New Geography

Tag: Financial Crisis

  • Surprise! For Fiscally Responsible, Housing Remains Good as Gold

    Back in 2002, I compared housing to gold. The surge in home buying in the 2000s looked like the 1970s rush to buy gold. Like the current times, the 1970s were a time of great economic uncertainty, followed by the rapid inflation of prices in the 1980s. Regardless of the actual return on investment, many people bought gold as a hedge against financial and economic turmoil. When Americans bought houses in the 2000s, they believed homes would provide some of that same protection, in addition to being a place to live.

    Today it is fashionable to believe that this shift to housing was a tremendous mistake. Yet our research suggests that, if done responsibly, investments in real estate have continued – even amidst the severe bubble in certain locales – to serve as a decent hedge against hard times. Real estate may have taken a dive, but, over time, the market has remained even further under water. The reality is that the percentage of regular (conventional and prime) mortgages past due and 90 days past due were higher in 1984 to 1989 (average 0.59%) than they were in 2007 (0.49%). The fact that foreclosures in regular mortgages spiked upward in 2007 and 2008 may have more to do with the Failure of Financial Innovation than with the behavior of homeowners. (Notice that the past due rate is historically much higher than foreclosure rate and they are now merging; and that regular mortgage interest rates remain at historically low levels.)

    Let’s look at the record. Since the turn of the 21st century, the net worth of Americans grew six times faster than disposable income. Initially this was more the result of the increase in the value of financial assets than real estate. However, while financial assets dipped in value in 2002, real estate did not, hence the perception that houses could be a better “investment” than stocks and bonds. Real estate values continued to grow at a rate more than twice as fast as income. Last year the value of financial assets dropped 2.9%, but real estate assets dropped by only 1.4%.

    The relationship between real estate shares and stock values has changed direction and become more volatile. From 1945 through 1980, the DJIA moved with household investment in real estate and then in the opposite direction through about 2002. In 2003, 2004 and 2005, DJIA and household real estate moved in the same direction. Now, it seems to be shifting again, ironically again in favor of real estate.

    The stock market was never the “safe” investment. You could have invested in about 400 shares of General Motors stock at $83 a share in 2000; it closed at $3 today (with an analyst’s target price of $0). Or you could have made a down payment on a $315,000 condo in Santa Monica; and sold it this year for $680,000. When capital and productivity are again allowed to surge, we can expect the housing market to rebound first and more strongly than the stock market. Right now even amidst the perilous economic news, we believe the turn back to real estate is just beginning, although the effects probably won’t be fully felt till 2010. We see evidence of potential buyers sitting on the sidelines. There was already a surge in homes sales this summer as some buyers must have judged prices to have adjusted sufficiently in some regions.

    So then the question is: did the New Gold strategy work? Has homeownership shielded Americans from economic uncertainty? We think the answer is – surprisingly – “yes”. As financial markets have become increasingly volatile, regular Americans were able to access the value of their homes. The aggregate value of mortgages increased from 44.4 percent of household real estate values in 2002 to 53.8 percent at the end of the first quarter of 2008. Note that this is not merely a result of falling real estate values. Aggregate real estate holdings increased in every year except for the last one.

    When real estate values slowed down, mortgage values slowed down even more. And, obviously, it isn’t because the bank reduced the value of the mortgage! It can only be because homeowners continued paying on existing balances.

    Before the “subprime crisis”, household real estate values grew at an increasing rate – from 9.9% in 2003 to 11.8% in 2004. But the growth of mortgages slowed from 14.1% in 2003 to 13.9% in 2004 and to 13.1% in 2005 when the growth of household real estate remained constant. What was happening here? I think millions of responsible American households were paying into equity. And when things got tough in 2007, some of them dipped into that equity. Not to remodel the kitchen or to buy a boat; but to expand their small business or start their kids in college. These homeowners are “the rest of us who have been prudent and responsible” as Roger Randall called them in a Letter to the Editor of USA Today (November 11, 2008). Mr. Randall asks the question: “Where can the prudent sign up for rewards?” The answer is: Anyone who protected their credit score over the last 8 years can still get a “no-doc” mortgage and bank credit for their small business. When a mortgage broker I know lamented that he couldn’t write a mortgage for anyone with a credit score under 600, I asked: “If someone has a credit score of 585, should they be buying a house?” Of course, the answer is “no.”

    Sure, you can deride this activity as Americans “treating their homes like piggy banks.” But the reality is that millions of Americans planned it this way. With a fiscally responsible approach to homeownership and financing, they have been and will continue to be able to insulate themselves from the worst of economic times. Good as Gold!

    Susanne Trimbath, Ph.D. is CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services. Dr. Trimbath’s credits include appearances on national television and radio programs. Dr. Trimbath is a Technical Advisor to the California Economic Strategy Panel and Associate Professor of Finance and Business Economics at USC’s Marshall School of Business. Dr. Trimbath was formerly Senior Research Economist at the Milken Institute and Senior Advisor on the Russian capital markets project for KPMG.

  • Will we be over-stimulated?

    Stimulus fever is in the air, and with the election of Sen. Barack Obama to become the 44th US president, it’s now reaching a fever pitch. US automakers have already made the rounds on Washington DC, meeting with Congressional leadership to generate political support for another $25 billion in government subsidy to avoid bankruptcy. Now, congressional leaders and some economists are clamoring for $150 billion to $300 billion in additional stimulus to goose the national economy – all this on top of the $700 billion financial services “rescue package” passed in October.

    Harking back to the days of the Great Depression, many policymakers see transportation spending in roads, highways, and transit as an effective job creation program. Indeed, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials has identified 3,109 “ready to go projects” worth $18.4 billion that could, in theory, produce 644,000 jobs.

    That’s more than double the number of jobs that disappeared in October according to the U.S. Department of Labor. Unemployment edged up to 6.5% in October as the economy shed 240,000 jobs. The number of employed has fallen by 1.2 million workers since the beginning of the year. Meanwhile, wages for those with jobs increased an average of 3.5% over the last year, significantly lagging inflation (for urban consumers) of 5.3% during the same period. More than half of that fall occurred in September, October, and November.

    These numbers embolden economists and pundits alike. Paul Krugman, writing in the New York Times, advises President-elect Obama to be bold and audacious in his fiscal stimulus:

    “My advice to the Obama people is to figure out how much help they think the economy needs, then add 50 percent. It’s much better, in a depressed economy, to err on the side of too much stimulus than on the side of too little. In short, Mr. Obama’s chances of leading a new New Deal depend largely on whether his short-run economic plans are sufficiently bold. Progressives can only hope that he has the necessary audacity.”

    Krugman’s observation is an extraordinary statement because little evidence exists that this kind of discretionary fiscal policy has a meaningful impact on the economy. Alan Aurbach, one of the nation’s leading macroeconomic policy experts and an economist at the University of California at Berkeley, examined fiscal policy during the 1980s, 1990s and early part of 2000s and concluded:

    “There is little evidence that discretionary fiscal policy has played an important stabilization role during recent decades, both because of the potential weakness of its effects and because some of its effects (with respect to investment) have been poorly timed.”

    Where fiscal policy has been effective it’s been through “automatic stabilizers”– programs such as social security and unemployment insurance that maintain income levels regardless of current economic conditions. Of course, these programs are not discretionary—they are ongoing programs resistant to manipulation by politicians responding to the immediate political climate.

    In short, a blanket infusion of cash through a one-time (or two or three) Congressional stimulus package(s) focused on transportation is not likely to be effective. This is true for a number of reasons. The key should not be how many miles of concrete we pour, or even how many jobs we create. Instead the focus should be on how much the investment creates a more productive and globally competitive American economy.

    It’s true transportation spending will ramp up construction jobs, but these are temporary ones that provide little stimulus to the advanced service, information technology, and manufacturing jobs that are critical to the long-term growth of the US economy. In addition, construction jobs tend to be seasonal, hardly the type of job creation that builds long-term economic expansion.

    More substantively, the transportation needs of a globally competitive, service-based economy differ fundamentally from those of the industrial economy that benefited so much from federal highway largess in the 20th century.

    In the 1950s, transportation investment was rather straightforward. Mobility was relatively low and restricted. Most households owned a car, but usually just one. Most households lived close to where they worked and walked to meet their daily needs. Typically, the wife stayed home, dropping the husband off at the train or bus station to take mass transit into work, picking him up at the end of the day. Many families could afford to allow one spouse to stay at home.

    A national transportation infrastructure program was relatively easy to identify during this period (even if it was politically controversial): connect major urban cities to create a unified economy, keep freight moving, and ensure workers could get to their places of employment. An Interstate Highway System linking the Central Business Districts of major cities, complete with beltways to shuttle employees and through traffic around these centers, created a highly efficient hub-and-spoke highway network.

    Today’s travel environment is far more complex, and doesn’t lend itself to the hub-and-spoke system. Current travel patterns point to a transportation network that should focus on improving point-to-point travel in a dynamic economy, more of a spiderweb than a hub-and-spoke network, as Adrian Moore and I point out in our new book Mobility First: A New Vision for Transportation in a Globally Competitive Twenty-first Century.

    In an era of customized travel, massive infusions of funding into a transportation network designed for the industrial era won’t be effective. Moreover, the legislative process is likely to be far less efficient at allocating transportation funds in a meaningful way without a system that allows travelers and highway users to determine what projects get the highest priority. What politicians or even federal planners think is important may not be to travelers. Only by adopting the latest and newest technology to gauge user willingness to pay, most usefully through electronic tolling, can the right projects be put in the right place at the right time while also ensuring a sustainable funding stream for the road network.

    Perhaps not surprisingly, economists Clifford Winston and Chad Shirley, writing in the Journal of Urban Economics, estimate that the return on investment to highway spending has fallen from 15% in the 1960s and 1970s to less than 5% in the 1980s and 1990s. They suggest one reason for the decline in productivity impacts has do with the fact that the highway system is already built out. Another reason is that federal transportation policy often targets unproductive investments – such as “Bridges to Nowhere” – rather than high-priority items, reducing transportation spending’s effectiveness at boosting overall economic growth.

    All this suggests that blanket spending on transportation projects may not have substantive long-run impacts on the economy. In fact, it could work against job creation and productivity if the added spending reinforced a transportation network that is already poorly suited to the needs of a modern, 21st century services-based economy.

    Douglas Elmendorf and Jason Furman, writing for the Brookings Institution, report that infrastructure spending has a lackluster record for boosting short-term economic growth. The focus should be elsewhere. For example, we should look more to the longer-term impacts of investments that actually increase productivity and competitiveness.

    Infrastructure should be seen, then, as a way to boost the speed of information and movement of goods, not as a quickie jobs program. Congressional leaders and urban planners should keep these cautionary points in mind as they ponder the need and efficacy of yet another stimulus package.

    Samuel R. Staley, Ph.D. is director of urban policy at Reason Foundation (www.reason.org) and co-author of Mobility First: A New Vision for Transportation in a Globally Competitive Twenty-first Century (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).

  • Two-Timing Telecommute Taxes

    Telecommuting — or telework — is a critical tool that can help employees, businesses and communities weather the current financial crisis, and thrive afterward. However, right now, the nation is burdened with a powerful threat to the growth of telework: the telecommuter tax. This tax is a state penalty imposed on Americans who work for employers outside their home states and sometimes telecommute.

    Proposed bi-partisan federal legislation called the Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act would abolish the telecommuter tax. To help assure that the nation can take full advantage of the economic relief telework offers, Congress must pass this bill – either as stand-alone legislation or as part of a new economic stimulus package.

    Relief for Employees

    Working from home (or alternative sites close to home) can save struggling families money on gasoline, parking, train and bus fares, dry cleaning, business wardrobes and work-week meals. They can save on dependent care by providing some of the necessary care themselves during the time they previously spent commuting.

    Telework can also relieve the considerable strain on Americans nearing retirement who have unexpectedly lost their pensions and must now continue working. Working indefinitely may be a hardship for many older employees. Some may not be able, physically, to continue making a daily round-trip commute. Some may need to move closer to their adult children who live out-of-state, either to receive physical help from them, or to help them with child-care costs by baby-sitting. If Americans who have been robbed of their retirements can work from home at least some of the time, they can stay on the job without having to travel as often or live as close to their offices.

    Relief for Employers

    Employers (both public and private) can use telework to slash real estate and energy expenses. When fewer employees work on-site every day, employers need to rent, heat, cool and light less office space.

    Implementing telework can also reduce recruitment and turnover costs: Employers offering flexibility can attract top-tier candidates from a wide geographic area, and generate loyalty among valued employees.

    Telework can reduce business interruption costs when an emergency or other major disruption occurs near the main office. If, for example, a severe storm, fire, bomb threat or transit strike affects the employer’s area, a staff trained to work remotely can keep operations running smoothly.

    And organizations adopting telework can become more productive. Employees can replace commute time with work time; concentrate better because they are less exposed to the frequent interruptions typical in busy offices; reduce absenteeism by completing tasks at home instead of taking whole days off when they have to meet non-work responsibilities, like caring for sick children, and reduce “presenteeism”, the phenomenon of employees showing up at the office when they are too sick to be productive and are likely to compromise the health and productivity of co-workers.

    Relief for Communities

    Telework can bring new Internet-based jobs to rural areas with sagging economies. It can also bring new home buyers to such regions: Americans who want to maintain their high paced, big-city careers in a slower paced, more scenic environment. A significant growth in the population of home-based workers in these communities can also produce growth in businesses catering to their needs, such as home office supply stores and business service providers.

    The Telecommuter Penalty Tax

    Despite the important help telework can provide during and after the financial meltdown, states may punish nonresident teleworkers by subjecting them to a telecommuter tax. New York has been particularly aggressive on this front.

    Under the “convenience of the employer” rule, when a nonresident of New York and his New York employer agree that the employee may sometimes work from home, New York will tax him on his entire income, both the income he earns when he works in New York, and the income he earns when he works at home, in a different state. Because telecommuters’ home states can also tax the wages telecommuters earn at home, they are taxed twice on those wages.

    In some cases, a telecommuter’s home state may give him a credit for the taxes he pays New York on the income he earns at home. However, even in such cases, the employee may be penalized for telecommuting. When New York taxes income at a higher rate than the home state, the telecommuter must pay taxes on his home state income at the higher rate.

    By subjecting nonresident employees to double or excessive taxation if they telecommute, a state like New York needlessly limits the strategies available for coping with our ailing economy.

    Harm to Employers

    By deterring telework, the telecommuter tax frustrates businesses trying to decentralize their workers and prevents them from exploiting telework’s business benefits.

    In addition, the hefty payroll obligations the telecommuter tax imposes on businesses can force companies to relocate. Indeed, The New York Times reported this year on a small business that planned to leave New York because tackling the state’s claims under the convenience of the employer rule proved too draining. (See David S. Joachim, “Telecommuters Cry ‘Ouch’ to the Tax Gods,” The New York Times, Special Section on Small Business, Feb. 20, 2008.)

    Further, by thwarting the growth of telework, the telecommuter tax encourages traffic congestion, a menace to productivity. Excessive traffic can, for example, cause employees to arrive late for work and delay customer deliveries.

    Harm to States

    In addition to employees and employers, telecommuters’ states of residence also suffer under the telecommuter tax. Consider a Virginia resident who telecommutes most of the time to his New York employer. If Virginia grants the telecommuter a credit for taxes paid to New York on his home state income, Virginia forfeits its tax revenue to New York. In so doing, Virginia effectively subsidizes public services in New York (like transportation, police, fire and other emergency services) while it makes the same services available to its resident who is working in Virginia. States currently struggling with steep budgetary shortfalls cannot afford to cede their own revenue to other states. The employee who telecommutes, meanwhile, suffers under a reduced budget for home state spending.

    Even the state imposing the tax loses. In addition to driving business away, New York’s telework tax policy can drive part-time telecommuters away. Because the convenience of the employer rule applies only to nonresidents who spend time working in New York, nonresidents can avoid the rule by avoiding the state: They can increase their telecommuting from part-time to full-time, or take jobs in their home states. When nonresidents stop traveling to New York for work, New York gives up the opportunity to tax any of their wages, and New York restaurants, hotels and other businesses lose the income these teleworkers would have generated on their commuting days.

    The Remedy

    The Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act would eliminate these ills, prohibiting states like New York from taxing the income nonresidents earn at home in other states.

    The bill has bi-partisan support in both Houses of Congress, including the support of lawmakers from Connecticut, Maine, Mississippi and Virginia. Outside Congress, the measure has been endorsed by advocates for telecommuters, taxpayers, homeowners and small businesses.

    To help assure that the greatest number of employees and businesses can maximize telework’s economic benefits – during the current crisis and afterward – Congress should pass the Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act. Whether as an addition to a new stimulus package or in a separate measure, Washington must see to it that telecommuter tax fairness becomes the law.

  • The Triumph Of The Creative Class

    Barack Obama rode to his resounding victory on the enthusiasm of two constituencies, the young and African Americans, whose support has driven his candidacy since the spring. Yet arguably the biggest winners of the Nov. 4 vote are located at the highest levels of the nation’s ascendant post-industrial business community.

    Obama’s triumph reflects a decisive shift in the economic center of gravity away from military contractors, manufacturers, agribusiness, pharmaceuticals, suburban real estate developers, energy companies, old-line remnants on Wall Street and other traditional backers of the GOP. In their place, we can see the rise of a different set of players, predominately drawn from the so-called “creative class” of Silicon Valley, Hollywood and the younger, go-go set in the financial world.

    These latter business interests provided much of the consistent and massive financial advantage that the Illinois senator has accrued since early spring. The term “creative class” was popularized by former George Mason professor Richard Florida, who used it to describe those with both brainy business acumen and a very liberal cultural agenda borrowed from the bohemians of the ’60s.

    Florida, whose views have affected urban policymakers over the last several years, has attributed these characteristics to upward of 30% of the workforce, basing his figures largely on education. On close examination, suggests Brookings Institution demographer Bill Frey, the “cultural creatives” at the core of Florida’s formulation represent likely no more than 5% of the population. After all, most college-educated workers live in suburbs, have children and even attend conservative churches.

    In contrast, the narrower “creative” group clusters heavily in the very areas–college towns, urban centers, some elite suburbs–where Obama has done exceedingly well from early on in the campaign. Nearly one quarter of the core “creative group,” those working in the arts and culture industries, live in just two cities, New York and Los Angeles.

    Many of these workers are employed by a far smaller, and more influential, base of largely pro-Obama corporate and financial titans who embrace the Florida view that “creativity” can save the U.S. economy. These include the likes of Eric Schmidt, CEO of Google–whose employees contributed over $400,000 to Obama’s campaign–as well as a who’s who of other Silicon Valley oligarchs.

    Obama has also enjoyed almost lock-step support in Hollywood and among the go-go wing on Wall Street. Hedge-fund managers, for example, gave 77% of their contributions in congressional races to Democrats last year, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, a nonpartisan analyst of campaign finances. George Soros, the peculiarly left-leaning financial speculator, has been a long-time financial supporter and a critical ally in terms of funding pro-Obama media.

    Of course, many of these people had influence during the Clinton administration, but not remotely to the extent we are about to witness. Back in the 1990s, traditional business leaders, some of whom had backed the “big dog” back in Arkansas, still had some White House clout. After 1994, they were thick with the Republican-dominated Congress.

    Today the traditional business leadership, like their Republican allies, present a spectacle of utter disarray. The commercial banks have been effectively nationalized. Many traditional manufacturers, notably automakers, also yearn to suck on the federal teat. Reduced to supplicants, these companies have surrendered their standing as independent players. At the same time, the traditional energy companies, long the whipping boys of Congressional Democrats, will be fully occupied trying to survive the onslaught of anti-carbon regulations now all but inevitable.

    In contrast, the creative class comes to power with the wind at its back. Its ascendancy was first predicted by Daniel Bell in his 1973 classic The Coming of Post-Industrial Society as a natural product of the rise of science-based industry. Shortly afterward California’s Jerry Brown became the first politician to recognize this shift, embracing Silicon Valley and Hollywood as a counterweight to the industrial, aerospace and agribusiness establishment that had supported both his father, former governor Pat Brown, and Ronald Reagan.

    In the ensuing decades, the creative class establishment rallied to different political causes and candidates, including Gary Hart’s 1984 presidential campaign and the causes of other so-called “Atari Democrats.” Yet it is only this year that its members have, like the Skynet computer system in the Terminator series, reached a level of consciousness about their potential true power.

    What will this ascendancy mean in economic terms? Since the creative class deals largely with images, ideas and transactions, it’s not likely to focus much on reviving the tangible parts of the economy: manufacturing, logistics, traditional energy and agribusiness.

    On the other hand, the creatives are unlikely to be protectionist since they represent companies whose growth markets, and often suppliers, are located overseas. Heavily counted among the world’s richest people, they are also likely to support some Bushite policies–like low interest rates and financial bailouts–that prop up their stock prices and drive money to Wall Street.

    The biggest difference between the creative class and the old business types isn’t on cultural issues–few traditional CEOs embraced the religious right’s agenda–but on environmental policy. Executives at places like Apple, as well as opportunistic investment firms, have become enthusiastic jihadis in the war against climate change. Conveniently, their companies don’t tend to be huge energy consumers and, if they make products, do so in largely unregulated facilities in China or elsewhere in the developing world. And youthful financial firms looking for the next “bubble” could benefit hugely from mandates for more solar, wind and other alternative fuels.

    All this could prove very bad news for groups that produce tangible products in the U.S. or that, like large agribusiness firms, are big consumers of carbon. Also threatened will be anyone who builds the suburban communities–notably single-family houses and malls–that most Americans still prefer but that Gore and his acolytes dismiss as too energy-intensive, not to mention in bad taste.

    Theoretically, there is opportunity for the Republicans–if they can somehow jettison the more primitive parts of their social agenda and come up with their own bold, environmentally sound energy agenda. The new hegemons could easily be painted as moralistic hypocrites who live the carbon-heavy luxury lifestyle of the super-rich while demanding ordinary Americans give up their cars, homes and even their jobs.

    Yet given the creative class’ increasing domination of the media, and the inability of the GOP to comprehend the changing world around it, such a counterstroke may be years in coming. For the time being we will just have to watch to see if the new economic order can perform better than the now largely discredited old business establishment whose time in the sun, at least for now, has set.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • San Francisco and the Meltdown

    Initially San Francisco and the Bay Area market seemed to be immune to the financial meltdown resulting from the mortgage crisis. After all, the City and its accompanying affluent suburbs had not suffered drastic drops in home prices as seen in many other regions of the country. Yet as the mortgage crisis has snowballed into a complete meltdown of the worldwide financial system, the poster child of the ‘new economy’ now appears less and less immune from the turmoil dominating our news headlines.

    The region that consists of the City by the Bay and the adjacent Silicon Valley is no stranger to drastic market corrections. Silicon Valley was front and center of the dot-com bubble burst at the early part of the decade. As it became abundantly clear that the dot-com frenzy was unsustainable, the region retracted as investment in internet startup companies waned severely.

    This time the crisis is different. The current economic realignment is not limited by region but affirms the global interdependence of financial systems. The Bay Area may sit atop the economic food chain more than most regions, but its vulnerability to the crisis is not necessarily less than that of less elite areas.

    Initially, much of core San Francisco’s resilience to the current economic conundrum can be attributed to the fact that the majority, approximately 65% of the city’s residents, are renters. But the greater Bay Area is being affected in other ways as a result of the financial crisis. As large banks fail, credit gets tighter and consumer confidence slows, business in sectors unrelated to real estate is beginning to be impacted. Case in point is Silicon Valley giant EBay recently laying off 10% of its workforce. Yahoo!, another large Bay Area employer, has also announced a significant reduction in staff. Even more troubling are moves by venture Capital Firms such as Sequoia Capital and Benchmark Capital to force companies in which they are stakeholders to ‘cut costs significantly’. With VC Firms tightening their belts, technology start-up companies, a primary driver of the Bay Area economy, are also likely to cut spending and employment.

    These cuts will hit San Francisco proper, but far less than the Peninsula, where the vast bulk of the tech-related work takes place. In contrast, San Francisco is increasingly a ‘museum city’ for those wealthy enough to afford a vacation home. This will help keep local businesses in the retail, restaurant and hospitality industries somewhat strong.

    The problems in the global, national and regional economy have touched off some alarms at the local level in San Francisco. Last week, Mayor Gavin Newsom announced his own version of an ‘economic stimulus plan.’ Under this plan, the city will lay off some government workers and continue to enforce a hiring freeze. The plan also calls for encouraging more foreign investment to the city. Capitalizing on a drop in lavish vacation spending by local residents, the Mayor is also looking to Bay Area dwellers to consider ‘staycations’ by spending time and money in the city rather than traveling outside the region. In a somewhat encouraging measure, the stimulus plan mentions reducing fees for local business and fast-tracking $5.3 billion worth of capital projects – both steps in the right direction.

    San Francisco’s relative buoyancy in the dire economic situation also can be attributed to the fact that the city has lost much of its once powerful financial sector. In addition, the one financial giant that remains headquartered in the city, Wells Fargo, happens to be one of the U.S. banking institutions faring quite well due to its careful avoidance of subprime home loans. The ongoing strength of Wells Fargo means that more people who work in the San Francisco financial services industry will be able to hold onto their jobs.

    Yet for all the relative good news, it is critical to realize that San Francisco remains an anomaly within the United States and should by no means serve as an economic model for other American cities. Most cities do not have the stunning geography and postcard-worthy locations needed to sustain a tourist economy. The unfortunate reality of San Francisco is that the gap between rich and poor residents continues to grow as the city’s middle class dwindles. Many of the city’s hospitality and retail workers are commuters from outside the city.

    In fact, the situation in San Francisco reveals a growing irony: wealthy, sometimes very liberal bastions often have the least equality. As one of the most unaffordable places to live in the nation, the Bay Area has developed an economy that has little room for the middle or working class. It may have become far less vulnerable to the nation’s economic crisis, but in a manner that neither solves society’s broader problems nor provides a model for the vast majority of American communities.

    Adam Nathaniel Mayer is a native of the San Francisco Bay Area. Raised in the town of Los Gatos, on the edge of Silicon Valley, Adam developed a keen interest in the importance of place within the framework of a highly globalized economy. He currently lives in San Francisco where he works in the architecture profession.

  • No More Urban Hype

    Just months ago, urban revivalists could see the rosy dawn of a new era for America’s cities. With rising gas prices and soaring foreclosures hitting the long-despised hinterland, urban boosters and their media claque were proclaiming suburbia home to, as the Atlantic put it, “the next slums.” Time magazine, the Financial Times, CNN and, of course, The New York Times all embraced the notion of a new urban epoch.

    Yet in one of those ironies that markets play on hypesters, the mortgage crisis is now puncturing the urbanists’ bubble. The mortgage meltdown that first singed the suburbs and exurbs, after all, was largely financed by Wall Street, the hedge funds, the investment banks, insurers and the rest of the highly city-centric top of the paper food chain.

    So, now we can expect some of the biggest layoffs and drops in income next to be found in the once high-flying urban cores. In New York alone, Wall Street has shed over 25,000 jobs – and the region could shed a total of 165,000 over the next two years.

    Not surprisingly, the property crisis once seen as the problem of the silly, aspiring working class and the McMansion nouveaus has now spread deep into the bailiwick of the urban sophisticates. For the first time in years, many Manhattan apartments are selling for well below purchase price, something unheard of during the boom. In Brooklyn, a 24% drop in sales over the last three months even has boosters talking of an imminent “Brownstone bust.”

    Even San Francisco – arguably the most recession-resistant big city due to its large concentration of nonprofits and “trustifarians” – is seeing prices drop for the first time in years. Far more vulnerable are fledgling neo-urban markets like Los Angeles, Atlanta, Oakland, Calif., San Diego, Memphis, Tenn., Miami and Dallas. Sales are down in most of these markets, as are prices.

    Signs of the times: desperate developers offering goodies to buyers. One downtown Los Angeles property owner has even offered to buy a Mini Cooper for anyone bold enough to buy a loft. Others, in Oakland, Boston and Atlanta, are resorting to auctions to offload their product. Foreclosures have taken place in several other markets, including Charlotte, N.C., and Philadelphia.

    Not surprisingly, many new projects conceived at the height of the bubble are being canceled, and some newly minted condominiums converted into rentals. The rental option makes immediate sense but does not help create the ambiance of luxury so coveted by wannabe cool cities. High-end buyers generally do not covet the idea of having a bunch of college-student renters enjoying a similarly granite-counter-topped unit next door. This is not necessarily good news for expensive restaurants or boutiques either.

    In addition, just if anyone is checking, even at the peak of gas prices, there remains virtually no evidence of any massive movement of the bourgeoisie back into the burghs. One assumes that the now plunging oil prices will not hurt suburban commuters.

    In reality, what we have is a market that is stuck in almost all geographies. Rather than shift people into the urban cores, or vice-versa, the mortgage crisis is simply stopping everyone in their tracks. Even if people wanted to move into the core cities, they could not sell their suburban houses to make the down payments.

    Nor is there ample reason to believe the urban migration will pick up in the near future. Crime has soared in some cities such as Oakland and Chicago. (“Obamastan” has suffered more murders this year than much larger New York and Los Angeles.) Overall, urban crime remains three times that of suburbs; a suddenly rising instance of mayhem threatens many urban recoveries.

    And in the end, it’s really all about the economy. The looming massive layoffs in many key urban markets – notably New York, Chicago and San Francisco – cannot possibly help. Finance has remained one industry that has continued to cluster in core cities, even as most others moved to the suburbs and smaller towns.

    Moreover, it is not just New York. Now, as the butcher’s bill for mortgage mania comes due, Chicago, Boston and San Francisco are all facing large-scale layoffs. The office market in the Windy City, for example, is being decimated by cutbacks at JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Wachovia, as well as at the commodity exchanges. So far, the less finance-dependent suburban market appears less impacted.

    A recent visit to Chicago confirmed these trends. The once ballyhooed Trump Tower, once seen as the nation’s tallest luxury condominium, remains incomplete, with a massive crane still perched at its top and troubled by persistent rumors of failing financial support. Another hyped project, Santiago Calatrava’s 2000-foot, 150-story Chicago Spire, is stuck in the ground because the developer has stopped paying his “starchitect’s” bill. All this is not too surprising, given a reported 73% drop in downtown home sales for the first half of the year.

    For a decade or more, city leaders have kept thinking that something from outside – demographic changes, high fuel prices or changing consumer tastes – would create a revival for them. This allowed them to avoid doing hard, nasty things like cutting often-outrageous public employee pensions, streamlining regulations, cutting taxes levied on businesses or improving often-dismal schools and basic infrastructure.

    Maybe the current downturn can be a wake-up call for city boosters. Overall, since 2000, the average job growth in cities has averaged less than one-sixth that of suburbs, according to research by my colleagues at the Praxis Strategy Group. This has been particularly notable in higher-paying blue collar positions in manufacturing and warehousing, but increasingly applies also to higher-end business services.

    Cities should start realizing that their biggest problem is not a shortage of cultural venues and performance artists but a chronic lack of decent, middle class jobs. And to be sure, older cities do possess critical advantages such as already existing, if often tattered, transportation systems and the best strategic locations. Their old industrial districts possess an existing infrastructure and, in some cases, a residual pool of skilled labor and some decent job-training facilities. If properly prodded, local universities could also become part of the solution by seeding new entrepreneurial ventures.

    But such a return to basics may be nullified by the prospect of an urban Democrat coming into the White House and a Congress dominated by the likes of Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Charles Rangel and Barney Frank. This will revive hope that largely suburban middle-class taxpayers will now bail out bloated city budgets and often-absurd projects (convention centers, stadia and associated nonsense).

    City leaders and land speculators may also play the Al Gore card of combating “global warming” to block new roads, single-family housing estates and even the transfer of jobs to the supposedly energy-inefficient suburbs. However, over time, the suburban-exurban majority is unlikely to support this approach. To experience a real renaissance, cities need to learn how to make themselves more congenial again to those – industry, entrepreneurs and the middle class – who have found themselves forced to head to the fringes for almost a half century.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History and is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Root Causes of the Financial Crisis: A Primer

    It is not yet clear whether we stand at the start of a long fiscal crisis or one that will pass relatively quickly, like most other post-World War II recessions. The full extent will only become obvious in the years to come. But if we want to avoid future deep financial meltdowns of this or even greater magnitude, we must address the root causes.

    In my estimation two critical and related factors created the current crisis. First, profligate lending which allowed many people to buy overpriced properties that they could not, in reality, afford. Second, the existence of excessive land use regulation which helped drive prices up in many of the most impacted markets.

    Profligate lending all by itself would not likely have produced the financial crisis. It took a toxic connection with excessive land-use regulation. In some metropolitan markets, land use restrictions, such as urban growth boundaries, building moratoria and large areas made off-limits to development propelled house prices to unprecedented levels, leading to severely higher mortgage exposures. On the other hand, where land regulation was not so severe, in the traditionally regulated markets, such as in Texas, Georgia and much of the US Midwest and South there were only modest increases in relative house prices. If the increase in mortgage exposures around the country had been on the order of those sustained in traditionally regulated markets, the financial losses would have been far less. Here is a primer on the process:

    1. The International Financial Crisis Started with Losses in the US Housing Market: There is general agreement that the US housing bubble was the proximate cause for the most severe financial crisis (in the US) since the Great Depression. This crisis has spread to other parts of the world, if for no other reason than the huge size of the American economy.
    2. Root Cause #1 (Macro-Economic): Profligate Lending Led to Losses: Profligate lending, a macro-economic factor, occurred throughout all markets in the United States. The greater availability of mortgage funding predictably led to greater demand for housing, as people who could not have previously qualified for credit received loans (“subprime” borrowers) and others qualified for loans far larger than they could have secured in the past (“prime” borrowers). When over-stretched, subprime and prime borrowers were unable to make their mortgage payments, the delinquency and foreclosure rates could not be absorbed by the lenders (and those which held or bought the “toxic” paper). This undermined the mortgage market, leading to the failures of firms like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and the virtual failures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In this era of interconnected markets, this unprecedented reversal reverberated around the world.
    3. Root Cause #2 (Micro-Economic): Excessive Land Use Regulation Exacerbated Losses: Profligate lending increased the demand for housing. This demand, however, produced far different results in different metropolitan areas, depending in large part upon the micro-economic factor of land use regulation. In some metropolitan markets, land use restrictions propelled prices and led to severely higher mortgage exposures. On the other hand, where land regulation was not so severe, in the traditionally regulated markets, there were only modest increases in relative house prices. If the increase in mortgage exposures around the country had been on the order of those sustained in traditionally regulated markets, the financial losses would have been far less. This “two-Americas” nature of the housing bubble was noted by Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman more than three years ago. Krugman noted that the US housing bubble was concentrated in areas with stronger land use regulation. Indeed, the housing bubble is by no means pervasive. Krugman and others have identified the single identifiable difference. The bubble – the largest relative housing price increases – occurred in metropolitan markets that have strong restrictions on land use (called “smart growth,” “urban consolidation,” or “compact city” policy). Metropolitan markets that have the more liberal and traditional land use regulation experienced little relative increase in housing prices. Unlike the more strongly regulated markets, the traditionally regulated markets permitted a normal supply response to the higher market demand created by the profligate lending. This disparate price performance is evidence of a well established principle of economics in operation – that shortages and rationing lead to higher prices.

      Among the 50 metropolitan areas with more than 1,000,000 population, 25 have significant land use restrictions and 25 are more liberally regulated. The markets with liberal land use regulation were generally able to absorb from the excess of profligate lending at historic price norms (Median Multiple, or median house price divided by median household income, of 3.0 or less), while those with restrictive land use regulation were not.

      Moreover, the demand was greater in the more liberal markets, not the restrictive markets. Since 2000, population growth has been at least four times as high in the traditional metropolitan markets as in the more regulated markets. The ultimate examples are liberally regulated Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston, the fastest growing metropolitan areas in the developed world with more than 5,000,000 population, where prices have remained within historic norms. Indeed, the more restrictive markets have seen a huge outflow of residents to the markets with traditional land use regulation (see: http://www.demographia.com/db-haffmigra.pdf).

    4. Toxic Mortgages are Concentrated Where there is Excessive Land Use Regulation: The overwhelming share of the excess increase in US house prices and mortgage exposures relative to incomes has occurred in the restrictive land use markets. Our analysis of Federal Reserve and US Bureau of the Census data shows that these over-regulated markets accounted for upwards of 80% of “overhang” of an estimated $5.3 billion in overinflated mortgages.
    5. Without Smart Growth, World Financial Losses Would Have Been Far Less: If supply markets had not been constrained by excessive land use regulation, the financial crisis would have been far less severe. Instead of a more than $5 Trillion housing bubble, a more likely scenario would have been at most a $0.5 Trillion housing bubble. Mortgage losses would have been at least that much less, something now defunct investors and the market probably could have handled.

      While the current financial crisis would not have occurred without the profligate lending that became pervasive in the United States, land use rationing policies of smart growth clearly intensified the problem and turned what may have been a relatively minor downturn into a global financial meltdown.

    Never Again: All of the analyst talk about whether we are “slipping into a recession” misses the point. For those whose retirement accounts have been wiped out, or stock in financial companies has been made worthless, those who have lost their jobs and homes, this might as well be another Great Depression. These people now have little prospect of restoring their former standard of living. Then there is the much larger number of people whose lives are more indirectly impacted – the many households and people toward the lower end of the economic ladder who have far less hope of achieving upward mobility.

    All of this leads to the bottom line. It is crucial that smart growth’s toxic land rationing policies be dismantled as quickly as possible. Otherwise, there could be further smart growth economic crises ahead, or, perhaps even worse, a further freezing of economic opportunity for future generations.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life”

  • Turns Out There’s Good News on Main St.

    As the financial crisis takes down Wall Street, the regular folks on Main Street are biting their nails, watching the toxic tsunami head their way. But for all our nightmares of drowning in a sea of bad mortgages, foreclosed homes and shrunken retirement plans, the truth is that the effects of this meltdown won’t be all bad in the long run. In one regard, it could offer our society a net positive: Forced into belt-tightening, Americans are likely to strengthen our family and community ties and to center our lives more closely on the places where we live.

    This trend toward what I call “the new localism” has been underway for some years, driven by changing demographics, new technologies and rising energy prices. But the economic downturn will probably accelerate it as individuals and corporations look not to the global stage but closer to home, concentrating and congregating on the Main Streets where we choose to live – in the suburbs, in urban neighborhoods or in small towns.

    In his 1972 bestseller, “A Nation of Strangers,” social critic Vance Packard depicted the United States as “a society coming apart at the seams.” He was only one in a long cavalcade of futurists who have envisioned an America of ever-increasing “spatial mobility” that would give rise to weaker families, childlessness and anonymous communities.

    Packard and others may not have been far off for their time: In 1970, nearly 20 percent of Americans changed their place of residence every year. But by 2004, that figure had dropped to 14 percent, the lowest level since 1950. Americans born today are actually more likely to reside near their place of birth than those who lived in the 19th century. Part of this is due to our aging population, because older people are far less likely to move than those under 30. But more limited economic options may intensify this phenomenon while bringing a host of social, economic and environmental benefits in their wake.

    For one thing, they may strengthen those long-weakening family ties. We’re already seeing signs of that. American family life today may not look like “Ozzie and Harriet,” with its two-parent nuclear family, but it reflects a pattern of earlier generations, when extended networks helped families withstand the dislocations of the westward expansion or of immigration.

    With a majority of married women now working, parents are frequently sharing child-rearing duties, and other family members are getting into the act. Grandparents and other relatives help provide care for roughly half of all preschoolers in the country. As the cost of living rises, this trend could accelerate.

    At the same time, difficulty in getting reasonable mortgages and the realities of diminished IRAs will force baby boomers and Generation Xers both to prolong their parental responsibilities and to delay their retirements. This, too, is already happening: According to one study, one-fourth of Gen-Xers still receive help from their parents. And as many as 40 percent of Americans between 20 and 34, according to another survey, live at least part-time with their parents.

    This clustering of families, after decades of dispersion, will spur more localism, which has a simple premise: The longer people stay in their homes and communities, the more they identify with and care for those places.

    This is evident in everything from the mushrooming of farmers markets in communities nationwide to burgeoning suburban cultural institutions. Since the 1980s, suburbs outside such cities as Chicago, Atlanta, Washington and Los Angeles have been building or contemplating new town centers – their own Main Streets, if you will, village squares intended to foster a unique local identity and community focus. Scores of suburban towns have established local orchestras and built playhouses and symphony halls – Strathmore Hall in Bethesda is one example. All this activity has dispelled some of the view of suburbs as strongholds of middle-class torpor.

    “This used to be a place where people went to sleep,” says Patricia Jones, president of the Arts Alliance, a group that helps raise funds for the sprawling, $63 million Civic Arts Plaza in the Los Angeles suburb of Thousand Oaks. “Now it’s a place where people live, work and find their entertainment. It’s a totally different environment. It’s not boring anymore.”

    Not only that, it’s probably more interconnected than ever before. In suburbs and cities from Los Angeles to New York, Web-based community newsletters have sprung up to keep residents informed of goings-on in their neighborhoods and to provide a sense of connectedness. “There’s an attempt in this neighborhood to break down the city feel and to see this more as a kind of a small town,” says Ellen Moncure, who edits the Flatbush Family Network Web site in New York. “It may be in the city, but it’s a community unto itself, a place where you can stay and raise your children.”

    Bolstering the trend are today’s higher energy prices, which make Americans’ old nomadic patterns less economically viable in more ways than one. Take recreation. More and more, says Tim Schneider, publisher of a magazine specializing in sports travel, people are sticking close to home instead of trekking far and wide in search of fun things to do. “Stay cations,” or vacations near home, are taking the place of trips to exotic distant locales. This means tougher times for such traditional tourist hot spots as Las Vegas and Hawaii, both of which have seen a drop-off in flight arrivals due to airline cutbacks. But there’s a moral for cities, says Schneider: Instead of counting on convention centers and arts and cultural facilities to attract outside tourists, most would do better to promote local “place-branding” events such as festivals, rodeos, sports tournaments and the like.

    Higher energy prices may also refocus local economies in unexpected ways. For generations, most Americans have been buying their food from distant corporate providers. But with shipping costs – and food-safety concerns – on the rise, the trend to buy local is moving into the mainstream. In Maryland, the number of farmers markets has grown from 20 in 1991 to 84 today. In 1977, California had four such markets; today it has more than 500. Higher energy costs could also benefit local manufacturers, bringing, say, clothing manufacture back to the Los Angeles garment district from China.

    The final factor driving the localist trend is technology, which has led to a rapid expansion of home-based work and to companies’ setting up work locations closer to where their employees live. The number of home-based workers has doubled twice as quickly in this decade as in the last and is now about 9 million. Nationwide, 13 million people telecommuted at least one day a week in 2007, a 16 percent leap from 2004. And more than 22 million people run home-based businesses.

    A recent study suggests that more than one-quarter of the U.S. workforce could eventually participate full- or part-time in this new work pattern. And over time, it will accelerate localism. Commuting – which became common only over the past century – has cut workers off from the places where they live. Home-based work, by contrast, gives people more choice about where they work and more time to spend with their families and communities.

    Telecommunication allows people who want privacy, low-density neighborhoods and good schools to live in small towns in a way never before possible. It also allows a firm such as Renaissance Learning, a leading educational software company, to set up headquarters in Wisconsin Rapids, Wis., a city of 17,500 whose small-town feeling, broad river and wooded countryside appeal to many workers. “We don’t have any trouble recruiting people here,” says Mark Swanson, the firm’s technical director.

    Yet the desire to stay in the local community isn’t limited to small towns or suburbs. I see it where I live, in California’s San Fernando Valley, or in parts of my mother’s native Brooklyn, where lots of people employed in fields such as the arts, consulting and design work at home or nearby and crowd the coffee shops, restaurants and stores of streets such as Ventura Boulevard in Studio City or once-decayed but now bustling Cortelyou Road in Flatbush.

    In the end, localism is neither urban nor anti-urban. At its heart, it represents something larger: a historic American tradition that sees society’s smaller units as vital and the proper focus of most people’s lives. This made the United States different from Europe, which, as Alexis de Tocqueville noted, has long tended toward centralization of power and decision-making.

    The expansion of the European welfare state has further fostered this trend. But it’s also true that Europeans tend to move less than Americans. And the powerful resistance to the most intrusive forms of European Union integration, such as a continent-wide constitution, suggest that strong localist elements remain imbedded in European communities.

    But if Europe is joining the trend, the United States is likely to be the leader in pushing decentralization. What most impressed Tocqueville wasn’t our large cities but the vitality of our many smaller towns and communities. “The intelligence and the power are dispersed abroad,” he wrote, “and instead of radiating from a point, they cross each other in every direction.”

    Today’s localist revival reflects this tradition, but with the benefit of the great access to the larger world that technology provides. It offers the prospect of an America that, rather than being “a nation of strangers,” can aspire again to be a nation of neighbors . . . in places that we choose for ourselves.

    This article originally appeared in the Washington Post.

    Joel Kotkin is a presidential fellow at Chapman University and executive editor of www.newgeography.com. He is finishing a book on the American future.

  • Beyond The Bailout: What’s Next in the Housing Market?

    The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (we’ll call it the “Bail Out”) was signed into law on October 3rd. This, combined with the new reality in capital markets and current economic conditions, will result in some major shifts in the outlook for housing over the next few years. It is always possible that the federal government will try to do even more to fix what will be an agonizing housing problem over the next few years, but seems unlikely even Bernake, Paulson or their appointed successors will be able to change the basic story line.

    The Credit Market
    Let’s set up the dynamics. The era of easy credit, especially in terms of mortgages and home equity lines, is over. The 2002 through early 2006 period will turn out to be an aberration in history. During that period, about all a person needed to do to qualify for a mortgage was to be healthy. For the foreseeable future, we will see the return of such requirements as a down payment and the ability to repay your loan based on income, along with a good credit history, that will allow a person to qualify. The tighter credit and the slow down of the economy already is making it difficult for all but the best borrowers to get mortgage loans. Thus, the housing market will remain under significant pressure and the excess supply will be absorbed only slowly.

    The Consumer
    Consumers have accumulated far too much debt; they don’t have much in the way of traditional savings; are faced with job declines and declines in hours worked and are also facing a reverse wealth affect (i.e. people tend to spend more when they feel richer and less when they feel poorer). In the 1990s, consumers felt wealthier because the stock market did very well. Studies of the wealth effect indicate that people spend about five cents out of every dollar of increased net worth from stock and housing price appreciation over about a three to five year period of time. In the early part of this decade, not only were housing prices rising rapidly, but, almost unbelievably (in retrospect), easy credit allowed people to use their house as a credit card. The result was a boom in retail spending and home buying. In fact, the rate of homeownership in the U.S. went from a long term average of about 65% in 2002, to a high of nearly 69% in 2006. The percentage of people who bought homes, as a percent of total households, reached a record level.

    Supply and Demand
    Today, there are roughly two million more homes for sale in the nation than normal (4.3 million new and resale listings versus the long-term average of 2.3 million homes for sale). In addition, foreclosures are skyrocketing and are likely to stay high for quite some time. Many recent buyers simply were not financially ready for home ownership’s financial realities. Basic demand has diminished significantly as the number of prospects who can qualify has declined. Put all of these things together and you will have a period where not only will there be fewer homes purchased, but there will be high levels of foreclosures, a decline back to the normalized level of homeownership. There will be fewer people moving (i.e. if you can’t sell your house in California, Michigan or Pennsylvania, you are not moving to Arizona). What this implies is that the demographic demand for housing will be lower than normal over the next few years until the excess supply is absorbed.

    How long will this take? Analysis suggests that it is two to four years away nationally and longer in the bubble states: Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada. All this suggests that as the homeownership rate comes down, more people will be moving to apartments, people will “double up” or move back home. As a result much of the housing demand will be absorbed by foreclosures and the excess existing housing inventory, mitigating the need for significant new housing in the near term.

    If you add this all up, this also means slower growth in what were normally rapid growing areas (like Phoenix) where a full recovery could take four to five years for housing. As the home-ownership – including condos – rate moves back to its long term trends there will be a shift back to apartments.

    Overall, there will be fewer single family homes demanded, more apartments demanded, and the homes that are demanded will be more affordable. The most affordable areas will continue to be at the edge of town. In addition, given how difficult it has been to get the entitlements necessary for new apartment construction in areas like Phoenix over the past several years along with the number of condos that are being converted back to multi-family rentals, rents are likely to increase past 2009 or 2010 as the excess supply of rental single family homes, condos and apartments are absorbed.

    Overall homeownership will still be the American dream, but that dream will not again be something people think about until housing prices stop declining and start recovering. It’s going to be a tough ride, particularly in Sunbelt ‘boomtowns’ like Phoenix.

    Elliott D. Pollack is Chief Executive Officer of Elliott D. Pollack and Company in Scottsdale, Arizona, an economic and real estate consulting firm established in 1987, which provides a broad range of services, specializing in Arizona economics and real estate.

  • The American Dream: Alive and Well (Some Places)

    Even after the burst of the housing bubble, the American Dream of home ownership has remained alive in some places. As it turns out the “bubble” was far from pervasive, and as Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman indicated in The New York Times, the housing price increases were largely limited to the areas of the nation with stronger land use regulation.

    In all, at the peak of the housing bubble, 46 of 129 US markets had house prices at or below the historic ceiling of three times household incomes (see 4th International Demographia Housing Affordability Survey. Before the bubble, nearly all markets were at or below that norm, but many have risen to double, triple or even more than three times the standard.

    The American Dream can be said to have started with William Levitt, who revolutionized home building starting with his huge Levittown, New York development in the late 1940s.

    As Witold Rybczynski wrote in a recent Wilson Quarterly article, new Levittown houses could be purchased for three times the average wage in Levittown. This bought a detached 750 square foot house, without a garage. Interestingly, this was at a time when single-income families were still the norm.

    Levittown is the birthplace of the modern American Dream. It was only after the pioneering model of Levittown that home ownership became the norm by becoming affordable to middle-income and blue collar households in America. At the end of World War II, home ownership in the United States was 40 percent. By 1960, it exceeded 60 percent and since risen to above 65 percent.

    Levittown, and the automobile-oriented urban expansion it foreshadowed, resulted in the greatest democratization of prosperity in history. Wherever mass suburbanization occurred – whether in the United States, its first world cousins Canada and Australia, Western Europe or later even Japan – we have seen the unprecedented rise of a mass property-owning class.

    This economic and social advance was built on liberal land use regulation. It would not have been possible if the policies that have poisoned housing markets from Los Angeles and Portland to Miami and Boston had been in effect at that time.

    Yet there is still life outside the high-priced coastal regions. Indeed in much of the country today, new housing affordability is at least as good as it was in Levittown. Generally, where land regulation has remained reasonable, new houses can be purchased for less than three times median household incomes. Purchasers may need two incomes to get there, but the effect remains the same. Moreover, the houses in these markets generally boast two-car garages and living space nearly double that of the typical Levittown ‘starter’ house.

    The small selection of examples below is limited to metropolitan areas with high housing demand. These are not economic basket cases like those in and around certain old industrial cities. Nor are these places where the market has evaporated because so many people have left or are planning to leave. Instead these are places attracting domestic migrants from other parts of the country (especially from metropolitan areas with strong land use regulation). These listings are the result of a quick search; they may not necessarily represent the least expensive new houses available. Each has three bedrooms and all have two-car garages.

    Atlanta: A new 1,500 square foot for a base price of $130,000 – 2.3 times the median household income View listing.

    Austin: A new 1,200 square foot for a base price of $106,500 – 1.9 times the median household income View listing.

    Charlotte: A new 1,500 square foot for a base price of $133,000 – 2.5 times the median household income View listing.

    Columbia, South Carolina: A new 1,500 square foot for a base price of $130,000 – 2.7 times the median household income View listing.

    Columbus: A new 1,400 square foot for a base price of $130,000 – 2.5 times the median household income View listing.

    Dallas-Fort Worth: A new 1,250 square foot for a base price of $120,000 – 2.2 times the median household income View listing.

    Houston: A new 1,300 square foot for a base price of $100,000 – 1.9 times the median household income View listing

    Indianapolis: A new 1,500 square foot for a base price of $114,000 – 2.1 times the median household income View listing.

    Kansas City: A new 1,200 square foot for a base price of $150,000 – 2.8 times the median household income View listing.

    The list could go on and on, including virtually every area of the nation that has not driven up the price of developable land by land use regulations. The American Dream is alive and well where it has not been snuffed out by economics-be-damned urban planning policies.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”