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  • Young People Living Off the System in Sweden

    There are those who believe that Sweden has a low level of unemployment. This is far from the truth. The combination of high taxes, generous government benefits and a regulated labor market has led to many Swedes to rely on handouts rather than work. The system does succeed in one thing: hiding the true unemployment.

    A few years ago, the Swedish economist Jan Edling noted that the number of people on sick leave and early retirement tended to correlate strongly with unemployment figures. The reason, Edling explained, was that many of the unemployed were hidden from the statistics through these measures.

    Far from being a right-leaning economist, Edling at the time worked for LO – an influential labor union with strong official and unofficial ties to the then-ruling Social Democratic party. The claim that the Swedish welfare state hid actual unemployment through various measures was unpopular among Swedish socialists. So unpopular in fact that Edlings report was not published, causing him to resign after 18 years faithful service.

    Four years ago a center right government was elected with the promise to reduce visible and hidden unemployment. The government has had some success in this, at last before the financial crisis hit and again raised unemployment. Tax cuts and reduced generosity of government benefits have promoted work over dependence. However, among one group reliance on government has not decreased: young people who are relying on early retirement for their living.

    The concept of relying on early retirement among the relatively youthful might sound a bit strange. Swedish politicians have even changed the term “early retirement” into “activity and sickness compensation” to make it sound more acceptable. And it has oddly enough become more or less an accepted fact that many young Swedes who cannot find a job instead rely on early retirement – often on a permanent basis.

    Since 2004 close to 70,000 Swedes in the ages 20-39 have been supported by early retirement. This represents close to three percent of the total population among this age group living in the country. In the Stockholm region, where the labor market is strong, two percent of the young population is living on early retirement. In regions where jobs are scarcer, the figure is four percent. Even among the youngest group – those between 20-24 years – more than two percent of Sweden’s population is being supported by early retirement.

    One reason for the popularity of early retirement is because of the increasing troubles for young Swedes to find employment. According to Statistics Sweden, the unemployment amongst those between 15-24 years was fully 24 percent in the beginning of 2009. Although Sweden does not have minimum wages set by the government, the vast majority of the employers have to follow labor union contracts and the contracts in turn include very high effective minimum wages.

    Not only is the price of youth labor set too high for demand to meet supply, but employers find it too risky to hire inexperienced youth since rigid labor market regulation make it difficult to fire those who do not perform well on their job.

    The high unemployment amongst youth is not only an economical, but also a social issue. Many young people feel depressed since they cannot find a meaningful purpose and cannot contribute to society. This feeling, strong among the youth who are not even officially employed, but rather hidden from the statistics through early retirement, sick leave or other systems.

    The OECD measures the percentage of those who are officially declared to be outside of the workforce but view themselves as being unemployed. This group is referred to as “discouraged workers”. In countries such as Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom only 0.1 percent of the labor force of 15-24 year olds is composed of discouraged workers. In Sweden, the figure is almost a hundred times higher.

    The Swedish welfare system is seen as many as a role model. When it comes to creating opportunities for the youth however, Sweden could learn much from free-market systems. Or for that matter it could learn from neighboring welfare state Denmark, which has combined welfare mechanisms with a dynamic labor market. The combination, coined by previous Social Democratic Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmusson as “flexicurity”, is far superior to the system of high effective minimum wages and rigid labor regulations introduced by the Social Democrats and their labor union allies in Sweden.

    Nima Sanandaji is the CEO of Swedish think tank Captus, and author of a report on early retirement among the youth for the think tank Timbro.

    Photo: by Claudio.Ar

  • Obama’s Middle-Class Meltdown

    The rapid decline in public support for Democrats and President Obama represents one of the most breathtaking political collapses in modern times. Little over a year from a huge electoral triumph, President Obama’s level of support has dropped from around 65% to under 50%. The Democrats in Congress, who held as much as a 10% edge over the Republicans last spring, are actually losing a “generic” vote.

    Many Republicans and conservatives may think this represents a confirmation of their values. Yet in reality, the Democratic meltdown has less to do with belated admiration for the GOP—their support as a party remains at historically low levels—than a question of a massive disconnect between the people in power and the large, middle-class majority.

    The Great Disconnect reflects a growing chasm between the normative “wisdom” within political parties and their aligned media, academic and policy cadres. The Disconnect in part derives from the tendency of politicos and their associates to converse mostly with each other—and not develop much of a direct feel for that vast, and increasingly complex, country beyond the Beltway.

    As President, Barack Obama’s Great Disconnect seems most obvious. Although he occasionally uses populist middle-class rhetoric, both Obama’s priorities and body language suggest his inspiration comes largely from the rarified world of the universities and Democratic Party contributors.

    Not surprising then that he started with a stimulus package that, although one was needed, offered little to private sector Main Street businesses. Instead, the primary beneficiaries turned out to be Wall Street grandees, whose high salaries he variously denounces and excuses, and public employee unions.

    Obama’s move was encouraged by the aging leadership of the Democratic Party, shaped by places like Nancy Pelosi’s San Francisco and Henry Waxman’s lushly affluent Beverly Hills. It has little to do with the views of the middle class who reside generally in smaller towns and less-than-tony suburbs—but some of the wealthiest, and most privileged, populations on earth.

    President Obama’s other key constituency lies in the public sector unions, whose power in his home state of Illinois now rivals and perhaps surpasses that of the Daley machine. Even as middle-class voters see their pensions dwindle along with their housing prices and jobs, the public sector has waxed into something resembling the Blue Meanie in Yellow Submarine who consumes everything in sight, and ultimately itself.

    Perhaps nothing so illustrates the Great Disconnect than the president and the congressional lions’ embrace of the radical green climate change agenda. Still popular in upper-class urban areas and university towns, this agenda is notably less well-supported in middle and working class communities, particularly in the middle of the country.

    Even before the Climategate revelations—which led to one top warmist figure admitting to the BBC that there had been in fact “no statistically significant” warming over the past fifteen years—the agenda was losing support, ranking it dead last among 20 priorities in a Pew survey last year. Now the public is becoming openly skeptical, with support for the notion of primarily human-caused warming falling since April from 47 to 35%.

    President Obama must realize that prioritization of the climate agenda, along with other coastal liberal priorities, undermines Democratic support in the Great Plains and the Great Lakes, where the party recently has been making some significant gains. The recent withdrawals of Senators Byron Dorgan and Evan Bayh reflect the Democrats’ growing vulnerability in these regions. Recent polls in Iowa, where Obama won his signature primary victory in 2008, show the president’s popularity at less than 50 percent, in large part due to losses among independent voters.

    Yet if Americans have been departing the Democrats, does it follow that they will shift en masse to the GOP? There is reason for skepticism here as well. After all, this is the same party that, along with the Democrats, supported massive spending under George Bush and actively promoted the disastrous de-regulation of the financial markets. The prescience of the likes of former Majority Leader Dick Armey—a co-conspirator in the Bush era’s profligacy—at the forefront of the Tea Parties should worry even the most credulous small-government activist.

    The Republican claim to the populist mantle is even more suspect. Republicans like House Minority Leader John Boehner have cozied up to Wall Street, hoping to take advantage of rising “buyer’s remorse” among the grandees. Suggesting Republicans could shield the financial sector from even modest Democrat efforts to make them face consequences for their loathsome and disastrous folly, they unintentionally show that their critique of the president’s “crony capitalism” largely involves shifting the identity of the cronies.

    The Republicans also have a bit of a demographic problem. Their Neanderthal stance on social issues varies radically from the rising millennial generation, and threatens to alienate them permanently. And perhaps even more seriously, the strong nativist wing of the party, epitomized by Tea Party keynoter former Representative Tom Tancredo, represent a threat to the other large emerging voting block, immigrants and their offspring.

    If you want to see an illustration of what this means, just examine the plummeting GOP registration levels in increasingly multi-racial California. For the first time in modern history, according to veteran political observer Allan Hoffenblum, there is not a single congressional, state Senate or Assembly district in the state with a majority Republican registration.

    Although the Republicans are riding high now, do not overestimate their ability to seize the field now so ineptly being vacated by the Democrats. It may well turn out that President Obama still may overcome the Great Disconnect before the GOP does. Obama’s ability to change direction already can be seen in such things as his new-found enthusiasm for nuclear power and more drilling on public lands. His most recent jobs bill also has more of a focus on promoting private employment growth than past efforts.

    Ultimately, the party that wins in 2010 and beyond will be the one that addresses the real issues of this age—the battle for private sector jobs and upward mobility—that matter to the vast majority of Americans. It is on those issues, not global warming, ethnic purity or gay marriage that the political future will now turn.

    This article originally appeared at The Daily Beast.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

    Photo: Official White House Photo by Pete Souza

  • Eminent Domain as Central Planning

    Free markets are out of vogue. The unfortunate lesson that policymakers have learned over the past two years is that a big, brainy government that supposedly creates jobs is superior to irrational, faceless markets that just create catastrophic errors. So Washington has seized on the financial and economic crises to enlarge its role in managing the economy—controlling the insurance giant AIG, for example, and trying to maintain high housing prices through tax credits and “mortgage modification” programs.

    But when it comes to central economic planning, New York City and State are way ahead of the feds. Empire State politicians from both parties already believe that it’s their responsibility to replace people and businesses in allocating the economy’s resources. They’re even confident that their duty to design a perfect economy trumps their constituents’ right to hold private property. Three current cases of eminent-domain abuse in New York show how serious they are—and how much damage such government intrusiveness can wreak.

    Brooklyn’s Prospect Heights, industrial and forlorn for much of the late twentieth century, was looking better by 2003. Government was doing its proper job: crime was down, and the public-transit commute to midtown Manhattan, where many Brooklynites worked, was just 25 minutes. That meant that the private sector could do its job, too, rejuvenating the neighborhood after urban decay. Developers had bought 1920s-era factories and warehouses and converted them into condos for buyers like Daniel Goldstein, who paid $590,000 for a place in a former dry-goods warehouse in 2003. These new residents weren’t put off by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s railyards nearby, and they liked the hardwood floors and airy views typical of such refurbished buildings. They also settled in alongside longtime residents in little houses on quiet streets. Wealthier newcomers joined regulars at Freddy’s, a bar that predated Prohibition. Small businesses continued to employ skilled laborers in low-rise industrial buildings.

    But Prospect Heights interested another investor: developer Bruce Ratner, who thought that the area would be perfect for high-rise apartments and office towers. Ratner didn’t want to do the piecemeal work of cajoling private owners into selling their properties, however. Instead, he appealed to the central-planning instincts of New York’s political class. Use the state’s power to seize the private property around the railyards, he told Governor George Pataki, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and Brooklyn borough president Marty Markowitz. Transfer me the property, and let me buy the railyards themselves below the market price. I’ll build my development, Atlantic Yards, around a world-class basketball arena.

    New York, in short, would give Ratner an unfair advantage, and he would return some of the profits reaped from that advantage by creating the “economic benefits” favored by the planning classes. Architecture critics loved Frank Gehry’s design for the arena. Race activist Al Sharpton loved the promise of thousands of minority jobs. The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (Acorn) loved the prospect of administering the more than 2,000 units of “affordable” housing planned for the development, as well as the $1.5 million in loans and grants that Ratner gave it outright. When the state held public hearings in 2006 to decide whether to approve Atlantic Yards, hundreds of supplicants, hoping for a good job or a cheap apartment, easily drowned out the voices of people like Goldstein, who wanted nothing from the government except the right to keep their homes.

    Can New York legally seize private property and transfer it to a developer purely for economic development? The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution allows the government to take property for a “public use,” long understood to mean such things as roads and railways, so long as it makes “just compensation” for them. Starting around the 1930s, a number of court cases began to broaden “public use” to include more nebulous “public purposes,” such as slum clearance. And in 2005, in Kelo v. New London, the Supreme Court decided that these “public purposes” could even include economic development. But New York’s constitution theoretically holds the state to a higher standard. In 1967, Empire State voters voted not to add a “public purpose” clause to their constitution, preferring to stick with the stricter requirement of “public use.”

    The state hasn’t let this inconvenience derail its plans for Prospect Heights, however. For seven decades, courts have let New York seize and demolish slum housing if it’s blighted—which New York State defines as “substandard” and “unsanitary.” So the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), a public entity of New York State, decided that the “public use” of Atlantic Yards would be blight removal. The city had already designated part of the neighborhood as “blighted” 40 years earlier, long before its resurgence. As for the rest, the UDC commissioned consultants—previously employed by Ratner—who soon returned the requisite blight finding.

    But wait, you say: people don’t buy half-million-dollar apartments in “substandard” or “unsanitary” neighborhoods. You’re right; that’s why the consultants had to stretch. In the 1930s, as Goldstein’s attorney, Matthew Brinckerhoff, pointed out, “substandard” and “unsanitary” meant “families and children dying from rampant fires and pestilence” in tuberculosis-ridden firetraps. In 2006, by contrast, the UDC’s consultants found “substandard” conditions in isolated graffiti, cracked sidewalks, and “underutilization”—that is, when property owners weren’t using their land to generate the social and economic benefits that the government desired.

    In New York, this creative definition of blight is the new central-planning model. Consultants have also cited “underutilization” in West Harlem, where the city’s Economic Development Corporation wants to take land from private owners and hand it to Columbia University for an expansion project. Says Norman Siegel, who represents the owners: “A private property owner has the right to determine the best productive use of his property. It’s not a right to be ceded to any government.”

    And in Queens, the Bloomberg administration is preparing a similar argument to grab swaths of Willets Point, an area adjacent to Citi Field that’s populated with auto-repair shops. The city’s recent “request for qualifications” from would-be developers drew a sharp response from the people who owned the land: “We . . . hold the most significant qualification of all: we own the properties. We are motivated to improve and use our own properties, consistent with the American free market system. We would have done so in spectacular fashion already, had the city upheld its end of the bargain by providing our neighborhood with essential services and infrastructure.” Instead, the city has done the opposite, letting streets disintegrate into ditches to bolster its blight finding. The perversity is astonishing: rather than doing its own job of maintaining public infrastructure and public safety, the government wants to do the private sector’s job—and is going about it by starving that private sector of public resources.

    Property owners have looked to the judiciary to check the overweening grasp of the legislative and executive branches. But courts can be wrong for longer than it takes to save a neighborhood. In Brooklyn, Goldstein and his neighbors have lost their lawsuits—most recently, in New York’s highest court, the court of appeals. In November, the court decided 6–1 that “all that is at issue is a reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the area in question is in fact substandard and insanitary. This is not a sufficient predicate for us to supplant [the state’s] determination.” The court essentially abdicated its duty to protect property owners from the governor and the Legislature.

    Nine days later, the West Harlem owners fared better in a lower court. The first department of the state supreme court’s appellate division found, 3–2, that the blight studies that the city and state had commissioned to justify their rapacity were “bereft of facts”—and further tainted by the fact that one blight consultant also worked for Columbia. The blight designation “is mere sophistry,” the majority concluded, “hatched to justify the employment of eminent domain.” The court further noted that “even a cursory examination of the study reveals the idiocy of considering things like unpainted block walls or loose awning supports as evidence of a blighted neighborhood. Virtually every neighborhood in the five boroughs will yield similar instances of disrepair.”

    The selective and arbitrary process that deems one neighborhood blighted while leaving a similar neighborhood alone also violates due process, the justices went on, as “one is compelled to guess what subjective factors will be employed in each claim of blight.” Another violation: the government responded poorly to property owners’ document requests under the state’s freedom of information law, hampering their right to mount a solid case. Such requests are particularly important in eminent-domain cases because New York property owners don’t enjoy the right to a trial with a discovery phase, but must go straight to appeals court—a seventies-era “reform” meant to speed up development projects.

    The Harlem owners were able to convince the lower court partly because they had commissioned their own “no-blight” study. “We said, ‘Let’s create our own record . . . as a counterweight,’ ” said Siegel. The owners also presented as evidence a government study, performed before Columbia showed interest in the land, that West Harlem was revitalizing itself. This is all very well—but property rights shouldn’t depend on owners’ creativity and resourcefulness in proving beyond all reasonable doubt that their land isn’t blighted.

    Further, the lower-court ruling is a tenuous victory. The case is proceeding to the court of appeals, and though Siegel is “cautiously optimistic” that it will rule in his clients’ favor, there’s no way to be sure. Meantime, Goldstein and fellow residents and business owners in Brooklyn have asked the court of appeals to reconsider its Atlantic Yards ruling after it rules on Harlem. But the starkly different decisions in the Harlem and Brooklyn cases, coming so close together, have pointed up the need for the Legislature and Governor David Paterson to create clear standards for the government’s power to seize property.

    An obvious step is to dispense with “underutilization” as a justification for a taking. As the court noted in the Harlem case, “the time has come to categorically reject eminent domain takings solely based on underutilization. This concept . . . transforms the purpose for blight removal from the elimination of harmful social and economic conditions . . . to a policy affirmatively requiring the ultimate commercial development of all property.”

    But the state should go even further and eliminate blight itself as a justification for property seizure. Since the sixties, when creeping blight seemed to threaten the city’s existence, New York has learned that the real remedy for “substandard” conditions is good policing and infrastructure, which create the conditions for people and companies to move to neighborhoods and improve them. As for 1930s-style “unsanitary” conditions, modern health care, infrastructure, and building codes have eliminated them. Today, the biggest risks to public health are often on government property: dangerous elevators in public housing, for instance, or the 2007 fire that killed two firefighters in the Deutsche Bank building in lower Manhattan, owned by the city and state since 9/11. Unless it needs property to build a road, a subway line, a water-treatment plant, or a similar piece of truly public infrastructure—or unless a piece of land poses a clear and present danger to the public—the state should keep its hands off people’s property.

    Eminent-domain abuse, dangerous though it is, is a symptom of a deeper problem: government officials’ belief that central planning is superior to free-market competition. That’s what New York has decided in each of its current eminent-domain cases. In Brooklyn, high-rise towers and an arena are better than a historic low-rise neighborhood; in Harlem, an elite university’s expansion project is better than continued private investment; and in Willets Point, Queens, almost anything is better than grubby body shops.

    To cure yourself of the notion that the government can do better than free markets in producing economic vitality, stroll around Atlantic Yards. You’ll walk past three-story clapboard homes nestled next to elegantly corniced row houses—the supposedly blighted residences that the state plans to demolish. You’ll see the Spalding Building, a stately sporting-goods-factory-turned-condo-building that, thanks to Ratner and his government allies, has been slated for demolition and now stands empty. You’ll peer up at Goldstein’s nearly empty apartment house, scheduled to be condemned and destroyed.

    And you’ll see how wrecking balls have already made the neighborhood gap-toothed. A vacant lot, for example, now sprawls where the historic Ward Bakery warehouse was, until recently, a candidate for private-sector reinvestment. Today, Prospect Heights finally shows what the state and city governments want everyone to see: decay. The decay, though, isn’t the work of callous markets that left the neighborhood to perish. It’s the work of a developer wielding state power to press property owners to sell their land “voluntarily.” It’s also the result of a half-decade’s worth of government-created uncertainty, which stopped genuine private investment in its tracks.

    Such uncertainty offers a crucial lesson to the rest of the nation, and not just in the area of eminent domain. Whenever government fails to confine itself to a limited role in the economy, it creates similar uncertainty. Even when the results aren’t as poignantly obvious as they are in Brooklyn, the private economy suffers—whether it’s financial or auto bailouts unfairly benefiting some firms at the expense of others, or mortgage bailouts unfairly benefiting some home buyers at the expense of others. Free markets may be imperfect, but they’re far better than the alternative—the blight of arbitrary government control and the uncertainty that it creates.

    This article originally appeared at City Journal. Research for this article was supported by the Brunie Fund for New York Journalism.

    Nicole Gelinas, a City Journal contributing editor and the Searle Freedom Trust Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, is a Chartered Financial Analyst and the author of After the Fall.

    Photo: Tracy Collins

  • Olympic Games: Greece’s Gold Medal For Debt

    Although I cannot imagine that it will have much appeal in the ratings beyond C-Span 2, a terrific new reality program, Euro Bomb, could be produced around the survival of the Greek economy.

    The founder of both the ancient and modern Olympic games is in the midst of a debt crisis that threatens not just to send a few bondholders off the island, but has the potential to blow up the European Union’s currency zone.

    The first indication of a problem with Greeks bearing debts was when the yield on the country’s sovereign debt soared past seven percent; in Germany, similar paper pays only three percent, although, in theory, both countries are members in good standing of the Euro zone, and thus have an implicit guarantee from the community.

    Greece joined the European Union in 1981, embraced the Euro in 2002, and staged the summer Olympics in 2004, steps that were intended to lead the country out of its Balkan past. Alas the only Greek medal was for the cost overrun, leaving Athens with garlands of high-priced debts.

    Then it turned out that the Greek government had cooked the books that report the country’s budget deficit. It was actually 13 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as opposed to the 3 percent that Athens had been reporting to Brussels. As late as 2009, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou was assuring voters (some of whom were in the streets) that there was no need for austerity programs or budget cutbacks.

    Issuing phony financial statements has been a Greek sport of Olympian dimension since the time of Socrates. But the consequence of the latest illusion has been that the European Union is now confronted with the invoice for its continuing unity.

    For Greece, the choices are stark, but clear. It can default on its debts and get bounced from the European Union; it can cut public expenditures and watch the streets fill up with unemployed public sector workers; or it can throw itself on the mercy of the European Union or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which would put in place a stabilization fund to keep the country afloat.

    The hard decisions are for the European Union, which, if it bails out Greece, could be forced to do the same, at a later date, for Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland, and possibly the United Kingdom, all of which took to borrowing as if it were pitchers of sangria.

    To be sure, the European Union could deliver Greece to the IMF, the vulture that normally descends on the roadkill of bankrupt countries. In recent years, the IMF has picked through the ruins of Argentina, Turkey, South Korea, and Mexico, and then returned them to the investment community, minus a few state assets and plus a lot of unhappy voters.

    But what does it say about the financial stability of the European Union — remember all the press releases about the United States of Europe and its standing as a global economic zone? — if Brussels cannot clean up the Greek mess, which only represents two percent of the European economy.

    Further, in weighing options for Greece, there is the specter of the political rivalry between the French president, Nicholas Sarkozy, and the IMF President, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who is thinking of running for the French presidency in 2012 as the Socialist candidate.

    President Sarkozy has an Olympian-sized ego, and the last thing he wants is to run against someone who could claim that he, not Sarko, had saved the European Union.

    Without the full faith and credit of the international financial community, the European Union (read the taxpayers of Germany) might not want to bail out the Greeks, who are perceived as lounging at the beach on the dole while the bail-posters trudge off to a factory in Dortmund.

    Plus, the numbers in the great Greek unraveling are substantial: $20 billion is needed by April. National debt is approaching 100 percent of GDP ($380 billion), while the country has a budget, trade, and current account deficit, and a contracting economy. And these numbers are nothing when compared with the debts in Portugal, Spain, and Italy.

    The central weakness of the Euro zone is that it has a common currency and a European Central Bank, but none of the political control that normally comes with monetary responsibility.

    Decisions on the issuance of debt, on budget deficits, and public spending are made in each EU country, not Brussels, which thus finds itself as a lender of last resort in an economic zone over which it has only moral suasion (and very little cash).

    Normally when a country tanks, its currency depreciates, which stimulates exports and promotes recovery. (This explains some of the American recovery.) But Greece is tied to the Euro, which remains overvalued in relation to the dollar, so things like tourism and exports are expensive.

    For the moment, the United States feels itself to be above the Greek crisis. Even the dollar has rallied in the wake of Greek illiquidity. But writing in the Financial Times, the historian Niall Ferguson makes the point that “a Greek crisis is coming to America.”

    His argument is that the projected budget deficits and international borrowings of the Obama administration give the United States Greek-like financial qualities, such as debt equal to GDP, and that it is only a matter of time before vulture capitalists come to roost in Washington, concluding, “Yet even a casual look at the fiscal position of the federal government (not to mention the states) makes a nonsense of the phrase ‘safe haven.’ US government debt is a safe haven the way Pearl Harbor was a safe haven in 1941.”

    While waiting for an international rescue, the Greek government can rail against hedge-fund speculators (who went short the country), international banks (who sold them all this expensive, junk-grade paper), and world capitalism (which is treating Greece as if it were the beach house of the Lehman brothers).

    Or, in the spirit of reality television, it can invoke the economic philosophy of Alexis Zorba, aka Zorba the Greek, whose idea of a bailout package involved a lot of grilled lamb and ouzo. “No more fooling around, not in this place,” he said. “We’ll pull our pants up and make a pile of money.”

    Matthew Stevenson is author of the recently published Remembering the Twentieth Century Limited. He lives in Europe.

  • The 10 Percent Solution to Urban Growth

    What if we achieved the urbanist dream, with people deciding en masse to move back to the city? Well, that would create a big problem, since there would be no place to put them. Many cities hit their peak population in 1950, when the US total was 150 million. Today it is over 300 million, with virtually all the growth taking place in the suburbs.

    So where would these new urbanites reside? With the enormous losses in our urban housing stock, our cities lack the residences to hold even their 1950 population. A recent survey found that one third of all the lots in Detroit are now vacant, for example. And even if all the old housing was rebuilt, declines in household sizes, particularly in urban areas, has reduced the effective carrying capacity of the old urban fabric even at historic densities.

    But there’s an even bigger challenge to wholesale urbanization from future population growth. The Census Bureau estimates that the US will add nearly 100 million more new people by 2050. If you look at the few cities in the country that have large inhabited urban cores, they hold a relatively small percentage of the current population. New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Boston, Seattle and Washington, DC combined barely hold 20 million people. Even if all these cities doubled in population by 2050, they would only be able to hold 20% of the net new growth expected over the next four decades.

    And achieving even that level of urban growth is simply not realistic. Most of the existing highly urbanized cities are already largely full of buildings. Even where land is available, zoning restricts what can be built there, and increasing densities is politically difficult. New York City has been the most aggressive on the growth front, rezoning 20% of the city under the Bloomberg administration, although many sections have actually been downzoned.

    But even this effort could accommodate a projected one million new residents by 2030. Chicago is going the other direction. When it introduced new zoning under the Daley administration, permitted densities were actually reduced in most cases, though Chicago remains perhaps the only truly urban city with large amount of vacant or underutilized land for redevelopment. Ed Glaeser calls for building skyscrapers in California, but San Francisco residents are imbued with a strong anti-development mindset and have long railed against the “Manhattanization” of their city.

    America could not be reshaped from a primarily suburban to a city-centric country without a massive shift in local political mind-sets. Rather than attempting that exercise in futility, urban advocates should adopt much more modest goals that, although limited, could be completely transformational for our cities.

    There’s been much made of the return to the city. Indeed, large tracts of the urban cores of many places have been utterly remade. But most of the cities where this has happened have been America’s largest tier one cities – New York, Chicago, Boston, etc. They have achieved the point of self-sustaining urban growth, and are well positioned to attract more residents, particularly the upscale and childless, young singles and students and recent immigrants.

    In contrast, smaller cities have seen a few hundred downtown condos and such, but not a real urban renaissance. There is still a lot of work to do in those places.

    The way to do this is to adopt the “10 percent solution”. That is, for most cities, they should develop a strategy that tries to capture somewhere between 5 and 15 percent of the net new growth in their metro areas. If a city can get more, great. But for any growing region, even 10 percent would create a dynamic of massive change in the urban core.

    Consider Indianapolis, a region with healthy regional growth that is above average but not among the nation’s leaders. The Indianapolis metro area is adding people at a rate of about 200,000 people per decade. Center Township, which is the urban core of the city, peaked in population in 1950 at 337,000 people. Today it is at 167,000, a decline of 50%, on par with America’s greatest urban collapses

    But what if the urban core managed to capture 10% of that new growth? That’s 20,000 new residents, very easy to physically accommodate within a decade. What would 20,000 new residents do to central Indianapolis? What would it do to the entire dynamic of the city? It could be completely transformational.

    Such a modest capture of new population would catapult central Indianapolis into one of the absolute top growth areas in the region. Only one suburb is on track to add that many or more people during the 2000s. Many other suburbs are considered prosperous and fast growing despite adding only a few thousand people. Even that limited influx creates a pattern of growth vs. stagnation and decline. That’s where urban Indianapolis needs to get.

    One of the great advantages of targeting 10% market share in new growth is that it frees the city to pursue a market segmentation strategy. It doesn’t have to try to convince vast numbers of suburbanites – the vast majority of whom are likely to stay in place – to make a radical lifestyle change. Rather, the core can market to specific segments that it is best positioned to attract, and put together the most compelling and differentiated product to attract them.

    One potential market is those who want an urban environment but can’t afford to live in one of the expensive tier one cities. They could market themselves to people who find themselves priced out of the biggest cities, but would settle in a smaller, but still vibrant urban environment.

    Can Indianapolis do it? As with many cities, there is already some evidence that it could. In the 2000s, decades of population decline came to an end in 2006, and Center Township started adding an estimated 400 people per year. The jury is still out on whether the estimates are confirmed by the census count and whether it can be sustained, but it still amounts to 4,000 people per decade, showing that the city is already starting to make progress.

    Cincinnati provides another example. It is a metro growing a bit less than the national average, but still adding people at a rate of about 150,000 per decade. The city of Cincinnati declined from a peak of 503,998 in 1950 to 333,336 today, a loss of 170,000 people. Again, if the city captured 100% of just regional growth, in little more than a decade it would be back to a record high population. That’s not realistic of course, but 10% of that total, or 15,000 people, would still make a tremendous impact on the city. Like Indianapolis, there’s already some sign of an inflection point, as the city population began growing again in the 2000s.

    Can this 10% solution really happen? The answer is a resounding Yes, because it is already happening in Atlanta. Its reputation as a sprawlburg overshadows the fact that it is experiencing one of America’s most impressive urban core booms. The city of Atlanta has added almost 120,000 new residents since 2000, an increase of 28%. This is a mere 10.5% of the metro area’s growth during that time – but it has totally changed the city. Atlanta lost over 100,000 people from its 1970 peak, but is now at an all time high.

    Viewed in this realistic light, there is huge reason for optimism about rebuilding the urban cores of even our Rust Belt cities. Frankly, with the required market share of growth to get there so low, there’s no excuse for not making it happen. If city leaders can’t figure out how to attract even 10% of the market, they deserve to lose. If they can do better, great. And once they’ve captured that 10% base, and restarted a growth pattern, they can figure out how to get more ambitious and expand market share.

    For regions with population decline, like Detroit and Cleveland, there’s a different and much more challenging dynamic. But for cities with even modest regional population growth, there’s all the opportunity in the world to attract new urban residents and completely change the game for their urban cores.

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile.

    Photo: Carl Van Rooy (vanrooy_13)

  • What is the Answer to the Suburban Question?

    We have recently assembled a special issue of the journal Cities with the title “The Suburban Question”, and we assume that many readers will assume the answer is “who cares”? The term ‘sub-urbs’ connotes a lesser form of urban life, and for decades it has been used dismissively to denote anything plastic, even hypocritical. Novelist Anthony Powell described one of his unsympathetic characters possessing a ‘‘face like Hampstead Garden Suburb”; the New York Times recently described architect Robert Stern as ‘‘a suede-loafered sultan of suburban retrotecture”. In the old days, record stores had ‘urban’ bins full of gangsta, but nothing marked ‘suburban’, although it is always easy to use the suburbs as a backdrop for duplicity, as in American Beauty, or the first series of Weeds (set in a gated community, a double score!).

    There has been some academic attention—Dick Walker, David Harvey, and of course Kenneth Jackson all wrote lasting pieces about the suburbs. But in these, they always appear as objects of inquiry, rather than subjects in their own right; and if academics live amongst the ‘little boxes of tickytacky’, they rarely write about them. This is more than unfortunate, for many reasons—the most obvious is that by most definitions, most of us are indeed suburbanites. But while there are endless dissertations on public housing, the decline of the inner city, and the much discussed revitalization of the inner city, there is precious little on their further-flung counterparts.

    It’s hardly the case, to answer the unspoken question, that there is nothing interesting to research ‘out there’. What about updating research on the ‘growth machine’? No one has really done any detailed work on the complexities of the home building industry, with its rigid design aspirations and complex financial connections. There is the gated community, which is still portrayed as ‘Fortress America’ even though there are significant proportions of Hispanic households living in gated communities, and many of these are rental properties and not the upscale compounds portrayed in textbooks. And there is the Home Owner Association. Despite the fact that millions of Americans live in them, relatively little research has been done on this important aspect of governance since the term ‘Privatopia’ was coined nearly two decades ago.

    A few authors have tried to push back against this indifference, arguing that suburbs appear to be ‘good places for most people’. Yet the reality that affordable homes-and-gardens are unquestionably popular does not seem to matter. In almost any manner imaginable, the suburban lifestyle has been savaged. Sprawl causes obesity; it destroys downtowns; it causes global warming. In Metroburbia, Paul Knox argues that the suburbs have turned us into monsters of capitalist consumerism, the sagging SUVs necessary to carry the wobbling masses from mall to McMansion.

    It is easy to argue that American suburbs are unsustainable, but to echo Peter Marcuse’s famous rhetorical question—‘sustainable for whom?’ Vibrant cities—New York, San Francisco, Boston—are expensive cities, and while that fabled creature, the Creative Worker (homo Floridian) is willing and, more importantly, able to pay large sums to live in very small spaces, most of us are not. Suburbs have attracted paying customers precisely because housing costs are low and conditions are attractive. Not many cool public spaces, but that’s less important to most people past their college years.

    This is the backdrop to the papers that we have collected in our special issue. Its aim is to present work that asks ‘what is happening in the suburbs, in terms of the built form, the economy and social relations’. They are not necessarily written ‘in defense of suburbs,’ but engage suburbs as if they matter. Nick Phelps leads off by emphasizing the contribution that suburbs make to our local and national economies. He reminds us of the transfers there of jobs and the growing importance of suburbs to the urban region and the economic health of our nations. He closes with an urgent reminder that the “economic centrality of suburbs within the contemporary economy should, perhaps more than anything else, signal the need for a re-balancing of urban studies to be more fully suburban in academic and policy focus.”

    A perfect example of this appears in a study of Phoenix by Carol Atkinson Palombo and Pat Gober. Their analysis of new housing construction in the prior two decades indicates trends that span different types of multi-family housing in suburban locations. They note, “densification no longer equates to urban infill but takes many forms and occurs all over the metropolitan region”. A complementary article by Roger Keil and Douglas Young focuses on their empirical work in Toronto, and especially what they have termed ‘the in-between city’. These places are “not quite traditional city and not quite traditional suburban”, forgotten geographies where many live and where their infrastructure reminds us that the placing of ‘urban versus suburban’ neglects the many shades of in-between urban places that require planning and policy attention.

    Toronto is the focus of another paper, in which Susan Moore explores the tenets of New Urbanism. In four case studies, she explores sub/urban forms, showing that the general edicts of the “densification-is-good” movement are contextualized in different settings, and reveals endless rounds of compromises between developers, planners, politicians and residents. In the end, this design imperative is unable to transcend the “urbanization of the suburbs or the suburbanization of the urban,” and once more we are challenged by the need to confront the assumed distinction between urban and suburban developments, or even cities and suburbs themselves.

    This theme is given additional attention in a further paper, by noted Turkish urbanist Feyzan Erkip, whose work explores, and contrasts, the new manifestations of Westernization in Ankara—malls and gated communities—with more traditional neighborhoods. She finds little difference between the views of the populations in the old and new, but the meanings that these new design features take on are very much conditioned by their context. For instance, the malls have a liberating veneer for Turkish women, who feel socially threatened in the streets but not in the private shopping districts. Conversely, gated communities adopt familiar design features but unlike their Western counterparts, these are essentially up-scale squatter settlements; this indeterminate legal status is attractive for some residents because it makes their homes less open to search by law enforcement or tax officials.

    We conclude our collection, and this piece, with a simple response: the answer to the suburban question is that they possess a rich history and a dynamic present and therefore demand more attention and a serious research agenda. We call for more academic attention to be given to places where a majority of Americans, many Europeans, and a growing number of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans live. Urban studies should either become inclusive of all parts of the city—from edge to center—or the field of Suburban Studies, spearheaded by the New Suburbanism, is long overdue.

    Andrew Kirby is the editor of the interdisciplinary Elsevier journal “Cities.”This is his 20th year as a resident of Arizona. Ali Modarres is an urban geographer in Los Angeles and co-author of City and Environment.

    Photo: urbanfeel @ flickr

  • Welcome to Ecotopia

    In this era of tea-partying revolutionary-era dress-ups, one usually associates secessionism with the far right. But if things turn sour for the present majority in Washington, you should expect a whole new wave of separatism to emerge on the greenish left coast.

    In 1975 Ernest Callenbach, an author based in Berkeley, Calif., published a sci-fi novel about enviro-secessionists called Ecotopia; a prequel, Ecotopia Rising, came out in 1981. These two books, which have acquired something of a cult following, chronicle–largely approvingly–the emergence of a future green nation along the country’s northwest coast.

    Aptly described by Callenbach as “an empire apart,” this region is, in real life, among the world’s most scenic and blessed by nature. Many in this part of America have long been more enthusiastic about their ties to Asia than those with the rest of the country. It is also home to many fervent ecological, cultural and political activists, who often feel at odds with the less enlightened country that lies beyond their soaring mountains.

    Until the election of Barack Obama, the Pacific Northwest certainly was separating from the rest of America–at least in attitude. After George W. Bush’s victory the 2004 presidential election, the Seattle weekly The Stranger published an angry editorial about how coastal urbanites needed to reject “heartland values like xenophobia, sexism, racism and homophobia” and places where “people are fatter and dumber and slower.”

    Such a narrow, cynical view of the rest of the country is in line with Callenbach’s Ecotopia novels, in which the bad guys–representatives of American government and corporations–are almost always male, overweight and clueless about everything from technology to tending to the earth.

    Of course, would-be Ecotopians have much of which to be proud. The three great cities of the region–San Francisco, Portland and Seattle–easily rank among the most attractive on the continent. They all boast higher-than-average levels of education and–at least around San Francisco and Seattle–some of the world’s deepest concentrations of high-tech companies.

    Yet for all their promise, the Ecotopian regions cannot claim to have missed the current recession. Downtown Seattle currently suffers a vacancy rate in excess of 20%, the highest in decades; last year apartment rental rates dropped 13.8%, the steepest decline among American metros. Meanwhile vacancies in the Silicon Valley area south of San Francisco have soared to above 20%. By early this year, there was enough unoccupied office space in the Valley to fill 15 Empire State Buildings.

    This may seem a bit counter-intuitive for a region that boasts the headquarters of Microsoft, Costco, Amazon, Intel and Apple. But while such companies provide lots of high-wage employment, they are no longer enough to spark much growth across the region’s economy. The San Francisco area has actually lost jobs over the past decade and shows little sign of recovering its once prodigious growth rates.

    But easily the weakest of the economies has been Portland, which lacks the presence of major anchor firms like those in greater Seattle or the Bay Area. Portland’s unemployment rate has been well over 10% since late last year.

    A wave of youthful migration has made the city a slacker haven for the past decade and, in turn, exacerbated unemployment figures. Homeless kids now crowd the downtown area, which, although far from destitute, does appear pretty grungy in places.

    Yet, like the Ecotopians in the Callenbach novels, Portland residents and politicians seem nonplussed about their anemic economic performance. After all, the city voted heavily–despite solid opposition from the rest of the state–to raise Oregon’s taxes on wealthy individuals and corporations, a move likely to deter new in-bound investment.

    “You don’t have a big focus here on economic development,” observes Stephen B. Braun, dean of the School of Management at Portland’s Concordia University. “There’s much more emphasis on quality of life than on making a living.”

    The proof: Portland may have high unemployment, but the big idea around city hall is not how to promote jobs but about investing an additional $600 million in bike lanes.

    All these places, of course, avidly endorse green jobs even if there’s little prospect they could replace the jobs being lost in the fading blue-collar sectors. A growing green job sector needs a vibrant economy that produces things and builds new buildings, notions that have little currency across much of the region.

    This anti-growth attitude reflects that of Callenbach’s Ecotopia, which favors a “stable state” economy over job or wealth creation. Ecotopian politics explicitly ban both population increases and the private automobile.

    While the mayors of Portland, San Francisco and Seattle are hardly that extreme, they could propose policies that would make driving more burdensome. And they certainly seem to do wonders in chasing would-be baby-makers out of the city. All three cities have among the lowest percentages of children of any in the U.S.

    Perhaps the toughest issue facing the Ecotopian political economy lies with the issue of class. Callenbach’s Ecotopia adopts something of an anarchic socialism; the cities of the real ecotopia have tended toward ever greater class bifurcation.

    San Francisco, for example, boasts one of the highest per capita incomes in the nation and remains a favorite destination for inherited wealth, whether among individuals or nested in nonprofits. Yet according to the Public Policy Institute of California, if the cost of living is applied, San Francisco ranks high among urban counties in terms of its concentration of poverty.

    It doesn’t help that the city’s economy has been hemorrhaging corporate headquarters and mid-range middle-class jobs for decades. High-end workers commute to Google and other Valley companies, and others work in the financial or media sectors, but many mid-range jobs have been lost, many of them to more affordable business-friendly locales in places like Colorado.

    As middle-class jobs disappear, Ecotopia’s cities increasingly resemble restrictive communities that are anything but diverse. As analyst Aaron Renn has pointed out, Portland and Seattle stand as among the whitest big cities in the nation. And San Francisco’s once vibrant African-American population has been dropping for decades.

    In the coming years this pattern will likely become more pronounced in Seattle and Portland as well. These cities continue to attract many well-educated people, particularly from California, who in turn bring with them both significant accumulated wealth and anti-growth attitudes.

    Strict “green” planning regimes are also accelerating the decline of the local middle class by driving housing prices up, greatly diminishing the once wide affordability for the middle class. Seattle’s regulatory environment, according to one recent study, has bolstered housing prices in the region by $200,000 since 1989. The percentage of families who could afford a median price home in the area has fallen by more than half.

    Many observers see a similar outcome from Portland’s widely ballyhooed planning regime. Despite the massive acceptance by planners as something of a model for the restored city, the vast majority of all job and population growth in the region has occurred at the less pricey fringes, including across the river in Vancouver, Wash., which lies outside the fearsome Portland planning regime.

    So what is the future for the region, and particularly the eco-cities? If the country starts moving toward the center, and even the right, you can expect Ecotopian sentiment to rise again, perhaps not to the point of secession but expressed in attitude.

    But this may not be all bad. As America’s population grows and other regions rise, perhaps it’s helpful for the various parts of the country to experiment with different systems. Short of civil war, there’s something to be said for relentless, even if sometimes daft, experimentation at the local level. The rest of country may not follow all their strictures, but our would-be Ecotopians could produce some interesting and even usable ideas.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.