Tag: Energy

  • As Partisan Rancor Rises, States That Back a Loser Will Be Punished

    Never mind the big-tent debate talk from both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney about how their respective politics will benefit all Americans. There’s a broader, ugly truth that as the last traces of purple fade from the electoral map, whoever wins will have little reason to take care of much of the country that rejected them.

     At least since the dissolving of the “solid South” in the late ’50s and early ’60s, both parties have competed to extend their reach to virtually every region. As recently as 1996, Democrat Bill Clinton could compete in the South, winning several states in the mid-South and even in the heart of Dixie, including Louisiana, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee. President Obama has about as much chance of winning these states this year as Abraham Lincoln did in 1860—giving him little reason to consider them in a second term.

    In the Clinton years, powerful Democrats hailed from what we now call red states not only in the South but also in the Great Plains. South Dakota’s Tom Daschle served as both Senate majority and minority leader, and Louisiana’s John Breaux and North Dakota’s Kent Conrad and Byron Dorgan were also players.

    After his 2008 win, Obama dismissed Republican objections to his stimulus with a two-word rejoinder: “I won.” But it’s become clear since that neither party is willing to accept the other’s claim of a popular mandate for its agenda. And the log jam  probably won’t be broken in November—especially if, as seems like the most likely outcome, Obama wins a second term while Republicans hold the House and edge closer to retaking the Senate.

    The 2010 Republican landslide was the rare election that radicalized both parties. The new GOP House majority was attained by adding Tea Partiers who have pushed the House—and to a lesser extent the Senate—rightward. At the same time, Democrats lost many of their remaining members who’d held on in Republican-leaning districts, leaving the party with a smaller but more ideologically pure cast of true believers in office.

    The right-leaning Blue Dog Democrats who once dominated the party’s ranks in the Plains and the Southeast are virtually extinct (as are Northeastern Republicans). In 2008 there were more than 50 Blue Dogs; the 2010 election sliced their ranks by half. After November there could be fewer than a dozen remaining. More and more Democrats, as Michael Barone has noted, come from overwhelmingly Democratic districts.

    A reelected President Obama may well find himself with almost no Plains or Southern Democrats in Congress outside of a few House members in Dixie’s handful of overwhelmingly African-American districts. With little reason to make compromise or common cause with solid red-state Republicans, the administration could leave the denizens of these states to bitterly cling to their guns and religion, while the president expands on his first-term practice of bypassing Congress to legislate by decree on everything from environmental policy to immigration and the implementation of health-care reform.  

    Already, notes National Journal’s Ron Brownstein, Democrats hold congressional majorities in only three noncoastal states—Iowa, New Mexico, and Vermont. Much of the country inside the coasts may find themselves with little sympathy from or access to a president whose reelection they will have rejected, often by lopsided double-digit margins.

    This could impact, in particular, energy policy since American fossil-fuel production is increasingly concentrated on the Plains, the rural Intermountain west and the Texas-Louisiana coast. Virtually all the mineral-rich economies excepting green-dominated California now lies well outside the electoral base of the president and his party. In a second Obama term, these states could well propel the national economy but could have little say on energy policies. Farming and ranching concerns will also have little political leverage with the White House. And traditional social concerns, most deeply felt in the Southern and more rural states, would lose all currency in a second-term administration whose worldview stems from that in big-city-dominated, deep-blue coastal states.

    The dissenting states with large fossil-fuel-driven economies—West Virginia, Texas, Oklahoma and North Dakota—would likely go to court to battle regulatory steps that they see as threatening large parts of their economies. In the Great Plains, expect a reprise of the 1970s Sagebrush Rebellion that bedeviled Jimmy Carter, as states fight back against green-oriented Washington regulators cracking down on users of federal land and water.

    Of course, if Romney finds a way to win, the coastal states would likely come in for some similarly rough treatment. The former Massachusetts governor has saved his harshest remarks for closed-door private events with big backers, dismissing 47 percent of the electorate as spongers at one such event, and telling backers at another that the Department of Education would become a “heck of a lot smaller” under his presidency and that the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which his father led during Richard Nixon’s first term in office, would face substantial cuts and “might not be around later.” The most devastating policy move he shared behind closed doors, though, was telling donors that he might eliminate the deductibility of state and local income and property taxes on federal returns—a move that would amount to a significant tax hike to many people living in high-tax and high-cost-of-living deep-blue states like New York and California.

    But since those states are solidly Democratic, Romney has little to lose politically by punishing or alienating their citizens.

    Deep-blue business interests could also lose their influence in a Romney administration, particularly if Republicans hold on to their strong majority in the House. The green-energy tax and subsidy farmers that have staked their future on the continued favor of the Democratic Party could find themselves cut off, and transit developers would also take a hit as the vast majority of train and bus riders come from a handful of dense and Democratic states (almost 40 percent of all national riders are in the New York area alone).

    But with Romney, the blue states would at least have a kind of patrician insurance, much as Clinton brought Southern sensibilities to the Democrats. The former Massachusetts governor is tied by a cultural and financial umbilical cord to his old comrades in the financial world of New York and Boston, making him less of a threat to the coastal ruling structures than Obama is to those of the interior states or the South.

    Whoever takes the White House, the nation’s best hope may be the regional mavericks who defy the trend toward geographical polarization. Democrats such as Sen. Jon Tester in Montana and Senate candidate Heidi Heitkamp in North Dakota are running hard against the anti-Obama tide in their states. Should they win, the party’s need to protect their seats would help press the White House to modify the party’s drift to an increasingly leftish social and environmental agenda.

    On the Republican side, the need to protect a middle-of-the-road politician like Massachusetts Sen. Scott Brown would push other party members into moderating their more extreme positions on social issues and regulation. Republican victories by Tommy Thompson in Wisconsin and Linda McMahon in Connecticut might also help moderate the party by adding to the numbers of “blue states” in the GOP caucus.

    For the federal union to work effectively, there has to be a sense that we are all, in different ways, linked to each other and share common interests that mean we’re willing to make compromises to live together. It’s time to bridge our partisan regional divides and avoid an ever more nasty, and divisive war between the states.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and contributing editor to the City Journal in New York. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    This piece originally appeared in The Daily Beast.

    State text map by Bigstock.

  • Obama Fuel Economy Rules Trump Smart Growth

    The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has just finalized its regulation requiring that new cars and light trucks (light vehicles) achieve average fuel efficiency of 54.5 miles per gallon (MPG) by 2025 (4.3 liters per 100 kilometers). This increase in the "CAFE" standard (Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency) is the second major step in the Obama Administration’s program to improve light vehicle fuel efficiency. In 2010, EPA adopted regulations requiring 35.5 MPG average by 2016 (6.6 liters per 100 kilometers).

    The EPA standard is based upon carbon dioxide (CO2) grams emitted per mile of light vehicle travel, with an average of 163 grams per mile (101 per kilometer) to be achieved in 2025. This is slightly above the 2020 European Union standard of 152 grams per mile (95 grams per kilometer). Of course, the regulations have both supporters and detractors, with the automobile manufacturers being among the supporters.  

    Assuming the objectives are met, the reductions in CO2 emissions will dwarf the modest gains forecast from anti-suburban smart growth policies. For decades, this powerful movement has sought to limit or prohibit suburban expansion and even outlaw the detached housing that most people prefer. This includes railing against automobile use and seeking to coerce people out of their cars (as expressed by Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood).

    The anti-suburban movement has many labels in addition to "smart growth," such as “densification policy," "compact cities," "growth management," "urban consolidation," etc. The origins can be traced back to just after World War II, with the enactment of the British Town and Country Planning Act. The policy origins of smart growth in the United States date from the 1960s (the state of Hawaii) and 1970s (the state of Oregon and California local jurisdictions).

    Forecast CO2 Emission Reductions from Smart Growth

    With concerns about greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (principally carbon dioxide, or CO2), proponents saw the opportunity to force people back into the cities (from which most did not come) and turn smart growth into an imperative for "saving the planet." This is no exaggeration. As late as last month, this was claimed by fellow panelists at a Maryland Association of Counties conference. As is indicated below, the data shows no such association.

    Even forecasts by proponents fall short of demonstrating an apocalyptic necessity for smart growth. The Cambridge Systematics and Urban Land Institute Moving Cooler report attributed only modest reductions in CO2 emissions to smart growth’s land use and mass transit policies (Moving Cooler was criticized on this site by Alan Pisarski. See ULI Moving Cooler Report: Greenhouse Gases, Exaggerations and Misdirections). The data in Moving Cooler suggests an approximately 50 million ton reduction in CO2 emissions from these smart growth strategies by 2035 (interpolating between 2030 and 2050 figures).

    The more balanced Transportation Research Board Driving and the Built Environment: The Effects of Compact Development on Motorized Travel, Energy Use, and CO2 Emissions  produced similar figures, however it indicated skepticism about whether their higher range projections were "plausible."

    Comparing Smart Growth to the Previous Fuel Economy Standard

    At the 2005 fuel economy rate and the projected driving increase rate in the US Department of Energy Annual Energy Outlook:2008 (AEO), CO2 emissions from light vehicles would have increased 64 percent from 2005 to 2035 (Note 1). This could be called the "baseline" case or the "business as usual" case. This would have resulted in a CO2 emissions increase from light vehicles of approximately 0.75 billion tons.

    Using the more aggressive Moving Cooler forecast, the smart growth transport and land use strategies would only minimally reduce CO2 emissions from the baseline case (64 percent above 2005 levels) to 60 percent. This is "chicken feed" (Figure 1).

    Forecast CO2 Emission Reductions from the 54.5 MPG Standard

    Under the previous 35.5 MPG standard, AEO:2008 and AEO:2012,  a 19 percent reduction in CO2 emissions from cars and light trucks would occur from 2005 to 2035. We modeled the new regulations based upon AEO:2012 forecasts for the earlier regulation. This yielded a 2035 CO2 emission reduction of 35 percent from 2005 (Figure 2), despite a healthy one-third increase in driving volumes over the period. The calculation also includes an upward adjustment for the rebound effect, as lower costs of driving encourage people to drive more, which EPA estimates at 10 percent ("induced traffic"), which is indicated in Figure 3.


    Achievement of the 54.5 MPG standard would reduce CO2 emissions from light vehicles from 1.9 billion annual tons in 2035 under the 2005 baseline to approximately 0.750 billion metric tons in 2035. Approximately 70 percent of the decline in CO2 emissions would be from improved fuel economy, while 30 percent would be from slower annual increase in vehicle travel that has been adopted in AEO:2012 (Figure 4). The increase in driving is now forecast at 33 percent from 2005.

    The contrast between the potential CO2 emissions from smart growth and fuel economy is stark. By comparison, the annual overall reduction in CO2 emissions (from the 2005 baseline) would be virtually equal to the 30 year impact of smart growth (Figure 5).

    Comparison with Transit

    The 35.5 MPG standard would make cars and light trucks less CO2 intensive than transit. At work trip vehicle occupancy rates, the average new light vehicle would emit less in CO2 per passenger mile in 2016 than transit in all but eight of the nation’s 51 metropolitan areas over 1,000,000 population. The 2025 54.5 MPG standard would drop that number to two (Note 2). Even before these developments, there was only scant potential for replacing automobile use with transit (much less walking or cycling) because of its long travel times. According to data in a Brookings Institution report, less than 10 percent of jobs in the largest metropolitan areas can be reached by the average resident in 45 minutes on transit (Note 3).

    Smart Growth: Not Needed to "Save the Planet"

    Smart growth is an exceedingly intrusive policy that would attempt to enforce personal behaviors,    counter to people’s preferences, by attempting to dictate where people live and how they travel. This is expensive as well as intrusive. It is also detrimental to the economy, which is already taking a toll in lower household discretionary income (especially from higher house prices) and stunted economic growth.

    A report by The McKinsey Corporation and The Conference Board  indicated that sufficient CO2 emissions could be achieved with "…no downsizing of vehicles, home or commercial space and traveling the same mileage" and "…no shift to denser housing." Or, more directly, smart growth is unnecessary, in addition to producing little "gain" for the "pain."

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

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    Note 1: The 2030 to 2035 driving volume is estimated using the annual percentage increase from 2025 to 2030 in AEO: 2008, which has data through 2030.

    Note 2: Calculated from 2010 National Transit Database summary by Randal O’Toole of the Cato Institute. These calculations assume the 250 gram per mile standard for new light vehicles in 2016 and the vehicle occupancy ratio of 1.13 for work trips from the 2009 National Household Travel Survey.

    Note 3: Limited transit access is not just an American problem. In Paris, with arguably the best transit system in the western world, the average resident of a suburban new town on the regional metro (RER) can reach twice as many jobs by car as by transit in an hour, according to Fouchier and Michelon.

    Prius photo by Bigstock.

  • The Unseen Class War That Could Decide The Presidential Election

    Much is said about class warfare in contemporary America, and there’s justifiable anger at the impoverishment of much of the middle and working classes. The Pew Research Center recently dubbed the 2000s a “lost decade” for middle-income earners — some 85% of Americans in that category feel it’s now more difficult to maintain their standard of living than at the beginning of the millennium, according to a Pew survey.

    Blaming a disliked minority — rich business folks — has morphed into a predictable strategy for President Obama’s Democrats, stripped of incumbent success. But all the talk of “one percent” versus “the ninety nine percent” misses new splits developing within both the upper and middle classes.

    There is no true solidarity among the rich since no one is yet threatening their status. The “one percent” are splitting their bets. In 2008 President Obama received more Wall Street money than any candidate in history, and he still relies on Wall Street bundlers for his sustenance. For all his class rhetoric, miscreant Wall Streeters, particularly big ones, have evaded big sanctions and the ignominy of jail time.

    Obama enjoys great support from the financial interests that benefit from government debt and expansive public largesse. Well-connected people like Obama’s financial tsar on the GM bailout, Steven Rattner, who is also known as a vigorous defender of “too big to fail.”

    The “patrician left” — a term that might have amused Marx — extends as well to Silicon Valley, where venture capitalists and techies have opened their wallets wider than ever before for the president. Microsoft and Google are two of Obama’s top three organizational sources of campaign contributions. Valley financiers are not always as selfless as they or their admirers imagine: Many have sought to feed at the Energy Department’s bounteous “green” energy trough and all face regulatory reviews by federal agencies.

    The Republicans have turned increasingly to those patricians who depend on the more tangible economy. If you make your living from digging coal or exploring for oil wells, even if you don’t like him, Romney is you man. This saddles the GOP with the burden of being linked to one of America’s most hated interests: oil and gas companies. Almost as detested is the biggest source of Romney cash, large Wall Street banks. (In contrast, Democratic-leaning industries, such as Internet-related companies, enjoy relatively high public support.)

    With the patriarchate divided, the real action in the emerging class war is taking place further down the economic food chain. This inconvenient reality is largely ignored by the left, which finds the idea of anyone this side of Bain Capital supporting Romney as little more than “false consciousness.”

    Obama’s core middle-class support, and that of his party, comes from what might be best described as “the clerisy,” a 21st century version of France’s pre-revolution First Estate. This includes an ever-expanding class of minders — lawyers, teachers, university professors, the media and, most particularly, the relatively well paid legions of public sector workers — who inhabit Washington, academia, large non-profits and government centers across the country.

    This largely well-heeled “middle class” still adores the president, and party theoreticians see it as the Democratic Party’s new base. Gallup surveys reveal Obama does best among “professionals” such as teachers, lawyers and educators. After retirees, educators and lawyers are the two biggest sources of campaign contributions for Obama by occupation. Obama’s largest source of funds among individual organizations is the University of California, Harvard is fifth and its wannabe cousin Stanford ranks ninth.

    Like teachers, much of academia and the legal bar like expanding government since the tax spigot flows in the right direction: that is, into their mouths. Like the old clerical classes, who relied on tithes and the collection bowl, many in today’s clerisy lives somewhat high on the hog; nearly one in five federal workers earn over $100,000.

    Essentially, the clerisy has become a new, mass privileged class who live a safer, more secure life compared to those trapped in the harsher, less cosseted private economy. As California Polytechnic economist Michael Marlow points out, public sector workers enjoy greater job stability, and salary and benefits as much as 21% higher than of private sector employees doing similar work.

    On this year’s Labor Day, this is the new face of unionism. The percentage of private-sector workers in unions has dropped from 24% in 1973 to barely 7% today and in 2010, for the first time, the public sector accounted for an absolute majority of union members. “Labor” increasingly means not guys with overalls and lunch pails, but people whose paychecks are signed by taxpayers.

    The GOP, for its part, now relies on another part of the middle class, what I would call the yeomanry. In many ways they represent the contemporary version of Jeffersonian farmers or the beneficiaries of President Lincoln’s Homestead Act. They are primarily small property owners who lack the girth and connections of the clerisy but resist joining the government-dependent poor. Particularly critical are small business owners, who Gallup identifies as “the least approving” of Obama among all the major occupation groups. Barely one in three likes the present administration.

    The yeomanry diverge from the clerisy in other ways. They tend to live in the suburbs, a geography much detested by many leaders of the clerisy and, likely, the president himself. Yeomen families tend to be concentrated in those parts of the country that have more children and are more apt to seek solutions to social problems through private efforts. Philanthropy, church work and voluntarism — what you might call, appropriately enough, the Utah approach, after the state that leads in philanthropy.

    The nature of their work also differentiates the clerisy from the yeomanry. The clerisy labors largely in offices and has no contact with actual production. Many yeomen, particularly in business services, depend on industry for their livelihoods either directly or indirectly. The clerisy’s stultifying, and often job-toxic regulations and “green” agenda may be one reason why people engaged in farming, fishing, forestry, transportation, manufacturing and construction overwhelmingly disapprove of the president’s policies, according to Gallup.

    Obama supporters sometimes trace the loss of largely white working-class support — even to the somewhat less than simpatico patrician Romney — to “false consciousness.”  A recent Daily Kos article, charmingly entitled “The Masses are Asses,” chose to wave the old bloody shirt of racism, arguing that whites “are the single largest, and most protected racial group in this country’s history.”

    Ultimately this division — clerisy and their clients versus yeomanry — will decide the election. The patricians and the unions will finance this battle on both sides, spreading a predictable thread of half-truths and outright lies. The Democrats enjoy a tactical advantage. All President Obama needs is to gain a rough split among the vast group making around or above the national median income. He can count on overwhelming backing by the largely government dependent poor as well as most ethnic minorities, even the most entrepreneurial and successful.

    Romney’s imperative will be to rouse the yeomanry by suggesting the clerisy, both by their sheer costliness and increasingly intrusive agenda, are crippling their family’s prospects for a better life. In these times of weak economic growth and growing income disparity, the Republicans delude themselves by claiming to ignore class warfare. They need to learn how instead to make it politically profitable for themselves.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and contributing editor to the City Journal in New York. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    This piece originally appeared in Forbes.

    Mitt Romney image from Bigstock.

  • German Renewable Power: Making Sustainability Unsustainable?

    Der Speigel reports that Germany’s rushed program to convert to renewable energy is already imposing an economic burden. Part of the problem is the inherent instability of power produced by renewable sources such as wind and solar:

    The problem is that wind and solar farms just don’t deliver the same amount of continuous electricity compared with nuclear and gas-fired power plants. To match traditional energy sources, grid operators must be able to exactly predict how strong the wind will blow or the sun will shine.

    A national energy expert said:

    "In the long run, if we can’t guarantee a stable grid, companies will leave (Germany). "As a center of industry, we can’t afford that."

    An important principle of the international impetus to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is that there be little or no economic loss. Certainly, an industrial powerhouse like Germany cannot subject itself to such risks.

    At the same time, other locations would be similarly threatened by implementation of renewable power mandates whose "time has not yet come." Not only is there the potential to inflict economic harm on industry (and consumers through higher prices), but higher electricity prices would reduce discretionary incomes and could lead to greater poverty rates. The eradication of poverty has recently been declared to be a virtual prerequisite to sustainability at the Rio conference.

    eradicating poverty should be given the highest priority, overriding all other concerns to achieve sustainable development.

    Environmental sustainability requires economic sustainability. A litany of failures could do serious damage to GHG emission reduction efforts.

  • The New Class Warfare

    Few states have offered the class warriors of Occupy Wall Street more enthusiastic support than California has. Before they overstayed their welcome and police began dispersing their camps, the Occupiers won official endorsements from city councils and mayors in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, Richmond, Irvine, Santa Rosa, and Santa Ana. Such is the extent to which modern-day “progressives” control the state’s politics.

    But if those progressives really wanted to find the culprits responsible for the state’s widening class divide, they should have looked in a mirror. Over the past decade, as California consolidated itself as a bastion of modern progressivism, the state’s class chasm has widened considerably. To close the gap, California needs to embrace pro-growth policies, especially in the critical energy and industrial sectors—but it’s exactly those policies that the progressives most strongly oppose.

    Even before the economic downturn, California was moving toward greater class inequality, but the Great Recession exacerbated the trend. From 2007 to 2010, according to a recent study by the liberal-leaning Public Policy Institute of California, income among families in the 10th percentile of earners plunged 21 percent. Nationwide, the figure was 14 percent. In the much wealthier 90th percentile of California earners, income fell far less sharply: 5 percent, only slightly more than the national 4 percent drop. Further, by 2010, the families in the 90th percentile had incomes 12 times higher than the incomes of families in the 10th—the highest ratio ever recorded in the state, and significantly higher than the national ratio.

    It’s also worth noting that in 2010, the California 10th-percentile families were earning less than their counterparts in the rest of the United States—$15,000 versus $16,300—even though California’s cost of living was substantially higher. A more familiar statistic signaling California’s problems is its unemployment rate, which is now the nation’s second-highest, right after Nevada’s. Of the eight American metropolitan areas where the joblessness rate exceeds 15 percent, seven are in California, and most of them have substantial minority and working-class populations.

    When California’s housing bubble popped, real-estate prices fell far more steeply than in less regulated markets, such as Texas. The drop hurt the working class in two ways: it took away a major part of their assets; and it destroyed the construction jobs important to many working-class, particularly Latino, families. The reliably left-leaning Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy found that between 2005 and 2009, the state lost fully one-third of its construction jobs, compared with a 24 percent drop nationwide. California has also suffered disproportionate losses in its most productive blue-collar industries. Over the past ten years, more than 125,000 industrial jobs have evaporated, even as industrial growth has helped spark a recovery in many other states. The San Francisco metropolitan area lost 40 percent of its industrial positions during this period, the worst record of any large metro area in the country. In 2011, while the country was gaining 227,000 industrial jobs, California’s manufacturers were still stuck in reverse, losing 4,000.

    Yet while the working and middle classes struggle, California’s most elite entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are thriving as never before. “We live in a bubble, and I don’t mean a tech bubble or a valuation bubble. I mean a bubble as in our own little world,” Google CEO Eric Schmidt recently told the San Francisco Chronicle. “And what a world it is. Companies can’t hire people fast enough. Young people can work hard and make a fortune. Homes hold their value.” Meanwhile, in nearby Oakland, the metropolitan region ranks dead last in job growth among the nation’s largest metro areas, according to a recent Forbes survey, and one in three children lives in poverty.

    One reason for California’s widening class divide is that, for a decade or longer, the state’s progressives have fostered a tax environment that slows job creation, particularly for the middle and working classes. In 1994, California placed 35th in the Tax Foundation’s ranking of states with the lightest tax burdens on business; today, it has plummeted to 48th. Only New York and New Jersey have more onerous business-tax burdens. Local taxes and fees have made five California cities—San Francisco, Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, Santa Monica, and Culver City—among the nation’s 20 most expensive business environments, according to the Kosmont–Rose Institute Cost of Doing Business Survey.

    Still more troubling to California employers is the state’s regulatory environment. California labor laws, a recent U.S. Chamber of Commerce study revealed, are among the most complex in the nation. The state has strict rules against noncompetition agreements, as well as an overtime regime that reduces flexibility: unlike other states, where overtime kicks in after 40 hours in a given week, California requires businesses to pay overtime to employees who have clocked more than eight hours a day. Rules for record-keeping and rest breaks are likewise more stringent than in other states. The labor code contains tough provisions on everything from discrimination to employee screening, the Chamber of Commerce study notes, and has created “a cottage industry of class actions” in the state. California’s legal climate is the fifth-worst in the nation, according to the Institute for Legal Reform; firms face far higher risks of nuisance and other lawsuits from employees than in most other places. In addition to these measures, California has imposed some of the most draconian environmental laws in the country, as we will see in a moment.

    The impact of these regulations is not lost on business executives, including those considering new investments or expansions in California. A survey of 500 top CEOs by Chief Executive found that California had the worst business climate in the country, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce calls California “a difficult environment for job creation.” Small wonder, then, that since 2001, California has accounted for just 1.9 percent of the country’s new investment in industrial facilities; in better times, between 1977 and 2000, it had grabbed 5.6 percent.

    Officials, including Governor Jerry Brown, argue that California’s economy is so huge that it can afford to lose companies to other states. But for the local economy to be hurt, firms don’t have to leave entirely. Business consultant Joe Vranich, who maintains a website that tracks businesses that leave the state, points out that when California companies decide to expand, often they do so in other parts of the U.S. and abroad, not in their home environment. Further, Brown is too cavalier about the effects of businesses’ departure. As Vranich notes, many businesses leave California “quietly in the night,” generating few headlines but real job losses. He cites the low-key departure in 2010 of Thomas Brothers Maps, a century-old California firm, which transferred dozens of employees from its Irvine headquarters to Skokie, Illinois, and outsourced the rest of its jobs to Bangalore.

    The list of companies leaving the state or shifting jobs elsewhere is extensive. It includes low-tech companies, such as Dunn Edwards Paints and fast-food operator CKE Restaurants, and high-tech ones, such as Acacia Research, Biocentric Energy Holdings, and eBay, which plans to create 1,000 new positions in Austin, Texas. Computer-security giant McAfee estimates that it saves 30 to 40 percent every time it hires outside California. Only 14 percent of the firm’s 6,500 employees remain in Silicon Valley, says CEO David DeWalt. The state’s small businesses, which account for the majority of employment, are harder to track, but a recent survey found that one in five didn’t expect to remain in business in California within the next three years.

    Apologists for the current regime also claim that the state’s venture capitalists will fund and create new companies that will boost employment. It’s certainly true that in the past, California firms funded by venture capital tended to expand largely in California. But as Jack Stewart, president of the California Manufacturing and Technology Association, points out, a different dynamic is at work today: once a company’s start-up phase is over, it tends to move its middle-class jobs elsewhere, as the state’s shrinking fraction of the nation’s industrial investment indicates. “Sure, we are getting half of all the venture capital investment, but in the end, we have relatively small research and development firms only,” Stewart argues. “Once they have a product or go to scale, the firms move [employment] elsewhere. The other states end up getting most of the middle-class jobs.”

    Radical environmentalism has been particularly responsible for driving wedges between California’s classes. Until fairly recently, as historian Kevin Starr says, California’s brand of progressivism involved spurring economic growth—particularly by building infrastructure—and encouraging broad social advancement. “What the progressives created,” Starr says, “was California as a middle-class utopia. The idea was if you wanted to be a nuclear physicist, a carpenter, or a cosmetologist, we would create the conditions to get you there.” By contrast, he says, today’s progressives regard with suspicion any growth that requires the use of land and natural resources. Where old-fashioned progressives embraced both conservation and the expansion of public parks, the new green movement advocates a reduced human “footprint” and opposes cars, “sprawl,” and even human reproduction.

    The Bay Area has served as the incubator for the new green progressivism. The militant Friends of the Earth was founded in 1969 in San Francisco. Malthusian Paul Ehrlich, author of the sensationalist 1968 jeremiad The Population Bomb and mentor of President Obama’s current science advisor, John Holdren, built his career at Stanford. Today, more than 130 environmental activist groups make their headquarters in San Francisco, Berkeley, Oakland, and surrounding cities.

    The environmentalist agenda emerged in full flower under nominally Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who initially cast himself as a Milton Friedman–loving neo-Reaganite. On his watch, California’s legislature in 2006 passed Assembly Bill 32, which, in order to cut greenhouse-gas emissions, imposes heavy fees on using carbon-based energy and severely restricts planning and development. One analysis of small-business impacts prepared by Sacramento State University economists indicates that AB 32 could strip about $181 billion per year, or nearly 10 percent, from the state’s economy. At the same time, land-use regulations connected to the climate-change legislation hinder expansion for firms.

    Another business-hobbling mandate is the law requiring that 30 percent of California’s electricity be generated by “renewable” sources by 2020. The state’s electricity costs are already 50 percent above the national average and the fifth-highest in the nation—yet state policies make the construction of new oil- or gas-fired power plants all but impossible and offer massive subsidies for expensive, often unreliable, “renewable” energy. The renewable-fuel laws will simply boost electricity costs further. The cost of electricity from the new NRG solar-energy facility in central California, for instance, will be 50 percent higher than the cost of power from a newly built gas-powered facility, according to state officials. For providing this expensive service, NRG will pay no property taxes on its facilities. By some estimates, green mandates could force electricity prices to rise 5 to 7 percent annually through 2020.

    The renewable-fuel regulations are driving even green jobs out of the state. Cereplast, a thriving El Segundo–based manufacturer of compostable plastic, last year moved its manufacturing operations to Indiana, where electricity costs are 70 percent lower. Fuel-cell firm Bing Energy cited cost and regulatory factors when announcing its move from California to Florida. “I just can’t imagine any corporation in their right mind would decide to set up in California right now,” the firm’s CFO, Dean Minardi, told the Inland Valley Daily Bulletin. Still more rules, aimed at improving water quality and protecting endangered species, could have a devastating effect on the construction and expansion of port facilities, which tend to sustain high-wage blue- and white-collar jobs.

    The political class largely ignores the economic consequences of these policies. Indeed, Governor Brown and others insist that they will create jobs—upward of 500,000 of them—while establishing California as a green-energy leader. To turn Brown’s green dreams into reality, the state has approved enormous subsidies and tax breaks for solar and other renewable-energy producers to supplement those dispensed by the Obama administration. Yet for all this, California has barely 300,000 “green jobs,” many of which are low-wage positions, such as weather-stripping installers. And the solar industry, in California and abroad, is imploding.

    Bill Watkins, head of the economic forecasting unit at California Lutheran University, notes that California’s green policies affect the very industries—manufacturing, home construction, warehousing, and agribusiness—that have traditionally employed middle- and working-class residents. “The middle-class economy is suffering since there is no real opposition to the environmental community,” says Watkins. “You see the Democrats, who should worry about blue-collar and middle-income jobs, give in every time.”

    Progressives and many Occupy protesters mourned the death of high-tech innovator and multibillionaire Steve Jobs. They also tend to view social-networking firms like Facebook more as allies than as class enemies. This embrace of Silicon Valley is nearly as strange as the Occupy movement’s decision to target the ports of Los Angeles and Oakland—large employers of well-paid blue-collar workers. Activists portrayed the attempted port shutdowns as attempts to “disrupt the profits of the 1 percent,” but union workers largely saw them as impositions on their livelihood. As former San Francisco mayor and state assembly speaker Willie Brown wrote in the San Francisco Chronicle: “If the Occupy people really want to make a point about the 1 percent, then lay off Oakland and go for the real money down in Silicon Valley. The folks who work on the docks in Oakland or drive the trucks in and out of the port are all part of the 99 percent.”

    The explanation for the progressives’ hypocritical friendliness to Silicon Valley is simple: money and politics. Venture capitalists and highly profitable, oligopolistic firms like Google (with its fleet of eight private jets) invest heavily in green companies; they were also among the primary bankrollers of the successful opposition to a 2010 ballot initiative aimed at reversing AB 32. The digital elite has become more and more involved in local politics, with executives from Facebook, Twitter, and gaming website Zynga contributing heavily to the recent campaign of San Francisco mayor Ed Lee, for example. Lee has, in turn, been extremely kind to the digerati, extending a payroll-tax break to Twitter and a stock-option break to Zynga and other firms that may soon go public.

    Hollywood manages to outdo even Silicon Valley in its class hypocrisy. Former actor Schwarzenegger doesn’t let his green zealotry stop him from owning oversize houses and driving fuel-gorging cars. Canadian-born director James Cameron, who contents himself with a six-bedroom, $3.5 million, 8,300-square-foot Malibu mansion, talks about the need to “stop industrial growth” and applauds the idea of a permanent recession. “It’s so heretical to everybody trying to recover from a recession economy—‘we have to stimulate growth!’ ” says Cameron. “Well, yeah. Except that’s what’s gonna kill this planet.”

    According to the Tax Foundation, California residents already pay the nation’s sixth-highest state tax rates, and they are likely to keep rising. Three tax-raising measures have already been proposed for the November 2012 ballot. Governor Brown’s proposal, which would boost both income and sales taxes, stands a good chance of passage. Hedge-fund manager Tom Steyer, an investor in environmental firms, has floated a measure that would raise taxes on out-of-state companies that conduct any operations in California and use some of the revenue to subsidize green-friendly building projects. And Molly Munger, a civil rights attorney and daughter of Warren Buffett’s longtime business partner, is pressing a measure to raise income taxes to fund schools. The so-called Think Long proposal, financed by nomadic French billionaire Nicolas Berggruen and overseen by a committee including Google’s Schmidt and billionaire philanthropist Eli Broad, proposes a mild cut in income-tax rates for the highest earners (like themselves) but new taxes on services provided by architects, accountants, business consultants, plumbers, gardeners, and others—the sole proprietors and microbusinesses that represent the one growing element in the state’s beleaguered private-sector middle class.

    More money for social services or education might help alleviate some of the recession’s impact, but it cannot break the vicious cycle from which California currently suffers: weak growth leading to low tax revenues, government boosting taxes to make up the shortfall, and those higher taxes driving businesses and jobs away, resulting in continued weak growth. What California’s middle and working classes need above all is broad, private-sector job growth—and that, fortunately, is a goal still well within reach. The Golden State may be run stupidly, but it retains enormous assets: its position on the Pacific Rim, large numbers of aspiring immigrants, unparalleled creative industries, fertile land, and a treasure trove of natural resources.

    The most promising opportunity is in the contentious area of fossil-fuel energy, a mainstay of the state’s economy since the turn of the twentieth century. California still ranks as the nation’s fourth-largest oil-producing state. Traditional energy has long provided good jobs; nationally, the industry pays an average annual salary of $100,000. And elsewhere, from the Great Plains to eastern Ohio, an oil and gas boom is driving growth.

    But California has thus far excluded itself from the party. Even as production surges in other parts of the country, California companies like Occidental Petroleum report diminishing oil production. The drop-off proves, some environmentalists say, that “peak oil” has been reached, but the evidence shows otherwise: the last few years have seen a fourfold increase in applications for drilling permits in California, largely because of the discovery of the massive Monterey shale deposits—containing a potential 15 billion barrels of oil—and of an estimated 10 billion barrels near Bakersfield. The real reason for the reduced production is that California has rejected most of the drilling applications since 2008. “I asked Jerry Brown about why California cannot come to grips with its huge hydrocarbon reserves,” recalls John Hofmeister, former president of Shell Oil’s U.S. operations. “After all, this could turn around the state. He answered that this is not logic, it’s California. This is simply not going to happen here.”

    The anti-fossil-fuel stance, according to the Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation, has placed some $1 billion in investment and 6,000 jobs on hold. The sense of wasted opportunity can be palpable. If you travel to Santa Maria, a hardscrabble town near the Monterey formation, you pass empty industrial parks and small, decaying shopping centers. As economist Watkins put it at a recent conference there: “If you guys were in Texas, you’d all be rich.”

    California doesn’t even need to abandon its progressive tradition to narrow the class divide. Homebuilding, manufacturing, and warehousing could expand if regulatory burdens other than those associated with fighting climate change were merely modified—not repealed, but relaxed sufficiently to make it possible to do business, put people to work, and make a profit. New energy production could take place under strict regulatory oversight. Future industrial and middle-class suburban development could be tied to practical energy-conservation measures, such as promoting home-based businesses and better building standards. California’s agriculture industry—currently thriving, thanks to exports—could be less burdened by the constant threat of water cutbacks and new groundwater regulations.

    Even from an environmental perspective, increased industrial growth in California might be a good thing. The state’s benign climate allows it to consume fossil-fuel energy far more efficiently than most states do, to say nothing of developing countries such as China. Keeping industry and middle-class jobs here may constitute a more intelligent ecological position than the prevailing green absolutism.

    More important still is that a pro-growth strategy could help reverse California’s current feudalization. The same Public Policy Institute of California study shows that during the last broad-based economic boom, between 1993 and 2001, the 10th percentile of earners enjoyed stronger income growth than earners in the higher percentiles did. The lesson, which progressives once understood, is that upward mobility is best served by a growing economy. If they fail to remember that all-important fact, the greens and their progressive allies may soon have to place the California dream on their list of endangered species.

    This piece originally appeared in The City Journal.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and contributing editor to the City Journal in New York. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Los Angeles aqueduct photo by BigStockPhoto.com.

  • The Return of the Monkish Virtues

    “[The author of Leviticus] posits the existence of one supreme God who contends neither with a higher realm nor with competing peers. The world of demons is abolished; there is no struggle with autonomous foes, because there are none. With the demise of the demons, only one creature remains with ‘demonic’ power – the human being. Endowed with free will, human power is greater than any attributed to humans by pagan society. Not only can one defy God but, in Priestly language, one can drive God out of his sanctuary. In this respect, humans have replaced demons…..[The author of Leviticus] also posits that the pollution of the sanctuary leads to YHWH’s abandonment of Israel and its ejection from the land….Israel pollutes the land; the land becomes infertile; Israel is forced to leave.” – Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus


    “Pollution ideas are the product of an ongoing political debate about the ideal society. All mysterious pollutions are dangerous, but to focus on the physical danger and to deride the reasoning that attaches it to particular transgressions is to miss the lesson for ourselves…. Pollution beliefs trace causal chains from from actions to disasters…Pollution beliefs uphold conceptual categories dividing the moral from the immoral and so sustain the vision of the good society.” – Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture


    “Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices.” – David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

    The era of the 100 watt incandescent light bulb came to an end in America on January 1st. Lower wattages will soon join them in a phaseout over time. As I noted previously, this will mean factory shutdowns in the United States and the migration of the light bulb manufacturing industry to China. The most common replacement type bulbs, compact fluorescents, are not “instant on,” generally fail to provide a proper light spectrum, contain poisonous mercury, and burn out sooner than advertised. CFL boosters claim none of these are real problems and that CFLs are a slam dunk for benefit/cost reasons, but the cold reality is that despite significant promotion, they never received widespread consumer adoption voluntarily. Given how eagerly consumers slurp up even bona fide more expensive products like Apple computers when they are perceived to be superior, I’m inclined to think the consumers are on to something. I’ve tried out CFLs myself and thought they basically sucked.

    The supposed rationale for imposing an inferior product that did not receive the desired traction in the the marketplace is to prevent climate change. I went searching to try to find exactly what the impact of light bulbs on greenhouse gas emissions was and have found it quite difficult to obtain. The various sites touting CFLs all note the high output of CO2 from electricity generation generally, how much CO2 changing this or that bulb will save, etc, but as for what a wholesale elimination of light bulbs would achieve, that’s harder to find.

    According to the EPA, residential electricity accounted for 784.6 million metric tons of CO2 in 2009, or 11.8% of total US human greenhouse gas emissions. How much of that is from light bulbs? It’s not broken out in the EPA’s report (even the detailed version), but I’ll attempt an estimate of aggregate CO2 savings. (If someone has a direct link to this information, please let me know).

    The Guardian reported that an Australian incandescent ban would save that country 800K tons of CO2 emitted per year and a UK ban would save 2-3 million tons. It also reported that China could save 48 million tons per year by banning incandescents.

    The US is bigger than Australia and the UK, but similarly advanced developmentally. China is a bigger emitter than the US, has far more people, is less advanced developmentally, and is a bigger user of coal for electricity generation. However, all three countries project similar per capita emissions reductions from incandescent elimination. If the US savings were at the upper end of their range, it would have CO2 savings of around 15 million tons a year. That’s only 0.2% of total US greenhouse gas emissions. Even if the US saved the same 48 million tons as China, it’s only 0.7%. I’d be skeptical of anyone claiming the US would save a lot more CO2 per capita than these. Some maybe, a lot, no.

    In short, swapping out incandescent light bulbs is not going to be a major contributor to solving the problem of climate change. I’m not aware of anyone claiming it is. So why pass a law that is unpopular in many quarters and cram CFLs and other type of bulbs consumers haven’t chosen to buy on their own down their throats? It seems to be a purely provocative move of a mostly symbolic nature with little real substance that is sure to only harden opposition to the real changes we need to make to actually make material reductions in GHG emissions. (One might say the same of other items like mandatory recycling or banning plastic grocery bags).

    The answer is that the symbolism is the substance.

    The sad reality is that rather than make policy cases based on benefit/cost or other technical considerations, for political or personal reasons sustainability advocates have decided to model their cause on the template of religion. In it we have an Edenic state of nature in a fallen state because of man’s sin (pollution) for which we will experience a coming apocalyptic judgement (damage from climate change). Thus avoiding the consequences becomes fundamentally a problem of sin management. The proposed sin management solution is again taken from traditional Christianity: confession and repentance, followed by penance, restoration to right standing with God (nature), and committing to a holier life.

    There are two basic problems with this. The first is that while the religion template taps in to a deep psychological vein in the human spirit – some have suggested humanity may even carry a so-called “God gene” – most people already have a religion and aren’t likely to convert to a new one without a major outreach effort.

    But more importantly, the notion of penance, and perhaps of asceticism more generally, has never sold with the public, even in more religious eras. David Hume (a vigorous religious skeptic it should be noted) referred to the values resulting from this lifestyle as the “monkish virtues” and noted that they have “everywhere rejected by men of sense.” Or as Carol Coletta put it more recently, people don’t want to be told to “eat their spinach.”

    It strikes me that while perhaps environmentalists don’t really want to force a particular lifestyle on people, there is a fundamental desire to see people engage in some sort of public penance for our environmental sins. I believe this to be the root logic underlying a lot of feel-good (or perhaps more accurately, “feel-bad”) initiatives like getting rid of incandescent light bulbs. It is a form of penance and embrace of the monkish virtues.

    I can’t help but notice that even Christianity itself has moved away from promoting the monkish virtues. While things humility are of course still preached and expected to be modeled, modern Christianity mostly rejects the notion of an ascetic life. Most Evangelical churches actually preach that God wants humans to be happy. The idea is of a God who wants us to be unselfish, but not unhappy. A not insignificant number of churches actually preach the so-called “prosperity gospel” in which God will provide earthly blessings to His followers. In the Catholic tradition, monasticism itself has been in decline for some time. (I liken the reports of upticks in interest in joining monasteries as similar to the perennial “return of the suit” articles in fashion magazines).

    Whether these theological points are accurate or not is beside the point of this article. They appear to be attractional. For example, well-known prosperity gospel preacher Joel Osteen runs the largest church in the United States, with over 40,000 attending weekly.

    What might the environmental movement have looked like based on a different template? I’ll refer again to the work of Bruce Mau. If you’ve ever seen him present on this topic, he likes to start by noting that if we brought the entire world up to US standards of living, it would take four Earth’s worth of resources given our current technologies and approaches to make it happen. He thinks that’s a good thing, because the patent impossibility of that “takes that option off the table.” He then goes on to talk about all the super-cool new stuff we are going to have to invent and scale up to address the challenges of the future. If you haven’t, I might suggest getting his book Massive Change, which I reviewed a while back. It’s difficult to come away from one of Mau’s books or lectures without being excited about the possibilities of the future.

    I don’t think Mau has any different view of the fundamentals of climate change than your typical orthodox environmentalist. But his approaches to solutions (which are admittedly not always short term practical action plans) and the sales job on them is very different. As a designer, he knows he needs to create something that’s aspirational and attractional in order to get people to want it. It’s a shame too few people have followed that lead.

    The monkish virtues are just never going to sell. Perhaps you can get a room full of the sustainability in-crowd to buy into it, or even focus on top level political success as with the bulb ban. But ultimately I think this is self-defeating.

    In the short term I’d suggest ending any efforts to impose direct consumer mandates. I don’t think that’s where the money is, so to speak, in GHG reductions. Instead, let’s focus on the producer side of the equation in ways that are largely transparent to consumers and don’t involve significant costs. More fuel efficient vehicles might be one. Replacing coal with natural gas is another possibility. (The EPA report I linked earlier cited this as a big contributor the decline in GHG emissions in recent years). New technologies are clearly needed and should perhaps be invested in even though as we know this will lead to many failures along the way.

    As the financial crisis in Greece and elsewhere shows, people rarely confront structural problems, no matter how serious, until the crisis actually comes. At least if “austerity” (a monkish virtue if ever there was one) is the major part of the proposed solution.

    If an environmental equivalent of austerity is required to save the planet, then I’m afraid we should prepare for the deluge. I personally don’t think we’re at that point, given that we’ve had huge gains in energy efficiency for many decades now while our lifestyles have actually improved. More of that, not the promotion of monkish solutions like CFL lightbulbs, is what it will really take to drive further environmental improvements.

    PS: If you don’t think people are really promoting or embracing monkish lifestyles in support of environmentalism, read this article from the Guardian about people giving up on daily showers. Or think about the people trying to completely go “off the grid.” Even if CFLs don’t fit for you, clearly there are plenty of examples. I pick CFLs because they are an institutionalization of monkish virtues, not just the passion of the small minority, which has always been the case.

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile, where this essay originally appeared.

    Photo by BigStockPhoto.com.

  • Shale Revolution Challenges the Left and the Right

    In his State of the Union address, President Obama invoked the 30-year history of federal support for new shale gas drilling technologies to defend his present day investments in green energy. Obama stressed the value of shale gas—which will create thousands of jobs and billions in profits—as part of his "all of the above" approach to energy, and defended the critical role government investment has always played in developing new energy technologies, from nuclear to solar panels to wind turbines.

    The president’s remarks unsurprisingly sparked a strong response from some conservatives (here, here, here, and here), who have downplayed and even attempted to deny the important role that federal investments in hydrofracking, geologic mapping, and horizontal drilling played in the shale gas revolution.

    This is an over-reaction. In acknowledging the critical role government funding played in shale gas, conservatives need not write a blank check for all government energy subsidies. Indeed, a closer look at the shale gas story challenges liberal policy preferences as much as it challenges those of conservatives, and points to much-needed reforms for today’s mash of state and federal clean energy subsidies and mandates.

    The Government’s Role

    Some have pointed to the fact that fracking dates back to the 19th century and hydraulic fracking to the 1940s as evidence that federal funding for today’s fracking technologies was unimportant. But dismissing the importance of federal support for new shale gas technologies in the ’70s and ‘80s because private firms had succeeded in fracking for oil in the ’40s and ’50s is like suggesting that postwar military investments in jet engines were unnecessary because the Wright Brothers invented the propeller plane in 1903.

    Enhancing oil recovery from existing wells in limestone formations by injecting various combinations of water, sand, and lubricants, as was done by private firms starting in the 1940s, is a vastly different and less complicated technical challenge than recovering widely dispersed gas methane in rock formations like shale that are simultaneously porous but not highly permeable.

    Recovering gas from shale formations at a commercial scale requires injecting vastly more water, sand, and lubricants at vastly higher pressures throughout vastly larger geological formations than anything that had been attempted in earlier oil recovery efforts. It requires having some idea of where the highly diffused pockets of gas are, and it requires both drilling long distances horizontally and being able to fracture rock under high pressure multiple times along the way.

    The oil and gas industries had no idea how to do any of this at the time that federal research and demonstration efforts were first initiated in the late 1960s—indeed, throughout the 1970s the gas industry made regular practice of drilling past shale to get to limestone gas deposits.

    This is not just our opinion, it was the opinion of the natural gas industry itself, which explicitly requested assistance from the federal government in figuring out how to economically recover gas from shale starting in the late 1970s. Indeed, shale gas pioneer George Mitchell was an avid and vocal supporter of federal investments in developing new oil and gas technologies, and regularly advocated on behalf of Department of Energy fossil research throughout the 1980s to prevent Congress from zeroing out research budgets in an era of low energy prices.

    Early Efforts

    The first federal efforts to demonstrate shale gas recovery at commercial scales did not immediately result in commercially viable technologies, and this too has been offered as evidence that federal research efforts were ineffective. In two gas stimulation experiments in 1967 and 1969, the Atomic Energy Commission detonated atomic devices in New Mexico and Colorado in order to crack the shale and release large volumes of gas trapped in the rock. The project succeeded in recovering gas, but due to concerns about radioactive tritium elements in the gas, the project was abandoned.

    These projects are easy to ridicule. They sound preposterous to both anti-nuclear and anti-government ears. But in fact, the experiment demonstrated that it was possible to recover diffused gas from shale formations—proof of a concept that had theretofore not been established.

    A few years later, the just-established Department of Energy demonstrated that the same result could be achieved by pumping massive amounts of highly pressurized water into shale formations. This process, known as massive hydraulic fracturing (MHF), proved too expensive for broad commercialization. But oil and gas firms, with continuing federal support, tinkered with the amount of sand, water, and binding agents over the following two decades to achieve today’s much cheaper formula, known as slickwater fracking.

    Early federal fracking demonstrations can be fairly characterized as big, slow, dumb, and expensive. But when it comes to technological innovation, the big, slow, dumb, and expensive phase is almost always unavoidable. Innovation typically proceeds from big, slow, dumb, and expensive to small, fast, smart, and cheap. Think of building-sized computers from the 1950s that lacked the processing power to run a primitive, 1970s digital watch.

    Private firms are really good at small, fast, smart, and cheap, but they mostly don’t do big, slow, dumb, and expensive, because the benefits are too remote, the risks too great, and the costs too high. But here’s the catch. You usually can’t do small, fast, smart, and cheap until you’ve done big, slow, dumb, and expensive first. Hence the reason that, again and again, the federal government has played that role for critical technologies that turned out to be important to our economic well-being.

    Drilling Down into Innovative Methods

    In fact, virtually all subsequent commercial fracturing technologies have been built upon the basic understanding of hydraulic fracturing first demonstrated by the Department of Energy in the 1970s. That included not just demonstrating that gas could be released from shale formations, but also the critical understanding of how shale cracks under pressure. Scientists learned from the large federal demonstration projects in the 1970s that most shale in the United States fractures in the same direction. This led government and industry researchers to focus their efforts on technologies that would allow them to drill long distances horizontally, in a direction that situated the well hole perpendicular to the directions that fractures would run, which allowed firms to capture much more gas from each well.

    Government and industry researchers also focused on developing the ability to create multiple fracks from each horizontal well, and in 1986 a joint government-industry venture demonstrated the first multifrack horizontal well in Devonian Shale. During the same period, government researchers at Sandia Laboratory developed tools for micro-seismic mapping, a technique that would prove critical to the development of commercially viable fracking. Micro-seismic mapping allowed firms to see precisely where the cracks in the rock were, and to modulate pressure, fluid, and proppant in order to control the size and geometry of each frack.

    George Mitchell, who is widely credited with having pioneered the shale gas revolution, leaned heavily upon these innovations throughout the 1990s, when he finally put all the pieces together and figured out how to extract gas from shale economically. Mitchell had spent over a decade consolidating his position in the Barnett Shale before he asked for technical assistance from the government. “By the early 1990s, we had a good position, acceptable but lacking knowledge base,” Mitchell Energy Vice President Dan Steward told us recently.

    Mitchell turned to the Gas Research Institute and federal laboratories for help in 1991. GRI paid for Mitchell to attempt his first horizontal well. The Sandia National Laboratory provided Mitchell with the tools and a scientific team to micro-seismically map his wells. It was only after Mitchell turned to GRI and federal laboratories for help that he finally cracked the shale gas code.

    A Counterfactual?

    But so what? Federal investments in new gas technologies may have proved critical to the shale gas revolution, but could they have happened without those investments? Where is the counterfactual?

    Constructing a counterfactual can be a useful analytical method, but it can be abused. In this case, the counterfactual has been asserted as a kind of faith-based defense against the inconvenient history of the shale gas revolution. Nobody has offered a real world example—for instance, a country where private firms developed economical shale gas technology without any public support.

    Nor has anyone offered a detailed historical analysis to justify the claim that private entrepreneurs would have done the critical applied research, developed the fracking technologies, funded the explorations in new drill bits and horizontal wells, and created the micro-seismic mapping technologies that were all required to make the shale revolution possible. A close look at the development of those technologies reveals private sector entrepreneurs, like Mitchell, who were loudly and clearly asking for help because they knew they had neither the technical knowledge nor the ability to finance such risky innovations on their own.

    The Implications for Renewable Energy Subsidies

    In the end though, we are mostly having this debate now because historical federal investments in shale gas are being compared to current investments in renewables. There is much that is in fact comparable—the federal role in the shale gas revolution went well beyond basic research, as some have claimed, and matches up with current renewables programs virtually demonstration for demonstration, tax credit for tax credit, and dollar for dollar when comparing the scale and nature of present federal support for renewables with past support for unconventional gas. But that doesn’t mean that President Obama’s subsidies for green energy are immune to criticism.

    Indeed, once we acknowledge the shale gas case as a government success, not a failure, it offers a powerful basis for reforming present clean energy investments and subsidies. Federal subsidies for shale gas came to an end, and so should federal wind and solar subsidies, at least as blanket subsidies for all solar and wind technologies. In many prime locations, where there is good wind, proximity to transmission, state renewable energy purchase mandates, and multiple state and federal subsidies, wind development is now highly profitable.

    If federal investments in wind and solar are really like those in unconventional gas, then we ought to set a date certain when blanket subsidies for wind and solar energy come to an end. Imposing a phase-out of production subsidies would encourage sustained innovations and absolute cost declines. We might want to extend continuing support for some newer classes of wind and solar technologies, those that are innovating new technological methods to generate energy, or those that are specifically designed to perform better in lower wind or marginal solar locations. But in the ’80s and ’90s we did not provide a tax credit to all gas wells, only those using new technologies to recover gas from new geologic formations—and we should not continue to provide subsidies to wind and solar technologies that are already proven and increasingly widely deployed with no end in sight.

    Another key lesson is that many of the most important research and demonstration projects in new shale gas technologies were funded and overseen by the Gas Research Institute, a partnership between Department of Energy laboratories and the natural gas industry that was funded through a small Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-administered fee on gas prices. GRI had both independence from Congress and the federal bureaucracy, and strong representation from the natural gas industry, which allowed it to focus research and dollars on solving key technical problems that pioneers like George Mitchell were struggling with. Federal investments in applied research and demonstration of new green energy projects ought to be similarly insulated from political meddling and rent seeking.

    These and other lessons from the shale gas revolution point to far-reaching reforms of federal energy innovation and subsidy programs. If the history of the shale gas revolution challenges the tale of a single lone entrepreneur persevering without help from the government, it also challenges the present federal approach to investing in renewables in important respects. The history of federal support for shale gas offers as much a case for reform of current federal clean energy investments as it does for their preservation.

    This piece originally appeared at The American.

    Shellenberger and Nordhaus are co-founders of the Breakthrough Institute, a leading environmental think tank in the United States. They are authors of Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility.

  • Is Energy the Last Good Issue for Republicans?

    With gas prices beginning their summer spike to what could be record highs, President Obama in recent days has gone out of his way to sound reassuring on energy, seeming to approve an oil pipeline to Oklahoma this week after earlier approving leases for drilling in Alaska. Yet few in the energy industry trust the administration’s commitment to expanding the nation’s conventional energy supplies given his strong ties to the powerful green movement, which opposes the fossil-fuel industry in a split that’s increasingly dividing the country by region, class, and culture.

    But Republicans, other than the increasingly irrelevant Newt Gingrich, have failed to capitalize on the potent issue, instead lending the president an unwitting assist by focusing the primary fight on vague economic plans and sex-related side issues like abortion, gay marriage, and contraception. The GOP may be winning over the College of Cardinals, but it is squandering its chance of gaining a majority in the Electoral College, holding the House, and taking the Senate.

    No single sector affects more people and industries than energy, and none is more deeply affected by the disposition of government. Energy divides the nation into two camps. On one side there are the regions and industries dependent on the development and use of energy. They include the increasingly expansive energy-producing region stretching from the Gulf Coast and the Great Plains to parts of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the Appalachian range.

    The centers of energy growth, including areas stretching from the Gulf Coast through the Great Plains to the Canadian border, have generated the highest levels of job and income growth over the past decade (along with parasitic Washington, D.C.).

    Nine of the 11 fastest-growing job categories are related to energy production, according to an analysis by Economic Modeling Systems Inc. Energy jobs pay an average of $100,000 annually, about the same as software engineers earn in Silicon Valley.

    Perhaps more important politically, this bonanza is now spreading to historical battleground states Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan. Long-depressed areas like western Pennsylvania are reversing decades of decline as new finds and advances in natural-gas drilling have opened up vast new stores of domestic energy. The new energy wealth has created new jobs, enriched property owners, and provided states with potential huge new sources of revenue.

    On the other side of the energy divide stand a handful of dense, mostly coastal metropolitan areas with either little in the way of energy resources or, in the case of California’s most affluent urban pockets, little interest in exploiting them. With a shrinking industrial base and less dependence on automobiles, these areas now constitute the political base for the both the Democratic Party and the growing green-industrial complex, which boasts strong ties to Silicon Valley’s well-heeled venture-capital “community” and their less celebrated, but even wealthier, Wall Street allies.

    In these places, the current fossil-energy boom is regarded less as a boon than as an environmental disaster in the making, a view captured in the unrelenting attack on shale development in the news pages of The New York Times and other outlets in broad sympathy with the Obama administration. New production of low-cost, low-emission natural gas also threatens the viability of politically preferred renewables such as solar and wind. But unlike fossil fuels, such “green” initiatives have created very few jobs; overall, the promise of “green jobs,” as even The New York Times has noted, has failed to live up to its hype.

    Given the success in the other energy states, California—with double-digit unemployment—might reconsider its policies, but this is unlikely. “I asked [Gov.] Jerry Brown about why California cannot come to grips with its huge hydrocarbon reserves,” John Hofmeister, a former president of Shell Oil’s American operations and a member of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technical Advisory Committee, told me recently. “After all, this could turn around the state."

    Brown’s answer, according to Hofmeister: “This is not logic, it’s California. This is simply not going to happen here.’”

    But elsewhere in the U.S., new technologies such as hydraulic fracking and vertical drilling have vastly increased estimates of North America’s energy resources, particularly natural gas. By 2020, the United States, according to the consultancy PFC Energy, will surpass Russia and Saudi Arabia as the world’s leading oil and gas producer.

    As President Obama has acknowledged, this surge of production boasts some great economic benefits. American imports of raw petroleum have fallen from a high of 60 percent of the total to less than 46 percent. Overall, according to Rice University’s Amy Myers Jaffe, U.S. oil reserves now stand at more than 2 trillion barrels; Canada has slightly more. She pegs North America’s combined reserves at more than three times the total estimated reserves of the Middle East and North Africa.

    At the same time, energy exploration is sparking something of an industrial revival. The demand for new rigs, pipelines, and a series of new petrochemical facilities has created a burst of industrial production across much of the country. Steel mills, makers of earth-moving equipment, and construction suppliers all have benefited. A recent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers suggests shale gas could lead to the development of 1 million industrial jobs. Not surprisingly, some of the biggest backers of shale-gas exploration are prominent CEOs from industrial firms.

    Energy policy may also be critical for the future of the Great Lakes–based American auto industry. Despite expensive PR ventures like the electric Chevy Volt, the Big Three depend for profits largely on SUVs and trucks. High oil prices will only help their competitors from Japan, South Korea, and Germany, all of which are ramping up in the emerging Southeastern auto corridor. Rising oil prices could also raise the costs of food production, which relies heavily on energy-intensive fertilizers and machinery.

    Aware of the negative consequences for a still-weak recovery, President Obama has started to mount a defense for his energy policies. Last month he launched several preemptive strikes, claiming credit for rising U.S. production while ridiculing Republicans for their “drill, baby, drill” response to rising energy prices.

    Obama is correct in asserting that increases in domestic production will not solve the energy price issue overnight, or even in the near future. But it was disingenuous for him to then take credit for the current energy boom, which resulted largely from policies adopted during the Bush years, while Obama’s policies have, if anything, slowed exploration and development.

    It’s fairly clear that the president and his team—notably Energy Secretary Steven Chu and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar—are at best ambivalent about greater fossil-fuel development. Obama, for example, recently proposed cutting tax breaks and subsidies for the oil industry, which he estimated at $4 billion annually—a new expense for the companies that would in large part be passed on to consumers at the pump.

    This is not necessarily a bad thing in its own right, but along with the effective tax hike, Obama proposed doubling down on the much larger and, to date, far less productive giveaways to the green-industrial complex, which received $80 billion in loans and subsidies in the 2009 stimulus. According to various studies, including the Energy Information Agency, solar firms enjoy rates of subsidization per kilowatt hour at least five times those gained by fossil-fuel firms.

    If all energy subsidies were removed, the fossil-fuel industry likely could shrug off the hit, while the heavily subsidized green-industrial complex would markedly diminish. Yet even if Congress refuses to continue the green subsidies, it’s probable that administration regulators would find ways to slow fossil-fuel expansion in a second Obama term. Responding largely to the Democratic environmental lobby, they have already overruled the State Department to delay the Keystone XL pipeline from Canada. Plans for new multibillion-dollar petrochemical plants on the Gulf will make easy pickings for federal regulators from agencies now controlled by environmental zealots.

    “The energy states feel they are being persecuted for their good deeds,” says Eric Smith, director of the Tulane Energy Institute in New Orleans. “There is a sense there are people in the administration who would like this whole industry to go away.”

    In the short run, Obama’s political exposure in the energy wars is somewhat limited. Most of the big-producing states—Oklahoma, Wyoming, Utah, Texas, Louisiana, Alaska, and North Dakota—are unlikely to vote for him anyway. Nor does he have to worry about too much pressure from inside his party; Democratic ranks in Congress from energy-producing states have thinned considerably in recent years, removing contrary voices inside the party.

    A more dicey issue relates to contestable states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, where many see the energy boom as a source of economic recovery. To make their case in these and other swing states, Republicans first have to make energy the overall revival of the American economy—the key issue for this November’s election. If they insist on campaigning primarily as stolid defenders of rigid social values and election-year promises of painless tax cuts, they will have themselves to blame for their drubbing in November.

    This piece originally appeared in TheDailyBeast.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and contributing editor to the City Journal in New York. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Photo courtesy of BigStockPhoto.com.

  • Who Stands The Most To Win – And Lose – From A Second Obama Term

    As the probability of President Barack Obama’s reelection grows, state and local officials across the country are tallying up the potential ramifications of a second term. For the most part, the biggest concerns lie with energy-producing states, which fear stricter environmental regulations, and those places most dependent on military or space spending, which are both likely to decrease under a second Obama administration.

    On the other hand, several states, and particularly the District of Columbia, have reasons to look forward to another four years. Under Obama the federal workforce has expanded — even as state and localities have cut their government jobs. The growing concentration of power has also swelled the ranks of Washington‘s parasitical enablers, from high-end lobbyists to expense-account restaurants. While much of urban America is struggling, currently Washington is experiencing something of a golden age.

    So what states have the most to lose from a second Obama term? The most obvious is Texas, the fastest-growing of the nation’s big states. Used to owning the inside track in Washington during the long years of Bush family rule, the Lone Star state now has less clout in Congress and the White House than in recent memory. Texans are particularly worried about restrictions on fossil fuel energy development, which is largely responsible for robust growth throughout the state.

    “Obama now wants to take credit for the increased production that has happened, but [increased production] has been opposed in every corner by the administration,” says John Hofmeister, founder of the Houston-based Citizens for Affordable Energy and former CEO of Shell USA. Hofmeister fears that in a second term, with no concern for reelection, Obama could exert even greater controls on fossil fuel development. This would have dramatic, negative implications not only for Texas but for the entire national energy grid, which includes North Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Alaska and Louisiana. These states fear that the nation’s recent energy boom, which has generated some of the nation’s strongest job and income growth, could implode in Obama’s second term.

    Take Louisiana, which is still recovering from Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the BP oil spill in 2010. The administration’s moratorium on offshore drilling, sparked by the spill, has had a deleterious effect on the state’s energy economy, according to a recent study, with half offshore oil and service companies  shifting their operations to other regions and laying off employees.

    Once the moratorium was lifted in 2010, companies have faced long delays for new wells, growing from 60-day delays in 2008 to more than 109 last year  .  “The energy states feel they are being persecuted for their good deeds,” says Eric Smith, director of the Tulane Energy Institute in New Orleans. “There is a sense there are people in the administration who would like this whole industry to go away.”

    Many of these same states also worry about the administration’s proposed downsizing of the military. Obama’s move to cut roughly towards $500 billion in defense spending may make sense, but it  threatens places with large military presences such as Texas, Florida, Oklahoma, Virginia, Georgia, South Carolina and New Mexico.

    The D.C. metro area might also be hit by defense cuts, but overall the it has many reasons to genuflect toward the Obama Administration. Federal wages, salaries and procurement account for 40% of the district’s economic activity, roughly four times the percentage of any state. Expanding regulation on energy, health care and financial services has sparked a steady job boom in lobbying, think tanks and other facets of the persuasion industry — including among Republicans –at a time when employment growth has been sluggish elsewhere.

    D.C. partisans hail their city as the leader of a national urban boom. The district clearly benefits from diminished job opportunities in more market-based economies, particularly for educated 20-somethings.

    No place has flourished as much as the capital, but a second term would be favorable to states such as Maryland, which depend heavily on research spending directed from Washington and where federal spending accounts for fifteen percent of the local economy, over seven times the national average. Maryland agencies such as the National Institutes for Health will likely expand under an increasingly federalized health care system — particularly if Democrats gain more seats in Congress with an Obama win.

    Other big states that may benefit from a second term include New York, California and Illinois. New York benefits largely from the administration’s Wall Street leanings, despite the president’s recent attacks on financial elite. Even for the non-conspiracy theorists, the administration’s ties to Goldman Sachs appear unusually intimate. Powerful allies like Democratic Sen. Charles Schumer, D.C.’s greatest Wall Street booster, suggest big money has little to fear from a second term.

    Overall the administration’s basic policy approach has favored the financial giants. Support for bailouts, seemingly permanent low interest rates, few prosecutions for miscreant investment bankers, the institutionalization of “too big to fail” and easy loans for renewable fuel firms all have benefited the big Wall Street players.

    Of course, a Republican victory would not be a disaster for these worthies. Companies like Goldman Sachs are hedging their bets by sending loads of cash to the likely Republican choice, former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney.

    But other New York interests, such as mass transit funding, would benefit from the current administration’s  generally pro-urban, green sensibilities. Tight regulations on carbon emissions — increasing the price of fossil fuels — may help the competitive position of New York City, which has little industry left and relatively low carbon emissions per capita, in part due to a greater reliance on hydroelectric and nuclear power.

    California also has reasons to root for an Obama victory. Although among the richest states in fossil fuels, particularly oil, the Golden State has become a bastion of both climate change alarmism and renewable energy subsidization. It adamantly won’t develop traditional its energy resources — which would help boost the state’s still weak economy — and Silicon Valley venture firms have eagerly grabbed subsidies and loans for start-ups from Energy Secretary Steven Chu’s seemingly bottomless cornucopia.

    Furthermore,  more powerful EPA would make California’s current “go it alone” energy and environmental problems less disadvantageous compared to more fossil-fuel-friendly states, leveling what is now a tortuous economic playing field.

    Similarly, attempts to push the state’s troubled high-speed rail line — recently described in Mother Jones as “jaw-droppingly shameless” –  will succeed only with strong backing by the federal government. Under a Republican administration and Congress, Brown’s beloved high-speed line would depend entirely on state and private funding, likely terminating the project.

    But no state needs an Obama victory more than his adopted home state of Illinois. To be sure, having a native son in the White House has not prevented the Land of Lincoln from suffering one of the weakest economies in the nation. The state has one of the highest rates of out-migration in the country, according to recent United Van Lines data and Census results.

    Even worse, the Land of Lincoln faces a fiscal crisis so great that it makes California look well-managed.  Without a good friend in the White House, and allies in Congress, Illinois could end up replacing long-struggling, now-improving Michigan as the Great Lakes’ new leading basket case. Count Illinois 20 electoral votes in the Obama column.

    This piece originally appeared in Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and contributing editor to the City Journal in New York. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Photo from BigStockPhoto.com.

  • Making Room for the Old and the New Economies

    The announcements by Sens. Ben Nelson (D-Neb.) and Kent Conrad (D-N.D.) that they would not run for reelection reflects what may be the last gasps of the Great Plains Democrats, much as California’s 2010 Democratic landslide assured that Republicans are soon to become endangered species in places like Los Angeles and Silicon Valley.

    The conventional explanation for these trends centers on culture or ideology, but the real cause may lie with an evolving conflict between two dueling political economies.

    On one side lies the information or “creative” economy, centered in coastal big cities and university towns. On the other lies the larger “basic” economy, which produces tangible items like food, manufactured goods and fossil-fuel energy.

    In the past, both political parties had liberals as well as conservatives and operated in both of these economies. Republicans thrived not only in the Heartland but also in information hubs like Silicon Valley, Southern California and even parts of Manhattan.

    Similarly, Democrats were influential in large swaths of the resource and agriculture-dependent parts of the country, including the Great Plains.

    However, this is increasingly no longer true. Plains Democrats, like former Sen. Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, struggled to sell the state’s remarkable energy-driven recovery to an administration hostile to fossil fuels. Many in his state, and other energy centers like Texas, view the Obama administration’s resistance to oil and gas development as an assault on economies that, over the past decade, have had the highest rates of job creation and per capita income growth in the nation.

    Dorgan, frustrated with Obama’s economic policy, chose not to run for reelection in 2010. But his House colleague, Earl Pomeroy, as well as Stephanie Herseth Sandlin (D-S.D.) were defeated. Nelson’s decision reflected a reaction to the strong GOP tide in the Plains. Registered Democrats in Nebraska have dropped from 38 percent to 33 percent just since 2008. The Republicans are at 48 percent.

    This is a remarkable fall from grace. As recently as 2006, Democrats held four of the six Senate seats representing the 650 miles of plains from Nebraska north to the Canadian border. If, as expected, Nelson’s seat is taken by the GOP, there will be only one — Sen. Tim Johnson (D-S.D.), who is up for what might a difficult reelection battle in 2014.

    Yet another energy-state Democrat, Sen. John Tester of Montana, is facing a tough reelection contest. If he is defeated, only a handful of Democrats from energy-producing states — Joe Manchin and Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia and Mary Landrieu of Louisiana — will be left in the Senate.

    For the most part, these Democrats are not being chased from office by cultural brawls over issues like gay rights or abortion — particularly in the socially moderate northern Great Plains. More damaging is the perception that Obama Democrats have little regard, even contempt, for the fundamental economics of basic industries.

    The battle over energy extends beyond the major oil-producing states. In places like eastern Ohio and western Pennsylvania, a nascent shale oil and gas boom is helping strengthen resurgence in industrial jobs lost decades ago. To many business people and workers in cities like Fort Wayne, Ind., looming Environmental Protection Agency regulations on mercury as well as carbon emissions could threaten this nascent revival. Reviving the Rust Belt, many believe, requires the cheap, reliable energy that, in the near future, can come only from fossil fuels.

    Instead, the Obama team reflects an urban, information economy bias. In contrast to President Bill Clinton, who supported industrial and agricultural development back when he was governor of Arkansas, Barack Obama represents an odd admixture of faculty lounge and urban bloc machine. He never developed any links to the basic economy; his worldview appears largely divorced from the realities of production. “It’s MoveOn.org run by the Chicago machine,” according to the mayor of a California farming town, a longtime Democrat.

    This tilt can also be seen in the widely touted strategy of conceding working-class white voters in states like Pennsylvania and Ohio in favor of what Democratic strategist Ruy Texeria calls “the mass upper middle class.”

    Today barely half of white union members, says researcher Alan Abramowicz, tilt Democratic compared with nearly two-thirds who supported them in the 1960s, when Democrats still identified strongly with the industrial and energy sectors.

    This trend may be further accelerated by the prospect of deep defense cuts. Many Plains and Southern states are dependent on defense-related expenditures. In the past, Plains Democrats and Southern Democrats, like retiring Sen. Jim Webb (D-Va.), were the product of or identified strongly with the military. But today, the Democratic Party’s hawkish traditions — extending from Harry S. Truman and Sen. Henry M. Jackson to Georgia’s Sam Nunn and Webb — is all but extinct.

    A parallel development can be seen in the information hubs of the Northeast and West Coast. As recently as the 1990s, Republicans could muster considerable numbers both in Silicon Valley and throughout the Los Angeles Basin. Manhattan’s “silk stocking district” regularly sent Republicans to the House.

    These exceptions barely exist today. Los Angeles County, home to nearly 10 million people, has only one Republican congressman. The Bay Area, which includes the district of House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), and Manhattan each has none. The same pattern is evident at the state and local levels — where almost the entire delegation is now “progressive” Democrats.

    As in the Great Plains, this shift parallels changes in the political economy. Over the past decade, the Bay Area experienced the single largest decline in manufacturing in the country, and New York ranked second. Now the information sector — as well as related finance, health and education sectors — dominate these economies. Even business people in these areas share little in common with business people in the manufacturing or energy economies.

    With dense population and far less reliance on cheap energy like coal, greater metropolitan areas like New York or San Francisco find it easier to embrace the administration’s green (read expensive) energy agenda. Indeed, many companies, including Google and several investment banks, have invested in new renewable fuel and electric battery firms that have received large loans and other subsidies from Washington and sympathetic local governments, notably in California.

    The information economy is also dependent on international markets, capital and, most particularly, brainpower. This makes them more sensitive to the nativist pandering that has been de rigueur in GOP national politics. Republican politicians, who now usually cater to their religious right by campaigning against gay marriage and abortion, turn off even libertarian voters in information hotbeds, where such views are anathema.

    Sadly, these two economic visions exacerbate already existing cultural and political divisions. This also threatens the country’s ability to compete globally at a time of great opportunity. To overcome our competitors, particularly China, the United States needs a Washington that embraces both the information economy — where the United States still remains pre-eminent — and the basic economy — where we are seeing signs of a nascent renaissance.

    Only when both economies are appreciated and supported in both parties can we find the common ground necessary to succeed in the coming decade.

    This piece originally appeared in Politico.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and contributing editor to the City Journal in New York. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

    Photo from BigStockPhoto.com.