Tag: Financial Crisis

  • From Bush’s Cowboy to Obama’s Collusive Capitalism

    Race may be the thing that most obviously distinguishes President Barack Obama from his predecessors, but his biggest impact may be in transforming the nature of class relations — and economic life — in the United States.

    In basic terms, the president is overseeing a profound shift from cowboy to what may be best described as collusive capitalism. This form of capitalism rejects the essential free-market theology embraced by the cowboys, supplanting it with a more managed, highly centralized form of cohabitation between the government apparat and the economic elite.

    Never as pure as its promoters suggested, cowboy capitalism always depended on subsidies to businesses such as corporate farming, suburban development, pharmaceuticals, energy and aerospace. George W. Bush and the Republican majorities of the early 2000s simply drove this essential hypocrisy to a disastrous extreme by increasing deficits and allowing deregulated financial markets to run wild. In the process, they helped drive the world economy off the cliff.

    Not surprisingly, Obama and his backers see their mission to reverse the course. However, the path they are taking may prove no friendlier — and perhaps less so — to the interests of American democracy and the middle class than those of the now-deposed cowboy posse.

    The Obama policy of collusive capitalism is most evident in the financial bailout. He has placed his economic program in the hands of a man — Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner — who can best be called, as analyst Susanne Trimbath puts it, a “lap dog of Wall Street.” A protégé of former Treasury Secretary and Citicorp board member Robert Rubin, Geithner played a pivotal role in the original Bush bailout of the Wall Street elite.

    Most recently, he proposed selling toxic assets to hedge funds and other financiers, a plan widely denounced by a host of liberal commentators, notably Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz. The Geithner plan, Stiglitz noted this week in a New York Times op-ed, represents “the kind of Rube Goldberg device that Wall Street loves: clever, complex and nontransparent, allowing huge transfers of wealth to the financial markets.”

    The winners in the plan are the top guns of the financial industry, who would welcome further government-sponsored financial consolidation. For them, this would be vastly preferable to the more democratic alternative of selling the remaining assets of the failed large firms to dispersed, healthy, usually smaller, regional institutions.

    Largely missing from even these critiques is precisely why Obama has adopted this collusive approach while mostly avoiding anything smacking of populist anger. Perhaps one has to start with the very obvious fact that the president — despite occasional attacks on the greed of Wall Street — did not run against the financial markets but, rather, with their strong support. As early as the 2008 Democratic primaries, noted New York Times Wall Street maven Andrew Ross Sorkin, Obama had “nailed [down] the hedge fund vote.”

    This group includes the notorious currency speculator George Soros, a major backer of liberal groups in Washington who recently admitted to London’s Daily Mail that he was having “a nice crisis.” Whatever Geithner is doing seems to be working well for Soros and his ilk, although not so beneficently for the people who are losing their jobs and homes.

    I do not mean to suggest the shift to collusive capitalism represents a conspiracy; it simply reflects a changing of the guard among the American elite. The new hegemons include not only financial barons but also powerful interests such as the burgeoning green industry, the high-tech/venture capital complex, urban landowners and, at least in the category of useful idiots, Hollywood and much of the media.

    The new collusive capitalist class differs from the cowboys in its view of government. The collusive capitalists — notably, powerful IT companies and venture capitalists — now look to spur “green” technologies, which are seen as their next meal ticket.

    Others standing to benefit from the rise of collusive capitalism include the university and nonprofit research establishment. Universities have become critical linchpins for the new Democratic Party — providing student shock troops and professorial financial contributions as well as the basic ideological underpinnings and much of the key personnel.

    Are there any dangers for the administration from this approach? In the short run, they certainly have little to fear from the Republicans, whose strident claims about a lurch toward socialism have about as much credibility as their supposed born-again faith in fiscal conservatism.

    A potentially more dangerous threat lies from those parts of the non-gentry left, who fear that collusive capitalism will promote a dangerous further concentration of wealth and power. More immediately, it may also suffer from the limitations of a top-down, green-obsessed strategy that is unlikely to generate enough private-sector jobs, particularly for blue-collar workers.

    This large job creation deficit may take years to become evident but could have a long-term impact on middle-class voters and, perhaps most important, the generally pro-Obama millennial generation workers who are among the prime victims of the current economic malaise. Hopefully, before then, the president will recognize the limitations of collusive capitalism and set out on a broader, more democratic wealth-creating agenda.

    This article originally appeared at Politico.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • What About Carmen?

    The national conversation in the wake of President Obama’s introduction of a mortgage relief plan has centered on “fairness” and the conditions to qualify for a mortgage modification. This misses the point. The effects of “innovative” mortgage products were felt far more broadly than the relationship between a single buyer (responsible or not) and his particular mortgage broker (despicable or not). To illustrate the point, meet Mrs. Conservative And Responsible Mortgage Neighbor (“Carmen” for short).

    In 2003, Carmen bid on a home and took a 30 year fixed mortgage with 20 percent down.

    Fast forward to today. Carmen has enjoyed her home and made all of her payments to the bank on time. Unfortunately, her home has dropped in value to the point where it is now significantly underwater . Her investment portfolio has fared just as poorly, losing 40 percent of its value in the last 18 months. All the while, her mortgage obligation has slowly amortized lower.

    If Carmen were to turn to her investments to pay off the loan today, she would come up short. Worldwide deflation has resulted in every asset in our little vignette having fallen by 40 percent. Carmen’s debt burden, however, remains the same,, struck in yesterday’s dollars.

    How does the current mortgage relief plan – which certainly excludes all of the Carmens out there — make sense? The short answer is that it doesn’t. It is neither fair nor effective. It lacks boldness, universality and an understanding of the problem.

    A far better answer to the problem is one time across-the-board principal reductions to all primary residence mortgages originated in the last ten years. Such a plan avoids the piecemeal approach of subjective formulae and doesn’t make personal bankruptcy a precondition to the reduction of principal. It acknowledges that the nation’s housing stock was overvalued because of unintelligent home buyers, products that have been discredited, fairly widespread fraud and inexcusable encouragement by naive government officials. Following the principal reduction, each loan can be re-amortized over its remaining life, resulting in the stimulus of a reduced monthly payment for every American homeowner.

  • Geithner’s Reforms: More Power to the Center May Appeal to Europeans, But Won’t Work for U.S.

    There will be much talk in London about global financial regulation, particularly from the Europeans. But don’t count on it ever coming into existence.

    At a House Financial Services Committee on March 26 Treasury Secretary Geithner testified that this particular subject “will be at the center of the agenda at the upcoming Leaders’ Summit of the G-20 in London on April 2.”

    Secretary Geithner presented a 61 page proposal dealing with financial companies that pose systemic risk. Let me paraphrase the main points:

    1. Create a Uni-regulator – This idea has been around a while; it won’t hurt. We tried to do this in the U.S. during the last round of sweeping financial reforms but couldn’t make it happen, primarily due to protectionist politics among the existing regulators (SEC, FRB, Treasury, FDIC, etc.). The UK and others have done it. It didn’t prevent the financial crisis from reaching them. Still, it wouldn’t hurt to have at least one adult in charge of the financial markets when things get messy.
    2. Make companies hold more cash to back up their riskier investments – The banks already have strict national and international capital requirements. It didn’t prevent them from needing a bailout, but the big banks are still standing while the rest of the financial companies are gone. This is probably a good idea.
    3. Set size limits on unregistered fund managers – I don’t think there should be any size limits: if you provide financial services you should register. Don’t plumbers have to be licensed? Why not bankers?
    4. Figure out how to regulate derivatives – We’ve known for a long time that this was a problem. If they haven’t figured it out by now, it’s unlikely they’ll get it right; the proposal is short on details. Geithner’s plan is to bring derivatives into the same centralized system now used for stocks and bonds – consolidating the risk rather than dispersing it – definitely a bad idea. The existing U.S. centralized system has, as of December 31, 2007, only $4.9 billion to back up $5.8 billion in off-balance-sheet obligations.
    5. Have the SEC set requirements for money market fund risk management – I’m not sure why on earth anyone would want the SEC to assume this responsibility. The SEC has failed miserably at protecting investors from basic short selling schemes and even more blatant schemes like Madoff’s Ponzi. Risk management at financial institutions should be the job of the central bank – that means the Federal Reserve, not the SEC.
    6. Let the government nationalize “too big to fail” companies – They just did this with AIG. In essence, the proposed legislation would codify and make permanent authority for the government to lather, rinse and repeat. Government ownership of financial institutions inevitably leads to inefficiency and worse.

    We’ve tried creating “revolutionary” financial laws before: the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 set the stage for the Savings and Loan Crisis; the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 helped get us where we are now. Better laws come about in “evolutionary” ways. It starts with a generally accepted good business practice, which all market participants follow. Eventually, one or more participants find a way to advance their position by cheating, by not following that good practice. When they get caught, new laws are created to codify the original “good business practice” and some punishment is put in place for those who don’t. What was once considered just a good way to conduct business now becomes a legal business requirement.

    Geithner’s proposed legislation is law by revolution – an attempt to toss aside all previous practices. The legislation was drafted at Davis, Polk & Wardwell, the New York lawyers for the Federal Reserve Bank and advisors to Fed and Treasury on AIG, not the kind of experience I’d want on my resume this year. There is an embedded comment on page four in the pdf-document: “Can Congress write a federal statute trumping a State Constitution?” I’m not sure what frightens me more: that they want to take power away from the states or that they don’t know if they can get away with it! Now is the time to give more authority to the states, not less. By their own admission, federal authorities have proven themselves incapable of protecting investors: Treasury Secretary Geithner told the House, “our system failed in basic fundamental ways.”

    Worse yet is the idea of proposing a global financial regulator, which will be high on the agenda at the G-20 Leaders’ Summit. Designing one regulatory framework for financial services to serve the capital markets in every country is akin to looking for people in every country to “cheat” the same way. Capital markets can work anywhere in the world, but the social and cultural foundations of the system that supports these markets may be quite different. The laws and regulations will need to be quite different, too. When it comes to developing the financial institutions that provide the infrastructure for robust capital markets, there is no “one size fits all”.

    “Stable financial markets through reform” has been the theme of innumerable conferences, conventions and meetings of the leaders and finance ministers of country groups from G8 to the United Nations. Two decades of experience with the “Washington Consensus” tells us that global regulation will not work any better than concentrating all power in Washington.

    Here’s the primary problem with trying to design one set of financial reforms that will serve many nations: Financial services are global not multi-national. Most other products and services sold around the world are multinational, but not global. For example, salt is a multinational product. The salt sold in Cairo is basically the same product as salt sold in Paris or London. Perhaps the label contains the word “salt” in a different language; maybe the Danes use more salt than the Swedes and the Japanese combine it with sugar. But a package of salt contains the same product and is used for the same purpose – one product, used the same way in many nations.

    Financial services are different. A share of stock in Paris has different rights, a different meaning, than a share of stock issued in Buenos Aries. Bondholders play a prominent role in restructuring companies in bankruptcy in the US; in France, debtors are protected from bondholders completely. Yet anyone anywhere can buy a share of a French company or the bond of a US company – many products, used for different investments in one world. For reasons like this, there is no one solution for regulating the banks, brokers and stock exchanges in every country.

    Economists have known for a long time that global financial regulation – or even ”sweeping” national changes – won’t work. Perhaps the lesson from the current financial crisis will be that national regulation must be supplemented with more oversight in the States. Given Geithner’s plan and his penchant for ever more consolidation of authority over financial services, it’s unlikely we’ll get the chance to find out.

    Susanne Trimbath, Ph.D. is CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services. Her training in finance and economics began with editing briefing documents for the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. She worked in operations at depository trust and clearing corporations in San Francisco and New York, including Depository Trust Company, a subsidiary of DTCC; formerly, she was a Senior Research Economist studying capital markets at the Milken Institute. Her PhD in economics is from New York University. In addition to teaching economics and finance at New York University and University of Southern California (Marshall School of Business), Trimbath is co-author of Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets.

  • Burnin’ Down the House! Part Two: Wall Street has a Weenie Roast With Your 401k

    Last week I wrote about the first part of my talk to the Bellevue Kiwanis Club on why our economy is in the position it is today. It is a story about good intentioned policies – like modifying credit scoring for Americans working in a cash-economy – that were bastardized in the execution – like some Americans using modified credit scoring to lie about their income. Just like there were superstar firms among the original “junk bond” companies, there were also firms like Enron and WorldCom.

    In the first part of my story: banks wrote mortgages, their broker-arms sold them to the public in the form of bonds, they paid fees to Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s to get triple-A credit ratings, and they devised crazy default protection schemes which they also sold in the public capital markets. On top of all that, they screwed up the paper work so there was no relationship between houses and the ultimate financial paper that could be used to cover potential losses.

    That’s when Wall Street staged a weenie-roast over the blazing fire of your 401k plan. They were making so much money in fees and trading profits that they decided to extend the scheme to car loans, credit card debt, and anything else they could package and sell off in capital markets around the world. When new money stopped flowing in and when the value of the underlying assets began the decline, the whole mess came falling down over their – and our – heads.

    In case after case, there are more derivatives than their underlying assets. Here’s an example of just how absurd this is: The market value of Bank of America (BofA) is $32 billion; the contracts that payoff if BofA fails are worth $119 billion. This isn’t rocket science math. It’s worth a lot more to someone to see BofA fail than it is to see them succeed. Here’s a table of some of financial companies and home builders, alongside some countries, to give you an idea of what the potential cost would be of letting them collapse – because the derivatives would have to be paid off if they collapsed. Where the market value of a company’s publicly-traded shares (or the outstanding public debt of a nation) is greater than the derivatives outstanding (a negative number in the difference column), the “market” is probably betting in favor of the company.

    Entity

    Derivatives outstanding

    Market Value or Public debt

    Difference

    BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION

    118,689,745,334

    31,558,840,000

    87,130,905,334

    GMAC LLC

    83,556,419,908

    4,690,000

    83,551,729,908

    MORGAN STANLEY

    84,271,180,804

    24,186,940,000

    60,084,240,804

    DEUTSCHE BANK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

    71,011,177,628

    18,510,000,000

    52,501,177,628

    CITIGROUP INC.

    61,875,137,002

    12,760,000,000

    49,115,137,002

    AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP (AIG)

    47,393,950,401

    2,230,000,000

    45,163,950,401

    GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION

    43,373,996,836

    1,540,000,000

    41,833,996,836

    CENTEX CORPORATION

    41,027,349,092

    856,760,000

    40,170,589,092

    LENNAR CORPORATION

    40,426,782,677

    1,260,000,000

    39,166,782,677

    AMBAC ASSURANCE CORPORATION

    36,835,358,941

    189,580,000

    36,645,778,941

    PULTE HOMES, INC.

    38,364,111,999

    2,460,000,000

    35,904,111,999

    FORD MOTOR COMPANY

    39,618,004,718

    5,030,000,000

    34,588,004,718

    THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC.

    80,849,691,288

    46,624,340,000

    34,225,351,288

    BARCLAYS BANK PLC

    44,579,007,183

    11,160,000,000

    33,419,007,183

    WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION

    32,665,900,751

    1,850,000,000

    30,815,900,751

    CBS CORPORATION

    32,484,932,800

    2,600,000,000

    29,884,932,800

    SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.

    33,766,673,423

    4,090,000,000

    29,676,673,423

    TOLL BROTHERS, INC.

    27,532,256,817

    2,590,000,000

    24,942,256,817

    SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION

    33,852,494,934

    10,230,000,000

    23,622,494,934

    AUTOZONE, INC.

    31,489,303,582

    8,700,000,000

    22,789,303,582

    D.R. HORTON, INC.

    19,889,587,401

    2,540,000,000

    17,349,587,401

    ALCOA INC.

    20,554,123,223

    4,620,000,000

    15,934,123,223

    AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY

    28,098,626,953

    13,970,000,000

    14,128,626,953

    K. HOVNANIAN ENTERPRISES, INC.

    9,458,710,459

    70,220,000

    9,388,490,459

    AETNA INC.

    15,056,041,259

    9,720,000,000

    5,336,041,259

    TIME WARNER INC.

    33,530,285,093

    29,240,000,000

    4,290,285,093

    WELLS FARGO & COMPANY

    47,902,948,043

    58,060,000,000

    -10,157,051,957

    JPMORGAN CHASE &CO.

    61,250,536,812

    86,770,000,000

    -25,519,463,188

    RUSSIAN FEDERATION

    102,631,256,656

    151,000,000,000

    -48,368,743,344

    ABBOTT LABORATORIES

    5,273,779,532

    68,720,000,000

    -63,446,220,468

    REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

    169,668,377,905

    243,747,000,000

    -74,078,622,095

    REPUBLIC OF ITALY

    157,609,796,730

    248,773,000,000

    -91,163,203,270

    BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

    18,409,990,929

    126,860,000,000

    -108,450,009,071

    UNITED MEXICAN STATES

    76,677,172,011

    320,334,000,000

    -243,656,827,989

    FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL

    113,249,393,554

    814,000,000,000

    -700,750,606,446

    Derivatives outstanding is data made available by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation for publicly traded credit default contracts. Market value is for public companies generally in early March 2009; public debt is for countries generally from year-end 2008. Difference is author’s calculation. The average derivatives outstanding for entities with positive differences are 22 times the value of the entity (excluding GMAC as an outlier with a multiplier of 17,816).

    In other words, you could buy all the shares of Lennar for $1.2 billion. However, if they go bankrupt, the payoff will be $40 billion for the holders of the derivative contracts. And at this point, we – the US taxpayers – are in the position of paying off on these contracts if the banks and other “too big” companies fail. This table also tells you that the “markets” think that Bank of America is significantly more likely to fail than, say, Brazil – which is probably true, if for no other reason than the fact that Brazil has an army and Bank of America doesn’t!

    The bottom line is that the government has to continue to bailout these banks and large companies because many of them, including AIG which is now owned about 80% by us, are the same entities that will have to pay off the bets if the other companies fail. There’s really no way out of it now. I remain opposed to the bailouts – they create “moral hazard,” the scenario whereby it is more profitable to fail than to succeed. But: I understand why they are being done and why we have to keep doing it.

    The reason is: it matters to our 401k plans, the pension plans of teachers and firefighters, the retirement benefits of loyal, hard-working Americans. You see, the debt of insurance companies and other triple-A rated credits (AIG had a good credit rating less than 12 months ago) are required investments for money market funds, pension plans, etc. Take a look at the prospectus for any of these investments if you have them and you’ll see what I mean. It is necessary for such funds to make triple-A investments because the funds need to be able to make payments and honor withdrawals, sometimes on short notice. That means they have to hold some very safe, very easily sold investments. Investments like those issued by AIG.

    If the mutual funds holding your 401k and the pension fund supporting the school teachers and all that go broke – well, no one wants to imagine what that America would look like. Despite all the bad economic news, few Americans have run out in the streets in protest and even those who did didn’t vandalize any property, public or private. Nor did we take our CEOs hostage. In fact, I think a little civil unrest may be called for: print this story, wrap it around a hotdog, mail it to the New York Stock Exchange and tell them to enjoy their weenie-roast!

    Here’s why: the time is coming very soon when Wall Street will need us again. Uncle Sam is doling out the bailout money to the financial institutions, but even now they are devising ways to get ordinary investors to come back to the markets – and to use our own money to do it.

    Susanne Trimbath, Ph.D. is CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services. Her training in finance and economics began with editing briefing documents for the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. She worked in operations at depository trust and clearing corporations in San Francisco and New York, including Depository Trust Company, a subsidiary of DTCC; formerly, she was a Senior Research Economist studying capital markets at the Milken Institute. Her PhD in economics is from New York University. In addition to teaching economics and finance at New York University and University of Southern California (Marshall School of Business), Trimbath is co-author of Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets.

  • Talkin’ Baseball – and Sub-Prime Mortgages

    I was thoroughly enjoying the broadcast of the March 23 final game of the recent World Baseball Classic at Dodger Stadium when I thought about steroids and sub-prime mortgages.

    A seemingly odd leap, I’ll grant you – but hang in there on this one.

    The thoughts had first stirred when I attended a semi-final game the prior Saturday, watching a South Korean team that counted just one player who’s on a big league roster here in the U.S. make hash of the Venezuelan squad. The Venezuelan team boasted plenty of players who make in living in the big leagues, including a number of All-Stars.

    Then I tuned in the next night to watch Japan do a similar number on Team USA. More of Japan’s ballplayers have made a mark in our big leagues compared to the South Korean squad, but their team still paled in comparison to the star power of the Americans.

    The Venezuelans and Americans didn’t just get beat in their semi-final games, by the way – they looked slow, lacking in the fundamentals of the game. The South Koreans and Japanese, on the other hand, looked quick and ever-alert. They pitched with heart, hit smartly, and fielded their positions with nimble dedication.

    That set up a South Korea-Japan final that proved to be one of the best ballgames I’ve ever seen, going all the way to extra innings in a performance that highlighted how the game should be played.

    None of the South Korean or Japanese ballplayers looked overly bulky. There were a few big fellas out there – but they were big like Babe Ruth or Frank Howard. They looked like naturally big guys who had learned to play baseball. No forearms that made you think of Popeye. No necklines from ears to shoulders.

    I thought about how the big leagues of the U.S. have only begun to admit to the recent steroid binge. It reminded me how obvious the trend had been. Anyone who couldn’t see the physical indicators in the players should have been able to get a good idea just by looking at the statistics piled up during the Steroid Era.

    Baseball fans looked past all of that, for the most part. So did players and team owners. Home runs are sure fun, after all.

    That’s where my thoughts turned to sub-prime mortgages – because we as a society did pretty much the same thing to our economy. We shot some concocted substance into our economic bloodstream, getting a short-term boost that didn’t require any real dedication to owning a home or building communities. We went for the shortcut – just like those big league ballplayers who decided to get their power from a syringe instead of dedication to the game.

    Folks all over the world joined us by directly or indirectly flexing the fake economic muscles engendered by the sub-prime mortgage mess. Yet a look at the World Baseball Classic shows that not everyone fell for the shortcut offered by steroids. Not everyone turned their backs on sportsmanship and fundamentals at the ball yard.

    So put love of the game alongside genuine community building on the back-to-basics list for our American Culture.

    We might as well make it a thorough housecleaning.

    Jerry Sullivan is the Editor & Publisher of the Los Angeles Garment & Citizen, a weekly community newspaper that covers Downtown Los Angeles and surrounding districts (www.garmentandcitizen.com)

  • Financial Crisis Boosts Local Markets

    By Richard Reep

    The current economic crisis has many mixed impacts, including the shift of grocery customers to low-cost companies like Wal-mart. Yet at the same time we see a shift to local, community markets in an effort to cope with the new economy. While the global players deliver discounts due to their enormous volume, local community markets offer low-priced produce, goods, and services due to their microscopic volume. This common ground between individual efforts and enormous buying machines yields an interesting treasure trove of passion and hope.

    As folks cope with financial turmoil, their choices for purchasing venues seem to be driven by the need for saving, as well as the need for a good experience. The middlemen, such as the regional and national chains, seem to be squeezed in between truly global players like Wal-mart, and the rising tide of localism appearing at a grass-roots level in so many communities.

    The rise of these small, open-air markets is an encouraging sign of authentic social interaction, after so many assaults upon our social network by the forces of the Old Economy. It suggests a new role for local entrepreneurs and for the revival of community spirit. At these local markets, producer and consumer traffic in direct interaction, without the army of marketing consultants, business analysts, merchandisers, industrial psychologists, and the rest of the hangers-on who have transformed the agora into an often dispiriting and uninteresting shopping experience.

    Now, with the Old Economy in shambles, the New Economy appears to be reviving the community element to our American commercial culture. Even a few years ago the Farmer’s Market was considered an anachronism, something found in rural areas and overlooked by cosmopolitan city dwellers. The fact that these are rising up in our urban and suburban culture speaks to our need for freshness, for authenticity, and for some spontaneity.

    In Central Florida, the Winter Park Farmer’s Market is perhaps the grandfather of the Central Florida market scene, having started sometime in the eighties. No one at the City could remember exactly when it started. Ron Moore, Parks and Recreation Assistant Director now manages the market, and he laughed when asked about its success in a recent interview. “Consulting to other municipalities who want to start up their own markets is a part-time job”, said Moore, his latest effort being Eatonville, whose inaugural Community Market was an exciting event.

    Markets on public property are an important trend in our cities, for they signal the revival of public space. All too often public space has been defined by soulless plazas, many of which are deserted most of the time. But, with the rise of the public market, the classic agora has been revived in Winter Park, Maitland, Downtown Orlando’s Lake Eola, Eatonville, and elsewhere in Central Florida.

    Mr. Moore stated that the Winter Park Farmer’s Market’s summer season is typically the slow time, but last summer was their best one ever, and this winter has been the highest attendance ever, with a waiting list of merchants to get in. He is fine-tuning the mix using common sense, watching people flow and traffic flow. This reflects a locally based entrepreneur who is all instinct and good listening skills; he is not a mall merchandiser using industrial psychology and the appeal of sameness to make sales.


    North of Orlando lays the town of Eatonville, America’s oldest African-American incorporated community, and it is sandwiched between the affluent Winter Park and Maitland areas. The Eatonville Market, for its part, is attracting produce, food items, and flowers, and is worth a visit on a Saturday morning. Complete with a stage, shoppers are treated to a vibrant music scene as well as a shopping venue, and as this market takes off, it will attract more and more people to this historically significant community.


    Public open markets are exciting, but perhaps an even more interesting trend is the private-run market. Organizers of private markets can have more authority over the vendors and their merchandise, and can give their markets more style to suit a specific audience. One of the area’s more interesting markets occurs at night – the Wednesday evening Audubon Community Market, occurring at Stardust Video and Coffee. Founded by Emily Rankin, the Community Market strives to bring items produced specifically in Audubon Park.

    This epitomizes the spirit of the new localism. The fact that it occurs at night makes the market scene unique. Ms. Rankin, in an interview, revealed that the Audubon Park Garden District, which she founded, now includes a network of vegetable gardens, and these are showcased at the market. Her cafe, Roots, serves food at this market, and it provides services, locally grown produce, art, music and other handmade items which rotate on a weekly basis.

    There are many advantages to privately run markets. The Winter Park Farmer’s Market has pages and pages of rules and forms. The private Audubon Community Market is direct, paperless, and quick: Ms. Rankin looks at your product and says, you are in or out. Her management of the market has sustained it through a change in location or two, and she is optimistic that the market will grow in popularity as people start looking locally for what they can’t find globally

    During times of financial stability, people often seek to reduce risk and experimentation, clinging to the tried and true. Certainly retail’s global players focus on cold calculation and maintaining shareholder value. Yet at the grassroots, individuals and families also seek a level of comfort and interaction. The consumer response to community markets suggests that there is a widely felt allegiance with these intrepid street vendors who brave the elements for a dollar’s worth of grapefruit. The shifting economy is allowing individual voices to speak and be heard by a wider audience. This is the coarse of true innovation. Those who persevere in the community market scene could well influence our commercial future for decades to come…

    Richard Reep is an Architect and artist living in Winter Park, Florida. His practice has centered around hospitality-driven mixed use, and has contributed in various capacities to urban mixed-use projects, both nationally and internationally, for the last 25 years.

  • While Fixing Housing, Fix the Regulations

    Everyone knows that subprime mortgages lie at the root of our current financial crisis. Lenders originated too many of them, they were securitized amidst an increasingly complex credit market, and the bubble popped. The rest is painful history.

    Most commentators have explained the source of the problem by pointing either to faulty federal housing policies – such as Fannie Mae’s affordable housing goals, the Fed’s easy money practices, and the Community Reinvestment Act – or to the imprudent zest for gain among investors who miscalculated risk and kept up the demand for bad mortgages. Both views are correct to varying degrees. These perceptions will shape the ongoing policy debate about needed reforms.

    But as this debate advances, we should not lose sight of another consequential, yet mundane, factor in the crisis: the way that regulations raised house prices and created conditions ripe for subprime loans. Regulations may be one of the least debated contributors to the current crisis, and yet their effect on the middle class’s ability to buy homes may arguably have been a key reason why subprime loans flourished in the first place.

    In the heated housing market before 2007, a median income family in the U.S. could only afford 40 percent of homes for sale across the country, compared to more than two-thirds of homes in 1997. Banks got creative and helped ordinary families buy overly expensive homes with risky mortgages. In a hot market, the risks seemed low. People never should have purchased homes they could not afford, but at the same time, rising prices were putting homeownership out of the reach of ordinary families such that unconventional loans seemed a convenient solution.

    Why were housing prices rising so rapidly? Observers have traditionally held that land scarcity drives up prices by preventing supply from meeting demand. But the more likely answer is that regulations on housing overly constricted supply in many parts of the U.S. Through the groundbreaking work of Wendell Cox at Demographia and scholars such as Ed Glaeser at Harvard and Joe Gyourko at the University of Pennsylvania, we have come to see that rules and regulations drive up housing prices much more than we had originally thought. Blaming supply problems on land scarcity has been a convenient excuse for too long for those who see hyper-regulation of housing as a good thing.

    Regulations often limit the number of housing units that can be built on a given lot, or they restrict the number of new home permits that can be issued in a given municipality, making supply a function of rules, not land scarcity. Restrictions to the property itself, such as environmental or design requirements, also raise the cost of construction (see Andres Duany’s thoughtful article on this issue here.).

    Increased regulation on housing has been a quiet, but disquieting, trend. For example, Glaeser has shown that only 50 percent of communities in greater Boston had restrictions on subdivisions in 1975, compared to nearly 100 percent today. Housing prices in the Boston area would have been between 23 and 36 percent lower on the eve of the crisis were it not for burdensome restrictions on housing. While the Boston area’s regulatory impulse may be excessive, it is nonetheless emblematic of a national trend. A recent U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has found that more than 90 percent of the subdivisions in a recent national study now have excessive restrictions.

    According to Harvard’s housing research center, the growing cost of regulations has edged smaller builders out of the construction market and increased the market share of the nation’s ten largest builders from 10 to 25 percent since the early 1990s. This doesn’t mean that the larger builders are happy about restrictions. Bob Toll, president of one of the nation’s largest builders, has said that his company quit building “starter homes” for young families years ago because the margins on small homes grew too narrow due to excessive regulations.

    How big is the problem? Most observers have typically agreed that housing regulations account for 15 to 35 percent of a median-priced home in the U.S. These percentages come from a 1991 federal housing commission, and they are likely to have increased considerably since then. If we conservatively use them to calculate the scope of regulations by the time the housing crisis began in earnest in 2007, they suggest that regulations accounted for between $35,850 and $83,650 of a median-priced home. Using the National Association of Homebuilders’ methodology for determining the impact of price increases on home affordability, we can say that regulatory restrictions priced at least 7 million – and as many as 18 million – families out of their local housing markets in 2007. As we have learned, families priced out of their markets still purchased homes – usually with unconventional, risky mortgages.

    Of course, not all housing regulations are bad, and zero regulation would introduce unnecessary risks to homeowners. But the increasing rate of regulation in the U.S. represents one of the nation’s larger assaults on the middle class that defenders of “working families” rarely talk about. Conservatives avoid the issue for federalism reasons, since any effective restraint on land-use planners will likely require the federal government’s involvement. And liberals hide from an honest debate about the effects of regulations for fear that it will derail their environmental agenda that relies up on regulations to limit the kind of housing most people want – such as single family homes.

    Now that there is an over-supply of housing in the U.S., the problem of housing regulations may seem moot. But if we do nothing about this issue, it will trip us up again in the future. While I served in the George W. Bush White House between 2005 and 2007, economists inside and outside the administration offered mixed – and sometimes completely contradictory – assessments of what was happening in the housing sector. We continued to work on our proposed reforms of Fannie and Freddie and the Federal Housing Administration in an effort to reduce the “systemic risk” but approached it more as a theoretical matter than as a perceived, impending crisis. We even had a HUD-based initiative on reducing regulatory barriers that quietly lumbered along but which we never elevated as a major policy issue. We now know that what we were grossly underestimating the scope of a potential crisis. We should have made housing sector reform a front burner issue.

    That is all behind us now, and we can see much more clearly what led to the crisis. We need to look at how rule-makers have for too long been making housing unnecessarily expensive for ordinary families. There is a limit to what the federal government can and should do about local housing regulations, but options exist for President Obama and Congress to consider.

    First of all, just as federal agencies are legally required to analyze the environmental impact of new regulations, Congress could require federal agencies to demonstrate the impact of new federal regulations on the cost of home construction. Federal agencies already have the personnel required for the task, and such a requirement would cost the taxpayer nothing extra. Second, Congress should consider new incentives in existing federal law, from highway construction to affordable housing, that would prompt states and municipalities to reduce burdensome regulations in exchange for federal resources. Third, President Obama could issue an executive order requiring federal agencies to amend regulations that have a negative effect on home construction costs. He could also use the same order to establish a task force whose job would be to identify the chief price-increasing regulations in use around the country to inform the legislative process.

    If we ignore the problem, as the housing market recovers, regulations will once again make housing more expensive than it should be. Unconventional mortgages will no longer be available due to the current crisis, and we will be back in a familiar debate about “affordable housing” in which the federal government is called upon to subsidize housing that others have made too expensive. In other words we return to the status quo in which we once again increase the role of a government that – under both Republican and Democratic administrations – has gotten ever bigger, more expensive and increasingly intrusive.

    Ryan Streeter is Senior Fellow at the London-based Legatum Institute and former special assistant to President George W. Bush for domestic policy.

  • Junk By Any Other Name Would Smell

    The Treasury this week disclosed details of their plan to pump $1 trillion into the financial system by removing “Legacy Assets” from the balance sheets of banks. Wading through the multitude of documents and documents, I’m reminded of a remark by Michael Milken in a conversation with Charlie Rose on October 27, 2008 “Complexity is not innovation.”

    Since its inception, the plan has been sold to Congress and the media as one with potential positive payoffs for the public coffers. To support this idea, proponents point to the experience of the Resolution Trust Company (RTC) in resolving the Savings and Loan (S&L) Crisis. Back then, RTC took over failing S&Ls – some of which were bankrupted by bad real estate loans made worse when they were forced to sell off below-investment grade bond assets – the by-now-well-known Junk Bonds.

    Selling off today’s junk bonds will, I agree, clean up the balance sheets of the banks and make them more attractive to investors and depositors. But the investment in junk bonds now is not going to turn out like the investment in junk bonds then. For starters, the value of the junk bonds then declined as a result of the forced sell-off – Congress prohibited S&Ls from holding junk bonds on their balance sheets. When this supply was dumped on the market, the prices naturally dropped. Selling assets at depressed prices damaged a lot of S&Ls. RTC stepped in near the bottom of those prices to take control of the assets. When credit markets returned to normal, the prices of the junk bonds rose and the investments had positive returns.

    Then, junk bonds paid extraordinary rates of return – 10 percentage points above Treasuries at the peak. At that time, a 30-year U.S. Treasury bond could be paying more than 18% interest.

    Now, we are talking about junk bonds that we all know are junk – no matter fancy labels like “Legacy.” What rate of return could there be on a mortgage bond – no matter how you “slice-and-dice” it – created when mortgage interest rates were 5-6%? Add to that our knowledge of the problems underlying these assets and it is increasingly unlikely that there will be any positive payoff for taxpayers in this plan.

    On March 25, 2009, Mirek Topolanek, President of the European Union, called the U.S. economic plan “the way to hell.” His concern is that we’ll have to finance these trillion dollar bailouts with borrowing and that will ultimately further undermine global financial markets. He’s right, of course. The public-private partnerships will finance the purchase of the “Legacy Assets” by issuing debt. That debt will be guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the same agency that guarantees our savings accounts at the local bank. Our guarantee is backed by the payment of insurance premiums to FDIC. The guarantee on the debt used to purchase Legacy Assets will be secured by the Legacy Assets – which will be rated by the same credit rating agencies that gave us triple-A rated subprime mortgage bonds in the first place. How can this possibly turn out well? I’m sure Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC have good intentions, but as EU President Topolanek says, they may all end up as pavement on “the way to hell.” As NYTimes columnist Paul Krugman said of the new plan, “What an awful mess.”

  • Geithner is Wall Street’s Lapdog

    Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner is on the cover of the April 2009 issue of Bloomberg Markets magazine. In the lead article, “Man in the Middle,” the authors refer to his time at the New York Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) as “experience as a consensus builder.” This overlooks the fact that it was easy for him to get everyone to agree, to build group solidarity, when he simply gave the banks and broker-dealers everything they wanted.

    The Primary Dealers, those broker-dealers and banks who have a special arrangement with the FRB for trading in treasury securities, agreed when Geithner let them fail to deliver $2.5 trillion of treasury securities for seven weeks in the fall; they agreed when he let them fail to deliver more than $1 trillion two years earlier; they agreed when he let them fail to deliver treasury securities even after Geithner’s own economists told him it was dangerous. By the way, last year the New York FRB’s public information department prevented those economists from speaking on the record about that research with a Bloomberg reporter.

    Now, at a hearing on March 24, 2009 before the House Financial Services Committee, Secretary Geithner and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke lectured us on the awesome responsibilities of Treasury and Federal Reserve in the current crisis – without admitting that they had those same responsibilities while the crisis was being created.

    In a joint statement from the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve they offer no explanation for their failure to fulfill their “central role … in preventing and managing financial crises.” Rather, they use the fact of that role to require that we accept whatever plan they put before us today as the best and wisest course. To convince us that their plan is the right one, they can all point to the fact that the stock markets rallied (gaining nearly 7% across the board) led by the shares of financial institutions (Goldman Sachs’ shares went from $97.48 on Friday night to $111.93 on Monday – a gain of about 15%).

    I criticized the “Public Private Partnership” when it was announced in February 2009. Calling Wall Street’s bad investments “Legacy Assets” doesn’t change the fact that they are “junk.” They could call it “the hair of the dog” because they now want to invest taxpayer money into the same junk investments that started the financial snow ball rolling in the first place.

    Just because the stock market rallied doesn’t make this “consensus building” – I call it being Wall Street’s lapdog.

  • Why We Need A New Works Progress Administration

    As the financial bailout fiasco worsens, President Obama may want to consider a do-over of his whole approach towards economic stimulus. Instead of lurching haphazardly in search of a “new” New Deal symphony, perhaps he should adapt parts of the original score.

    Nothing makes more sense, for example, than reviving programs like the Works Progress Administration (WPA), started in the 1935, as well as the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), begun in 1933. These programs, focused on employing young people whose families were on relief, completed many important projects – many still in use today – while providing practical training to and instilling discipline in an entire generation.

    Unemployment today may not be as extreme as in the 1930s, but for whole segments of the population – notably young workers under 25 – it is on the rise. Already young workers with college educations suffer a 7.7% jobless rate, while employment is nearly twice that among young workers overall. Hardest hit, in fact, are young people without college educations, whose real earnings already have dropped by almost 30% over the past 30 years, according to one study.

    Tapping the energies of this new “millennial” generation – those now entering their teens and early 20s – would make enormous sense both for economic and social reasons.

    Not only do they need work, but also, as their chroniclers, authors Morley Winograd and Mike Hais have demonstrated, many share an interest in community-building in ways reminiscent of the last “civic generation” in the 1930s.

    In contrast, the current stimulus, rather than inspiring a new generation, has focused on bailing out failed corporations, few of which will generate much employment. Many of the “new” jobs will be going to the already entitled: highly paid, big-pension-collecting, unionized government workers and well-educated people working in federal and university laboratories.

    Also getting short shrift has been the kind of construction projects that drive fundamental economic growth and competitive advantage. These include roads, freight rail, electrical transmission lines and water services that boost productivity in agriculture, manufacturing, high-end business services and technology. The Chinese are currently targeting their spending on precisely the steps that would aid these sectors.

    This is where a New Deal revival would help. The WPA and the CCC were all about building useful, tangible things that made the country stronger and more competitive. Overall, these and other New Deal programs amassed an amazing record – finishing over 22,000 roads, 7,488 educational buildings and over 7,000 sewer, water and other projects.

    These efforts put to work over 3 million workers. (Compare that to the mere 250,000 slated to work in the expanded AmeriCorps program.) Their earnings helped support 10 million dependents. The WPA also employed 125,000 engineers, social workers, accountants, superintendents, supervisors and timekeepers scattered in every state and community. Ultimately, notes political economy professor Jason Scott Smith, the New Deal intimately touched the lives of more than 50 million people – out of a total U.S. population, in 1933, of 125 million. Now that’s stimulus!

    Critically, the WPA and CCC also left behind useful things for the next generation. As historian Gary Breichin has pointed out, we unknowingly walk, drive and ride through many structures built by these agencies.

    These projects did not act as “lures” for the elites, cognitive and otherwise – as so many of our current efforts do – but rather served a broader purpose for the public. The University of Washington’s Richard Morrill notes that the WPA bequeathed “an enduring legacy” around Seattle: bridges and retaining walls and drainage systems, parks and playgrounds, roads and trails, sewers, recreational facilities, airports, streetcars, low-income housing, as well as programs for musicians, artists and writers.

    The WPA and CCC left a similar mark even on the most remote parts of rural “red” America. In places such as Wishek, N.D., notes native Delore Zimmerman, few people recognize that it was the New Deal-sponsored WPA that built the still-used local pool and the community center. Nor do farmers, many of them rock-ribbed Republicans, readily acknowledge that the windbreaks and other conservation projects started by the CCC helped preserve the land from devastating erosion.

    A public works agenda today, of course, would include different things, like expansion of broadband Internet access and a greater emphasis on private financing and skills training. Yet a neo-WPA would still focus on upgrading and expanding our basic infrastructure, which, by all estimates, is generally in sad shape.

    If this is such a good idea, why is no one else promoting it? Among Republicans and conservatives, of course, nothing done by Franklin Roosevelt – except, perhaps, winning the Second World War – could ever hold much merit. They certainly can argue, with some justification, that it was the war, and not the New Deal, that finally got us out of the Great Depression.

    But this is narrow thinking. America’s post-war boom owed much to the work of WPA, CCC and other New Deal programs. Our late 20th-century expansion required travel along their roads and bridges; their energy plants and transmission lines powered our industrial growth, extending it to formerly poor regions like the South. Water and conservation projects undertaken in the agricultural heartland precipitated a revolution in productivity that has fed much of the world.

    More troubling may be why Democrats – often professed admirers of FDR and his work – have not been eager to revive these programs. One factor may be the enormous power of unions representing public employees. The power of organized public-sector workers, notes historian Fred Siegel, was a non-issue in the 1930s and 1940s.

    Today, though, these groups are powerful enough to boost the cost of any government initiative – because often they require high salaries, costly work rules and, most important, pension benefits. The last thing these unions would sanction would be the mass employment of young workers on a temporary basis at living, but not union-scale, wages and benefits.

    Secondly, there are political obstacles. This administration often appears, as one Democratic mayor from central California put it, like “moveon.org run by the Chicago machine.” Its first priority seems to be to reward allies in organizations – whether in “grassroots” groups like ACORN or in the academy – who also share their political agenda.

    Take, for example, the federal government’s proposed expenditure of $500 million to $600 million for “climate change research.” These funds are almost certain to end up in the pockets of high-end government workers and university-based zealots; as a scientific enterprise, it is likely to be as valid as asking the College of Cardinals in Rome to determine the existence of God. The ultimate result will be to provide new grist for Al Gore’s – and the administration’s – friends in the “green” investment banking world and Silicon Valley.

    This green agenda itself may also constitute a third cause itself for WPA avoidance. Much of the environmental movement – committed largely to reducing the carbon footprint of 300 million Americans – doesn’t want new bridges, roads, ports or much of anything that uses greenhouse gas-spewing concrete. They’d prefer to scale back agriculture and grow just enough organic produce to keep Alice Waters clucking happily in her kitchen.

    A similar disconnect can be seen in energy policy. A new WPA could help build transmission lines to connect the energy-rich parts of the country to the major metropolitan areas. This would spur both industrial development in places like the Great Plains – rich in everything from fossil fuels to wind power – while keeping energy prices down for U.S. consumers and firms.

    Yet so far, the energy program seems focused almost exclusively on providing rich contracts to Silicon Valley firms that are close to the administration. So don’t expect a massive expansion of new transmission lines or any expansion of new, “clean” hydropower. The administration’s green agenda seems to revolve not predominately around better or even cleaner energy, but less.

    And, sadly, conservation is one place a new WPA would be most effective. One possible function for a modern WPA would be to go to neighborhoods – particularly poor and working class ones – and insulate houses. This would certainly save money over having government workers or contractors do the same work.

    All this suggests a profound disconnect between the new administration and the real world.

    The post-industrial educated class that now dominates Washington appears, if not scornful, profoundly detached from the problems facing productive industry. These officials also seem blissfully unaware that the public – as opposed to the academy and the elite media – cares more about jobs than about being green; by nearly three to one, according to the most recent Pew poll, they are more worried about the economy than climate change.

    In many ways, this disconnect is inevitable. Products of the “information age,” Obama’s academically oriented backers seem to have trouble distinguishing between words and actual things. Virtually no one in the upper reaches of this administration has been tested by running a private company, manufacturing a product or bringing in a crop. This administration of “experts” from academia and government service appears to possess little tactile knowledge of the real world.

    In this way, Obama’s great strengths – he is a brilliant communicator and image-builder – are also proving to be a source of profound weakness. Right now, he is selling a post-racial kumbaya and a vague confection of ‘hope.” Financing for these good intentions is likely to ebb, however, as a result of a stunning redistribution of wealth from taxpayers to an expanded class of tax-takers.

    Indeed, for all his communication skills, the president has failed to create an attainable vision of a stronger, wealthier America with better jobs, more wealth and improved infrastructure. Roosevelt and even Truman provided inspiration, too, but they backed it up with practical changes that promised improvements in the day-to-day lives of most Americans.

    These hard times require tangible solutions to basic economic problems. Rather than worry about the generally clueless Republicans, the administration should focus on building a legacy as real and long-lasting as the one left behind by the WPA and CCC.

    More than a mere matter of building roads and bridges and increasing access to cheap energy, the WPA was about restoring a collective spirit, a shared stake, in constructing the sinews of a more competitive, prosperous country. Unfortunately, amidst the confused priorities of this administration, such bold initiatives remain but distant possibilities.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.