New Geography

Tag: housing market

  • Home Ownership and the American Dream

    What defines the American Dream? A new poll by Big Builder reveals that one answer to this enduring question may be home ownership. A major portion of the American population (59%) believes that they are living the American Dream. Respondents distinguished owning a home as the second most important factor of the American Dream, just behind raising a family.

    Another statistic in this poll seem to suggest that this trend may be more stifled as the younger generation of Americans (18-29 year olds) come to the crucial decision of buying a home. Still, 49% see home ownership as a “sound investment,” while 49% of this age group call it “too risky.” Perhaps the effect of the weak economy has been especially evident in this age group.

    Some interesting contradictions also arise in these statistics. For instance, 58% of those who believe the housing crisis is a chronic problem also recommend buying a home. Furthermore, 75% of respondents claim to not have benefited from any federal program to assist in ownership (such as mortgage interest deduction), yet 71% confessed to taking the deduction. The pollsters have considered that perhaps the government’s assistance in home ownership may be unclear for many Americans.

    A final statistic worth mentioning is that 58% of Americans believe that fulfilling the American Dream is influenced mostly by their own skills and hard work than by the current state of the economy. The ubiquitous American Dream still runs on hard work and the pressing notion of owning a home, it would seem.

  • Housing Crisis in Australia

    Even if Australia is a beautiful place to live, it is far from affordable. Results from the Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey show that some of the country’s major cities rank near the bottom of the list of areas with affordable housing. Out of the 325 cities analyzed, Perth ranks 291st, Melbourne ranks 321st, and Sydney ranks 324th. At 6.3, 9, and 9.6 respectively, each one has a median housing price to median household income ratio at least three to six points higher than the 3.0 price to income ratio demarcating affordable from unaffordable housing. Compared to these places in Australia, living in New York or London seems almost reasonable.

    Residential property prices in Australia have risen 250% in the past ten years, mainly due to the Government’s concentration on incentives for investors and speculators. A first home buyer’s program and negative gearing incentives for home and property owners have taken a toll on the housing market, creating such “inexcusable” conditions according to Australian Greens housing spokesman Senator Scott Ludlam.

    The 2008 Senate Select Committee on Housing Affordability’s investigation into this issue reveals that the Government spent about $50 billion annually on capital gains exemptions and negative gearing incentives, while only spending $512 million over the course of five years to improve the supply of affordable housing. Rental affordability is not much better, as indicated by the gap of 493,000 affordable and available rental properties in Australia.

    Ludlam and others have started to call this a “crisis,” an adequate term given migration trends all over the world. Cities with unaffordable housing, such as New York, London, and San Francisco, are losing people moving to the less expensive suburban areas. If Australia continues to have housing bubbles and affordability issues, cities like Melbourne and Sydney may experience high out-migration rates in the coming years, which would not bode well for cities on the rise.

  • Miami Condo Price Implosion Continues

    The National Association of Realtors has just published its quarterly median house prices and the trend continues downward in Miami. At the end of the third quarter, the median condominium price had dropped to $82,900 in Miami, about the same as the list price for a BMW-7 sedan. This places condominium prices at 77 percent below the 2007 second quarter median of $367,000.

    While Miami has experienced perhaps the most substantial condominium bust in the nation, other metropolitan areas, such as Atlanta, Seattle, Los Angeles, San Diego, Chicago and Portland (Oregon) have seen huge decreases and a spate of spate of distress auctions and conversion of units to rentals.

    A recent article in The Wall Street Journal noted that condominiums have experienced an even greater market decline than detached housing. The over-building of condominiums may have been spurred by rose predictions from urban planners about the demand for central city housing being far greater than the supply. For example, the developer of City Center Las Vegas indicated that they built too many condominium units, at least in part in response to information received an urban planning symposium.

    Photograph: Condominium Conversion to Rentals in Portland (by author).

  • Misunderstanding the Bubble and Burst in Sacramento

    An opinion piece in the Sacramento Bee by Sean Wirth of the Environmental Council of Sacramento could not have been more wrong in its characterization of the causes of the housing bubble in Sacramento.

    The article starts out promisingly, correctly noting that:

    • The housing bubble spawned the Great Recession
    • Demand exceeded the inventory of houses in the Sacramento area
    • Sacramento prices “soared sky high”


    But it is all downhill from there, with the suggestion that the extraordinary price increases in Sacramento were the result of too much suburbanization (the theological term in urban planning circles is “sprawl”). In fact, all things being equal, house prices tend to escalate where the supply is more constrained, not less. Where suburbanization is allowed, the market can supply enough housing to avoid inordinate house price increases. Where suburbanization is severely constrained, a legion of evidence indicates that house prices are prone to rise. It is all a matter of basic economics. George Mason University economist Daniel Klein puts it this way:

    Basic economics acknowledges that whatever redeeming features a restriction may have, it increases the cost of production and exchange, making goods and services less affordable. There may be exceptions to the general case, but they would be atypical.

    Housing is not atypical and Sacramento house prices soared in response to the tough use regulations. By the peak of the bubble, the Median Multiple (median house price divided by median household income) had risen to 6.8, well above the historic norm of 3.0. Many houses were built, but not enough to satisfy the demand, as Mr. Wirth indicates. Building many houses is not enough. There need to be enough houses to supply the demand, otherwise land prices soar, driving up house prices.

    Unless a sufficient supply is allowed, speculators and flippers will “smell the blood” of windfall profits, which are there for the taking in excessively regulated markets.

    During the housing bubble, house prices rose well above the historic Median Multiple norm only in metropolitan areas that had severe constraints land use constraints (called “smart growth” or “growth management”). This included Sacramento, other California markets, Miami, Portland, and Seattle and other markets around the country.

    At the same time, more liberal development regulations allowed a sufficient inventory of housing to meet the demand in high growth areas like Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston and Austin. In each of these places (and many others), the Median Multiple remained near or below the historic norm of 3.0, even with the heightened demand generated by a finance sector that had lost interest in credit-worthiness. As would be expected, speculators and flippers avoided the traditionally regulated markets, where an adequate supply of affordably priced housing continued to be produced.

    Wirth expresses understandable concern about the house price losses since the bust. From the peak to the trough, the drop in Sacramento median house prices was more than 55%. However, this is to be expected once a serious economic decline is precipitated, especially in the sector that precipitated the crash (in this case housing). Economists Ed Glaeser of Harvard and Joseph Gyourko of Wharton have shown that not only (1) are house prices higher in more restricted markets but also that (2) there is greater price volatility in more highly regulated markets. Indeed, it is likely that the housing bust would have been much less severe or even avoided altogether if constraints on land had not driven the prices and subsequent mortgage losses so high in California and a few other states that they could not be absorbed by financial institutions. At the time of the Lehman Brothers collapse, 11 “ground zero” markets (including Sacramento), all highly regulated, accounted for 75% of the mortgage losses in the nation, with a per house loss rate of 15 times that of traditionally regulated markets.

    Wirth’s article expresses opposition to a Sacramento County decision to allow more development to occur on the urban fringe. He would prefer to force development into the existing urban footprint. The economic consequences of such folly are well known. In Australia, such policies have driven led to a doubling or tripling of house costs relative to incomes. The annual mortgage cost of the median priced house has risen to 50% of the median pre-tax household income, in a country that defines mortgage stress at the 35% level. Before the adoption of smart growth policies, Australia’s housing affordability was similar to that of liberally regulated markets in the United States.

    Avoiding the next housing bubble requires not repeating the mistakes that led to the last. Sacramento’s young and lower income households can only hope that the additional land approved by the Board of Supervisors will be enough of a safety valve to keep housing affordable so that they can become owners rather than renters.

    Photograph: Sacramento (author)

  • Evangelicals: Preventing and Causing the Housing Bubble

    The International Monetary Fund has published some of the most peculiar econometric research in recent history in Irrational Exuberance in the US Housing Market: Were Evangelicals Left Behind? In it, Christopher Crowe associates the financial behavior of Evangelical Protestant Christians with more stable US markets during the housing bubble. It is well known that the housing bubble was concentrated in some metropolitan areas and largely missed others, such as Dallas-Fort Worth, Atlanta, Houston, Indianapolis and many others, most of them with stronger underlying demand than in the metropolitan areas with huge house price increases. Crowe’s research raises the possibility that Evangelicals kept house prices down by not speculating, due to their religious beliefs.

    Evangelicals generally believe in missionary and conversion activities and tend to hold to beliefs that were largely liberalized in large portions, but not universally in the “mainstream” Protestant churches (such as Episcopal, United Church of Christ, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist and Disciples of Christ churches) during the first half of the 20th century. In recent decades, Evangelical churches have grown strongly, Evangelical membership is now 50% greater than that of “mainstream” Protestantism (even with its Evangelical remnants), which has been relegated to “mainstream” in name only.

    The Crowe thesis is generally that Evangelicals, allegedly with an “intense” belief in “end times” theology (such as the “imminent” return or the “second coming” of Jesus Christ) were less inclined to speculate in housing, which kept house prices from rising strongly in metropolitan areas with larger concentrations of Evangelicals.

    There are some rather substantial difficulties with the thesis.

    The first problem is relates to speculation. Rising prices are needed for there to be any incentive to speculate. If, for example, the numerous Evangelicals in Dallas-Fort Worth had undertaken a furious speculative frenzy, prices would not have gone up, instead more houses would have been built. This is because the liberal land use regime in Dallas-Fort Worth permits housing to be built in response to demand and nullifies any potential for speculative gain. Evangelicals, of course, like Catholics, Mainstream Protestants, Jews and Atheists are not stupid and were no more inclined to speculate on housing in the plentiful Dallas-Fort Worth market than they would have been climb over one another to offer higher prices for sand on the beach.

    Another difficulty is that Crowe’s characterization of Evangelical beliefs is a caricature. In fact, the nation’s 40 million Evangelicals, including 15 million Southern Baptists more than 2 million Missouri Synod Lutherans, more than 1 million members of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, non-denominational megachurch members and others behave similarly to other Americans in the economic sphere. Crowe hypothesizes that “that a belief in the end times reduces incentives to save simply because agents put a lower expectation on the future being realized.” It would have been equally reliable to conjecture on the subsurface geology of an undiscovered planet.

    Evangelicals like nice houses. They like nice cars. They like their children to be well clothed and to go to good schools. They do not refuse raises offered by their bosses because they expect shortly to be caught up into heaven like the prophet Elijah. True, some “end times” Christians have sold their property and trekked to mountaintops or otherwise awaited dates wrongly prophesied by their leaders. It happened in 1844 and in 1914, but these were not Evangelicals.

    While Crowe’s research suggests an Evangelical stabilizing effect on housing markets, an opposite, but no less improbable thesis was advanced in an Atlantic Monthly article entitled “Did Christianity Cause the Housing Crash?” This article suggests that the “prosperity” gospel preached in some Evangelical churches led parishioners to take on obligations they could not afford, leading to the bursting of the bubble, though it is mercifully devoid of spurious regressions. Author Hanna Rosin names names, such as Joel Osteen of Houston’s Lakewood Church and Rick Warren, whose Saddleback Church in Southern California hosted President Obama as a candidate. It would not be surprising if a future article in The Atlantic pontificated about abandoned suburban megachurches.

    One can only wonder what the other nearly 90 percent of Americans were doing while Evangelicals were simultaneously causing and preventing the housing bubble.

    Wendell Cox a contributing editor of newgeography.com is the son of an Evangelical clergyman (Pentecostal), became Presbyterian and later an Episcopalian.

    Photo: Hollywood Presbyterian Church: An Evangelical Church in a Mainstream Protestant Denomination (by the author).

  • China’s Housing Bubble: Quality Research Required

    It is extremely difficult to find reliable reporting on the intensity of the housing bubbles across China, but this article from the China Post of June 1, 2010 “Economist sees housing market bubble”, appears to be realistic.

    It states that in 2009 the average house price to average annual household income in China was 9.1 times earnings and that it rose to 11.15 during the first two months of 2010. Beijing and Shanghai are reported to have exceeded 20 times average household earnings during early 2010. These figures are from Yao Shujie, head of the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham.

    The article noted that last week, Chinese real estate services company E House China released figures suggesting that house prices to incomes nationwide in 2009 were 8.03 times incomes, but those in Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou and Shenzhen were over 14 times household incomes.

    Recently, Wendell Cox of Demographia, working with the South China Post, estimated that the Median Multiple (median house price divided by median household income) for Hong Kong was 10.4 – as reported in this New Geography article Unaffordable Housing in Hong Kong. Because sufficiently reliable data is now available from Hong Kong, it will be included within the Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Surveys going forward.

    As the Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Surveys clearly illustrate, house prices do not exceed three times gross annual household incomes in normal markets.

    Rather remarkably, in researching and reporting on the China Housing Bubble, there has been no discussion of the land ownership differences of China and western countries.

    Freehold land is not available in China. The land is leased for a remarkably short term of 70 years. Instead of conventional ground leases in the west where ground rentals are paid, Chinese Local Governments demand an upfront payment of capitalized rental. On this basis, the land interest should be a wasting asset over the term of the lease.

    Rather remarkably – this appears not to be the case in China, where the buying public have convinced themselves (no doubt with encouragement from real estate agents and developers) that at the end of the term of the ground lease, Local Government will simply “gift” the land to home owners!

    On the sound income to house price measure, China’s housing bubble is clearly the worst in the world. When the unsatisfactory and uncertain land ownership issue is factored in as well, it is particularly concerning.

  • Australian Treasurer Calls for Reasonable Land Regulation

    Australia’s Treasurer Wayne Swan called for reducing restrictions on building houses, to improve housing affordability. The Treasurer’s comments came amid growing concern about housing cost escalation that has been highlighted by recent reports, including the 6th Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey (which identified Australia as the most expensive nation surveyed).

    Treasurer Swan told the Herald Sun in Melbourne “Unless constraints to the supply side of the market are addressed, our cities will not adapt to meet the needs of a growing population and we will see continued problems of affordability for ordinary Australians.” He continued: “We are not building enough houses and if this continues then we will all be paying increasingly more and more for our housing whether it be in terms of repayments or in terms of rent.”

    Australia’s housing affordability crisis, has been the result of overly restrictive land use policies (called “urban consolidation” or “smart growth”), which by intensively controlling the land supply, raise its price and that of housing. This association between prescriptive land use regulations and the loss of housing affordability has been documented by a number of the world’s most eminent economists, such as Kate Barker, a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England and Donald Brash, former Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Brash has said that “the affordability of housing is overwhelmingly a function of just one thing, the extent to which governments place artificial restrictions on the supply of residential land.

    Indicating the “can do” attitude so typical of Australia, the Treasurer said: “We can and must do better than this.”

  • Avoiding Housing Bubbles: Regulating the (Land Use) Regulators

    Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernacke called for stronger regulation to avoid future asset bubbles, such as the housing bubble that precipitated the international financial crisis (the Great Recession) in an Atlanta speech.

    The Chairman appears to miss the fact that regulation itself was a principal cause of the Great Recession. The culprit, however, was not financial regulation, but rather land use regulation, which drove house prices so high in highly regulated markets. When households that could not afford their mortgages defaulted, the losses were far too intense for the mortgage industry to sustain, and thus the Great Recession.

    This is not to ignore the role of Congress and others, which fueled more liberal mortgage credit, and created the excess and credit-unworthy
    additional demand for home ownership.

    This higher demand, however, was only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for creating the bubble, which when burst, precipitated the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. In many markets, there was relatively little increase in house prices relative to incomes, as prices remained at or below the historic Median Multiple (median house price divided by median household income) standard of 3.0. In other markets, however, prices reached from 5 to 11 times incomes.

    Already, a new bubble may be on the way to developing. Even after the huge losses, house prices in California were only beginning to return to sustainable historic levels (3.0 Median Multiple). Since bottoming out, however, prices in California have risen 20%, at an annualized rate greater than that of any bubble year.

    Perhaps the first principle of regulation is understanding what to regulate. In the case of the housing bubble, it was land use regulations themselves that needed to be regulated.
    To avoid future housing bubbles, no more effective action could be taken than to repeal the restrictive land use regulations, without which the last bubble would have been, at most, only slight compared to the destructive reality that ensued.

  • The Case for Walking Away

    First American CoreLogic, a real estate research company, recently released data on negative equity mortgages for the third quarter of 2009. The situation is stark. Nearly one in four U.S. mortgages (23%) is currently underwater, with the borrower owing more than the property is currently worth. According to First American, when mortgages “near” negative equity are tallied, the total number of mortgages near or currently underwater is around 14 million- “nearly 28 percent of all residential properties with a mortgage nationwide.”

    Being underwater does not necessarily mean that a borrower is at risk of default. Although foreclosures and payment delinquencies are currently at record levels nationwide in the wake of the popped real estate bubble, most borrowers facing negative equity continue to make their mortgage payments. While being underwater “is the best predictor for loan defaults,” according to Sam Khater, economist with First American, “if you have your job and don’t encounter economic shock, you’ll most likely keep paying on your home.”

    But should you keep paying if you’re underwater? Brent White, an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Arizona has examined the situation, and argues in a recent discussion paper that homeowners “should be walking away in droves.” According to White, millions of homeowners “could save hundreds of thousands of dollars by strategically defaulting on their mortgages.”

    Such a strategic move comes with consequences for the borrower- most notably a negative impact on one’s credit score. This has a quantifiable cost, but White states that “a few years of poor credit shouldn’t cost more than few thousand dollars,” and notes that individuals can rebuild their credit rating over time, and can “plan in advance for a few years of limited credit.”

    Such costs are, argues White, “minimal compared to the financial benefit of strategic default.” White makes use of the hypothetical example of a California couple purchasing an average priced ($585,000), averaged sized home in 2006 to demonstrate the case for default:

    “Though they still owe about $560,000 on their home, it is now only worth $187,000. A similar house around the corner from Sam and Chris recently listed for $179,000, which, with a modest 5% down, would translate to a total monthly payment of less than $1200 per month – as compared to the $4300 that they currently pay. They could rent a similar house in the neighborhood for about $1000.

    Assuming they intend to stay in their home ten years, Sam and Chris would save approximately $340,000 by walking away, including a monthly savings of at least $1700 on rent verses mortgage payments… If they stay in their home on the other hand, it will take Sam and Chris over 60 years just to recover their equity”

    White argues that in such cases, borrowers are better off taking a short-term hit to their credit, and strategically defaulting to escape a long-term, crushing financial burden. By staying in the home, borrowers are taking money that could otherwise be saved for retirement or used for other purposes, and throwing it away to service a liability that is unlikely to show positive equity in their lifetime.

    Such advice seems most likely to appeal to those upside-down in particularly hard-hit areas of the country, including California, Florida, Nevada and Arizona. However, as noted, most homeowners are sticking it out, and continuing to pay their mortgages. According to White, many who might otherwise make such a decision avoid doing so due to “fear, shame, and guilt,” sentiments which are “actively cultivated” by the government and financial industry to keep homeowners from walking away.

    It remains to be seen if underwater borrowers will overcome fear of the consequences and take White’s advice to strategically default. Mortgage lenders most likely hope that his ideas remain firmly in the minority- as one mortgage executive stated in comments reacting to White’s report, the argument for strategic default is “incredibly irresponsible and misinformed,” and, if widely embraced, has the potential to “‘tear apart the very basis’ upon which mortgage lending rests”. Losing otherwise performing mortgages to strategic default, whatever the economic sense for borrowers, could be yet another blow to an already reeling industry.

  • The Fed and Asset Bubbles: Beyond Superficiality

    There is considerable discussion about tasking the Federal Reserve Board with monitoring and even taking actions to prevent asset bubbles. Before they move too far, the Fed needs to understand what happened in the housing bubble to which they responded after the world economy was decimated.

    Any initiative on the part of the Fed to seriously understand, much less do anything about asset bubbles requires that their causes be comprehended at more than a superficial level. To this day, the Fed appears to presume that the housing bubble was simply the result of financial factors, such as loose money and loose lending. In fact, however, the housing bubble was far more complex than that.

    The averages on which the Fed and much of the business press have based their analysis hide the dynamics that were at the heart of the price explosion. The housing bubble inflated with a vengeance in only one-half of the major US metropolitan markets, and inflated very little in the others.

    There is no doubt that the bubble would not have occurred without the loose monetary policies. However, where the bubble inflated the most, it was in a metropolitan environment of excessively strong land use controls or artificially constricted land supply (called compact development or smart growth). In these markets (such as in California, Florida, Phoenix, Las Vegas, Portland and Seattle), regulation is so strong that when the loose credit induced expansion of demand occurred, the housing market was not permitted to respond with a supply of new affordable housing, and there was a rush to purchase existing stock, which drove prices up.

    On the other hand, in the traditionally regulated markets, including fast growing metropolitan areas like Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston, there was comparatively little escalation in house prices. In short, one-half of the country had a housing bubble, the other half did not. In the more highly regulated markets, the Median Multiple (median house price divided by median household income) increased to from 4.5 times to more than 11 (compared to the historic ratio of 3.0). In the traditionally regulated markets, the 3.0 standard was generally not exceeded. Thus, as Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman of Princeton University and The New York Times noted more than three years before the crash, the United States was really two nations with respect to house price escalation, and the difference was land use regulation.

    We have estimated that the house value losses were overly concentrated in the compact development markets, accounting for 85% of the peak to trough declines. Without these artificial losses, which were the result of unwise policy intervention, the international Great Recession might not have been set off or it certainly would have been less severe. All of this is described in the last two editions of our “Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey” and related items (the 6th Annual Demographia Housing Affordability Survey will be available early in 2010).

    The purpose of compact development and smart growth is to stop the expansion (the ideological term is “sprawl”) of urban areas. Clearly, given the distress that has occurred in the US housing market and the wave of additional losses in both the domestic and international economy that followed, the price of stopping urban expansion (or attempting to) has proven to be immensely larger than any gains.

    At least in housing, until the Fed understands what happened, it will be powerless to effectively apply whatever new powers it employs to control future housing bubbles.