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  • Sundown for California

    Twenty-five years ago, along with another young journalist, I coauthored a book called California, Inc. about our adopted home state. The book described “California’s rise to economic, political, and cultural ascendancy.”

    As relative newcomers at the time, we saw California as a place of limitless possibility. And over most of the next two decades, my coauthor, Paul Grabowicz, and I could feel comfortable that we were indeed predicting the future.

    But much has changed in recent years. And today our Golden State appears headed, if not for imminent disaster, then toward an unanticipated, maddening, and largely unnecessary mediocrity.

    Since 2000, California’s job growth rate— which in the late 1970s surged at many times the national average—has lagged behind the national average by almost 20 percent. Rapid population growth, once synonymous with the state, has slowed dramatically. Most troubling of all, domestic out-migration, about even in 2001, swelled to over 260,000 in 2007 and now surpasses international immigration. Texas has replaced California as the leading growth center for Hispanics.

    Out-migration is a key factor, along with a weak economy, for the collapse of the housing market. Simply put, the population growth expected for many areas has not materialized, nor the new jobs that might attract newcomers. In the past year, four of the top six housing markets in terms of price decline have been in California, including Sacramento, San Diego, Riverside, and Los Angeles. The Central Valley towns of Stockton, Merced, and Modesto have all been awarded the dubious honors of the highest foreclosure rates in the nation during the past year.

    Even with prices down, many of the most desirable places in California are also among the most unaffordable in the nation. Less than 15 percent of households earning the local median income can afford a home in L.A. or San Francisco. In Santa Barbara, San Diego, Oxnard, Santa Cruz, or San Jose, it’s less than a third. That’s about half the number who can buy in the big Texas or North Carolina markets. Moreover, state officials warned in October that they might have to seek as much as $7 billion in loans from the U.S. Treasury. This is a disappointing turn for a state that once saw itself as the harbinger of the future.

    Not surprisingly, few Californians see a turnaround soon. In the most recent Field Poll in July, a record high 63 percent of Californians said they are financially worse off than they were a year ago, while a record low 14 percent described themselves as better off. Poll director Mark DiCamillo called it “the broadest sentiment of pessimism we’ve ever seen.”

    Of course, California can still attract many newcomers, particularly young and ambitious people who dream of a career in Hollywood or Silicon Valley. The problem is that when you grow up and have failed to secure your own dotcom or television series, life in Texas, Arizona, North Carolina, or even Kansas starts looking better. According to real estate analysts, the only thing preventing the current outflow from being worse is that homeowners cannot sell their residences in order to move.

    All of this suggests a historic slide of California’s role as a bastion of upward mobility. In 1946, Californians enjoyed the nation’s highest living standards and the third highest per-capita income, noted journalist John Gunther. As recently as the 1980s, Californians generally got richer faster than other Americans did. Now, median household income growth trails the national average while the already large divide between the social classes—often bemoaned by the state’s political left—grows faster than in the rest of the country.

    Today, notes a recent Public Policy Institute of California study, California has the 15th highest poverty rate in the nation. Only New York and the District of Columbia fare worse if the cost of living is factored in. Indeed, after accounting for cost of living, L.A., Monterey, and San Francisco counties—all places known for concentrations of wealth—have poverty populations of 20 percent. “San Francisco,” says historian Kevin Starr, a native of the city, “is a cross between Carmel and Calcutta.”

    The Political Roots of the California Ascendancy

    You can blame many factors for California’s fall from grace: too much immigration from poor countries, the impact of global competition on technology and aerospace industries, the end of the Cold War, failing schools, and the 12 years of political control by the Texas-centric Bushes. Yet other states have weathered similar storms and still gained ground on the Golden State.

    The real problem lies in the decline of the state’s political culture. “Our society may be evolving spectacularly but our politics are devolving,” suggests Starr, the state’s most eminent historian. “California is in no way a role model for anyone from outside the state.”

    For much of the 20th century, California—already blessed by climate, topography, and fertility—was also relatively well governed. California’s schools, universities, and infrastructure were considered among the finest anywhere. From the 1920s on, its prevailing ideology was a kind of business-like progressivism. Californians in both parties embraced the idea that government could be a positive force in the economic and social life of California. However, they also embraced the latest notions of scientific management. One report from the administration of California’s Republican Governor Hiram Johnson, produced in the early part of the 20th century, stated that the goal was “to systematize the business of the State of California.”

    California’s state government laid the foundation for its remarkable ascendancy. Progressivism’s pragmatic orientation, the melding of science and technology into government, the large-scale investment in infrastructure, and a strong nonpartisan tradition produced spectacular results. In his famous book Inside USA in 1946, Gunther gushingly described California as “the most spectacular and most diversified American state … so ripe, golden.”

    Another Republican California governor, Earl Warren, who served between 1943 and 1953, epitomized progressive virtues—pragmatic in policy, nonpartisan in approach, and activist in his manner. Later on, as the GOP became more conservative, the progressive mantle shifted to the Democrats. Under Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown, elected in 1958, the state continued with an aggressive program of public works, a rapid expansion of higher education, and the massive California Water Project.

    Like his Republican progressive predecessors, Brown advocated civil rights for minorities but also promoted business interests, notably in real estate development, Hollywood, aerospace, and agribusiness. Equally important, the Democrat embraced the traditional good government principles of the progressives. Shortly after taking office, Brown initiated a thorough reorganization of state government, attempting to make it more businesslike. California, Brown himself noted, needed “to apply the latest concepts of management, organization, and cost control just as modern corporations have done.”

    The End of the Progressive Era

    By the mid-1960s, Brown’s traditional progressivism was being undermined by rising interest-group liberalism. State employees, left-liberal lobby groups, and minorities were demanding more and more from the governor. Fed up with ever-growing taxes and social spending, business interests became increasingly alienated. Once seen as a boon to the private sector, state government was becoming perceived by corporate interests as overly meddlesome and hostile.

    Perhaps even more damaging was the cultural rift that developed. Many white middle- and working-class voters felt threatened by the rise of new militant minority and student groups. Riots at Berkeley and Watts deepened resentments against the university and African Americans, two linchpins of Brown’s support.

    In the 1966 gubernatorial election, Ronald Reagan smashed Brown and the remnants of the old progressive coalition. The former actor captured both business support and grassroots votes in previously Democratic-leaning areas in suburban L.A. and the Central Valley. Numerous interviews conducted with his closest confidants at the time make clear that they did not intend to impose a conservative social agenda, but hoped to slow the regulatory regime and restore order on the state’s campuses and ghetto streets.

    One scholar has claimed that Reagan “destroyed” progressivism, but some of the blame should also be laid at the feet of the Democrats. To be sure, Reagan slowed the growth of government, but infrastructure building continued and the state university grew, as did many social problems. Much the same could be said of later Republican governors George Deukmejian and Pete Wilson, whose policies were only moderately conservative.

    Enter Governor Moonbeam

    The real problems for the progressive model, ironically, began to surface with the rise of Pat Brown’s son, Governor Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown Jr. He veered away from the traditional focus on nonpartisan governance and infrastructure spending—what long-time advisor Tom Quinn called “this build, build, build thing”—and instead focused on an environmentally friendly, “small is beautiful” approach.

    However, the real problems did not ultimately reside with the brash, creative, and sometimes unpredictable young governor himself. Entrenched Democratic interest groups, particularly public employees, resisted property tax relief for California’s middle-class homeowners. Ultimately, this failure brought about the passage of Proposition 13, a strict limit on property taxes that would sharply curtail infrastructure spending and reduce the ability of local governments to address serious problems.

    During Brown’s watch, and even despite his occasional opposition, the Democratic Party came increasingly under the sway of public employees, trial lawyers, and narrow interest activist groups. Their ability to raise money and impose their political will often outweighed that of even the most powerful business interests.

    The full bill for this transformation would eventually be paid not by Brown, but by his former chief of staff, Gray Davis. Becoming governor in 1998, Davis became the prisoner of the special interest groups with whom his predecessors, Deukmejian and Wilson, had struggled.

    By then, California’s shift to the Democrats had become inexorable and, with the fading of a GOP counterweight, influence within the party flowed to its more radical factions further to the political left. As a result, the state moved decisively away from the economic growth focus of Pat Brown. It seemed determined to wage war against its own economy. As pet social programs, entitlements, and state employee pensions soared, infrastructure spending—the hallmark of the Pat Brown regime and once 20 percent of the state budget—shrank to less than 3 percent.

    The educational system, closely aligned with the Democrats in the legislature, accelerated its secular decline. Once full of highly skilled workers, California has become increasingly less so. For example, California ranks second in the percentage of its 65-year-olds holding an associate degree or higher and fifth in those with a bachelor’s degree. But when you look at the 25-to-34 age group, those rankings fade to 30th and 24th.

    Instead of reversing these trends, the state legislature decided to spend its money on public employees and impose ever more regulatory burdens on business. Davis, a clever and experienced public servant, understood this but could not fight the zealots in his own party. When the state’s revenues shrank after the high-tech bust in 2000, he appeared to be their complete captive. Perhaps the most telling example of the misplaced priorities of the state’s majority party took place amid the state budget crisis when legislators, facing an imminent fiscal disaster, took time to debate legislation about providing more protections for transgender Californians.

    Enter the Girlie Man

    Davis’s apparent inability to gain control of the looming budget crisis opened the door to his 2003 recall and the election of a Republican, Arnold Schwarzenegger. The former bodybuilder and action hero promised to clean up “the mess” in California. He took aim at what he derided as the “girlie men” in the legislature, promising to get the state’s affairs in order. It was not to be. After a bruising defeat by liberal interest groups over a series of propositions, the onetime tough guy embraced what he called “bipartisanship.” The media, particularly on the national level, cooed, but in reality the governor simply ceded initiative to the very “girlie men”—the left-leaning state legislators—that he formerly promised to rein in.

    Under Schwarzenegger, notes former GOP Assemblyman Keith Richman, the state budget actually grew even faster—10 percent annually as opposed to 7 percent—than under his spendthrift Democratic predecessor, Gray Davis.

    Dan Walters, the dean of California political reporters, argues that Schwarzenegger never bothered to learn the basics of state governance. As a result, state spending, particularly on state employees and their pensions, continued with no notion that another budget crisis was looming.

    The Economic Crash

    The Terminator and his advisors also never understood the economic rot undermining the state. The governor assumed little could be done to preserve manufacturing, warehousing, and other high-paying blue-collar jobs in California. Instead, he bought the idea that “creative” professionals in technology, finance, and entertainment could keep the state economically vibrant.

    To be sure, the big players in technology and entertainment still often keep their main offices, and sometimes their research facilities, in California. However, they also tend to locate their middle management and production jobs to more affordable, enterprise-friendly states and countries. This is one reason, notes the Milken Institute’s Ross DeVol, that tech growth has been relatively weak even during the much-ballyhooed Internet 2.0 boom.

    Worst of all, the governor’s economic team did not see the danger of the state’s growing reliance on the real estate bubble. According to my colleagues at the Praxis Strategy Group and others, as much as 50 percent of the state’s job growth in the 2000s relied on an inflated property market. It worked for a time, keeping many people—investors, homeowners, construction workers, financial types—gainfully employed and the state, for a while, solvent. A better-informed governor might have known it would all unravel. Indeed, in early 2007, even as it was clear that the bubble was deflating, Schwarzenegger continued to play vaingloriously to the klieg lights, promoting California as “the harmonious state, the prosperous state, the cutting-edge state … a model not just for 21st-century American society, but the world.”

    Instead of addressing the fundamental fiscal and economic problems, the governor preened for the local and national media by making California the focal point for addressing global climate change. He also proposed a gigantic $14 billion healthcare program largely funded by a state that has beleaguered smaller businesses.

    Fiscal reality scuttled the healthcare plan, but business is still trying to figure out how to cope with a carbon regime faced by few of their competitors. Meanwhile, California’s unemployment is now over 7.3 percent, fourth worst in the nation, behind only Michigan, Mississippi, and Rhode Island.

    In wide regions of the state—from San Diego up through the Central Valley—the only boom is in the foreclosure business. Nor are the inner-city revivals doing much better. Shining condominium towers in Oakland, L.A., and San Diego have either cut their prices or, in many cases, gone rental, a fitting tribute to an age of diminished expectations.

    …and Now the Return of Governor Moonbeam?

    The state’s Republicans might be expected to exploit such a record of Democratic failure but seem incapable of doing so. Since the mid-1990s and Pete Wilson’s embrace of Proposition 187, the ballot measure designed to restrict social services provided to illegal immigrants, many grassroots elements of the party have tended to demonize the immigrants who make up almost 40 percent of the workforce.

    The state is already close to a minority majority; Latinos alone make up half of the current kindergarten class. Republicans could blame the Democrats for the state’s persistent fiscal crisis. They could score points against the elitist aspects of ultra-green policies, the gluttony of public employees, the prospect of higher taxes, and the more radical parts of the left’s social agenda. However, that argument must be addressed toward, not against, the state’s increasingly minority middle class.

    Instead, the most probable political scenario is more of the same, or worse. The two leading candidates for governor, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom and 70-year-old Attorney General Jerry Brown, are considerably to the left of and even greener than Schwarzenegger.

    Brown is clearly the stronger candidate, with a demonstrated appeal to minority voters that Newsom lacks. And Brown enjoys greater name recognition and better access to the big urban land interests, Hollywood, and Silicon Valley, the main money sources of the party other than the unions. In addition, Newsom is particularly ill suited to make even Jerry Brown seem out of touch. In a campaign, Newsom will have to justify his city’s policy of shielding illegal alien felons. He has spoken publicly about fining residents up to $1,000 for failing to sort their garbage correctly, something sure to repel most Californians.

    Yet a second Brown administration poses enormous risks. Although somewhat pragmatic as mayor of Oakland, Brown has become an increasingly strident apostle of Al Gore’s global warming ideology. Brown calls global warming “the most important environmental issue facing the state and the world.” He has made it clear that he hopes to use legislative and executive power to curb suburban growth and induce people to cram themselves into California’s already congested, often crime-ridden cities.

    Brown also seems determined to declare a holy war against the state’s already weakened agricultural and industrial base. As attorney general, he has pledged to block a proposed northern California plant that violates green values by using plastic bottles, a policy which, if he carries it out to its logical end, will decimate almost every blue-collar and industrial industry in the state.

    So is there hope for the Golden State? Perhaps, although California likely will never regain the preeminence of a quarter century ago. Brown is many things, but he is also smart and flexible, as he showed by embracing Proposition 13 after its passage in 1978. He could still find a way to push the legitimate part of the green agenda, such as expansion of renewable fuels, without forcing every carbon- consuming business or single-family homebuilder out of the state.

    Finally, there is this: no place in North America enjoys California’s combination of fertility, natural beauty, and diversity. Many Californians accept high housing prices, silly regulations, and noxious lawyers as part of the price of paradise. In a country of 50 states and more than 300 million people, there should still be a niche for an exceptional place, even if it no longer can pretend to lead the nation.

    This article originally appeared at American.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Pittsburgh’s Brain Drain Game

    Rust Belt communities are obsessed with brain drain. The demographic losers of economic restructuring, cities are employing a variety of strategies to stop the bleeding and keep the talent from leaving the region. Akron, OH recently voted down a proposal to lease the city’s sewer system in order to fund a scholarship program designed to plug the holes of out-migration. The voters balked at the initiative partly as a result of the 30-year residential commitment necessary to reap the full benefits of the funding for post-secondary education in Akron schools.

    You would think plugging the brain drain seems like a good idea. I thought so when I decided to help Southwestern Pennsylvania solve its declining population problem. However, a few months into the project I determined that the exodus from Pittsburgh ended almost two decades ago. The devastating loss of young adults in the early 1980s still echoed throughout the area and informed a great deal of policymaking.

    The most comical anti-brain-drain campaign was Border Guard Bob, a product of the Pittsburgh Regional Alliance who was invented to keep local graduates around home. The pitch was that Pittsburgh is too great of a place to leave, if you knew where to look. Bob was retired before his unveiling, hopefully because he was too ridiculous even for our local leaders, but the spirit behind it remained.

    I’m not aware of any successful anti-brain-drain program, but Pittsburgh continues to try despite having more college graduates than the region can employ. If anything, Greater Pittsburgh suffers from a glut of talent that stubbornly tries to stay. Average wages are below even those in nearby Cleveland, which sports notably more unemployment and a much more acute foreclosure crisis. Yet the initiatives keep coming.

    The Pittsburgh Urban Magnet Project (PUMP) claims to better enfranchise young adults living in the city. The ultimate goal is to retain talent by giving them reasons to stay. Empowering residents is noble enough, but I doubt PUMP can deliver the population boost the City of Pittsburgh desperately seeks.

    Maybe the problem is not that Pittsburgh or other Midwest cities are unattractive places to live. Instead the roots of the out-migration lie elsewhere – in dysfunctional economies and wretched politics. It’s not lack of “cool places” to hang out but things like a declining tax base and a growing pension debt that effectively hamstring the city.

    Frustrated job seekers aren’t heading to the Sun Belt because they need a cooler place to hang out. They are looking for jobs and opportunities. And if they hang around until their thirties, they then leave to the surrounding suburbs and their better schools.

    The Pittsburgh Promise, a child of the Kalamazoo Promise, offers a better alternative. Thanks to money from the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC), the City doesn’t have to lease its sewers in order to provide graduates from Pittsburgh public schools with scholarships. The suburban schools don’t look quite so attractive when we are talking about a free ride for college.

    But even if it’s a step in the right direction, the Pittsburgh Promise still won’t keep families from moving to Charlotte, NC. It certainly won’t attract families from Austin, TX. Therein lies the flaw. There are no mechanisms to bring new talent into the region. Without substantial in-migration, particularly immigration, no Rust Belt city is likely to experience an economic renaissance. But the focus is always on the people who leave. The real problem is why people don’t come.

    Just about anywhere in the Rust Belt, the perception of brain drain and actual rates of out-migration are horribly out of whack. This past summer, the Land Policy Institute at Michigan State University issued a report that concluded that the number of young adults in the state was growing faster than the national average during the period of 2000-2006. The cry to stop brain drain in Michigan – epitomized by Governor Jennifer Granholm’s “cool cities” program – has never been louder. The rhetoric doesn’t concern me, but the ineffectiveness of the programs should give everyone pause.

    Basically fighting out-migration is a losing cause. The US Census found a positive correlation between increasing levels of education and the greater likelihood of leaving a region. Should Pittsburgh stop investing in its schools in order to better retain residents? Of course not. But this is no more absurd than spending a lot of money to keep people from seeking opportunity elsewhere.

    If you are a parent, then the idea of moving in order to improve your children’s opportunities makes sense. However, for a community to invest in a student likely to leave the economic area presents a conflict of interest.

    The Pittsburgh Promise isn’t a bad idea. Maybe it will encourage people to stay or even move in from the suburbs given the carrot of subsidized college tuition. But that won’t alleviate anemic regional population growth. Pittsburgh needs to sell itself globally as a place where you can access opportunity, either for yourself or your children. Pittsburgh must attract new blood. Pittsburgh, essentially, needs economic growth.

    I’ve labored over the best way to align the interests of individuals with that of the community concerning geographic mobility. I think the solution is, counter-intuitively, to promote out-migration. Pittsburgh’s exodus during the early 1980s was impressive, perhaps uniquely so. The result is what I call the Burgh Diaspora, the scattered expatriates who still retain an unusual preoccupation with their hometown.

    My idea is to use the Burgh Diaspora like an alumni network, to help Pittsburghers get a leg up on globalization. You can always find an ex-neighbor prepared to help you. Facilitating this odyssey could deepen loyalty and might eventually spark a return migration. But my hope is that non-natives would also appreciate this value proposition, seeking access to the diaspora network.

    Read Jim’s Rust Belt writings at Burgh Diaspora.

  • Young Voters Turn America Left

    Nothing made Barack Obama’s victory potentially more historically significant than his overwhelming support from millennial voters, members of the generation born in or after 1982. Obama won voters under 30 by roughly two-to-one, compared with barely half for John Kerry, making some Democrats positively giddy with the prospect of long-term domination of American politics. Most of these voters also stayed with the Democrats down ticket, enhancing the mass slaughter of GOP lambs across the country.

    Whether the Democrats keep this edge, however, depends not so much on the new president’s personal appeal, but on whether he and his party can deliver economically for workers entering a very tough economy. This will become increasingly critical as millennial voters age and begin focusing less on symbolism and more on how the new regime has worked for them in terms of income and upward mobility.

    The poor economy impacts young voters more than commonly believed. Even before the recession kicked in, a 2006 survey by the Center for American Progress found 15- to 25-year-olds twice as likely to view the economy as the main issue than the rest of population. When they came out to vote earlier this month, young voters had little reason to support continued Republican rule. Even in the expansionary period earlier in this decade, the incomes of younger workers continued to fall, in part because they were too young to enjoy gains from either the stock or housing bubbles.

    More ominously, since 2000, these reverses have been shared even by those with college educations–the very group that, outside of the poor and African-Americans, most supported Obama. They voted for him at a time when, according to a survey by the National Association of Colleges and Employers, half of all companies planned to cut the number of new graduates hired from the previous year.

    In contrast to previous generations, millennials are finding that a four-year degree no longer insulates them from declining earnings or the specter of under-employment. This may be in part because college-educated workers today face unprecedented competition from skilled labor in other countries, particularly in the developing world.

    Reversing this trend for younger workers may well prove the greatest challenge and opportunity for the new administration. If the millennials stick with President Obama and the Democrats, we indeed could witness a long-term shift toward the left in American politics.

    Certainly, the initial indications are positive. As Morley Winograd and Michael Hais point out in their groundbreaking book Millennial Makeover, younger voters were attracted to the egalitarian and “civic” orientation of the Obama campaign. They first rejected the individualist, combative baby-boomer ethos represented by Hillary Clinton, who did very poorly among younger voters. Later they also turned against the harsh tone of the McCain campaign and its embrace of both Cold War rhetoric and social conservatism.

    However, how long will the millennials’ leftward tilt last? It all depends on whether the new administration fixes the economy and creates opportunities for the millennials who will be flooding the workforce in the coming years.

    A generation’s early exposure to politics and politicians can shape their perspective for decades. The politics of the generation that came to age during the 1930s, for example, reflected their experience first with the New Deal and then with Democratic leadership during the Second World War.

    Although conservative ideologues can argue incessantly that Franklin Roosevelt’s policies prolonged the Great Depression, the fact remains that most Americans supported Roosevelt through the entire period. More importantly, after the great stimulus of the Second World War, large parts of an entire generation shared in one of the greatest periods of prosperity in global history.

    Not only did they enjoy a steady increase in real incomes, but also the average person’s access to homeownership and college education expanded at an unprecedented rate. In addition, critically, the economy’s expansion took place without increasing the gap between the rich and everyone else, unlike the most recent expansions.

    Economists can bicker all they want, but most people believed that the New Deal and the Democrats delivered. This won them the loyalty of a generation that kept them as the majority party well into the 1960s.

    If President Obama and the Democrats can deliver similarly prolonged economic growth with a strong egalitarian distribution, the millennials would seem destined to constitute the bulwark of a quasi-permanent new majority. Nothing that the Republicans could do with cultural issues or security could offset this phenomenon. Indeed, millennial positions on issues such as gay marriage and abortion suggest that contemplating a continuation of the “culture wars” could be self-defeating.

    This is not the only possible scenario. In the 1960s and 1970s, many baby boomers also embraced liberal politics, largely for cultural reasons and in opposition to the Vietnam War. However, the dismal economic failures of the Carter years, and the apparent cluelessness of the Democratic Congress in finding ways to compete in a changing world economy, ultimately drove many boomers to Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party. This shift allowed the GOP to dominate American politics for a quarter century.

    For the new president, the critical millennial challenge will be to create a vibrant, productive economy that can expand opportunities for new workers, including those with college degrees. Style and symbolism will seduce young people only for so long; ultimately, they will also want jobs, income and the chance to live a decent middle-class life.

    Everything depends on what the Democrats now do. Few of the forces closest to the new president–the gentry liberals, the legal establishment, the green lobby and big city mayors–have a track record of creating widespread new employment and expanding opportunity.

    In addition, much of the leadership of the congressional party, based in urban and elite locales, favors positions that might constrain broad-based growth.

    A policy of raising taxes on entrepreneurs (as opposed to the accumulated wealth of the gentry class), increased regulation on small businesses and spending on an ever-expanding public sector bureaucracy does not bode well for a strong economic resurgence.

    It is true that younger voters, as a recent Center for American Progress report suggested, support higher taxes and expanded government as the preferred way to solve social ills. But as they age, some of those very millennials will be the ones paying the bills for their good intentions. They will have to try establishing businesses in a harsh regulatory climate. This could turn even some now fervent Obamaphiles into retro-Reaganites.

    However, if the new president proves as clever at policy as at politics, and sparks a new growth economy, all this could prove moot. With a grateful new generation behind him, Obama could help the Democrats achieve a period of predominance every bit as extended as the one shaped by Franklin Roosevelt three-quarters of a century ago.

    It all boils down to whether the senator can meet the millennial challenge not only this year but also in the years ahead.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • The Geography of Change: Election 2008

    As an old radical Democrat, I remained fearful that this fall would see another 2000 and 2004. But instead there was a massive shift of perhaps 10 million votes, or about 7 percent to the Democratic side.

    Yet in some ways the “red” and “blue” map of results doesn’t look very different than in the past – a vast interior sea of red, although close inspection reveals some important shifts from red to blue. But the second map, of change – 2008 compared to 2004, is astounding: now a sea of blue across the North and West (except for the Arizona due home state effect). There was also a fascinating (Bible?) belt of counties that became redder than in 2004, if that were possible, from Appalachia, the southwest tip of PA, through WV, TN and northern AL, then west across the border South through TN, AR, ands OK.

    The 2008 election clearly reinforced and amplified some trends already apparent in 2006, a Democratic ascendancy based first in large metropolitan areas, but now extending far into suburbia and even exurbia, and dominated by an intellectual and professional class, and second, traditional racial and ethnic minority areas, urban or rural.

    Now these are joined by a third group, a dramatically larger Obama vote from the under thirty, and probably enough to have shifted several critical states – CO, IN, IA, NH, NC and VA – the Democrats. The three groups overlap, of course. Except in those anomalous border states, the relative shift was about the same in rural small-town America as in the large metropolitan areas. However, the turnout certainly increased more for minorities and for the under-30 than for us white non-Hispanic adults. Frankly, along with other political geography experts, I underestimated the likelihood of the shift to the Democrats of VA, NC and IN.

    There are some fascinating details. First is the amazing success of Obama in counties dominated by colleges and universities, with switches in strongly Republican Whitman county in Washington (home of Washington State), or Gallatin, MT (Montana State, Bozeman) and Monongalia (Univ. West Virginia), or Tippecanoe (Purdue University), IN, and dozens of others. Second is the shift of many metropolitan core, suburban and exurban counties to Obama, including in California Ventura, San Bernardino, Riverside and San Diego (truly amazing), as well as Reno (Washoe), NV; Orlando (Orange), FL; Houston (Harris); TX; Birmingham, AL; and Raleigh, NC. Perhaps the most unusual were the switch of very long time Republican strongholds as Omaha NE, Cincinnati, OH, and Grand Rapids, MI. Third, Democrats also continued to carry even more counties with environmental in-migration, especially in the west.

    We may have seen a historic shift from the baby-boomer generation to a newer Millennial generation. But the Democrats should remember from 1994 that the American electorate is centrist, and any supposed realignment is fragile.

    Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist)

    Election maps courtesy of Mark Newman, Department of Physics and Center for the Study of Complex Systems, University of Michigan

  • Of Houses, Castles and the Universal Dream

    As I sit here in Beijing Capital International Airport waiting for a flight to Taiyuan, I realize something universal about people. Whether in the suburbs of Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, Xi’an, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Nanjing or even in the historical accident of Hong Kong, some of the most beautiful single-family detached housing in the world is here. It is not extensive, because it is not affordable to the great majority of Chinese. The Chinese call them “villas.” It is, however, the most expensive of housing and a goal to which many of the nation’s rising entrepreneurial class aspire.

    It may be that it was called a dream first in America, but its beginnings go back much further. For much of human history, most people who lived in large cities were forced to put up with virtually inhuman densities. By definition, large cities were compact. Indeed, they were often not a lot larger in their geographical expanse than smaller cities. Why? To be efficient labor markets, cities had to be small, so that all of the workers could get to all of the jobs – and in those days the only way to get around was by foot. As cities got larger, especially during the industrial revolution, densities rose in some neighborhoods to 200,000 and more per square mile. The lower East Side of New York topped out at 375,000 in the 1910 census and has since dropped by 75 percent.

    The lack of sewers, clean water and the rampant filth bred disease and discomfort far beyond that experienced by any in today’s America, or for that matter today’s Europe, Japan or any other developed world country. The residents put up with it because it was better than staying in the countryside where there were fewer jobs, opportunities, or any hope for a better life. It says much about how difficult rural life was.

    But not everyone lived in such crowded conditions. Throughout history, the most wealthy have had their castles, estates and mansions. This was true in the cesspool of 19th century American and European industrial cities, just as it was in Rome.

    The coming of mechanized transport, especially urban and suburban commuter rail systems changed all this. In the latter half of the 19th century the upper middle class began to enjoy a small modicum of estate life. These communities were set in places like Riverside in Chicago and Llewelyn Park in New Jersey and even the semi-detached housing suburbs of outer London. In these places, better transport made it possible for a larger share of the population to live without urban crowding, with their own private grounds, however humble.

    Transport was to get even better and, as a result, the suburban option spread. The popular, modern start of the mass-produced automobile oriented suburb was Bill Levitt’s Levittown, built in a Long Island potato field. These modest less than 750 square foot homes, with their yard, seemed nothing less than estates to the thousands of military personnel and others who gave the name to the American Dream. Levitt and Detroit had combined to make it possible. For the first time in history a large proportion of households to own their own, albeit miniaturized, castle.

    Although not quite estate link, the average home has grown, with the average size approaching 2,500 square feet. Many Levittown homes have been expanded to accommodate a more affluent lifestyle. All of it is what I like to call the democratization of prosperity – an unprecedented sharing of the wealth that started not far beyond the borders of New York City.

    For the traveler interested in seeing urban areas beyond the touristic haunts, it is clear that the dream has expanded far beyond America. This is not surprising, because human beings, in general, seem to prefer their own space and will buy it if they can afford it. The Great Australian Dream involves detached housing that is nearly as large as new housing in the United States – even as planners struggle to force new houses on lots so small that a fire in one will likely spread to others. The large urban areas of suburbs from Canada to the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Sweden, Germany and all other developed nations all have experienced a rapid expansion of suburban living.

    The extent of the Universal Dream becomes even more compelling when one travels the developing world. Virtually the same pattern is evident in new suburbs of Beijing, Jakarta, Manila, Bangkok, Istanbul and Cairo. All have a smattering of single-family detached housing. Unlike the developed world, however, it cannot be afforded by much of the middle income population.

    None of this is to suggest that there are not some who would prefer a condominium on the upper East Side of New York, or in Chicago’s Gold Coast or in the precincts of the ville de Paris or the core of Stockholm. These people, however, constitute a minority, at least in part because a quality urban life comes with a price tag often far higher than that of the suburbs. For most people with middle class incomes, the best option remains a house that offers comfort, privacy and space at a price they can afford.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life

  • Obama: Making History but Not Ending It

    Barack Obama won a mandate among younger voters so large that it literally defies comparison, and with it, we’re told, a mandate to retire tired old fights of little concern to this new generation. Yet in the long run, it may well be that his victory has only put on hold some enduring political conflicts and may even ignite new ones.

    Obama’s 34-point, 66-32 percent win among the group that made up about 20 percent of voters and 60 percent of new voters was nearly four times the margin of John F. Kennedy in 1960 and Clinton in 1992.

    This differential has been put down to the vast age gap between the first post-boomer candidate and his pre-boomer foe. A poll comparing support in an Obama-McCain race against a theoretical Clinton-McCain race in September, though, showed no gender gap in support for the respective Democrats, but a vast difference in the age of their supporters, with the Illinois senator faring 20 percentage points better than his New York counterpart among voters 35 and under, which was more or less cancelled out by Clinton’s 6-point lead among the larger pool of voters 35 and older.

    It’s clear that Obama’s victory represents, among other things, a generational transfer of power. What’s less clear is the oft-repeated claim that with it the culture wars of the 1960s have finally been “won,” or at least that the two sides have agreed to a cease-fire.

    Vietnam vets, pollster James Zogby points out, are oh-for-the-last-three elections, and vets overall oh-for-the-last five. Race has been put away, perhaps since Obama’s post-Wright speech and certainly since his election. (That particular cease-fire, as it were, was immeasurably aided by McCain’s decision, not always honored by his campaign, to stay clear of former Obama spiritual guide Reverand Jeremiah Wright in particular and race more generally).

    Gender? It turns out the Hillary supporters came around to Obama after all. When feminists blasted Sarah Palin for working despite having five children and conservatives insisted they’d never had an issue with unmarried teen pregnancies, it became clear that yesterday’s core principles had been reduced to this election’s politically expedient positions.

    The era-ending nature of Obama’s win has been vouched for by no less an authority of the old culture wars than William Ayers. Writing in These Times after the election, the Weatherman founder turned Hyde Park friend of the Chicago machine writes:

    “The idea that the 2008 election may be the last time in American political life that the ’60s plays any role whatsoever is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, let’s get over the nostalgia and move on.

    On the other, the lessons we might have learned from the black freedom movement and from the resistance against the Vietnam War have never been learned. To achieve this would require that we face history fully and honestly, something this nation has never done.”

    Ayers is right that we haven’t faced history, in part because Americans are always so busy trying to bury it. We have opted to use Obama – who referred to himself in The Audacity of Hope as “A blank screen on which people of vastly differently political stripes project their own views” – as a proxy for history. With his election, the old politics are behind us.

    Or not. As Mario Cuomo might say, it’s a poetic notion but it won’t survive four years of prose.

    By the time the election was called for Obama at 11:00 Tuesday night, it was already clear that the old racial, ethnic, gender, class and regional antagonisms remain very much in play.

    The heated and at times nasty name calling between blacks and gays (mostly aimed at the former by the latter) in the aftermath of Proposition 8’s passage in California even as those same voters gave Obama a 23-point, 2.6 millon vote win, represents one illustration. (Gays incidentally, preferred Clinton to Obama by more than 2-to-1 in the state’s primary, according to CNN exit polling). Arizona and Florida voters also passed referenda defining marriage as between one man and one woman, and Arkansas voters passed one prohibiting unmarried couples from adopting children or serving as foster parents.

    It’s clear that the strong generational consensus of equal rights for gays isn’t a broader American consensus just yet.

    New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s dismissal of the automakers’ appeals for federal monies (which spawned a predictable round of New York to Detroit: Drop Dead headlines) is another, representing both the clash of cities and regions for their share of the federal bailout funds, and the clash of wealthy Wall Street Democrats with what’s left of the old industrial union branch of the party.

    So too will be coming tension between the party’s urban core and vulnerable new exurban House members, who may not easily accept the urbanist green agenda embraced by the party’s city-oriented congressional leadership, and which would pass tremendous upfront and long term costs to industries ranging from airlines and aerospace to truckers and energy producers. Whatever the potential environmental and economic benefits down the road, this tack will prove politically difficult to implement if the economy continues to struggle and oil prices continue to fall.

    More generally, there’s the tension between the socially libertarian instincts of younger voters and their pro-big government tilt, especially but not exclusively on the environment, a dynamic that’s just now beginning to play out but augurs conflict to come.

    Then there’s the continued dissatisfaction of those Hillary voters who gritted their teeth while pulling the lever for Obama. What if the Republicans find a more effective and proven female standard-bearer than Sarah Palin?

    New black and Latino voters culturally closer to the religious right than to the wealthier liberals with whom they united in support of Obama have not had a chance to express those culturally conservative views. Perhaps a Bobby Jindal or some other non-white Republican figure could emerge to exploit these potential fissures once memories the anti-immigration fervor of the GOP primaries has faded.

    It’s critical to recognize that all these conflicts – regional, geographic, ethnic and philosophical – were suppressed this year by the economy, which drove voters of all stripes running to the Democrats. When the economy improves, or becomes the problem of the Democrats as opposed to George Bush’s cross to bear, many issues now considered resolved won’t be.

    Barack Obama may have made history but he did not end it. As we have seen over the past decades, the end of one set of conflicts often sets the stage for another. This is likely to be the case again.

    Harry Siegel is a contributing editor at Politico. hsiegel@politico.com

  • Two-Timing Telecommute Taxes

    Telecommuting — or telework — is a critical tool that can help employees, businesses and communities weather the current financial crisis, and thrive afterward. However, right now, the nation is burdened with a powerful threat to the growth of telework: the telecommuter tax. This tax is a state penalty imposed on Americans who work for employers outside their home states and sometimes telecommute.

    Proposed bi-partisan federal legislation called the Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act would abolish the telecommuter tax. To help assure that the nation can take full advantage of the economic relief telework offers, Congress must pass this bill – either as stand-alone legislation or as part of a new economic stimulus package.

    Relief for Employees

    Working from home (or alternative sites close to home) can save struggling families money on gasoline, parking, train and bus fares, dry cleaning, business wardrobes and work-week meals. They can save on dependent care by providing some of the necessary care themselves during the time they previously spent commuting.

    Telework can also relieve the considerable strain on Americans nearing retirement who have unexpectedly lost their pensions and must now continue working. Working indefinitely may be a hardship for many older employees. Some may not be able, physically, to continue making a daily round-trip commute. Some may need to move closer to their adult children who live out-of-state, either to receive physical help from them, or to help them with child-care costs by baby-sitting. If Americans who have been robbed of their retirements can work from home at least some of the time, they can stay on the job without having to travel as often or live as close to their offices.

    Relief for Employers

    Employers (both public and private) can use telework to slash real estate and energy expenses. When fewer employees work on-site every day, employers need to rent, heat, cool and light less office space.

    Implementing telework can also reduce recruitment and turnover costs: Employers offering flexibility can attract top-tier candidates from a wide geographic area, and generate loyalty among valued employees.

    Telework can reduce business interruption costs when an emergency or other major disruption occurs near the main office. If, for example, a severe storm, fire, bomb threat or transit strike affects the employer’s area, a staff trained to work remotely can keep operations running smoothly.

    And organizations adopting telework can become more productive. Employees can replace commute time with work time; concentrate better because they are less exposed to the frequent interruptions typical in busy offices; reduce absenteeism by completing tasks at home instead of taking whole days off when they have to meet non-work responsibilities, like caring for sick children, and reduce “presenteeism”, the phenomenon of employees showing up at the office when they are too sick to be productive and are likely to compromise the health and productivity of co-workers.

    Relief for Communities

    Telework can bring new Internet-based jobs to rural areas with sagging economies. It can also bring new home buyers to such regions: Americans who want to maintain their high paced, big-city careers in a slower paced, more scenic environment. A significant growth in the population of home-based workers in these communities can also produce growth in businesses catering to their needs, such as home office supply stores and business service providers.

    The Telecommuter Penalty Tax

    Despite the important help telework can provide during and after the financial meltdown, states may punish nonresident teleworkers by subjecting them to a telecommuter tax. New York has been particularly aggressive on this front.

    Under the “convenience of the employer” rule, when a nonresident of New York and his New York employer agree that the employee may sometimes work from home, New York will tax him on his entire income, both the income he earns when he works in New York, and the income he earns when he works at home, in a different state. Because telecommuters’ home states can also tax the wages telecommuters earn at home, they are taxed twice on those wages.

    In some cases, a telecommuter’s home state may give him a credit for the taxes he pays New York on the income he earns at home. However, even in such cases, the employee may be penalized for telecommuting. When New York taxes income at a higher rate than the home state, the telecommuter must pay taxes on his home state income at the higher rate.

    By subjecting nonresident employees to double or excessive taxation if they telecommute, a state like New York needlessly limits the strategies available for coping with our ailing economy.

    Harm to Employers

    By deterring telework, the telecommuter tax frustrates businesses trying to decentralize their workers and prevents them from exploiting telework’s business benefits.

    In addition, the hefty payroll obligations the telecommuter tax imposes on businesses can force companies to relocate. Indeed, The New York Times reported this year on a small business that planned to leave New York because tackling the state’s claims under the convenience of the employer rule proved too draining. (See David S. Joachim, “Telecommuters Cry ‘Ouch’ to the Tax Gods,” The New York Times, Special Section on Small Business, Feb. 20, 2008.)

    Further, by thwarting the growth of telework, the telecommuter tax encourages traffic congestion, a menace to productivity. Excessive traffic can, for example, cause employees to arrive late for work and delay customer deliveries.

    Harm to States

    In addition to employees and employers, telecommuters’ states of residence also suffer under the telecommuter tax. Consider a Virginia resident who telecommutes most of the time to his New York employer. If Virginia grants the telecommuter a credit for taxes paid to New York on his home state income, Virginia forfeits its tax revenue to New York. In so doing, Virginia effectively subsidizes public services in New York (like transportation, police, fire and other emergency services) while it makes the same services available to its resident who is working in Virginia. States currently struggling with steep budgetary shortfalls cannot afford to cede their own revenue to other states. The employee who telecommutes, meanwhile, suffers under a reduced budget for home state spending.

    Even the state imposing the tax loses. In addition to driving business away, New York’s telework tax policy can drive part-time telecommuters away. Because the convenience of the employer rule applies only to nonresidents who spend time working in New York, nonresidents can avoid the rule by avoiding the state: They can increase their telecommuting from part-time to full-time, or take jobs in their home states. When nonresidents stop traveling to New York for work, New York gives up the opportunity to tax any of their wages, and New York restaurants, hotels and other businesses lose the income these teleworkers would have generated on their commuting days.

    The Remedy

    The Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act would eliminate these ills, prohibiting states like New York from taxing the income nonresidents earn at home in other states.

    The bill has bi-partisan support in both Houses of Congress, including the support of lawmakers from Connecticut, Maine, Mississippi and Virginia. Outside Congress, the measure has been endorsed by advocates for telecommuters, taxpayers, homeowners and small businesses.

    To help assure that the greatest number of employees and businesses can maximize telework’s economic benefits – during the current crisis and afterward – Congress should pass the Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act. Whether as an addition to a new stimulus package or in a separate measure, Washington must see to it that telecommuter tax fairness becomes the law.