 Oklahoma City, OK -3.3% $4,500

    Cleveland, the newest entrant to the “over 50” club, fell largely because of the collapse of its industrial economy. It remains the only one of the thirteen mega-losers without prescriptive land use policies (sometimes called “smart growth”), which raise house prices by rationing land for development and imposing more stringent regulatory requirements. Cleveland illustrates a point made in a previous commentary: that the huge house price losses in the housing downturn have spread broadly from the original metropolitan areas that precipitated Meltdown Monday, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, and the Panic of 2008.

    During Phase I of the housing downturn (through September 2008), the largest losses were concentrated in the “Ground Zero” markets of California, Florida, Las Vegas, Phoenix and Washington, DC. In each of these 11 markets, median house prices dropped at least 25 percent, with per house over $100,000 except in Tampa-St. Petersburg during Phase I. These markets, all with more prescriptive planning, accounted for nearly 75 percent of the gross house value loss in the nation, with other more prescriptive markets accounting for another 20 percent. The more responsive markets, where land use regulation follows more traditional market-driven lines, accounted for slightly more than 5 percent of the loss.

    The Chart below and Table 1 in The Housing Downturn in the United States: 2009 First Quarter Update financial collapse, however, now has spread the losses much more generally. In Phase II, the Ground Zero markets represented 44 percent of the loss, the other more prescriptive markets 38 percent and the more responsive markets 18 percent.

    As of the first quarter of 2009, prices had dropped in all major metropolitan areas. The average per house loss in the Ground Zero markets was still the highest, at 48 percent, though the overall all loss had increased to 34 percent.

    There are indications that the housing downturn may be slowing. The latest data indicates that the median house price increased in March, though not enough to forestall a loss in the first quarter. Another indicator is the fact that the Median Multiple (median house price divided by median household income) has fallen to a national level of 3.1, which is slightly more than the 2.9 historic rate and well below the 4.6 peak.

    The best news of all is that the Median Multiple has dropped to 3.8 in the Ground Zero markets, which is equal to the historic level and well below the peak of 7.3. In the other more prescriptive markets, the Median Multiple is at 3.5, above the 2.9 historic average but well below the peak of 4.8. In the more responsive markets, the Median Multiple has dropped to 2.6, just above the historic average of 2.5 and below the peak figure of 3.2.


    Prices have fallen so much that they now stand at historic 1980 to 2000 Median Multiple levels in 18 of the 49 metropolitan areas. Critically, this includes the Ground Zero markets of Riverside-San Bernardino, Sacramento, Phoenix and Las Vegas.

    Other Ground Zero markets have seen much of their price inflation whittled away, but still have a way to go. Prices need to decline $33,500 to reach the historic Median Multiple level in Los Angeles, $32,300 in Miami, $31,200 in Washington, $18,500 in San Francisco, $11,100 in San Diego and only $1,700 in Tampa-St. Petersburg.

    In other markets, however, prices still have some distance to go before the historic Median Multiple is reached. The largest decrease would have to occur in New York, at $122,000, followed by Portland ($95,000), Seattle ($94,000), Baltimore ($75,000) and Salt Lake City ($74,000). Other markets, including Philadelphia, Virginia Beach, Milwaukee and Ground Zero San Jose would need to have price declines of more than $50,000 to restore their historic Median Multiples. See Table 2.

    Table 2
    Median House Price Reduction Required to Reach Historic Price/Income Ratio (Median Multiple)
    Median House Price Reduction Required to Reach 1980-2000 Median Multiple
    Median Multiple
    Rank Metropolitan Area
    1980-2000 Average
    2000-2008 Peak
    Current (2009: 1st Quarter)
          1 New York, NY-NJ-PA $122,200             3.9            7.7           5.8
          2 Portland, OR-WA $94,700             2.7            5.4           4.4
          3 Seattle, WA $94,400             3.3            6.2           4.7
          4 Baltimore, MD $74,700             2.6            4.6           3.7
          5 Salt Lake City, UT $73,800             2.6            4.3           3.8
          6 Philadelphia, PA-NJ-DE-MD $61,500             2.4            4.2           3.4
          7 San Jose, CA $55,400             4.5          10.2           5.1
          8 Virginia Beach-Norfolk, VA $53,600             2.6            4.7           3.5
          9 Milwaukee, WI $51,400             2.8            4.4           3.8
        10 Boston, MA-NH $41,900             3.5            6.1           4.1
        11 Los Angeles, CA $33,500             4.5          10.1           5.1
        12 Miami-West Palm Beach, FL $32,300             3.4            7.0           4.0
        13 Jacksonville, FL $32,000             2.3            3.6           2.9
        14 Washington, DC-VA-MD-WV $31,200             2.9            5.3           3.3
        15 Providence, RI-MA $29,400             3.1            5.4           3.6
        16 Raleigh, NC $26,700             3.3            3.9           3.7
        17 Austin, TX $20,500             2.8            3.3           3.2
        18 San Francisco, CA $18,500             5.0          11.2           5.2
        19 Denver, CO $18,000             2.9            4.3           3.2
        20 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI $15,700             2.4            3.6           2.6
        21 Hartford, CT $14,300             3.1            4.2           3.3
        22 San Diego, CA $11,100             4.9            9.5           5.1
        23 Buffalo, NY $10,900             1.9            2.5           2.1
        24 Charlotte, NC-SC $10,100             3.0            4.1           3.2
        25 Richmond, VA $9,500             2.8            4.1           3.0
        26 Louisville, KY-IN $8,100             2.4            3.1           2.6
        27 Chicago, IL $7,800             2.9            4.8           3.0
        28 San Antonio, TX $5,200             3.0            3.3           3.1
        29 Orlando, FL $4,000             2.9            5.2           3.0
        30 Pittsburgh, PA $3,400             2.1            2.8           2.2
        31 Tampa-St. Petersburg, FL $1,700             2.8            4.7           2.8
    Las Vegas, NV  At or Below              3.4            5.3           2.7
    Riverside-San Bernardino, CA  At or Below              3.7            6.6           3.0
    Sacramento, CA  At or Below              3.6            5.6           2.8
    Memphis, TN-MS-AR  At or Below              3.0            3.1           2.0
    New Orleans, LA  At or Below              3.1            3.3           2.8
    Phoenix, AZ  At or Below              2.8            4.7           2.4
    Atlanta, GA  At or Below              2.4            3.1           2.0
    Birmingham, AL  At or Below              3.0            3.5           2.7
    Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN  At or Below              2.3            2.8           2.0
    Cleveland, OH  At or Below              2.2            2.8           1.4
    Columbus, OH  At or Below              2.4            2.9           2.2
    Dallas-Fort Worth, TX  At or Below              2.7            2.7           2.4
    Houston, TX  At or Below              2.5            2.9           2.5
    Indianapolis, IN  At or Below              2.1            2.3           1.7
    Kansas City, MO-KS  At or Below              2.5            2.9           2.3
    Oklahoma City, OK  At or Below              2.8            2.9           2.8
    Rochester, NY  At or Below              2.2            2.4           2.0
    St. Louis, MO-IL  At or Below              2.2            2.9           1.9
    Median Multiple: Median house price divided by median household income.

    These price reductions may or may not occur in over-valued metropolitan areas like New York, Portland and Seattle, all of which are also experiencing serious increases in unemployment. However, given the pervasive evidence that the market is returning to the vicinity of historic price ratios, it would not be surprising if significant price reductions happen in these metropolitan areas, which were previously seen and saw themselves as immune to the fallout that hit the less well-regarded ground zero markets.

    Additional information is available in:
    The Housing Downturn in the United States: 2009 First Quarter Update

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.

  • The Luxury City vs. the Middle Class

    The sustainable city of the future will rest on the revival of traditional institutions that have faded in many of today’s cities.

    Ellen Moncure and Joe Wong first met in school and then fell in love while living in the same dorm at the College of William and Mary. After graduation, they got married and, in 1999, moved to Washington, D.C., where they worked amid a large community of single and childless people.

    Like many in their late 20s, the couple began to seek something other than exciting careers and late-night outings with friends. “D.C. was terrific,” Moncure recalled over lunch near her office in lower Manhattan. “It was an extension of college. But after a while, you want to get to a different ‘place.’”

    The “place” Ellen and Joe looked for was not just a physical location but something less tangible: a sense of community and a neighborhood to raise their hoped-for children. Although they considered suburban locations, as most families do, ultimately they chose the Ditmas Park neighborhood of Brooklyn, where Joe had grown up.

    At first, this seemed a risky choice. While Joe was growing up in the 1980s, the neighborhood — a mixture of Victorian homes and modest apartments — had become crime-infested. The old families were moving out, and newer ones were not replacing them. Yet Joe’s Mom still lived there, and they liked the idea of having grandma around for their planned-for family.

    In a city that has been losing middle-class families for generations, the resurgence of places like Ditmas Park represents a welcome change. In recent years, child-friendly restaurants and shops have started up along once-decayed Cortelyou Road. More important, some local elementary schools have shown marked improvement, with an increase in parental involvement and new facilities.

    Even in hard economic times, the area has become a beacon to New York families, as well as singles seeking a community where they will put down long-term roots. “There’s an attempt in this neighborhood to break down the city feel and to see this more as a kind of a small town,” notes Ellen. “It may be in the city, but it’s a community unto itself, a place where you can stay and raise your children.”

    The Decline of the Urban Middle Class

    The rise of neighborhoods like Ditmas Park suggests that cities can still nurture and accommodate a middle class. Yet sadly this trend continues to fight an uphill battle against a host of forces from high taxes and regulation to poor schools, highly bifurcated labor markets, and the scourge of crime.

    These problems can be seen in the migration numbers. A demographic analysis conducted by my colleagues at the Praxis Strategy Group over the past decade found that New York and other top cities — including Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston — have been suffering the largest net out-migration of residents of virtually all places in the country, albeit the pattern has slowed with the recession.

    It’s astonishing that, even with the many improvements over the past decade in New York, for example, more residents left its five boroughs for other locales in 2006 than in 1993, when the city was in demonstrably far worse shape. In 2006, the city had a net loss of 153,828 residents through domestic out-migration, compared to a decline of 141,047 in 1993, with every borough except Brooklyn experiencing a higher number of out-migrants in 2006.

    Since the 1990s virtually all the gains made in the New York economy have accrued to the highest income earners. Overall, New York has the smallest share of middle-income families in the nation, according to a recent Brookings Institution study; its proportion of middle-income neighborhoods was smaller than any metropolitan area, except for Los Angeles.

    Much the same pattern can be seen in what has become widely touted as America’s “model city,” President Obama’s adopted hometown of Chicago. The city has also experienced a rapid loss of its largely white middle class at a rate roughly 40 percent faster than the rest of the country.

    Although there has been a considerable gentrification in some pockets around Lake Michigan, Chicago remains America’s most segregated big city. In contrast to the president’s well-integrated cadre of upper-class African Americans, Chicago’s black population remains among the poorest, and most isolated, of any ethnic population in America.

    And like other American cities, Chicago now has a growing glut of “luxury” condos, a pattern that became evident as early as 2006 and has now, as Chicago magazine put it, “stalled” as a result of a “perfect storm” of toughened mortgage standards, overbuilding, job losses, and rising crime.

    Yet there could be some good from the current crisis. Considerable drops in urban rents and residential housing prices should ease the burdens on those who struggle with extremely high prices and taxes. Younger people, including families, may now be able to consider whether a home in Brooklyn, Chicago’s Wicker Park, or Los Angeles’ Studio City might now be affordable and desirable enough to eschew the move to the suburbs.

    The Cost of Being Urban

    In doing scores of interviews recently for a report on New York’s middle class, my coauthor Jonathan Bowles of the Center for an Urban Future and I ran into many people who were considering moving out of the city or had friends who had recently left. This seems particularly true in the remaining middle-class enclaves in the outer boroughs.

    “Almost all the friends I grew up with have moved to Mahopac or Yorktown [in the Hudson Valley],” says Jimmy Vacca, a member of the City Council who represents communities in the Northeast Bronx such as Throgs Neck and Pelham Parkway. “There’s a flight out by many middle-class people because of the schools. A couple gets married and by the time their children gets to age five, they move.”

    Costs, particularly relating to child-raising, are killing the urban middle class. Urban residents generally pay higher taxes and more for utilities, insurance, trash, and sewer than those living elsewhere. Manhattan is by far the most expensive urban area in the United States, with an average cost of living that is more than twice as much as the national average; San Francisco, another city that has seen large-scale middle-class flight, ranks second. The Washington, D.C. area, Los Angeles, and Boston also suffer extremely high living costs.

    These costs are most onerous on the middle class, particularly those with children. This can be seen in the rapidly declining numbers of students in most urban school districts, including such hyped success stories as Chicago, Seattle, Portland, Washington, and San Francisco. Over the past seven years, for example, Chicago’s school system, which was run by new Education Secretary Arne Duncan, has declined by 41,000 students.

    America’s core cities — including the borough of Manhattan in New York — boast among the lowest percentage of children under 17 in the nation. Although Manhattan had a much discussed “baby boomlet” (the borough’s number of toddlers under the age of 4 grew 26 percent between 2000 and 2004), once children over 5 are taken into account, Manhattan’s under-age population is well under the national average. This indicates there may be a process of exhaustion — both mental and financial — as the costs of raising children drain family resources.

    The real issue for the urban middle class is not having babies but being able to sustain their families as the children age and as families expand. One reason: many middle class urbanites spend tens of thousands of dollars a year in additional expenses that those in other cities as well as surrounding suburbs often avoid. For instance, since most middle-class families in big cities today need to have two working parents just to get by, child care becomes a necessity for those without grandparents or other relatives to look after young children. In places like Chicago, Washington, Boston, San Francisco, New York, or Los Angeles these costs typically run from $13,000 to $25,000 per child annually.

    Later many of these same families, if they choose to stay, must then contemplate shelling out considerable sums to send their children to private schools, particularly after the elementary level. This can add from a few thousand dollars to $30,000 a year to their annual costs — and with no tax benefit.

    Do Cities Need a Middle Class?

    Ultimately, in good times or bad, cities have to want a middle class to have one. And politicians, if asked, will genuflect to the idea of maintaining a middle class, yet their actions — on taxes, regulations, schools, development — suggest otherwise.

    Indeed, in reality most urban areas have focused on creating what New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg famously dubbed the “luxury city.” To pay for often inflated public employee costs, the luxury city can only survive off the wealthy and on other groups — empty nesters, singles and students — who demand relatively little in the way of basic services like schools and public health facilities.

    City planners and urban developers favor the unattached: the “young and restless,” the “creative class,” and the so-called “yuspie” — the young urban single professional. Champions of the unattached suggest that companies and cities should capture this segment, described by one as “the dream demographic,” if they wish to inhabit the top tiers of the economic food chain.

    Another key group coveted by cities are the legions of baby boomers who have already raised children. No longer cohabiting with offspring, they are expected to give up their dull family existence and rediscover the allure of a fast-paced, defiantly “youthful” lifestyle. The new retirees, suggests luxury homebuilder Robert Toll, “are more hip-hop and happening than our parents.” They are more interested in indulging “the sophistication and joy and music that comes with city dwelling, and doesn’t come with sitting in the ’burbs watching the day go by.”

    A Demographic Dead End?

    This whole approach has severe limitations. Despite an enormous amount of publicity about empty nesters moving back to the city, surveys conducted by the housing industry find that most aging boomers — upwards of 70 percent — are aging in place, mostly in the suburbs. The numbers moving back into the urban core remain negligible, except in the pages of urban booster publications like The New York Times.

    The young singles provide a more promising demographic for cities. But even here time may be running out. This will be even more evident between 2010 and 2020, when the millennial generation hits their 30s and early 40s and enter the prime years for family formation. Surveys of the cutting edge of this group — the other large age cohort in the population — show that most prefer a single-family home and, like their parents, seem most likely to head to the suburbs.

    But perhaps most troubling of all is what this means in terms of the historic role of cities as incubators of upward mobility. Back in the 1960s, Jane Jacobs could still predict that Latino immigrants to New York, mainly from Puerto Rico, would inevitably make “a fine middle class.” Yet four decades later in the Bronx, the city’s most heavily Latino county, roughly one in three households lives in poverty, the highest rate of any urban county in the nation.

    On the other extreme, in Manhattan, where the rich are concentrated, the disparities between the classes have been rising steadily. In 1980 it ranked 17th among the nation’s counties for social inequality; today it ranks first, with the top fifth of wage earners earning 52 times that of the lowest fifth, a disparity roughly comparable to that of Namibia.

    The University of Chicago’s Terry Nichols Clark, one of the most articulate advocates for this new urban pattern, says cities should focus on acting not so much as vehicles for class mobility, but as “entertainment machines” for the privileged. For these elite residents, the lures are not economic opportunity, but rather “bicycle paths, beaches and softball fields,” and “up-to-the-date consumption opportunities in the hip restaurants, bars, shops, and boutiques abundant in restructured urban neighborhoods.”

    In this formulation cities become the domicile primarily of the young, the rich (and their servants), as well as those members of the underclass who persist in hanging around. What emerges, in the end, is a city largely without children, particularly of school-age, and with a diminishing middle class. Ironically, these are places that, despite celebrating diversity, actually could end up as hip, dense versions of the most constipated suburb imaginable.

    This shift will also limit the economic functions of certain elite cities. Cost pressures, for example, have already helped Houston to replace New York and Los Angeles as the nation’s energy capital; in the future, although now humbled by the collapse of Wachovia, more middle class-oriented Charlotte, as well as other cities, could continue to gain jobs in the post-bust financial sector. Charlotte real estate developer John Harris suggests the city can compete against an expensive metropolitan region not only at the top levels of management but across the board. “It’s hard to be a mass employer in San Francisco,” he notes.

    Joe Gyourko, a real estate professor at the Wharton School, suggests this elite model of urbanism will spread to other favored places such as Portland, Seattle, and possibly Austin. In all these places, we may be seeing the emergence of a European-style pattern of elite urbanism in the core, with a growing concentration of low-wage workers in the least favored parts of the urban periphery.

    The City of Aspiration

    Even if such a model proves sustainable, it certainly means a major change for American urbanism. Unlike most urban cultures, that of the United States has been dominated not by the dictates of princes or priests, but by the efforts of ambitious entrepreneurs and migrants.

    American cities have been driven by a protean, ever-shifting commercial and middle-class culture, willing to break the bonds of tradition. As the great sociologist E. Digby Baltzell noted, the population in New York and other American cities has been “heterogeneous from top to bottom.” Social mobility, Baltzell said, constituted the fundamental reality of American urbanism.

    In this country, cities emerged as the principal North American bastion for those who sought to improve their lives. As historians Charles and Mary Beard noted, “All save the most wretched had aspirations.”

    Such cities often were not inherently pleasant or culturally edifying. Although its wealth would propel it to one day become the world’s cultural capital, visitors from more genteel Philadelphia and Boston often regarded 19th-century New Yorkers as crass and money-oriented.

    The new cities on the opportunity frontier — Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati — were, if anything, even more egalitarian. After two years in Cincinnati, British writer Frances Trollope deplored how “every bee in the hive is actively employed in the search for honey…neither art, science, learning, nor pleasure can seduce them from their pursuit.” Chicago, a Swedish visitor commented in 1850, was “one of the most miserable and ugly cities” of America.

    Yet these places were ideal for taking advantage of new technologies from mass manufacturing to trains and the telegraph. They created dynamic societies that provided huge opportunities for vast waves of immigrants, who by 1890 accounted for as much as half of the nation’s urban dwellers.

    The newcomers were joined by others from rural America, including, by the early 20th century, many African Americans. The “Great Migration” of African Americans from the rural south, noted Gunnar Myrdal in 1944, created “a fundamental redefinition of the Negro’s status in America.” Urban life had its horrors, but in the cities it became increasingly difficult to restrict a person into “tight caste boundaries.” African-American migrants from the South may have been different in many ways from newcomers from Italy, Ireland, or Russia, but their fundamental aspirations were often very much the same.

    The Key to a Middle-Class Comeback: The Power of Plain Vanilla

    Compared to the dismal decline in the 1970s and early 1980s, urban prospects have improved, particularly in primary urban areas such as Chicago, New York, and San Francisco. Yet, if these and other cities are to sustain their momentum, they need to look beyond “the luxury city” to the potential of less glamorous neighborhoods that can attract the middle class and people with families.

    These “plain vanilla” neighborhoods include many places that managed to resist the urban decay of the 1970s and in many cases have begun to enjoy a steady resurgence. These include, for example, large swaths of Brooklyn and Queens, as well as the lovely, park-blessed sections of south and west St. Louis, or scattered Los Angeles neighborhoods in places like the San Fernando Valley.

    But these communities can only grow if cities focus on those things critical to the middle class such as maintaining relatively low density work areas and shopping streets, new schools, and parks.

    This would require a massive shift in urban priorities away from the current course of subsidizing developers for luxury mega-developments, new museums, or performing arts centers. To maintain and nurture a middle class, cities need to look at the essentials that have made great cities in the past and could once again do so in the future.

    The New Urban Middle Class

    Perhaps the other key question is what constitutes the economic base for the people who might settle and remain in cities. It’s clear that many traditional industries — heavy manufacturing, warehousing — as well as middle-management white collar jobs will diminish in the future. But it is possible to imagine the rise of a new kind of urban economy built around people working in small firms, or independently in growing fields such as information, education, healthcare, and culture, or as specialists in a wide array of business services.

    These are professions that continued to grow in many older cities, even as other fields declined. In San Francisco, for example, by 2006 there were an estimated 70,000 home-based businesses and a thriving culture of self-employed “Bedouins” working in post-industrial professions. These self-employed people, noted one study, were critical to helping the city withstand the ill effects of the post-2000 dotcom collapse.

    Similarly, the close-in communities of the San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles are home to large contingents of entertainment industry workers, many of them self-employed. According to studies by California State University’s Dan Blake, up to 60 percent of all L.A.-area workers in this highly dispersed industry reside somewhere in this sprawling urban region made up largely of post–World War II single-family houses. Workers in media, graphic arts, and other specialized services have also been among the few groups of middle and upper-middle income earners to see rapid growth in New York’s outer boroughs.

    These post–industrial age artisans — along with more traditional parts of the middle class such as civil servants, teachers, nurses, and other service workers — could provide the critical residential base for the plain vanilla urban neighborhoods’ work. Neither rich nor poor, these artisans could use the new telecommunications net to access clients who may exist in the sprawling suburban rings, throughout the United States, or overseas.

    Cities of the Future

    You can see this emerging reality in places like Ditmas Park, Brooklyn. Nelson Ryland, a film editor with two children who works part-time at his sprawling turn-of-the-century Flatbush house, suggests that the key to an urban revival lies not in the spectacular but in the mundane. “It’s easy to name the things that attracted us — the neighbors, the moderate density,” he says over coffee in a house close to that occupied by Ellen and Joe. “More than anything it’s the sense of community. That’s the great thing that keeps people like us here.”

    This “sense of community” will become the key currency of sustaining urban communities. Such middle-class sensibilities get short shrift by urban scholars such as Richard Florida, who argue that in the so-called “creative age” places of residence should be “leased” like cars. In his mind, single-family homes, the ideal of homeownership, should be replaced “by a new kind of housing” that embraces higher forms of density without long-term commitment to a particular residence or location.

    In fact, the sustainable city of the future will depend precisely on commitment and long-term residents. It also will rest on the revival of traditional institutions that have faded in many of today’s cities. Churches — albeit often in reinvented form — help maintain and nurture such communities. Similarly, extended family networks will be critical to future successful urban areas. As Queens resident and real estate agent Judy Markowitz puts it, “In Manhattan people with kids have nannies. In Queens, we have grandparents.”

    The modest and mundane ties between people that exist in such places represent the key to reviving America’s urban regions in the coming generation. It is in our urban neighborhoods — not in the glamour zones and high-end downtowns — that our country’s cities can find a new life and purpose in the 21st century.

    This article originally appeared at American.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Suburbs and Cities: The Unexpected Truth

    Much has been written about how suburbs have taken people away from the city and that now suburbanites need to return back to where they came. But in reality most suburbs of large cities have grown not from the migration of local city-dwellers but from migration from small towns and the countryside.

    It is true that suburban areas have been growing strongly, while core cities have tended to grow much more slowly or even to decline. The predominance of suburban growth is not just an American phenomenon, but is fairly universal in the high income world).

    This is true in both auto-oriented and transit oriented environments. Suburbs have accounted for more than 90 percent of growth in Japan’s metropolitan areas with more than 1,000,000 residents, both those with high transit market shares and those with high auto market shares, The same is true in Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

    In Western Europe, where vaunted transit systems carry a far smaller share of travel than cars, all growth and then some has been in the suburbs, as overall core city populations have declined. Indeed, the same trend is well underway in middle and lower income world urban areas. In such places as Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Manila, Shanghai, Kolkata, and Jakarta, nearly all population growth has occurred in the suburbs, rather than the core cities.

    As the world faces a more expensive energy future and as efforts are intensified to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it is sometimes suggested that people need to “move back” to the cities. This is a dubious and needless strategy, which reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the dynamics of metropolitan growth.

    Most suburban growth is not the result of declining core city populations, but is rather a consequence of people moving from rural areas and small towns to the major metropolitan areas. It is the appeal of large metropolitan places that drives suburban growth.

    Larger metropolitan areas have more lucrative employment opportunities and generally have higher incomes than smaller metropolitan areas. This is particularly the case in developing countries. As a result, the big urban areas attract people seeking to escape what are often the stagnant or even declining economies in smaller areas.

    There are, of course, significant individual exceptions. Virtually all of the first world core cities that have achieved a population of more than 400,000 – if they have not expanded their boundaries and did not have substantial empty land for development – experienced losses to 2000. Yet even in most of these cases, the majority of suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan areas, rather than from the core cities. For example:

    • St. Louis is a champion among the ranks of population losers, having lost the greatest percentage of its population of any large municipality in the world, (dropping from nearly 860,000 in 1950 to 350,000 in 2000). Indeed, it may be fair to say that St. Louis has lost more of its population than any city since the Romans sacked Carthage. Yet, even in St. Louis, 60 percent of suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan area, rather than from the city.
    • Few core cities have lost the nearly 1,000,000 residents that have fled Detroit since 1950. Yet, even in Detroit, 65 percent of suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan area, rather than from the city.
    • The city of Chicago lost 725,000 residents between 1950 and 2000, yet 82 percent of the suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan area.
    • The city of Philadelphia lost 550,000 residents between 1950 and 2000, yet 76 percent of the suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan area (See lead picture of Philadelpia downtown).
    • The central city of Paris lost approximately one-quarter of its population from 1965 to 2000 (675,000), while the suburbs gained nearly 3,850,000 residents. More than 80 percent of suburban Paris growth came from outside the region.
    • The central city of Lisbon experienced a 30 percent population decline from 1965 to 2000. Yet suburban Lisbon’s growth was 80 percent from outside.
    • Stockholm was another losing core city, yet more than 90 percent of the suburban growth came from smaller towns and cities.
    • Despite Zurich’s nearly one-quarter population loss 83 percent of the suburban gains derived from outside the region.
    • The core city of Tokyo (which really doesn’t exist except as 23 separate subdivisions or kus of a city abolished during World War II) lost more than 700,000 residents from 1965 to 2000. Tokyo’s suburbs, however, attracted more than 90 percent of their growth from region.

    In some metropolitan areas, smaller towns and rural areas contributed less to suburban growth. In Amsterdam, 50 percent of the suburban growth was from outside the metropolitan area. In Copenhagen, the number was 40 percent of the suburban growth while in Birmingham (UK) only 30 percent of the suburban gain was from outside.

    In a few cases, both the core city losses were greater than the suburban gains, such as in Pittsburgh, Liverpool and Manchester. In these cases, it is fair to attribute all of the suburban gains to core city losses.

    Unlike the cases above, however, most core cities gained population. This includes all in Canada, Australia and New Zealand and many in the United States. As a result, none of the suburban growth in the corresponding metropolitan areas can be attributed to an exodus from the city, because there, on balance, was no exodus.

    Suburbanization is often characterized as reducing densities, but in fact it has done just the opposite. Most suburbanites come from smaller places; they may prefer suburbs because they are less dense, safer, or simply more manageable than the core cities. But they are also, almost invariably, more dense than where they lived before. Suburbanization is thus a densifying dynamic, albeit one that is less dramatic than preferred by many planners and architects.

    In this sense, suburbs have to be seen not as the enemies of the city, as just a modern expression of urbanization. They are neither the enemies of the city, nor are their residents likely to move “back” there. You cannot move back to someplace you did not come from.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.

  • Lenny Mills to Urban America: Clock Is Ticking for Ranks of ‘New Homeless’

    I always do my best to make time for Lenny Mills because he’s earned that sort of consideration.

    Mills is the fellow who wrote several pieces under the banner of his trademark “7 Rules” outline, where he applies the tricks he learned as a telemarketer to analyses of real estate development, politics, and other matters.

    Mills did an especially fine job on the “7 Rules of Downtown Gentrification,” which appeared in the Garment & Citizen’s issue of April 21, 2006. He laid out a number of reasons – seven, to be exact –to consider the possibility that the residential real estate boom ringing through Downtown Los Angeles back then would eventually turn into a busted bubble.

    Events have certainly borne out Mills’ prediction, so he brought credibility with him on his latest visit to my office.

    Mills waved a recent copy of USA Today at me, saying that he’s worried about the sort of folks who were featured in a recent front-page story in the national publication, a piece that described the circumstances of some of “the new homeless.” These are individuals who worked steadily their whole lives before hitting the skids and losing their homes in the current economic downturn. It’s a trend that has become familiar these days, with homeless encampments cropping up in all sorts of places, including Los Angeles.

    Mills has some added credibility when he speaks about homelessness – he spent a number of years living on the streets. He knows what it means to go through life with a weather-beaten face, watching opportunities slip away for lack of a telephone number to leave behind when seeking work.

    Mills has a place to live now, but he remains determined to inject his warnings about the new homeless into the public debate. The clock it ticking, he says, and the deterioration that comes with life on the streets will make it harder and harder for folks to climb back into mainstream lives. Once the wardrobe starts to fray, he says, the odds against getting back on track grow longer. Once the teeth start to go, he adds, homeless individuals can just about write off any return to the life they once knew. Each bit of deterioration makes it tougher for the homeless individuals – and more likely that they will become permanent burdens to the rest of us in one way or the other.

    Mills is remarkable in a number of ways, including the ability he mustered to retain his social skills during his time on the streets – something that many individuals quickly lose. I disagree with him on some things, but I can’t fault his ability to make fine use of the language to get his points across.

    Mills used such skill during our recent talk, driving home a couple of points about the new homeless: Our society has a narrow window of opportunity to pay for programs to reverse the trend – and a failure to act soon will mean far greater costs in terms of human lives and the public purse.

    Mills can spout chapter and verse on what he sees as the causes of the increases in homelessness over the past 40 years. He can cite demographic trends, economic patterns, and public policies to make a compelling case that a lot of folks were swept into life on the streets by causes beyond their control. He firmly believes that we as a society could have prevented most of the homelessness we have seen over the years had we not lacked the will to do so.

    I wouldn’t describe Mills as a fun guy. He’s a valuable fellow, though, because he’s willing to tell you what you’d rather not hear – and he’s capable of doing so in reasoned tones.

    Give Mills his due for hitting upon something of vital importance now. It’s clear that all the talk we’ve heard about addressing the old homelessness has led to no great progress over the course of decades. What did that latest Blue-Ribbon Public-Private Committee to End Homelessness Forever accomplish besides a photo opportunity, anyway?

    Someone wake the Blue Ribbon brigade and fire all of them.

    We have a whole new homeless problem – and we’re in desperate need of new ideas.

    Jerry Sullivan is the Editor & Publisher of the Los Angeles Garment & Citizen, a weekly community newspaper that covers Downtown Los Angeles and surrounding districts (www.garmentandcitizen.com)

  • Austin’s Secrets For Economic Success

    Few places have received more accolades in recent years than Austin, the city that ranked first on our list of the best big cities for jobs. Understanding what makes this attractive, fast-growing city tick can tell us much about what urban growth will look like in the coming decades.

    Austin’s success is not surprising since, in many ways, it starts on third base. Two of its greatest assets result from the luck of the draw; it’s both a state capital and home to a major research university.

    Our ranking of the best cities for job growth includes many college towns–from Fargo, N.D., (home to North Dakota State) to Athens, Ga., (University of Georgia), Durham-Chapel Hill, N.C., (Duke and University of North Carolina) and College Station, Texas (Texas A&M).

    Being a state capital also helps. Baton Rouge, La., home to both the state government and Louisiana State University, ranked seventh on our list of the best medium-sized cities for employment. This confluence of institutions also accounts in large part for the relatively decent rankings of two Midwestern cities, Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio, in spite of the generally sad situation in that region.

    That’s because colleges and state governments offer stable employment–since they cannot or will not outsource jobs to India or China. These places also tend to be inhabited by reasonably well-educated people whose stable incomes makes them less vulnerable to contractions in competitive industries like finance, manufacturing, construction or information.

    “We’re pretty close to recession-proof,” suggest Chris Bradford, a local attorney and blogger in Austin. “It’s almost anti-cyclical. In bad times, the students want to stay here.”

    There is a third factor, however, that adds to Austin’s special sauce: the fact that it is located in Texas, the one fast-growing mega-state. With low taxes and low regulation at the state level, Austin–no doubt to many locals’ consternation–is a great environment not only for public sector employment but also private sector growth.

    Its success contrasts dramatically with the relatively poor employment status of capitals in business-unfriendly states (such as Sacramento, Calif., which ranked 60th among large cities) as well as other college towns like Ann Arbor, Mich., home to one of the nation’s best public universities, the University of Michigan. (Among medium-sized cities, Ann Arbor came in 93rd.)

    Austin, essentially, reaps the benefits of being a deep blue, Democratic island in a red-state sea. The university and state government employ large numbers of people who might want higher taxes and greater regulation–but they can talk the redistributionist’s game without feeling any of the pain.

    This is not to say that Austin itself–that is, its urban core area–does not try to trot out its blue, and “green,” trimmings. Like every college town, Austin likes smart growth, mass transit and high density.

    But in reality, Austin is not a dense region. In fact, its metropolitan population per acre puts it in the middle of the nation’s largest areas, well behind not only Los Angeles and New York but also Houston and Dallas.

    Even central Austin seems rather spread out and suburban compared to traditional East Coast cities. Smaller, older homes–mainly cottages–dominate neighborhoods close to downtown. Recent attempts to go high-rise have not been notably successful, as the auction signs on the sides of some new towers suggest.

    Yet the urban center increasingly represents less and less of the area’s total employment and houses fewer and fewer of its residences. Today, the city itself is home to well under half the metropolitan population of 1.5 million.

    As in many regions, notes blogger Bradford, over the past decade the strongest growth has occurred in Austin’s periphery. Even as the city itself has enjoyed strong job and population growth, the biggest increases have taken place in suburban outposts outside city limits, like Williamson, Bastrop and Hays counties, as well as parts of Travis, the county that is home to Austin. In fact, Williamson was the nation’s sixth fastest-growing county last year, while Hays ranked 10th.

    Surprisingly, these suburban areas are the places most driving Austin’s economic success. Why? Two reasons: affordability and livability. By Texas standards, the city is not cheap. It costs between $350,000 and $400,000 for a nice three- or four-bedroom house in a good school district, say, 20 minutes from downtown. However, a similar place in the ‘burbs of Silicon Valley, San Francisco, Boston or Irvine would run at least twice as much.

    Local Realtor and blogger Shannan Gonyea-Reimer adds that, a bit further away from town, home prices can drop as low as $150,000. “People come from California, and they are shocked,” she says.

    This price structure, along with the human capital attracted to the University of Texas, has in turn propelled the rapid expansion of the non-governmental economy in places like Cedar Creek and Round Rock, home to Dell. A recent Brookings study estimates that central Austin employment grew by almost 13% between 1998 and 2006. The number of jobs more than 10 miles from the central business district increased by 77,523, or 62%, according to the study.

    Austin has seen remarkable overall employment growth–almost 34%–in the last decade. With that figure, it leaves its major hip tech rivals in the dust. Over the same period, for example, San Jose/Silicon Valley has lost 6% of its jobs; San Francisco, around 1.6%. Boston, Austin’s other big high-tech competitor, enjoyed only a 1.2% gain.

    Again, this growth stems in part from the unique combination of both an appealing city center and attractive suburbs. The city’s lively urban core remains a lure for affluent professionals, young singles and, of course, students. However, unlike places like New York, Boston and San Francisco, the sprawling ‘burbs provide an affordable place for people to move to when their hardcore clubbing days are over.

    “California might work well for the apartment-dwelling, single-guy lifestyle person, but when you get married, you can’t afford Los Gatos,” says former Silicon Valley entrepreneur Mike Shultz, the CEO of Infoglide, a software firm headquartered on Austin’s outer ring. “In Austin, the same person can grow up, move into a reasonable house and have a reasonable life.”

    This does much to explain why Austin has enjoyed a migration pattern unlike that of its primary competitors. Its residents may start off hip and cool, but the city also accommodates their often inevitable evolution to Ozzie and Harriet. This allows individuals and companies to plan to stick around. One doesn’t have to have the short-term mentality so common in the Bay Area, L.A., Boston or New York.

    Ultimately, it is this combination of a “cool” downtown culture–with excellent restaurants as well as great music–and a more sedate, affordable periphery that makes Austin a home run.

    “It has a hip cool side to it,” Shultz observes, “but it’s also a great place to raise kids.”

    A caveat to all this: We also have to consider scale. With roughly 1.5 million people, Austin simply offers more convenient choices than a megalopolitan behemoth like Los Angeles, New York or the Bay Area. In Austin, nice, single-family homes within walking distance of cool urban streets are not uncommon or absurdly expensive–and even a larger, more affordable house out in the suburbs is usually less than a half an hour from downtown.

    Additionally, Texas, unlike its main rival California, is not teetering on the edge of bankruptcy and is instead a stable long-term bet in this recession. Rather than haggling with bankers or public employee unions, it is busy building its future: attracting new comers, investing in its university and building new transportation infrastructure.

    “Austin is off the charts livable, but it’s in a state that makes it viable,” says Shultz, the entrepreneur. “You can’t say that about California and many of the other places where our competitors are.”

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Unsustainable Transit: New York City

    When it comes to transit, as like many things in the United States, there is no place like New York City. The subways and buses of the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) carry more than 40 percent of the nation’s transit rides (unlinked trips). To account for 40 percent of the nation’s ridership is quite an accomplishment inasmuch as the city represents less than 3 percent of the nation’s population.

    Of course, New York City’s ridership domination stems from the evolution of an ideal environment for transit. Most of the ridership comes from the heavily urban boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens and the Bronx, with a much smaller ridership in Staten Island, most of which looks like the second ring adjacent New Jersey suburbs. The four highly urban boroughs have exceedingly high population densities, averaging above 30,000 per square mile. The city of San Francisco, with its reputation for density, is little more than one-half as dense. The four boroughs are nearly as dense as city (23 ku area) of Tokyo, denser than most European core cities and nearly three times as crowded as Amsterdam.

    The most important factor, however, is the concentration of destinations in the central business district, south of 59th Street in Manhattan. This is the world’s second largest central business district and the home of approximately 2,000,000 jobs. Only the geographically larger business district inside Tokyo’s Yamanote Loop has more jobs. The Manhattan business district (really two, Uptown and Lower Manhattan and the area between) has at least four times as many jobs as Chicago’s Loop, the second largest central business district in the nation.

    The share of people commuting to work by transit is far higher than anywhere else in the nation. Approximately 75 percent of the people commuting to jobs in Manhattan get there by transit. Approximately 55 percent of the city’s working population commutes by transit, double the percentage of automobiles. By comparison, other highly urbanized central cities have far smaller transit work trip market shares, with Boston at 34 percent, San Francisco at 33 percent and Chicago at 26 percent. In each of these cities, considerably more people commute by car than by transit.

    Suffice it to say that New York is the penultimate transit city. If transit is the answer anywhere, it is the answer in New York.

    Yet the history of New York City Transit Authority has been one of financial crisis. From the NYCTA’s founding in 1953, transit riders of New York City have been faced by recurring threats of service reductions and fare increases. Over the years, transit fares have risen sharply despite increased subsidies. The financial downturn has generated yet another financial crisis at NYCTA, as well as at many other transit agencies around the country. There may be a financial bail-out from Albany, or there could be significant fare increases or service reductions. But the present financial crisis is by no means the first and it is unlikely to be the last. The problem is that transit is characterized by perverse incentives that keep if from focusing on its principal mission.

    Transit’s mission, as my late Los Angeles County Transportation Commission colleague (and Santa Monica city councilwoman) Christine Reed so eloquently put it, is to serve both riders and taxpayers. Regrettably, however, the riders and taxpayers routinely take a back seat to other more concentrated and powerful groups with a strong interest in getting themselves more money and scant interest in cost efficiency.

    As a result, the story is always the same in New York and elsewhere. Financial crises are characterized as funding crises and the answer to every question is more money. Little or no serious attention is paid to the cost side of the equation. In the present environment, the riders and the taxpayers are unlikely to ever be able to provide enough money to make transit financially sustainable.

    Both labor and management operate in an environment of perverse incentives. Labor unions understandably seek to improve the wages and working conditions of their members. In a competitive environment, there are some limits. But transit remains immune to competitive pressures; it is rather a political environment. Transit board members are appointed by elected officials, many of whom rely heavily on political contributions from labor unions and their often sophisticated get out the vote operations.

    Transit managers must live with this reality and any who become too courageous in their dealings with transit labor can expect to be shown the door. At the same time, transit labor negotiations are often not really conducted between parties across the table from one-another. Indeed, often the table is shoved up against the wall, since the gains that are won by the labor unions are largely duplicated in the pay and benefits packages of transit managers. Thus, costs are higher in transit – whether at NYCTA or at other agencies – than they would be for similar work in the private sector.

    One might expect transit to face frequent crises in Eugene, Madison or even Los Angeles or Seattle. But New York City? Perverse incentives are the problem, but other cities have managed to have successful transit systems without such incentives. In some of the world’s largest cores, such as Tokyo and Hong Kong, transit obtains virtually all of its funds from commercial revenues, principally fares. Without access to the deep pockets of taxpayers, transit is required to live within their means. Serious attention is paid both to funding and costs. It may be too much to ask for transit in New York City to be converted from its heavy subsidies to a profitable operation. But improvements can be made.

    In transit operations, one answer is competitive contracting (competitive tendering), whereby the transit agency seeks competitive bids on bus and rail routes for private operation. The competitive market reduces costs, while the transit agency specifies all aspects of the service. The best example of competitive contracting in the world is the London Transport bus system, which is the largest city bus system in the developed world. Buses are operated by multiple private contractors, under the control of Transport for London, which determines fare levels, routes, schedules and transfer arrangements. To the public, London Transport’s buses look and act like a single system. There is, however, a big difference. Competitive contracting has reduced costs per mile by nearly 40 percent after adjustment for inflation over the past 25 years. The savings have been plowed back into substantial service increases, which have led to strong ridership increases. Subway operating costs have also been reduced through competitive contracting, such as in Stockholm.

    But so long as the focus is on revenues and costs are largely ignored, the only thing sustainable about transit in New York City will be its fiscal crises. Even if there is an eventual financial bailout of NYCTA this time, expect the clock to start ticking towards the next inevitable crisis.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.