New Geography

Tag: middle class

  • The middle class is key to any city’s future

    What are your favorite cities in the US and abroad? Chances are you like cities for their vibrancy, diversity, people, foods, smells, sights, sounds, and opportunities for work, learning, play and life.

    These cities can only exist with vibrant middle classes to do the work, pay the taxes, and sustain life (including birthing the kids that are the city’s future).

    I have had the opportunity to live, work in and visit cities around the world. I have noticed that cities dependent on one industry or activity (such as resort tourism, for example), are not interesting, exciting, vibrant, dynamic, or sustainable. They are missing a middle
    class. There is nothing more depressing and dispiriting than to visit a resort where you are surrounded by the wealthy attendees and minimum-wage attendants. It is laughable when such wealthy patrons then try to ameliorate the situation with low-cost housing and other half-baked solutions. Raising wages for the largely itinerant labor force does not work. You need a middle class.

    Some of our “normal” and “regular” cities are heading down this path. They are losing their middle classes.

    The Decline of Middle-Class Neighborhoods

    Several studies document the trend. According to a Brookings Institution study released last year, as a share of all urban and suburban neighborhoods, middle-income neighborhoods in the nation’s 100 largest metro areas have declined from 58% in 1970 to 41% in 2000. In their place, poor and rich neighborhoods are both on the rise, as cities and suburbs have become increasingly segregated by income.
    Middle-income neighborhoods – where families earn 80 to 120 percent of the local median income – have plunged by more than 20 percent as a share of all neighborhoods in Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles and Philadelphia. They are down 10 percent in the Washington area. Only 23 percent of central city neighborhoods in 12 large metropolitan areas were middle income in 2000, down from 45 percent in 1970, according to Brookings.

    In Los Angeles – the most hollowed-out metropolitan area in the country over the past three decades – the share of poor neighborhoods is up 10 percent, rich neighborhoods are up 14 percent and middle-income areas are down by 24 percent.

    There are non-economic consequences for cities that lose a lot of middle-income residents. The disappearance of middle-income neighborhoods can limit opportunities for upward mobility, the authors of the Brookings study say. It becomes harder for lower-income homeowners to move up the property ladder, buy into safer neighborhoods, send their children to better schools and even make the kinds of personal contacts that can be a route to better jobs.

    The Exit of the Middle-Class

    In New York, according to “New York’s Delicate Migration Balance,” a report released by the city’s controller last year, 300,000 residents a year are moving out of the city to other parts of the US, twice the number who relocate to NYC from elsewhere in the country – and that was before this year’s financial meltdown.

    Middle-class families – notably households with annual incomes between $40,000 and $60,000 along with households earning more than $140,000 – make up a disproportionate segment of the army heading for the exits. “Those who leave appear to be younger, better educated and slightly more affluent,” the report says. More than 40% of the adults making up the exodus have at least a bachelor’s degree; 20% have a master’s degree or higher.

    That is devastating news, writes Errol Louis (“Call an ambulance – our middle class is bleeding,” New York Daily News, 9/16/07): “It means the backbone of the city is weakening as hundreds of thousands of teachers, cops, firefighters, bus drivers, security guards, transit workers, barbers and administrators – a big slice of the people who make the city go – give up on New York every year.”

    The report also suggests that a lot of what people think they know about the supposed link between gentrification, housing prices and neighborhood change is wrong: “contrary to the tone of public discussion, New York City is not experiencing an influx of educated, affluent, working age residents.” Louis concludes:

    “Communities, and the city as a whole, thrive when we have many different income groups living side-by-side – civil servants near retirees, welfare moms next door to teachers and carpenters.
    “All are equally valuable, and all need to stay in New York. Inner-city areas especially need a critical mass of adults who can put in the enormous amount of casual time and volunteer effort it takes to raise a neighborhood’s children. The kids need to see – and learn from – all kinds of working people in the streets, parks and libraries. Schools that don’t get time, attention and pressure from middle-class parents are more likely to fail.”

    A Natural or Man-Made Trend?

    In a way this trend is natural, a tale of upward mobility: those who can move to a better neighborhood do. But why do middle-income neighborhoods “tip” towards rich or poor? Why this “big sort?”
    Public policy analysts scratch their heads. Some blame the loss of middle-income neighborhoods on the loss of the middle class itself, but that can’t be it: incomes for all types and in all income quintiles of households have gone up (except for single-female-headed households with kids), although they have gone up faster for higher income households. But there are natural reasons for that too: higher income households have more income earners, with higher skills, working more hours.

    Others blame the bifurcation of housing costs, that is, the lack of affordable middle-class housing. According to a New York University study, the likeliest households to exit in New York were those earning between $40,000 and $60,000 (the solidly middle-class in a city where the median household income is $40,000). Though these made up only 17 percent of non-elderly households in 2005, they accounted for 22 percent of those households that left.

    Any middle-class – or even upper-middle-class – flight is understandable given the chunks of income that New Yorkers pay on housing.

    Of the 110,663 Manhattan homes with a mortgage, nearly one fourth spend at least 35 percent of the household’s monthly income on housing costs, according to Census estimates. Of the 562,469 occupied rental apartments in Manhattan, over 34 percent spend at least 35 percent of the household’s monthly income on rent. Another 8.4 percent spend 30 to 34.9 percent.

    Of the 182,226 Brooklyn homes with a mortgage, over 46 percent spend at least 35 percent of the household’s monthly income on housing costs. Of the estimated 590,843 rental apartments in Brooklyn, nearly 42 percent pay at least 35 percent of the household’s monthly income on rent.

    Others blame sprawl, complaining that exurbs are bleeding cities of the middle class. But it is hard to argue that people’s freedom of choice about where to live is the problem, and that they should be forced to live in expensive, deteriorating cities.
    It’s middle-income jobs, stupid

    In a recent article in City Journal (Summer 2008), “Houston, New York Has a Problem,” Edward Glaeser compares Houston to New York and comes to the conclusion that Houston is preferable because it welcomes the middle class, while a heavily regulated and expensive New York drives it away. It is a devastating comparison:

    “Houston’s great advantage, it turns out, is its ability to provide affordable living for middle-income Americans, something that is increasingly hard to achieve in the Big Apple. That Houston is a middle-class city is mirrored in the nature of its economy. Both greater Houston and Manhattan have about 2 million employees.

    “In Manhattan, almost 600,000 of them work in the idea-intensive sectors of finance, insurance, and professional services; only 2% are in manufacturing, and fewer than that in construction. Finance increasingly drives New York City’s economy as a whole. By contrast, Houston is a manufacturing powerhouse that makes machinery, food products, and electronics, with a retail sector twice the size of Manhattan’s and lots of middle-class jobs.”

    New York used to be a place where a lot of middle-income jobs were created. That’s not happening anymore: from 1975 to 2005, New York City shrank as a regional job hub relative to 12 surrounding counties in Long Island, southern New York and northern New Jersey, according to the Center for an Urban Future.

    Back in 1975, New York City accounted for 53.1 percent of the 5,022,801 jobs in the New York region. By 1980, the city’s share of regional jobs had diminished to 50.5 percent. In 2005 – the last year the figures were tallied – the 12 surrounding counties accounted for 52.8 percent of the 6,171,642 jobs in the New York region.

    No middle-income jobs, no middle class.

    What the Middle Class Needs

    The real obstacle to a thriving middle class in New York is too much government involvement in people’s lives, writes Nicole Gelinas in The New York Sun.

    In housing, for example, constricting the supply of apartments through regulation makes rents, on average, more expensive, not less. As for schools, Medicaid, and other government programs, all of the $58 billion New York spends annually must come from somewhere, and it comes from high taxes. As the city’s independent budget office has noted, state and local taxes within the five boroughs are the highest in the nation, nearly 50% higher than in the average city. Due in large part to these high taxes, big corporations and small businesses alike have a hard time locating middle-class jobs here.

    Living cities must be growing cities that go through constant cycles of renewal of people, economies, and industries. Creative destruction is a necessary city dynamic. This means private-sector job creation. That requires healthy business growth, which adds to the tax base, not public sector job growth, which drains funds from the system.
    There is in fact a “Virtuous Circle” of metropolitan wealth creation: it starts with business growth, leading to job growth, leading to tax revenue growth, making more government services and infrastructure possible, enhancing quality of life for all inhabitants. We all draw from and contribute to this economic food chain. Without it, cities cannot have real life.

    The key to maintaining and growing a middle class is not the government provision of services, benefits and subsidies. It is government provision of the few things government is supposed to provide: protection of persons and property and a social and legal environment which promotes the pursuit of happiness and the general welfare – most fundamentally and importantly, the freedom to start and operate a business without onerous taxation and regulation.

    Dr. Roger Selbert is a business futurist and trend guy. He publishes Growth Strategies, a newsletter on economic, social and demographic trends, and is a professional public speaker [www.rogerselbert.com]. Roger is US economic analyst for the Institute for Business Cycle Analysis in Copenhagen, and North American representative for its US Consumer Demand Index.

  • Turns Out There’s Good News on Main St.

    As the financial crisis takes down Wall Street, the regular folks on Main Street are biting their nails, watching the toxic tsunami head their way. But for all our nightmares of drowning in a sea of bad mortgages, foreclosed homes and shrunken retirement plans, the truth is that the effects of this meltdown won’t be all bad in the long run. In one regard, it could offer our society a net positive: Forced into belt-tightening, Americans are likely to strengthen our family and community ties and to center our lives more closely on the places where we live.

    This trend toward what I call “the new localism” has been underway for some years, driven by changing demographics, new technologies and rising energy prices. But the economic downturn will probably accelerate it as individuals and corporations look not to the global stage but closer to home, concentrating and congregating on the Main Streets where we choose to live – in the suburbs, in urban neighborhoods or in small towns.

    In his 1972 bestseller, “A Nation of Strangers,” social critic Vance Packard depicted the United States as “a society coming apart at the seams.” He was only one in a long cavalcade of futurists who have envisioned an America of ever-increasing “spatial mobility” that would give rise to weaker families, childlessness and anonymous communities.

    Packard and others may not have been far off for their time: In 1970, nearly 20 percent of Americans changed their place of residence every year. But by 2004, that figure had dropped to 14 percent, the lowest level since 1950. Americans born today are actually more likely to reside near their place of birth than those who lived in the 19th century. Part of this is due to our aging population, because older people are far less likely to move than those under 30. But more limited economic options may intensify this phenomenon while bringing a host of social, economic and environmental benefits in their wake.

    For one thing, they may strengthen those long-weakening family ties. We’re already seeing signs of that. American family life today may not look like “Ozzie and Harriet,” with its two-parent nuclear family, but it reflects a pattern of earlier generations, when extended networks helped families withstand the dislocations of the westward expansion or of immigration.

    With a majority of married women now working, parents are frequently sharing child-rearing duties, and other family members are getting into the act. Grandparents and other relatives help provide care for roughly half of all preschoolers in the country. As the cost of living rises, this trend could accelerate.

    At the same time, difficulty in getting reasonable mortgages and the realities of diminished IRAs will force baby boomers and Generation Xers both to prolong their parental responsibilities and to delay their retirements. This, too, is already happening: According to one study, one-fourth of Gen-Xers still receive help from their parents. And as many as 40 percent of Americans between 20 and 34, according to another survey, live at least part-time with their parents.

    This clustering of families, after decades of dispersion, will spur more localism, which has a simple premise: The longer people stay in their homes and communities, the more they identify with and care for those places.

    This is evident in everything from the mushrooming of farmers markets in communities nationwide to burgeoning suburban cultural institutions. Since the 1980s, suburbs outside such cities as Chicago, Atlanta, Washington and Los Angeles have been building or contemplating new town centers – their own Main Streets, if you will, village squares intended to foster a unique local identity and community focus. Scores of suburban towns have established local orchestras and built playhouses and symphony halls – Strathmore Hall in Bethesda is one example. All this activity has dispelled some of the view of suburbs as strongholds of middle-class torpor.

    “This used to be a place where people went to sleep,” says Patricia Jones, president of the Arts Alliance, a group that helps raise funds for the sprawling, $63 million Civic Arts Plaza in the Los Angeles suburb of Thousand Oaks. “Now it’s a place where people live, work and find their entertainment. It’s a totally different environment. It’s not boring anymore.”

    Not only that, it’s probably more interconnected than ever before. In suburbs and cities from Los Angeles to New York, Web-based community newsletters have sprung up to keep residents informed of goings-on in their neighborhoods and to provide a sense of connectedness. “There’s an attempt in this neighborhood to break down the city feel and to see this more as a kind of a small town,” says Ellen Moncure, who edits the Flatbush Family Network Web site in New York. “It may be in the city, but it’s a community unto itself, a place where you can stay and raise your children.”

    Bolstering the trend are today’s higher energy prices, which make Americans’ old nomadic patterns less economically viable in more ways than one. Take recreation. More and more, says Tim Schneider, publisher of a magazine specializing in sports travel, people are sticking close to home instead of trekking far and wide in search of fun things to do. “Stay cations,” or vacations near home, are taking the place of trips to exotic distant locales. This means tougher times for such traditional tourist hot spots as Las Vegas and Hawaii, both of which have seen a drop-off in flight arrivals due to airline cutbacks. But there’s a moral for cities, says Schneider: Instead of counting on convention centers and arts and cultural facilities to attract outside tourists, most would do better to promote local “place-branding” events such as festivals, rodeos, sports tournaments and the like.

    Higher energy prices may also refocus local economies in unexpected ways. For generations, most Americans have been buying their food from distant corporate providers. But with shipping costs – and food-safety concerns – on the rise, the trend to buy local is moving into the mainstream. In Maryland, the number of farmers markets has grown from 20 in 1991 to 84 today. In 1977, California had four such markets; today it has more than 500. Higher energy costs could also benefit local manufacturers, bringing, say, clothing manufacture back to the Los Angeles garment district from China.

    The final factor driving the localist trend is technology, which has led to a rapid expansion of home-based work and to companies’ setting up work locations closer to where their employees live. The number of home-based workers has doubled twice as quickly in this decade as in the last and is now about 9 million. Nationwide, 13 million people telecommuted at least one day a week in 2007, a 16 percent leap from 2004. And more than 22 million people run home-based businesses.

    A recent study suggests that more than one-quarter of the U.S. workforce could eventually participate full- or part-time in this new work pattern. And over time, it will accelerate localism. Commuting – which became common only over the past century – has cut workers off from the places where they live. Home-based work, by contrast, gives people more choice about where they work and more time to spend with their families and communities.

    Telecommunication allows people who want privacy, low-density neighborhoods and good schools to live in small towns in a way never before possible. It also allows a firm such as Renaissance Learning, a leading educational software company, to set up headquarters in Wisconsin Rapids, Wis., a city of 17,500 whose small-town feeling, broad river and wooded countryside appeal to many workers. “We don’t have any trouble recruiting people here,” says Mark Swanson, the firm’s technical director.

    Yet the desire to stay in the local community isn’t limited to small towns or suburbs. I see it where I live, in California’s San Fernando Valley, or in parts of my mother’s native Brooklyn, where lots of people employed in fields such as the arts, consulting and design work at home or nearby and crowd the coffee shops, restaurants and stores of streets such as Ventura Boulevard in Studio City or once-decayed but now bustling Cortelyou Road in Flatbush.

    In the end, localism is neither urban nor anti-urban. At its heart, it represents something larger: a historic American tradition that sees society’s smaller units as vital and the proper focus of most people’s lives. This made the United States different from Europe, which, as Alexis de Tocqueville noted, has long tended toward centralization of power and decision-making.

    The expansion of the European welfare state has further fostered this trend. But it’s also true that Europeans tend to move less than Americans. And the powerful resistance to the most intrusive forms of European Union integration, such as a continent-wide constitution, suggest that strong localist elements remain imbedded in European communities.

    But if Europe is joining the trend, the United States is likely to be the leader in pushing decentralization. What most impressed Tocqueville wasn’t our large cities but the vitality of our many smaller towns and communities. “The intelligence and the power are dispersed abroad,” he wrote, “and instead of radiating from a point, they cross each other in every direction.”

    Today’s localist revival reflects this tradition, but with the benefit of the great access to the larger world that technology provides. It offers the prospect of an America that, rather than being “a nation of strangers,” can aspire again to be a nation of neighbors . . . in places that we choose for ourselves.

    This article originally appeared in the Washington Post.

    Joel Kotkin is a presidential fellow at Chapman University and executive editor of www.newgeography.com. He is finishing a book on the American future.

  • The Geography of Inequality

    The global financial crisis has drawn greater attention to the world of the super rich and to the astounding increases in inequality since 1980, returning the country to a degree of inequality last seen in 1929 or perhaps even 1913. In the year 2006 alone, Wall Street executives received bonuses of $62 billion. Financial services increased from 10 percent of all business profits in 1980 to 40 percent in 2007, an obscene and indefensible development that now threatens the rest of the ‘real economy’.

    Here’s what happened to income and wealth between 1970 and 2005

    These figures reveal an inexorably growing concentration of income and wealth, which has taken place under both Democratic and Republican regimes. Conversely, given inflation over the last 35 years, lower and middle classes receive smaller shares. Only the affluent – the top 10% – and the rich – the top 1% – have gained ground.

    This pattern of inequality also has a geography with variations across the country between different places (here counties). Generally between 1970 and 2000 the greatest inequality has developed in the largest metropolitan regions and their suburbs.


    Large metropolitan core counties are by far the most likely to have higher inequality. In contrast other geographies have much lower inequality, with small metropolitan, small city and rural counties near the national average. In other words, core metropolitan counties are skewed toward greater inequality (higher shares of very rich and of very poor), while suburban and exurban areas generally exhibit lower inequality (values bunched centrally, with fewer extremely rich or poor households).

    Overall the greatest inequality lies in the very largest metropolitan cores (Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, Houston, etc), areas with large racial or ethnic minorities (e.g., in FL, TX, CA and much of the South), as well as in selected large northeastern metropolises (suburb as well as core, as in Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington DC) and across the southern half of the country more generally. Lower inequality occurs mainly in suburban or small metropolitan counties, and mainly in the north.

    Among smaller metropolitan (< 50,000 households) and non-metropolitan counties there emerges a truly dramatic north-south cleavage just around the Iowa border and along the Ohio River divide. A more mixed pattern prevails in the west and in the northeast, where intermediate levels of inequality are common. Especially high rates of inequality characterize racial and ethnic minority areas and Appalachia, as could be expected, but also many environmental amenity areas, especially in the west. Low inequality is fairly extensive in the hinterlands of selected Great Lakes and upper Midwest metropolises, like Omaha, Minneapolis and Chicago. Generally more egalitarian areas boast higher incomes, female labor force participation, more shares in manufacturing, greater incidence of husband-wife families, of whites, of home ownership, but lower percentages of government and service jobs, fewer residents with less than a 9th grade education, people 18-24, singles, single parent families, and less Blacks and Hispanics. High levels of inequality are generally the opposite of the egalitarian areas: more minorities, single parent families, less manufacturing and dependence on government as well as service sector jobs. Inequality varies by both kinds of settlement geography and by the social and economic character of areas. The most obvious and visible attributes that signify greater inequality are social characteristics: racial and ethnic minorities, low levels of education, low proportions of traditional husband-wife families (partly because of fewer earners), and high dependency (many of the very young and very old). Unequal places tend to be those with low concentrations of manufacturing and higher shares of both managerial-professional occupations and service jobs. Geographic impacts vary. Most rural, newer suburban and exurban areas tend to have lower inequality because they tend to maintain middle income homogeneity. Yet rural areas that are isolated and have weak economies, like Appalachia, suffer high inequality. Large metropolitan areas with the highest inequality also tend to have large concentrations of racial minorities and of non-families, especially young singles Overall it is clear that inequality has been on the rise since 1970. This was a time when the nation was prosperous, manufacturing was strong, as were unions, income taxes fairly progressive, while “war on poverty” legislation had helped those at the bottom, the baby boom was still on and families dominant. But if the extent of inequality has grown, its geography has changed far less. Large metropolitan cores had the highest inequality in 1970 and 2000, and metropolitan suburbs and exurbs the lowest, with small cities in between. Yet inequality grew fastest in large metropolitan cores and suburbs. Small metropolitan areas (many were small cities in 1970) had the next highest increase (80 percent) and rural small town areas the lowest (69 percent). Sadly, only a few counties had decreases in inequality. Many were military base counties, mainly in the south. Another group of counties with lower inequality are new suburban counties, which have become more uniformly middle class as a result of significant urban growth, mainly in the South with more rapid urban and industrial growth. Overall, the change in inequality between 1970 and 2000 was substantial and wide ranging. The causes for this tend to be national and structural, including deindustrialization, the rise of a service economy, the decline of the traditional family and tax changes favoring the very wealthy. Areas that traditionally were most unequal – notably the great global cities – have simply become more so. It is here, in the command and communication centers of the economy, that the greatest wealth has been accumulated and where we can see the rise of a new aristocracy nevertheless dependent on a large low wage service class. The next Administration and Congress should start to address these trends or the traditional American dream will become, for most citizens, no more than that. Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist)

  • Gentrification from the inside out in Brooklyn’s Ditmas Park

    Twenty some years ago my husband, 2 young sons and I moved from our cramped 16-foot wide attached row house in Brooklyn’s trendy Park Slope to a free-standing, 7-bedroom Victorian house in the Ditmas Park section of Flatbush with stained glass windows, pocket doors, original wood paneling, a back yard, front porch, driveway and 2-car garage in a little-known, tree-lined neighborhood about 10 minutes away – on the other, high-crime side of Prospect Park. Friends thought we’d taken leave of our senses!

    Built early last century, our neighborhood Long has been known for its architecture, with the largest concentration of Victorian houses in America. It’s the kind of neighborhood sensible new urbanists dream about it; the only block in New York with subway stations at each end. This was a tribute to the clout of the neighborhood’s original developers who had a strong commitment to building “suburbs in the city,” and secured the best in public transportation for their customers.

    Driveways help preserve the neighborhood’s low density, while also allowing ample street parking. But before and after WWII, entire blocks of houses were torn down and apartment buildings erected in their place. Today, blocks of beautiful, 3-story Victorian houses with large front porches alternate with blocks of 5 and 6-story apartment buildings.

    Not surprisingly, the people in the houses differed, in terms of race and social class, from the people in the apartment buildings. They rarely interacted. The subway tracks demarcated the neighborhood; one side was mixed, the other predominantly black and lower middle class. When crime exploded in the 1960s and welfare tenants were moved into some of the apartments, much of the middle class – white and black – fled. By the early 1990s many assumed that nothing could be done about the collapse of the quality of life. It wasn’t unusual for police officers in that era, many of whom lived in suburban Suffolk County, to respond to crime victims condescendingly by asking, “What do you expect if you live in a neighborhood like this?”

    Little changed even after the extraordinary Giuliani/Bratton efforts brought down crime, little changed in the mid-1990s. The district’s once thriving shopping street, Cortelyou Road, still had no bank, no coffee shop, no diner, no sit-down restaurant, no children’s store, no real estate office. So there wasn’t much pedestrian traffic – or “eyes” – on the main commercial street, still dominated by 99 cent stores competing with 97 cent stores.

    Most neighborhood residents, if possible, shopped elsewhere. Frustrated by this situation, in 2001 I founded “Friends of Cortelyou,” a (very) small group dedicated to recruiting new businesses to our commercial strip. A couple of “friends” and I went to lunch, dinner, and coffee at places that we liked in other neighborhoods in Brooklyn. We introduced ourselves to owners and managers as Friends of Cortelyou, trying to convince entrepreneurs to expand into our still “below the radar” neighborhood.

    To us, the broader, social implications of local shopping were clear; people who walked to local stores on local streets, instead of driving or taking the subway to more developed neighborhoods would generate the everyday interaction that defines a lively neighborhood. Cortelyou’s commercial strip is only 7 blocks long, and a few new stores could have a significant impact.

    I figured that someone who had taken a chance in Brooklyn’s Ft. Greene, that edgy, racially (and income) diverse neighborhood might see the potential in ours which US News and World Report described as the “most diverse neighborhood in America.” One owner, a half Martiniquen, half Jewish former Parisian was hooked; he saw the possibilities for commercial development and knew first-hand the advantages of being first (namely, cheap rent and “buzz”).

    The former Parisian negotiated to take over the lease of an existing corner bar. When he ran into trouble securing “the last $30,000”, we put out a call to about 40 neighbors to raise the last start-up capital. Thirty six different neighbors agreed to loan (or give) $1000 each to back someone who would open a new restaurant in our neighborhood!

    One incredible woman, Susan Siegel, decided she wanted to bring a farmers market to the neighborhood. She worked on this full time, and a year later it opened! Some Cortelyou grocers objected to having it on their strip; a few vocal homeowners objected to unlocking a public school yard and using it to house the market. Ironically the fight over the market swelled into a local “pro-development” movement, made up of people alive to the new possibilities, and sparked a neighborhood newsletter.

    Once it opened in 2002, the Farmers Market became an informal community center, a literal common ground, for our neighborhood. The Market became a place where the full range of neighborhood residents could come together to buy fresh fruits and vegetables and to catch up on what’s happening in the schools, the playgrounds, and stores including a highly successful organic food co-op. Until then, only the homeowners were organized but now new co-op owners, home owners, and renters all came, mingling freely with each other, and with “veterans”, in a way that had not previously been the case.

    At that time we realized we needed more new and engaged residents. I tried to persuade two local realtors to sell the co-op apartments; they were far cheaper than co-ops in other good (or “good enough”) neighborhoods, and seemed like the way to bring in young or single people. But the realtors were dismissive explaining, “there’s not enough money,” or “too much work” in selling coops to make it worth their while.

    I realized I’d have to take this on myself. So I got a real estate license, affiliated with a Park Slope broker, and began selling co-ops in one building in our area. Other agents in that office didn’t mind; for them, too, it was too little money and too much work. Selling real estate and developing the neighborhood were two sides of a coin; the combination turned out surprisingly to be more fun and satisfying than I had imagined. Within two years I co-founded Brooklyn Hearth Realty, an agency I currently own with two partners, young, dynamic neighborhood residents who moved here in the twenty-first century.

    The neighborhood buzz kept growing. Jim Heaton, a local advertising executive initiated an online newsletter, FREND, and also designed a logo for Friends of Cortelyou. We had the logo printed on t-shirts and oversized shopping bags, and sold them to raise money for the few activities we sponsored that required financial support. We initiated and hosted “Welcome Receptions”, at first in our homes, then in the new restaurants that we recruited for the new residents. These turned out to be very popular, and were one more mark of distinction for our neighborhood. Local businesses joined in as sponsors.

    FREND served to “connect” nearly a thousand people and families to the new initiatives, particularly around the Farmers Market and crime, but the on-line contribution really blossomed in 2003 when Ellen Moncure and Joe Wong revived the Flatbush Family Network (FFN). This site has become an invaluable source of neighborhood and childrearing information for the many young families who live here. For many people moving into this neighborhood, FFN provides an initial introduction and orientation to life in this neighborhood. For those who live here, it’s a convenient, ongoing source of information and support.

    All this really began to congeal by 2002. New stores began to open on Cortelyou Road. One of the early successes was the Picket Fence restaurant. Picket Fence was followed by a vintage furniture store (opened by Nicole Francis, a staunch FOC member), a Mexican restaurant, a café, a bar, a bagel shop, a dance studio, a real estate office, wine store, furniture store, children’s store, natural food store, new flower shop/bar, and Tibetan Café. Meanwhile the long-established food co-op and the pizza shop both expanded and upgraded. The Farm on Adderley broke new ground in 2005, attracting attention and customers from far outside the neighborhood. The owners of that restaurant opened another a few blocks away the following year, and just opened the flower shop/bar a month ago. Once seemingly on its last legs, the neighborhood now pulses with a contagious energy.

    That energy gave birth to the Ditmas Park Blog, founded in early 2007 by Ben Smith and Liena Zagare. The blog sends local information and gossip beyond the neighborhood’s families, reaching growing numbers of singles as well. This was the first institution to target singles as much as families, extending the neighborhood’s expanding demographic boundaries. Zagare, her finger on the neighborhood’s pulse, went on to found the Ditmas Workspace in summer, 2008. She created a shared workspace in a former doctor’s office. Another former doctor’s office, also on the ground floor of a large house, has a neighborhood yoga studio and several artists working in small, separate spaces. That’s the “new use of old space” that’s helping to reconfigure our neighborhood for the 21st century.

    Much of what I’ve described occurred during the boom times of 2002 through the first half of 2008. Although Brooklyn’s market stayed strong through the summer of 2008, we now face an uncertain future in a very volatile economic climate. Perhaps people will stay closer to home, like the woman who stopped in my office on Cortelyou the other day who said, “I’m not going out as much, and trying to save money. So I’m going over to my friend’s with a bottle of wine.” After all, you can save money on transportation and on babysitting by staying closer to home.

    As I write this, the owner of a successful Manhattan restaurant is looking closely at Cortelyou, hoping to open in a “real neighborhood” where customers support local businesses. No one knows yet where the economy is headed, or what this means for our neighborhood. But we now have a vibrant neighborhood. This is no longer just a location where the houses are a comparative bargain. It’s an area with an identity.

    Jan Rosenberg taught Sociology at LIU’s Brooklyn Campus for 28 years; her studies of other Brooklyn neighborhoods, and of cities, inspired her work in Ditmas Park. She is cofounder of Brooklyn Hearth Realty.

    Photos courtesy of Joanna Grazda and Mark Gilman.

  • The American Dream: Alive and Well (Some Places)

    Even after the burst of the housing bubble, the American Dream of home ownership has remained alive in some places. As it turns out the “bubble” was far from pervasive, and as Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman indicated in The New York Times, the housing price increases were largely limited to the areas of the nation with stronger land use regulation.

    In all, at the peak of the housing bubble, 46 of 129 US markets had house prices at or below the historic ceiling of three times household incomes (see 4th International Demographia Housing Affordability Survey. Before the bubble, nearly all markets were at or below that norm, but many have risen to double, triple or even more than three times the standard.

    The American Dream can be said to have started with William Levitt, who revolutionized home building starting with his huge Levittown, New York development in the late 1940s.

    As Witold Rybczynski wrote in a recent Wilson Quarterly article, new Levittown houses could be purchased for three times the average wage in Levittown. This bought a detached 750 square foot house, without a garage. Interestingly, this was at a time when single-income families were still the norm.

    Levittown is the birthplace of the modern American Dream. It was only after the pioneering model of Levittown that home ownership became the norm by becoming affordable to middle-income and blue collar households in America. At the end of World War II, home ownership in the United States was 40 percent. By 1960, it exceeded 60 percent and since risen to above 65 percent.

    Levittown, and the automobile-oriented urban expansion it foreshadowed, resulted in the greatest democratization of prosperity in history. Wherever mass suburbanization occurred – whether in the United States, its first world cousins Canada and Australia, Western Europe or later even Japan – we have seen the unprecedented rise of a mass property-owning class.

    This economic and social advance was built on liberal land use regulation. It would not have been possible if the policies that have poisoned housing markets from Los Angeles and Portland to Miami and Boston had been in effect at that time.

    Yet there is still life outside the high-priced coastal regions. Indeed in much of the country today, new housing affordability is at least as good as it was in Levittown. Generally, where land regulation has remained reasonable, new houses can be purchased for less than three times median household incomes. Purchasers may need two incomes to get there, but the effect remains the same. Moreover, the houses in these markets generally boast two-car garages and living space nearly double that of the typical Levittown ‘starter’ house.

    The small selection of examples below is limited to metropolitan areas with high housing demand. These are not economic basket cases like those in and around certain old industrial cities. Nor are these places where the market has evaporated because so many people have left or are planning to leave. Instead these are places attracting domestic migrants from other parts of the country (especially from metropolitan areas with strong land use regulation). These listings are the result of a quick search; they may not necessarily represent the least expensive new houses available. Each has three bedrooms and all have two-car garages.

    Atlanta: A new 1,500 square foot for a base price of $130,000 – 2.3 times the median household income View listing.

    Austin: A new 1,200 square foot for a base price of $106,500 – 1.9 times the median household income View listing.

    Charlotte: A new 1,500 square foot for a base price of $133,000 – 2.5 times the median household income View listing.

    Columbia, South Carolina: A new 1,500 square foot for a base price of $130,000 – 2.7 times the median household income View listing.

    Columbus: A new 1,400 square foot for a base price of $130,000 – 2.5 times the median household income View listing.

    Dallas-Fort Worth: A new 1,250 square foot for a base price of $120,000 – 2.2 times the median household income View listing.

    Houston: A new 1,300 square foot for a base price of $100,000 – 1.9 times the median household income View listing

    Indianapolis: A new 1,500 square foot for a base price of $114,000 – 2.1 times the median household income View listing.

    Kansas City: A new 1,200 square foot for a base price of $150,000 – 2.8 times the median household income View listing.

    The list could go on and on, including virtually every area of the nation that has not driven up the price of developable land by land use regulations. The American Dream is alive and well where it has not been snuffed out by economics-be-damned urban planning policies.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

  • Geography, Class, and Red and Blue Voting

    Consider the following two apparently contradictory sets of statistics:

    From the Republican convention and much of the media, you’d get the impression that class voting has turned upside down—that the Democrats are the party of the “elite” and the Republicans the new friends of the “working class”.

    But the ACTUAL voting behavior in 2004, when Republicans did especially well at making inroads among socially conservative, less affluent households. Consider the accompanying chart, where Bush dominated Kerry in households making more than $100,000.

    And according to McCain, $200000 is solidly middle class!
    This looks like “economic class“ still matters!

    But then look at the following equally CORRECT statistics, (courtesy of Fred Shelley, U Oklahoma:

    The purple states are the current tossup states: CO, FL, IN,MI, NH, NV, NM, NC,OH,VA

    So is it true, contrary to the 2004 national data, that states that are richer and more educated tend Democratic (blue) and those with less educated and poorer folks lead Republican (red)? How can both sets of data be true?

    The answer lies in the math. The first set uses INDIVIDUALS, while the second uses average, aggregate values. Making inferences from averages risks what statisticians call the “ecological fallacy” , attributing to everyone the value of an average, from what in reality is probably a very heterogeneous (highly variable) population.

    Blue states like CA, WA, NY or MA have high average levels of income and education, but we do not know the distribution of votes for D and R by varying levels of education and income. So to reconcile the two sets of statistics, it is reasonable to assume that despite high average levels, the more educated and wealthier are more likely to vote Republican, the less educated and poorer more likely to vote Democratic.

    For example, consider state A (big metropolitan) and state B (non-metro, small town, rural):

    A has a larger share of richer than average voters than B, but it’s a big metro state while B is a smaller rural, small city state. Richer voters tend R in both and poorer voters tend to vote D in both states, but the R share is higher for all classes in the non-metro state and D shares higher for both classes in the big metro state.

    The other part of the story is geography, largely about the split between large metropolitan and small and non-metropolitan America. Over half the population lives in large metropolitan areas. These tend to have above average levels of education and income, as they are the control centers of society, but they also have the large majority of racial and ethnic minorities and of the poor— which are the real numerical base of the Democratic vote. Not that you would know it from either party’s rhetoric!

    Now it is certainly true that a significant and increasing share of the educated affluent has shifted Democratic in the last decade or so; these folks are powerful and articulate and have effectively taken over the Democratic Party. We know from precinct level data that Democrats swept areas with highly educated professionals, especially around universities, but Republicans continued to dominate wider areas, especially suburban and exurban, of the more managerial affluent.

    Generally speaking, the Democratic “elite” overestimates its own numbers, and often unintentionally pursues policies hurtful to the poor and lower middle classes. This can be seen in the elite’s indifference to the less affluent and educated Democratic base as demonstrated by their emphasis on the virtues of dense urban, “green” living. This agenda often results in gentrification, displacement of the poor and minorities. Elite democrats also ignore —except perhaps at election time — job competition from massive immigration, legal and illegal, the ravages of excess globalization, and out of sight housing prices.

    The 2004 election data shows that the historic base of the Democratic party is not gone, at least in large metropolitan America. Middle and working class white voters in the suburbs and exurbs still matter. Obama cannot win unless that base is reassured and respected.

    Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist).

  • Cities, Children and the Future

    By Joel Kotkin and Mark Schill

    “Suburbs,” the great urbanist Jane Jacobs once wrote, “must be a difficult place to raise children.” Yet, as one historian notes, had Jacobs turned as much attention to suburbs as she did to her beloved Greenwich Village, she would have discovered that suburbs possessed their own considerable appeal, particularly for those with children.

    Although some still hold onto the idea that suburbs are bad places to raise children, in virtually every region of the country, families with children are far more likely to live in suburbs than in cities. Nearly all the leading locations in percentages of married couples are suburbs, from Midwestern towns like O’Fallon, Missouri to Sugarland, Texas, Naperville, Illinois and Highlands Ranch, Colorado.

    In contrast, many of the places with the lowest percentages of children are urban centers. This includes many of the most highly touted urban cores such as Manhattan, Boston, Portland, Seattle and San Francisco.

    This is particularly true among more affluent, middle class, educated family households. Despite the rise in the number of children in a few affluent locales, such as the upper east side of Manhattan, most middle class families tend to cluster outside the city core. Even in Manhattan the number of kids falls considerably below the national average after the age of five.

    So the question remains: are families important to the planners, developers and politicians who run our cities? Veteran geographer Dick Morrill wonders if they do. He sees many cities turning their backs on working and middle class families, long the ballast of urban society throughout the ages.

    Instead, many city planners, and urban developers have focused their attention on the growing ranks of the unattached: the “young and restless,” the “creative class,” and the so-called “yuspie” – the young urban single professional. These advocates suggest that companies and cities should capture this segment, described by one as “the dream demographic.”

    The other coveted urban demographic centers on the so-called “empty nester,” largely boomers who have already raised families. Developers, like luxury homebuilder Robert Toll, see a vast movement of such people from the suburbs to the inner city. “We are more hip-hop and happening than our parents,” he explains. “We want the sophistication and joy and music that comes with city dwelling, and doesn’t come with sitting in the burbs watching the day go by…”

    Yet although this strategy might work for a handful of cities, childless urbanism may have its limits. There is, for example, little evidence that many empty nesters — outside of the very rich — are moving en masse to center cities. The vast majority seem to be staying put in the suburbs while a considerable group heads further out into the periphery and beyond.

    This leaves the key demographic for cities to remain viable: the young and educated, one group that has shown a tendency to move into center cities. But there’s a problem with relying of ‘yuspies” in the long run — they get older and grow up. Right now, as Philadelphia’s Paul Levy suggests, most young couples leave once they start having children. If cities are to hold on to this population, he suggests, they must address the basics important to families, such as public safety, good schools and parks.

    This issue will become even more pressing in the next few years. As the current and very large millennial generation ages, they will begin to dominate the housing market. From all accounts, they tend to be family oriented. More than 80 percent thought getting married would make them happy, and some 77 percent said they definitely or probably would want children, while less than twelve percent said they likely would not.

    If cities cannot change to appeal to these young people once they enter their 30s and 40s, they will be hard-pressed to maintain, much less expand, the population gains made over the past decade. Once the Millennials are gone, the next generation of young people seems certain to be considerably smaller.

    In this sense, the Millennials represent the future hope for cities. The need to shift the focus beyond the denser downtowns and towards many outlying neighborhoods will become a necessity. These places — think of Queens in New York, South St. Louis or parts of the northwest Philadelphia — may see less glamorous and more “plain vanilla” than city centers but they already possess some of the basic prerequisites needed by family: relatively low density, work areas nearby, neighborhood shopping streets, churches, schools and parks.

    What will happen to the least child-friendly cities over the next generation? Imagine a city with fewer total residences, inhabited by fewer people, although with a significant increase in “luxury” dwellings. In the new urban landscape, high-rise towers for the rich predominate, some of them in refurbished office buildings that formerly employed the middle class. These now become the homes of the “creative class” and the nomadic rich.

    This is a city whose funds come largely from the global economy, but whose needs are cared for largely by low-wage workers who eke out their existence in the city, and reside in outlying areas. Ultimately, such a bifurcated society may limit the economic functions that can be carried out in these places. A small cadre of operatives, including the CEO and some senior staff, may remain ensconced in the glamour zone but companies dependent on a broader array of talent will continue to relocate to less exclusive places, either to the suburbs or to different regions.

    Such pressures have already helped Houston to replace New York and Los Angeles as the nation’s energy capital. In the future a place like Charlotte will continue its emergence and its drive for financial dominance. Charlotte, suggests local real estate developer, John Harris, can compete against an expensive metropolitan region not only at the top levels of management, but across the board. “It’s hard to be a mass employer in San Francisco,” he notes.

    In the end, the elite childless city can be seen as both the culmination of urban development and as a demographic dead end. Unable to lift up outsiders and absorb newcomers, these cities may be able to thrive as high end business hubs and elite playgrounds. But they seem unlikely to absorb more than a trickle of those Americans who may want to move into dense urban places over the coming decades. Instead, this cohort may look to those towns ready and still willing to accommodate families.

    Joel Kotkin is the executive editor of Newgeography.com.

  • Silicon Valley’s Working Class Walks Tightrope

    It may be home to Google, Cisco, Oracle and the other gleaming companies of the New Economy, but times are tough for the Silicon Valley’s working class.

    “Working people in Silicon Valley are walking an economic tightrope, and any unexpected medical bill or even a car breakdown can push them over the edge.”

    What happens to a community like this when the working class can no longer afford to live there?

  • 250 Square Feet Condos in San Francisco

    In this famously expensive city, one developer has a plan: Build 250 square-feet condos for singles who can then move on up. The 98 units will sell from $279,000 to $330,000.

    Yes, it sounds like a glorified closet, but you have to admire Hauser Architects’ sense of practicality for these Hong Kong-style apartments. The huge towers going up on Rincon Hill and South of Market are only meant for those earning well into six figures. It’s refreshing that someone is actually building housing not meant for the super-wealthy. It could also serve as a harbinger of housing to come for single middle-class urban dwellers.