New Geography

Tag: Cleveland

  • The Successful, the Stable, and the Struggling Midwest Cities

    The Midwest has a deserved reputation as a place that has largely failed to adapt to the globalized world. For example, no Midwestern city would qualify as a boomtown but still there remain a diversity of outcomes in how the region’s cities have dealt with their shared heritage and challenges. Some places are faring surprisingly well, outpacing even the national average in many measures, while others bring up the bottom of the league tables in multiple civics measures.

    Let us examine the health of various cities, using population growth as a heuristic proxy for overall civic health. Looking at population change from 2000 to 2008, we will classify a city as “successful” if its metro area population growth exceeded the national average growth rate of 8% during that period, as “stable” if it had a population growth rate between 3% and 8%, and as “struggling” if its growth was less than 3%. Let us also put Chicago into its own category of “global city”. It is simply one of a kind in the Midwest, a colossus of nearly 10 million people, and not easily measured against the other cities. Indeed, it is really three cities in one, a prosperous urban core, an archipelago of successful upscale suburbs and edge based growth to the west and north, with a sea of deteriorating city neighborhoods and stagnant to declining suburbs surrounding them. On our scale, Chicago would be “stable” – its inner core has grown but the city overall has lost population, while the outer ring has grown strongly. As a region, it has grown somewhat below the national average.

    Here are the results of our tiering, including all cities in the Midwest* with metro areas exceeding 500,000 in population:

    Global City
    Chicago (5.2%)

    Successful Cities
    Des Moines (15.6%)
    Indianapolis (12.5%)
    Madison (11.9%)
    Columbus (9.9%)
    Kansas City (9.0%)
    Minneapolis-St. Paul (8.8%)

    Stable Cities
    Cincinnati (7.2%)
    Grand Rapids (4.9%)
    St. Louis (4.4%)
    Milwaukee (3.2%)

    Struggling Cities
    Akron (0.5%)
    Detroit (-0.6%)
    Dayton (-1.4%)
    Toledo (-1.5%)
    Cleveland (-2.8%)
    Youngstown (-6.1%)

    These tiers, based only on a single criterion and arbitrary boundaries, nevertheless basically conform to how these cities are performing both economically and in terms of perceptions.

    A few interesting things emerge:

    1. There are a surprisingly large number of Midwestern cities that are growing faster than the US average population. This indicates pockets of strength, in its larger metros at least, seldom associated with the Midwest.
    2. The clear dominance of the successful list by state capitals. This is so pronounced that I have put forth what I call the “Urbanophile Conjecture”, which is that if you want to be a successful Midwestern city, it helps to be a state capital with a metro area population of over 500,000. The only successful city on the list that is not a state capital is Kansas City.
    3. The 500,000 barrier seems to be important as well. The state capitals below that threshold – Lansing, Springfield, and Jefferson City – would not qualify as successful on this list. Note too that the presence or absence of the major state university does not appear to be a decisive factor. Des Moines and Indianapolis are not home to their states’ flagship universities. The home of the academic powerhouse that is the University of Michigan is the Ann Arbor metro area, which was not included in this list because its population is only about 350,000. Notwithstanding, its growth rate would have put it into the stable category.
    4. In a region in which there is such divergence between the performance of cities, a diversity of city specific policies are required. There is no one size fits all for the Midwest. There may indeed be a base of pan-Midwest policies worth pursuing – improvements in education, attractiveness to migrants, better conditions for innovative entrepreneurship, etc – but successful approaches will be those most tailored to uniquely local conditions. For example, a state capital or University town may have different needs than a place that has neither.

    Some suggested areas to investigate by city tier are:

    • Chicago. How can it ease the gap between the thriving global city of Chicago – largely located around the Loop as well as the northern and western suburbs – and the parts of the region that are falling behind, largely the western city neighborhoods and southern edge of metropolis? How do you do this without sacrificing its overall competitiveness? Can the policies appropriate to each be reconciled?
    • Successful Cities. Their policy focus should be on maintaining favorable demographic and economic conditions, and dealing with decaying areas of their urban cores and the potential for decay in some inner ring suburbs. Should the civic aspiration be desirous of it, tuning the engine to attempt to shift the growth rate into high gear to target a profile closer to the Sunbelt boomtowns would be a further focus area. Each city would need to examine which specific policy levers it could pull to attempt to do this. Clearly modernizing and expanding infrastructure to keep up with growth in these places and maintain their high quality of life is a clear imperative.
    • Stable Cities. Their challenge is to bring growth rates up to average or above average levels. It would be worthwhile for them to study the successful areas, and ask what policies and approaches might be adopted. Kansas City offers the best encouragement here. It has managed to maintain a strong growth rate despite not being a state capital and being part of a bi-state metro region. Kansas City features lows costs, high quality of life, a relatively stable housing marketing, and a pro-business culture. It is clearly a standout and worthy of further study for that reason. It may hold the key for moving the stable cities up into the successful tier. Geographically, it is notable that Kansas City is a border state on the far edge of the Midwest, and could arguably be called a Great Plains city. Is that a factor? Some type of peer city comparison with the successful cities, and especially Kansas City, might be warranted here.
    • Struggling Cities. Unfortunately, there isn’t a magic bullet to solve the long festering problems in these places. All of them were heavily industrialized and have borne the brunt of globalization, particularly in manufacturing. This is especially the case in cities linked to the domestic automobile industry, which is clearly in a state of crisis. Until the automobile industry completes its restructuring, and out migration right sizes some of these areas, there does not seem to be a clear path to restart growth. Youngstown, which brings up the bottom of our league table, perhaps offers the best road forward. It is trying to right-size itself to a permanently smaller, but more sustainable, future population based on an aggressive controlled shrinkage plan that has received extensive national notice. This type of plan is likely something all of these cities need to be actively considering as the large fixed costs support a population base that no longer exists will become increasingly unaffordable as the population further shrinks. These cities likely also will need special state and federal help to back this shrinkage plan.

    * The Midwest is defined as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile.

  • The Worst Cities for Job Growth

    One of the saddest tasks in the annual survey of the best places to do business I conduct with Pepperdine University’s Michael Shires is examining the cities at the bottom of the list. Yet even in these nether regions there exists considerable diversity: Some places are likely to come back soon, while others have little immediate hope of moving up. (Please also see “Best Cities For Job Growth” for further analysis.)

    The study is based on job growth in 336 regions – called Metropolitan Statistical Areas by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which provided the data – across the U.S. Our analysis looked not only at job growth in the last year but also at how employment figures have changed since 1996. This is because we are wary of overemphasizing recent data and strive to give a more complete picture of the potential a region has for job-seekers. (For the complete methodology, click here.)

    First let’s deal with the perennial losers, the sad sacks of the American economy. Mostly cities in the nation’s industrial heartland, these places have ranked toward the bottom of our list for much of the past five years. Eleven of the bottom 16 regions on our list are in two states, Ohio and Michigan. In fact, the Wolverine State alone accounts for the bottom four cities: Jackson, Detroit, Saginaw and Flint.

    Unfortunately, there’s not much in the way of short-term – or perhaps even medium- or long-term – hope for a strong rebound in those places. President Obama seems determined to give the automakers, for whom Michigan is home base, far rougher treatment than what he meted out to ailing companies in the financial sector.

    In addition, new environmental regulations may not help auto production, since it necessitates some carbon-spewing and therefore perhaps unacceptable levels of greenhouse gas emission.

    However, not all of Michigan’s problems stem from Washington or the marketplace. Many of the locations at the bottom of the list remain inhospitable to business. To be sure, housing is cheap – in Detroit, property values are fast plummeting toward zero – but running a business can be surprisingly expensive in these hard-pressed places.

    In fact, according to a recent survey by the Tax Foundation, Ohio has an average tax burden roughly similar to New York, California, Massachusetts and Connecticut. But while the others are comparatively high-income states, Ohio residents no longer enjoy that level of affluence.

    Can these places come back? It is un-American to abandon hope, but there needs to be a radical shift in strategy to focus on creating new middle-class jobs. Some Midwestern cities, like Kalamazoo and Indianapolis, have made some successful efforts to diversify their economies, encouraging start-ups and trying to be business-friendly.

    But those are exceptions. Cleveland, one of our worst big cities, could spark a renaissance by revamping its port and nearby industrial hinterland. Once the world economy improves, it could re-emerge – building on the existing knowledge and skills of its production- and design-savvy population – as a hub for manufacturing and exports.

    But right now, Cleveland does not seem to be pursuing such opportunities. As Purdue’s Ed Morrison has pointed out, local leaders there seem to “confuse real estate development with economic development.”

    So Cleveland will focus on inanities such as convention business and tourism, believing we all fantasize about a week enjoying the sights along Lake Erie. Yet even high-profile buildings like the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, completed in 1986, have not transformed a gritty old industrial town into a beacon for the hip and cool.

    Old industrial cities like Cleveland are better off focusing on their locational advantages – access to roads, train lines and water routes – while offering a safe, inexpensive and friendly venue for ambitious young families, immigrants and entrepreneurs.

    Meanwhile, cities with formerly robust economies – like Reno, Nev., Las Vegas, Orlando, Fla., Tampa, Fla., Fort Lauderdale, Fla., West Palm Beach, Fla., Jacksonville, Fla., and Phoenix – are more likely to rebound. These areas topped our list for much of the 2000s; their success was driven first by surging population and job growth and later by escalating housing prices.

    But the collapse of the housing bubble and a drop in large-scale migration from other regions has weakened, often dramatically, these perennial successes. “We could rely on 1,000 people a week moving into the area,” notes one longtime official in central Florida. “These people needed services, houses and bought stuff. Now the growth is a 10th of that.”

    Instead of waiting for the real estate bubble to return, these areas should choose to focus on boosting employment in fields like medical services, business services and light manufacturing. In much of Florida and Nevada, there’s also a need to shift away from a reliance on tourism, an industry that pays poorly on average and is always subject to changes in consumer tastes.

    We can even be cautiously optimistic about some of these former superstars. After all, observes Phoenix-based economist Elliot Pollack, the existing reasons for moving to Arizona, Nevada or Florida – warm weather, relatively low taxes and generally pro-business governments – have not disappeared. “There’s no change in the fundamentals,” he argues. “It’s a transition. It’s ugly, and there’s pain, but it’s still a cycle that will turn.”

    Once the economy stabilizes, Pollack says he expects the flow of people and companies from the Northeast and California to Phoenix and other former hot spots will resume, once again lured by inexpensive real estate, better conditions for business and a generally more up-to-date infrastructure.

    The Problem with California
    So what about California? The economic well-being of many metropolitan areas in the Golden State has been sinking precipitously since 2006. This year, three California regions – Oakland, Sacramento and San Bernardino-Riverside – have sunk down into the bottom 10 on the large cities list. That’s a phenomenon we’ve never seen before – and never expected to see.

    Like other Sun Belt communities, California suffered disproportionately from the housing bubble’s bust, which has devastated both employment in construction-related industries as well as much of the finance sector. But some, like economist Esmael Adibi, director of the Anderson Center for Economic Research at Chapman University, where I teach, think a real estate turnaround may be imminent.

    Among the first to predict the potential for a real estate bubble back in 2005, these days Adibi is more upbeat, pointing to rising sales of single-family homes, particularly at the lower end of the market. California’s inventory of unsold homes is now down to about six months’ worth, a figure well below the national average of 9.6 months.

    It seems not everyone is ready to abandon the Golden State – but still, recovery in California may prove weaker than in surrounding states. One forecaster, Bill Watkins, even predicts unemployment could reach 15% next year, up from about 11% today. California, most likely, will see only an anemic recovery in 2010 even if growth picks up elsewhere.

    Much of the problem lies with the state’s notoriously inept government. The enormous budget deficit will almost certainly lead to tax increases, which will fall mostly on the state’s vaunted high-income entrepreneurial residents. Stimulus funds won’t do much good either, Adibi notes, since “the state is grabbing all of the federal stimulus money” to keep itself afloat.

    A draconian regulatory environment also could dim California’s prospects for growth. Despite double-digit unemployment, the state seems determined not only to raise taxes but also to tighten its regulatory stranglehold.

    This is a stark contrast to what happened in the 1990s during the last deep recession. At that time, leaders from both political parties pulled together to reform the state’s regulatory and tax environment. Almost everyone recognized the need to improve the economic climate.

    But an even deeper recession, it seems, hardly troubles today’s dominant players – public employees, environmental activists and gentry liberals who largely live along the coast. The state has recently passed a draconian Assembly bill aimed to offset global warming by capping greenhouse gas emissions – a measure that seems designed to discourage productive industry.

    “This is becoming a horrible place to produce anything,” says Watkins, who is executive director of the Economic Forecast Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

    California’s lawyers, though, might stay busy. Attorney General Jerry Brown has threatened to sue anyone who grows their business in unapproved, environment-threatening ways. To be sure, this promise may have relatively little impact on the more affluent, aging coastal communities – but it could wreak havoc on younger, less tony areas in the state’s interior. Many of the local economies there still rely on resource-dependent industries like oil, manufacturing and agriculture.

    It’s sad because California has the capacity to recover more quickly than the rest of the country if the state moderates its spending and stops regulating itself into oblivion. This current round of legislation is so dangerous precisely because it could eviscerate the heart of the economy by slowing down entrepreneurial growth, the state’s greatest asset.

    Even in hard times, there are people with innovative ideas trying to bring them to market – and not just in Hollywood- and Silicon Valley-based industries but in a broad range of fields, from garments to agriculture, aerospace and processed foods. The desire to increase regulation reflects a peculiar narcissism and arrogance of the state’s ruling elites, who believe the genius of San Francisco’s venture capitalists and Los Angeles’ image-makers alone are enough to spark a powerful recovery.

    This is delusional. True, California still has a lead in everything from farm products to films to high-tech manufacturers. But it has been slowly losing ground – to both other states and overseas competitors. CEOs and top management might stay in the Golden State, but they increasingly send outside its borders all jobs that don’t require access to the local market, genius scientists or talented entertainers.

    “There’s a feeling in California that we will come back, no matter what, because we are California,” Watkins says. “The leadership is swallowing Panglossian Kool-aid. Some very smart people, a beautiful climate and nice beaches is not enough to guarantee a strong recovery.”

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Cleveland, Part II: Re-Constructing the Comeback

    Yesterday, in Part I, I talked about how, despite the Cleveland region’s significant assets, the Greater Cleveland Partnership’s strategy is failing to transform its economy. Today I’ll focus on the strategy’s five weaknesses, and how to fix them.

    First: The Wrong Approach To Achieving Scale
    To be effective, economic development initiatives have to be big enough to make a difference. Traditionally, this has meant building bigger organizations. The Cleveland leadership is following an economic development model based on hierarchies.

    What worked 30 years ago does not work so well today. Across the business landscape large, vertically integrated organizations are breaking apart. In economic development, this transition means that civic leaders need to build regional scale by developing networks. In a world of increasing economic complexity, regions that have strong, trusted networks will be more competitive. They will learn faster, spot opportunities faster, and will align their resources more quickly. And they will make faster and better decisions. Cleveland’s civic leadership can be far more effective if it learns the power of social networks. A number of good books explore this topic; The Tipping Point should be required reading.

    Second: Misunderstanding Public-Private Partnerships
    Over the past decade, Cleveland’s business leadership has revealed a startling misunderstanding of the nature of the two categories of public-private partnerships that drive economic development.

    Publicly-led and privately-supported investment projects typically involve large infrastructure, as well as projects in which public financing represents over half of the total development budget, such as stadiums, museums, libraries, and community sports complexes.

    The second category involves privately-led and publicly-supported investment projects. Here, the private sector takes the lead, but the public sector provides support and guidance. Good examples include tax increment financing districts, business improvement districts, and virtually all economic development incentives.

    Cleveland, during the Voinovich Administration, executed well on publicly-led and privately supported projects. A new baseball stadium, the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, the Science Museum, the new basketball arena, and the Cleveland Browns stadium are all examples. Starting in the mid-1990’s this capability degraded rapidly, so that it has taken over ten years (with no end in sight) to complete the last of the Voinovich projects, the convention center.

    But when it comes to privately-led and publicly supported investment, the business community has proven itself inept. It took ten years for it to establish a business improvement district around the new baseball stadium and arena. The signature downtown shopping mall, Tower City, has no anchors, no street visibility, and terrible parking.

    The easiest way to learn how these partnerships can be successful involves visiting other cities. Not surprisingly, Cleveland’s civic leadership does not regularly take leadership visits, a common practice among dynamic metro regions.

    Third: No Strategic Framework, No Theory Of Change
    Foundations are fond of asking for a “theory of change”. In other words, they want their grantees to orient themselves within a broader system. They want a simple, clear explanation of how a proposed intervention will transform the system to better performance.

    Cleveland’s leadership has no apparent theory of change. Overwhelmingly, the strategy is now driven by individual projects. These projects, pushed by the real estate interests that dominate the board of the Greater Cleveland Partnership, confuse real estate development with economic development. This leads to the “Big Thing Theory” of economic development: Prosperity results from building one more big thing.

    The economy has shifted under the leadership’s feet. We are rapidly moving toward an economy of networks embedded in other networks. With an economy driven by knowledge and networks, economic development is more than land development, real estate projects, and recruiting firms that move from Michigan to Mexico.

    Today, economic development begins with brainpower in 21st-century skills, and Cleveland’s leadership largely ignores the role of developing brainpower. The next version of the Cleveland+ strategy should explain how the city-region will innovate to build these skills. The best places to look: Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Syracuse and Kalamazoo.

    Prosperous regions must also develop thick, trusted networks to convert this brainpower into wealth through innovation and entrepreneurship. Cleveland’s top-heavy development organizations need to shift toward network-based strategies that are more lean and agile. That will put investment toward more productive use. Good examples to follow: Ann Arbor Spark and the Milwaukee 7.

    In order to attract and retain smart people, regional leaders need to develop quality, connected places, “hot spots” that attract people and “smart growth” strategies that efficiently leverage scarce public investments. In Cleveland’s case, the city needs more coherence to its physical development, one that embraces the city’s inevitable shrinkage in the years ahead.

    To create a buzz, effective regional leaders build their brands, not with clever logos, but with powerful experiences and stories that help people to connect their past to a prosperous future. Action, authentic stories, and networks are changing Akron, Youngstown, Kalamazoo and Milwaukee, all cities facing the same challenges as Cleveland.

    Fourth: The Wrong Mindset For Making Decisions
    If you live in a world of hierarchies, you live in a world of two directions: top-down or bottom-up, with top-down the preferred direction. It’s the direction of command-and-control; of predictability and stability. Bottom up is the opposite. It implies disorganization and chaos, inefficiency and fragmentation, confusion and uncertainty. If you approach economic development from a top-down perspective, you want to limit and control public comment. Civic engagement is a carefully circumscribed event, not a process; a meeting, not a collaboration. Anyone who has attended a school board meeting understands this point.

    There’s only one problem. The top-down world does not exist in economic development. Complex public/private strategies are developed in a “civic space” outside the four walls of any one organization. Within the civic space, no one can tell anyone else what to do. Strategies born in a top-down mindset are doomed to fail.

    Networks have no top or bottom, only nodes and links. Strategy is an exercise of aligning, linking and leveraging assets across a network. Transformation takes place when enough people in the network align themselves toward a specific outcome, through purposeful conversation. To traditionalists, conversation is a distraction or a waste of time. In the years ahead, the challenge for places like Cleveland will be to manage complex conversations.

    At Purdue, we are developing the new disciplines of “Strategic Doing”, an approach to select and test transformative ideas in complex environments quickly. Traditional approaches of strategic planning are too linear, time-consuming, inflexible and expensive. Strategic Doing offers an alternative. By translating ideas into action quickly, the disciplines of Strategic Doing build both collective knowledge and trusted connections. They lead us to “link and leverage” strategies that multiply the effective power of our assets.

    Cleveland’s leadership has a long way to travel down this road. There’s a naive ineptitude in the civic deliberations on complex issues. For over ten years, the Greater Cleveland Partnership has been fiddling with a convention center decision. In the long run, the upside for the city is minimal, while the downside grows each day. By following traditional top down management models, the city’s leadership, if it’s lucky, will build a 30-year-old idea 10 years late.

    Fifth: Weak (Or Nonexistent) Metrics
    In traditional world hierarchies, metrics are the primary instrument of top-down control. It’s not surprising that, as a rule, economic development professionals tend to shy away from measurements. Relatively few regional strategies include them.

    In a networked world, metrics serve different and more important functions. They help clarify outcomes, and add coherence by promoting alignment. Visions are difficult to translate to action. More specific outcomes and metrics mark the direction in which we are heading. They help us learn “what works”. Economic development is inherently an inductive process of experimentation. Without measurement, we have no way of knowing whether or not our underlying assumptions are more right than wrong.

    Creating The Comeback
    Cleveland can find a new path to prosperity, but it will take new leadership committed to transparency and different ways of thinking and acting. With new leadership, Cleveland can do better. It will find prosperity with initiatives that embrace brainpower, creativity, innovation, sustainability, collaboration. These are the foundations on which Cleveland’s future can be built and created.

    Ed Morrison is an Economic Policy Advisor at the Purdue Center for Regional Development. This article draws from Royce Hanson, et.al, “Finding a New Voice for Corporate Leadership in a Changed Urban World”, a case study from The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program (September 2006).

  • Cleveland: How The Comeback Collapsed

    The Cleveland comeback has stalled. Once hailed as a shining example of rebirth in our industrial heartland, Cleveland now sits rudderless and drifting backward. Between 2000 and 2007, Cleveland suffered one of the largest proportional population losses in the country: the city shrank by 8%. Per capita income growth in Cleveland also lags behind cities like Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh. Since the early 1990s, the gap between Cleveland and these other cities has widened. As a regional economy deteriorates, the pressure for social services goes up. It’s not surprising, therefore, that local tax rates in Cleveland are among the highest in the country. Political corruption also takes a toll; Cleveland sits in Cuyahoga County where federal law enforcement officials recently launched a sweeping probe of political corruption.

    The future doesn’t look much brighter. Cuyahoga County is often described as the epicenter of the foreclosure crisis; since 2000, it has had the highest per capita rate in the country. Overnight, foreclosures have decimated neighborhoods that took years to rebuild. In the Cleveland neighborhood of Kinsman, half of the mortgage properties are in foreclosure. In other neighborhoods foreclosure rates range from 25% to 30% and, not surprisingly, are concentrated in the lowest income neighborhoods, the places hardest to rebuild. About 72 hours after a house becomes vacant, vandals strip appliances, windows, and fixtures (scrap metal recycling is a booming business in Cleveland). Stripping the pipes renders the property a total loss.

    Meanwhile, the Cleveland Municipal School District is making improvements only at a glacial pace. According to a recent report by America’s Promise, Cleveland ranks 48th of 50 large school districts in high school graduation rates. Fewer than six in ten of Cleveland’s 9th graders will complete high school; dropout factories here include Collinwood and East Tech high schools, where only four in ten 9th graders graduate.

    Many older industrial cities face the same set of challenges, but few cities started three decades ago with the same promise of regeneration. The collapse of the steel industry in the late 1960s was the beginning of Cleveland’s spiral downward. It did not help that 40 years ago, when the Cuyahoga River caught on fire, Cleveland jokes became a staple of late-night television. The city hit bottom when it filed for bankruptcy in 1978.

    It turned the page with the election of George Voinovich as mayor in 1980. Voinovich, a tough minded Republican, challenged the business, labor and civic leadership of the city to transform Cleveland, and the business community responded. A core of corporate CEO’s organized Cleveland Tomorrow – modeled on the Allegheny Conference in Pittsburgh – which drove a focused agenda of urban transformation. By 1989, Fortune magazine applauded the new trajectory in “How Business Bosses Saved a Sick City”.

    The partnership between the city and the business community began to shift in 1990 with the election of mayor Michael White. While the business community worked with White to complete projects like a new baseball stadium and basketball arena that had been planned earlier, the relationship between the mayor and the business community gradually deteriorated. A 1995 community push for mayoral control of the city school system represented the last big collaboration. By the time White began his third term in ’97, the Voinovich momentum pushing public-private partnerships had evaporated.

    At the same time, dramatic changes were taking place in Cleveland’s corporate landscape. By the late 1990s, the city had lost five Fortune 500 headquarters. Manufacturing, the backbone of the region’s economy, shrank dramatically. As the influence of manufacturing declined, real estate developers emerged as important forces within Cleveland’s business circle. Entering the 2001 recession, Cleveland was clearly in trouble. The Cleveland Plain Dealer proclaimed a “quiet crisis”. The editors started pushing for a master plan for economic development to follow up on the momentum of the Voinovich years. As one editor noted, the region was about to face “economic extinction.” The business leadership responded by consolidating different business organizations — Cleveland Tomorrow (leading CEOs), the Greater Cleveland Growth Association (a chamber of commerce), the Cleveland Roundtable (a group focused on diversity issues), and the Council of Smaller Enterprises (a small business organization) — into the Greater Cleveland Partnership.

    The Partnership focused its economic development agenda on building a convention center, the last Voinovich era project. It also re-organized a set of affiliate economic development organizations for better control and (hopefully) impact. JumpStart (for start-ups), BioEnterprise (for life science companies), MAGNET (for manufacturing companies), Team NEO (a recruiting organization), and Cleveland+ (a new branding effort) were to drive the transformation of the city-region, renamed Cleveland+. The Partnership has been resourceful in financing. A close relationship with a new coalition of foundations, called Fund for our Economic Future, provides about $8 million a year for the affiliate organizations, and effectively operates as a financing arm for the Cleveland+ strategy.

    To finance the new convention center, the Partnership pushed County Commissioners to approve a sales tax increase for about $500 million. In July 2008, the Commission — cleverly skating past a public vote (which by all accounts would have rejected the plan) — increased the sales tax unilaterally…and in a hurry. The vote to finance a convention center took place without a development plan, or even a site, in place. So, in effect, Cuyahoga County taxpayers are already paying for a non-existent convention center. The reason for all the rush seems clear. Last July, on the eve of the Commission vote to raise the sales tax, the Federal Bureau of Investigation assembled a team of over 200 agents to launch a public corruption probe, with raids of county offices, the home of one commissioner, and the offices of several contractors. Federal prosecutors are looking into the close relationship between county officials and several contracting and real estate development firms.

    Amidst the turmoil, Cleveland’s leadership has drifted into a classic case of group think. By shutting themselves off from public scrutiny, they have tried to shield themselves from growing public opposition. But in the process, they have drifted into a dream world that is increasingly detached from underlying market realities. The City’s future, according to the leadership’s current thinking, hinges on a convention center. There’s only one problem: There is no evidence that this strategy will work (and plenty of evidence that it will not). Convention centers represent a formula for low-skill, low-wage employment and public operating deficits as far as the eye can see.

    Put the convention center aside for a moment. Despite the significant assets within the region, the Greater Cleveland Partnership’s broader strategy for Cleveland is failing to transform the city-region’s economy.

    There are five weaknesses in the current Cleveland strategy: The wrong approach to scale, to public/private partnerships, to theoretical underpinnings, to change, to decision-making, and to understanding metrics.

    In Part II, I talk about what went wrong in each of these important realms, and how to strengthen each one.

    Ed Morrison is an Economic Policy Advisor at the Purdue Center for Regional Development. This article draws from Royce Hanson, et al, “Finding a New Voice for Corporate Leadership in a Changed Urban World”, a case study from The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program (September 2006).