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  • When Saving 90% is Not Enough: The Transit Savings Report

    The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is publishing monthly Transit Savings Report to illustrate the purportedly great savings that can be achieved by giving up the car and traveling by transit instead. APTA compares the average cost of buying a monthly transit pass to replace a car, which is assumed to travel 15,000 miles annually.

    The latest edition was made public on April 6 and reveals astounding savings, as was reported by The Wall Street Journal and other press-release echoing press outlets. The APTA release indicates that households could save from $8,174 to $13,784 annually by giving up a car for transit in the 20 urban areas with the highest transit ridership. Overall, the APTA figures calculate to an average savings of $10,183. The APTA press release does not say how much the monthly bus pass would cost. However, our own quick survey of 17 major transit systems indicates that a monthly pass averages approximately $90 per month, or $1,080 per year. This means that getting rid of the car and riding transit instead saves approximately 90%, ($10,183 divided by [$1,080 + $10,183]) at least according to APTA (Note).

    With savings such as these, a visitor from Mars to APTA’s Fantasyland might expect that nearly all urban travel should logically be by transit rather than by cars. But, alas, no. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, cars, which APTA tells us cost nearly 10 times transit, account for more than 98% of motorized travel in US urban areas.

    Profligate Americans? What could possibly explain this paradox? Surely, there is plenty of evidence that Americans would much rather spend less than more on products of equal value. This has been painfully evident to “legacy” airlines that have had to lower their prices to compete with discount carriers like Southwest Airlines. Traditional supermarkets have lost hoards of customers stores like Wal-Mart or Costco over amounts that pale by comparison to the savings that APTA would have us believe are so readily available by rejecting our “love affair” with the automobile.

    Of course, the choice is not that simple. Americans no more have a love affair with the automobile than with flush toilets or refrigerators. The American (and Canadian, Australian, European and Asian) love affair is not with products, but rather with the better life style that the products make possible. People have refrigerators because they keep food fresh and prevent spoiling. Under certain circumstances, however, refrigerators are not practical, such as when one uses a cooler instead at a picnic. Transit is like that. It makes sense for some trips, but not a large share in the overall scheme of things.

    The Largest Downtowns: Where Transit Works Best: For the overwhelming majority of trips, the automobile provides much faster and generally more comfortable travel than can be made available by transit. There are times, however, when transit is superior. For example, the car is particularly impractical for commuting into crowded Manhattan, which is served by an enormous subway, commuter rail and bus system that extends to the further reaches of the metropolitan area.

    This is evident in data from the latest US Bureau of the Census American Community Survey, which indicates that transit accounts for 80% of the motorized commuter travel to Manhattan. Manhattan’s business district has nearly 2,000,000 jobs in a relatively small area, and riding transit and the average transit commute is only slightly longer than the average car commute. With Manhattan’s world class traffic, transit is a demonstrably superior competitor to the car.

    This, in reality, simply demonstrates that transit is “about downtown.” Consumer preferences demonstrate that commuting to some of the nation’s largest downtown areas is better by transit. The impressive skyscrapers can leave the impression that downtowns are dominant in metropolitan employment. However, downtowns represent only 10% of metropolitan employment. The largest downtowns are well situated for transit service, by virtue of their high employment densities and the fact that transit systems focus on them.

    These include central business districts, including New York’s Manhattan and Brooklyn, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia and San Francisco. All of these downtown areas where transit is dominant were added together, they would cover barely one-third of the expanse Orlando’s Walt Disney World. But consumer preferences also show that the car provides superior mobility to virtually all other destinations. Our already heavily indebted public sector could not begin to provide a level of service to replicate transit’s downtown access throughout the urban area.

    Transit even has difficulty competing in the dense outer boroughs of New York City. While slightly more people commute to Brooklyn jobs by transit than by car, the reverse is true in the Bronx. Twice as many people commute to jobs in Queens by car than transit, despite the borough’s having a population density greater than that of San Francisco, the nation’s second most dense large municipality.

    Transit’s share falls off even more sharply in the suburbs of New York. Nine times as many people commuting to jobs in inner suburban Nassau County use cars as use transit. Commuters to outer suburban Suffolk County use cars 40 times as much as transit.

    Consumers make these choices not because cars are inherently superior to transit or vice versa. A commuter who lives in New Brunswick, New Jersey and works in Manhattan, usually takes a New Jersey Transit train or bus to work, because the car competes poorly for such a trip. The neighbor, however, who works in the suburban I-287 corridor takes the car, because transit cannot compete for that trip.

    It remains true that for the overwhelming majority of trips cars meet the needs of consumers far better than transit. Cars are faster and deliver people within walking distance of their destinations.

    Even the ultimate — making transit free — makes little difference. In 1990, Austin, Texas eliminated fares. Yet the share of travel in the Austin area by car declined about a quarter of one percent. For most urban travel, transit is so uncompetitive that you can’t even give it away.

    Note: None of the above should be interpreted to be an acceptance of the APTA figures. APTA assumes annual parking costs of $1,850, yet most parking outside downtowns. Some might object that there is a cost to this free parking, but to ignore its costs is quite appropriate, given that APTA’s figures do not include subsidies to transit, which would quadruple its cost. Further, APTA uses especially high costs for automobile use, which assume that everyone purchases a new car every five years. This substantially overstates the cost of cars relative to transit.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

    Photo: New Jersey Turnpike

  • All About OC

  • The New E.D. — Environmental Density

    Developers often have an E.D. problem and are not even aware of it. No, not the type of E.D. temporarily cured with Viagra. Environmental Density — E.D. — is the measurement of the impact of man made construction on a site. In simple terms, E.D. is the average per acre volume of impervious surface due to land development construction. It has two very important impacts, one environmental, and one financial. One acre of land is 43,560 square feet. The lower the E.D. — square foot of impervious surface area divided by 43,560 — the lower the surface area of manmade structures that divert rain run-off, and the less environmental damage.

    Some municipalities have impervious surface limitations in their regulations. These limitations can be counter to human benefits. For example, a developer faced with the limits of allowed impervious surface area would rather not propose a walking system; the regulations could mean a choice between walkways and homes. E.D., on the other hand, is not an imposed limit, but a way to measure the efficiency of the neighborhood design.

    Don’t bother searching the internet for opposing articles on E.D., because we invented the term’s use in relationship to modern land development right here at www.newgeography.com.

    From a financial perspective, the lower the volume of manmade stuff, the lower the development cost. The savings translate into more money that can be spent on higher quality development and/or a drop in the cost of housing and commercial construction. In other words higher quality development at more affordable prices. This affects everyone, worldwide.

    It doesn’t matter if the site is a New Urban “Smart Growth” design, a subdivision in “Garage Grove Acres”, or a Prefurbia neighborhood. E.D. is the number that can easily indicate the direct environmental impact of land development. The E.D. is essentially the Efficiency of Development.

    Assuming that New Geography readers are not all engineers, I’ll use some simple examples of E.D.:

    If the design is wasteful (eliminating waste in design is NOT a subject taught in land planning schools – but it should be), then costs and environmental impacts increase. Nobody but the paving and earthwork contractors being paid to build excessive infrastructure gain from wasteful development. The developer’s profit decreases and the city’s maintenance cost escalates from having to maintain excessive infrastructure… forever. We all pay for this!

    In an urban high density development which has a very large ratio of hard surface area to organic ground (sometimes the E.D. reaches 100%), there are often opportunities to lower the inorganic percentage. Green roofs (landscaped rooftops) have an impact on E.D. because, in theory, the rainfall is held in soils that water landscaping. However, this assumes existing building structures can handle the additional weight and can be modified to properly maintain an organic area. Organic space on ground level benefits 100% of the population, as opposed to a green roof many stories above the pedestrian ways. So for the purposes of this article we will define all rooftops (urban or suburban) as negative impact square footage. Walks, streets, and driveways are all hard surface areas that divert rain. Organic areas absorb rain. Run-off from hard surface area negatively affects the environment.

    Velocity is another problem. Run-off travels on hard surfaces at a much higher rate than it does on landscaped ground. The worst rates are found where there are long runs of straight street with rain traveling along gutters; curved design slows it a bit . Velocity builds momentum as more rain collects in gutters, inlets and sewer pipes. Eventually this wall of water reaches the end of developed land and spills into a natural system, carrying pollutants into major bodies of water. That oil slick on your driveway can be carried to environmentally sensitive areas hundreds or thousands of miles away in a heavy downpour.

    Lower the E.D. ratio and some magnificent things happen.

    A gain in organic space can reduce the disruption of the earth — the moving of dirt — which can significantly lower development costs, as well as provide surface run-off conduits which cost much less than sewer pipe. The designer must learn how to identify waste, and then take the steps to reduce it. This adds an additional element in the initial planning stages, but an extra day or two in design could reduce development costs by hundreds of thousands of dollars.
    Rooftop surface can be reduced by building up, not out. The trend to build single level housing for the empty-nester market results in sprawling homes with terrible E.D. ratios, and it adds to the costs of the structures; roofs and foundations certainly are not cheap. Sprawling homes require longer streets to be reached, another increase in costs and environmental damage. A residential elevator is about $14,000 (installed) for a two story home, and $22,000 for three floors . By using them, builders can construct compact structures and plummet the E.D. ratio.

    Paved areas can be reduced by changing regulations to allow vast, commercial parking areas, shared. by users that have different peak times. Some cities use progressive thinking, and allow this simple technique to lower the E.D. ratio of a region. Paved areas built to municipal standards are incredibly expensive, making the E.D. ratio even more critical.

    When we developed Performance Planning Systems we wanted to create the tools to easily determine E.D. while still in the initial design phases, as well as to provide the education to recognize waste and teach how it can be reduced. E.D. relies on this new technology; tracing accurate space for the calculations would have been too tedious and time consuming in the past. Environmental Density, unlike impervious surface limits, does not impede efforts to create great neighborhoods. It’s not a restriction on what can be built, but a measure of a design’s efficiency that can benefit builders, developers, and environmentalists.

    Rick Harrison is President of Rick Harrison Site Design Studio and Neighborhood Innovations, LLC. He is author of Prefurbia: Reinventing The Suburbs From Disdainable To Sustainable and creator of Performance Planning System. His websites are rhsdplanning.com and performanceplanningsystem.com.

  • Arizona’s Short-Sighted Immigration Bill

    Arizona’s recent passage of what is widely perceived as a harsh anti-immigrant bill reflects a growing tendency–in both political parties–to focus on the here and now, as opposed to the future. The effort to largely target Latino illegal aliens during a sharp recession may well gain votes among an angry, alienated majority population, but it could have unforeseen negative consequences over time.

    In terms of the Arizona law, this is not simply a case of one wacko state. The most recent Gallup survey shows that more Americans favor the law than oppose it, with independents and Republicans showing strong support. Despite the negative coverage in the media, the Arizona gambit could somewhat pay off in November. A weak economy tends to exacerbate nativist sentiments, something that has been constant throughout much of American history.

    But there is a distinct danger for the GOP here, not only in Arizona but in the rest of the country as well. As Bill Frey of the Brookings Institute points out, there is a growing gap between the electorate, which is still largely white and older, and the much younger, far more rapidly growing Latino population. In Arizona Frey says the “cultural generation gap” between the ethnicity of seniors and children is some 40%, meaning that while 83% of senior are white, only 43% of children are. Nationwide, Frey estimates the gap in the ethnic composition of seniors and youths stands at a still sizable 25 points.

    Arizona’s large disequilibrium in the ethnicity of its generations is a product, in part, of the state’s historic pull to white retirees. Yet its formerly booming economy, based largely around construction and tourism, required a massive importation of largely Latino, low-wage labor, much of it illegal. As a result over the past two decades, Arizona’s Latino population has grown by 180%, turning what had been a 72% Anglo state to one that is merely 58% white.

    You don’t have to go very far–in fact just across the California border–to see what awaits Arizona’s nativist Republicans. The Grand Canyon state’s future has already emerged there. In the 1970s and 1980s California’s generally robust economy made it a primary destination for immigrants from both Asia and Latin America. Comfortable in their Anglo-ness, papers like the Arizona Republic were dismissing California as a “third world state,” particularly in the wake of the 1992 LA riots.

    Like their Arizona counterparts today, many white Californians then were sickened by pictures of mass Latino participation in looting during the riots. Many were also concerned with soaring costs of providing social services to a largely poor immigrant population. Sensing an opportunity, in 1994 Gov. Pete Wilson–locked in tough re-election battle amid a deep recession–endorsed Proposition 187, a measure designed to prevent illegal aliens from accessing public services. The measure passed easily, with support from both whites and African-Americans. The strong backing among Independents and even some Democrats helped Wilson win re-election with surprising ease.

    But the long-term consequences of 187 reveal the longer-term consequences for the GOP. During the Reagan era and even the first Wilson term, Latino voters split their votes fairly evenly between the parties. But after 1994 there was a distinct turn toward the Democrats, with the GOP share at the gubernatorial level falling from nearly half in 1990 to less than a third in subsequent election. In some cases, right-wing Republicans garnered even smaller portions of Latino voters.

    This is a classic case of the past waging war on the future. Since 1990 Latino and immigrant population has continued to grow. Overall, the percentage of foreign-born residents, according to USC demographer Dowell Myers, has grown from roughly 22% to 27%. One-third of Californians in 2000 were Latino; Myers projects Latinos will constitute almost 47% of the state’s population in 2030.

    The political consequences will only get worse for Republicans. Latino population voting power already has doubled from roughly 10% of the total in 1990 to 20% in 2006.

    This Latino population will become increasingly active and engaged. It is, for one thing, ever more English-fluent, and increasingly dominated by the second and third generations. This group could become permanently estranged, like African-Americans, from the GOP. If that happens, notes longtime Sacramento columnist Dan Weintraub, Republicans could “all but become a permanent minority party in California.”

    And the rest of the country will feel these trends; between 2000 and 2050, the vast majority of America ‘s net population growth will come from racial minorities, particularly Asians and Hispanics. Already one out of every five American children–tomorrow’s voters–is Hispanic.

    Of course, as Latinos integrate and intermarry, they may become less particular in their world view and share more in common with other middle-class Americans. Yet memories of slights against a particular group can overcome even economic self-interest. Blood often proves thicker than bank accounts. The tendency of Jews, a largely affluent and entrepreneurial tribe, to back often harshly anti-business Democrats has its roots in old world scars left from the pogroms in czarist Russia as well as the right-wing genocide in Nazi Germany. Some older voters recall the rabid anti-Semites once prominent in the American far-right as well as the more genteel exclusionism practiced by more refined upper-class Republicans.

    In the future, today’s images of shrill, anti-immigrant right-wing activists could resound for coming generations of Latinos as well as Asians and other newcomer groups. It could essentially deprive the Republican Party of voters who might otherwise consider the GOP option, handing the Democrats a permanently expanded base, not only in southwest but in much of the country.

    None of this is necessary or good for the country. Political competition for ethnic groups is a healthy thing for national interests and for the individual groups. Lock-step support by African-Americans may make them powerful within the Democratic Party, but it also means they can also be taken for granted when push comes to shove. And, of course, when they are in power, Republicans have little real political stake in confronting the serious issues facing black America.

    All this is particularly disturbing since competition for Latino voters should be intense. Heavily employed in construction and manufacturing industries, they have been badly hurt in the recession and their interests were not particularly addressed in the Obama stimulus plan. Many are also socially conservative, supporting, for example, California’s Proposition 8 ban on gay marriage.

    In coming months other proposed steps by the administration and its congressional allies, such as the proposed cap-and-trade legislation, could prove very tough on industries that tend to employ Latinos. Climate change-inspired moves against single-family homes–already in place in California–conflict directly with the aspirations of many Latinos as well as other immigrants who, unlike the usually affluent, homeowning white population, are still seeking the chance to buy their own home.

    But instead of fighting for their economic interests, the Arizona law has handed the Democrats a golden opportunity for to engage their own demagogy on race issues. Instead of having to defend their plans to restart the economy and reorient them to middle and working class needs, Democrats now can play to narrow racial concerns among Latinos while further bolstering the self-righteousness of their affluent, white, left-wing base.

    The reversion to racial politics prompted by the Arizona law ultimately does no good for anyone except “base-oriented” partisan campaign consultants, nativists and ethnic warlords. With all the long-term economic and social challenges that face this growing country, Phoenix’s folly marks an unfortunate step backward to our more shameful past and away from a potentially promising future.

    This article originally appeared in Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

    Photo by Caleb Alvarado

    May 4, 2010

  • A Carbon Added Tax, Not Cap and Trade

    Paul Krugman devoted a recent lengthy New York Times Magazine article to the promotion of a disastrous “cap and trade” regime for reducing carbon emissions. Though he doesn’t outright endorse it, he strongly suggests that the Waxman-Markey bill that passed the House would be acceptable to him. Krugman then proceeds to pooh-pooh the carbon tax idea, one that I believe has far more merit.

    Cap and trade would be a debacle for a slew of reasons. The most important is that it won’t even reduce carbon emissions. Two of the EPA’s own San Francisco attorneys dismissed the Waxman-Markey cap and trade regime as a “mirage” that would not reduce carbon because of the ability of polluters to obtain fictitious carbon offsets, among other problems.

    Even if cap and trade would require American producers to reduce carbon emissions, it would do nothing about overseas polluters. An American manufacturer could escape cap and trade simply by moving production to China. Given China’s massive coal-based electricity infrastructure and other notoriously polluting practices, carbon emissions would likely only get worse as a result, in addition to the US jobs lost.

    Krugman suggests this can be fixed with a carbon tariff, but that’s dangerously naïve. There’s no guarantee a carbon tariff would be put in place after cap and trade passed. In effect, it requires two completely separate policy mechanisms be put in place and kept synchronized over time, which seems dubious. Our trading partners would surely chafe at any carbon tariff, which would be vulnerable to challenge under international trade treaties.

    Cap and trade also has huge distortive impacts within the United States. The Brookings Institution crunched the numbers and found that cap and trade costs vary widely across the country. Compliance costs would be minimal in California and rest of the West and Northeast, while the Midwest, Mid-Atlantic, and the South get pummeled. It should come as no surprise that it is California Rep. Henry Waxman who’s pushing the bill. One can’t help but suspect these regional disparities are the real implicit goal of the bill. Indiana Gov. Mitch Daniels denounced cap and trade as “imperialism”.

    Perhaps the most diabolical part of cap and trade is in its very name. The operative word is “trade”. Who do you think will be doing the trading? Why, none other than the very people who got us into the economic mess we’re in today. Cap and trade is a gigantic giveaway to Goldman; it’s yet another instrument for speculation; it’s another way for the profiteers on Wall Street to line their pockets at our expense.

    So in a sense it’s also another way that, perhaps unintentionally, the richest sectors, the upper classes, and the financial centers like New York, Boston and San Francisco are being favored over the poor Main Street rubes who have taken it on the chin during this recession without a bailout. If you think things are bad now, just wait until CDS stands for “carbon default swap”. It’s pouring fuel on the fire of inequality between the haves and have nots.

    Cap and trade is nothing more than another tranche in the never-ending merry-go-round of bailouts for the financiers. And didn’t we learn anything from Enron’s electricity trading shenanigans? When an Iowa farmer opens up in his electric bill that’s suddenly spiked, or has to pay double to fuel his farm equipment, it’s not too much to ask that it be in the service of actual carbon reduction, not houses in the Hamptons, owned by people to whom the added cost is not material given their wealth.

    There is a better way, and that’s the Carbon Added Tax. Similar to a European-style Value Added Tax, a CAT tax would directly tax the quantity of carbon emissions added to the atmosphere in each stage of the production cycle. The tax could be set at a level that would provide certainty of price such that investments in lower carbon technologies are financially feasible right now, not decades from now.

    Also, similar to the US income tax system, the CAT would apply to the carbon emitted globally, not just in the United States. A deduction would be permitted for any bona fide carbon taxes paid in a foreign jurisdiction, up to the level of the US tax. A true-up on the carbon tax due would be paid at the point of import into the United States. That is, an importer would have to pay the CAT on products brought into the country, less any deductions for foreign carbon taxes paid, at the port of entry.

    While this global approach is a widely, and correctly, maligned feature of the US income tax code, it has important benefits from a carbon reduction perspective. First, it is location neutral. Since the tax is the same whether the carbon is emitted in China or the United States, it doesn’t encourage business to move offshore. But it also doesn’t discriminate against foreign producers. (Like any anti-carbon regime, it would raise costs in the US, affecting both domestic consumers and the competitiveness of exports).

    The CAT is also functionally equivalent to a carbon tariff, but is a unitary regime. That is, you don’t have to figure out how to bundle in or pass a separate carbon tariff as part of implementing a domestic cap and trade system. You simply pass a CAT on global carbon emissions and you are done.

    And this system allows each country to decide on its own level of carbon taxation. If countries like China want to have no tax, that’s their choice. Or, European countries could decide to have a higher tax. The complexity would come in figuring out the allowed deductions for emissions in countries that adopted other schemes like cap and trade, but this should be a readily solvable technical issue.

    There will still be divergent regional domestic impacts under a CAT. This is unavoidable in a nation where carbon emissions are unevenly distributed. But by preventing the financiers from skimming off the top, the total burden is reduced, and a CAT is a more location neutral, transparent mechanism for carbon reductions.

    A Carbon Added Tax is a far superior way to reduce carbon emissions than a cap and trade system only a Wall Street trader could love.

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile.

    Photo by Gilbert R.

  • neo

  • Rating the Unaffordable: The Economist and Mercer

    An article by Carl Bialik in The Wall Street Journal questions the value of city livability ratings, such as lists produced by The Economist and Mercer. This issue has been raised on this site by Owen McShane.

    (1) The Wall Street Journal notes a lack of transparency in ratings. In the case of The Economist and Mercer, this starts with the very definition of “city.” They don’t say. In the case of New York, for example, is the city Manhattan?, the city of New York or the New York metropolitan area. The difference? Manhattan has fewer than 2,000,000 residents, the city about 8,000,000 and the metropolitan area about 20,000,000. That makes a difference. The same problem exists, to differing degrees in the other “cities,” whatever they are.

    (2) The first principle of livability is affordability. If you cannot afford to live in a city it cannot, by definition, be affordable.

    The Economist ranks Vancouver, Melbourne, Sydney, Perth, Adelaide and Auckland among its top 10 livable cities. In fact, in our 6th Annual International Housing Affordability Survey, these metropolitan areas rank among the 25 least affordable out of 272 metropolitan areas in six nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand). The Economist’s champion, Vancouver, is most unaffordable, with Sydney second most unaffordable. Mercer’s top 10 list also includes Vancouver, Auckland and Sydney.

    By contrast, the three fastest growing metropolitan areas with more than 5,000,000 population in the developed world, (Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston) have housing that is one-half to one-third as expensive relative to incomes (using the Median Multiple: the median house price divided by the median household income) as all of the “cities” noted above in the two lists.

    Purpose of the Lists: The purpose of these lists, for all their difficulties, is often missed. The Economist and Mercer do not rate livability for average people, but rather for international executives. Thus, the lists are best understood as rating cities for people with a lot of money and a big expense account. The lists may be useful if one is contemplating a move from Manhattan’s Upper East Side to London’s Mayfair.

    Unfortunately, The Economist and Mercer lists are often treated by the press as if they rate the quality of life for average citizens, which they most surely do not.

    The average Vancouverite does not live on English Bay, nor does the average Sydneysider have a view of the Harbour Bridge. Because of escalating house prices, they are far more likely to live in rental units, with the hope of home ownership having made impossibly expensive by rationing, through restrictive land use policies, of an intensity that not even OPEC would dare adopt.

  • Growing America: Demographics and Destiny

    Over the next four decades, American governments will oversee a much larger and far more diverse population. As we gain upward of 100 million people, America will inevitably become a more complex, crowded and competitive place, but it will continue to remain highly dependent on its people’s innovative and entrepreneurial spirit.

    In 2050, the U.S. will look very different from the country in 2000, at the dawn of the new millennium. By mid-century, the U.S. will no longer be a “white country,” but rather a staggering amalgam of racial, ethnic and religious groups, all participants in the construction of a new civilization whose roots lie not in any one country or continent, but across the entirety of human cultures and racial types. No other advanced, populous country will enjoy such ethnic diversity.

    The implications of this change will be profound for governments-perhaps in ways not now commonly anticipated. Many “progressives” believe a more diverse, populous nation will need more guidance from Washington, D.C., but a more complex and varied country will increasingly not fit well into a one-size-fits-all approach.

    Although the economic crisis of 2008 led to a rapid rise of federal power, there has been a stunning and largely unexpected push-back reflected, in part, by the tea party movement. Some states have passed laws that seek to restrict federal prerogatives on a host of issues. More importantly, public opinion, measured in numerous surveys, seems to be drifting away from major expansions of government power.

    Of course, most Americans would accede to the federal government an important role in developing public works, national defense and regulations for health and safety. But generally speaking, they also tend to believe that local communities, neighborhoods and parents should possess the power to craft appropriate solutions on many other problems.

    This also reflects our historical experience. From its origins, American democracy has been largely self-created and fostered a dispersion of power; in many European countries, and more recently in parts of Asia, democracy was forged by central authorities.

    Other periods of massive government intervention, most notably after the New Deal and the Great Society, also elicited reactions against centralization. But the current push-back’s speed and ferocity has been remarkable. Yet the often polarizing debate about the scope of federal power largely has ignored the longer-term trends that will promote the efficacy of an increasingly decentralized approach to governance.

    Perhaps the most important factor here is the trajectory of greater growth and increasing diversity of who we are and how we live. Not only are Americans becoming more racially diverse, but they inhabit a host of different environments, ranging from dense cities to urbanized suburbs, to smaller cities and towns, that have different needs and aspirations.

    Americans also are more settled than any time in our history-partially a function of an aging population-and thus more concerned with local developments. As recently as the 1970s, one in five Americans moved annually; in 2004 that number was 14 percent, the lowest rate since 1950. In 2008, barely one in 10 moved, a fraction of the rate in the 1960s. Workers are increasingly unwilling to move even for a promotion due to family and other concerns. The recession accelerated this process, but the pattern appears likely to persist even in good times.

    Americans also prefer to live in decentralized environments. There are more than 65,000 general-purpose governments; the average local jurisdiction population in the United States is 6,200-small enough that nonprofessional politicians can have a serious impact on local issues. This contrasts with the vast preference among academic planners, policy gurus and the national media for larger government units as the best way to regulate and plan for the future.

    Short of a draconian expansion of federal power, this dispersion is likely to continue. Roughly 80 to 90 percent of all metropolitan growth in the last decade took place on the periphery; at the same time, the patterns of domestic migration have seen a shift away from the biggest cities and toward smaller ones. As Joel Garreau noted in his classic Edge City, “planners drool” over high-density development, but most residents in suburbia “hate a lot of this stuff.” They might enjoy a town center, a paseo or a walking district, but they usually resent the proliferation of high-rises or condo complexes. If they wanted to live in buildings like them, they would have stayed in the city.

    Attempts to force major densification in these areas will be fiercely resisted, even in the most liberal communities. Some of the strongest anti-growth hotbeds in the nation are areas like Fairfax County, Va., with high concentrations of progressives-well educated people who might seem amenable to environmentally correct “smart growth”-advocating denser development along transit corridors. As one planning director in a well-to-do suburban Maryland county put it, “Smart growth is something people want. They just don’t want it in their own neighborhood.”

    The great long-term spur to successful dispersion will come from technology, as James Martin first saw in his pioneering 1978 book, The Wired Society. A former software designer for IBM, Martin foresaw the emergence of mass telecommunications that would allow a massive reduction in commuting, greater deconcentration of workplaces and a “localization of physical activities … centered in local communities.”

    Technology would allow skilled people to congregate in communities of their choice or at home. Today not only knowledge workers but also those in construction trades, agriculture and other professions are home-based, conducting their operations out of trucks, vans or home offices.

    Many leading-edge companies now recognize this trend. As much as 40 percent of IBM’s work force operates full time at home or remotely at clients’ businesses. Siemens, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, Merrill Lynch and American Express have expanded their use of telecommuting, with noted increases in productivity.

    At the same time, employment is shifting away from mega-corporations to smaller units and individuals; between 1980 and 2000, self-employed individuals expanded tenfold to include 16 percent of the work force. The smallest businesses, the microenterprises, have enjoyed the fastest rate of growth, far more than any other business category. By 2006 there were some 20 million such businesses, one for every six private-sector workers.

    Hard economic times could slow this trend, but recessions have historically served as incubators of innovation and entrepreneurship. Many individuals starting new firms will have recently left or been laid off by bigger companies, particularly during a severe economic downturn. Whether they form a new bank, energy company or design firm, they will do it more efficiently-with less overhead, more efficient Internet use and less emphasis on pretentious office settings. In addition, they will do it primarily in places that can scale themselves to economic realities.

    Simultaneously the Internet’s rise allows every business-indeed every family-unprecedented access to information, something that militates against centralized power. Given Internet access, many lay people aren’t easily intimidated into accepting the ability of “experts” to dictate solutions based on exclusive knowledge since the hoi polloi now possess the ability to gather and analyze information. Even the powerful media companies are rapidly losing their ability to define agendas; there are too many sources of information to mobilize mass opinion. The widespread breakdown of support for climate change is a recent example of this phenomenon.

    Once the current drive for centralization falters, support for decentralization will grow, including progressive communities that now favor a heavy-handed expansion of federal power. Attempts to impose solutions from a central point will be increasingly regarded as obtrusive and oppressive to them, just as they would to many more conservative places like South Dakota. In the coming era, in many cases, only locally based solutions-agreed to at the community, municipal or state level-can possibly gather strong support.

    This drive toward dispersing power will prove critical if we hope to meet the needs of an unprecedentedly diverse and complex nation of 400 million. New forms of association-from local electronic newsletters to a proliferation of local farmers markets, festivals and a host of ad hoc social service groups-are already growing. Indeed, after a generation-long decline, volunteerism has spiked among Millennials and seems likely to surge among downshifting baby boomers. In 2008, some 61 million Americans volunteered, representing more than one-quarter of the population older than 16.

    It’s these more intimate units-the family, the neighborhood association, the church or local farmers market-that constitute what Thomas Jefferson called our “little republics,” which are most critical to helping mid-21st-century America. Here, our nation of 400 million souls will find its fundamental sustenance and its best hope for the brightest future.

    This article originally appeared in GOVERNING Magazine.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

    Photo by slynkycat

    May 3, 2010

  • Is Sweden a False Utopia?

    By Nima Sanandaji and Robert Gidehag

    Sweden is often held up by American pundits and experts as a kind of Utopia, a country to be emulated. As is often the case when dealing with Utopias however, the complexities of history, culture and policy frequently are shoved aside.

    Rather than being guinea pigs in a progressive experiment in social engineering, Swedes are a unique people with a long history. Therefore, we should question the lazy assumption that good Swedish outcomes (long life expectancies, social equality) are due to particular Scandinavian policies (the welfare state).

    After all, even before the high-tax welfare state, Sweden was characterized by an even distribution of income, low poverty and long life spans, the same phenomena that today are said to be the result of high-tax welfare policies. In 1950, before the high-tax welfare state, Swedes lived 2.6 years longer than Americans. Today the difference is 2.7 years.

    A more reasonable view of why Sweden performs well on many social metrics has its basis in history and sociology: Swedes have for hundreds of years benefited from sound low-level institutions, such as a strong work ethic and high levels of trust and cooperation.

    These cultural phenomena do not disappear when Swedes cross the Atlantic to the supposedly inferior “cowboy” country. On the contrary, they appear to bloom fully. The 4.4 million Americans with Swedish origins are considerably richer than the average American. If Americans with Swedish ancestry would form their own country their per capita GDP would be $56,900, more than $10,000 above the earnings of the average American.

    The old Sweden, in contrast, has not done as well in economic terms. In 1960 taxation stood at 30 percent of GDP, roughly where the US is today. As taxes rose, economic growth decreased, with Sweden dropping from being the 4th richest country in 1970 to being the 12th richest in 2008. Swedish GDP per capita is now $36,600, far below the $45,500 of the US, and even further behind the $56,900 of Swedes in America.

    A Scandinavian economist once stated to Milton Friedman: “In Scandinavia we have no poverty.” Milton Friedman replied, “That’s interesting, because in America among Scandinavians, we have no poverty either.” Indeed, the poverty rate for Americans with Swedish ancestry is only 6.7%, half the U.S average. Economists Geranda Notten and Chris de Neubourg have calculated the poverty rate in Sweden using the American poverty threshold, finding it to be an identical 6.7%.

    Ironically, this points us towards the conclusion that what makes Sweden uniquely successful is not the welfare state, as is commonly assumed. Rather than being the cause of Sweden’s social strengths, the high-tax welfare state might have been enabled by the hard-won Swedish stock of social capital. It was well before the welfare state, when hard work paid off, that a culture with strong protestant working ethics developed.

    As taxes in Sweden have grown rapidly towards taking up half of the economy, that social capital is being eroded. In the 1990s, supposedly hyper-healthy Sweden established itself as being sickest country in the rich world, in terms of sick-leave. In addition, half a million working-age people (compared to a total labor force of four million) were placed in health-related “early retirement”.

    Labor union economist Jan Edling calculated that a fifth of working-age Swedes were supported by some form of public unemployment support, including sickness related leave in 2004, when the economy was growing strongly.

    The high-tax state has also created an increasingly threatened middle class. In a recent study, the Swedish Taxpayers association noted that wealth formation among the middle classes is weak. There is little correlation between earnings and wealth amongst Swedes.

    Instead of building capital, Swedes go into debt: 27 percent of Swedish households in fact have more debts than wealth, compared to between 16 and 19 percent in the US. With middle class wealth formation being held back by high taxes, Sweden has ironically developed a more unequal wealth distribution than the US. The Gini coefficient for ownership is almost 0.9 in Sweden, compared to slightly above 0.8 in the US.

    In short, there is much to admire in Sweden. But when it comes to economic policy and copying Swedish institutions, Americans are probably better off being inspired by Swedes in America, rather than Swedes in Sweden.

    Nima Sanandaji, is President of the Swedish think-tank Captus and Robert Gidehag is president of the Swedish Taxpayer´s association. They were assisted by Tino Sanandaji and Arvid Malm, chief economists at Captus respectively the Swedish Taxpayers Association.

  • State Auditor Says Only Part of California High Speed Rail Line May be Built

    The California State Auditor’s report title says it all: High-Speed Rail Authority: It Risks Delays or an Incomplete System Because of Inadequate Planning, Weak Oversight, and Lax Contract Management.

    The report, which can fairly be characterized as “damning,” criticizes the California High Speed Rail Authority on a wide range of issues, some of which go to the very heart of the project itself.

    For example, the State Auditor says that without additional bond funding from the taxpayers, the state “may have to settle for a plan covering less than a complete corridor.” Given the financial and administrative disarray of the California High Speed Rail Authority, this is a distinct possibility, which was raised by the Reason Foundation California High Speed Rail Due Diligence Report, released in September of 2008 (co-authored by Joseph Vranich and me).

    This could produce a system that spectacularly fails to meet the promises of its promoters, while enriching the income statements mostly offshore firms that build trains and of firms that failed so spectacularly in managing the Big Dig in Boston. Martin Engel, who leads an organization of concerned citizens on the San Francisco peninsula frequently notes that the real driving force behind high speed rail is spending the money. In this regard, the California High Speed Rail Authority will deliver the goods. The vendors and consultants will get their money.

    The State Auditor also raises questions about the potential to attract the substantial private investment necessary to completing the project. This is a legitimate concern, since the California High Speed Rail Authority has raised the possibility of government revenue guarantees for private investors. This could lead to “back door” taxpayer payment of the “private” investment.

    The Authority continues to skirt legal requirements. The State Auditor notes that the “peer review” committee, ordered by state law in 2008, is still not fully constituted. This is not surprising for an agency that delayed its publication of a legally mandated business plan from two months before the 2008 bond election to days after it.

    In its response, the California High Speed Rail Authority was relegated to taking issue with the report’s title, characterizing it as “inflammatory” and “overly aggressive.” It hardly seems inflammatory and overly aggressive to point out that an ill-conceived plan is rushing headlong to failure. The State Auditor rightly dismissed the criticism saying: “We disagree. The title accurately characterizes the risks the Authority faces, given our findings.”

    This potential financial debacle could not have come at a worse time for California. California’s fiscal crisis is of Greek proportions. Economist Bill Watkins has raised the possibility of a default on debt. Former Mayor Richard Riordan has suggested bankruptcy for Los Angeles, the nation’s second largest municipality.

    Unlike many in California, Riverside’s Press-Enterprise in high-speed rail in the context of California’s bleak financial situation: The dearth of answers to basic fiscal questions suggests that taxpayers might end up paying for big financial deficiencies in the rail plans. Deficit-ridden California has better uses for public money; no list of state priorities includes dumping countless billions into faster trains.