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  • New Zealand Has Worst Traffic: International Data

    Three decades ago, the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) at Texas A&M University began a ground-breaking project to quantify traffic congestion levels in the larger urban areas of the United States. The Urban Mobility Report project was begun under Tim Lomax and David Shrank, who have led the project over the first 30 annual editions. Perhaps the most important contribution of this work to the state of transportation knowledge is TTI’s "travel time index," which measures the extent to which peak period traffic congestion as to travel times.

    Of Highway Expansion and Maternity Wards

    The TTI data has been invaluable. One important contribution has exposed a fallacious interpretation of the “induced traffic” effect, which holds that there is no point in expanding roadways because they will only be filled up by new traffic. As if more maternity wards would increase the birth rate, the argument goes that we “can’t build our way out of congestion.” In fact the TTI data, which measures at the comprehensive urban area level (and the only reliable level), says we can.

    I recall a 1980s City Hall meeting with a Portland Commissioner, who admiringly cited Phoenix for not having built a Los Angeles style freeway system. I remarked that if there was anything worse than Los Angeles with its freeways, it would be Los Angeles without its freeways. Then, Phoenix was the 35th largest urban area in the nation, yet had the 10th worst traffic congestion. The situation soon was improved, after Phoenix voters authorized funding for the largest recent freeway expansion program and now Phoenix ranks 37th in traffic congestion, despite having more than doubled in population (now the 12th largest urban area).

    The lesson repeated itself in traffic clogged Houston, which led Los Angeles in traffic congestion in three of the first four years of the Annual Mobility Report. Under the leadership of visionary Mayor Robert Lanier, freeway and arterial expansions were built, and Houston dropped to rank 10th in traffic congestion despite having since added more residents than live in Portland. Meanwhile, Portland, with its densification and anti-automobile policies has been vaulted from the 47th worst traffic congestion in 1985 to 6th worst in 2012, which is notable for the an urban area ranking on only 23rd in population.

    Houston’s roadway expansions cleared the way for a Los Angeles run of 26 straight years as the nation’s most congested urban area, with little prospect of improvement.

    The Travel Time Index Goes International

    TTI’s traffic congestion ratings were adopted internationally. INRIX, a Seattle based automobile navigation services company was first, providing virtually the same measure for urban areas in North America and Western Europe. More recently, Tom Tom, an Amsterdam based automobile navigation services company issued its own Tom Tom Traffic Index, providing by far the most comprehensive international coverage, adding Australia, South Africa and New Zealand.

    Tom Tom has just produced its results for the second quarter of 2013. Looking globally, Los Angeles does not look so bad; it didn’t even make the top 10 most congested, outpaced (or perhaps better underpaced) by urban areas in Western Europe and Canada.  

    Higher Income World Urban Areas

    Tom Tom produced data for 122 urban areas in the higher income United States, Western Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This included nearly all urban areas with more than 1,000,000 population, and some smaller. It might be expected that the “sprawl” of US urban areas, and their virtual universality of automobile ownership, as well as the paucity of transit ridership in most metropolitan areas would set the US to to the nether world of worst traffic congestion. This is not so, and not by a long shot.  

    1. New Zealand: The trophy goes to, of all places, New Zealand (Figure 1).  The average excess time spent in traffic in the three urban areas of New Zealand rated by Tom Tom was 31.3%. This means that the average trip that would take 30 minutes without congestion would take, on average, approximately 40 minutes in the three urban areas of New Zealand. This is stunning. New Zealand’s urban areas are very small. The largest, Auckland, has a population of approximately 1.3 million, which would rank it no higher than 25th in Western Europe, 35th in the United States and 4th in Canada and Australia. Christchurch and Wellington are among the smallest urban areas (less than 500,000 population) covered in the Tom Tom Traffic Index, but manage to rank among the 20 most congested (Figure 2). Christchurch and Wellington have little in freeway lengths.

    2. Australia: Second place is claimed by Australia. The average trip takes 27.5 percent longer in Australia because of traffic congestion. All five of Australia’s metropolitan areas with more than 1,000,000 population are among the 20 most congested urban areas in the higher income world. In the case of four urban areas (Sydney, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide), every larger US urban area has less traffic congestion. Melbourne is the exception, but is still “punching well above its weight,” with worse traffic congestion than larger Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, Toronto, Philadelphia, Miami, Atlanta, Washington, Riverside-San Bernardino and Boston.

    3. Canada: Canada is the third most congested, with an excess travel time of 24.8 percent. Vancouver ranks as the third most congested urban area (36 percent excess travel time) in the higher income world, and has displaced Los Angeles as suffering the worst traffic congestion in North America. This is a notable accomplishment, since Los Angeles has more than five times the population, is more dense and only one-third as many of its commuters use transit to get to work. None of the other five largest urban areas in Canada (Toronto, Montréal, Ottawa, Edmonton and Calgary) is rated among the 20 most congested in the higher income world (Figure 3). Toronto is tied for 6th worst in North America with Washington (DC-VA-MD) and San Jose (Figure 4).

    4. Western Europe: Fourth position in the congestion sweepstakes is occupied by Western Europe, where the excess travel time averages 22.2 percent. Marseille (France) and Palermo (Italy) are tied with the worst traffic congestion in the higher income world, with excess travel times of 40 percent. Excluding Christchurch and Wellington, Marseille and Palermo are among the smallest urban areas among the most congested 20, though their large and dense historic cores complicate travel patterns. Rome, Paris, Stockholm and Rome, all with strong transit commute shares, are tied with Vancouver for the third worst traffic congestion (36 percent excess travel time). Other Western European entries to the most congested 20 rankings are London, Nice and Lyon in France and Stuttgart, Hamburg and Berlin in Germany. Western Europe contributes only 11 of its 54 rated urban areas to the most congested 20 list (the most 20 most congested list includes 24 urban areas because of a five way tie for 19th).

    Unlike New Zealand, Australia and Canada, Western Europe has representation in the 20 least congested urban areas (Figure 5), taking seven of the 22 positions (A three way tie at the top places increases the total to 22). The least congested urban area in Zaragoza in Spain (seven percent excess travel time), itself a small urban area of approximately 700,000, while similarly small Bern in Switzerland, Malaga in Spain and Malmo in Sweden are tied with four US urban areas in the second least congested position (10 percent excess travel time).

    5. United States: The United States is the least congested in these rankings with an excess travel time of 18.3 percent. Even after losing its top North American ranking to Vancouver, Los Angeles continues to be the most congested urban area in the United States, with an excess travel time of 35 percent. San Francisco (32 percent), Seattle, and much smaller Honolulu (tied at 28 percent) are also in the most congested 20. Only four of the 53 rated US urban areas is in the most congested 20.

    The US dominates the least congested 20 list, with 15 urban areas. Richmond, Kansas City, Cleveland and Indianapolis share the second least congested position with three Western European urban areas (10 percent excess travel time). Phoenix, which was formerly one of the most congested in the US, is also on the list, ranking as the 12th least congested in the higher income world and the 5th least congested urban area in North America.

    Less Traffic Congestion: Lower Densities and Less Employment Concentration

    The Tom Tom traffic congestion rankings are further indication of the association between higher population densities and more intense traffic congestion. But there is more to the story. Residents of the United States also benefit because employment is more dispersed, which tends to result in less urban core related traffic congestion. Lower density and employment dispersion are instrumental in the more modest traffic congestion of the United States, including such large urban areas as Dallas-Fort Worth (the fastest growing high income world metropolitan area with more than 5,000,000 population), Houston, Miami and even roadway deficient Atlanta.

     

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.

    Photo: Freeway in Marseille (by author)

  • Jerry Brown and California’s “Attractive” Poverty

    Jerry Brown is supposed to be a different kind of politician: well informed, smart, slick, and skilled.  While he has had some missteps, he’s always bounced back.  His savvy smarts have allowed him to have a fantastically successful career while generally avoiding the egregious dishonesty that characterizes so many political practitioners.

    So, I was shocked to read that he said that California’s poverty is a result of the State’s booming economy.  Here’s part of the Sacramento Bee report:

    Gov. Jerry Brown, whose pronouncements of California’s economic recovery have been criticized by Republicans who point out the state’s high poverty rate, said in a radio interview Wednesday that poverty and the large number of people looking for work are "really the flip side of California’s incredible attractiveness and prosperity."

    The Democratic governor’s remarks aired the same day the U.S. Census Bureau reported that 23.8 percent of Californians live in poverty under an alternative calculation that includes the cost of living. Asked on National Public Radio’s "All Things Considered" about two negative indicators — the state’s nation-high poverty rate and the large number of Californians who are unemployed or marginally employed and looking for work — Brown said, "Well, that’s true, because California is a magnet.

    "People come here from all over in the world, close by from Mexico and Central America and farther out from Asia and the Middle East. So, California beckons, and people come. And then, of course, a lot of people who arrive are not that skilled, and they take lower paying jobs. And that reflects itself in the economic distribution."

    This is so incredibly wrong that I’m worried that Brown has lost his head and ability to reason.   If he really believes what he said, he’s living in the past and he’s so ill informed as to be delusional.  If he doesn’t believe what he said, I’m worried that his political skills have slipped.  To my knowledge, he’s never said anything so clearly at odds with the truth in his career.

    Here are the facts:

    • California’s poverty is not where the jobs are, which is what we’d expect if what Brown said was true.  Most of California’s jobs are being created in the Bay Area, a region of fabulous wealth. By contrast, California’s poverty is mostly inland. San Bernardino, for example, has the second highest poverty rate for American cities over 200,000 population, and no, it’s not because it’s a magnet. Most of California’s Great Central Valley is a jobs desert, but the region is characterized by persistent grinding poverty and unemployment.  No one in recent years is moving to Kings County to look for a job.
    • States with opportunity have low poverty rates.  North Dakota may have America’s most booming economy.  According to the Census Bureau, North Dakota’s Supplemental Poverty Measure is 9.2 percent.  That is, after adjustments for cost of living, 9.2 percent of North Dakotans live in poverty.  The rate in Texas – a state with a very diverse population, and higher percentages of Latinos and African-Americans – is 16.4 percent.  California leads the nation with 23.8 percent of Californians living in poverty.
    • According to the U.S. Census, domestic migration (migration between California and other states) has been negative for 20 consecutive years. That is, for 20 years more people have left California for other states than have come to California from other states. Wake up, Jerry, this is no longer your Dad’s state – or that of his successor, Ronald Reagan. This is a big change from when Brown was elected governor the first time.  At that time, California was a magnet.  It had a vibrant economy, one with opportunity.  California was a place where you could have a career, afford a home, raise a family.  It was where the American Dream was realized.
    • How about the magnetic attraction for immigrants from all over the world? According to the Census Bureau, international migration to California is way down.  The number of California international immigrants has been declining for a decade at least.  Indeed, in recent years there have been about half as many international immigrants to California than we saw in the 1990s.  Over the past decade, the number of foreign born increased more in Houston than the Bay Area and Los Angeles put together. Opportunity, not  “attractiveness”, drives people to move.
    • The result of negative domestic migration and falling international migration is the total migration to California has been negative in each of the past eight years.  More people have left California than have come to California for eight consecutive years. 
    • California’s migration trends combined with falling birth rates has resulted in the lowest sustained population growth rates that California has seen.

    The data are clear: Brown’s assertions have no basis in fact.  California – with the exception only recently of the Bay Area – is not a magnet. California is not "incredibly attractive and prosperous."  People are not coming from all over the world. California may beckon, but more are leaving, and those here are having fewer children. California’s seductive charms go only so far.

    I don’t know if I’d prefer that Brown was delusional or lying. On the one hand, policy made from a delusional analysis of the world is sure to be bad policy. Brown, for example, may convince himself that Twitter, Google, and Facebook are the future of the California economy, without recognizing how few people, particularly from the working class or historically disadvantaged minorities, they employ. On the other hand, Brown is very skilled in the political arts. If someone as skilled as he has to resort to such outright misdirection, we may be in worse shape than I think.

    Bill Watkins is a professor at California Lutheran University. and runs the Center for Economic Research and Forecasting, which can be found at clucerf.org.

    Jerry Brown photo by Bigstock.

  • Can the Rust Belt Learn From Dixie?

    Aaron Renn’s recent piece on the Rust Belt has some formidable strengths that can be the foundation of its revitalization, but it has a set of structural problems that must be confronted to achieve true revitalization.  Current revitalization strategies, he suggests, are outside of each city’s system or fail to bring the appropriate heft to lift all those who need lifting — largely because they only obliquely address the structural challenges.  The challenges:

    • Racism
    • Corruption
    • Closed societies
    • Two-tiered environment and resulting paralysis

    I won’t rehash Aaron’s assessment, but I do agree with it.

    What occurred to me is that, if you think about it, the South’s cities were in the same position following the Civil War — and faced the same obstacles — until after World War II.  Racism clearly plagued Southern metros and hindered growth during that era; many places were well known for their corruption.  The South certainly had a reputation for being a closed society, unwelcome to outsiders, and its history of reliance on low- and moderately-skilled labor made the South perhaps more skeptical of highly educated labor, just like in the Midwest.

    Following World War II, however, Southern metros began to make great strides to catch up with and even surpass Northeastern and Midwestern cities.  I’m no scholar on post-war Southern growth, but it appears Southern metros took on these strategies to move upward and onward:

    Tolerate Newcomers.  After World War II Southern cities realized that they could no longer rely on intra-region growth if they were going to prosper, particularly during a period with widespread migration of blacks to Northern cities at the time.  Southern business leaders rightfully recognized opportunities to bring businesses and residents to the South from other parts of the country.

    Seeing education as an asset.  It’s no coincidence that the Southern metros that have developed the strongest post-war economies — Atlanta, Charlotte, Dallas, Houston, Austin, Raleigh, Nashville — are home to significant educational institutions.  After the war the colleges and universities of large Southern metros became integral to their growth.

    Becoming a low-cost alternative to the rest of the country.  Prior to their turnaround Southern cities probably described themselves in terms of what they lacked in comparison to Northern cities.  They did not have the impressive skylines, the classic neighborhoods, the exceptional park systems or the infrastructure that were the legacy of Northern cities.  However they did have cheap land and cheap labor, and those factors became the driver that facilitated the development of what they lacked.

    The above strategies, combined with the widespread use of air conditioning that made the Southern climate more tolerable, allowed for the growth of Southern metros. 

    The Rust Belt should take note.  While the South only address race as the federal government made them, perhaps the Rust Belt can become a leader in addressing race matters.  If the South can learn to become more tolerant of outsiders, the Midwest can as well; it does have a legacy of immigration that can serve as a foundation.  Advocates of the Rust Belt Chic movement may turn the low-cost strategy on its head — the Rust Belt has a unique physical and social legacy that those who’ve grown up in places with less would welcome.  And the Rust Belt has perhaps the greatest collection of public research universities in the nation (even if most are located in smaller metros and not the big cities), and they could be a huge driver of revitalization.

    Clearly, the South did not get everything right.  But when faced with an existential crisis not unlike what the Rust Belt faces today, they adapted.  The Rust Belt must find its strengths and play to them.

  • Are Millennials Turning Their Backs on the American Dream?

    In his classic 1893 essay, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” historian Frederick Jackson Turner spoke of “the expansive character of American life.” Even though the frontier was closing, Turner argued, the fundamental nature of Americans was still defined by their incessant probing for “a new field of opportunity.” Turner’s claim held true for at least a century—during that time, the American spirit generated relentless technological improvement, the gradual creation of a mass middle class, and the integration of ever more diverse immigrants into the national narrative.

    Yet today, many consider this modern period of “expansiveness” to be as doomed as the prairie frontier culture whose denouement Turner portrayed. Nothing makes this clearer than the perception of a majority of middle class Americans that their children will not do better than them, with as many as pessimistic about the future as are optimistic. Almost one-third of the public, according to Pew, consider themselves “lower” class , as opposed to middle class, up from barely one quarter in 2008.

    Are Young Americans Becoming Herbivores?

    To some, this dismal outlook is either inevitable, or even positive, as Americans shift from their historically “expansive” view and embrace a more modest déclassé future. Rather than seek new worlds to conquer, or even hope to retain the accomplishments of prior generations, contemporary young Americans seem destined to confront a world stamped by ever narrowing opportunity, class distinction, and societal stagnation. Once a nation of competitive omnivores and carnivores, America could be turning more docile—a country of content, grazing herbivores.

    Just such a diminished world view has already taken root in Japan, particularly among that country’s younger males. Growing up in a period of tepid economic growth, a declining labor market, and a loss of overall competitiveness, Japan’s male “herbivores” are more interested in comics, computer games, and Internet socializing than building a career or even the opposite sex. Marriage and family have increasingly little appeal to them, sentiments they share with most women their age.

    This devolved future is widely embraced by both left and right. Libertarian-leaning economist Tyler Cowen identifies a permanent upper class, essentially those who command machines and particularly the software that runs them, while the masses, something like 85 percent of the population, need to adjust to lower living standards, and a diet made up largely of beans and rice.

    This approach has appeal to the grandees of finance, who see in a diminishing American dream not only higher relative status for themselves but an opportunity to turn prospective property owners into rental serfs. Large equity funds have been particularly aggressive about buying foreclosed homes and renting them out, often at high rates, to economically distressed families.

    This “rentership” society, as first suggested by Morgan Stanley’s Oliver Chang, reflects, in this sense, an almost Marxian dialectic that sees ownership of property concentrating in ever fewer hands. Conservative theorists have little problem with this, since they naturally defend class privileges and are less committed to upward mobility than assuring the relentless triumph of market capitalism.

    But the most potent apologists for shrinking the American dream come from the very left which, in the past, once championed broad-based economic growth and upward mobility. Instead, progressives increasingly favor their own version of a “rentership society,” albeit one more regulated than the conservative version, but also accepting , and even encouraging, the proletarianization of the American middle class. (Turning them, in the process, into good, reliable clients of the Democratic Party). Goodbye Levittown, with its promise of property ownership and privacy, and back to the tenements of Brownsville, now dressed up as “hip and cool.”

    Some even have suggested getting rid of “middle class norms of decency” governing housing and bringing back the boarding house of the 19th and early 20th Century. The goal, of course, is to facilitate ever more densification of urban areas and to rein in the dreaded suburban “sprawl.”

    This tendency to force densification and downgrade ownership is deeply pronounced among urbanists and the green lobby, two groups with ample power in most blue states and regions. “Progressive” theorists such as Richard Florida see wealth transferring to a handful of “spiky” American cities, places such as San Francisco and Manhattan, where even the prospect of home ownership is inconceivable to the vast majority of the population.

    There are many others, farther out on the green urbanist track, who believe that the entire notion of middle class upward mobility is too consumption-oriented and, well, sort of in bad taste. They maintain that millennials will not only eschew home ownership but the ownership of automobiles and practically anything else bigger than their beloved electronic gadgets.

    Indeed, this transformation would be greeted with enthusiasm by many greens and traditional urbanists. The environmental magazine Grist even envisions “a hero generation” that will escape the material trap of suburban living and work that engulfed their parents. “We know the financial odds are stacked against us, and instead of trying to beat them, we’d rather give the finger to the whole rigged system,” the millennial author concludes.

    Are Americans Millennials Victims of Circumstance?

    Are young Americans ready to move off the competitive playing field and onto the herbivore pastureland? The economic stagnation certainly seems to have had a negative effect on everything from marriage to fertility rates, which are at their lowest levels in a quarter century. Much like their Japanese counterparts, young Americans increasingly avoid both marriage and having children, according to a recent Pew Foundation study. Despite a total rise in population of 27 million (PDF), there were actually fewer births in 2010 than there were ten years earlier.

    Is this a matter of preference or a reaction to hard times?  Hemmed in by college debt and a persistently weak economy, almost 40 percent of the unemployed are between 20 and 34. A smaller percentage of American males between 25 and 34—the key age for prospective families—are in the workforce than at any time since 1948.

    One reason some celebrate the rejection of marriage and family is that it undermines the suburban environments that overwhelmingly attract most families. Urban theorists such as Peter Katz maintain that millennials (the generation born after 1983) show little interest in “returning to the cul-de-sacs of their teenage years.” Manhattanite Leigh Gallagher, author of the predictable anti-burbs broadside The Death of Suburbs, asserts with certitude that that “millennials hate the suburbs” and prefer more eco-friendly, singleton-dominated urban environments.

    Another apparent casualty here may be entrepreneurship, the very thing that characterized both boomers and their successors, Generation X.  Entrepreneurship rates remain strong among older Americans , but start-up rates among young people look far weaker. Millennials’ experience with the economy makes them, according to generational chroniclers Morley Winograd and Mike Hais, “very risk averse,” particularly in comparison with previous generations.

    Can millennials recreate the “Expansive” culture in their own image?

    Winograd and Hais see millennial timidity as a mostly temporary phenomena. Far from rejecting suburbia, homeownership, and the American dream, millennials are simply seeking to recreate it in their own image. Contrary to the notions promoted by the Wall Street financiers, urban land speculators, and greens, most millennials, particularly those entering their 30s, express a strong desire to own a home, with three times as many eyeing the suburbs as the inner core.

    The recession, according to a recent Wilson Center study (PDF), did not kill the desire to own a home among younger people: more than 90 percent of those under 45 said they wanted to own their own residence.    Another survey by TD Bank found that 84 percent of renters aged 18 to 34 intend to purchase a home in the future. And a Better Homes and Gardenssurvey found that three in four sawhomeownership as “a key indicator of success.”

    Survey data also suggests that millennials are highly focused on getting married and being good parents. Nearly four in five millennials express a desire to have children. This will become more significant as millennials reach their 30s and early 40s, the prime age for family formation. Over the next decade, at least six million people will be entering their 30s, and that number is expected to keep expanding through 2050.

    None of this suggests that, as some social conservatives might hope, that the Ozzie and Harriet family is about to make a major comeback. For one thing, millennials will likely get hitched and have children later than previous generations. Their marriages also will probably be less traditional and male-centered. Hais and Winograd assert that millennials are a “female dominated” generation and have a less traditional view of sex roles—or for that matter, what constitutes a family, since they tend to be highly supportive of same sex marriage.

    But if they differ from past generations, most millennials clearly do not aspire to the ideal of singleness and childlessness embraced by more radical boomer enthusiasts. That said, they will not recreate the family or their residence in their parents’ image. They may, for example, be more willing to customize their residences for their own unique needs or for greater energy efficiency, and place greater emphasis on “technology capabilities” than on a larger kitchen, or some more traditional suburbanaccoutrements.

    As they get on with life, they will also make new demands on their bosses, warn Hais and Winograd. Companies will need to accommodate as well the new familial arrangements that Millennials are likely to seek out. This means firms will need to adopt policies that favor telecommuting, flexible hours, and maternity and paternity leave that will allow for a better balance between work and personal life.

    But in the long run, millennials, if given a chance, are likely to maintain the national ethos of aspiration despite the powerful headwinds they now face. As Turner suggested at the end of his famous essay, it would be “a rash prophet who would assert that the expansive character of American life has now entirely ceased.”

    The real issue here is not the declining validity of American aspiration, but overcoming the economic, political and social factors that threaten to suffocate it. Similar challenges—the concentration of wealth of the Gilded Age, the Great Depression, war, and environmental angst—have periodically appeared and were eventually addressed through technological innovation, and critical political and social changes. Rather than accept the shrinkage of the American prospect, we should seek ways to restore it for those who will inherit this republic.

    This story originally appeared at The Daily Beast.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and Distinguished Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures at Chapman University, and a member of the editorial board of the Orange County Register. He is author of The City: A Global History and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. His most recent study, The Rise of Postfamilialism, has been widely discussed and distributed internationally. He lives in Los Angeles, CA.

  • Richard Murdocco

  • Long Island’s Flawed Housing Policy is the Real Brain Drain

    Affordable housing is Long Island’s greatest regional failure and the key to our success in the 21st century. Yet, for such an important topic, there is still a fundamental lack of understanding of the problem, and a marked lack of standardization in studying it. We don’t have a regional standard when it comes to affordability, nor do we have an accurate assessment of how many existing units can be considered “affordable.”

    Worse, the approach in which we’re addressing the problem is significantly flawed. This flawed approach is the byproduct of two larger trends in urban planning that I’ve seen on Long Island: shoehorning urban solutions onto suburban problems and allowing stakeholders to dominate the discussion of the issues.

    Recently, I attended a housing design forum hosted by a group that is spearheaded by a development firm that is actively working to “cultivate a spirit of community-driven visioning, entrepreneurship and local investment.”

    In general, I support any initiative that seeks to discuss and address Long Island’s regional issues, and think it’s an important effort. It is critical that the topics of housing, our economy and reversing suburban decline are discussed with the general public. I enjoy attending the events and participating in the discussion. Yet, time and time again, it’s been the same trend – stakeholders, be it developers, environmentalists or so on, all of which have “a dog in the fight” or something to lose or gain, dominate the conversation regarding our regional issues and push to benefit their own agendas.

    We get the policy we deserve

    The group I mentioned earlier has recently a launched a focused campaign to build attainably priced housing. The crux of their proposed solution is the creation of micro-unit apartments across Long Island’s downtown areas. These hypothetical micro-units range in size from 300- to 400-square-foot (roughly three times the size of the average prison cell) unit studios, up to two-bedroom units in the 800- to 900-square-foot range. The theory is that the smaller units, located in a transit-oriented development in the heart of a downtown area, will lead to a more efficient lifestyle. This efficiency will promote sustainable living that is the opposite of suburban waste, reduce energy consumption (because the units are so small) and so on.

    This is all well and good, but when it comes to dollars and cents, the plan makes no sense.

    DLI Pricing

    The hypothetical units, as proposed during a design forum, could rent for between $1,000 and $1,400 for 300- to 400-square foot units up to $2,000 to $2,500 for the 800- to 900-square-foot variants. These rents do not include utilities or cable/internet. To be fair though, the projected rents do not reflect any government subsidies either.

    Regardless, in what world is this considered “affordable?” Um… I mean… workforce. Or is it ”attainable” housing these days?

    Give me a break.

    Granted, these are hypothetical units, but the fact these were presented as a viable option to get excited about in an absolutely serious manner with a straight face, is insulting.

    This is what we get for allowing developers, not planners, economists and others detached from the process, to take the lead when it comes to addressing our regional housing issues. When developers helm the discussion we get proposals such as these.

    A mentor of mine raised a good point when we were discussing the issue. Can the real estate industry play a constructive role in the discussion of housing issues on Long Island? Can the goals of the real estate industry (make as much profit in as short a time frame as possible) harmonize with the goal of planners (to keep land use in balance with the socio-economic needs of residents and the environment)? Often, no; the goals of private industry conflict with the planning ideals.

    One could say, “Well, Mr. Know-it-all, Long Island’s young professionals need different options or they’ll leave. There is a brain drain you know.” The only brain drain I’ve seen is our approach to housing policy.

    If we are losing the young, why not focus on job creation that goes beyond low-wage retail. Stop advocating for mixed-use with integrated retail and create wealth and opportunity that will allow Long Island’s younger generations to stay, be single and eventually start a family. With each Target superstore built, we lose the opportunity to create a strong manufacturing, green or tech base. Land on an island is finite. We must ask ourselves, are we maximizing our open space? Are we creating a business climate that will appeal to startups and entrepreneurs?  What can be done to lower costs, drive up business and allow for a multitude of housing options?

    Enough is Enough

    Drop the buzzwords, drop the flowery language such as “attainable” or “workforce” and let’s actually start to tackle our problem.

    Here is a newsflash: A thousand bucks for a 300-square-foot closet will not fly with millennials raised in homes with bedrooms larger than that. Long Island’s young people are getting priced out of a restricted, stagnant housing market with high costs of living, high property taxes and a distinct lack of affordable housing. They can’t afford nicer living because our job opportunities stink, but don’t insult young islanders with shoe boxes priced astronomically high. If we wanted to live in a tight space, Manhattan is a train ride away.

    We Long Islanders have driven ourselves into a ditch and expect to build our way out of it. Well, you can’t build your way out of a recession. Maybe it’s time to enact a “fair-share” housing policy that requires each and every municipality on Long Island to create a quota of truly affordable development. Perhaps it’s time to stare our property tax problem in the eye, buck up and start looking into consolidation.

    Problems aren’t solved by tip-toeing around the issues and giving us gilded solutions that sit on a shelf and gather dust. The public, especially Long Island’s millennials, deserve better. Why is suburban growth stagnant? It’s because of the stakeholders and their stagnant solutions.

    This piece originally appeared on LIBN’s Young Island.

    Richard Murdocco is a digital marketing analyst for Teachers Federal Credit Union, although the views expressed in this post are Murdocco’s alone and not shared by TFCU. Follow him on Twitter @TheFoggiestIdea, visit thefoggiestidea.org or email him atrich.murdocco@gmail.com.

    Photo by cinderellasg.

  • The Tough Realities Facing Smaller Post-Industrial Cities

    A couple weeks ago the Economist ran a leader and an article on the plight of smaller post-industrial cities, noting that these days the worst urban decay is found not in big cities but in small ones. They observe:

    Partly, this reflects the extraordinary success of London and continuing deindustrialisation in the north of England. Areas such as Teesside have been struggling, on and off, since the first world war. But whereas over the past two decades England’s big cities have developed strong service-sector economies, its smaller industrial towns have continued their relative decline. Hartlepool is typical of Britain’s rust belt in that it has grown far more slowly than the region it is in. So too is Wolverhampton, a small city west of Birmingham, and Hull, a city in east Yorkshire.
    …
    And even with growth, the most ambitious and best-educated people will still tend to leave places like Hull. Their size, location and demographics means that they will never offer the sorts of restaurants or shops that the middle classes like.

    Their editorial forthrightly embraces a policy of triage, saying “The fate of these once-confident places is sad. That so many well-intentioned people are trying so hard to save them suggests how much affection they still claim. The coalition is trying to help in its own way, by setting up ‘enterprise zones’ where taxes are low and broadband fast. But these kindly efforts are misguided. Governments should not try to rescue failing towns. Instead, they should support the people who live in them.”

    This same dynamic is clearly evident in the United States as well. Bigger cities have tended to weather industrial decline far better than smaller ones. There seems to be some threshold size below which it is difficult to support the infrastructure, the amenities, and the thick labor markets that attract the people and businesses in 21st century growth industries. My “Urbanophile Conjecture” heuristic suggests that you need to be a state capital with a population greater than 500,000 to be thriving. But even larger places that aren’t capitals and conventionally viewed as failures like Detroit retain powerful metro area economies and large concentrations of educated workers, especially in the suburbs. Conversely, smaller places like Youngstown, Ohio and Flint, Michigan face much bleaker circumstances.

    There are exceptions to the rule, including many delightful college towns or the occasional oddball like Columbus, Indiana, but for the most part smaller post-industrial cities have really struggled to reinvent themselves.

    In part this is because a rising tide hasn’t lifted all boats, only some of them. As economist Michael Hicks noted, “Almost all our local economic policies target business investment, and masquerade as job creation efforts. We abate taxes, apply TIF’s and woo businesses all over the state, but then the employees who receive middle class wages (say $18 an hour or more) choose the nicest place to live within a 40-mile radius. So, we bring a nice factory to Muncie, and the employees all commute from Noblesville.”

    In short, growth actually fuels divergence because a) the growth disproportionately accrues to the places that are doing well in the first place and b) even when struggling cities can attract jobs, people earning middle class wages frequently live elsewhere. Doug Masson likened this to Jesus’ statement that “For he that hath, to him shall be given: and he that hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath.” I think there’s a lot of evidence that for bigger cities a lot of activity is exhibiting a convergent or flattening effect. That’s why so many places today have decent startup scenes, quality food, agglomerations of talent, etc. But for smaller cities my observation is that it’s still a divergent world.

    You see this on full display in central Illinois, where the town of Danville (population 33,000) and Champaign-Urbana (combined population 124,000) are only about half an hour’s drive apart on I-74. Danville is one of the bleakest towns I’ve ever visited in the Rust Belt. When your Main Street is a STROAD, you know you’re in trouble. Champaign-Urbana by contrast, is a fairly healthy community. It’s home to the main campus of the University of Illinois, seems to be reasonably thriving, has many high quality residential streets, a direct rail connection to Chicago, etc. As a college town, it’s one of those “exception” smaller places.

    Anyone within reasonable driving distance with a choice would almost undoubtedly choose to live in Champaign over Danville, unless they had a family or personal connection to the latter. It’s an easy slam dunk decision. In effect, proximity to Champaign acts as kryptonite to Danville’s revitalization. Again, a rising tide only fuels this divergence.

    This sort of divide between communities mirrors the divide in society as well. The question is, what approach should be taken to address these disparities? One approach is to focus on the people, and leave the places to rot. Jim Russell has noted that “people develop, not places” thus most place based economic strategies are destined to fail. This approach has also been advocated by economist Ed Glaeser, who in an article title, “Can Buffalo Ever Come Back?” answered his own question by saying, “probably not—and government should stop bribing people to stay there.”

    This is obviously unpalatable to policy makers of either the left or the right, as no one has yet embraced it openly. How then have the left and right responded? The response of the left seems to be what Walter Russell Mead has labeled the “blue model” solution. His basic view is that the post-war economy was based around a policy consensus he labeled the blue social model (and which Urbanophile contributor Robert Munson has simply labeled the New Deal). This involved large corporations, powerful unions, extensive industrial regulation, and an expanding safety net. Those who wish to retain the model suggest allowing divergence to continue, but raising taxes on the wealthy and successful in order to redistribute them to sustain those at the bottom of the ladder (via an expanded welfare state), who are in effect seen as lost causes in the modern global knowledge economy, though few of them will openly say it. So the idea is to invest in success, and redistribute the harvest aggressively. That’s why you see lots of left advocacy in favor of tax increases on higher income earners and against food stamp and other benefit cuts, but a paucity of ideas for how to provide the left behinds with jobs and opportunity.

    Mead suggests there’s no such thing as the red social model, and perhaps he’s right in that there’s never been a national policy consensus we could label as such, but there’s certainly a red model response to current conditions and it’s called the Tea Party, or what Mead has labeled a “Red Dawn” in many places like Kansas, North Carolina, and New Mexico. This is a type of single factor determinism model. In these kinds of models, a single factor like education, transportation infrastructure, climate, etc is treated as overwhelmingly determinant in driving the economic structure and outcomes. The factor posited by the Red Dawn model is government, therefore the red model response is to slash and burn government (with the potential exception of highway spending) to lower costs, taxes, and regulatory barriers that are perceived to be holding the economy back. In other words, government is the base, and the economy and everything else is the superstructure. Fix the base and the superstructure will correct itself. That’s the theory.

    Broadly speaking, these are the paths that Illinois and Indiana have followed. Chicago’s size enables it and its values to political dominate the state in the modern era. With only a rump of a Republican Party, the Democrats are free to do what they like. Conversely, in Southern influenced Indiana it is the outstate areas that are numerically superior to the successful urban regions, thus the state follows their policy preference, and Republicans overwhelmingly dominate the state so there’s little real opposition to red model policies.

    What have the results been? Most obviously, Illinois is nearly bankrupt while Indiana is sitting on a AAA credit rating and a $2 billion surplus in the bank. (It has a pension deficit, but it’s manageable and there’s a funding strategy in place). Clearly Indiana has a more functional political system than Illinois, which somehow manages to remain gridlocked despite a “four horseman” style legislative system and overwhelming Democratic dominance. So score two for Indiana.

    Finances aside, what have the results been? Illinois has poured massive quantities of cash into building on success, with items like the O’Hare Modernization Program and Millennium Park. The successful side of the economy, epitomized by the global city portion of Chicago, has soared to incredible heights. This is a city that earned at seat at the table of the global elite. On the other hand, the overlooked areas like much of the south and west sides of Chicago and places like Danville, are in horrific shape. The goal of allowing divergence clearly worked. However, with the state’s finances in abysmal shape, the redistribution portion did not happen. Indeed, the social safety net and basic services depended on by the rest of Illinois are being shredded. Even if you believe that it’s viable to simply support a large lumpenproletariat in perpetuity on welfare – which is doubtful – financial extremis means Illinois isn’t even able to try.

    Meanwhile in Indiana, pretty much the entire state policy has been reoriented towards making the left behind areas attractive to lower wage businesses. Policies that would cater to higher end businesses in successful urban areas have been less popular. That’s not to say there’s been nothing. Gov. Pence recently agreed to subsidize a non-stop flight between Indianapolis and San Francisco to help the local tech industry, for example. And he’s supported efforts to boost the life sciences sector. But I think think it’s fair to say low costs and low taxes are the watchword, with right to work, light touch environmental regulation, mass transit skepticism, etc.

    However, most of Indiana’s left behind type places have not recovered. Overall the state has retained a stubbornly high unemployment rate significantly above the US average, and, even more worrying, incomes have been declining relative to the US. Metropolitan Indianapolis, Lafayette, Bloomington, and Columbus have done reasonably well. Much of the rest of the state has continued to struggle, particularly in adding jobs with middle class wages. As the recent commentary by Brian Howey, Michael Hicks, and Doug Masson shows, Indiana retains its “Noblesville-Muncie” divides mirroring Illinois’ “Champaign-Danville” ones.

    In short, the blue and the red model produced some success, albeit in different modes (think San Francisco vs. Houston, Chicago vs. Indianapolis), for the “haves” side of the equation but haven’t yet proven equal to the “have nots.” The Economist makes it clear the totaly different policy configurations of the UK haven’t made a dent in it either. Post-industrial blight in much of Europe tells a similar tale. This suggests that there are powerful macro forces at work that are extremely difficult if not impossible to overcome. It’s no surprise then that the Economist suggests giving up.

    Again, that’s not likely, so what should we do? I won’t pretend to have all the answers to a very difficult question. However, I’ll suggest a few possibilities:

    • Seek to stop the civic death spiral. This means getting ahead of the decline curve by seeking to halt the cycle of people and businesses leaving, leading to revenue declines and degraded quality of place, leading in turn to to service cuts and tax increases and disinvestment, which leads to more people and businesses leaving. This involves getting ahead of decline and restructuring government to a place where you can hold a defensible position on services and taxes from which you can seek to rebuild.
    • Integrate with metropolitan economies. Rather than Muncie trying to hold Noblesville/Metro Indy at bay, or Danville the same to Champaign, closer connectivity is the key. I’ve written on this before regarding Indiana. In the short term losing the highly paid employees to a nearby municipality is a good thing. Without those living options for the managers, etc. you’d never be in play for the plant in the first place. That connection expands your labor pool, provides trade opportunities, etc. Just the property taxes from the plant is valuable, and can be used in rebuilding. Fostering these connections would require decisions that seem counter-intuitive on the short run. For example, Ball State University in Muncie should clearly expand its downtown Indianapolis presence. That isn’t necessarily taking away from Muncie. It’s building new connections and opportunities for Muncie where they don’t exist today.
    • Find a claim to fame around which to rebuild. Carl Wohlt says that every commercial district needs to be known for at least one sure thing. Similarly, what’s Danville’s sure thing? Some towns like Warsaw or Elkhart already have it and need to build on it. Others need to find one. That’s not to say one thing is the only thing you’ll ever need or that you aren’t opportunistic around potentials deals that come your way. But you have to start somewhere. Where do you put your limited available civic funds?

    I’m not so naive as to think this it the complete answer. But if there’s to be a genuine attempt to rescue places, then new thinking is needed and a turnaround will take a long time. In the meantime in parallel, clearly people-centric solutions also need to be pursued, to give people the best opportunity to realize their potential and dreams in life, where ever that may take them. No city is a failure that does this for its citizens.

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs and the founder of Telestrian, a data analysis and mapping tool. He writes at The Urbanophile, where this piece originally appeared.

    Photo by Randy von Liski

  • Playing Musical Chairs with World Economies

    The world’s largest economies seem engaged in something like the children’s game of “musical chairs.” For years, the United States has been the world’s largest national economy, though in recent decades the integrated economy of the European Union has challenged that claim given that the region   includes four of the ten top national economies, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy. The most recent data, reflecting the deep European recession, indicates that the top position has been retaken by the United States.

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has released its semi-annual World Economic Outlook Database for October 2013. Information is provided for 189 country-level geographies, from 1980 to the present, with projections to 2018. Despite the economic malaise, the IMF data shows the US gross domestic product, adjusted for purchasing power parity (GDP-PPP), to be greater than that of the combined 28 member European Union (EU). This development, however, is at least partially due to accounting revisions, which are described below.

    2012 Gross Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Parity)

    The new data shows the United States to have a 2012 GDP-PPP of $16.245 trillion (current international dollars), two percent above the EU’s $15.933. This difference is relatively minor – the equivalent of Maryland’s GDP. In 2011, the EU led the US by a small margin, before the accounting methodology change. The IMF expects the US lead to be lengthened to approximately 10 percent by 2018. For comparison, in 1980, the same 28 EU economies had a GDP nearly one-quarter larger than that of the United States (Figures 1 and 2). However, it must be noted that in 1980, the European Union had only nine members and had an economy 8 percent smaller than that of the US.           

    China’s reduced, but still strong economic growth has propelled it to a GDP-PPP of $12.3 trillion, reaching 75 percent of the US figure. By 2018, the IMF expects China to reach 96 percent of the US GDP. If the IMF projected GDP increase rates of China and the US were to continue, China would be a larger economy than the United States by 2020. While this may be seem to be occurring sooner than expected, it is consistent with the expectation of former IMF economist Arvind Subramanian, in his book Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance. The scale of Chinese economic miracle that started under Deng Xiaoping can be seen by the fact that in 1980 its GDP was barely 10 percent of the US economy (See Ronald Coase and Ning Wang, How China Became Capitalist).

    India’s economy also continues to progress. Now the world’s fifth largest economy, India’s GDP-PPP is estimated at $4.7 trillion. By 2012, India’s economy had reached 29 percent of that of the United States, nearly triple the 1980 figure. IMF expects India to close the gap by another five percentage points by 2018.

    Japan has fallen to the fifth largest economy, at approximately $4.58 trillion. Japan had grown strongly after World War II, having reached 35 percent of the US economy by 1980. A number of experts, such as Harvard’s Ezra Vogel, expected that Japan would continue to close the gap with the United States. But Japan’s ascendency stopped by 1991, when it reached a size 41 percent of the US economy. In the subsequent economic slide, Japan’s economy fell to 28 percent of the US by 2012. IMF expects another two point drop by 2018.

    Gross Domestic Product per Capita (Purchasing Power Parity)

    The United States remains dominant in personal affluence among the world’s largest economies. In 2012, the US GDP-PPP per capita was $51,700. The European Union had a GDP-PPP of $31,600 in 2012, but is declining relative to the United States. In 2012, the EU GDP per capita was 61 percent of the US figure. This is down from a peak of 66 percent in 1982. IMF projects a further three percentage point loss by 2018 (Figures 3 and 4). The GDP-PPP per capita of the nations in the 9 nation European Union of 1980 was higher, at $36,100 in 2012 (Figure 5).

    Despite China’s potential for becoming the world’s leading economy by the beginning of the next decade, its huge population makes the GDP per capita much lower. In 2012 China’s GDP per capita was $9,100, about 18 percent of the US figure. This is, however, far higher than the 1980 figure of 2 percent. IMF expects China’s GDP per capita to rise to $14,900 by 2018, 23 percent of the US figure. 

    India’s GDP per capita was $3,800 in 2012, or seven percent of the US GDP per capita. India’s progress has been rapid, though   strongly overshadowed by China. India’s GDP per capita was 70 percent higher than China’s in 1980, but now China’s is now 60 percent higher. However, India has gained five percentage points on the US since 1980.

    Japan’s GDP per capita stood at 69 percent of the US figure in 2012 ($35,900), down significantly from 1991, when Japan’s GDP per capita reached 84 percent of the US level. IMF projects about a 1.5 percentage point further decline by 2018.

    Accounting Revision

    As is noted above, the accounting changes implemented by the United States have changed the world rankings and their prospects

    Data in the IMF’s last release (March 2013) placed the European Union slightly ahead of the United States in GDP-PPP. The United States is the first country to fully implement internationally agreed upon changes to national accounts (United Nations’ System of National Accounts 2008).  The IMF summarizes the revisions and its impact on the US economy as follows:

    “…expenditures on research and development activities and for the creation of entertainment, literary, and artistic originals are now treated as capital expenditures. Furthermore, the treatment of defined-benefit pension plans is switched from a cash basis to an accrual basis. The revisions increase the level of GDP by 3.4 percent and boost the personal savings rate.”

    The US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis indicates that Europe will convert to the new methodology in 2013 and it is to be expected that other nations will quickly follow.

    Before the accounting revision IMF data predicted that US would not pass the EU until 2015. Further, the previously lower GDP figures predicted that China would pass the United States just two years later (2017). China may have to wait to assume the top chair, but perhaps not. It all depends on how fast China converts to the new accounting and the impact of the revision on GDP figures.

    An Uncertain World

    Of course, economic projections cannot be “taken to the bank.” The world economy is volatile and uncertain and more so now that in more stable times.

    The US economy continues to sputter along with lagging growth. The European economy is doing even more poorly. Mixed signals continue to be heard from China, where astronomic growth rates are being replaced, at least for the moment, by more modest ones. President Xi Jinping says that China can create sufficient employment for its growing urban workforce with a 7.2 percent growth rate (See: “China Needs 7.2% Growth to Ensure Employment” in The Wall Street Journal) – a rate that would be the envy of each of the world’s strongest economies.

    The big high income world nations also have reason to envy India. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the economy of India “clocked a low growth rate of 4.4 percent” in the April to June quarter. The OECD characterized India’s immediate economic prospects as “weak,” yet India’s growth rate is far above those of the US, EU and Japan.

    The Bank of Japan (BOJ), the nation’s reserve bank, is optimistic about the nation’s new growth-seeking policies under “Abenomics” (named after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe). But the BOJ predictions of economic growth at 1.5 percent in 2014 and 2015 are favorable only in the light of Japan’s anemic recent growth.

    All of these predictions, combined with accounting changes, paint a blurred picture. This is the nature of a world economy that the IMF refers to as being stuck in “low gear.”

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.

    —-

    Photo: Bank of China (right) and Peace Hotel, Shanghai (by author)

  • http://www.themwatchesusa.net/

  • American Cities May Have Hit ‘Peak Office’

    Despite some hype and a few regional exceptions, the construction of office towers and suburban office parks has not made a significant resurgence in the current recovery. After a century in which office space expanded nationally with every uptick in the economy, we may have reached something close to “peak office” in most markets.

    The amount of new office space in development is extraordinarily low by historical standards, outside of a handful of markets. Back in the mid-1980s, according to the commercial real-estate research firm CoStar, upward of 200 million square feet of office space was built annually. After dropping precipitously in the early 1990s, construction rose again to 200 million square feet a year in the early 2000s before dropping well under 150 million square feet in 2006, and lower after that. This year, in what is purported to be the middle of an economic recovery,  we will add barely 30 million square feet,according to Reis Inc.

    Even with this paltry construction, vacancy rates nationwide have barely moved, hovering around 17%. This is nowhere near low enough to justify much more construction in the vast majority of markets, where office rents remain well below 2007 levels.

    Indeed, the trend in real estate remains to convert office spaces to other uses,particularly residential. Large-scale office construction is happening in just a handful of markets; New York and Houston are the only ones with 10 million square feet being built, with smaller amounts in the works in Boston, Washington, Dallas-Ft. Worth and the San Francisco Bay Area.

    Most of the current anemic growth is happening outside downtown areas. Silicon Valley, which is essentially a sprawling suburb, currently has about as much construction as San Francisco. In Houston, another big metro area with robust job growth, there is a new 47-story high-rise being developed downtown, but much of the action is taking place on the periphery, notably in the Energy Corridor. ExxonMobil’s massive new campus, at 3 million square feet, ranks with One World Trade Center in Manhattan as the nation’s largest new office projects.

    Through the third quarter this year, the amount of new office space under construction in suburban areas was roughly double the amount being built in central business districts, by CoStar’s count. Furthermore, only 7.1 million square feet of office space was absorbed downtown in the first nine months of 2013, compared to 51.5 million in suburban areas, CoStar says. But overall there is still 100 million square feet less space being used today than in 2007, and at current absorption rates, it could take six or seven years just to get back to where we were before the recession.

    The Weak Economy

    The key question here is not the geography of office space but why so little is being built. As long as economic growth is modest, don’t expect much change in the skyline in most downtowns, or suburbs. Job growth has been mediocre at best, and much of that has been in the low-wage and part-time category. McJobs and part-time workers do not generally fill office towers.

    The dirty little secret of this recovery is that labor participation rates are at the lowest level since 1978. Underemployment is rife, at around 18% to 20%, and much of that likely includes large numbers of people who used to work in offices.

    This is true even in New York City, where the rate of “office-using employment” has been dropping since the late 1960s and even in the recovery, has yet to rebound to the levels of 2000.

    Changing Use of Space

    Just as we have gotten used to more fuel-efficient cars, companies now utilize space more efficiently than before, largely through information technology. This is a trend many companies plan to accelerate. In the past, for example, your average mid-level executive had his own secretary; now it’s more common to have perhaps one aide for several managers. Historically office developers assumed that each worker would require 250 square feet of space; by the end of the decade this could drop to 100 to 125 square feet.

    Even the most notoriously bureaucratic of professions, law, is scaling back. A recent Cushman and Wakefield survey  found that most firms — many already downsizing — were working to reduce their office footprint per attorney from 800 to 500 square feet. Almost two out of five expect to use “hoteling,” or the sharing of offices among attorneys, something very rare a decade ago.

    At the same time, some of the sectors that are the best bets for expansion, such as information technology and media, are increasingly seeking out unconventional office space. Mayor Mike Bloomberg’s drive to upzone large parts of Midtown Manhattan to create ever-taller towers works operates on the assumption that new users will be much like the old ones. But some experts, such as New York-based architect Robert Stern, suggest that ultra high-rise development does not appeal to either creative businesses and tourists, while preserving older districts, with already developed buildings, does.

    Self-Employment and Home-Based Businesses

    Perhaps the biggest long-term threat lies in the shift from corporate to self-employment. From 2001 to 2012, the number of self-employed workers grew by 14%, according to a recent study by Economic Modeling Specialists. This is occurring not only in the metro areas that suffered the worst during the recession, such as Phoenix, Los Angeles and Riverside-San Bernardino, but also in the healthiest economies such as Houston and Seattle.

    Some of these now self-employed workers may end up in small offices, but many don’t leave home at all. Working at home is growing far faster than commuting by either car or transit, and in most U.S. metro areas, far exceeds those who get to work by public conveyance, most often to downtown areas. Over the past decade the number of U.S. telecommuters expanded 41% to some 1.7 million, almost double the much-ballyhooed increase of 900,000 transit riders.

    Are We Blowing Another Bubble?

    In some specialized, fast-growing markets, new office construction may well be justified. Raleigh is seeing some new construction in its small downtown, as are hot job markets such as Austin and oil-rich Midland, Texas, where a proposed 53-story office tower would be the tallest building between Dallas and Los Angeles.

    But in New York, plans for massive new office tower construction seem to contradict an unemployment rate considerably above the national average. Financial services, the primary driver of the Manhattan market, is showing signs of economic distress, with firms moving middle-management jobs to more affordable places such as Richmond, Va.; Pittsburgh; St. Louis; and Jacksonville, Fla.

    Perhaps even more worrisome, less than half of the space in new buildings in Manhattan is preleased, compared to over 70% in both Houston and Boston, and a remarkable 92% in San Jose/Silicon Valley. This reflects an apparent dearth of large employers in New York who could conceivably afford and fill ultra-expensive office space in the coming years, a recent article in Crain’s New York points out. Tech companies might be expected to help fill the gap, but we have to remember that after the last boomlet Silicon Alley suffered asteep contraction; it has since recovered, but could be hit hard again if the current bubble pops.

    San Francisco, the other current darling of office developers, is even more dependent on the current dot-com boom. The IPOs of Frisco-based firms such as Twitter appear to suggest the prospect of a whole new generation of office occupants. By one account, there is as much as 12 million square feet of new office space in the pipeline in the city, enough to satisfy historical demand for the next 16 years.

    Yet past experience shows many of these companies will likely dissolve or merge in the next few years. They may be fewer in numbers and longer established than last time around, as some local boosters eagerly suggest, but most are still unprofitable and many may never be truly viable. Following the 2000 dot-com crash, San Francisco office occupancy dropped roughly 10 million square feet, while tech employment crashed from a high of 34,000 in 2000 to barely 18,000 four years later.  As one real-estate executive put it at the time, “The office-space market here ”reminds me of the Road Runner cartoon where the Coyote runs into the wall.”

    Observers also point out that more traditional businesses, such as banks, continue to ship jobs elsewhere, in large part due to extraordinarily high costs. The fact that pre-leasing for SF’s new office buildings is barely 33% should add to the caution.

    None of this suggests there are not some good opportunities for new construction, but the office building’s role as a key indicator of the strength of the U.S. economy has faded. In great cities, rather than a ballyhooed era of new office skyscrapers we will see more conversions and the construction of residential high-rises, as well as medical buildings. The secular trend is for the dispersion of business service employment to smaller markets, and into people’s homes. The glory days of the American office tower are over, and not likely to return soon, given technological trends and a persistently tepid economy.

    This story originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and Distinguished Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures at Chapman University, and a member of the editorial board of the Orange County Register. He is author of The City: A Global History and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. His most recent study, The Rise of Postfamilialism, has been widely discussed and distributed internationally. He lives in Los Angeles, CA.

    Photo by Mark Lyon — Full Floor For Rent.