New Geography

Tag: Financial Crisis

  • What Way for the Stimulus? Post-Industrial America vs. Neo-Industrial America

    As a result of the economic crisis, there is a broad consensus in favor of large-scale public investment in infrastructure in the U.S., both as part of a temporary stimulus program and to promote long-term modernization of America’s transportation, energy, telecom and water utility grids. But this momentary consensus masks the continuing disagreement on whether the U.S. government can legitimately promote American industries, and, if so, which industries. This is a problem for infrastructure policy, because different national infrastructures correspond to different national economic strategies.

    Consider the antebellum U.S. in Henry Clay’s American System: federal infrastructure investment in canals and later railroads (“internal improvements”) was part of a package that included import-substitution tariffs to protect infant U.S. industries from British competition. For Clay and his Whig allies and followers, including future Republicans such as Abraham Lincoln, internal improvements and tariffs were not ends in themselves. They were instruments to be used in the pursuit of the Whig-Republican vision of a decentralized, mixed industrial and agricultural economy where business owners, mostly small, and free workers, mostly prosperous, could realize the utopia of Clay’s “self-made man.”

    From Thomas Jefferson to Jefferson Davis, the Southern planters who opposed such ambitious schemes had no objection to infrastructure as such. They favored infrastructure tailored to suit the needs of their semi-colonial slave plantation economy, based on exports of cotton and other commodities to British and Western European factories. Local wharves and harbors that facilitated the shipment of crops to industrial Britain were acceptable to the planters. They opposed infrastructure that would encourage industrialization in the South or the U.S. as a whole, out of fear that urbanization and industrialization would threaten their local dominance over both black slaves and poor white yeoman farmers. They also feared they would be marginalized in national politics – as they indeed were – by industrialists, merchants and financiers.

    Today, the rivalry is not between the champions of an industrial America and an agrarian America. Rather, it is a rivalry between the champions of a neo-industrial America, which includes world-class industrial agriculture, and a post-industrial America, in which most if not all manufacturing and even agriculture will be outsourced. In this formulation, post-industrial America emerges as a consumerist paradise populated by investors, executives of multinational companies, rentiers, realtors, government and nonprofit bureaucrats, and a supporting cast of service sector proletarians including nursing aides, nannies, gardeners, security guards and restaurant and hotel workers.

    Just as there was one logical infrastructure for the industrializing North and one for the anti-industrial plantation South in the nineteenth century, so in the twenty-first century a different infrastructure would be appropriate, depending on whether the goal is a post-industrial America or a neo-industrial America.

    A post-industrial infrastructure can be simple, local and substantially foreign.

    The post-industrial infrastructure can be simple since it involves little more than the roads and harbors needed to bring in high-value-added imports from abroad and ship out low-value-added American commodities. Adequate harbors are necessary, as are adequate highways to help ship U.S. soybeans and timber to industrial Asia while bringing Chinese, Japanese and Korean goods to Wal-Marts for distribution.

    The post-industrial infrastructure can also be local. Just as the Southern planters were indifferent or hostile to regional or national infrastructure projects, so the elites of the service sector are interested chiefly in the infrastructure needs of the half dozen or so coastal megalopolitan areas where they live. Many favor high-speed rail to connect nearby big cities on the coasts, while denouncing federal investment in non-metropolitan areas as boondoggles. The FIRE (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) economy of post-industrial America could function reasonably well as long as a handful of colossal city-states – Boswash, Northern California, Greater LA, the Texas Triangle – had state-of-the-art local telecom and transportation and energy grids. So what if the rest of the continent decayed?

    Finally, the post-industrial infrastructure can be largely foreign. Most of the urban service sector elite favors both outsourcing American industry and importing a new metropolitan immigrant proletariat willing to work for lower wages and fewer benefits than native Americans. To be sure, someone must build the components of the metro infrastructure and put them in place. But steel can be shipped in from Asia and assembled in New York, San Francisco, Atlanta, Chicago and Houston by immigrants, legal or illegal. Better yet, the metro-supportive infrastructure can be leased or permanently sold to foreign consortiums and even foreign sovereign wealth funds, in order to avoid the need to raise taxes to pay for upfront costs or repay bonds over the long term. The “leakage” of federal stimulus spending to benefit Chinese factories, law-breaking Latin American illegal immigrants and petrostate sovereign wealth funds will not bother elites who are not only post-industrial but to a large extent too sophisticated to worry about narrow patriotism.

    If the infrastructure of a post-industrial America would be simple, local and largely foreign, the infrastructure of a neo-industrial America should be complex, national and predominantly American.

    A neo-industrial infrastructure necessarily must be complex, because the purpose of a neo-industrial infrastructure would be onshoring – arresting and in some cases reversing the transfer of high-value-added manufacturing and services to other countries. This requires something more than freight rail bringing Chinese imports to Wal-Mart and airports helping to deliver Amazon.com boxes to urban apartments. It requires an infrastructure tailored to the needs of an entire complex ecosystem of factories, design offices, and their suppliers and contractors. And that infrastructure not only must be rebuilt in existing industrial areas like Detroit but also built from scratch in areas such as the Great Plains. It would aim to put many of tomorrow’s factories and research parks in today’s depopulating rural areas and derelict inner cities.

    A neo-industrial infrastructure must be national and inclusive in scope. Its goal resonates with the aspiration of Henry Clay Whigs, Lincoln Republicans and William Jennings Bryan Populists – a decentralized, prosperous middle-class society of small and medium-sized towns as opposed to a country where half a billion people are crammed into a few plutocratic megacities and forced to live in dense apartment blocks.

    Such decentralization – contrary to the claims of some urbanists and greens – need not mean excessive “sprawl.” This is still a very large country with lots of land, as anyone who spends time away from the coasts recognizes.

    But more important, there can only be an independent middle-class majority in a United States with 400 or 500 million people in 2050 if most Americans live and work in relatively low-density areas where homes are affordable and small business rents are not crippling. That means building new towns and new industrial centers away from the existing ones, to spread out the population and accommodate tens of millions of new immigrants with desirable skills. The rich, who will remain concentrated in a few metro areas, where they can socialize, compete and conspire with one another, must be taxed by the federal government to subsidize the infrastructure of the entire continental U.S., not just their own cities, metro areas and states.

    Last but not least, a neo-industrial infrastructure must be predominantly national with respect to its components and its workforce. It would be self-defeating to design an infrastructure friendly to American industries and workers and then hire foreign industries and foreign workers to build it. Most or all federal infrastructure spending should be reserved for corporations and suppliers whose high-value-added production takes place on American soil. And all jobs directly or indirectly related to infrastructure construction should be reserved for citizens or legal immigrants. Law-abiding American citizens should not be taxed to subsidize law-breaking illegal immigrant workers and the unpatriotic, criminal contractors who employ them. This is not “nativism.” The right kind of legal immigration would be an important part of any neo-industrial strategy, as would taking advantage of foreign direct investment by foreign companies and sovereign wealth funds in mutually beneficial ways.

    The debate about infrastructure, then, is also a debate about the future industrial profile of America. Will America in the twenty-first century be neo-industrial or post-industrial? This debate, in turn, may well determine whether the U.S. will become a decentralized, continental middle-class society or a collection of plutocratic, hierarchical city-states. The stakes could not be higher.

    Michael Lind is Whitehead Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation and Director of the American Infrastructure Initiative.

  • Should We Bailout Geithner Too?

    This morning the Senate Finance Committee approved the nomination for treasury secretary of Timothy F. Geithner, head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Geithner is a Wall Street darling, but taxpayers may have a different take. Senator Jim Bunning (R-KY) reminded us at the Senate confirmation Hearing January 20 that Geithner was part of every bailout and every failed policy put forth by the current Treasury secretary. After you read this, you should begin to see why I’m so opposed to Geithner’s appointment – I don’t want the fox any closer to the hen house than he already is.

    For starters, look at what the Fed has admittedly been up to – this is from a recent speech by the President of the San Francisco Fed, Janet Yelin. The Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Fed to lend to “individuals, partnerships, or corporations” in extraordinary times. For the first time since the Great Depression, the Fed is invoking this authority to make direct loans to subprime borrowers – that is, those who can’t get credit from a bank.

    Basically, the New York Fed, under Geithner’s direction, created a couple of special companies so they could print money to get around restrictions on what the Fed can do directly. Now, be perfectly clear on this first point – this is not Treasury or TARP or Congress that’s spending this money. It’s the Federal Reserve. They don’t have to ask Congress for money, they just print it. The Fed is providing “credit to a broad range of private borrowers.” And by-and-large, they don’t have to tell you who they give the money to, either. Here’s how Yelin put it:

    “It is worth noting that, as the nation’s central bank, the Fed can issue as much currency and bank reserves as required to finance these asset purchases and restore functioning to these markets. Indeed, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has already ballooned from about $900 billion at the beginning of 2008 to more than $2.2 trillion currently—and is rising.”

    Notice how easy it is to double our money – they just keep the printing presses running. In fact, the recent expansion is extraordinary. Since 2003 the Fed’s balance sheet averaged only $838 billion. So this doubling has all taken place in the past year. In the last recession, around 2002, the Fed’s balance sheet increased by only 13%. If the current recession started in 2007, and if the Fed’s balance sheet is any gauge, then we’re in for much worse.

    Average Federal Reserve balance sheet

    Year

    Reserves

    % change

    2000

    $625,822,500,000

     

    2001

    $653,774,500,000

    4.5%

    2002

    $740,502,000,000

    13.3%

    2003

    $762,853,509,434

    3.0%

    2004

    $803,004,846,154

    5.3%

    2005

    $843,397,519,231

    5.0%

    2006

    $877,922,692,308

    4.1%

    2007

    $907,023,653,846

    3.3%

    2008

    $1,228,848,679,245

    35.5%

    2009

    $2,175,364,000,000

    77.0%
    2000-2002 are for last 2 weeks only; 2009 is for first 2 weeks only. Data available from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/hist/

    Where are they spending all this cash? You probably didn’t hear that the Fed started buying commercial paper through these “private-sector vehicle[s]” created to sidestep an act of Congress. (Commercial paper is the short term debt of corporations.) Another thing you aren’t hearing about is that back in November 2008, the Fed bought $600 billion of mortgage-backed securities from AIG. This action, if taken without subterfuge, would not be legal. The Federal Reserve Act limits the Fed to buying securities that were issued or guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury or U.S. agencies. In order for the Executive Branch to get around a limit placed by the Legislative Branch, the Fed got help from the Treasury.

    Yelin laid it out unabashedly: “Cooperation with the Treasury is necessary because the program entails some risk of loss and, under the Federal Reserve Act, all Fed lending must be appropriately secured. The Treasury has committed $20 billion of TARP funds to protect the Fed against losses on the Fed’s lending commitment of up to $200 billion.” Don’t kid yourself: this is a credit default swap on a national level.

    On June 26, 2008, the Fed used this scheme to buy the assets of Bear Stearns. That money went to JP Morgan. On November 25, 2008, Geithner’s New York Fed bought out the underlying assets for which American International Group had written credit default swaps, saving AIG from having to pay off the swaps when the assets failed. On December 12, 2008, they bought more residential mortgage-backed securities from AIG. Those two bailout packages currently stand at about $73 billion. The big ones are those where the recipients are not being named. On October 27, 2008, they bought commercial paper from “eligible issuers.” On November 24, 2008, they bought “certificates of deposit, bank notes, and commercial paper from eligible issuers.”

    In an odd twist of democracy, you can read all about Geithner’s personal income tax problem but you won’t find anywhere information on who is benefiting from this particular bailout money which Geithner is in charge of passing out. The commercial paper bailout from the Fed (this doesn’t include anything that Treasury is doing or that Congress has authorized) stands at $333 billion.

    They aren’t done, either. According to Yelin, there are plans in place to substantially expand this spree of lending, buying, and guaranteeing to include more kinds of assets issued by more kinds of institutions, like commercial loans and non-agency mortgage-backed securities.

    Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) referred to this as Geithner’s participation in “a monstrous act of government intervention and ownership over our financial markets.” While TARP has a Special Inspector General and various congressional oversight duties, similar transparency and oversight does not exist for the bailouts conducted by Geithner in New York. Geithner may be, as Grassley asked him, “the general, drawing on your financial sector expertise, who will marshal the financial troops and assets of the Treasury Department.” But he can’t “lead our nation to prosperity.”

    He couldn’t, in six years, stop the primary dealers in US Treasuries from selling more bonds than Treasury issued. The only way this could go on to the extent that it did, with an average of $2.1 trillion of Treasuries sold but undelivered for seven weeks from September 24 to November 5, is because Geithner did not have the support of the “financial troops” to stop it. In fact, I will suggest to you that this level of abuse, in what amounts to massive naked short selling of US Treasury securities, could only be done with complicity.

    Finally, it is a simple matter to compare Geithner’s activities at the Fed to those of Ken Lay at Enron. Remember all those “partnerships” with cool names derived from Star Wars movies? Geithner’s New York Fed created Delaware Limited Liability Companies with the name “Maiden Lane” which is the Fed’s street address in New York. They are using unregulated companies to make loans and to buy and sell assets completely outside the view of the public. The Senate Finance Committee approved Geithner’s nomination on January 22, 2009 in an Open Executive Session. Geithner has proven he can hide the ball; let’s not let this scheme move to Treasury.

    Susanne Trimbath, Ph.D. is CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services. Her training in finance and economics began with editing briefing documents for the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. She worked in operations at depository trust and clearing corporations in San Francisco and New York, including Depository Trust Company, a subsidiary of DTCC; formerly, she was a Senior Research Economist studying capital markets at the Milken Institute. Her PhD in economics is from New York University. In addition to teaching economics and finance at New York University and University of Southern California (Marshall School of Business), Trimbath is co-author of Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets.

  • Solving the Financial Crisis: Looking Beyond Simple Solutions

    When presented with complex ideas about complicated events, the human tendency is to think in terms of Jungian archetypes: good guys and bad guys, heroes and villains. The more complicated the events, the more the human mind seeks to limit the number of variables it considers in unison in order to make sense of what it sees. The result is a tendency to describe events in the simplest black and white terms, ignoring the spectrum of colors in between.

    This principle can be seen in the current explanation of the financial crisis. University of West Virginia Professor of Sociology Lawrence Nichols has developed what he calls the “landmark narrative” shaping how the public reacts to dramatic swings in financial cycles.

    As Professor Nichols explains, the narrative described by the landmarks can be a contrived and even inaccurate version of history. By its nature, the shorthand narrative is often unable to describe the detailed reality of an occurrence. Much like an interstate highway, the landmark narrative takes the valley pass, avoiding the mountaintops from which the full view of history can be seen and understood. If we move away from the landmark narrative – beyond the highway for a view from the hilltop – we’ll see more of the landscape: enough to make sense of the complicated events that make up our financial environment.

    There is real danger in limiting our view of events to what can be described by the landmark narrative. It’s like describing New Jersey from the I-95 Turnpike: funny enough for late night television but not particularly useful for problem solving. Basing our view of events on the landmark narrative can, and very well might, lead to “solutions” that could prove as dangerous – or worse – than doing nothing.

    Specifically, reactions to the current financial crisis are making their way into popular consciousness, potentially becoming imbedded in unpredictable and usually indelible ways. In a democracy, our elected officials are bound to respond to these shifts in popular consciousness. The constant repetition of contrived and inaccurate versions of events eventually leads us to suffer what Nobel Laureate Merton Miller called “the unintended consequences [of] regulatory interventions.” Austrian Economist Ludwig von Mises, in fact, warned decades earlier that market data could be “falsified by the interference of the government,” with misleading results for businesses and consumers.

    As Americans, we have repeatedly failed to learn this lesson. Throughout our history, Americans have had an irrational fear of finance. Deemed to be too complicated, the field of finance lends itself easily to description by landmark narrative. Quite possibly to our detriment, the rise of the financial sector has been tied to economic expansion throughout our modern business history. The more robust the flow of finance in capital markets, the more robust is economic activity. Our economy, our livelihood and our well-being are inextricably related to finance at home and around the world.

    So what are the assumptions about finance we see today? It turns out many of the assumptions are often erroneous and usually dangerous. The problems on Wall Street, for example, did not stem from too few laws; rather, it resulted from not enforcing the laws we already have. When I talk to regulators and industry participants about problems with fails-to-deliver in bond and equity markets, they often respond that there is no rule against it. Indeed, there is no specific law that says that the seller of stock cannot fail to deliver the shares on the settlement date (usually 3 days after the trade); there is no specific punishment in place. Yet it seems clear that if someone takes your money and doesn’t give you what they promised, this is stealing and there are laws against it. Look at it this way: there is no specific law that says “it is a crime to hit a person on the head with a hammer.” Yet I assure you that if I hit you on the head with a hammer the police will arrest me for a crime. It will have some other name (like “assault with a deadly weapon”) instead of “the crime of hitting a person on the head with a hammer.” But I will be just as arrested. And it is just as much a crime.

    So the real problem here is not a lack of laws, but a lack of enforcement of what already exists on the books. Our reluctance to act on this reality has serious consequences. First, we don’t focus on punishing the perpetrators. Our government says they don’t have time for “finger pointing” because they are too busy rushing rapidly to fix the problem – a problem they have yet to define. So we pour money into institutions, allow huge bonuses to be paid with public money, lavish retreats on insurance company executives – and then insist what we need is massive regulatory reform.

    This has reached the level of absurdity. The House Financial Services Committee held hearings on January 5 to assess the alleged $50 billion investment fraud engineered by Mr. Bernard L. Madoff. The assumption is that somehow we don’t have the laws on the books to prevent Ponzi schemes; in fact those laws have been there for decades. A rash of new laws to prevent such occurrences is not necessary; we simply need to enforce what already exists.

    Yet rewrite we will, and with what may well be reckless abandon. Opening the session, Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski (D-PA), the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, called for Congress to “rebuild” the regulatory system and commence with “the most substantial rewrite of the laws governing the U.S. financial markets since the Great Depression.”

    But this is the wrong approach. The real question isn’t new laws – although that may make good headlines for vote-seeking congressmen. The more basic question should be: where has the lawman been?

    Hearings like this are an integral part of the “landmark narrative.” Unless we’ve learned our lesson, we will be in for a rash of new rules, regulations and legislation paving the path for a future round of financial turmoil while allowing the perpetrators who created the crisis to avoid prosecution. Remember Sarbanes-Oxley, the measure supposed to prevent ill-doing by Wall Street. Passed in 2002, it didn’t seem to do anything except keep accountants and lawyers busy. In fact, it had the unintended consequence of discouraging small businesses from going public because of the extra cost for the reporting it required. Need more examples? Here’s a speech by an SEC economist that explains how regulations designed “to reduce executive compensation could actually increase expected compensation.” I’ve written in the past about “regulatory chokeholds” that make the failures of financial institutions almost inevitable.

    In 2009, we are presented with a new opportunity to display our capacity to evolve beyond the same old pattern of reaction and spurious law-writing. When dealing with violations of the law by respectable and powerful groups (like bankers), we need to consider using the laws already there; it’s simply time to find someone to enforce them.

    Susanne Trimbath, Ph.D. is CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services. Her training in finance and economics began with editing briefing documents for the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. She worked in operations at depository trust and clearing corporations in San Francisco and New York, including Depository Trust Company, a subsidiary of DTCC; formerly, she was a Senior Research Economist studying capital markets at the Milken Institute. Her PhD in economics is from New York University. In addition to teaching economics and finance at New York University and University of Southern California (Marshall School of Business), Trimbath is co-author of Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets.

  • The Leveling of Citigroup

    The idea that Citigroup could support the family by gambling didn’t begin with Robert Rubin. It’s part of a long tradition. What was different in the most recent go-round is that, this time, Citi didn’t invent the game. Of course, once it got to the casino it characteristically placed larger bets than anyone else.

    Word that Citigroup is teetering on the brink of break up brings a certain wistfulness to this former Citibank speechwriter. Not because intensive care is something new for the old bank — it isn’t — but because it ended up on life support by following the crowd instead of leading it. For well over a century, Citigroup and its precursors — First National, the City Bank of New York, First National City, Citibank, and Citicorp — were innovators. They didn’t just overdo the fad of the moment, as they have done with mortgage-backed securities of one sort or another: they created it. They led the Charge of the Light Brigade.

    New York was America’s imperial city, and Citibank was a vehicle for imperial vision by people who lacked imperial lineage.

    When trade followed the flag to Latin America and the Philippines, Citi was there to count the cash. The vision of the bank as a financial supermarket didn’t begin when Sandy Weill stepped into the picture; it had its antecedents in the 1920s when Charles Mitchell, chairman of the National City Bank, merged commercial and consumer banking with his “bank for all”. His vision that was still ruffling feathers six decades later, when senior vice-president Eben Pyne bitterly told me, “Charles Mitchell ruined my grandfather’s bank [Farmers Loan and Trust], and they’re doing the same thing now with these credit cards.” After acquiring Grandpa Percy’s FL&T for its retail customer base, National City stuffed customers accounts with speculative paper from Latin America. Think Bernard Madoff with widows and orphans.

    Walter Wriston was CEO when I arrived at Citi in 1980. Walt used to say that when he entered banking soon after World War II, it seemed like the embodiment of everything dull. Over his next years as Citicorp Chairman, he would certainly turn up the excitement. He pioneered the negotiable certificate of deposit, shepherded the career of consumer banking king John Reed, and above all attacked the regulatory and legal regime that had been erected during the Depression, all under the watchful eye of a portrait of Austrian economist Frederich Hayek on his office wall. The strategy that emerged late in his tenure was known as the “Five I’s”: institutions, individuals, investments, insurance, and information. They wanted to do it all. And to do it, Citi needed to create a level playing field. Other institutions not regulated as banks could perform bank-like functions, while banks couldn’t reciprocate. Merrill Lynch’s money market accounts, which offered interest along with checking privileges, were a case in point.

    The deregulation campaign provided plenty of work for the speechwriting team. Ronald Reagan’s first term, when Adam Smith neckties were all the rage, was a propitious time to turn up the heat. The anti-regulatory fever that we were doing our utmost to spread was more reasonable then than many people now credit. At the time, we liked to remind everyone that the prohibition against interstate banking dated from an era when people traveled by horse. Under unitary banking laws then current in Texas, for example, each standalone ATM required incorporation as a bank. The commercial market allowed corporations with excess cash to lend to other corporations by way of Wall Street, bypassing the banks. It seemed as though any financial company that didn’t have a bank charter was free to poach on bank territory, while we had our hands tied.

    Citibank was constantly challenging these constraints, legally, operationally, and, happily for me, rhetorically. Some of the ideas were just plain dumb. One was a travelers-checks-by-mail scheme that would allow consumer deposits to be collected across state lines. What was missing was any sense that consumers could actually be induced to do business this way; one thing I did learn at Citibank was that consumer behavior often failed to keep up with the brilliance of these innovators.

    There was a pervasive feeling that Wall Street’s profits were unjustifiably high, and that we should be allowed to compete. We needed the regulatory freedom to enter each new line of business that just wasn’t there for banks. If Merrill Lynch could offer interest-bearing checking accounts and Sears could issue credit cards and sell insurance, why shouldn’t we sell mutual funds and insurance policies in our branches? We had machines to do mindless tasks like taking deposits and dispensing cash; why shouldn’t we use our people to do things that only people can do?

    But as we achieved some of our legal and regulatory goals, the true prize only receded. The head of our private banking division once confided in me, for no good reason, “Do you know how hard it is to beat the S&P 500 day after day?” Citibank was discovering, yet again, that it’s hard to make a whole lot of money in banking all the time unless you’re smart and nimble enough to adjust to changing economic circumstances.

    Citibank was nimble of mind but slow of foot. Profitability depended on finding an occasional niche and driving a truck through it, whether it was lending to Latin America, commercial real estate, or credit cards. At some point, John Reed told us that Citibank was a credit card company with six or seven [unprofitable] lines of business. At other times the investment didn’t pay off at all. Remember Quotron, the dominant player in desktop information for brokers around the world? Even the bank’s own due diligence showed that it wasn’t worth the $1.5 billion price tag. But we wanted to buy market share in that fifth “I”, the financial information business. This transaction made Daimler’s acquisition of Chrysler look like the Louisiana Purchase. At the time, there was a former trader named Bloomberg just entering the picture. Within a couple of years, it was his name, not Quotron’s, that sat on every trading desk in the world.

    In the early 1990s, as its stock fell below $10, necessitating a Saudi bailout, Citibank abandoned one of its most cherished traditions, the continuous payment of dividends for more than 100 years. A tradition sustained for many years, as it turns out, by borrowed money, not earnings.

    Fast forward to this week: a lead headline in the New York Times business section reads, “Citigroup Plans to Split Itself Up, Taking Apart the Financial Supermarket”. The playing field is now level. Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Citi have all been leveled by their gambles in the same lousy securities.

    Citibank was always a bi-polar kind of place. It alternated eras of rash and brash with periods of sober and staid, sometimes with new senior management and sometimes with the same team that created the mess to begin with. For now, the mania is over. Current CEO Vikram Pandit, described in the press as a technocrat, has put Smith Barney up for sale. It’s back to basics. Both Grandpa Percy Pyne, and now Grandson Eben, can take time out from turning over in their graves for a little schadenfreude. If we’re lucky, Citigroup will be just a bank… until the next time.

    Henry Ehrlich is a footnote to the financial history of our time. He was a senior speechwriter for Citibank for 11 years, where he served the great, the near great, and the not so great. Among other things, he wrote every speech for the senior bank negotiator during the early years of the 1980s LDC debt crisis. He is author of Writing Effective Speeches and The Wiley Book of Business Quotations.

  • In a Financial Crisis What Happens to the Dog Bakeries?

    What will happen to the dog bakeries? I ask this question, because this line of business (and perhaps many others) escaped my attention for so long. I saw my first one years ago in suburban St. Louis. As one interested in economics, poverty and history, it struck me that dog bakeries represented a perfect symbol for the many “discretionary” business lines that have been established in recent decades in what has been called the consumer economy.

    This discretionary economy consists of businesses for which do not exist in societies with little discretionary income. It includes in its ranks a host of businesses that did not even exist before the last couple of decades, from dog bakeries, to Starbucks, tony cafes, specialized clothing stores and personal fitness centers. While these businesses might have been attractive to the households of the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s, people just didn’t have enough discretionary income to support them.

    Stores specializing in accessories for the bathroom simply did not exist in the immediate post World War II years. There was little, if anything, akin to a Gap store, a Banana Republic or an Abercrombie and Fitch. Few people had either access to or membership in gyms or personal fitness centers. Gyms in those days were often barebones affairs for roughnecks as opposed to the fashionista hangouts of today.

    Even in the 1960s and 1970s, many of the businesses we take for granted today simply did not exist. There were no Starbucks coffee shops. If you wanted espresso, you looked near a college campus or found an Italian neighborhood. Big box stores specializing in pets had not proliferated. Instead there were small stores crowded with everything from hamsters and turtles to birds and bulldogs. I suspect there were no dog bakeries.

    It would be most difficult to reliably estimate the size of the discretionary economy. Much of the discretionary economy lies embedded in the larger service sector. By 2007, the share of private employment in the nation in services had reached 2.5 times the rate of 1947. Within that vast sector are companies which provide goods and services our forebears lived without like gyms, boutique coffee and dog bakeries.

    The years since World War II have seen an unprecedented democratization of prosperity in the United States. Poverty rates have fallen and people live a far better life style than before. This has led critics to complain about the consumer society. For some, this “consumerism” was declared a false god and some even looked forward to a day of reckoning when the nation’s sins of over-consumption would earn it a deserved eternal damnation.

    Generally, these critics lacked a decent understanding of economics. For one thing even the most frivolous types of consumption employ people. When households cancel the gym memberships or have no need of the dog bakery, people lose their jobs. Supporting a nation of 300 million people requires all of the consumption it can afford to provide employment, a decent standard of living, and yes, to reduce poverty.

    So what happens now? If the ‘bubble’ expanded the discretionary economy, what will a prolonged recession do? It could be a mistake to presume that the economic downturn will soon be reversed and that previous consumption rates will be restored. One of the factors different about this downturn is the extent to which it has reduced the wealth of households. The IRAs and investment portfolios that many had relied upon to provide a comfortable retirement have declined steeply in value. This is a particular problem for the millions of baby boomers, who have spearheaded the development of the discretionary economy.

    Now they seem less likely to consume with the abandon they showed before the prospect of running out of money became a realistic one. The coffee at home will be more attractive than the $5.00 latte at Starbucks. Rather than stopping at the canine bakery, people may now choose to buy more prosaic dog biscuits from a supercenter aisle. The recent decision by Starbucks to close 600 stores recently may be a harbinger of things to come.

    But there is more. Boomers and others who have seen their savings devastated could reduce their spending on other items not directly part of the discretionary economy. The wardrobe – you need clothes, but not necessarily new suits every season – may not be renewed quite as frequently. The car may be kept a couple of extra years. This could place the entire auto bailout in jeopardy.

    It would be a mistake to assume that there will be a quick and easy exit from the current economic difficulties. An affluent economy is necessarily a consuming society. Such an economy requires both necessities as well as the frills. It needs gyms, Starbucks, dog bakeries and the rest of the discretionary economy, just as it needs automobile manufacturing, information services and grocery stores. The destruction of the discretionary economy may not be as serious as the loss of homes in Detroit or jobs on Wall Street, but it can not take place without destroying the jobs and lives of people.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

  • A Bailout For Yuppies

    The recent call by the porn industry – a big employer where I live, in the San Fernando Valley – for a $5 billion bailout elicited outrage in other places. Around here, it sparked something more akin to nervous laughter. Yet lending a helping hand to Pornopolis is far from the most absurd approach being discussed to stimulate the economy.

    Some influentials close to the administration may even find the porn industry a bit too tangible for their tastes. After all, the pornsters make a product that sells internationally, appeals to the masses and employs a lot of people whose skills are, well, more practical than ideational.

    As such, they may not even qualify for what is best described as a yuppie bailout, poised to extend the welfare state to the highly educated professional set. After all, George Bush’s bailout of Wall Street has already set a precedent, using public money to secure the bonuses and nest eggs of some of the nation’s most elite professionals. Call it the Paulson principle: In bad times, steer help to those least in need.

    A yuppie stimulus differs from the more traditional approach, which aims to get the front-line, blue-collar types back to work. Instead, it would channel public funds away from those grouchy construction workers – some 30% of whom may soon be out of work – to better heeled, and, in their minds, more deserving “creative” professionals. After all, what stake do the netroots have in making things better for Joe the Plumber?

    In contrast, the yuppie bailout focuses on a sure-fire Democratic constituency, the well-educated urban professional. One advocate of such an approach, pundit Richard Florida, has urged President-elect Barack Obama to eschew crude investments in traditional production and a renewed housing market in favor of goodies directed to what he calls “the creative industry.”

    Florida sees any focus on restoring manufacturing and housing as a misguided rescue of the “old industrial economy,” in which Americans actually made things and other Americans consumed them. Instead, he suggests, “the first step must be to reduce demand for the core products and lifestyle of the old order.”

    So let’s stop worrying about what happens to Detroit, or the crisis in the housing market. In Florida’s view, cars, of course, are demonized as woefully bad for environmental reasons and not particularly friendly to the preferred dense urbanity so attractive to advocates of “hip cool” cities.

    Florida even recommends shifting away from the single-family home, which is also, all too often, in the ‘burbs. Instead, we should develop what he calls “flexible rental housing,” so people can move every time they get new jobs. I think that is what they used to do in Chairman Mao’s China, too, albeit without the granite countertops and a Starbucks around the corner.

    In a yuppie bailout, what spending takes priority? More jobs for academics and educators. Florida suggests we invest in “individually tailored learning.” We assume this means neither home-schooling nor basic skills training but something more like painting and acting classes for tots and advanced “creative” navel-gazing for tweens and adolescents. And, of course, lots and lots of new jobs for well-paid, unionized teachers.

    These ideas should not be dismissed out of hand as the impractical meanderings of a lone scholar. In fact, Florida’s views are taken very seriously among influential Obama supporters at companies like Google as well as by politicos such as Michigan Gov. Jennifer Granholm, who is widely identified as a key Obama counselor on economic issues.

    Nor is Florida alone in his views. Bigger feet among the purveyors of conventional wisdom, like The New York Times‘ Thomas Friedman, also think the stimulus should steer more resources into the public pedagogy. Friedman even recently suggested teachers be exempted from paying federal taxes.

    And it’s not just teachers who would benefit from a yuppie bailout. The economic stimulus, Friedman says, should also focus more on high-tech companies like Google, Apple, Intel and Microsoft, all of which enjoy extraordinary valuations. This reaffirms the Paulson principle with a politically correct spin.

    Politically, a yuppie bailout would certainly appeal to powerful Democratic constituencies, not just the teachers’ unions. Select high-tech companies and venture capitalists can count on new subsidies and tax breaks. Greens and “smart growth” advocates will celebrate if money is diverted from hard infrastructure – such as improved roads, bridges, ports and transmission lines – which they insist would create enough carbon to heat the planet like a toaster.

    This “yuppie first” approach certainly would appeal to many mayors, some of whom are already adherents to the Floridian ideology. They may be further encouraged by a new report by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve called “City Beautiful,” which suggests cities should not promote growth through traditional infrastructure but instead invest in frilly amenities. As a Boston Globe article on the report summarized cheerfully: “Make it fun.”

    Here’s another hint of what might be coming in a yuppie bailout. Providence, R.I., located in the state with the nation’s second-highest unemployment rate, wants to sink money into a polar bear exhibit at its zoo – perhaps so we can see them before they become extinct or go on Al Gore’s payroll – as well as make improvements to a soccer field. Miami envisions spending on a giant water slide, new BMX and dirt bike trails at a local park and, of great national import, a new Miami Rowing Club building.

    Even the once-booming but now-hurting ultimate “fun city,” Las Vegas, wants in on the act. Mayor Oscar Goodman is asking the feds to kick in big time for its new Museum of Organized Crime and Law Enforcement. That’s right, taxpayers can participate in building a monument to Bugsy Segal. And with Nevada’s own Harry Reid running the Senate, the project seems well-positioned to get the “respect” it deserves.

    If Goodman, who used to defend mobsters as a criminal defense lawyer, has his way, it could spark a feeding frenzy for every under-funded tourist trap from Cleveland to Cucamonga. Pork used to mean roads, bridges and ports that, at least in theory, made the economy more productive while providing well-paid work for blue-collar workers. Soon these dollars may instead go toward yacht clubs, art galleries, museums and “creativity” training for toddlers.

    A yuppie bailout is likely to hold more money for Boston, San Francisco and other havens of the perennially hip – all of them Democratic bastions. There’s also likely to be less funding for the grotty suburban towns, industrial backwaters and Appalachian hamlets, all of which don’t usually appeal to the artistic set.

    To an old-fashioned Democrat, this all seems to miss the point. Shouldn’t we be stimulating the places already suffering the most from high unemployment, foreclosures and spreading impoverishment? Where do Toledo, Cleveland or Modesto fit in to the yuppie bailout? As Pittsburgh-based blogger Jim Russell says: “Most of the population will continue to live in ‘Forgottenville.’ Should we just forget about them?”

    In spite of all this, the mounting pressure for a yuppie bailout sadly reveals how the supposed party of the people is being transformed into just a second party of privilege. We should desperately try to create new productive capacity and better-paying jobs, especially for the denizens of Forgottenville. It certainly makes more sense than pouring taxpayer funds into new clubhouses, water slides or even better-financed pornographic movies – however much the latter may help property values in my neighborhood.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Corporate Sponsorship of the Golden Gate, the Ultimate Sign of Failed Infrastructure

    The most anticipated tourist attraction in the city where I live, The Golden Gate Bridge, is a testament to the lasting utility of a well executed infrastructure project. The world’s most famous suspension bridge still serves as the critical artery connecting San Francisco to the bedroom communities of Marin County to the north, where much of the city’s workforce resides. Remarkably, this marvel of engineering was completed in the late 1930s – a time when the U.S. was coming out of the Great Depression.

    The New Deal brought about an expansion of infrastructure that should inspire us. Yet nearly 70 years after its completion, the sobering reality remains: it’s difficult to imagine a project of that moxie being constructed today.

    One indicator of the distance between then and now can be seen in the story of Doyle Drive – the one-and-half mile southern approach to the Bridge. In 1993, USA Today reported that the elevated portion of Doyle Drive is the 5th most dangerous bridge in America. After years of EIR studies and bickering amongst a myriad of stakeholders and governmental agencies, San Francisco voters in 2003 finally passed Proposition K, a sales tax increase ensuring the city’s funding for an upgrade of Doyle Drive.

    Sales tax revenue generated from Proposition K is slated to cover only $67.9 million of the $1.045 billion estimated cost of the project. State and Federal funding has also been committed for the project, yet there is still $414 million of cost yet to be accounted for. Along with hopes of securing additional funding from the Fed, The Golden Gate Bridge District is responsible for providing $75 million for the Doyle Drive retrofit. To meet the cost of this and other projects, such as the addition of a suicide-prevention net, the Bridge District is seriously considering soliciting corporate sponsorship of the world-famous span.

    The appalling fact that corporate sponsorship is on the table for one of the most iconic pieces of infrastructure in the modern world confirms the failure of the public sector in regards to maintaining an aging infrastructure. For the past few years, politicians at all levels of the government seeking office have beaten the drum of tax reductions in order to secure votes, only to find themselves with budget crises on their hands once elected. With city and state budgets strapped, local politicians often look to the federal government in order to help pay for repairing roads and other basic services, not to mention the huge pensions of public employees.

    The other place local governments look for money to balance the budget is from the private sector. In many cities across America, elected officials have responded to these kinds of crises by partnering up with private enterprise to generate jobs and sales tax revenue by developing ‘convention and retail districts’. Oftentimes these developments will also include hotels, luxury condominiums and even sporting or arts venues. Even before the recent economic downturn, many of these developments were representing white elephants, sitting empty while the issues of sustained job creation and infrastructure repair remain unresolved.

    Examples of infrastructure from the past, such as the ruins of Roman Aqueducts on the Iberian Peninsula and the dams of the ancient city of Petra in Jordan, remind us of the great lengths societies will go through in order to function more efficiently. Although today the concept of infrastructure is primarily associated with industrial economies and modernization in the developing world, the truth is that ever since the earliest agrarian communities humans have been building physical systems that harness the powerful forces of nature and make life more convenient.

    Years from now, the built environment of America will provide one of the primary measurements for historians seeking to quantify 20th Century achievements. Today the vast networks of roads, bridges, ports, airports, power plants and water lines built in the U.S. over the past 150 years remains the standard for nations undergoing industrialization. Yet while other countries are busy catching up to the American paradigm, the U.S. system is falling behind. Entropy is setting in, and repeated policy failures prevent retrofitting and repair to take place at a mass scale.

    With all the current hubris surrounding the “New New Deal” proposed by the incoming Obama administration, discussion about the fundamental role of infrastructure seems to be missing from the conversation. Primary focus about the infrastructure package remains on rapid job creation rather than long term economic health. New Orleans remains a grim reminder of how infrastructural failure can destroy an economy for good, and misplaced investments in convention centers and other ephemera have limited impact.

    There has also been much press about a ‘green revolution’. While looking for cleaner alternatives to powering our society is an important issue, there is almost no acknowledgment that the most sustainable approach lies in fixing and updating what is already in place. Already, speculators are foaming at the mouth at what will end up probably being the next bubble – clean tech.

    In the coming days, it will be critical that careful attention be paid to a basic approach to ensure that stimulus money is not squandered on pork. As state and local governments – as well as big business and special interests – vie for handouts from Papa Fed, the United States government must seek ways to allocate funds for maximum investment in future generations.

    This is not to say such investments should not be bold and even beautiful. I know it’s possible every time I look at, or cross, the Golden Gate.

    Adam Nathaniel Mayer is a native of the San Francisco Bay Area. Raised in the town of Los Gatos, on the edge of Silicon Valley, Adam developed a keen interest in the importance of place within the framework of a highly globalized economy. He currently lives in San Francisco where he works in the architecture profession.

  • Tough Budget Math for City Politicians: Bad Economy + Human Nature = More Cops

    Our economy is going to get better some day, step by step. But it’s bad right now, with a full recovery likely a matter of years rather than months away. Public officials should plan accordingly, keeping in mind how the vicious cycle of a bad economy turns typical decision making on its head.

    Start with a look at a virtuous cycle – the opposite of a vicious cycle – for a point of reference. Look back to the early 1990s, when President Bill Clinton got a tax increase through the U.S. Congress. A lot of folks were genuinely concerned about our federal budget deficits and national debt back then. The tax hike signaled that the federal government had grown serious about getting its finances in line. That quelled fears about inflation, and sent interest rates lower.

    The relatively low cost of borrowing benefited businesses just as new strides in technology were reshaping our lives and helping keep inflation in check. The tech sector’s growth sparked other segments of the economy, leading to more payroll taxes, sales taxes, property taxes, capital gains taxes, etc. The federal budget came into balance, and then went into surplus. Public officials had plenty to divvy up from the virtuous cycle.

    Now we face a vicious cycle. Tapped-out consumers stop spending. Companies cut back on orders and production and payrolls. Weakness leads to more weakness. Jobs keep disappearing. Government revenues decline at every level. Budget deficits abound.

    Elected officials in Los Angeles should beware as they seek to meet those deficits with budget cuts, however. The vicious cycle is in full swing. Plenty of folks are desperate to hang on to their house, make their rent, or just get their next meal. Desperate individuals sometimes take desperate actions. Some of them lie, cheat, steal – and worse.

    This trend holds the potential to tear apart our social fabric. Examine past periods of economic hardship and you’ll see that some folks fall into cynicism, looking beyond government institutions for leadership. Some are drawn to what appears to be strong leadership but is really a criminal element sophisticated enough to exploit stress points in our societal sense of right and wrong. Yesterday’s gangsters could quickly become today’s folk heroes in a tough economy.

    That’s a particularly vicious cycle, and it will take an increased commitment to public safety to head off any such erosion to our social compact amid the current downturn.

    Now is the time for elected officials to trade across-the-board mentalities on budget cuts for a sharpened sense of priorities. They should heed the vicious cycle and find money for more cops to help keep the cynics and criminals at bay while the rest of us make an honest effort to slug our way through tough times.

    The everyday working folks and business owners who will ultimately pull us out of this mess deserve that much cover.

    The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), meanwhile, has earned the assumption that properly trained and appropriately deployed cops can do more than simply react to crimes once they have occurred. The LAPD’s recent record has earned a place for the notion that good police work can not only prevent crimes but also dispel any atmosphere of lawlessness that might otherwise take hold – with safeguards on civil liberties in place all the while.

    Indeed, it’s true that the rugged economy is pushing some of our people a rung or two down the socio-economic ladder, and it’s inevitable that some of them will resort to crime. Yet that still doesn’t mean that socio-economic factors trump cops on the beat – or that we must accept lawlessness as a natural and unavoidable by-product of a bad economy. The economic downturn means that the pool of potential criminals will grow, to be sure, but that presents a question of math rather than sociology – and the answer is more cops.

    Just in case that’s not enough, we urge our politicians to consider the bonus that’s in it for them. They should understand just how disappointed voters are with elected officials at every level. They should know that perhaps the best chance for them to recover their standing with the public is to make courageous decisions when it comes to public safety.

    Jerry Sullivan is the Editor & Publisher of the Los Angeles Garment & Citizen, a weekly community newspaper that covers Downtown Los Angeles and surrounding districts (www.garmentandcitizen.com)

  • Daschle And State-by-State Healthcare Mistakes

    Tom Daschle appears before the Senate this week for confirmation as Secretary of Health and Human Services. While Daschle knows his stuff on health care (see his book, Critical: What We Can Do About the Health-Care Crisis), the discussion is likely to be sidetracked by those who champion a reliance on insurance companies, or on piecemeal reform starting with children. Or, as I’ll discuss here, on a wrong-headed impulse to depend on the states to create new health care models.

    Justice Louis Brandeis famously said, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”

    Brandeis’ elegant language has been distilled to the phrase, “laboratories of democracy,” and used as if that’s a good thing. However, the converse also holds: bad ideas can be legislated at the state level and spread nationwide. One idea that continues to threaten to boil over the boundaries of a single state is “universal health insurance” achieved one state at a time. Oregon, Tennessee, California, and most famously Massachusetts have all experimented with versions, and other states have tried variations, particularly with children.

    I’ll get to the more general notion of why I think states can’t go it alone. But for now, I’ll give a quick rundown on how states have tried and failed.

    Critical Mass: Despite recent claims of a 97-percent coverage rate, Commonwealth Care, the Massachusetts plan, is struggling. You remember the Massachusetts plan: Mitt Romney was for it as governor before he was against it as a presidential candidate.

    The plan is a patchwork of good intentions, political and practical exceptions, and as-yet deferred but heavy-handed enforcement. There’s an appeals system, waivers, and “creditability” (this has to do with the comprehensiveness of the policy and the out-of-network charges).

    The crux of the Massachusetts law is a model of administrative clarity. The goal of insuring the uninsured was to be achieved in a couple of ways. One was that if health insurance was “offered by” an employer, the employee had to take it.

    The problem is that “offered by” the employer isn’t a clean standard. Employers might have an insurance plan that’s technically available to employees, but it might be too expensive for them, or for their families. To square this circle, Massachusetts subsidized employment-based coverage if it cost more than a certain percent of the person’s income, and raised the eligibility limits for public insurance. Those without employers were required to buy private insurance, and insurers were regulated to make the policies “affordable.”

    And then there are the penalties: “To enforce the mandate, [Massachusetts will] establish state income tax penalties for adults who do not purchase affordable health insurance….”

    These stipulations raise obvious questions. What is “affordable”? Will residents be penalized for buying a policy too expensive for their family budget? Will insurance companies be punished for selling them such policies (do I hear the words “sub-prime mortgage”?). Will premium arrearages be counted as medical debt in bankruptcy court?

    Alan Sager and Deborah Socolar, directors of the Health Reform Program at the Boston University School of Public Health, damned the Massachusetts legislation with faint praise in the Boston Globe last July: “the best law that could be passed.”

    Calling it “a blessing to 350,000 newly insured people,” they pointed out that a similar number remained uninsured, and that the law often “can’t work” largely for reasons of cost. The mandates, they said, required huge subsidies, boosted payments to providers without controls, and redistributed funds committed to the most vulnerable.

    Not surprisingly, by summer 2008, the lousy economy had begun to take its toll. To shore up the “coverage” rate, Massachusetts has reduced funding to safety-net hospitals, and has even cut millions of dollars from subsidized immunization programs. Patients wait six months for a physical.

    With no plan for reducing medical costs, the state is effectively obligated to bankrupt itself.

    The Oregon Lucky Number:

    Oregon in March – for the first time in more than three years – will begin accepting new beneficiaries in its Oregon Health Plan […] The state will use a lottery system to enroll 2,000 eligible applicants per month for 11 months. Kaisernetwork.org, Jan. 10, 2008

    The Oregon plan had lost two-thirds of its participants since freezing enrollment in 2004 and a lottery was deemed to be the fairest way to apportion openings.

    Government lotteries have been used for everything from real estate in tax foreclosure to placement in magnet schools or, showing my age, the chance to serve in Vietnam.

    Still, why should anyone have to depend on a lucky number to be treated for diabetes or cancer without going broke? If the plan is funded for 32,000 participants out of a total of 100,000 eligible residents, why didn’t they keep topping up as the numbers diminished? Or was there a theoretical break-even point somewhere?

    California Pipe Dream: In early 2007, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger announced a $14 billion program that supposedly mirrored the Massachusetts plan. The plan would have extended Medi-Cal, the state’s Medicaid program, to adults earning up to twice the federal poverty line, and to children, regardless of immigration status, who lived in homes with family incomes up to 300 percent above – about $60,000 a year for a family of four.

    One controversial element called for employers without health plans to contribute to a fund to help cover the working uninsured. Doctors were to pay two percent and hospitals four percent of their revenues to help cover higher reimbursements for those who treat patients enrolled in Medi-Cal.

    The ambitious program died in committee a year later, with legislators from both parties agreeing that it was unaffordable.

    Florida No Frills: A 2008 Florida package would allow insurers to offer “no-frills coverage to the state’s 3.8 million uninsured” residents. Residents ages 19 to 64 could purchase limited health coverage for as little as $150 per month; the policies would cover preventive care and office visits, but not care from specialists or long-term hospitalizations.

    “No frills” works better in airline travel than in health care. You can do without hot meals and pay extra for a headset or a Bloody Mary, but what Floridians will ultimately get for their $1800 a year and up are office visits and preventive care. It would probably be cheaper served à la carte and paid for in cash.

    Hawaii’s Keiki Care In October, 2008, Hawaii dissolved the only state universal child health care program in the nation after only seven months. Dr. Kenny Fink, the administrator at the Department of Human Services, told a reporter, “People who were already able to afford health care began to stop paying for it so they could get it for free. I don’t believe that was the intent of the program.”

    I should say not, but this disconnect between the intent of the program and its result makes perfect sense. Consumer behavior is supposed to be based on rational choices, and those parents who switched seem pretty rational. Hawaii’s solution seems simple and elegant, until you apply some basic laws of economics and behavior. Aloha, Keiki Care.

    Why States Can’t Do It Alone

    Why haven’t any of these state “universal health care” plans succeeded? Probably for the same reason that states can’t be self-sufficient in fossil fuels, or in banking. Most don’t produce their own fuels, and those that do can’t require their use within the state. They don’t print their own currencies. They have to compete with the rest of the world, public sector and private, for energy and capital.

    These are not minor issues with localized consequences. The decision-making alone requires resources that might not be available at the state level. We need national bodies to determine standards, to evaluate technology, and – remembering that Medicaid, Medicare, the VA, and the government employee system amount to around half of health care spending – to decide on the appropriate use of federal dollars.

    A final thought: Each additional set of rules, level of supervision, and geographic boundary may make sense initially. But when the lines drawn become indelible, and the bureaucracies created to enforce them calcify, we move further from the goal of providing health care. Jobs, and their budgets, become ends in themselves. We have to return to our original purpose and ask, “How can we get there?” One thing you can be sure of: it won’t be one state at a time. When it comes to health care, we need more unum and less e pluribus.

    Georganne Chapin is President and CEO of Hudson Health Plan, a not-for-profit Medicaid managed care organization, and the Hudson Center for Health Equity & Quality, an independent not-for-profit that promotes universal access and quality in health care through streamlining. Both organizations are based in Tarrytown, New York.

    Tom Daschle photo by: aaronmentele

  • Moving to Flyover Country

    As the international financial crisis and the US economy have worsened, there have been various reports about more people “staying put,” not moving from one part of the country to another. There is some truth in this, but the latest US Bureau of the Census estimates indicate the people are still moving, and in big numbers.

    In the year ended June 30, 2008, 670,000 people moved between states. This is down substantially from the peak years of 2005 to 2007, when housing prices in California and its suburbs of Nevada and Arizona, Florida, the Northeast and the Northwest reached record heights never seen before. In those years, people could elicit considerable and unprecedented financial gain by moving to parts of the country where the housing bubble had not visited or had done less damage. A household could buy in Indianapolis, Dallas-Fort Worth or Atlanta and save more than $1,000,000 in purchase price and mortgage payments compared to a comparable house in San Diego, Los Angeles or the San Francisco Bay area. In 2006, net domestic migration between states peaked at 1,200,000.

    Still, despite the reduction from the most extreme bubble years, last year’s interstate migration numbers still exceeded those of 2001, 2002 and 2003 and nearly equaled 2004. Lost in the discussions of the decline has been the continuation of a seemingly inexorable secular trend: the continued migration to the “Flyover County” that many of the coastal urban elites tend to dismiss as insignificant and even unlivable. What residents of Elitia reject, millions are embracing.

    Can 3,500,000 Movers be Wrong? The new data shows a strong trend of domestic migration to Flyover Country. Between 2000 and 2008, 3,500,000 residents moved to Flyover Country. This is roughly equal to the movement of the entire population of the City of Los Angeles. Moreover, the trend has been accelerating. In the last four years, the number of people relative to the population leaving Elitia’s promised lands has increased by 60 percent.

    The Lost Empire: New York has lost residents at a rate exceeding that of any other state or the District of Columbia. Not even the destructive winds of Katrina and Rita, the malfeasance of the Army Corps of Engineers or even mis-governance – from Washington to Baton Rouge and New Orleans itself – could drive people out as effectively as the Empire State. New York has lost 1,575,000 domestic migrants since 2000, nearly equal to the population of Manhattan.

    New York’s net domestic migration loss is equal to 8.1 percent of its 2000 population, compared to Louisiana’s 7.1 percent loss. New York has even outdone that perpetual exporter of residents, the District of Columbia, which lost a mere 7.6 percent through domestic migration.

    From Golden State to Fool’s Gold State: Then there is California, which has added more people over the past 50 years than live in Australia. How things have changed. Early in the decade, the Golden State was suffering somewhat modest domestic migration losses. But by 2005, with house prices escalating wildly relative to incomes, California won the race to the bottom. Each year since then, California has driven away more people than any other state.

    What’s Right with Pennsylvania: There are anomalies, however. One of the leading parlor games is “what’s wrong with Pennsylvania” stories. From the Philadelphia Inquirer to Washington’s Brookings Institution, there has probably been more hand wringing about Pennsylvania than about all other states combined. Yet things have changed materially, and largely for the better. Although Pennsylvania continues to lose domestic migrants, the rate has been far less than elsewhere in the Northeast. Between 2000 and 2008, Pennsylvania lost less than 50,000 domestic migrants. Its neighboring states – New York, New Jersey, Maryland and Ohio (Delaware and West Virginia have had small gains) – have lost more than 2,300,000 domestic migrants or nearly 50 domestic migrants for every one leaving Pennsylvania. Among states with more than 10,000,000 population, only Florida and Texas have done better in domestic migration than Pennsylvania.

    That’s pretty good company for a state so many have declared to be on life support. Indeed, it is time to ask “what’s right about Pennsylvania?” One answer might be that Pennsylvania home prices did not explode relative to incomes (a distortion avoided because of Pennsylvania’s generally more liberal land use regulations). The American Dream – at least for those who are aspiring to achieve it – has shifted from New York, New Jersey and Maryland to Pennsylvania. This is evident from the housing construction on the west bank of the Delaware River and just over the Maryland line in York, Adams and Franklin counties.

    Florida: A Changing Story: Flyover Country’s gains are impressive. Florida has attracted the largest number of residents from other states, at 1,250,000 since 2000. This amounts to a 7.6 percent increase compared to the state’s 2000 population. However, things are changing. As the state’s housing became unaffordable, domestic migration dropped and then stopped. By 2007, domestic migration fell more than 80 percent from average of earlier years. Then, Florida slipped into a loss of 9,000 domestic migrants in 2008.

    Southern Gains: The rest of the South generally avoided the worst of the housing bubble. Texas has added 700,000 domestic migrants since 2000. The state displaced Florida as the leading destination for domestic migrants and has held that position since 2006. North Carolina has added 580,000 domestic migrants; Georgia added 525,000, South Carolina 270,000 and Tennessee 240,000. Even Arkansas and Alabama, although held in low esteem on the coasts, gained more domestic migrants than any state in the Northeast.

    Escaping from California: Nevada has been a big draw for domestic migration, adding 365,000 new residents. This is 18.3 percent of its 2000 population, the highest rate in the nation. Arizona added 700,000, or 13.7 percent of its population. Much of this growth has been driven by Californians fleeing out of control housing prices, though their own more recently developing bubbles have probably contributed to somewhat reduced domestic migration gains In recent years.

    Basket Cases in Flyover Country: However, not all is well in Flyover Country. Michigan lost 109,000 residents to other states in 2008 alone, for the deepest percentage loss in the nation (1.1 percent). Since 2000, Michigan experienced a 4.7 percent domestic migration loss, equal to the decline in Massachusetts. Further, based upon current rates, Michigan next year will probably be the first state to ever drop from above to below 10,000,000 residents. Illinois and Ohio have also suffered substantial domestic migration losses, at 4.6 percent and 3.0 percent respectively.

    Where from Here? It is, of course, impossible to tell whether these trends will continue. Domestic migration could fall even more precipitously if economic times continue to worsen.

    We cannot predict whether seemingly unlikely trends, such as net in-migration to South Dakota and West Virginia, will continue in the longer run. Will Florida’s losses continue or intensify, or will it resume its position as a magnet for residents of other states? Has the magnet of California truly lost its attraction? Will the improving trends in the Midwest begin to make up for half a century of migration losses? Only time will tell.

    Resource: State Population & Migration: 2000-2008 (http://www.demographia.com/db-statemigra2008.pdf)

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”