New Geography

Tag: China

  • The Evolving Urban Form: Jing-Jin-Ji (Dispersing Beijing)

    China’s cities continue to add population at a rapid rate, despite a significant slowdown in population growth. Although overall population is expected to peak around 2030, the urban population will continue growing until after 2050. China’s cities will be adding more than 250 million new residents in the next quarter century, according to United Nations projections. China’s cities will add nearly as many people as live in Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest country, more than live in Brazil and 10 times as many as live in Australia.

    Two of China’s six megacities (urban areas with more than 10 million population) are nearly adjacent, within 90 miles (150 kilometers) of one another. The urban areas of Beijing and Tianjin have a combined population of 35 million and are among the fastest growing in the world. This is an increase of nearly 60% from the 2000 population of 21 million.

    The Jing-Jin-Ji Megalopolis

    The faster growing of the two, Beijing, is the national capital. Beijing is encircled by five freeway standard ring roads or beltways. These are numbered 2 through 6, with the first ring road being surrounding the Forbidden City. Its population is served by a number of additional expressways and the world’s longest subway. For some time there has been discussion of integrating the metropolitan areas of a much larger region. A principal purpose is dispersion — to redistribute activities, such as government administration and manufacturing away from Beijing’s congested core to peripheral locations.

    Over the past year, there have been various announcements describing the process. The  megalopolis would be called Jing-Jin-Ji, and would be composed of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei province. An alternative name would be the "Capital Economic Circle." The name, Jing-Jin-Ji is constructed of the last syllables of "Beijing" and "Tianjin," along with "ji," which is the pronunciation of the one character Mandarin abbreviation for Hebei.

    The Need for Dispersal

    Beijing has just become too dense and too crowded. Traffic congestion already is among the worst in the world. According to The Sydney Morning Herald, the situation has become so bad that officials intended to limit the population of the Beijing municipality (province) to 23 million, only slightly above the population that is nearing 22 million. They also intend to reduce the population of central districts by 15%.

    Important steps are already being taken. Construction has begun on a new facility to house Beijing municipality functions in the suburban district ("qu") of Tongzhou. This subsidiary center is a 40 minute drive from the city center. Tongzhou borders the municipality of Tianjin and, according to the Beijing Municipality government is itself growing about one-quarter faster than the Beijing municipality itself.

    There are also plans to move many of the manufacturing facilities that have located in Beijing to the other jurisdictions. The extent of the manufacturing dominance of Beijing is illustrated by the much larger "floating population," of Beijing, which consists of migrants from other parts of the country who lack local residence permission (hukou). According to data in the China Yearbook 2014, Beijing has more than double the ratio to its population of migrant workers as Tianjin and nearly 10 times the ratio of Hebei, which has more than two-thirds of the megalopolis population.

    One large automobile manufacturer has already completed moving out of Beijing to Huanghua, a county level city in the Hebei municipality of Cangzhou, which borders Tianjin to the south.

    Geography of Jing-Jin-Ji

    The jurisdictions comprising Jing-Jin-Ji have approximately 110 million residents. The gross land area is approximately 216,000 square kilometers (83,000 square miles), approximately the land area of Romania or the US state of Idaho. No one, however, should imagine a Phoenix or Portland type sprawl of such a magnitude. As is indicated the Table, the overall population density of Jing-Jin-Ji is only 500 residents per square kilometer (1,300 per square mile).  The largest urban areas comprise only 3.5% of the land area, yet contain approximately 40% of the population. Despite the massive urbanization of Beijing and Tianjin, and the other large urban areas, Jing-Jin-Ji has a population that is 40% rural.

    Components of Jing-Jin-Ji
    Jurisdiction Total Population (2013) Density (per KM2) Principal Urban Area Population (2015) Urban Density (per KM2)
    Beijing 21.2      1,300 20.2      5,100
    Tianjin 14.7      1,200 10.9      5,400
    Jing-Jin-Ji Core 35.9      1,300 31.1      5,200
    Baoding 10.2         500 1.3      5,900
    Langfang 4.4         700 0.5      3,800
    Canzhou 7.2         500 0.5      3,800
    Tangshan 7.5         600 2.4      8,700
    Zhangzhiakow 4.6         100 1.2      9,200
    Qinhuangdao 2.9         400 1.0      6,500
    Chengde 3.7         100 0.1      4,300
    Inner Jing-Jin-Ji 40.5         300 7.0      6,600
    Shijiazhuang 10.4         700 3.4    17,000
    Handan 9.2         800 2.0    11,900
    Xingtai 7.1         600 0.7      6,000
    Henshui 4.3         500 0.4    11,800
    Outer Jing-Jin-Ji 31.0         600 6.5    12,500
    Jng-Jin-Ji 109.2         500 44.6      5,900
    Population in millions.
    Jurisdition population from government sources
    Urban area population from Demographia World Urban Areas

     

    The Nearby Urban Areas

    In addition to Tianjin, other urban areas are expected to gain functions, jobs and residents from Beijing. Baoding, an urban area to the southwest of Beijing is expected to gain hospitals, educational institutions and government offices. Baoding has a population of 1.3 million and is a former capital Hebei, but was displaced by Shijiazhuang in 1967. Shijiazhuang, with a population of 3,4 million, is located  in the outer ring of Jing-Jin-Ji.

    Langfang is unusual in being a discontinuous municipality, part of which is an enclave surrounded by Beijing and Tianjin (as is Hebei province), and the other part located to the south of both jurisdictions. Langfang is in the path of growth of both Beijing and Tianjin. The urban area of Langfang is still relatively small, with 500,000 residents. The urbanization along the Jingtang Expressway through Langfang nearly reaches the development of Beijing to the northwest and Tianjin to the southeast.

    Tangshan is directly north of Tianjin and east of Beijing. Tangshan seems likely to benefit from the dispersion of functions, jobs and residences by virtue of its proximity to both of the megacities. A new high speed rail line has just been announced that would connect Tangshan with Beijing in 30 minutes. Tangshan gained international notoriety in 1976 when it was struck by a devastating earthquake (photo here) that virtually flattened the city and killed at least 240,000 people (estimates of the earthquake death toll reach 800,000). Tangshan has been completely rebuilt, with impressive modern architecture (photograph above, taken from an earthquake memorial), but not appreciated by all. One architectural critic has insensitively bloviated that the new architecture "has been more destructive to Tangshan’s urban history than the great earthquake." Today, Tangshan is an urban area of 2.4 million.

    Qinhuangdao, an urban area of 1 million, lies just beyond (northeast of) Tangshan on the way to Shenyang and China’s Dongbei (Manchuria). Qinhuangdao could profit from its well placed seaport.

    Transportation Improvements

    Important transportation improvements have been announced. There are plans to expand Beijing’s subway, which already has the highest ridership in the world and is second longest (after Shanghai). New suburban train lines will be built and new high speed rail lines will connect the cities within Jing-Jin-Ji that are farther apart. There will be considerable expansion of the already comprehensive expressway system, including Beijing’s seventh ring road, which is to be fully completed by 2017. Already, approximately 400 kilometers have been completed, much of it through the mountains to the west of Beijing.

    Decentralizing Beijing

    Jing-Jin-Ji would be China’s third megalopolis, joining with the Yangtze Delta (centered on Shanghai) and Pearl River Delta (centered on an axis from Guangzhou to Shenzhen). But Jing-Jin-Ji is substantially different and not so obvious a candidate for integration. Jing-jin-ji’s urban areas are located farther apart than in the Pearl or the Yangtze. Yet its concentration of development is greater, especially in the Beijing core, which provides much of the justification for decentralization.

    Wendell Cox is Chair, Housing Affordability and Municipal Policy for the Frontier Centre for Public Policy (Canada), is a Senior Fellow of the Center for Opportunity Urbanism (US), a member of the Board of Advisors of the Center for Demographics and Policy at Chapman University (California) and principal of Demographia, an international public policy and demographics firm.

    He is co-author of the "Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey" and author of "Demographia World Urban Areas" and "War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life." He was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, where he served with the leading city and county leadership as the only non-elected member. He served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, a national university in Paris. 

    Photograph: Tangshan’s modern architecture, from an earthquake memorial (by author)

  • Blaming Foreigners for Unaffordable Housing

    In a number of Western world cities, there is rising concern about foreign housing purchases which may be driving up prices for local residents. Much of the attention is aimed at mainland Chinese buyers in metropolitan areas where housing is already pricier than elsewhere. The concern about housing affordability is legitimate. However, blaming foreigners misses the point, which is that the rising prices are to a large degree the result of urban containment policies implemented by governments.

    London and the United Kingdom              

    The Daily Mail reports that London being deluged with foreign house buyers, who are buying not only expensive properties but also "starter homes," driving prices up. The Mail singles out Russian and Chinese buyers, many of whom pay cash for their purchases. Paula Higgins of the Home Owners Alliance lamented the fact that many foreign buyers are paying cash.  She questions the appropriateness of foreign investment in "family homes." David King, of Priced Out, said: "Foreign investment is driving up prices, making it even harder for ordinary people to get a decent place to live."

    Real estate firms headquartered in Russia are steering their clients to less expensive locations, outside London, such as to the north of England and Wales. A London real estate firm said that only 15% of its sales were to buyers from the UK. There is pressure for the government to protect local home buyers

    Certainly these investors are stepping into an already pricey market. The 11th Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey found London house prices to be a severely unaffordable 8.5 times household incomes in 2014. London has the seventh worst housing affordability out of the 86 major markets rated in nine nations. The outside-the-greenbelt exurbs of London have house prices 6.9 times incomes.

    Vancouver

    Vancouver is a city of immigrants. According to data compiled by University of British Columbia (UBC) Geography Professor David Ley, nearly 90 percent of metropolitan Vancouver’s growth over the past two decades has been from foreign immigration (this article contains a graph with the numbers). Yet, there is significant concern about home purchases in the Vancouver area by mainland Chinese. UBC Professor Henry Yu’s history class described the issue in a video (Blaming the Mainlander).

    The Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey found Vancouver house prices to be a severely unaffordable 10.6 times household incomes in 2014. Vancouver has the second worst housing affordability out of the 86 major metropolitan areas rated in nine nations. Hong Kong has the worst housing affordability, with a median multiple of 17.0.

    California and New York

    Ilya Marritz of Public Broadcasting Systems (PBS) radio station WNYC remarked on how foreign investment is driving up prices in the New York and San Francisco bay areas: "There’s this relatively new trend of people buying properties in the city and not actually spending a lot of time living here." The Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey found New York metropolitan area housing to cost 6.1 times incomes, a 65% increase since before the housing bubble.

    The Diplomat, which specializes in Asia-Pacific affairs, commented that “there’s no doubt that China’s presence in the Bay Area market is driving up prices. The Diplomat quoted real estate executive Mark McLaughlin; “it’s added a demographic of buyers who, generally, take a long-term view. They’re not sellers in the next five to seven years.” Chinese buyers are sitting on much of this property as housing in the Bay Area becomes increasingly scarce, causing its value to skyrocket."

    The Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey places both San Francisco and San Jose metropolitan area house prices at 9.2 times incomes, tied for fourth least affordable in the 9 nations.

    The Los Angeles Times reports strong mainland Chinese purchasing activity in the suburbs of Los Angeles, from the San Gabriel Valley to Orange County, particularly Irvine as well as in Riverside-San Bernardino (the Inland Empire).

    The Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey found house prices to be 8.0 times incomes in Los Angeles, the 10th least affordable major metropolitan area in the Survey. Nearby San Diego prices are even higher, at 8.3 times incomes, earning it the 8th least affordable major metropolitan area in the 9 nation Survey.

    New Zealand

    Things have become more heated in New Zealand. The Labour Party opposition housing spokesperson Phil Twyford blamed foreign investors for driving up house prices in Auckland, New Zealand’s only metropolitan area with more than 1,000,000 population.

    "Kiwi families who are struggling to buy their own home want to know the impact offshore speculators are having on skyrocketing Auckland house prices. They are sick and tired of losing homes at auction to higher bidders down the end of a telephone line in another country."

    This evoked considerable criticism for ethnic insensitivity not only among New Zealand’s large Chinese minority, but also ordinary citizens. Radio New Zealand opined: "For a party that has diligently and deliberately courted the ethnic vote, including the Chinese community in Auckland, this was a risky strategy." The Economics Minister accused Labour of playing "the race card." There was predictable reaction in China, which is New Zealand’s largest goods export partner. The Shanghai Daily headlined: "New Zealand housing market debate descends into race row. "Meanwhile, the National Party government continues its difficult task of trying to reverse the consequences of urban containment policy in Auckland.

    The Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey found Auckland house prices to be a severely unaffordable at 8.2 times household incomes in 2014. Auckland has the ninth worst housing affordability out of the 86 major metropolitan areas rated in nine nations.

    Australia

    In Sydney, the Party for Freedom produced a brochure "blaming Chinese property buyers for pushing up home prices, ‘ethnically cleansing’ Australian families from their suburbs and creating a new ‘stolen generation,’" according to The Sydney Morning Herald (" Race hate flyer distributed in Sydney’s north shore and inner city"). The brochure also referred to foreign purchasers as "greedy foreign invaders," and charged them with "pricing locals out of the market." A You-Tube video was posted in which the party chairman burns the flags of China, the Australian ruling Liberal Party, the Labor Party and the Greens and images of Australia’s Prime Minister and the New South Wales Premier.

    Predictably, this brought a sharp reaction from public officials, such as Lane Cove mayor David Brooks-Horn, whose affluent North Shore community was targeted for distribution of the brochures.

    Despite this "vile attack," as New South Wales Multiculturalism Minister characterized it, there remains serious concern in Australia about rising house prices, which many blame on foreign investors aalthough avoiding the extremes indicated above.

    The Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey found Sydney house prices to be a severely unaffordable 9.8 times household incomes in 2014. This is the third most unaffordable market among the 86 major metropolitan areas rated in nine nations.  Today, The Australian Financial Review reported that the median house price in Sydney has reached $1,000,000 for the first time. This is a 23% increase in just one year.

    Melbourne, with prices 8.7 times incomes is sixth least affordable.

    "Supply, Supply, Supply"

    There is a common theme among those who are blaming foreigners for the escalation in their local house prices: foreign buyers have driven up demand, thus increasing prices and driving local purchasers out of the market. That might be a plausible theory if demand by itself raised prices. But, all else equal, demand results in higher prices only when there is a shortage of supply. And a shortage of supply is exactly what has been produced by government policies in each of the metropolitan areas described above.

    The problem lies largely with the blunt policy instrument of urban containment, which makes it virtually impossible to build on wide swaths of suburban greenfield land. Urban containment policy’s most destructive strategies are urban growth boundaries or greenbelts, which often prohibit development on virtually all greenfield sites and other regulations that deny planning permission on the majority of parcels suitable for housing on and beyond the urban fringe. The shortage of supply so important to the price increases has been produced by government policies in each of the metropolitan areas described above (Figure).

    The problem is that urban containment policy "creates its own weather." Investors are disproportionately drawn to markets where there are shortages. Sir Peter Hall and his colleagues pointed out that development plans provide a guide for developers of where to buy within the metropolitan area (in The Containment of Urban England).

    A Canary Wharf buyer in London told The Wall Street Journal: “If I could afford it I’d buy as many as I could”… “Flats [in London] are a great investment. I can’t see that changing." Nor will it so long as the "sure thing" of extraordinary house price increases supported by planning policy continues. San Francisco Bay Area public officials may as well have hung a "Welcome Speculators" banner from the Golden Gate Bridge.

    James Laurenceson, Deputy Director of the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology in Sydney, told The Sydney Morning Herald.:

    "Housing affordability is a real problem. The real reasons are right in front of our eyes – limited land releases, zoning regulations, development charges, record low interest rates and tax breaks to property investors. There’s not a Chinese buyer amongst them."

    Indeed, most of the cities above became severely unaffordable well before an affluent middle-class was enabled by China’s economic reforms.

    New South Wales Premier Mike Baird characterized the solution as "supply, supply, supply," which he sees as "the principal lever" for improving housing affordability. Housing affordability proposals that do not start with the supply shortage are little more than empty rhetoric. Attempts to blame the prices primarily on foreigners are not only misleading, but also diverts the public from the more important role played by limiting supply.

    Wendell Cox is Chair, Housing Affordability and Municipal Policy for the Frontier Centre for Public Policy (Canada), is a Senior Fellow of the Center for Opportunity Urbanism (US), a member of the Board of Advisors of the Center for Demographics and Policy at Chapman University (California) and principal of Demographia, an international public policy and demographics firm.

    He is co-author of the "Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey" and author of "Demographia World Urban Areas" and "War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life." He was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, where he served with the leading city and county leadership as the only non-elected member. He served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, a national university in Paris. 

    Photograph: Opera House, Sydney (by author).

  • China’s Shifting Population Growth Patterns

    As demographers have projected for some time, China’s population growth is slowing. The nation gained population at a rate of 0.49% between 2010 and 2013, according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics. This is a reduction from the rate of 0.57% between 2000 and 2010. Further growth rate declines are expected until the 2030s when the total population, according to United Nations projections, will actually begin to decline.

    Right now the biggest slowdown is taking place in regions with the greatest and densest urbanization such as in the province of Guangdong, home of the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze Delta, anchored by Shanghai. At the same time, the northern plains economic region of Beijing-Tianjin continues its growth, but following a more decentralized pattern that sees more growth away from Beijing.

    Guangdong and the Pearl River Delta

    Guangdong is unique in being home to two of the world’s megacities (urban areas over 10 million population), Guangzhou-Foshan and Shenzhen. No other sub-national jurisdiction (province or state) in the world has more than one. The province, anchored along the Pearl River Delta, has been the heart of China’s three decade long economic advance. Between Guangzhou-Foshan and Shenzhen, the Dongguan urban area has 8 million residents. Across the Pearl River, Jiangmen, Zhongshan and Zhuhai all have more than one million residents. If the China’s adjacent special economic regions of Hong Kong and Macau are included, the area’s population reaches 55 million, nearly one-half more than Tokyo, with nearly the same land area. However, with little day-to-day work trip commuting between, they do not, at least as of yet, represent a single labor market (metropolitan area).

    This slowdown comes after years of spectacular growth. Between 1990 and 2000, the province added more than 40 million new residents, more people than live in California. On average, the the population rose 2.1 million every year, an annual rate of 2.6 percent. Just between 2009 and 2010 the increase was 3.1 million. However, over the three years between 2010 and 2013 Guangdong added only 700,000 each year, for an annual growth rate of 0.66 percent., 

    Shanghai and the Yangtze Delta

    Shanghai, a city province that contains nearly all of the Shanghai mega-city, also experienced a huge drop in its population growth rate (Parts of Shanghai’s continuously built-up area are now stretching into neighboring Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces). Between 2000 and 2010, Shanghai grew at an annual rate of 3.65% and added nearly 7 million new residents. Over the last three years, the annual rate of population growth has dropped by more than half, to 1.67% as only 1.1 million new residents have been added. Shanghai was estimated to have a population of 24,150,000 at the end of 2013.

    Shanghai is at the core of the larger Yangtze River Delta, home to nearly 160 million residents crowded into an area the size of Oregon. The Yangtze Delta includes the provinces of Zhejiang, Shanghai and Jiangsu and stretches from Ningbo, through Hangzhou, Shanghai, Suzhou, Changzhou, and Zhenjiang to Nanjing. Like Guangdong, the Yangtze Delta experienced a substantial drop in its rate of population growth. Between 2000 and 2010, the Yangtze Delta added approximately 20 million new residents, or 1.4 percent annually. This dropped to only 2 million between 2010 and 2013, dropping the annual growth rate  to 0.5%.

    Beijing, Tianjin and the Northern China Plain

    All the population of the Beijing mega-city is contained within the municipal province of Beijing. With its adjacent megacity of Tianjin (also a municipal province) the two provinces combined have a population of 35 million. When combined with the surrounding province of Hebei (capital Shijiazhuang), the population of this Northern China Plain megalopolis is nearing 110 million. Unlike China’s other two major economic regions, the North China Plain is sustaining its population growth. Between 2000 and 2010, the annual population growth rate was 1.47 percent. Over the past three years, it was 1.46 percent.

    Beijing was estimated to have a population of 21,150,000 at the end of 2013.Yet, there has been a substantial slowdown in growth but not as marked as that of Shanghai. Between 2000 and 2010, Beijing added more than 6 million residents, growing at an annual rate of 3.70 percent. Another 1.5 million residents were added between 2010 and 2013, but the growth rate dropped to 2.67 percent.

    The trajectory of growth has now shifted to Tianjin. Tianjin is by far the fastest growing provincial level jurisdiction in China. Between 2010 and 2013, Tianjin grew at an annual rate of 4.49 percent, and added 1.7 million new residents. This is more in total numbers than either Beijing or Shanghai, which are both larger. Among the provincial level jurisdictions, only Guangdong, seven times as large, added more residents. Tianjin is estimated to have a population of 14,720,000.

    Tianjin appears to be an opportunity corridor for growth. Tianjin is located approximately 90 miles (145 kilometers) from Beijing and is the principal seaport in the area. High speed trains between Tianjin and Beijing operate about 100 times each way daily, completing the trip in 35 minutes. Tianjin is a natural safety valve for the continuing growth of the North China Plain megalopolis.

    Hebei continued its stronger than national growth. In the 2000s, Hebei added 5.2 million residents, and added another 1.4 million over the past three years.

    This shift of growth from Beijing to surrounding areas could indicate some success in the policy initiatives of the national and Beijing governments to control Beijing’s rapid population growth and shift it to more peripheral areas. More decentralization initiatives are due, such as the planned seventh ring road, which will traverse most of its distance in surrounding Tianjin and Hebei.

    The Dongbei Rust Belt

    Population growth continues to elude China’s historic Rust Belt, the Dongbei ("East North," also called Manchuria). This area, consisting of Lioaning, Jilin and Heliongjiang provinces, with major cities Shenyang, Harbin and Dalian grew by only 200,000 residents, an annual rate of 0.06 percent. This is down from 0.26 percent in the 2000s, which was less than one-half the national growth rate. The Dongbei has nearly 110 million residents.

    Other Areas

    At the same time, population in the interior province of Hubei (capital Wuhan) has been propelled from 0.14 percent annually between 2000 and 2010 to a near national rate of 0.41 percent since 2010. Adjacent interior province Hunan (capital Changsha) recovered from a 0.01 percent annual growth rate in the 2000s to 0.62 in the last three years. Next to Hunan, city province Chongqing recovered from a lethargic 0.12 percent growth rate between 2000 and 2010, to an impressive 0.99 percent over the last three years. These cases may also be another indication of the success of government policies to encourage growth away from the East Coast.

    Outside of Tianjin, only four regions of China are growing at a greater than one percent annual rate. Three are to the west, including Tibet (1.31 percent), Xinjiang (1.21 percent) and Ningxia (1.12 percent). All are experiencing slower growth than before. To the south, Hainan, the island province, is also growing at just above one percent), about the same rate as in the 2000s.

    Floating Population: Slower Growth

    China’s large floating population, — internal migrants who have moved to the cities to provide the work force for much of the manufacturing and construction boom — continued to grow, but at a somewhat slower rate. The floating population grew 8 million annually between 2010 and 2013, down from 15 million annually between 2005 and 2010. Of course, that is still a big number. With reform of the internal passport system ("hukou" system) promised, there may be an important incentive for many to remain in the cities, where economic aspirations may be more likely to be met.

    China’s Changing Growth Patterns

    China is going through an important transition from nearly speed-of-light economic expansion to much slower growth that is, nonetheless the envy of just about every other major economy. Nonetheless, these changes are already bringing spatial changes.

    Photo: Dalian (Liaoning), in the Dongbei (by author)

    Wendell Cox is principal of Demographia, an international public policy and demographics firm. He is co-author of the "Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey" and author of "Demographia World Urban Areas" and "War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life." He was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, where he served with the leading city and county leadership as the only non-elected member. He served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts etMetiers, a national university in Paris and is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Opportunity Urbanism.

  • 10 Most Affluent Cities in the World: Macau and Hartford Top the List

    The United States and Europe continue to dominate the list of strongest metropolitan areas (city) economies in the world, according to the Brookings Institution’s recently released Global Metro Monitor 2014. This is measured by gross domestic product per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity (GDP-PPP). Brookings points out that this does not indicate personal income, but "proxies the average standard of living in an area."

    The Global Metro Monitor 2014 provides detailed ratings for the 300 largest metropolitan economies in the world, measured by gross domestic product adjusted for purchasing power parity. The list is defined by total size of the economy, with some cities with very high GDP-PPPs per capita, but small populations are excluded. For example, Midland, Texas, with the highest GDP-PPP per capita metropolitan area according to the United States by the Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, is excluded.  Other cities, with large populations and low GDP-PPP s per capita were included, such as megacity Kolkata, with a GDP-PPP of $4,000, a fraction of the top 10 average of $77,000. Megacities such as Lagos, Dhaka and Kinshasa were excluded from the top 300, owing to their low GDP-PPPs per capita

    According to data in the Global Metro Monitor website and report, 90 of the top 100 cities were in the United States or Europe in 2014, 68 in the United States and 20 in Europe. The US figure matches that of the previous Global Metro Monitor (2012), while Europe has fallen from 22 to 20 cities.

    Macau: The Most Affluent City

    Last year’s most affluent city, Hartford, was replaced by Macau, which, with Hong Kong is one of China’s two special economic regions. Brookings estimates Macau’s GDP-PPP per capita at $93,849, opening a substantial lead on Hartford of more than $10,000.

    Macau’s economy has expanded rapidly the last decade, principally due to legalized gaming industry and related tourism. Macau displaced Las Vegas as the largest gaming center in 2006. According to the Las Vegas Review Journal, Macau’s gaming revenues had exploded to nearly seven times that of the Las Vegas Strip ($44.1 billion compared to $6.4 billion). Revenue declined, however, in 2014, partly due to China’s anti-corruption drive and competition from other growing East Asian centers, such as Singapore and the Philippines.

    Macau is the one of the smallest cities in the Brookings 300, with a population of only 575,000. Only three other richest cities have populations less than 600,000 including Durham, North Carolina the smallest, ranked 12th, Pennsylvania’s capital, Harrisburg (with a core city that filed for bankruptcy), ranked 25th and Scotland’s capital, Edinburgh, at ranked 37th.

    Balance of the Top 10 Cities

    As was the case last year, nine of the 10 largest GDP-PPP’s per capita were in the United States (Figure). Like Macau, the second and third ranking cities were also smaller than the average, a population of 4.7 million. Second ranked Hartford, with a GDP-PPP per capita of $83,100 has 1.1 million residents. Hartford’s economy strong in finance, especially insurance and benefits and is an important government center, as the capital of Connecticut.

    San Jose, with 1.9 million residents, ranked third, with a GDP-PPP per capita of $82,400. San Jose is home to the larger part of the world’s leading technology center, suburban Silicon Valley. Tech and University hub Boston ranked fourth.

    Leading energy hub Houston ranked as the fifth most affluent city, with a GDP-PPP per capita of nearly $75,000 (Note 1). With 6.4 million residents, Houston is the largest city among the top five. Among the top ten, only New York is larger.

    Bridgeport, Connecticut, a metropolitan area adjacent to New York that includes suburban business centers such as Stamford, Westport and Greenwich is ranked 6th.

    The balance of the top 10 also includes cities specializing in technology, finance and government. Number seven Washington has probably the world’s largest government complex   and has nurtured a huge technology center centered in the Virginia and Maryland suburbs. Seattle ranks eighth, continuing its historic leadership in the technology driven aerospace industry besides its emergence as one of leading information technology centers in the world.

    San Francisco which includes part of the Silicon Valley in its suburbs (sharing with San Jose) and has a strong social media industry in its urban core, ranks 9th. The top 10 was rounded out by New York, perennially ranked as one of the two top global cities, along with London (see: Size is not the Answer: The Changing Face of the Global City, referred to as the Global Cities Report, described further in Note 2)

    Additional Highlights

    Europe:Unlike the United States, which placed 37 of its most affluent cities in the top 50 and 31 in the second 50, Europe’s 20 most affluent economies were concentrated in the second 50, with only six in the top 50. Comparatively small Edinburgh, cited above, was the most affluent, at 37th. Paris was ranked 40th most affluent by Brookings and 3rd in the Global Cites report, just ahead of London at 42nd, the perennial global city co-leader (which was ranked number one in the Global Cities Report).

    Hong Kong:Along with Macau, China’s other special economic region, Hong Kong continued to be among the world’s most affluent, at 39th. The Global Cities Report ranked Hong Kong as the sixth Global City, with a GDP-PPP PPP higher than that of former its former imperial capital   London.

    China: Perhaps most significantly, mainland China has begun to enter the top 100. Suzhou, partly exurban to Shanghai (Kunshan), now ranks 68th. Suzhou has been the recipient of considerable business park investment, including cooperative ventures with Singapore. China’s economic prosperity may be shifting toward the Yangtze Delta (which extends from Ningbo and Hangzhou, through Shanghai to Nanjing). Along with Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou and Nanjing now have GDP-PPP’s per capita exceeding $30,000. By contrast, among the large manufacturing centers of the Pearl River Delta, only Shenzhen exceeds a GDP-PPP of $30,000, while Guangzhou, Dongguan and Foshan are below that level (Note 2). According to a new Economist Intelligence Unit report, Jiangsu (which includes the urban corridor from Suzhou to Nanjing) now accounts for more manufacturing employment than any other province.

    Surprisingly Low Rankings: Some cities that might have been expected to be among the world’s most affluent, ranked comparatively low. For example Tokyo, the world’s largest city, ranked fourth in the Global Cities Report, made it only to the third 50 in affluence. Seoul-Incheon, a burgeoning corporate and tech center, remained outside the top 100.

    Canada’s largest city, Toronto managed only a ranking of 100, well below the Prairie behemoths of Calgary (11th) and Edmonton (23rd). Australia’s largest city, Sydney also barely made the top 100, at 95th, far below energy and commodities capital Perth (17th).

    European cities with reputations for unusual prosperity also ranked lower than expected. Financial center Zurich was ranked 45th. Scandinavia’s most affluent city  was Stockholm (48th), followed by energy leader Oslo (62nd), Helsinki (87th) and Copenhagen, which failed to make the top 100 and ranked in the third 50. Singapore,which the Global Cities Report ranks fourth, is ranked 14th most affluent.  

    Evaluating City Performance

    Cities grow as migrants are attracted by hope for better lives. This is as true in Africa and India as it is in Europe or the United States. Cities achieve their primary purpose when they produce a higher standard of living for their residents. Some cities do very well at this, as the Brookings data indicates, and some do less well. The Global Metro Monitor provides crucial information that can be used by national, regional and local officials to measure how well their policies are performing in improving living conditions in relation to both their own past and other cities.

    Note 1: Purchasing power can vary greatly even within nations. Because of this, the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis has developed a regional price parities (RPP) program to adjust for metropolitan area costs of living. For example, in 2012, the unadjusted per capita income in San Jose was 30 percent above that of Houston. In the same year, the per capita income-RPP (or in international terms, the per capita income-PPP) in San Jose was just six percent above that of Houston, indicating cost of living at least 20 percent higher in San Jose. 

    Note 2:  Joel Kotkin was principal author of Size is not the Answer: The Changing Face of the Global City, which included contributing authors Ali Modarres, Aaron M. Renn and me. The report was jointly published by the Civil Service College of Singapore and Chapman University. The report is available here.

    Note 3: The 2012 Global Metro Monitor ranked some cities of China higher, though Note 19 expressed concerns about population data for some cities, which might have excluded migrant populations (the "floating population"). There are no such difficulties in the 2014 Global Metro Monitor.

    Wendell Cox is principal of Demographia, an international public policy and demographics firm. He is co-author of the "Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey" and author of "Demographia World Urban Areas" and "War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life." He was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, where he served with the leading city and county leadership as the only non-elected member. He was appointed to the Amtrak Reform Council to fill the unexpired term of Governor Christine Todd Whitman and has served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, a national university in Paris.

    Photo: St. Paul’s Church (Facade), Macau, photo by authors

  • Planning a Trip to China

    Recently concluded agreements between the United States and China have led to easing of visa restrictions, which is expected to lead to tourist volume increases in both directions. As a frequent traveler to China, I have found that organized groups – the simplest way to travel in China – far too confining and have avoided their use with the exception of travel to a Great Wall site in the Beijing area.

    It is easy to obtain a visa by mail or express to visit China by applying through a Chinese consulate or visa service. These are readily found on the internet. It may be surprising that obtaining a visa to visit China is easier than obtaining a visa for a US visit by Chinese citizens, which requires a face-to-face interview with a US consular official.

    Purpose of My Travel

    My principal professional interest is cities. I have toured all of the urban areas with more than 1,000,000 residents in Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States and nearly all of the world’s megacities (over 10 million people). My purpose has been to examine the geography, urban form and transport system of world cities

    China has become a particular interest, not only because of its unprecedented economic trajectory and its poverty reduction, but also because of its strong rate of urbanization. According to the United Nations, in 1975, China was 17 percent urban, and will reach 56 percent in 2015, three times the level of 40 years ago. I have traveled extensively in China over the past 15 years and toured each of the 27 largest urban areas and a number of smaller urban areas.

    Getting There

    Chances are that the individual tourist will enter China through one of its two largest international airports in Beijing and Shanghai.

    Beijing’s Capital International Airport was rebuilt for the Olympics and is an architectural masterpiece. Capital International Airport now trails only Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in passenger volume. As late as 2002, Capital International did not rank among the world’s top 25 airports. There is a limited stop Metro line to the core of Beijing, costing about $4.

    Shanghai’s Pudong International Airport has been substantially expanded in recent years, and unlike many airports, has maintained a consistent architectural design, despite its additions. Pudong International is unique is being served by the world’s only Magnetic Levitation train ("maglev") which takes passengers part way to central Shanghai, at speeds up to 270 miles per hour (430 kilometers per hour). The Mag Lev is the fastest train in the world in commercial operation. The one-way fare is approximately $8 (Note 1). The core of Shanghai can be reached from Pudong by Metro for slightly more than $1.00 (29 miles or 47 kilometers).

    One option the tourist will not find at Chinese airports is the self-drive rental car counter. Generally, rental cars are available only to drivers with a Chinese driving license.

    Not Getting Lost

    Some in China speak English, but the vast majority do not. As is noted below, the principal means of travel within the cities is by taxi and most taxi drivers do not speak English. Therefore it is very important to always take an "address card," which will have the hotel name and address printed in both Chinese characters and English, so the taxi driver can return you to the hotel. Hotel personnel will also write destinations in Chinese characters to give to taxi drivers for trips from the hotel.

    Getting Around in Urban Areas

    Even so, the urban transportation system meets the needs of most tourists. China’s cities are by no means walkable, though some attractions will be available on foot. For example, many central Beijing hotels are within walking distance of Forbidden City. In Shanghai, the Bund and the Nanjing Road shopping district (Note 2) are also near central area hotels.

    Generally you can get around on plentiful and inexpensive taxis or transit systems. China is building metros (subways) in many cities. Shanghai has the longest Metro system in the world, while Beijing ranks second. Distances between stations are often quite great and it is advisable to use taxis from the station for destinations that are beyond comfortable walking distance.

    Getting Around Between Cities

    Airlines: China also has an effective intercity transportation network. China’s domestic airline passenger volume is nearly equal to that of the European Union and trails the United States by 40 percent. Generally, the Chinese airline system is very "English friendly," with onboard staff generally bilingual and English speakers easily found within airports. Meals are provided on most flights.

    Air tickets may be readily purchased using credit cards through Internet sites such as Orbitz.com, Expedia.com, Travelocity.com, and C–Trip.com. My favorite is C-Trip, a Chinese travel agency which has an English language toll free number in China.

    Trains: China has the longest high-speed rail system in the world, with similar quality to those of Japanese and Europe or Amtrak’s Acela Express. The high-speed trains have train number prefixes of "C", "D" or "G" (such as G-1234). Other trains could be less comfortable for Westerner. They can be much slower and often do not have Western style toilets.

    Announcements and electronic signs in carriages are in English and Mandarin. Staff is generally less English proficient than on the airlines, however. There is limited food service (as on the French trains) and travelers may want to take along snacks. Drinks are readily available.

    Tickets may be purchased online from sites such as Travel China and C-Trip with credit cards. However, credit cards cannot be used for tickets at railway stations. I purchase tickets in China, at major stations, where there are special English windows.

    Buses: Buses, which operate on the world’s largest motorway (freeway) network, go many places that cannot be reached by the higher quality train services. Often hotels will be able to obtain bus tickets. My most notable bus trip was from Ningbo to Shanghai, to cross the Hangzhou Bay Bridge, one of the longest in the world.

    Hotels

    China has its share of five star and other "high- end" hotels. I tend to avoid these hotels, because I am interested in stretching my dollar to see more, and stay longer. There are good options for lower cost hotels in China. My own favorite is Ibis, part of the French owned Accor chain. While the guest can expect to pay €100 or more in Europe, Ibis hotels tend to cost between $25 and $50 per night for double occupancy. The advantage, is that Ibis provides a consistent standard that is little different between Paris and Shanghai or Qingdao. Generally, Ibis staff communicates adequately in English. Ibis also has restaurants with limited fare, though I prefer the small entrepreneurial neighborhood establishments.

    A good second choice is the locally owned Jin Jiang Inns, which have similar costs, but where staff English proficiency is less predictable. Even so, Jin Jiang Inn staff will often provide assistance using "on-call" English speakers by mobile phone.

    The travel site Kayak.com aggregates hotel rates (including Ibis and Jin Jiang) and is a good shortcut for finding the best deals.

    Eating

    There is significant variation in the cuisine between the provinces and regions of China. Eating is one of the great pleasures of China. This too can be inexpensive. There are small independently owned restaurants throughout Chinese cities. Meals can be purchased at from $1 to $3 in these establishments. Of course, you can pay much more.

    My favorite is Lanzhou noodles, which are served in a large bowl with beef, vegetables and hot Sichuan pepper sauce. Servers will routinely ask Westerners whether they want the hot sauce (and it is hot), but I order it. The noodle dish is named after the city of Lanzhou, capital of Gansu province.

    However, some tourists may prefer Western food, which can be found at some higher cost restaurants and the many fast food restaurants such as McDonald’s, Burger King, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Pizza Hut.

    Convenience Stores

    Chinese cities are dotted with many small entrepreneurial as well as franchised convenience stores (or small grocery stores). Usually within walking distance, these stores carry a good selection of soft drinks, including both western and Chinese.

    Currency

    The Chinese currency is the "Yuan" or "RMB." The current exchange rate is about six to the dollar or 600 per $100. Money may be exchanged on entry at the airports and generally at the large national banks, such as the Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the China Merchants Bank, the Bank of Communications, China CITIC Bank, and ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China). Usually, there will be English proficient staff available. These banks have branches throughout the nation. Further, these banks usually have Automatic Teller Machines linked to international networks, such as Visa.

    Other Cautions

    Water: As in many developing countries, tap water may be insufficiently safe for drinking. Hotels routinely provide bottled water.

    Food: I recommend eating only hot food. It is advisable take along an antibiotic prescription in case of serious stomach upset. On 11 trips, I have had only one occurrence and have seen the problem cleared up overnight.

    Taxis: The great majority of Chinese taxis operate legitimately, charging metered fares (with drop charges ranging from near $1 to just over $2). My fare from Pudong International Airport to the Jing’an District of Shanghai (beyond the core) was $32 in terrible traffic.

    However, there can be difficulties with taxis, especially at train stations and airports. It is always best to obtain a taxi from the organized taxi rank, where metered fares will be available. Often western travelers are approached by drivers at terminal exits offering absurdly high rates. For example, this trip, at Longyang Road Station in Shanghai (terminus of the Mag Lev), I was offered fares ranging from more than three to 15 times the meter fare to nearby hotels.

    The First Trip

    A good way for the novice traveler to China to start is a trip to the Shanghai or Beijing areas.

    In Beijing, there are sites such as the Great Wall of China (Exhibit 1), the Forbidden City (Exhibit 2), the Ming Tombs. The Lama Buddhist Temple and the Confucius Temple (only a 3 minute walk away) and the Summer Palace. The former treaty port of Tianjin, with its extensive pre-War western housing and spectacular new architecture is little more than a half hour away by train. Tangshan, site of one of the world’s most deadly earthquakes (1976), is another 45 minutes away (Exhibit 3).

    Shanghai has the "Bund," along the Huang Pu (river), with its Western style commercial buildings from the pre-World War II era. From the walkway on the Bund, there is a stunning view of the new Lujiazui business district in Pudong, which includes the second tallest building in the world (top picture). Only 30 minutes away by train is Suzhou, the "Venice of China," with its canals (Exhibit 4) and the leaning pagoda on Tiger Hill. Hangzhou, with its scenic West Lake is just an hour’s train ride away (Exhibit 5). The historic Grand Canal, which provided access between the Yangtze Delta and the Beijing area, can be seen at both Suzhou (Exhibit 6) and Hangzhou.

    There are many other cities of great interest for subsequent trips, especially Chongqing, Qingdao, Xi’an, Dalian (Exhibit 7), Harbin, Chengdu, Shenzhen and Wuhan.

    The bottom line is that traveling in China is more complicated than traveling in Wisconsin or Ontario. But it is not that difficult and getting better.

    Note 1: The Mag Lev line was intended as a demonstration line that would encourage China to use that technology for its high speed rail network. Further, the line was to be expanded through central Shanghai and then southwest to Hangzhou (180 miles or 110 kilometers). Citizen opposition led to cancellation of the extension and China opted to use conventional technology, rather than Mag Lev for its high speed rail network.

    Note 2: On Nanjing Road, Western tourists are often solicited by students to attend a tea drinking ceremony. This experience should be avoided. The tourist will have to pay the bill and the costs will likely be far above expectation.

    Top photo: Lujiazui business center in Pudong, across the Huang Pu from the Bund (November 3 by author)

    Wendell Cox is principal of Demographia, an international public policy and demographics firm. He is co-author of the “Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey” and author of “Demographia World Urban Areas” and “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.” He was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, where he served with the leading city and county leadership as the only non-elected member. He was appointed to the Amtrak Reform Council to fill the unexpired term of Governor Christine Todd Whitman and has served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, a national university in Paris.

  • The Evolving Urban Form: Tianjin

    Tianjin is located on Bohai Gulf, approximately 75 miles (120 kilometers) from Beijing. It was the imperial port of China, by virtue of that proximity. Tianjin also served as one of the most important "treaty ports" occupied and/or controlled by western nations and Japan for various years before 1950.

    Tianjin is pivotally located along the East coast corridor between "Dongbei" – the northeast (the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, which are also referred to as Manchuria) and Jinan, Nanjing, Shanghai and points south. Both the most direct expressway route (interstate standard) and high speed rail line from Shanghai to Dongbei cross through Tianjin rather than larger Beijing.

    Tianjin is one of four centrally administered provincial level municipalities, along with Shanghai, Beijing, and Chongqing. While Tianjin has grown strongly in recent years, it has been one of China’s largest cities for decades. According to the United Nations, the 1950 Tianjin urban area was the second largest in China, with 2.5 million residents, trailing only Shanghai which had 4.3 million. Beijing trailed Tianjin by a third, at 1.7 million.

    Population and Growth

    Since 1982, the total population of Tianjin has expanded by nearly 90 percent, from 7.9 million to 14.7 million in 2013 (Exhibit 1).  Population growth has accelerated over that time. Between 2000 and 2010, the population rose 2.7 percent annually, more than double 1.2 percent rate of the 1990s. The rate of increase was even higher between 2010 and 2013, at 4.5 percent.

    Between the 2000 and 2010 censuses, the inner core district (Heping qu), experienced a population loss of 12 percent. But the rest of the municipality increased, accounting for 101 percent of the growth. The balance of the core captured 18 percent of the growth, while the suburban ring attracted 27 percent. By far the greatest growth was in the outer districts, which accounted for a solid majority of the growth (Exhibit 2). This peripheral domination of growth mirrors the experience of other large Chinese cities, such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Chongqing, which have seen their core areas decline in population, with most growth occurring in the outer sectors.

    A New Megacity

    Tianjin is one of the world’s newest megacities (urban area over 10 million population). This has occurred because of the strong post-2010 population growth. In the next Demographia World Urban Areas (early 2015), Tianjin will have an estimated built up urban area population of 10.9 million. With an urban expanse covering 775 square miles (2,007 square kilometers), Tianjin has an urban population density of 14,100 per square mile (5,400 per square kilometer).

    With the urban area expanding geographically, Tianjin fits the international trend of cities, in growing strongly, yet experiencing declining overall urban densities. Chinese urban planners have told me that it has been an intended objective of policy to reduce population densities, to give people more living space. This is despite the preachments of US and European urban planners for whom higher densities often are embraced as an "Article of Faith."

    Tianjin’s Urban Form

    Despite their comparatively high density, Chinese cities are anything but compact. Most are polycentric in urban form, with central districts have widely spaced commercial buildings (the most notable exceptions may be Shanghai, Chongqing, and Dalian, but even these are somewhat polycentric). Tianjin, along with "in situ" urbanization Quanzhou, may be the least compact of the major cities.

    Tianjin has a broad central business district (CBD), populated with tall, commercial buildings and residential structures (Exhibits 3 & 4). As is the case in many Asian cities (such as Bangkok, Guanzhou-Foshan, Xi’an and Beijing, the tall commercial buildings tend to be highly dispersed, rather than close together as is the custom in Canadian and American cities. In between the dispersed tall buildings are lower rise buildings, both commercial and residential.

    Currently the tallest building in the CBD is the Tianjin World Financial Center (Exhibit 5), at 76 stories (1,105 feet or 337 meters). This is somewhat taller than New York’s Chrysler Building, which was the second tallest in Gotham for years. However, another taller building is near completion, the Tianjin R&F Guangdong Tower (Exhibit 6), which is well on the way to its 91 floors (1,535 feet or 468 meters). However,even this building is not as tall as three others under construction in other Tianjin centers.

    A second central business district is developing in the Binhai new area, near the port and 30 miles (50 kilometers) south of the Tianjin CBD. The Rose Rock International Financial Center will reach 100 floors (1,929 feet or 538 meters). This, however, is only the second tallest under construction. The CTF Tower is also under construction and will reach 96 floors (1,740 feet or 530 meters), nearly as tall as the new World Trade Center in New York (1,776 feet or 541 meters).

    Finally, the tallest building in Tianjin, Goldin Finance 117 is under construction approximately 9 miles (15 kilometers) west of the Tianjin CBD in a virtually new business center. This building will exceed the heights of all but three of the completed skyscrapers in the world (Lead Photo).

    Altogether, Tianjin will soon have five buildings of more than 90 floors, a record few if any cities will soon equal.

    Architecture

    Tianjin has more than its share of modern Chinese high rise commercial structures and residential buildings. But, perhaps to a greater extent than any other Chinese city, Tianjin exhibits the architecture of the foreign powers to a greater degree than some other treaty ports (such as Fuzhou, Dalian, and Wuhan). The city of Tianjin has meticulously preserved many of these structures, not only commercial and residential buildings, but also churches.

    The Tianjin CBD has a number of low rise streets with European architecture. Some of the most impressive are across the Hai River from the Tianjin Railway Station. There is also a long pedestrian street beyond with considerable western architecture. Virtually throughout the urban core there are examples of classic western architecture, some as ornate as in central Buenos Aires (Exhibit 7).

    Perhaps the most unique feature is a large area of western residences just to the south of the Tianjin CBD (Exhibits 8 & 9).

    In the Beijing Orbit: An Advantage

    Tianjin is clearly in the orbit of larger Beijing, which has recently announced plans for a 7th ring road and other infrastructure to tie not only the city but adjacent provincial level jurisdictions together (Tianjin and Hebei). With a strong policy interest in limiting Beijing’s population growth, and with plenty of rural land available, Tianjin could receive a substantial share of growth that otherwise would go to Beijing.

    Top photo: Goldin 117 Financial Building under construction at November 6, 2014 (by author).

    Wendell Cox is principal of Demographia, an international public policy and demographics firm. He is co-author of the "Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey" and author of "Demographia World Urban Areas" and "War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life." He was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, where he served with the leading city and county leadership as the only non-elected member. He was appointed to the Amtrak Reform Council to fill the unexpired term of Governor Christine Todd Whitman and has served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, a national university in Paris.

  • Housing Affordability in China

    Finally, there is credible housing affordability data from China. For years, analysts have produced "back of the envelope" anecdotal calculations that have been often as inconsistent as they have been wrong. The Economist has compiled an index of housing affordability in 40 cities, which uses an "average multiple" (average house price divided by average household income) (China Index of Housing Affordability). This is in contrast to the "median multiple," which is the median house price divided by the median household income (used in the Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey and other affordability indexes). The Demographia Survey rates affordability in 9 geographies, including Hong Kong (a special administrative region of China). The average multiple for a metropolitan market is generally similar to the median multiple.

    The Economist Data and Methodology

    The Economist develops its ratio from central government data on house sales and incomes in individual cities. Like the Demographia Survey, The Economist provides estimates for housing affordability from the perspective of the average urban household, as opposed to the "ex-pat" or "luxury" markets that are typically reported by real estate commentators. The Economist also estimates its price to income ratio using an average house size of 100 square meters (approximately 1,075 square feet). This is larger than the average new house size in the United Kingdom, but smaller than those in the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

    With an overall average multiple of 8.8, China’s housing is less affordable (Figure 1) than all of the nine geographies rated in the Demographia Survey, except for Hong Kong (14.9). Even so, China’s housing affordability has improved from a national average multiple of 11.7 in April of 2010.

    Affordability by City

    It appears that if The Economist had included Hong Kong in its China ranking, it would have been ranked the most unaffordable in the country. Hong Kong houses are much smaller than the Chinese average, at 45 square meters (480 square feet). This would have given Hong Kong, with an unadjusted multiple of 14.9, a house size adjusted multiple of more than 30.

    For years, there have been press reports of astronomic price to income multiples in China. The Economist data indicates that in some cities (Shenzhen, Beijing, Hanghzou and Wenzhou) this has indeed been true. But incomes have risen faster than house prices in recent years, and average multiples above 20 are, for now, a thing of the past.

    Shenzhen, the "instant" megacity next to Hong Kong, is ranked as the least affordable with an average multiple of 19.6. The Economist indicates that this may be the result of demand from Hong Kong residents. Shenzhen had reached an average multiple of nearly 25 in 2010. An even higher average multiple was recorded in Beijing, which reached 27 in 2010. Beijing house prices have fallen substantially, however, dropping to 16.6 in 2014, the second most unaffordable in China.

    China’s other megacities (over 10 million population) have lower average multiples than Shenzhen and Beijing. Shanghai has an average multiple of 12.8 and Guangzhou has an average multiple of 11.4. Tianjin, approximately 100 miles (140 kilometers) from Beijing and China’s newest megacity has an average multiple of 11.2.

    China’s most affordable city is Hohhot, capital of Inner Mongolia (Nei Mongol), with an average multiple of 4.9. Generally, interior cities had better housing affordability than those along the east coast. For example, Changsha (capital of Hunan) has an average multiple of 5.9, Kunming 6.6, while the two leading cities of China’s Red Basin, Chongqing and Chengdu, were somewhat higher (7.1 and 7.4).

    Comparison to Other Demographia Cities

    Yet the multiples for many Chinese cities are no worse than highly unaffordable cities in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

    Outside Hong Kong, the other most expensive cities in the Demographia Survey would rank in the second 10 of Chinese cities. Vancouver, with a median multiple of 10.3, is more expensive than all but 12 of the 40 cities rated in China. San Francisco, with a median multiple of 9.3, would rank 15th. Sydney, with a median multiple of 9.0, would rank in a 16th tie with Dalian. San Jose, at 8.7, would rank in a 19th place tie for unaffordability with Wuhan and Ningbo.

    A sampling of cities from China and the Demographia Survey is illustrated in Figure 2.

    Toward an Affordable China

    One of rapidly urbanizing China’s biggest challenges is to improve housing affordability. This is an imperative, with easing of the hukou internal resident permit system and the one-child policy. United Nations projections indicate that China’s urban areas will add another third to their population in the next 25 years, an increase of more than 250 million. China is better housed today than perhaps at any time in its history. But it needs to be still better housed, as internal migrants become permanent urban residents and as rural citizens move to the cities for better lives.

    Wendell Cox is principal of Demographia, an international public policy and demographics firm. He is co-author of the “Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey” and author of “Demographia World Urban Areas” and “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.” He was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, where he served with the leading city and county leadership as the only non-elected member. He was appointed to the Amtrak Reform Council to fill the unexpired term of Governor Christine Todd Whitman and has served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, a national university in Paris.

    Photo: Jinan

  • The Unrest In Hong Kong And China’s Bigger Urban Crisis

    The current protests in Hong Kong for democracy reflects only part of the issues facing Chinese cities, as they grow and become ever more sophisticated. In just four decades, China has gone from 17.4 percent to 55.6 percent urban, adding nearly 600 million city residents. And this process is far from over: United Nations projections indicate that over the next 20 years, China’s urban population will increase by 250 million, even as national population growth rates slow and stall.

    Overall this transition has been spectacularly successful. As it has urbanized, China, following the lead of Hong Kong, has become a much richer country, expanding its share of global GDP from 2 percent in 1995 to 12 percent in 2012.

    China now boasts four megacities of over 10 million people, the most of any country. The population of Shanghai, a cosmopolitan world city decades before the Communist takeover of the country, has expanded almost 50% since 2000, and the ancient capital Beijing and the southern commerce and industrial hub of Guangzhou have grown nearly as rapidly. The U.N.’s growth projections suggest that the future list of megacities will include Chongqing, Tianjin and Chengdu.

    Shenzhen, one of the four current megacities, epitomizes the speed of China’s urbanization. A small fishing village along the Hong Kong border with a few factories when I first visited three decades ago, the city rose as the focus of Deng Xiaoping’s first wave of modernization policies. In 1979 it had roughly 30,000 people; now it is a thriving metropolis of 13 million whose population in the past decade grew 56%. Its rise has been so recent and quick that the Asia Society has labeled it “a city without a history.”

    Shenzhen has not only grown but thrived over the past three decades, as was evident on my most recent trip. In contrast to the often impoverished slum cities of the developing world, China’s cities have grown much as Britain’s did in the 19th century, upon the back of rapid expansion of manufacturing and trade. This sets Chinese urbanization apart from India‘s; manufacturing’s share of Indian GDP is half that of China. In the process, Chinese cities have become more tied to the global economy, exposing its people to international trends, as well as greater affluence. This is exactly what has happened earlier in Hong Kong, setting the stage for some of the recent unrest. At the same time, the leading cities of the West are, for the most part, barely growing, and much of that by dint of immigration. With plunging birthrates and generally anemic economies, the great cities of the Europe and North America are hardly likely to blaze a brash urban trail; they are more concerned with retaining what they can from their historical inertia. There is no city in the West — even Houston and Dallas-Fort Worth — that approaches the dynamism one now finds in China.

    The Coming Chinese Urban Economic Crisis

    China’s successful urban transformation now faces a challenge as the country’s export-led economy weakens. Labor costs are soaring and young adults, some four times as many of whom have attended college than those who came of age a decade ago, have little interest in factory work. At the same time, many of China’s most successful and talented people are seeking out lives abroad; two-thirds of the country’s affluent residents, according to one survey, are considering migrating overseas.

    The labor crunch is most intense in China’s coastal cities, home to most of the urban population. These face greater competition from less expensive urban areas further west, such as Chongqing and Chengdu. But even these areas are facing a labor shortage, forcing companies to fill their ranks with not necessarily voluntary student laborers. There is also growing competition as well in labor-intensive industries like textiles from cheaper cities in places like Vietnam, Indonesia and Bangladesh.

    Recent attacks by Beijing on multinationals, charging them for corruption and anti-trust violations, could make things worse. For political reasons, the government has decided to persecute the very companies that account for half of Chinese exports, charging corruption and anti-trust violation. China, where ironically the public is more favorable than most Westerners to large corporations, now faces an investment downturn as foreign companies look for safer havens such as in Mexico or to come back to the U.S.

    The logical solution to this challenge, particularly for coastal Chinese cities, is to move up the value chain, much as Hong Kong and Singapore have already done. This means a greater reliance on finance, business services and technology. Shenzhen, for example, looks to Silicon Valley as a role model. But their attempt is taking place in an urban environment very different than that nurtured in California suburban garages. Instead we see typically immense infrastructure projects like the 15 square kilometer Qianhai development near the city’s main port. Qianhai hopes to lure service and tech employment from pricier, and for now, more unstable Hong Kong.

    But in many cases, high-value industries depend on open access to information, something Beijing clearly sees as a threat to the political order; China’s great Internet Firewall is getting, if anything, higher and more difficult to breach, to the detriment of local knowledge workers. Government authorities realize that Hong Kongers’ access to western media, movies and culture makes them less pliable than those, even in neighboring Shenzhen, where access to major foreign publications, Google and many websites is highly restricted.

    Health And Demographics

    China is not only urbanizing, but doing it at extreme levels of density; barely four to six percent of all new floor space in the country goes to single-family houses. Even on the suburban periphery, there are few low-rise apartment buildings and even fewer houses; much of the construction, particularly for rural migrants, is also substandard, with buildings erected so close that sometimes residents of one can shake the hands of those next to it.

    This has created a series of health problems. Dense urbanization, notes a recent Chinese study, has led to more obesity, particularly among the young, who get less exercise, and spend more time desk-bound. Stroke and heart disease have become leading causes of death.

    Perhaps the best known result from intensified urbanization can be seen outside any window: pervasive air pollution. Beijing and Shanghai rank among the most polluted major cities in the world, just behind Delhi. This problem has become so severe that it has led, even in authoritarian China, to grass-roots protests, many of them targeted at new industrial plants and other facilities near cities such as Shanghai, Dalian, and Hangzhou.

    More serious still has been the impact on birth rates. Even though the government has been relaxing its long-held “one child” policy, the density of Chinese cities continues to help suppress birthrates. This relationship between density and low fertility can also be seen in similarly crowded Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, where there is no official limit on having more than one child. In Hong Kong some 45% of middle-class couples have abandoned the idea of having children, not surprising since the cost of raising a child is now estimated at over $700,000, more than twice than in the United States.

    Given high prices relative to incomes, and dense conditions, Chinese cities appear to follow the same pattern, which over time is almost certain to slow economic growth as the population of elderly grows and the workforce shrinks. Already, notes National University of Singapore demographer Gavin Jones, the fertility rate of women in Shanghai has fallen to 0.7, among the lowest ever reported, well below the “one child” mandate and barely one-third the number required simply to replace the current population. Overall, the Chinese urban fertility rate is a weak 1.08.

    The Future

    Rather than look at the current unrest in Hong Kong as a singular example, we should understand that many problems faced in the former British colony are increasingly felt as well in mainland China. As cities reach middle class status and land prices soar, they need to move up the value scale, but this is very difficult to do under a fundamentally authoritarian system.

    While authoritarian structures can work in an industrial city, they may be less effective in a more information-based economy, in which companies need to adjust to rapidly changing attitudes and trends. The problem here is that, in an authoritarian state, controls over information are often deemed mandatory; in a sense, in an information-dependent economy, this is like trying to run a car with watered down gasoline. At the same time, the health effects of dense urbanism, and the massive pollution of the surrounding countryside, augur poorly for many of the largest Chinese cities, which will be forced to compete not only with more open economies, but with lower-cost cities across the developing world.

    Ultimately, China, whose urban growth has been a great success story, now must consider changing development patterns, perhaps looking at lower density and more dispersed development. One promising sign is that China’s smaller cities, particularly in the West, are now growing faster — with encouragement from Beijing authorities — than megacities. Recently released 2014 population estimates indicate reductions in the annual growth rates of both Shanghai and Beijing.

    Ultimately, a shift towards dispersion — both within regions and between them — could have a many positive effects. It would allow people more living space, and if employment also was also spread out, a quicker and less rigorous commute, with related benefits gained in time and energy conservation. It would greatly help families and children by reducing the need for parents to migrate for work, separating as many as one in five Chinese families.

    Clearly, new models are clearly called for, ones that look not only at bulking up cities, but humanizing them. This may be imperative if Beijing would like to avoid the prospect of a future characterized by an aging, alienated and increasingly unhealthy population.

    This piece first appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and Roger Hobbs Distinguished Fellow in Urban Studies at Chapman University, and a member of the editorial board of the Orange County Register. His newest book, The New Class Conflict is now available at Amazon and Telos Press. He is author of The City: A Global History and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. His most recent study, The Rise of Postfamilialism, has been widely discussed and distributed internationally. He lives in Los Angeles, CA.

    Photo by Pasu Au Yeung.

  • Paving Over Hunan? The Portland Model for China

    For two centuries, people have crowded into urban areas, seeking higher standards of living than prevail in the rural areas they abandoned. Nowhere is this truer than in China. In just four decades, it has risen from 17.4 percent to 55.6 percent urban, adding nearly 600 million city residents. This has been accomplished while lifting an unprecedented number of people out of poverty.  

    Yet in the future, China faces tough urbanization challenges. The United Nations forecasts that another 200 million residents will be added to the cities by 2035, increasing the urban population by nearly another one-third.

    Los Angeles Style Suburbs in China?

    For years, western planners have sought to impose their visions of the future on China’s cities (see: China Should Send the Western Planners Home). There are more recent rumblings from Britain. Writing in The Guardian, Bianca Bosker finds considerable fault with Chinese cities. In criticizing China’s perceived copying of US and European models, her article conveys an impression that detached housing (called "villas in China) makes up a large part of China’s suburbs, as in the United States ("Why Haven’t China’s Cities Learned from America’s Mistakes?" with an intriguing subtitle "Faceless estates. Sprawling suburbs. Soulless financial districts … are in vogue in China").

    Having traveled widely within all but two of China’s 25 largest cities, I would have to disagree. You have to look hard to find detached housing in China. This is quite unlike the case in US suburbs, as well as those of Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia and elsewhere.

    In fact, the suburban areas of Chinese cities are largely high-rise and mid-rise multi-family buildings, with their attendant high densities. Detached housing has accounted for between 4 and 6 percent of new housing floor space. The actual percentage of detached units is probably smaller, since their average floor space of detached housing is greater. The type of housing in the photographs at the bottom of the article (Figures 2 through 6) is typical of China’s suburbs.

    Bosker also criticizes about China’s "towers in the park" high-rise development, noting that "The desire to escape sardine conditions in these superblocks, where greenery often consists of sickly shrubs gasping between six-lane roads, has in turn multiplied the number of land-devouring compounds like Rancho Santa Fe." In fact, villa developments like Rancho Santa Fe, nearby Shanghai’s Honquiao Airport, are very high income enclaves, and small. Rancho Santa Fe itself occupies less than 90 acres and the gross average lot size is approximately one-quarter acre (1/10 hectare), smaller than the average middle income suburban lot in the United States. No ordinary “tower in the park" resident can afford to move to the pricey villa developments.

    California’s High Urban Densities

    The article also condemns the "urban sprawl" of Los Angeles and California (this is nothing new).  However, the reality is that Los Angeles is the most dense major urban area in the United States (and thus the least sprawling) and nearly as dense as Toronto. Further, California has the highest urban density of any state, leading even New York. The average urban density of the state and even that of smaller California cities, such as Fresno, Stockton, Modesto and Salinas, is more than that of urban planning Nirvana Portland (below).

    Los Angeles: Land of Gridlock?

    The article calls Los Angeles the "land of gridlock," and there is no doubt that its traffic is intense. Yet, Los Angeles ranks only in a 20th place tie with Paris out of 125 cities in the latest Tom Tom Traffic Index. Traffic is worse in Brussels and Rome, almost as bad in London and far worse in places like Moscow, Istanbul, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City and Sao Paulo. In spite of the traffic congestion, Los Angeles has the shortest work trip travel times of any world megacity for which there is data, the result of its dispersed residential and employment pattern (call it "sprawl" if you like).

    In Los Angeles, suburban residents have shorter work travel times than people living in the urban cores, which is the general situation among US major metropolitan areas (more than 1,000,000 population). This is to be expected, since lower densities are associated with less traffic congestion and shorter travel times.

    Paving Over Hunan?

    Ms. Bosker suggests that China may be poised to follow the "Portland model." A planner is quoted: “Portland is a really great model.” That, I would suggest, depends on your perspective.

    The Portland model has its philosophical roots in the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. As early as 1973, Sir Peter Hall and his colleagues characterized the Act having had the "reverse effect" an important policy goal, to benefit less affluent households, by virtue of the house price escalation that ensued.

    Portland has drawn an urban growth boundary around the city beyond which development is generally prohibited, and within which there is insufficient space to maintain competitive land prices. Portland has also has sought to attract people out of their cars by both building an extensive light rail system and   loath to provide new highway capacity to meet demand.

    After more than 30 years of its urban containment ("smart growth") policy, Portland’s urban density remains at only 1,350 per square kilometer (3,500 per square mile), less than one-quarter that of China’s cities with more than 500,000 population (5,750 per square kilometer/14,900 per square mile). Los Angeles is twice as dense as Portland. Portland’s urban density is closer to that of the world’s most sprawling large urban area, Atlanta, than it is to that of Los Angeles. Planning whipping boy Houston is only 15 percent less dense than Portland.

    To equal Portland’s density, Chinese cities would need to expand their footprints by 210,000 square kilometers (80,000 square miles). This would require the equivalent of paving over Hunan province (Figure 1), the state of Minnesota or the combination of England and Scotland.

    Portland is no model to copy, unless all you care about is inputs (like light rail and not building freeways and suburban housing). The outputs tell a completely different story. In 1980 (the last data before the first light rail line was opened) 65.1 percent of commuters drove alone to work. By 2012, that figure had increased to 70.8 percent. Transit was down from 8.4 percent to 6.0 percent. Approximately one-quarter as many people worked at home as commuted by transit in 1980 (2.2 percent). By 2012, more people in the Portland metropolitan area worked at home than rode transit (6.4 percent).

    This is not surprising. Portland’s "model" transit system (now with five light rail lines) can get the average commuter to only 8 percent of the jobs in 45 minutes. This is not very attractive in contrast to travel by automobiles, which provides access to virtually 100 percent of the jobs in less time (30 minutes).

    Meanwhile, Portland’s anti-highway policies have been rewarded with some of the most rapidly increasing traffic congestion in the United States. In the early 1980s, Portland ranked 47th worst out of the 101 US urban areas ranked by the Texas A&M Transportation Institute. By 2011, Portland’s traffic congestion had deteriorated to sixth worst, a stunning failure for a city with a population that doesn’t even rank the top 20. Meanwhile, Houston, castigated for its wide freeways, has improved from the worst traffic congestion in the middle 1980s to four positions better than Portland (10th), despite adding having added three times as many new residents as Portland.

    American Cities

    If outputs are more important than inputs (which I suggest is true), then US cities do very well. They have the highest incomes in the world, occupying 36 of the top 50 positions in gross domestic product per capita. They have some of the most affordable housing in the world, if cities following the Portland model are excluded. They have shorter work trip commutes and less traffic congestion than their peers in other high income world nations. And, they are poised for huge progress in environmental protection. The US Department of Energy forecasts large reductions in gross greenhouse gas emission from the national automobile fleet in the coming decades.

    Overwhelmingly, the growth of cities happened because rural residents sought higher standards of living and an escape from lower incomes and poverty, in rural areas. Few, if any moved to cities for wise urban planning, for "soulful financial districts" or to commute by light rail. Overall, US city outputs correspond very well with the purpose of cities — which is why they attracted residents.

    China: Setting its Own Course

    No one could have predicted China’s urban progress that was to follow in the decades following Deng Xiao Ping’s assumption of power. China’s cities have provided for their growing number of citizens. By that standard, both Chinese and American cities have done very well. China has charted its own urbanization course and seems likely to do so in the future. It is unlikely to seek to follow the advice of western critics whose plans fail the needs of their own citizens, much those in a complex, rapidly changing place like China.

    Top photograph: Suburban development, Changsha, Hunan. (All photographs by author).

    Wendell Cox is principal of Demographia, an international public policy and demographics firm. He is co-author of the “Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey” and author of “Demographia World Urban Areas” and “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.” He was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, where he served with the leading city and county leadership as the only non-elected member. He was appointed to the Amtrak Reform Council to fill the unexpired term of Governor Christine Todd Whitman and has served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, a national university in Paris.

  • Welcome to the Billion-Man Slum

    When our urban pundit class speaks of the future of cities, we are offered glittering images of London, New York, Singapore, or Shanghai. In reality, the future for most of the world’s megacities—places with more than 10 million people—may look more like Dhaka, Mumbai, or Kinshasa: dirty, poverty- and disease-ridden, and environmentally disastrous.

    Harvard’s Ed Glaeser suggests that megacities grow because “globalization” and “technological change have increased the returns to being smart.” And to be sure, megacities such as Jakarta, Kolkata (in India), Mumbai, Manila, Karachi, and Lagos—all among the top 25 most populous cities in the world—present a great opportunity for large corporate development firms and thrilling treasure troves for both journalists and academic researchers. But surely there’s a better alternative to celebrating misery, as one prominent author did recently in aForeign Policy article bizarrely entitled “In Praise of Slums.”

    Bigger is no longer better.

    Let’s start with the idea that, in an urbanizing world, bigger is no longer necessarily better. In a recent study I conducted with Ali Modarres, Aaron Renn, and Wendell Cox for Singapore’s Civil Service College and Chapman University, we ranked cities by importance as global centers. Of the world’s estimated 29 megacities, only a handful made into the top 20. Most leading megacities were either long-established Western cities—Tokyo, New York, London, Los Angeles—or located in booming East Asia, including Beijing, Shanghai, and Seoul.

    Notably missing are fast-growing growing megacities such as Lagos, Karachi, and Dhaka, as well as the 16 additional megacities—mostly in developing countries in Africa and south Asia—that will pass the 10 million mark by 2030. Yet despite their girth, the majority of megacities are not particularly attractive for foreign investors or as locations for regional corporate offices. These firms tend to cluster instead in westernized cities such as Singapore, Hong Kong, or Dubai, and visit places like Jakarta, Manila, and Cairo only when necessary.

    History drives some of this. The great global cities rose as centers of industry and trade, while developing from there an excellence in related services. They created pockets of a more advanced economy to serve the predominately rural hinterland, or in some cases colonial possessions. This imperial relationship spurred the rise of London, Paris, and New York in the early 20th century, and also that of Tokyo, still the world’s biggest city.

    Some new megacities, some such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen (which in 1979 had roughly 30,000 people, compared to its 10.6 million today) have a real economic shot at becoming top global cities due to China’s emergence as the world’s workshop. But, as we explain in a recent paper from Chapman University, this is far less the case for most megacities in the developing world.

    Unlike their Chinese counterparts, these megacities’ expansion has not been driven by economic growth but more by bringing people from their own impoverished countryside into the city. Critically, in contrast to the peasants who came to Tokyo in the ’50s or Shanghai in the ’90s, there is no huge demand for an industrial workforce in cities in South Asia, Africa, or Latin America, where manufacturing is far less prevalent—manufacturing’s share of India’s GDP, for example, is half that of China.

    Here’s the difficult truth: Most emerging megacities, particularly outside of China, face bleak prospects. Emerging megacities like Kinshasa or Lima do not command important global niches. Their problems are often ignored or minimized by those who inhabit what commentator Rajiv Desai has described as “the VIP zone of cities,” where there is “reliable electric power, adequate water supply, and any sanitation at all.” Outside the zone, Desai notes, even much of the middle class have to “endure inhuman conditions” of congested, cratered roads, unreliable energy, and undrinkable water.

    The slums of Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka, swell by as many as 400,000 new migrants each year. Some argue that these migrants are better off than previous slum dwellers since they ride motorcycles and have cellphones. Yet access to the wonders of transportation and “information technology” don’t compensate for physical conditions demonstrably worse than those endured even by Depression-era poor New Yorkers. My mother’s generation at least could drink water out of a tap and expect consistent electricity, if the bill was paid, something not taken for granted by their modern-day counterparts (PDF) in the developing world.

    More serious still, the slum dwellers face enormous risk from unsafely built environments. Traffic, as anyone who has spent time in these cities easily notices, poses particular threats to riders and pedestrian alike. According to researchers, developing countries now experience a “neglected epidemic” of road-related injuries accounting for 85 percent of the world’s traffic fatalities.

    And don’t drink the water, please. Nearly two-thirds of the sewage in the megacity of Dhaka, with 15 million people, is untreated. As Dr. Marc Reidl, a specialist in respiratory disease at UCLA, puts it, “Megacity life is an unprecedented insult to the immune system.”

    Cities of disappointment.

    Over these environmental problems loom arguably greater social ones. Many of the megacities—including the fastest growing, Dhaka—are essentially conurbations dominated by very-low-income people; roughly 70 percent of Dhaka households earn less than $170 (U.S.) a month, and many of them far less. “The megacity of the poor,” is how the urban geographer Nazrul Islam describes his hometown.

    Inequality is expanding in most of these places. A recent Euromonitor International study found that larger “city size remains the key explanatory factor for income inequalities across the world’s urban agglomerations.” Even megacities that we might refer to as “middle income,” such as Tehran and Istanbul, are becoming what geographer Ali Modarres calls “cities of disappointment.” In many cases, high housing prices and a lack of space have already reduced the birthrate to well below the replacement level. Increasingly, many women are choosing to remain single—heretofore something rare in these countries.

    One scholar, Jan Nijman, suggests that most gains in recent years have accrued to the upper echelons of the middle class in Indian cities while “the ranks of the lower middle income classes have shrunk, and the ranks of the poor have expanded rapidly.” Much of the growth in a perceived middle class, Nijman argues, is based not on income but on consumption driven by credit. The informal sector—drivers, stall-owners, repair-people, household industries—account for much of Mumbai’s employment growth.

    Housing costs are the key here. Researcher Vatsala Pant estimates a monthly total household “middle class income” in Mumbai at 40,000-50,000 rupees; equivalent to less than $1,000 U.S. dollars. Yet monthly salaries for teachers, police officers, and other mid-level jobs are often half that amount. Not surprisingly, even these workers often find themselves living in slum neighborhoods, which are also known as jhopad-patti, jhuggi-jhopadi or busties. “It’s the dream of an immigrant for a place in Mumbai … and ends up with a slum,” she notes.

    Is there a better alternative?

    Future urbanization does not need to pose a choice between rural hopelessness and urban despair. This is a critical issue, even for high-income countries. The rise of a mass of poor slum dwellers—estimated as high as 1 billion—threatens the social stability not only of the countries they inhabit, but the world, as they tend to generate high levels of both random violence and more organized forms ofthuggery, including terrorism.

    Fortunately, an alternative structure of urbanization is beginning to emerge that emphasizes a spreading diversity of cities as opposed to gigantic agglomerations. In the coming decade, McKinsey predicts megacities will underperform economically and demographically, as growth shifts to “fast growing middleweights,” many of them in China and India.

    There needs to be a far greater emphasis on these smaller cities, as well as working to develop a viable economy for the villages. In India, migration to large cities already is beginning to slow, as more potential migrants weigh the costs and opportunities of making such a move as opposed to staying closer to home. This phenomenon has been called “rurbanization” and was an important provision of the campaign of India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, who implemented such programs as chief minister of the state of Gujarat. Modi speaks of human settlements with the “heart of a village” and developing “the facilities of the city.”

    A growing array of critics understand the need to break with the megacity mantra. Ashok R. Datar, chairman of the Mumbai Environmental Social Network and a longtime adviser to the Ambani corporate group, says the emerging megacities of the developing world need to stop emulating the Western model of rapid, dense urbanization. “We are copying the Western experience in our own stupid and silly way,” Datar says.

    He suggests a policy focusing on more human-scale growth. One does not have to be a Gandhian idealist to suggest that Ebenezer Howard’s “garden city” concept—conceived as a response to miserable conditions in early 20th century urban Britain—may be a better guide to future urban growth than the current trend of relentless concentration.

    The “garden city” alternative could help ameliorate the downsides of  mass urbanization in China as well, where the government is seeking to move 250 million more people from the countryside to urban areas over the next decade. “There’s this feeling that we have to modernize, we have to urbanize, and this is our national-development strategy,” said Gao Yu, China country director for the Landesa Rural Development Institute, based in Seattle. Referring to the disastrous Maoist campaign to industrialize overnight, he added, “it’s almost like another Great Leap Forward.”

    As the world urbanizes, we need to start thinking about how to make cities better, not simply bigger. The primary goal of a city should not be to enrich already wealthy landlords and construction companies. It should not be to make politicians more powerful. And it certainly should not be mindless, pointless growth for its own sake. Urbanism should not be defined by the egos of planners, architects, politicians, or the über-rich but by what works best for the most people.

    This piece originally appeared at The Daily Beast.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and Distinguished Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures at Chapman University, and a member of the editorial board of the Orange County Register. His newest book, The New Class Conflict is now available for pre-order atAmazon and Telos Press. He is author of The City: A Global History and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. His most recent study, The Rise of Postfamilialism, has been widely discussed and distributed internationally. He lives in Los Angeles, CA.

    Dhaka photo by Wendell Cox.