New Geography

Blog

  • Cincinnati: Suburban Counties Gain, Core Losses

    The historical core municipality of the Cincinnati metropolitan area, the city of  Cincinnati, continued its population loss string stretching back to the 1970 census and dropped below 300,000 population for the first time since the 1890 census.  The city peaked at 504,000 in 1950.

    In 2010, the census counted 297,000 residents, down 10 percent from the 2000 figure of 331,000. The city of Cincinnati has essentially the same borders (city limits) as in 1950. Hamilton County, which is the core county and includes the city of Cincinnati lost 43,000 people, with a net loss of 9,000 in the portions outside the city.  

    All growth was in the suburbs, which grew at a rate of 9 percent. The fastest growing counties were Boone in Kentucky at 38 percent and Warren in Ohio at 34 percent. Combined, these two counties captured more than two-thirds of the metropolitan area growth.

    The Cincinnati metropolitan area, which stretches from Ohio into Kentucky and Indiana grew 6 percent, from 2,010,000 to 2,130,000.

  • Theo

  • Actually, Cities are Part of the Economy

    “The prosperity of our economy and communities is dependent on the political structures and mechanisms used to manage and coordinate our economic systems.”

    No politician expecting to be taken seriously would say that today. State intervention was discredited long before it collapsed in the 1980s. Even our prime minister in Australia pays lip-service to “flexible markets with the right incentives and price signals to maximise the value of our people and capital resources.” But how does that square with her government’s quiet push for a more intrusive urban policy agenda?

    Over the last twelve months, Infrastructure Minister Anthony Albanese has been laying the ground work for a grand National Urban Policy, to be announced later in the year. To this end, he released three dense documents. Last March we got State of Australian Cities 2010 (“Cities 2010”), a compilation of statistics confirming, amongst other things, that cities account for 80 per cent of our Gross Domestic Product. Then in December came a discussion paper and a background paper, both called Our Cities.

    Their general drift can be gauged from a line in the latter’s final chapter. It’s the sentence quoted at the top of this article, with the words “cities” and “urban” replacing “economy” and “economic.”

    Embarrassed to champion intervention at the macro level, progressives resort to carving chunks out of the national economy and relabeling them “the environment”, “social capital” or “urban planning” before turning reality upside down. As he moves urban policy to the environment ledger, Mr. Albanese promises to transform the “productivity, sustainability and liveability” of our cities. Intervention is bad for the national economy, it seems, but good for the 80 per cent of GDP generated by cities.

    Urban Myths

    The authors of Mr. Albanese’s documents are anonymous, but aficionados will recognize the handiwork of Curtin University’s Sustainable Policy Institute, Griffith University’s Urban Research Program, the Faculty of the Built Environment at NSW University, and other focal-points of green orthodoxy. The reference lists are full of their output. Their technique of persuasion, recycled by Mr. Albanese’s Department, is to evoke plausible images while perpetuating three myths: suburban growth worsens carbon emissions and traffic congestion, people are being forced to live far from jobs concentrated in CBDs, and denser development will make housing cheaper.

    The discussion paper says: “Australian cities generate very high carbon emissions and air pollution from our heavy reliance on carbon fuels for energy and transport. Carbon emissions from transport are principally due to the lengths of trips necessitated by our dispersed cities and our extensive use of private motor vehicles.” Variations of this passage recur throughout the documents. It sounds plausible enough. So many vehicles cris-crossing our wide open cities must be spewing out heaps of carbon dioxide. But the documents ignore evidence painting a different picture.

    There is the Australian Conservation Foundation’s Consumption Atlas, which found that dense, affluent, inner-suburbs account for more carbon than the dispersed fringe, suggesting that, as a factor in emissions, general consumption trumps settlement patterns; there is a 2007 study by Randolph and Troy confirming earlier findings that energy consumption per capita in high-density developments, like high-rise apartments, is notably higher than in detached housing; there is a recent report by Allen Consulting for the Victorian Building Commission, noting the absence of conclusive evidence that vertical living is more ‘sustainable’ than conventional homes; and there is more.

    None of these rate a mention in the documents. Chapter 5 of the background paper does reference a couple of studies by Alford and Whteman (2009) and Trubka, Newman and Bisborough (2010), but these focus on “transport energy consumption” and “transport greenhouse gases.” They don’t investigate the impact of urban form on general consumption, the real determinant of emission levels. And a study by Perkins et al (2009), cited in Cities 2010, actually contradicts the approved message: “overall, it cannot be assumed that centralised, higher density living will deliver per capita emission reductions for residents … ”

    There is no reliable evidence that suburban growth is worse for emissions. Even Griffith’s Brendan Gleeson, a very green urbanist, had to concede that “the faith … in residential density as a simple lever that can be used to manipulate urban sustainability appears to be misplaced. New Australian scientific analysis points to the consumptive lifestyle, not the nature of one’s dwelling, as the root of environmental woes.”

    In any event, transport accounts for 14 per cent of Australia’s 1.4 per cent share of global emissions, or a minuscule 0.197 per cent of the world’s carbon. We should retain a sense of perspective, even if the documents obsess about our high per capita emissions. If the climate is being affected (a big if), it’s absolute volumes that matter.

    Allied to the myth of carbon-spewing suburbs is the myth of centrally-located jobs. We read in Cities 2010 that “the impacts of outward expansion and low density residential development have been a greater separation between residential areas and locations of employment …” The discussion paper asserts, more directly, that “the trend to inner-city living reflects changing preferences for dwellings and location – living closer to employment that is concentrated in central areas.” Again, similar statements crop up throughout the documents. People shouldn’t have to drive or commute long distances to a “centre” where the jobs are.

    Evidence to the contrary is easy to find. According to the NSW Department of Transport, only 12 per cent of Sydney’s jobs are in the CBD, and second tier centres like North Sydney, Chatswood, Parramatta, Hustville and Penrith have no more than 1.8 per cent each. The rest are distributed throughout the metropolitan region. In the case of Melbourne, McCloskey, Birrell and Yip (2009) say it’s absurd to concentrate housing near transit lines since only 19 per cent of jobs within the Melbourne Statistical Division (MSD – Greater Melbourne) were located in the Melbourne Local Government Area (the CBD), while 81 per cent “are scattered throughout the rest of the MSD”.

    In fact, the background paper points out that a majority of the employed in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth live within 10 kilometres of their workplace, while around 15 per cent live more than 20 kilometres away. This is hardly a disaster in the making. Consistently, Cities 2010 refers to “evidence that commuting distances have been stable or even declining since the 1990s in a number of capital cities.”

    For green urbanists, these myths are indispensible. Their agenda hasn’t a hope unless the public accepts that suburban growth will spoil the climate, and hike congestion and transport costs. As for housing affordability, the documents take a leave-pass (social housing is another story). They promote the term “living affordability”, adding petrol prices and mortgage rates to the equation.

    Evidence linking costly housing to supply restrictions on the fringe, like the annual Demographia survey, is too inconvenient. When the background paper does get around to the subject, it says “multiple factors [impede] the delivery of an efficient supply of suitable and affordable housing.”
    These include “land zoning and building code regulations and other standards related to building quality.” A few pages later, however, canvassing some solutions to the problem, the paper proposes “reforming planning systems to … position a variety of residential development in close proximity to centres and transport infrastructure”. Doesn’t this mean a lot more inefficient “land zoning”?

    This is just one instance of disjointed logic and economic illiteracy; many others are scattered throughout the documents.

    The Invisible Hand and Land

    Actually, cities are part of the economy, and are subject to the same principles. The operations of demand, supply and prices are equally applicable to land and structures. They can’t be erased by regulation, even if it’s called planning and zoning. The inflationary effect of coercive zoning on land values is the elephant in the room. Nowhere is it acknowledged in the documents.

    Consider two recent press items. Retail tenants in Pitt Street Mall, the heart of Sydney’s CBD, are paying rents as high as $13,000 a square meter, while industrial tenants on the north-west outskirts pay around $237. These rent differentials are, of course, a function of distance, and influence the viability, not just the location, of various types of activities.

    Restricting expansion and other forms of coercive zoning place an escalating floor under peripheral rents and values. Mr. Albanese’s authors fail to appreciate the implications of this, not least for “urban productivity.” There is little call to dwell on economic mechanisms if you believe, as the discussion paper puts it, “the private sector, through a myriad of individual decisions and investments, guided and constrained by government investments, regulations or charges, is a powerful shaper of cities [emphasis added]”.

    In the documents, lifting productivity boils down to cutting the costs of traffic congestion, estimated to reach $20 billion a year by 2020, principally by reducing “car dependency” (another loaded term, echoing drug dependency).

    Ignoring the reality of high job dispersal, the background paper says “a key challenge is to reduce dependence on motor vehicles while maintaining access between and within locations … the Australian Government recognises that it has a role … in investing in major mass transit systems, identifying and protecting new transport corridors and supporting means to shift from private vehicles to public transport”. But as McCloskey, Birrell and Yip explain, “the high level of job dispersal around Melbourne [and other cities] cannot be easily unwound.” In those conditions, Mr. Albanese’s strategy is doomed to failure.

    Alternatively, when diseconomies from congestion start to outweigh economies from centrality, firms and commuters will move to other, less congested sites, easing congestion all-round. This is the only effective, long-term solution to congestion. However by mandating concentration rather than enabling dispersion, evidenced by a dim view of road-building, green planning stymies this process. The documents want to end it altogether.

    According to the background paper, “connectivity within cities can also be achieved by placing people closer to the jobs, facilities, goods and services they desire – or putting these closer to where people live. This highlights the important role of integrated land-use and infrastructure planning in managing the need for physical travel”. But this notion, that firms and residences can be “placed” by a central authority, is logically flawed. It suffers from something akin to a “coordination problem” (a concept from game theory).

    Suppose household A has, in existing circumstances, chosen its optimal location relative to (1) affordable housing, (2) employment and (3) services. How can the government arrange things so that A ends up in a more optimal location? Moving A closer to work may push it further from affordable housing and services. Moved closer to services, A may end up further from other factors, and so on. It’s unlikely that the government can ever place A in a better location relative to all three factors.

    Then suppose household B has chosen its own optimal location relative to the three factors, some distance away from the point chosen by A. How does the government improve the outcome for both households? Action benefiting A may hurt B and vice versa.

    The same problem can be framed for businesses locating relative to (1) competitive rents, (2) transport routes, (3) suppliers, (4) suitable labour and (5) customers (market). Our cities host hundreds of thousands of households and businesses. There is no way that a planning hierarchy can engineer a more efficient outcome than the people themselves, interacting freely in the marketplace. Official meddling is more likely to induce problems than solve them.

    Instances of disjointed logic abound. One paper talks about “micro-reforms to reduce costs to businesses and consumers”, but another urges “access to a range of [more expensive and less efficient] high-quality renewable energy sources”; a paper commends “the principle of subsidiarity, ensuring that the most local level of government is used …”, but then calls for “improving alignment and integration of planning and investment across all three levels of government to support the nationally agreed … objective”; a paper demands action to “reduce red tape”, but all three documents offer heaps more instruments and regulations.

    Ultimately, Mr. Albanese’s documents are the pretext for a new wave of intrusion into economic life. As such, they represent a glaring case of bureaucratic overreach. However much he may spruik flats, smaller houses, public transport and higher utility bills as an enhancement of urban “liveability”, most Australians will disdain them as anything but liveable.

    John Muscat is a co-editor of The New City, where this piece originally appeared. 

    Photo by Joseph Younis.

  • Mixed Performance in Suburbanized Core Cities of Tennessee and Kentucky

    New 2010 census data for the highly suburbanized historic core municipalities of the major metropolitan areas of Tennessee and Kentucky indicates mixed results. The historic core municipality of Louisville (Louisville/Jefferson County) captured just under one half of the metropolitan area’s growth, yet grew more slowly than the historic core municipality of Nashville/Davidson County, which captured 20 percent of the metropolitan area’s growth. The historic core municipality of Memphis, which annexed substantial suburban areas, experienced a loss.

    The majority of population growth was in the suburbs in all three metropolitan areas.

    Nashville: The Nashville (Tennessee) metropolitan area grew 21 percent, from 1,312,000 in 2000 to 1,590,000 in 2010, according to the recent census count. The historical core municipality (city of Nashville) grew from 570,000 to 627,000, for a growth rate of 10 percent. The city of Nashville is combined with Davidson County and is of a largely suburban form, and includes rural areas. Between 1960 and 1970, the consolidation increased Nashville’s land area nearly 20 fold, from 29 square miles to 508 square miles, while the population less than tripled. Nashville/Davidson County covers 1.6 times the land area of the city of New York, which has more than 10 times the population. Nashville/Davidson County captured 20 percent of the metropolitan area growth, above the average thus far of less than 10 percent.

    Growing at a rate of nearly 30 percent, the suburbs captured 80 percent of the metropolitan area growth. The suburbs account for nearly 40 percent of the metropolitan population. Williamson and Rutherford counties were the fastest growing, at approximately 45 percent. Combined, the two counties represented one-half of the metropolitan area growth.

    Louisville: The Louisville (Kentucky-Indiana) metropolitan area grew 9 percent, from 1,162,000 in 2000 to 1,267,000 in 2010, according to the recent census count. The historical core municipality (the combined city of Louisville and Jefferson County) grew from 693,000 to 741,000, for a growth rate of 7 percent. The city of Louisville is combined with Jefferson County and is of a largely suburban form, and includes rural areas. Between 2000 and 2010, the consolidation increased Louisville’s land area five times, from 62 square miles to 385 square miles, while the population nearly tripled. Louisville/Jefferson County covers nearly three times the land area of the city of Philadelphia, which has a population twice as large. Louisville/Jefferson County captured 45 percent of the metropolitan area growth, well above the average thus far of less than 10 percent.

    The suburbs grew at rate of 12 percent and captured 55 percent of the metropolitan area. Suburban Desoto County, Mississippi grew by 50 percent and accounted for one-half of the metropolitan area’s growth.

    Memphis: Memphis (Tennessee-Mississippi-Arkansas) was alone among the major metropolitan areas with historic core municipalities in Kentucky and Tennessee that lost population between 2000 and 2010.  The 2000 population for the present land area of the historical core municipality, the city of Memphis declined six percent, from 691,000 to 647,000. The city of Memphis has a principally post-World War II urban form, having expanded its land area more than 150 percent, and covers more than five times the land area of the larger city of San Francisco.

    Overall, the Memphis metropolitan area grew from 1,205,000 in 2000 to 1,316,000 in 2010, a growth rate of 9 percent, slightly below the national average. The suburbs grew 21 percent and captured all of the growth.

  • Anchorage Spreading Out

    Alaska’s largest metropolitan area, Anchorage, is spreading out like its major metropolitan area counterparts in the Lower 48. The historical core municipality of Anchorage grew from 262,000 in 2000 to 291,000 in 2010, a growth rate of 12 percent. Anchorage is largely post-World War II suburban.

    Suburban Matanuska-Susitna Borough, to the north nearly equaled Anchorage’s 31,000 population growth, adding 30,000 residents, though on a much smaller base. Matanuska-Susitna grew from 59,000 to 89,000, for a growth rate of 51 percent..

  • Florida Metropolitan Areas Disperse; City of Miami Continues to Densify

    Miami: The Miami metropolitan area grew 11 percent between 2000 and 2010 according to the recently released census count. The population growth was from 5,008,000 in 2000 to 5,575,000 in 2010. This growth, only modestly above the national average, caused Miami to slip behind Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston, to become the nation’s 7th largest metropolitan area. The Miami metropolitan area was expanded after the 2000 census to include not only the core county of Miami-Dade, but also Broward (Fort Lauderdale) and Palm Beach (West Palm Beach) counties.

    The historical core municipality, the city of Miami, grew from 362,000 to 399,000 and accounted for 7 percent of the metropolitan area growth. Miami is unique among the nation’s historic core municipalities in having densified in every census period since 1960, despite not annexing new territory and not having substantial greenfield space for development.

    The suburbs captured 93 percent of the growth. Growth was modest in all counties, but was the greatest in the most outlying, Palm Beach, at 17 percent.

    Orlando: The Orlando metropolitan area grew nearly 30 percent between 2000 and 2010 according to the recently released census count. Orlando grew from 1,645,000 in 2000 to 2,134,000 in 2010. The historical core municipality, the city of Orlando, grew from 194,000 to 238,000 and accounted for 9 percent of the metropolitan area growth. The suburbs captured 91 percent of the metropolitan area growth, expanding their population by 31 percent. Outlying (Osceola 55 percent) and Lake (41 percent) counties grew the fastest.

    Tampa-St. Petersburg: The Tampa-St Petersburg metropolitan area grew 16 percent between 2000 and 2010 according to the recently released census count. The population growth was from 2,396,000 in 2000 to 2,448,000 in 2010. The historical core municipality, the city of Tampa grew from 303,000 to 336,000 and accounted for 8 percent of the metropolitan area growth. The suburbs captured 92 percent of the growth. The fastest growing counties were both outlying, Pasco (35 percent) and Hernando (32 percent).

    Jacksonville: The Jacksonville metropolitan area grew nearly 20 percent between 2000 and 2010 according to the recently released census count. Jacksonville grew from 1,123,000 in 2000 to 1,346,000 in 2010. The historical core municipality, the city of Jacksonville, grew from 736,000 to 822,000 and accounted for 39 percent of the metropolitan area growth. The city of Jacksonville is essentially combined with Duval County has a largely suburban form and includes rural areas. The consolidation occurred between the 1960 and 1970 censuses, with the new jurisdiction covering nearly 25 times that of the old (768 square miles as opposed to 32 square miles), while the population of the new jurisdiction was somewhat more than 2.5 times that of the old. Jacksonville covers more than twice the land area than New York City and has approximately one-tenth the population.

    The suburbs captured 61 percent of the growth. The fastest growing counties were both outlying, St. John’s (54 percent) and Clay (36 percent), which captured more than one-half of the metropolitan area growth.

  • Twin Cities Growth All in Suburbs

    The historical core municipalities of the Twin Cities area, Minneapolis and St. Paul experienced modest population declines between 2000 and 2010, according to the latest census count. All of the growth in the metropolitan area was in the suburbs.

    The Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan (Minnesota-Wisconsin) area grew from 2,969,000 in 2000 to 3,280,000 in 2010, an increase of 10.5 percent. The city of Minneapolis lost 40 residents, with a population of 382,618 in 2000 and 382,578 in 2010. The city of St. Paul lost 2,000 residents, from 287,000 to 285,000. Both historic core cities reached their population peaks in 1950, at 522,000 in Minneapolis and 311,000 in St. Paul. Each of the core cities have maintained essentially the same boundaries (city limits) as in 1950.

    The suburbs grew 13.6 percent. The strongest growth was in Scott County (MN) at 45 percent, Wright County (MN) at 38 percent,  Sherburne County (MN) at 37 percent, St. Croix County (WI) at 34 percent, Chisago County (MN) at 31 percent and Carver County (MN) at 30 percent. These counties combined to attract nearly one-half of the population growth, despite accounting for less than 15 percent of the population in 2000, indicating the continuing dispersion of the Twin Cities.

  • Energy Policy Reset: Forget Nuclear Reactors and Mideast Oil

    The two largest crises today — the Japanese nuclear disaster and the widening unrest in the Middle East — prove it’s time to de-fetishize energy policy. These serious problems also demonstrate why we must expand the nation’s ample oil and gas supplies — urgently.

    The worsening Japanese nuclear crisis means, for all intents and purposes, that atomic power is, if not dead, certainly on a respirator.

    Some experts may still make the case that nuclear power remains relatively safe. Some green advocates still tout its virtues for emitting virtually no greenhouse gases.

    But the strongest case against nuclear power is now rooted in grave public fears about radiation. Imagine trying to site or revamp a nuclear plant today anywhere remotely close to an earthquake fault or a major city.

    Germany has already begun shutting down some reactors. Opposition throughout Europe and in the United States is likely to grow exponentially as Japan’s tragedy unfolds.

    At the best of times, nukes were a hard sell. Even with support from Energy Secretary Steven Chu, a Nobel Prize-winning physicist who talks tough about fossil fuels, the obstacles to new nuclear construction were steep. Now, no amount of Obama administration green or corporate lobbying can overcome images of horrific fires and the terror, even if exaggerated, of radiation leaks.

    The other shoe dropping relates to the growing chaos in the Middle East, from North Africa to the Gulf. The price of oil is likely to continue climbing, unless the world economy slides back into recession — and perhaps even then. The governments that emerge from the current Mideast upheavals are likely to be far less pliable to Western interests than the authoritarian potentates that Washington long supported. Disruptions in supply, higher energy taxes and emergent environmental movements could constrain markets for months, even years, to come.

    These realities upset all the “best” obsessions of our rival political classes. Much of the progressive community, for example, had embraced nuclear fuel as key to ultimately replacing fossil fuels as a source of electricity — including the long-awaited electric cars. Green advocates often overestimated the readiness of renewable fuels — still far more expensive than fossil fuels and highly dependent on subsidies.

    Wind power, for example, produces, at best, some 2.3 percent of the nation’s electricity. But in addition to wiping out whole flocks of birds, it receives subsidies many times higher per megawatt hour than fossil fuels. In contrast, the dirtiest fuel, coal, still produces close to 50 percent of the nation’s electricity.

    Meanwhile, solar panel production, touted as a wellspring of job creation, seems to be shifting inexorably to China. Algae-based biofuels and other types look promising — but could take decades to become practical.

    Many conservatives, on the other hand, have espoused the nuclear option — in part, because the industry has powerful corporate backing, which is always an influential factor to Republicans. But even red-state denizens are probably looking at the scenes of Fukushima with understandable horror.

    So if the “best” agendas of both parties are flawed, it may be time to look at the “good.” The pragmatic way out of this emerging energy mess means focusing on our increasingly abundant supplies of oil and gas.

    “Peak oil” enthusiasts may not have noticed, but recent discoveries and improvements in technology have greatly expanded the scope of U.S. energy resources. New finds are occurring around the world, but some of the biggest are in the United States.

    Shale oil deposits in the northern Great Plains, Texas, California and Colorado could yield more oil annually by 2015 than the Gulf of Mexico. Within 10 years, these finds have the potential to reduce U.S. oil imports by more than half.

    Even more promising, from the environmental standpoint, are huge natural gas finds. Discoveries in Texas, Arkansas and Pennsylvania could satisfy 100 years of use at current demand levels.

    Natural gas is already muscling out coal as the primary source for new power plants. It can also be converted into transportation fuel, particularly for buses, trucks and taxis. In terms of pollutants and greenhouse gases, natural gas is much cleaner to burn than oil and significantly more so than coal.

    Exploring these resources is, of course, still likely to pose considerable environmental risks. But compared with the existential threat of nuclear radiation, even potential oil spills and damage to water supplies from fracking shale might be regarded as tolerable risks for which we have considerable experience and technology managing with enhanced regulation.

    In contrast, a nuclear meltdown, such as could be happening in Japan, poses a far more immediate threat than the scenarios proposed about climate change. Similarly, ceding even more power to an increasingly unstable Middle East represents a clear threat to both our economic and military security.

    Focusing on near- and medium-term fossil fuel development also has the virtue of fitting into the here-and-now realities of global economic conditions — largely the growing demand for energy in developing countries — and all but guarantees long-term high prices that encourage private investors to assume the risk. The likely demise of “clean” nuclear energy, sadly, makes such bets even more appealing.

    Producing domestic energy also creates the potential for hundreds of thousands of new U.S. jobs — everything from engineering to high-paying blue-collar work in the fields.

    A new gas-led energy boom would also spark increases in demand for manufactured goods like oil rig equipment, tractors, pipelines and refineries. And those are sectors that the United States still dominates.

    Would we rather this economic growth take place in Iran, Saudi Arabia or, for that matter, Vladimir Putin’s Russia?

    The time has come for both political parties to give up their “best” energy options for the good. A green economy that produces millions of new jobs is a laudable goal. But the renewable sector cannot develop rapidly without massive expenditures of scarce public dollars. To fully develop these technologies, we need lots of money and time.

    Republicans, too, need to give up their “bests” — including the notion that no policy is always the best, usually a convenient cover for the narrow interests of large energy corporations. Allowing private corporations to unilaterally determine our energy policy makes little sense. After all, most of our key competitors — China, Brazil and India — approach energy not as an ideological hobby horse but as a national priority.

    This new energy policy can be accomplished at far lower cost than either increasing dependence or waiting for the green Godot. It could also be far less expensive in terms of our soldiers’ lives — which would otherwise be spent protecting oil rights of corrupt Middle East regimes.

    It’s time to demand that our deluded, and self-interested, political class develops an energy policy based not ideology but on how to best guarantee prosperity for future generations of Americans.

    This piece originally appeared in Politico.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Photo by gfpeck

  • English Goddess

    Chandra Bhan Prasad, a political activist from Northern part of India, has recently constructed a temple enshrining “Goddess English” in Bankagaon, near Lakhimpur in Utter Pradesh, India. The statue resembles the Statue of Liberty (but no crown; just a hat), carries a copy of the Indian constitution, and holds a fountain pen. Representing the unshaken belief by many Indians that English is a passport for good education, well respected and good paying jobs, and a modern outlook, no wonder the Goddess English stands on a personal computer. The temple will have symbols and formulae of chemistry, mathematics and physics engraved on the walls, and current plans are to build the staircase in the form of a computer keyboard replica.

    India is a country with over 1,652 languages spoken by its 1.2 billion residents. Hindi is one of its two official languages, spoken by about 350 million people, and the primary language of North India. But about 300 to 350 million Indians speak English. Most linguists rank India as the largest English language user in the world.

    Knowledge of English is one of the key factors in India’s new prosperity. You can feel the correlation between English language acceptance and personal income. India’s haves and have-nots are basically divided by their knowledge of the English language.

    Do we see similar pattern in the border states of the United States? The USA, as a single language country, has been engulfed in multi-language education controversies, especially in California, Arizona and Texas. A very unacceptable high school dropout rate can be observed in school districts where English is not spoken well, and the per capita income of the non-English speaking Latino population is substantially lower than US median household income.

    Is there a lesson to be learned?

  • Krista Peterson