New Geography

Tag: Environment

  • Jerry Brown: Machiavelli Or Torquemada?

    For more than one-third of a century Jerry Brown has proved one of the most interesting and original figures in American politics–and the 71-year-old former wunderkind might be back in office in 2010. If he indeed wins California’s gubernatorial election, the results could range from somewhat positive to positively disastrous.

    Brown is a multi-faceted man, but in political terms he has a dual personality, split between two very different Catholic figures from the 15th century: Machiavelli and Tomas de Torquemada. For the sake of California, we better hope that he follows the pragmatism espoused by the Italian author more than the stern visage of the Grand Inquisitor.

    Like a good Jesuit, Brown certainly can be flexible. Back in 1978, for example, he worked against Howard Jarvis’ Proposition 13, which capped real estate taxes. But once the measure was passed, Brown embraced it as his own. Indeed, he was so enthusiastic about the tax-cutting measure that Jarvis actually voted for Brown’s re-election late that same year. A month after the vote a Los Angeles Times poll revealed most Californians thought Brown actually supported 13.

    Brown also has shown his flexibility by throwing even loyal allies under the bus. Elected largely due to the electoral coalition constructed by his father, Edmund G. “Pat” Brown, Brown made a point of tweaking and restraining the expanding bureaucracy largely created by his father. He also took on the University of California and the welfare bureaucracy as well as agriculture, residential real estate and manufacturing giants.

    This Oedipal battle reflected Brown’s personal crankiness. He came into office, recalled top aide Tom Quinn, “questioning the values of the Democratic Party.”

    Ascetic and even monk-like, he rejected his father’s “build, build, build” philosophy and embraced E. F. Schumacher’s “small is beautiful” ideology. Like the 15th-century Florentine Catholic monk Girolamo Savanarola, he came to rid Sacramento of suberbia and luxuria.

    Brown was also ahead of his time. His early embrace of green politics–particularly energy conservation and renewable fuels–foreshadowed that of later Democrats, particularly Barack Obama. His strong outreach to Latinos and other minorities expanded his political base among California’s fastest-growing populations.

    Yet Brown understood that economic prosperity–not civil rights or environmental zealotry–was key to political ascendancy. Eastern journalists dismissed him as “Governor Moonbeam,” but they ignored his Machiavellian skill in recognizing and reaching out to rising economic forces, notably the high-tech entrepreneurs in the Silicon Valley and across Southern California. The growth of this sector, along with rising trade with Asia and the military boom after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, set the pace for the state’s strong rebound from its early 1970s doldrums.

    But Brown’s inquisitorial side surfaced again as he prepared a second run–he had made a charmingly eccentric assault in 1976–for the White House. Perhaps the prospect of facing a man of infinite flexibility, Bill Clinton, pushed him over the top, but Brown re-invented himself as a high-octane and, at times, shrill populist.

    After some years in the political wilderness, he reemerged in 1998 as Mayor of Oakland, a tough job even in good times. Although he remained predictably arrogant and aloof, the job of managing a working-class city seemed to have brought him to his senses. Like the ideal politician in The Prince, Brown governed with something approaching strategic precision, pushing economic development, embracing the police and supporting new infrastructure spending.

    Brown’s newfound reputation as a canny realist helped him win the election as attorney general in 2006. Yet once back in statewide politics, the inquisitorial side found expression. Convinced about the impending threat of global warming, Brown used his new powers to push the Gorite agenda with the passion of a Torquemada.

    Although Brown was not quite torturing heretics, he certainly applied the legal equivalent of thumbscrews to anyone–developers, cities, counties–who did not follow his prescriptions about “carbon neutrality.” Even proposals for sensible, relatively dense “in fill” development were turned aside in favor of utopian, economically unsustainable ideas about forced density and transit friendliness.

    Today, with California’s economy is in tatters–its unemployment well over 12%–and Brown’s crusade seems likely to make it worse. Onerous regulation threatens everything from the construction of new single-family homes to new employment tied to anything that releases demon carbon–including manufacturing, oil drilling and large-scale agriculture.

    All this has made Brown widely feared in much of California’s fractured, traumatized business community. Even worse, he has emerged as the standard-bearer of the public employee unions, the very force whose political power and pensions are bringing the state to the verge of economic ruin. The fact that Brown’s campaign is funded largely by these unions makes it, at least on the surface, unlikely to challenge the hegemony of our putative “civil servants.” They are said to be ready to spend up to $40 million on “independent” campaigns to help beat back any chance of a GOP victory.

    This is worrisome given Brown’s role in fostering the expansion of public-sector unions during his term, a group whose ascendancy has become arguably the single biggest factor in the state’s precipitous decline during his last gubernatorial reign. As author Steven Greenhut has pointed out, unfunded pension liabilities in excess of $50 billion are one key element driving the state toward ever more depressed bond ratings and possible bankruptcy.

    Under normal circumstances, Brown’s ties to the public sector, his fickle nature and his dubious accomplishments would spell political doom. But amazingly, Brown’s long, if mixed, record might actually prove an advantage against his most likely opponent, former eBay executive Meg Whitman, who is running as an outsider.

    The problem for Whitman or any GOP candidate lies with the miserable legacy of another nominally Republican outsider, Arnold Schwarzenegger. The Terminator’s record of ineptitude and empty blather stands as a mega-advertisement against inexperience. Compared to the former body builder’s amateurish blundering, Brown’s wealth of knowledge of government looks appealing.

    Whitman, or her main challenger Insurance Commissioner Steve Poizner, also must struggle with a Republican Party out of sync with an increasingly multi-racial and socially liberal state. As long-time political analyst Allan Hoffenblum notes, for the first time there is not one congressional, state senate or assembly district with a GOP majority.

    So in the end, California’s fate may end up resting on which Jerry Brown emerges after the election. If he continues on his inquisitorial assault on carbon-creators, you can pretty much expect California’s middle class to continue diminishing while the state’s aspirational appeal ebbs ever further. The state could end up resembling Kevin Starr’s description of his native San Francisco– “a cross between Carmel and Calcutta.”

    But given his history, Brown could still surprise us. Stuck with responsibility for a decaying economy and fiscally burdened by the voracious public unions, Brown could do a “Nixon in China,” imposing controls on pensions and salaries. He could recognize that “green jobs” can not save California from the abyss and that a new “era of limits” must apply to the public sector as well as the rest of us. With the passionate climate-change constituency shrinking, he might even decide to accept a modicum of carbon heresy as a necessary evil.

    Brown should heed Machiavelli’s advice for rulers to be “merciful and not cruel” and “proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and humanity.” If in his old age Brown adopts the Italian writer’s credo of tactical flexibility, reason and tolerance, the Golden State may yet revive itself, and with it restore the legacy of its most storied political family.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

    Photo: Troy Holden

  • The Harvard $7 Per Gallon Study: Missing the Point Completely

    A new study by researchers at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University suggests that President Obama’s greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goal will require gasoline prices of from $7.15 to $8.71 per gallon by 2030. This is not only untrue, but also represents a “roadmap” to economic and environmental folly.

    The study begins with the assumption that the transportation sector would need to reduce its GHG emissions by the same 14% percentage as the overall goal for the economy, as proposed by President Obama (Note).

    “Across the Board Reductions” are Absurd: The Harvard assumption is flawed from the start. GHG emissions reduction is not about “across the board” reductions of the same percentages applied to economic sectors. Such an approach could result in serious misallocation of resources, as opportunities for less expensive GHG emissions reductions in some sectors are ignored, while more expensive strategies are implemented in other sectors.

    The Appropriate Price for GHG Reduction: The study itself assumes that the present GHG price is $30 and that the price will rise to $60 by 2030. Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and McKinsey/The Conference Board say that sufficient GHG emission reductions can be achieved at below $50 per ton. It is fair to suggest, therefore, that any strategy costing more than the $50-$60 range must be rejected as being too expensive.

    The Harvard study notes that GHG

    …prices at their projected levels are far too small to create a significant incentive to drive less. Fuel prices above $8/gallon may be needed to significantly reduce U.S. GHG emissions and oil imports.

    This should tell us something. Achieving the proposed reduction is GHG emissions from the transportation sector is just too expensive. If the current market price for GHG emissions cannot significantly reduce gasoline usage, then strategies that can be achieved for the market price should be implemented (in other sectors). Such an approach would by no means interfere with the potential to achieve GHG emissions reductions, rather it would facilitate less disruptive achievement.

    $7 Per Gallon Gasoline: The Harvard study goes on to suggest that gasoline prices of $7.15 to $8.71 per gallon by 2030 might be necessary to achieve the overall GHG reduction goal in the transportation sector. These higher prices would be the result of significantly higher fuel taxes. The resulting cost of GHG emissions reductions could be more than $500 per ton (compared to the Department of Energy 2030 gasoline price projection). While the Harvard report “poo-poos” the economic impact of doubling gasoline prices, a Reason Foundation report (and previous research at the University of Paris by Remy Prud’homme and Chang Wong Lee) has found a strong relationship between mobility (driving more) and economic growth.

    Focusing on Ends, Not Means: No one should believe it will be easy to achieve any eventual GHG emission objective. Success will be greatly enhanced by focusing on “ends” rather than “means.” This means employing the least costly and least disruptive strategies, without regard to how much we drive, where we live, how much power we consume or any other peripheral (and irrelevant) consideration.

    At a price of $500 or more, the Harvard report’s price per ton could be nearly 10 times as much as the $60 GHG price assumed in the very same report. Such an increase in the price of gasoline would be both absurd and unnecessary.

    ——

    Note: There are multiple proposals for economy wide GHG emissions reductions. Congressional have been for 17% to 20% reductions by 2020.

  • Obama’s Middle-Class Meltdown

    The rapid decline in public support for Democrats and President Obama represents one of the most breathtaking political collapses in modern times. Little over a year from a huge electoral triumph, President Obama’s level of support has dropped from around 65% to under 50%. The Democrats in Congress, who held as much as a 10% edge over the Republicans last spring, are actually losing a “generic” vote.

    Many Republicans and conservatives may think this represents a confirmation of their values. Yet in reality, the Democratic meltdown has less to do with belated admiration for the GOP—their support as a party remains at historically low levels—than a question of a massive disconnect between the people in power and the large, middle-class majority.

    The Great Disconnect reflects a growing chasm between the normative “wisdom” within political parties and their aligned media, academic and policy cadres. The Disconnect in part derives from the tendency of politicos and their associates to converse mostly with each other—and not develop much of a direct feel for that vast, and increasingly complex, country beyond the Beltway.

    As President, Barack Obama’s Great Disconnect seems most obvious. Although he occasionally uses populist middle-class rhetoric, both Obama’s priorities and body language suggest his inspiration comes largely from the rarified world of the universities and Democratic Party contributors.

    Not surprising then that he started with a stimulus package that, although one was needed, offered little to private sector Main Street businesses. Instead, the primary beneficiaries turned out to be Wall Street grandees, whose high salaries he variously denounces and excuses, and public employee unions.

    Obama’s move was encouraged by the aging leadership of the Democratic Party, shaped by places like Nancy Pelosi’s San Francisco and Henry Waxman’s lushly affluent Beverly Hills. It has little to do with the views of the middle class who reside generally in smaller towns and less-than-tony suburbs—but some of the wealthiest, and most privileged, populations on earth.

    President Obama’s other key constituency lies in the public sector unions, whose power in his home state of Illinois now rivals and perhaps surpasses that of the Daley machine. Even as middle-class voters see their pensions dwindle along with their housing prices and jobs, the public sector has waxed into something resembling the Blue Meanie in Yellow Submarine who consumes everything in sight, and ultimately itself.

    Perhaps nothing so illustrates the Great Disconnect than the president and the congressional lions’ embrace of the radical green climate change agenda. Still popular in upper-class urban areas and university towns, this agenda is notably less well-supported in middle and working class communities, particularly in the middle of the country.

    Even before the Climategate revelations—which led to one top warmist figure admitting to the BBC that there had been in fact “no statistically significant” warming over the past fifteen years—the agenda was losing support, ranking it dead last among 20 priorities in a Pew survey last year. Now the public is becoming openly skeptical, with support for the notion of primarily human-caused warming falling since April from 47 to 35%.

    President Obama must realize that prioritization of the climate agenda, along with other coastal liberal priorities, undermines Democratic support in the Great Plains and the Great Lakes, where the party recently has been making some significant gains. The recent withdrawals of Senators Byron Dorgan and Evan Bayh reflect the Democrats’ growing vulnerability in these regions. Recent polls in Iowa, where Obama won his signature primary victory in 2008, show the president’s popularity at less than 50 percent, in large part due to losses among independent voters.

    Yet if Americans have been departing the Democrats, does it follow that they will shift en masse to the GOP? There is reason for skepticism here as well. After all, this is the same party that, along with the Democrats, supported massive spending under George Bush and actively promoted the disastrous de-regulation of the financial markets. The prescience of the likes of former Majority Leader Dick Armey—a co-conspirator in the Bush era’s profligacy—at the forefront of the Tea Parties should worry even the most credulous small-government activist.

    The Republican claim to the populist mantle is even more suspect. Republicans like House Minority Leader John Boehner have cozied up to Wall Street, hoping to take advantage of rising “buyer’s remorse” among the grandees. Suggesting Republicans could shield the financial sector from even modest Democrat efforts to make them face consequences for their loathsome and disastrous folly, they unintentionally show that their critique of the president’s “crony capitalism” largely involves shifting the identity of the cronies.

    The Republicans also have a bit of a demographic problem. Their Neanderthal stance on social issues varies radically from the rising millennial generation, and threatens to alienate them permanently. And perhaps even more seriously, the strong nativist wing of the party, epitomized by Tea Party keynoter former Representative Tom Tancredo, represent a threat to the other large emerging voting block, immigrants and their offspring.

    If you want to see an illustration of what this means, just examine the plummeting GOP registration levels in increasingly multi-racial California. For the first time in modern history, according to veteran political observer Allan Hoffenblum, there is not a single congressional, state Senate or Assembly district in the state with a majority Republican registration.

    Although the Republicans are riding high now, do not overestimate their ability to seize the field now so ineptly being vacated by the Democrats. It may well turn out that President Obama still may overcome the Great Disconnect before the GOP does. Obama’s ability to change direction already can be seen in such things as his new-found enthusiasm for nuclear power and more drilling on public lands. His most recent jobs bill also has more of a focus on promoting private employment growth than past efforts.

    Ultimately, the party that wins in 2010 and beyond will be the one that addresses the real issues of this age—the battle for private sector jobs and upward mobility—that matter to the vast majority of Americans. It is on those issues, not global warming, ethnic purity or gay marriage that the political future will now turn.

    This article originally appeared at The Daily Beast.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

    Photo: Official White House Photo by Pete Souza

  • Welcome to Ecotopia

    In this era of tea-partying revolutionary-era dress-ups, one usually associates secessionism with the far right. But if things turn sour for the present majority in Washington, you should expect a whole new wave of separatism to emerge on the greenish left coast.

    In 1975 Ernest Callenbach, an author based in Berkeley, Calif., published a sci-fi novel about enviro-secessionists called Ecotopia; a prequel, Ecotopia Rising, came out in 1981. These two books, which have acquired something of a cult following, chronicle–largely approvingly–the emergence of a future green nation along the country’s northwest coast.

    Aptly described by Callenbach as “an empire apart,” this region is, in real life, among the world’s most scenic and blessed by nature. Many in this part of America have long been more enthusiastic about their ties to Asia than those with the rest of the country. It is also home to many fervent ecological, cultural and political activists, who often feel at odds with the less enlightened country that lies beyond their soaring mountains.

    Until the election of Barack Obama, the Pacific Northwest certainly was separating from the rest of America–at least in attitude. After George W. Bush’s victory the 2004 presidential election, the Seattle weekly The Stranger published an angry editorial about how coastal urbanites needed to reject “heartland values like xenophobia, sexism, racism and homophobia” and places where “people are fatter and dumber and slower.”

    Such a narrow, cynical view of the rest of the country is in line with Callenbach’s Ecotopia novels, in which the bad guys–representatives of American government and corporations–are almost always male, overweight and clueless about everything from technology to tending to the earth.

    Of course, would-be Ecotopians have much of which to be proud. The three great cities of the region–San Francisco, Portland and Seattle–easily rank among the most attractive on the continent. They all boast higher-than-average levels of education and–at least around San Francisco and Seattle–some of the world’s deepest concentrations of high-tech companies.

    Yet for all their promise, the Ecotopian regions cannot claim to have missed the current recession. Downtown Seattle currently suffers a vacancy rate in excess of 20%, the highest in decades; last year apartment rental rates dropped 13.8%, the steepest decline among American metros. Meanwhile vacancies in the Silicon Valley area south of San Francisco have soared to above 20%. By early this year, there was enough unoccupied office space in the Valley to fill 15 Empire State Buildings.

    This may seem a bit counter-intuitive for a region that boasts the headquarters of Microsoft, Costco, Amazon, Intel and Apple. But while such companies provide lots of high-wage employment, they are no longer enough to spark much growth across the region’s economy. The San Francisco area has actually lost jobs over the past decade and shows little sign of recovering its once prodigious growth rates.

    But easily the weakest of the economies has been Portland, which lacks the presence of major anchor firms like those in greater Seattle or the Bay Area. Portland’s unemployment rate has been well over 10% since late last year.

    A wave of youthful migration has made the city a slacker haven for the past decade and, in turn, exacerbated unemployment figures. Homeless kids now crowd the downtown area, which, although far from destitute, does appear pretty grungy in places.

    Yet, like the Ecotopians in the Callenbach novels, Portland residents and politicians seem nonplussed about their anemic economic performance. After all, the city voted heavily–despite solid opposition from the rest of the state–to raise Oregon’s taxes on wealthy individuals and corporations, a move likely to deter new in-bound investment.

    “You don’t have a big focus here on economic development,” observes Stephen B. Braun, dean of the School of Management at Portland’s Concordia University. “There’s much more emphasis on quality of life than on making a living.”

    The proof: Portland may have high unemployment, but the big idea around city hall is not how to promote jobs but about investing an additional $600 million in bike lanes.

    All these places, of course, avidly endorse green jobs even if there’s little prospect they could replace the jobs being lost in the fading blue-collar sectors. A growing green job sector needs a vibrant economy that produces things and builds new buildings, notions that have little currency across much of the region.

    This anti-growth attitude reflects that of Callenbach’s Ecotopia, which favors a “stable state” economy over job or wealth creation. Ecotopian politics explicitly ban both population increases and the private automobile.

    While the mayors of Portland, San Francisco and Seattle are hardly that extreme, they could propose policies that would make driving more burdensome. And they certainly seem to do wonders in chasing would-be baby-makers out of the city. All three cities have among the lowest percentages of children of any in the U.S.

    Perhaps the toughest issue facing the Ecotopian political economy lies with the issue of class. Callenbach’s Ecotopia adopts something of an anarchic socialism; the cities of the real ecotopia have tended toward ever greater class bifurcation.

    San Francisco, for example, boasts one of the highest per capita incomes in the nation and remains a favorite destination for inherited wealth, whether among individuals or nested in nonprofits. Yet according to the Public Policy Institute of California, if the cost of living is applied, San Francisco ranks high among urban counties in terms of its concentration of poverty.

    It doesn’t help that the city’s economy has been hemorrhaging corporate headquarters and mid-range middle-class jobs for decades. High-end workers commute to Google and other Valley companies, and others work in the financial or media sectors, but many mid-range jobs have been lost, many of them to more affordable business-friendly locales in places like Colorado.

    As middle-class jobs disappear, Ecotopia’s cities increasingly resemble restrictive communities that are anything but diverse. As analyst Aaron Renn has pointed out, Portland and Seattle stand as among the whitest big cities in the nation. And San Francisco’s once vibrant African-American population has been dropping for decades.

    In the coming years this pattern will likely become more pronounced in Seattle and Portland as well. These cities continue to attract many well-educated people, particularly from California, who in turn bring with them both significant accumulated wealth and anti-growth attitudes.

    Strict “green” planning regimes are also accelerating the decline of the local middle class by driving housing prices up, greatly diminishing the once wide affordability for the middle class. Seattle’s regulatory environment, according to one recent study, has bolstered housing prices in the region by $200,000 since 1989. The percentage of families who could afford a median price home in the area has fallen by more than half.

    Many observers see a similar outcome from Portland’s widely ballyhooed planning regime. Despite the massive acceptance by planners as something of a model for the restored city, the vast majority of all job and population growth in the region has occurred at the less pricey fringes, including across the river in Vancouver, Wash., which lies outside the fearsome Portland planning regime.

    So what is the future for the region, and particularly the eco-cities? If the country starts moving toward the center, and even the right, you can expect Ecotopian sentiment to rise again, perhaps not to the point of secession but expressed in attitude.

    But this may not be all bad. As America’s population grows and other regions rise, perhaps it’s helpful for the various parts of the country to experiment with different systems. Short of civil war, there’s something to be said for relentless, even if sometimes daft, experimentation at the local level. The rest of country may not follow all their strictures, but our would-be Ecotopians could produce some interesting and even usable ideas.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

  • Our Exurban Future and the Ecological Footprint

    ‘How shall we live?’ is a question that naturally concerns architects, planners, community representatives and all of us. It is a question that turns on the density of human settlements, the use of resources and the growing division of labour.

    Where Europeans lived mostly in the countryside in the eighteenth century, by the middle of the nineteenth century they had gathered in burgeoning towns and cities. The divide between town and country became a worldwide template in the twentieth century, as nations measured their economic growth by the pace of urbanisation. Today, more and more of the world’s population live in cities. In 1970, 35 per cent of the world’s population lived in urban environments; today that number has passed fifty per cent.

    The passage of people from the countryside to the city, though, was not the end of the great movement of peoples in the developed world. The developing world continues to urbanise, but North America and Europe started to move in the opposite direction in the 1920s, away from city centres outwards into new suburbs. Humanity, it seemed, was on the move again, and by the 1970s more Americans lived in suburbs than in cities or in the country.

    European cities, too, saw the growth of suburbs, as first wealthy people, and then later working people moved away from city centres, taking advantage of new railway and tramlines, and then later motorways, to commute to work, and return to homes beyond the urban boundary line. All these have been in one way or the other supported by governments.

    Roosevelt’s government Homeowners Loan Corporation, the Federal Housing Administration and then later the Veterans Administration provided cheap mortgages with fixed term repayments and a low interest rate. After World War II the rise continued, and by 1972 the FHA had helped nearly eleven million families to own homes. In those same years between 1934 and 1972, the percentage of American families living in owner-occupied dwellings rose from 44 per cent to 63 per cent.

    Between 1920 and 1930, when automobile registrations rose by more than 150 percent, the suburbs of the nation’s largest cities grew twice as fast as the core communities. Henry Ford said at the time ‘The City is doomed’ and that ‘we shall solve the city problem by leaving the city’. In 1956, the Interstate Highway Act created the largest freeway system in the world.

    In Britain, the postwar government planned and built garden suburbs and new towns, ringing London, on schemes first outlined by Ebenezer Howard at the end of the nineteenth century. Similar ‘garden cities’ were built in places like Hellerau, outside Dresden (1909) and Kapuskasing and Walkerville in Ontario, Canada.

    The reflux of people in the more developed world, away from the city centres, strains our distinctions between ‘city’ and ‘suburb’. The suburbs of the previous generation are the urban centres of the present. The dense settlements of Notting Hill, New Jersey and Sarcelles are the suburbs of twenty, fifty or a hundred years ago. As suburbanisation carries on, people are moving away from the suburbs their parents moved into, with much the same motives of seeking greener pastures or fleeing urban problems. New words are coined to describe the change: exurbs, edge cities, edgelands.

    This pace of suburbanisation has provoked its own anxieties. The great historian of ‘sprawl’, Robert Bruegmann, identifies three distinctive ‘anti-sprawl’ movements. In the 1920s Britain, intellectuals and Tory shire-dwellers raised a great protest against ‘ribbon development’ and what they condemned as ‘bungaloid growth’. In the late 1950s William H. Whyte, a journalist at Fortune magazine warned that ‘huge patches of once green countryside have been turned into vast, smog-filled deserts – at a rate of some 3000 acres a day’.

    Today suburbs are no longer just gauche or racist; they are killers of the planet. Herbert Girardet’s idea of the ‘human footprint’ was that each head of population would need a given area of land from which to raise his or her subsistence. As the mass of consumer goods each person used increased, he would need more land – the footprint would get larger. Indeed, says Girardet, if all the world lived at London rates of consumption, they would need three planets to sustain them, around 40 billion hectares, rather than the 14 billion hectares of landmass on our earth.

    Often ignored in such discussions is the fact that as consumption has grown, even more so has productivity. Across the world the land given over to grain harvesting shrunk from 732 million hectares in 1981 to 656 million in 2000 (after growing solidly from 587 million in 1950), even though the world population kept rising. That is because yields grew faster than consumption, releasing land from cultivation. Over the same years, grain yields from each hectare grew from 1.1 tons to 2.7 tons.

    This efficiency has done much to keep green land, well, green. We are seeing not deforestation but aforestation. In the United States forestland is growing 5886 square kilometres on average every year. In the European Union forests are growing 1428 square kilometres every year. And as farm land is retired, ever more land is protected in national parks worldwide.

    Much of the critique of the suburbs revolves around the car. The intrinsic link between suburbs and cars has many social consequences, but first and foremost it has consequences for energy use and globe-warming CO2 emissions. In thousands of ways, the more dispersed life of the suburbs would seem to be a much greater drain on resources than a more compact life in densely occupied cities.

    However, there is evidence that runs counter to our expectations of the association between settlement densities on the one hand, and energy use and greenhouse gas emissions on the other. Analysis of the Australian Conservation Foundation’s Conservation Atlas prepared for the Residential Development Council shows, surprisingly, that per capita greenhouse gas emissions are lower in suburban areas than city centres.


    Source: Greenhouse gas emissions, tonnes per capita, Housing form in Australia and its impact on greenhouse gas emissions, Residential Development Council 22 October 2007, p 11

    There are a number of reasons why this should be the case. First, suburban dwellings are often newer, incorporating more energy efficient means and materials – notably, better insulation. Second, though car journeys are less greenhouse gas efficient by the kilometre, the difference is not so great, and public transit is less efficient in other ways (because it rarely takes you just where you need to go) creating extra journeys and more waste.

    What is more, the view that suburban commuting must be a greater producer of greenhouse gas emissions does not take into account the changing patterns of home and work location in the newer suburbs. Our model of the diurnal commute, into the city in the morning and back to the dormitory town at night is becoming less typical.

    For many people, commuting is quicker in the suburbs than in cities. It takes residents within the suburbs and exurbs 24/25 minutes, much less than the 43 minutes for those living and working in Greater London. The case for reducing energy use by living at higher densities appeals to our common sense, but less dense living might provide answers to the problems of energy and emissions.

    Suburbanisation has raised fears of social division. Anxieties about social alienation, along with those about the environment, fit into a wider account of the problems of suburbanisation, and a proposed solution, which has been called the New Urbanism.

    One group that hoped to address the problem are the New Urbanists, a group of architects and planners who have turned the perceived problem of the suburbs around and created a manifesto to reverse those negative trends. Among the best-known exponents of the New Urbanism is Peter Calthorpe, for the arguments in his books The Next American Metropolis (1993) and Sustainable Communities (with Sim Van der Ryn, 1989).

    Calthorpe argues that we are still building suburbs that are ‘increasingly out of sync with today’s culture’ failing to take into account changing household composition, falling incomes and environmental concerns – a proposition that many American “progressives” held to be strikingly confirmed by the collapse of the US housing market in 2008/9, and its wider impact on the economy.

    Intriguingly, Calthorpe’s views on planning take us far away from technical considerations into an idea of what the good life ought to be. Calthorpe says that ‘we need to start creating neighbourhoods’, arguing that, ‘Our faith in government and the fundamental sense of commonality at the centre of any vital democracy is seeping away in suburbs designed more for cars than people, more for market segments than communities.’

    The New Urbanists were an influence on Britain’s Urban Task Force, under Lord Rogers of Riverside, who drew up the British government’s planning policy in the document Towards an Urban Renaissance in 1998. Rogers, too, favoured higher densities, mixed use and an end to suburban sprawl.

    Folding the idea of preserving our social capital into the broader ideas of environmentalism, New Urbanists, the Urban Task Force and Herbert Girardet have all gravitated towards a concept of ‘sustainable communities’. It is a concept that is at once recognisable and at the same time very vague. Still, it has been an enormous influence on policy makers, who have tried to give substance to its implications.

    However, the evidence is clear that despite the many policy initiatives that have been taken to create ‘sustainable communities’, developers, and perhaps consumers, too, have resisted the appeal. First, take the case of Europe. Analysis of 42 west European cities shows that in all but one (Berlin) the suburbs and exurbs are growing faster than the core.

    In 1965 44 million people lived in the center of these 42 cities, while 42 million lived in the suburbs and exurbs. By 2000, the inner city population had dropped to 39 million, while the suburban had grown to 71.6 million. On average, inner city populations declined by 13 per cent, while suburban and exurban populations increased by 113 per cent.

    • For example Madrid’s inner city population grew from 2.25 million to 2.4 million between 1965 and 2000, but its suburbs grew from 125,000 to 2.1 million.
    • Over the same period, Frankfurt’s inner city declined from 695,000 to 641,000, while its suburbs grew from 755,000 to 1.25 million
    • Brussels’ inner city shrunk by 30,000 to 137,000, while its suburbs grew from 1.8 to 2.3 million.
    • Even Barcelona, poster-boy for urban densification, saw its core decline from 1.6 million in 1965 to 1.5 million in 2000, while its suburbs grew from half a million to 2.26 million over the same period.

    Source: Western Europe: Metropolitan Areas & Core Cities 1965 to 2000/2001, Demographia, http://www.demographia.com/db-metro-we1965.htm.

    Policies that try to contain sprawl run against the grain of human nature. Many, even most people aspire to live at lower densities than they do right now.

    Still, there is a point to the Urban Renaissance. The gentrification of canal and riverside districts, and the creation of ‘cultural quarters’ is a well-documented trend. This was the sense in which there was an urban renaissance in the noughties: well-heeled yuppies took back parts of the inner city. Often single, they had less need of gardens and preferred loft living in Shoreditch or central Zurich to a detached house in the Suburbs, which were coming to be less exclusive, anyway.

    These developments should lead those polemicists painting the suburbs as the greedy well-to-do and the inner cities as disproportionately occupied by the suffering poor to recalibrate their argument. Tim Butler, Chris Hamnett and Mark Ramsden’s analysis of London’s employment in the 2001 census shows that outer London and the South East is more working class than inner London.

    The image of black inner cities and white suburbs is changing, too. Many major cities are suffering ‘black flight’ as black Americans move out to the more affordable suburbs: Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, Dallas, San Diego, Washington and Oakland. San Francisco’s black population is down from 13.4 to 6.5 per cent.

    Not only do the New Urban policy prescriptions coincide with the recent gentrification of inner cities, there is some evidence that they have helped it. Portland, where the adoption of an urban growth boundary (or green belt) was intended to densify the city and protect the country, has seen house prices rise much faster than the national average (it was below that, now it is above). Inside Oregon’s protected ‘farm land’ many farmhouses turn out to be just country homes for the wealthy disguised as farms

    To show that Greenwich Millennium Village was not just more riverside yuppie flats, but a real community, architect Ralph Erskine built in a combined school and health centre, except that an old school, Anandale, had to be relocated from the centre of Greenwich to the peninsula to provide the children – and spookily, it has kept its old catchment. Erskine’s Potemkin Village recruits children from Greenwich to act the part of the local community. A few parents objected at first, but most changed their minds when they saw the quality of the facilities. Around ten of the families in the Village proper send their children there, and of those, the majority are in the 20 per cent of new homes that earmarked for social housing. Like other attempts to reinvent the village in the town, such as the Bo01 estate in Malmo, Sweden, Erskine’s Greenwich peninsula is overwhelmingly upper middle class.

    It is pointed that in Britain, where, thanks in part to Lord Rogers, planning restrictions on new development were greatest, there was no boom in housebuilding, unlike much of the rest of the world. Of course there was a boom in house-prices – quite a phenomenal one. But all through the period 1997 to 2008 house-building fell below the rate needed to replace Britain’s dilapidated housing stock.

    The New Urbanism was always rather more than an architectural style, but also a vision of the good life. It hoped to address the social divide, and the solipsistic withdrawal from city life. Curiously, it seems if anything to have played a part in accelerating the social divide, in particular the gentrification of inner city enclaves. Far from making the city more diverse, the new urbanism seems to be making it more uniform. In London the trend towards in-fill by building on brownfield land has had the unintended effect of the loss of green spaces in the City. In the north of the city, Londoners gathered to protest at the recreation of urban overcrowding, when Islington’s municipal authorities planned to force yet another apartment block on top of garages in Pilgrim’s Way.

    The New Urbanism describes one trend in society, the gentrification of inner cities. But many more people want to move outwards, to cheaper and more spacious homes. As communications improve, and more land is released from farm use by rising agricultural productivity, that shift towards more dispersed dwellings should find its place in architecture and planning theory, too.

    Ultimately more dispersed patterns of living lead to more dispersed commuting.

    South East England, the Bassin Parisien, Central Belgium, the Dutch Randstad, Rhine-Ruhr, Rhine-Main, Northern Switzerland, and Greater Dublin are examples of what geographers call polycentric urban regions. When industry moves out of monocentric cities, it disperses along valleys and communication lines.

    But the growth of Mega City Regions does not mean the countryside is all being concreted over. On the contrary, these economic regions are a lot greener, a lot more dispersed than the twentieth century city. Exurbs and edge towns are being populated in the yawning green spaces in between the industrial estates.

    The issue that needs to be addressed is: Can We Imagine A Dispersed Future?

    Far from being necessarily de-humanising, dispersed settlements are an opportunity for an enlargement of the human spirit. To imagine that there is anything in physical proximity that is essential to community is to confuse animal warmth with civilisation, and an unfortunately deterministic view of architecture’s relationship to society. But worst of all it misses out the great alternatives that are waiting to be made in new communities across the country.

    James Heartfield is author of Let’s Build! Why we need five million homes in the next ten years, and a director of www.Audacity.org.

  • The Death Of Gentry Liberalism

    Gentry liberalism, so hot just a year ago, is now in full retreat, a victim of its hypocrisy and fundamental contradictions. Its collapse threatens the coherence of President Barack Obama’s message as he prepares for his State of the Union speech on Wednesday.

    Gentry liberalism combines four basic elements: faith in postindustrial “creative” financial capitalism, cultural liberalism, Gore-ite environmentalism and the backing of the nation’s arguably best-organized political force, public employee unions. Obama rose to power on the back of all these forces and, until now, has governed as their tribune.

    Obama’s problems stem primarily from gentry liberalism’s class contradictions. Focused on ultra-affluent greens, the media, Wall Street and the public sector, gentry liberalism generally gives short shrift to upward mobility, the basic aspiration of the middle class.

    Scott Brown’s shocking victory in Massachusetts–like earlier GOP triumphs in Virginia and New Jersey–can be explained best by class. Analysis by demographer Wendell Cox, among others, shows that Brown won his margin in largely middle- and working-class suburbs, where many backed Obama in 2008. He lost by almost 2-to-1 among poor voters and also among those earning over $85,000 a year. He also won a slight margin among union members–remarkable given the lockstep support of their organizations for Brown’s Democratic opponent, Martha Coakley.

    Geography played a role, of course, but class proved the divider. Coakley did well in the wealthiest suburbs largely north and northwest of Boston. But Brown’s edge in the more middle- and working-class suburbs proved insurmountable.

    Obama, a genius at handling race, has always had problems with class. His early primary victories in 2008 resulted not only from superior organization but the preponderance of students and upper-income professionals in early primary states. Once Hillary Clinton morphed, just a bit late, into Harry Truman in a pants suit, she proved unstoppable, rolling over Obama in critical states like Pennsylvania, Texas, California, Florida, Michigan and throughout Appalachia.

    In the general election Obama succeeded in winning over a significant portion of these voters. Long-simmering disgust with the Bush administration and the Republican Congress, combined with a catastrophic economic collapse, undermined the GOP’s hold on middle-class suburbanites.

    Now that the ball is in his court, the president and his party must abandon their gentry-liberal game plan. The emphasis on bailing out Wall Street and public employees, supporting social welfare and manufacturing “green” jobs appealed to the core gentry coalition but left many voters, including lifelong Democrats, wondering what was in it for them and their families.

    In the next few elections there’s an even greater threat of alienation among millennial voters, who in 2008 accounted for much of the president’s margin of victory. Generational researchers Morley Winograd and Mike Hais note that millennials are starting to enter the workforce in big numbers. Right now their prospects are not pretty. The unemployment rate for those under 25 stands at 19%. Even for college graduates, wages are declining even as opportunities dry up.

    The greatest political danger is not so much a millennial switch to the GOP but a loss of enthusiasm that will diminish the youth vote. Winograd and Hais estimate only about one-third of those who voted in 2008 in Massachusetts voted in this last special Senate election. “Republicans will keep on celebrating victories until Democrats turn their attention to young voters and get them as excited as Obama did in 2008,” Winograd warns.

    Ever deepening disillusionment–not only among millennials–is inevitable unless Obama changes course and starts building a broad-based recovery. The president’s economic team is as pro-big-bank as any conjured up by the most rock-ribbed Republican. Its motto could be a reworking of that old notion by onetime GM CEO and Eisenhower Defense Secretary Charles Wilson: “What’s good for General Motors is good for the USA”–just substitute Wall Street for GM.

    But where GM brought jobs and prosperity to millions, the current Wall Street focus has forged a recovery that works for the gentry but fails to promote upward mobility. Bailed out from their disastrous risky bets and then provided with easy access to cheap credit, the financiers have had themselves a fine party while the rest of the private sector economy suffered. The partygoers have become so rarified that they are unable to lift even the New York City economy, whose unemployment rate now surpasses the national average.

    This spectacle has forced Obama to try locating his hidden populist, but dangers lurk in this shift. If he attacks Wall Street with any real ferocity, the only linchpin of the current weak recovery could crumple. An administration that has focused on finance as the essence of the economy may prove poorly suited to skewer its primary object of affection.

    Yet it may not be too late for the president to recover some of his economic mojo. Although his financial tax plan represents little more than petty cash at today’s absurd Wall Street rates, Obama’s endorsement of Paul Volcker’s more muscular reform agenda could rally Democrats while forcing Republicans into a doctrinal crisis. Some, like Sen. John McCain, may favor a policy to downsize the megabanks and limit their activities. But many others who hold up the holy grail of free markets über alles will expose themselves again as mindless corporate lackeys.

    But badmouthing the financial aristocracy is not enough. Obama also must jettison some of the lamer parts of the gentry agenda. Cap and trade, a gentry favorite that satisfies both green piety and Wall Street’s greedy desire for yet another speculative market, needs to be scrapped as a potential job-killer for many industries. Similarly, the administration needs to delay measures to impose draconian limits of greenhouse gas emissions through the Environmental Protection Agency, which could devastate large sectors of the economy, including manufacturing, agriculture and construction.

    Obama, particularly after the Copenhagen fiasco, needs to shift to more practical, job-creating conservation measures like tree-planting and reducing traffic congestion–notably by promoting telecommuting–while continuing research and development of all kinds of cleaner fuels. Measures that make America more energy-efficient and self-sufficient–without ruining the economy with ruinously high prices–would be far more saleable to the public than the current quasi-religious obsession with wind and solar.

    Obama also needs to stop his naive promotion of the chimera of “green jobs” as his signature answer to the country’s mounting employment woes. There is no way a few thousand, mostly heavily subsidized, jobs creating ever more expensive energy can turn around any economy. Just look at the economic carnage in Spain–where youth unemployment has now reached a remarkable 44%–which has bet much of its resources targeting “green” energy.

    More than anything the president needs to make the case that government can help the productive economy. This requires a scaling down of regulatory measures that are now scaring off entrepreneurs–including some aspects of health care reform–and beginning to demonstrate a direct concern for basic industries like manufacturing, agriculture and trade.

    Pivoting away from gentry liberalism will no doubt offend some of the president’s core constituencies. But if he does not do this soon, and decisively, he will find that the middle-class anger seen in Massachusetts will spread throughout the country. As a result Barack Obama, a man who would be Franklin Roosevelt and could settle on being the next Bill Clinton, will end up looking more like that sad sack of Democratic presidents, James Earl Carter.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin Press February 4th, 2010.

  • Suburbs & Cul-de-Sacs: Is The Romance Over?

    The Virginia Department of Transportation does not like cul-de-sacs. You know, those little circles that suburban home dwellers worship so much and pay a premium to be located on? Under its regulations, all new subdivisions must have only through streets. Essentially, no more cul-de-sacs. Getting rid of these desirable dead-ends, according to the DOT, will improve safety and accessibility for emergency vehicles.

    The new set of rules regarding street regulations is called Secondary Street Acceptance Requirements (SSAR). It requires a set of closed, interconnected street segments designed under specific formulae to make sure the streets are well situated for pedestrians and bicycles. The SSAR is also designed to better distribute traffic in local suburban settings, specifically subdivisions.

    I’m here to defend the cul-de-sac, but not as it is typically built and designed.

    What makes a cul-de-sac lot premium? Homeowners fall in love with the quiet courts and the sense of built-in neighborliness. The words “quiet cul-de-sac location” can spur more sales than the words “new granite counters.” The homes have huge rear yards, because of the extreme pie shape. The paved dead end areas guarantee no traffic will be speeding through, making parents and kids feel safe.

    The wide angles between the adjacent home sides create some useable side yard space, as well as added privacy. Quiet, serene, and safe – what’s not to love?

    Who Determines The Best Street Pattern? One of the biggest problems of suburban street design is that those who typically plan subdivisions don’t focus on vehicular or pedestrian flow, nor are they required to do so. The vast majority of subdivisions (and even of master planned developments) in the US are designed by engineering and land surveying companies that focus on density and meeting the ‘minimums’. A developer will typically hire the same company that engineers and surveys their site to plan the subdivision layout.

    Very little information is available on how to create suburban street patterns with connectivity. These areas may have significant topographic variations, making a traditional urban grid pattern undesirable. Suburban regulations don’t offer much help or guidance, either. Planning commissions and city councils that do not have an understanding of traffic engineering end up giving a yes vote to site plans they do not understand. The result is a conglomeration of people involved in the approval processes that produce a traffic system based more on familiarity than on functionality.

    Cul-de-Sac Design Guidelines: To make matters worse, existing design guidelines for cul-de-sacs create the most waste with the least benefit. Here in the upper Midwest, a cul-de-sac will have a 120 foot diameter right-of-way with a 110 foot circle of asphalt. Why? Because fire departments say they need that radius to turn around a fire truck. Go a bit south and that dimension reduces to a 100 foot diameter right-of-way with a 90 foot diameter circle. I’m not sure why northern firemen don’t turn the steering wheel as tight as those in the South, but according to these regulations, they apparently can’t. So up North the typical cul-de-sac will consume 8,500 square feet of paving, and in the South just under 6,000.

    This means that at a typical 25 foot setback from the right-of-way to the home front, an 80 foot wide suburban lot in the north will result in four or so premium lots. In the South, with a typical 20 foot setback and narrower 60 foot wide lot, there might be five or so premium lots.

    An 8,500 square foot volume of cul-de-sac paving for four Northern-sized lots comes out to 40 percent more square feet of paving per house compared to the same lot on a straight street. This means the home will cost the city 40 percent more for snow removal, resurfacing, etc., forever. It also cost the developer 40 percent more, but that is recouped because the lots on the cul-de-sac can be sold at a huge premium.

    A street leading to a cul-de-sac will have standard size lots fronting it. Depending upon the length of the street, there may be a few lots or dozens of them leading to the premium ones along the circle. These “street” lots might have a slightly higher value because of the low traffic approaching a closed end street, but they will certainly not equal the value of the lots around the circle.

    From an efficiency perspective, it seems like only a fool would defend the use of cul-de-sacs. Here are some facts from that fool. In planning, everyone assumes that the minimum dimension is the most efficient. In cul-de-sacs, the minimum dimensions are typically very inefficient. Making cul-de-sacs larger than the minimum fire engine turning radius makes them more efficient.

    Impossible? Take a look at the typical suburban design above, and compare it to to this re-designed cul-de-sac:

    By making a typical northern cul-de-sac larger, say 160 feet in diameter, and using a one-way narrow lane with an island in the center, the amount of total paved area plummets. Instead of a solid sea of asphalt, the new cul-de-sac uses 10% less paving and has room for a central park that will be approximately 8,800 square feet of organic surface.

    Now place the homes at a deeper setback. Yes, pulling the homes farther from the right-of-way to a 40 or 50 foot setback (instead of 25) accomplishes two things. It stretches the length of the setback line and makes the lots much less pie-shaped. The new, deeper setback should double the number of lots…with much less paving. Instead of being 40 percent less efficient, the new cul-de-sac is approximately 20 per cent more efficient than a rectangular lot on a straight street.

    And while the new cul-de-sac lot is less pie shaped, it will still have a significantly larger rear yard. The lots overlooking an 8,800 square foot park will have a much higher value than if they were overlooking 8,500 square feet of asphalt or concrete. The park can be used in a variety of ways, but a combination of rain gardens and recreation seems natural. By draining into the center, we eliminate curbing on one side, making them even more efficient. Since the number of premium cul-de-sac lots is at least doubled and uses less paving and less overall land area, there would be fewer cul-de-sacs.

    The Dead End Issue: But what of pedestrian and bicycle circulation? Well, that’s simple, as these non-vehicular designs can extend beyond the cul-de-sac as well as through them, making the central park areas destination places. Emergency vehicular access? Interconnecting walks could be made wide enough at certain locations to provide emergency access that would rival tight grid patterns.

    If these arguments favoring the efficient new cul-de-sacs aren’t enough, God likes them! How do I know? What scripture did I study to make this claim? Well, if God did not want cul-de-sacs, then why vary the natural contours of the land? Not every site is perfectly flat or a perfect square shape. In many cases, contours form peaks and valleys in which cul-de-sacs may be the only way to design a development; anything else would be unnatural.

    Hold your hand in front of you and then spread your fingers wide. When rain falls on the land and runs off it forms peaks and valleys similar to your jutting fingers. Where this happens, using the natural contour for the location of cul-de-sacs makes much more sense than trying to place a circulation pattern between the finger nails. Property configurations also often require a cul-de-sac or two (three, four or more).

    Of course a big bull-dozer could reconfigure any land to implement SSAR, but then…wouldn’t that be a sin?

    Rick Harrison is President of Rick Harrison Site Design Studio and Neighborhood Innovations, LLC. He is author of Prefurbia: Reinventing The Suburbs From Disdainable To Sustainable and creator of Performance Planning System. His websites are rhsdplanning.com and performanceplanningsystem.com.

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  • Florida: From Hard Times in the Sunnier Climes

    By Richard Reep

    Florida’s era of hard times continues. Last week we held a “Jobs Summit ” here in Orlando but heard little but self-congratulation by politicians like Governor Charlie Crist. He praised the Legislature’s budget cuts but had little to claim when it came to reviving the economy.

    The basic reality is this: Florida is not only troubled, but in danger of falling further behind. For example, Suntech China, a solar cell manufacturer, recently worked with the State of Florida to build a solar cell manufacturing plant – in Arizona. Thanks to Florida’s unconvincing efforts, this employer decided to call Arizona its new home.

    The television and movie industry is rapidly expanding out of California into states like New York, Louisiana and New Mexico, thanks to incentives by these states to attract film and TV producers. Florida, with MGM, Universal Studios, Full Sail, and other venues, remains stagnant in this industry.

    While Central Florida is one of the country’s top ten “super regions” of population clusters, it consistently fails to get on the national stage regarding transportation, employment, and return on its federal tax money. For every dollar of income tax sent by Central Florida citizens each year, far less than a dollar comes back in terms of federal spending. Other states, like New Mexico and Alaska, receive our portion of that dollar.

    Publicly funded capital improvement projects, such as Nemours Hospital, continue to be awarded to out-of-state companies, leaving companies here in Florida, already reeling from the collapse of the real estate bubble, in even worse shape.

    Florida, which has little onshore energy resources such as oil or gas, has offshore energy resources that could pump billions of dollars into its coffers. Instead the riches of the Gulf are being exploited by Texas, Louisana, and Alabama.

    Florida, the “Sunshine State,” with vast solar and agricultural potential, has no renewable energy policy. Instead, biofuel and solar research leadership seems headed to Michigan, California and other states.

    Florida has yet to create a policy of sustainability at a statewide level. Instead, the state relies on growth, tourism, and agriculture for employment, hardly a sustainable policy given the catastrophe of 2009.

    While statewide unemployment is over 11%, labeled “Great Recession” by the press, those in the design and construction industry face unemployment estimates between 25% and 33%, levels matching that of the Great Depression.

    Nor are politics in our favor, even though Florida, reversing its generally conservative past, cast its lot with Obama in 2008. But now the promises of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood in return for the State’s funding of commuter rail seem to be largely forsaken. During the Jobs summit, Obama’s railroad czar Joseph Szabo assured Florida that its priority would be yielded to Illinois. High-speed rail in Florida is unlikely in our lifetime. Chicago is simply more important than Orlando in today’s politics.

    Clearly Florida is not yet a basket case. With the right help from Tallahassee, Florida can reinvent itself and take advantage of the following natural assets:

    Sunshine still can bring talent and jobs. Sure, we are behind right now, but sunshine brought jobs before WW2 when Florida was ahead in aviation training. The mild climate is far more forgiving on student pilots than places where harsh winters ground light aircraft.

    Suntech should serve as Florida’s Pearl Harbor. Sure, we lost one solar cell manufacturer, but that technology is barely efficient enough to be viable. Florida could take advantage of this failure to revamp its poor growth management process, which was the reason for the failure to begin with, and actively seek out the best candidate for research and development of photovoltaic technology that would compete with Suntech and win.

    Deregulate Power Generation: The Sunshine State should be a net energy producer, not consumer. We could build a conduit to supply energy, through solar fields, up into the Southeast, as well as down into the Caribbean. There is a rather large island in need of vast amounts of clean power 90 miles away that will need this someday soon.

    Agricultural jobs: The statewide emergency declared as a result of the freeze should be a wake-up call to assist agriculture with some new ideas. Rather than sell dead orange groves out to developers, Florida should assist farmers to convert a portion of cropland to power generation, using solar collectors, photovoltaics, and biofuel crops.

    Media: This is a no-brainer for jobs. The movie industry grew in California because of the climate but is unionized and regulated to death. It’s time for Florida to compete. The next wave of entertainment culture is interactive virtual reality anyway, and the center of this activity has yet to be established, although there is an emerging concentration of firms like Raytheon doing research here. Florida could become a virtual reality technopole if it attracts the right players and provides the right resources.

    Transportation and the National Stage: For too long, Florida’s congressional delegation seems to have labored in the background, and Florida sends too few effective people to Washington. As a state made up of people escaping hard reality up north, we seem to have taken our “live and let live” beach culture too far and it has cost us credibility, capital, and clout. It’s time to reverse this trend and get passionate about our worth as a state and our contribution to America in items that matter. As a destination, Florida must rank much higher than Illinois for travel, and high speed rail should be awarded based on need rather than political favoritism.

    Meanwhile, growth and tourism will come back. They always do. And Florida, instead of losing designers to its competition, could find ways to retain them for the next generation of entertainment and leisure destinations. Housing, presently overbuilt, shouldn’t be ignored, but Florida has much to fix in terms of the quality of housing. Public/private partnerships to increase quality of life over quantity are necessary to make housing attractive and affordable and create quality, desirable communities for the 21st century.

    Florida is truly at a crossroads. For the last hundred and sixty-five years it relied on agriculture, growth, and tourism, but these narrow economic bands perpetuate cyclical booms and busts. Fundamental change can occur if the state’s leadership declares war on business as usual. The state needs to get nimbler to stay competitive when the economy does return. For those who want to stick it out and see Florida through this economic transition, it is imperative that the leadership respond now not just with words, but with actions that effect true, deep, and meaningful change.

    Richard Reep is an Architect and artist living in Winter Park, Florida. His practice has centered around hospitality-driven mixed use, and has contributed in various capacities to urban mixed-use projects, both nationally and internationally, for the last 25 years.

  • America’s Agricultural Angst

    In this high-tech information age few look to the most basic industries as sources of national economic power. Yet no sector in America is better positioned for the future than agriculture–if we allow it to reach its potential.

    Like manufacturers and homebuilders before them, farmers have found themselves in the crosshairs of urban aesthetes and green activists who hope to impose their own Utopian vision of agriculture. This vision includes shutting down large-scale scientifically run farms and replacing them with small organic homesteads and urban gardens.

    Troublingly, the assault on mainstream farmers is moving into the policy arena. It extends to cut-offs on water, stricter rules on the use of pesticides, prohibitions on the caging of chickens and a growing movement to ban the use of genetic engineering in crops. And it could undermine a sector that has performed well over the past decade and has excellent long-term prospects.

    Over the next 40 years the world will be adding some 3 billion people. These people will not only want to eat, they will want to improve their intake of proteins, grains, fresh vegetables and fruits. The U.S., with the most arable land and developed agricultural production, stands to gain from these growing markets. Last year the U.S.’ export surplus in agriculture grew to nearly $35 billion, compared with roughly $5 billion in 2005.

    The overall impact of agriculture on the economy is much greater than generally assumed, notes my colleague Delore Zimmerman, of Praxis Strategy Group. Roughly 4.1 million people are directly employed in production agriculture as farmers, ranchers and laborers, but the industry directly or indirectly employs approximately one out of six American workers, including those working in food processing, marketing, shipping and supermarkets.

    Yet none of this seems to be slowing the mounting criticisms of “corporate agriculture.” A typical article in Time, called “Getting Real About the High Price of Cheap Food,” assailed the “U.S. agricultural industry” for precipitating an ecological disaster. “With the exhaustion of the soil, the impact of global warming and the inevitably rising price of oil–which will affect everything from fertilizer to supermarket electricity bills–our industrial style of food production,” the article predicts, “will end sooner or later.”

    The romantic model being promoted by Time and agri-intellectuals like Michael Pollan hearkens back to European and Tolstoyan notions of small family farms run by generations of happy peasants. But this really has little to do with the essential ethos of American agriculture.

    Back in the early 19th century Alexis de Tocqueville noted that American farmers viewed their holdings more like capitalists than peasants. They would sell their farms and move on to other businesses or other lands–a practice unheard of in Europe. “Almost all the farmers of the United States,” he wrote, “combine some trade with agriculture; most of them make agriculture itself a trade.”

    Despite the perceptions of a corporatized farm sector, this entrepreneurial spirit remains. Families own almost 96% of the nation’s 2.2 million farms, including the vast majority of the largest spreads. And small-scale agriculture, after decreasing for years, is on the upswing; between 2002 and 2009 the number of farms increased by 4%.

    This trend toward smaller-scale specialized production represents a positive trend, but large-scale, scientifically advanced farming still produces the majority of the average family’s foodstuffs, as well as the bulk of our exports. Overall, organic foods and beverages account for less than 3% of all food sales in the U.S.–hardly enough to feed a nation, much less a growing, hungry planet.

    Then there’s the even more fanciful notion–promoted by Columbia University’s Dickson D. Despommier–of moving food production into massive urban hothouses. In a recent op-ed in the New York Times he argues we are running out of land and need to take agriculture off the farm. According to Despommier, “The traditional soil-based farming model developed over the last 12,000 years will no longer be a sustainable option.”

    Yet Praxis Strategy’s Matthew Lephion, who grew up on a family farm, points out that such projects hardly represent a credible alternative in terms of food production. Urban land is far more expensive–often at least 10 times as much as rural. Energy and other costs of maintaining farms in big cities also are likely to be higher.

    Furthermore the notion that America is running out of land–one justification for subsidizing urban farming–seems fanciful at best. The past 30 years have seen some loss of farmland, but the amount of land that actually grows harvested crops has remained stable. Though some prime farmland close to metropolitan centers should be protected, agriculture has over the past decades returned to nature–forests, wetlands, prairie–millions of acres, far more than the land that has been devoted to housing and other urban needs.

    However ludicrous the arguments, the Obama administration remains influenced by green groups and is the cultural prisoner of the lifestyle left, with its powerful organic foodie contingent. That leaves farmers and the small towns dependent on them with little voice.

    The ability of greens and others to wreak havoc on agriculture can be seen in the disaster now unfolding in California’s fertile Central Valley. Large swaths of this area are being de-developed back to desert–due less to a mild drought than to regulations designed to save obscure fish species in the state’s delta. Over 450,000 acres have already been allowed to go fallow. Nearly 30,000 agriculture jobs–held mostly by Latinos–have been lost, and many farm towns suffer conditions that recall The Grapes of Wrath.

    Not satisfied with these results, the green lobby has prompted the National Marine Fisheries Service to further cut water supplies, in part to improve the conditions for whales and other species out in the ocean. Given these attitudes, farmers, including those I have worked with in Salinas, are fretting about what steps federal and state regulators may take next.

    One particular concern revolves around the movement against genetically modified food. Already there are calls for banning GMOs in Monterey County. Local officials worry this would cripple the area’s nascent agricultural biotech industry as well as the long-term ability of existing farmers to compete with less regulated competitors elsewhere. The fact that a less advanced form of genetic engineering also sparked the “green revolution” that greatly reduced world hunger after 1965 seems, to them at least, irrelevant.

    When viewed globally, the anti-big farm movement seems even more misguided. As Chapman University’s professor of food science Anuradha Prakash observes, India’s own organic farms serve a small portion of the market and cannot possibly meet the nutritional needs of the country’s expanding population. “You just don’t get the yields you need for Africa and Asia from organic methods,” she explains.

    A formula that works for high-end foodies of the Bay Area or Manhattan can’t produce enough affordable food to feed the masses–whether in Minnesota or Mumbai. The emerging war on agriculture threatens not only the livelihoods of millions of American workers; it could undermine our ability to help feed the world.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin Press February 4th, 2010.

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  • Denmark, and the US, in 2010

    Denmark is a good microcosm. It holds lessons for us here in the States, good and bad. I felt that way when I first lived there in 1971, when I researched my doctoral dissertation there in 1977, and I feel that way now.

    Denmark is a mixed-economy (free market competition with a large public sector), social welfare, multi-party democratic country that, because of its small size and international exposure, is affected more quickly and deeply by social, economic and political forces at work in the Western (and wider) world. It was a founding NATO member (1949) and the first Nordic member of the European Union (which it joined, simultaneously with Britain and Ireland, on New Year’s Day 1973). For such a small, homogenous country, it has amazing social, economic and political diversity (for example, over the past 36 years some 15 different political parties have at one time or another garnered representation in Folketinget, the Danish Parliament).

    Denmark has had, and continues to have, an outsized global influence relative to its size, whether in diplomacy, design, architecture, or quality manufacturing. Denmark gets a lot of things right. The standard of living is high, and so is the quality of life. As for the Danes themselves, both the famous and anonymous, they display an unmistakable national character combined with healthy individualism. (The unwritten law of Danish culture commands that one is not to draw attention to oneself, but it’s liberally violated!)

    The US is also a mixed-economy, social welfare, multi-party, democratic, diverse nation. There is an undeniable leftist political orientation among elites, media, academia, government and public policy professionals in both countries. What lessons can we learn from recent developments in Denmark? Like the US, Denmark has gone through, and is going through, economic, financial, real estate, employment, debt and deficit problems of unanticipated severity. And like the US, responsible parties have taken their eye off the ball.

    My colleague and partner Jorn Thulstrup, owner, CEO and publisher of News ex-press, a daily compilation of Danish news media presented in English for the diplomatic community in Copenhagen (among other clients), recently wrote a sharply critical report on the hangover left in Denmark by the Climate Conference. He states:

    The COP15 Climate Conference held in Copenhagen in December, fuelled by political and economic special interests and enthusiastically embraced by naive Danish journalists, preoccupied people in this country far more than the rest of the world. For a lengthy period of time, leading Danish politicians and commentators seemed to be suffering from the illusion that, in terms of climate and energy, Denmark could rule the world. A widespread perception flourished that Denmark, as host of COP15, could create some kind of platform to market Danish technology, especially wind energy and enzymes used in the production of bio-ethanol.

    But eventually, as expected, the concluding “Copenhagen Accord” failed to live up to the exaggerated expectations and only confirmed that the skeptics were right at least about the politics: the climate conference was a ritual event without meaning or influence.

    Preoccupation with meaningless things is not costless. Hosting the Climate Conference cost Denmark billions of kroner, but the indirect costs were even more serious: it tied up official government business, cabinet ministers and security forces for such a long time, and to such an extent, that many serious political and economic issues – like how to get the economy growing again – were neglected.

    Denmark deservedly prides itself on its quality of life, which includes a low crime rate. But while Copenhagen was free of the widespread destruction and vandalism that many had feared during the climate conference, the devotion of overwhelming police resources to COP15 over the past two years has actually been accompanied by an increased crime rate generally.

    The failure of COP15 is disappointing, if not unexpected. But the global economic crisis has left its mark throughout this country too. Years of budget surpluses have been transformed into deficits, in the necessary effort to prevent a collapse of the financial sector and limit growing unemployment. The government is now focused on the domestic agenda, with the top priority to restore economic growth, aiming to secure a political platform that will lead to victory at the next general election. Sound familiar?

    Small country, big ideas
    Another more serious problem is Denmark’s inability to compete, writes Thulstrup. Major wage hikes at home and devaluations abroad have made Danish goods and services too expensive. Unfortunately, Danish workers haven’t been able to compensate with increased productivity – in fact, quite the opposite. Possibly, as a society, the crisis was not taken seriously enough. Things went well for years and it appeared, after years of balance of payments and budget surpluses, that the country was capable of managing any setback. Also sound familiar?

    Every year or so some international poll shows that Danes are the “world’s happiest people.” (It would be more accurate to say “most contented,” or, if I’m feeling mischievous, “resigned to their situation”!) But the problem, writes Thulstrup, is that they are no longer very industrious. Studies, reports and commissions have been warning for years of the lack of qualified manpower.

    Denmark has a high workforce participation rate, due to the share of women that work outside the home, but is a laggard in actual hours worked. It’s a case of short working days, long holidays, and a high amount of sick leave. Students take too long to become qualified and too many people retire early – at the state’s expense. More and more fail to contribute anything to production and are being supported by fewer and fewer. A third of working-age adults – the potential labor force – is out of work, compared to just one in four eight years ago. And it’s going to get worse in the coming years. Thulstrup expects very little change in Denmark in 2010, in terms of economic growth. .

    That also sounds depressingly familiar.

    What about “flexicurity,” the Danish labor market scheme that seeks to combine employer flexibility (the ability to hire and fire easily) with employee security (publicly-funded job retraining)? Robert Kuttner praises flexicurity in Foreign Affairs (March/April 2008), while conceding that Danish conditions are unique and not applicable elsewhere. Thulstrup says flexicurity keeps the official Danish unemployment rate artificially low by forcing into job training, and then counting as employed, many people whose employment prospects are meager. In this way and others, he says, the system is susceptible to waste, fraud and abuse. Additionally, its costs are exorbitant: an “astonishing” 4.5% of GDP (as per Kuttner).

    Big country, perverse ideas
    We have taken our eye off the ball here in the States too. Over the past year our liberal elites have been consumed with climate control, health-care reform and public-sector pump-priming, when they should have been focusing on creating the conditions for private sector economic growth. We are now faced with the specter of laws, regulations and taxes that are unwanted and harmful, more expensive energy, and slower economic growth than would otherwise occur. That’s a shame, because economic growth is an all-purpose salve that cures a multitude of ills, and an all-purpose social lubricant that hides a multitude of sins.

    The essence of all of this is the matter of incentives.

    The lesson we should be learning from Denmark is that preoccupation with ritual, meaningless and nonsensical things is not costless. The cost of not working is greater than imagined over time. Misallocation of resources is not just wasteful and expensive, it does violence to the general welfare, not to mention common sense.

    Dr. Roger Selbert is a trend analyst, researcher, writer and speaker. Growth Strategies is his newsletter on economic, social and demographic trends. Roger is economic analyst, North American representative and Principal for the US Consumer Demand Index, a monthly survey of American households’ buying intentions.

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