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  • Urban Densities Exclude Rural Areas: Avent Postscript

    We recently noted that Ryan Avent was one third right in his recent Sunday New York Times article on urban density. Avent has posted a response suggesting that it is inappropriate to use average urban densities in urban productivity analyses, as we had done, but that "weighted average densities" should be used instead. Weighted average density was not mentioned in his New York Times article.

    In the interim, we were able to find the studies on urban density and productivity that seem to match those Avent refers to in his New York Times article. There are two studies concluding that doubling employment (not population) density increases productivity by six percent (Ciccone & Hall, 1996 and Harris & Ioannides, 2000), as Avent noted.  Another study (Davis, Fisher & Whited, 2007) indicates that doubling employment densities could increase productivity by as much as 28 percent, also as Avent noted.

    Urban and Rural Density Combined Are Not Urban Density: In contrast to Avent’s preference for weighted average density, each of the studies uses average density, like with our analysis. More importantly the econometric formulas in the studies do not include an urban density variable. The density variables in all three studies include rural areas.

    The studies use county, metropolitan area and sub-metropolitan area densities, each of which contain far more rural land than urban land. By definition, urban areas exclude rural areas and, as a result, the moment rural areas become a part of the calculation, the result cannot be urban densities. In 2000, Census Bureau data showed counties (county equivalent level jurisdictions), which comprise the entire nation, to be less than three percent urban and more than 97 percent rural (Figure 1). Metropolitan areas also have a similar predominance of rural land (Figure 1). Among major metropolitan areas (those with more than 1,000,000 population) in 2000, approximately 85 percent of the land was rural and 15 percent of the land was urban (Figure 2).

    Ciccone & Hall use employment density at the county level and thus mix urban and rural densities. Harris & Ioannides use employment densities at the metropolitan statistical area or the primary metropolitan statistical area level (a sub-metropolitan designation since replaced by the more appropriately titled "metropolitan division"). Davis, Fisher & Whited use employment densities at the metropolitan statistical area level. The two studies using metropolitan areas or parts of metropolitan areas also mix urban and rural densities.

    Urban Area Densities: Urban density is calculated at the urban area level, which is the area of continuous urban development. This is also called the urban footprint, which is generally indicated by the lights of the city one would see from an airplane on a clear night. Urban areas are delineated using the smallest census geographical units ("census blocks," which are smaller than census tracts) each ten years. The 2010 data will be released next year. Among urban areas, the highest density core urban area in a major metropolitan area (Los Angeles) is approximately four times the lowest (Birmingham).

    Nonsensical Metropolitan Area Densities: Theoretically, metropolitan areas are labor market areas, which include a core urban area (and sometimes more than one urban area) and nearby rural areas from which people commute to work in the urban area (can be called the "commuter shed"). However, in the United States, metropolitan areas are too coarsely defined for density comparisons with one another. US metropolitan areas are composed of complete counties or, in the six New England states, complete towns. This jurisdictionally based criteria can produce metropolitan areas that are much larger than genuine labor markets in a number of cases and some that are smaller. American metropolitan areas are not spatially consistent by any functional labor market definition. Metropolitan densities are thus nonsensical, no matter what density is being measured (such as population or employment density). Among major metropolitan areas, the highest density metropolitan area (New York) is 24 times that of the lowest density (Salt Lake City), six times the maximum difference in urban area density.

    Metropolitan Ireland and Happenstance: In the similarly sized San Francisco (as used by Davis, Fisher and Whited) and Riverside-San Bernardino metropolitan areas, San Francisco has 1,700 square miles of rural land, while Riverside-San Bernardino has 26,000, approximately 15 times as much. At more than 27,000 square miles, Riverside-San Bernardino covers more land area than the Republic of Ireland. The difference in population densities between metropolitan areas is determined in considerable measure by the size (land area) of the included counties, not by the number of people in cities.

    If the state of California were to carve out a new county composed of western Riverside and San Bernardino counties (as Colorado created Bloomfield County in the early 2000s), the land area of the metropolitan area could be reduced 95 percent, because the remainder would not meet the criteria for inclusion in Riverside-San Bernardino. The importance of the density variable for Riverside-San Bernardino in econometric formulas would be increased many times. With only 3,100 county level jurisdictions of varying sizes, this kind of incomparability cannot help but occur. The boundaries of metropolitan areas are defined by political happenstance.

    On the other hand, the nation’s urban areas are built up from 7,000,000 census blocks. This permits a fine grained definition that makes urban areas appropriate for density comparisons. The definition of urban areas is beyond political fiat.

    Metropolitan areas in the United States could be readily defined at the census block level, just like urban areas. Regrettably, the Office of Management and Budget missed another opportunity in the 2010 census to make the necessary criteria change. U.S. metropolitan area data is of great value for most analysis, but misleading for spatial or density analysis.

    Low-Density Productivity: Subregionalizing the density and productivity analysis would pose problems. Avent uses household incomes as his standard (and we agree that cost of living differentials are important). The San Jose metropolitan area has the highest household incomes of any major metropolitan area and would therefore be among the most productive. Yet, San Jose’s automobile-oriented Silicon Valley, to which much of the productivity is attributable, has a far lower employment density than the transit and pedestrian oriented cores of Manhattan and San Francisco (and yes, even not-so-transit oriented downtown Phoenix). In low-density Seattle, Microsoft’s automobile oriented Redmond campus probably ranks among the most productive real estate in the country, yet its employment density (like that of Silicon Valley) pales by comparison to the higher density cores of Seattle, Phoenix, Nashville, Oklahoma City and virtually every other downtown core of a major metropolitan area.

    At the End, Agreement: Avent concludes, "I just want to make sure we stop costing ourselves easy opportunities for growth." I could not agree more. It is time to abandon regulations that artificially raise housing prices, deprive households of a better standard of living, and drive them to places they would rather not live. For centuries, people have flocked to urban areas for better economic opportunities. Urban areas should be places where people can realize their aspirations, not places that repel them because it doesn’t suit the interests of those already there.

  • Obama’s Economic Trifecta: How The President Helped Kill Progressivism, Capitalism And Moderation

    President Barack Obama‘s “pivot” on jobs this week shows that the president has finally — if belatedly — acknowledged the real misery caused by the Great Recession. However, it does not shed his complicity in the ever deepening employment crisis. Unemployment remains high, exceeding 9% — 16% if you include part-time workers. The percentage of adults in the workforce is bouncing near a 30-year low. And according to a recent Gallup Poll, barely one-fourth of the American public approve of the president’s economic policies.

    Over the past three years, President Obama has done a remarkable job of undermining three very different ideals: progressivism, capitalism and moderation. Progressivism, his own brand, has taken the biggest blow, which may be why so many progressives — particularly environmentalists — have been so critical of their chosen candidate.

    Progressivism’s golden day seemed to have arrived with Obama’s election. But the progressivism embraced by the president was not the middle-class-oriented, growth-inducing kind associated with previous Democrats. Instead, Obama’s progressivism was shaped by his fellow academics, who have enjoyed unprecedented influence in this administration, as well as closely aligned classes such as affluent greens, urban land interests, venture capitalists and the mainstream media.

    Expressing the world view of the well-heeled, Obama’s progressivism did not focus on class mobility and economic growth. The old progressivism’s program was bold and opportunity-oriented: increasing energy supplies (think Tennessee Valley Authority) and encouraging industrial growth through building critical new infrastructure.

    Obama’s stimulus did not seek to increase productivity capacity or create good blue-collar jobs. It largely missed the recession’s biggest victims: minorities, the working class and the young who are well represented of the 1 in 5 Americans now not working.  The president instead chose to service the needs of organized constituencies such as public sector unions, large research universities and “green capitalists.”

    The tragedy is that Obama could have done things differently. A new variation of the Works Progress Administration, for example, would create hundreds of thousands of jobs for the currently unemployed, particularly those under the age of 25. At the same time, it would have created a legacy of tree-planting and road, port and bridge construction, which would have impressed voters of all kinds by actually producing tangible results. Think of all the bridges, public facilities and art bequeathed to us by WPA.

    Instead Obama’s regressive progressivism strangled blue-collar sectors of the economy. Many of his key policy initiatives, particularly in the health and environmental areas, scared businesses from expanding their operations.

    Sadly, the one infrastructure project embraced by the administration — high speed rail — reflected trendy urbanist theory more than common sense. At very best high-speed rail would have served, at an exorbitant cost, a small cadre of tourists and businessmen now capable of getting to the same places by car, plane or Megabus. HSR’s ever rising costs have even led some leftists, such as Mother Jones’ Kevin Drum, to denounce it as “boondoggly.” As Drum sensibly put it, “We have way better uses for the dough.”

    Similarly, Obama’s much ballyhooed “green jobs” have proved an expensive bust. Environmentalists Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger note there are fewer “green jobs” in Silicon Valley, the industry’s supposed hot bed, today than in 2003. The recent bankruptcy of California-based solar-panel maker Solyndra — recipient of a $500 million federally guaranteed loan — represents just the first of a series of government-backed failures.

    The traditional left is also increasingly persuaded that Obama’s policies have been better for the silk stocking set than the lunch pail crowd. Banks and high-end finance capital have been the biggest beneficiaries of Obama, a peculiar accomplishment for a nominally progressive administration. Wall Street’s subsidized ride to profits — courtesy of TARP and the Bernanke-Geithner fiscal policies — has helped a relative handful of investors and brokers  to enjoy record pay in 2009 and 2010.

    These failures have downgraded the chances for another big stimulus — the prescription most favored on the left — to all but impossible. But left-wing ideology hasn’t been Obama’s only victim; he has also delivered a body blow to the ethos of capitalism itself. For decades conservatives have preached that if we made capital available through a soaring stock market, business would then spend its bounty by reinvesting in the country’s productive capacity. Yet even as the market boomed over the past two years, very little has reached Main Street businesses faced with middle-income customers too skittish to buy their goods and services.

    Obama’s most recent fetish, moderation, also is proving something of a bust. Anxious not to be labeled anti-business, he has surrounded himself not with entrepreneurs but consummate crony capitalists — chief of staff Bill Daley (scion of the Chicago machine family), General Electric‘s Jeffrey Immelt and proposed Commerce Chief John Bryson, who has spent much time as a master manipulator for a large regulated utility. These figures have little or no credibility among grassroots businesspeople. They are seen as being more adept at working the system than succeeding in the free market. If this is what moderation is about, the public has good reason not to trust it.

    So having downgraded progressivism, capitalism and even moderation, Obama’s remaining hope lies in two things: the intrinsic strengths of the U.S. economy and the well-demonstrated ineptitude of his political rivals. He may have helped his cause — to the consternation of his green base — by restraining EPA emissions rules and opening some areas for oil exploration. This could help supercharge the nation’s energy industry, which has added 250,000 new, high-paying jobs since Obama’s election, mostly across the energy belt from Texas to the Dakotas.

    Unencumbered by some of the more draconian EPA rules, America’s increasingly competitive manufacturers should be able to continue boosting exports. The U.S. also retains a big edge in industries from agriculture to software. Just do less egregious harm, and perhaps the economy will come back some on its own.

    And then there’s the gift that keeps giving: the Republican Party. The GOP has no real economic strategy except to cut government and stop higher taxes. Its record on enhancing class mobility, particularly under the Bushes, is less than exemplary; wages barely moved over the George W.’s first five years in office.

    To win this year, the GOP needs to convince enough middle- and working-class voters that it offers something other than a less refined version of the same old insider game, albeit without the annoying professorial rhetoric. In this sense, the recent rush of some former pro-Obama hedge funds to the GOP may represent more of a curse than a blessing since no one, short of Mitt Romney, wants to associate themselves too much with Wall Street.

    The party base’s obsession with antediluvian social views also works to the president’s advantage,  since it distracts from a more  economic focus that would work against Obama’s reelection  . Overt religiosity and social-issue litmus tests are not the best way to win over suburban voters who turned so decisively on the Democrats in 2010.

    For three years President Obama has accomplished a hat trick of economic ineptitude that has downgraded the street cred of progressivism, capitalism and even reason. By all rights, he should be thinking about his profitable future as a post-presidential celebrity. But, for reasons having little to do with his own record, he’ll likely be entering a re-election campaign with a decent chance for another chance to screw up even worse.

    This piece originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Photo courtesy of Barack Obama’s Photostream.

  • Applying Lessons from the UK Riots to Australia

    Many commentators correctly attribute the UK rioting to decades of misgoverning and miseducating youth. Contributing to this has been the breakdown of family discipline, the replacement of working fathers as role models and the creation of a culture of entitlement. Tony Blair has talked about a breakdown in public morality. Less convincingly, many on the left have attributed the cause to the social expenditure cuts of the Cameron Government, cuts that have actually made barely a dent in the proceeding Blair/Brown years of tumescent expenditure growth.

    Adding poison to the brew are government appointments and procedures that deflect police forces away from law enforcement into institutions that “reach out” rather than prevent wrong-doing, seek to understand miscreants rather than enforce the law, and try to contain disturbances rather than prevent them. The soft sociological and managerial ethos that has undermined policing in Britain is all too familiar here in Australia.

    But there are other factors at work. This is especially evident given the nature of those arrested. Many turn out not to be part of some jobless underclass but relatively affluent working people, some in their late twenties and early thirties.

    And the rioters are black and white – though hardly any Indians or other Asians. One reason for this is Asian family background, bringing values based on self-improvement by work rather than theft, reinforced by religious teachings, especially in the case of Muslims, the only group where a large majority are religious practitioners.

    While the complexion of the rioters will be subject to considerable analysis over future months, we can be confident about one hypothesis: few if any of the rioters own their own homes. This is because nothing engenders respect for property and others’ possessions more than people having a personal stake in property themselves. Property ownership – for most of us this means home ownership – is the key to creating a law abiding society. Where riots in England take place outside of areas other than those hosting electrical and sporting goods, they take place on council estates, in areas where people rent. If in owner-occupied housing areas, the rioters are outsiders.

    British families owning their own homes rose steadily up to the early 1980s, reaching 75 per cent. The figure has since fallen back to 70 per cent. More critically, the ability to get on the house ownership ladder has become increasingly difficult for large numbers of young people. Demographia reports that the average house in England now costs over five times the average family’s income. That’s up from three times the average family’s income 25 years ago. In London and other major cities the cost is much higher than this.

    Countless reports in England, Australia and the US demonstrate planning restraints over land use are the cause of houses becoming expensive. Governments do their level best to impose additional costs on house builders, especially through energy saving requirements, but the building industry is highly competitive and finds ways of largely offsetting these costs. However, when government regulations constrain the amount of land that can be built upon this engenders unavoidable costs.

    Ironically, after decades of acquiescing in creating shortages for new home building, the UK Government last month finally expressed a determination to do something about freeing up more land for building. That was met by the usual howls of protest from incumbent home owners wanting to avoid having “riff raff” moving close to them, barking on about preservation of villages and anxious to see a continued shortage of available properties in order to boost their own house values. But these self-centred blockages of new housing stock are contributing to an alienation of many people from mainstream values.

    British Labour Party leader, David Miliband, is arguing that a gulf between rich and poor is a cause of the rioting. He may well have home ownership in mind in offering as his solution, “we need to give people a stake in this society”. But “giving” is not a policy that will work. It morphs into an entitlement regime, which reinforces divisions within society and weakens the self-improvement ethos. Applied to housing, it is reminiscent of the US policy which required banks to make housing loans to those who were not credit-worthy, a policy still unraveling in mortgage defaults and collapsed price bubbles. Removing regulatory restraints that have driven housing prices into unaffordable ranges is the better approach.

    Not being a participant in a home owning democracy provides no excuse for trashing and thieving. But it is clear that there is a vast number of young people who have decided they are excluded and have become eager participants in hooliganism. Policies of tolerating misdemeanors and acquiescing in slack educational supervision will clearly be re-thought in the UK. But so also must be the policies creating barriers that shut people out of home ownership.

    There are lessons in the UK developments for Australia. Not the least concerns home ownership. A fundamental cause of the present economic malaise has been over-investment in US housing as a result misguided attempts to foster home ownership through forcing financial institutions to lend to people who were not creditworthy. This was motivated by the hope that the subsequent property stake would lead to an improvement in civil society on the part of those who found themselves excluded.

    These measures failed because they created a housing price bubble. However, removal of cost enhancing planning restraints would not be likely to bring the same housing inflation outcomes (indeed in states like Texas where the artificial price boosting caused by planning restraints is absent, home price inflation and busts has been modest).

    Planning restraints in Australia have created home costs that are six times family incomes (nine times family incomes in Sydney). House prices in Australia are therefore even higher than in England and urgent steps need to be taken to reform the planning policies that have caused this. If this means a society closer to the ideal of a property owning democracy, so much the better.

    Alan Moran is the Director, Deregulation at the Institute of Public Affairs.

    Photo by bobaliciouslondon.

  • Avent on Cities: Understanding Part of the Equation

    Ryan Avent hits a home run, strikes out and earns a "yes, but," all in the same article ("One Path to Better Jobs: More Density in Cities") in The New York Times.

    A Home Run on Housing Regulation: Avent rightly notes that the land-use and housing regulations of metropolitan areas like San Francisco have not only driven housing prices higher, but also negatively impacted economic growth. Studies in the UK, the US and the Netherlands have demonstrated that significant restrictions on land use (called smart growth or urban containment) lead to reduced employment and economic growth in metropolitan areas. His comparison to OPEC is "right on" – that metropolitan areas like San Francisco have squeezed the supply of housing, which, of course, drives up house prices, just as restricting the supply of any good or service in demand will tend to do. Avent is also right in noting that high housing prices have driven huge numbers of people out of the San Francisco Bay Area to places like Phoenix. According to the Census Bureau, nearly 2,100,000 people moved from Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego and San Jose between 2000 and 2009 to other parts of the country.

    Striking Out on Density: The strikeout results from assumptions that are patently wrong. Cities (urban areas) do not get more dense as they add population. They actually become less dense. For example, the New York urban area has added 50 percent to its population since 1950, yet its population density has dropped by 45 percent (Figure 1). Between 2000 and 2010, most metropolitan population growth, whether in San Francisco, New York, Phoenix, Portland or Houston, was in the lower density suburbs (see: http://www.city-journal.org/2011/eon0406jkwc.html ). The same dispersion is occurring virtually around the world (see: http://www.demographia.com/db-evolveix.htm), from Seoul, to Shanghai, Manila and Mumbai. Rapid urban growth would mean even further dispersion and lower densities, not the higher density neighborhoods Avent imagines. Nonetheless, allowing the more affordable detached housing that people prefer would likely lead to stronger economic growth and more affluent residents in the San Francisco and other over-regulated metropolitan areas.

    A "Yes, But" on Productivity: Any comparison of incomes between metropolitan areas needs to take into consideration the cost of living. For example, the San Francisco Bay Area (San Francisco/San Jose) is one of the most expensive places to live in the country. The median house price is more than 2.5 times that of Phoenix, after accounting for income differentials. Avent does not control for the difference in the cost of living, which is largely driven by the higher cost of housing. The lower cost of living neutralizes much of the impact of lower incomes (such as in Houston) in metropolitan areas like Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, Indianapolis, etc., where the OPEC model has not been applied to land use regulation.

    Finally, even controlling for the cost of living, there are substantial exceptions to any density-productivity thesis. For example, some of the greatest productivity gains information technology have come out of the Seattle area, which is the least dense major urban area in the 13 Western states, less dense than Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth and Phoenix. Even more impressively, Seattle’s urban density is barely one-half that of New York or San Francisco (Figure 2), yet its gross domestic product per capita is higher than New York and within 2 percent of San Francisco/San Jose. Seattle’s substantial contribution to the nation’s productivity has occurred while its population density was declining nearly 15 percent (since 1980).  

    Avent, like many analysts before appears to presume that population growth means higher densities. In fact, urban areas grow by dispersing, not densifying.

  • The Economist: The Great High Speed Train Robbery

    The Economist magazine has called on the British government to cancel plans for the HS-2 high-speed rail line that would run from London to Birmingham and Manchester. The Economist said:

    …these days politicians across the developed world hope new rapid trains, which barrel along at over 250mph (400kph), can do the same. But high-speed rail rarely delivers the widespread economic benefits its boosters predict. The British government—the latest to be beguiled by this vision of modernity—should think again

    The government claims the line will cost £32 billion line, however the international experiences suggests a figure more on the order of  £32  and the experience in this corridor itself suggests costs could rise even more (see The High Speed Rail Battle of Britain).

    A principal purpose for the line is to bridge the economic gap between the economic dynamo of Southeast England (including London) and the Midlands and North of the country. This does not convince The Economist:

    China suspended new projects after a fatal collision of two high-speed trains in July; Brazil delayed plans for a rapid Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo link, after lack of interest from construction firms. Yet governments remain susceptible to the idea that such projects can help to diminish regional inequalities and promote growth.

    The Economist doubts this will happen:

    In fact, in most developed economies high-speed railways fail to bridge regional divides and sometimes exacerbate them. Better connections strengthen the advantages of a rich city at the network’s hub: firms in wealthy regions can reach a bigger area, harming the prospects of poorer places. Even in Japan, home to the most commercially successful line, Tokyo continues to grow faster than Osaka. New Spanish rail lines have swelled Madrid’s business population to Seville’s loss. The trend in France has been for headquarters to move up the line to Paris and for fewer overnight stays elsewhere.

    The Economist reminds the government that:

    Britain still has time to ditch this grand infrastructure project—and should. Other countries should also reconsider plans to expand or introduce such lines. A good infrastructure scheme has a long life. But a bad one can derail both the public finances and a country’s development ambitions.

    Finally, The Economist says that there is better use for the money.

    The £32 billion at its disposal might well yield a higher return if it were spent on less glitzy schemes, such as road improvements and intra-city transport initiatives. If the aim is to regenerate “the north”, the current plan might prove a high-speed route in the wrong direction.