New Geography

Tag: Portland

  • New Traffic Scorecard Reinforces Density-Traffic Congestion Nexus

    Inrix, an industry provider of traffic information, has just published its third annual Traffic Scorecard, which ranks the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas based upon the intensity of their peak hour traffic congestion in 2009. The results provide further evidence of the association between higher urban population densities and more intense traffic congestion.

    Los Angeles, Again: Not surprisingly, Los Angeles is again the most congested metropolitan area over 1,000,000 population. In Los Angeles, roadway travel takes nearly 34.7% more in peak periods than when there is no congestion. This means that a trip that would take 30 minutes without congestion would take, on average 40.5 minutes during peak periods.

    The principal measure used by Inrix is the Travel Time Index, which was developed by the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI), for its congestion reports that started in 1982. TTI’s latest Urban Mobility Report is for 2007. The Inrix measures are developed from actual GPS vehicle readings. This information is also provided to TTI to assist in preparation of its annual Urban Mobility Report.

    Measuring Delay: In the new edition, Inrix switches from using the Travel Time Index to what it calls the Travel Time Tax. The difference between the two measures is that the Travel Time Tax measures the percentage of delay, such as 35% in Los Angeles, while the Travel Time Index would state the figure as 1.35. The new method is preferable because differences in traffic congestion are more readily apparent. . For example, a metropolitan area having a Travel Time Tax of 15% would have 50% worse traffic congestion than a metropolitan area having a Travel Time Tax of 10%. This large difference is not as obvious when comparing the Travel Time Index values of 1.15 and 1.10. The “Travel Time Tax” parlance, however, is less than optimal and this article will use “average congestion delay” instead.

    Ranking the Metropolitan Areas: The average congestion delay in Los Angeles was much worse than in the other largest metropolitan areas, just as its core urban area density is well above that of anywhere else in the US, including New York (where far less dense suburbs more than negate the density advantage in the core city). It also doesn’t help that a number of planned freeways were cancelled in Los Angeles over the last 50 years.

    Among the large metropolitan areas, Washington, DC had the second worst Average congestion delay, at 22.4%, followed by San Francisco, at 21.5%, Austin at 20.7% and New York at 19.7%. Austin may seem to have placed surprisingly high, however this was the nation’s last large metropolitan area to open a full freeway to freeway interchange and has only recently begun to develop a comprehensive freeway system, through the addition of toll roads. Austin’s late roadway development is the result of two factors. Austin was too small in 1956 to receive a beltway under the interstate highway system and an anti-freeway movement delayed construction for decades.

    Inrix also develops an average congestion delay for the worst commuting hour. Los Angeles also has the most congested worst hour, with an average congestion delay of 69%. Austin ranked second worst at 55%, while San Francisco was third at 46%, Washington, DC fourth at 45% and New York fifth at 44%.

    Honolulu: Almost as Bad as Los Angeles: Smaller metropolitan areas also exhibited intense traffic congestion. Honolulu had an average congestion delay nearly as bad as Los Angeles, at 32.4% and a worst hour average congestion delay of 64%. The core urban area of Honolulu has the highest density of any metropolitan area between 500,000 and 1,000,000 population. New York exurb Bridgeport-Stamford had a worst hour average congestion delay of 63%, with a peak period average congestion delay of 18.0%.

    Inrix: Density and Traffic Congestion: Virtually all of the congestion and most of the analyzed road mileage is in the urban areas, rather than in the rural areas that make up the balance of the metropolitan areas. The metropolitan areas with more dense urban areas tend to have worse traffic congestion, as the table below indicates.

      • Metropolitan areas with core urban densities (see Note 1) of more than 4,000 per square mile had peak period average congestion delays of 18.4%, which is more than three times that of metropolitan areas with core urban densities of less than 2,000 (5.9%).

      • Metropolitan areas with core urban densities of more than 4,000 per square mile had worst peak hour average congestion delays of 37.5%, which is nearly 2.4 times that of metropolitan areas with core urban densities of less than 2,000 (15.9%).

    These relationships are similar to those indicated in the Texas Transportation Institute data for 2007.

    Traffic Congestion & Urban Density in the United States: 2009
    Core Urban Area Density (2000) Peak Period Average Congestion Delay: 2009 Compared to Least Dense Category Worst Hour Average Congestion Delay: 2009 Compared to Least Dense Category
    Over 4,000 18.4% 3.26 37.5% 2.36
    3,000-3,999 10.0% 1.76 22.3% 1.41
    2,000-2,999 7.3% 1.30 17.7% 1.12
    Under 2,000 5.6% 1.00 15.9% 1.00
    Density: Population per square mile
    Travel Time Tax: Additional travel time required due to traffic congestion
    2000 population density is the latest reliable data
    Calculated from INRIX & 2000 Census data

    Sierra Club Data Also Shows Nexus: Moreover, the association between higher densities and greater traffic congestion is indicated by the ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability Density-VMT Calculator, which is based upon Sierra Club research. According to the Calculator, under the “smart growth” scenario, residential housing would be 15 units per acre, as opposed to its “business as usual” scenario at a typical density of four housing units per acre. The density of traffic (vehicle miles per square mile) under the higher density “smart growth” strategy would be 2.5 times as high as under the “business as usual” scenario (Figure).

    The Inevitable Comparisons: Invariably, analysts (smart growth advocates and me) like to point out relationships between Portland, with its “smart growth” policies and Atlanta, the least dense major urban area in the world. The Inrix data shows Portland to have an average peak hour delay of 12.2%, which is 15% worse than Atlanta (10.6%). Portland is nearly twice as dense as Atlanta, while Atlanta’s traffic congestion is made worse by one of the most decrepit freeway and arterial systems in the nation.

    A National Vision: Inrix has also developed a monthly national congestion delay factor. Inrix notes that traffic congestion had been improving as driving declined due to the Great Recession. However, Inrix refers to reduction in driving as “lucky,” and notes that without a “national vision” that “includes addressing congestion as a national priority,” greater traffic congestion will result.

    There is indeed good reason to address traffic congestion. As David Hartgen and M. David Fields have shown, there is a strong relationship between the higher levels of mobility that occur with less congestion and greater economic growth. Obviously that relationship extends to higher urban densities, which are associated with economically counter-productive levels of traffic congestion.

    But there is more than jobs and the economy. More intense traffic congestion produces more intense air pollution as well as more greenhouse gas emissions. It is well to remember that public health was the rationale for air pollution regulation. Air pollution’s negative impacts are so local that they are measured in the quality of life of individual people, especially those in close proximity to unnecessarily overcrowded roads. It is ironic that the higher density promoted by smart growth advocates exposes urban residents to more intense air pollution.

    Note 1: 2000 core urban area (urbanized area) population densities are used in this analysis because there is no later reliable information. The next reliable urban area density data will be a product of the 2010 census. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) produces later urban area density figures, many of which are substantially inconsistent with those of the United States Bureau of the Census, which is the primary source of such information. For example, as late as 2005, FHWA reported the Houston urban area to have 1.3 million fewer people than the Bureau of the Census, while reporting a land area nearly 250 square miles larger than the census had measured. Of course, this is a physical impossibility. The result was that Houston’s density was overstated by 45%.

    Note 2: Inrix also ranks metropolitan areas using an “overall congestion” measure, which is simply all congestion added up. As a result, the overall congestion measure is heavily weighted by population. This is illustrated by comparing Los Angeles and Honolulu. These metropolitan areas have very similar average congestion delays, as noted above. This means that drivers encounter similar traffic delays during peak in Los Angeles and Honolulu. However, Honolulu’s overall congestion measure is 95% less than that of Los Angeles, principally driven by the fact that Honolulu’s population is 93% less. As such, the overall congestion measure is of little relevance to people in their day to day commute or as a comparative measure of the intensity of congestion between areas.

    Photograph: Los Angeles City Hall.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

  • Welcome to Ecotopia

    In this era of tea-partying revolutionary-era dress-ups, one usually associates secessionism with the far right. But if things turn sour for the present majority in Washington, you should expect a whole new wave of separatism to emerge on the greenish left coast.

    In 1975 Ernest Callenbach, an author based in Berkeley, Calif., published a sci-fi novel about enviro-secessionists called Ecotopia; a prequel, Ecotopia Rising, came out in 1981. These two books, which have acquired something of a cult following, chronicle–largely approvingly–the emergence of a future green nation along the country’s northwest coast.

    Aptly described by Callenbach as “an empire apart,” this region is, in real life, among the world’s most scenic and blessed by nature. Many in this part of America have long been more enthusiastic about their ties to Asia than those with the rest of the country. It is also home to many fervent ecological, cultural and political activists, who often feel at odds with the less enlightened country that lies beyond their soaring mountains.

    Until the election of Barack Obama, the Pacific Northwest certainly was separating from the rest of America–at least in attitude. After George W. Bush’s victory the 2004 presidential election, the Seattle weekly The Stranger published an angry editorial about how coastal urbanites needed to reject “heartland values like xenophobia, sexism, racism and homophobia” and places where “people are fatter and dumber and slower.”

    Such a narrow, cynical view of the rest of the country is in line with Callenbach’s Ecotopia novels, in which the bad guys–representatives of American government and corporations–are almost always male, overweight and clueless about everything from technology to tending to the earth.

    Of course, would-be Ecotopians have much of which to be proud. The three great cities of the region–San Francisco, Portland and Seattle–easily rank among the most attractive on the continent. They all boast higher-than-average levels of education and–at least around San Francisco and Seattle–some of the world’s deepest concentrations of high-tech companies.

    Yet for all their promise, the Ecotopian regions cannot claim to have missed the current recession. Downtown Seattle currently suffers a vacancy rate in excess of 20%, the highest in decades; last year apartment rental rates dropped 13.8%, the steepest decline among American metros. Meanwhile vacancies in the Silicon Valley area south of San Francisco have soared to above 20%. By early this year, there was enough unoccupied office space in the Valley to fill 15 Empire State Buildings.

    This may seem a bit counter-intuitive for a region that boasts the headquarters of Microsoft, Costco, Amazon, Intel and Apple. But while such companies provide lots of high-wage employment, they are no longer enough to spark much growth across the region’s economy. The San Francisco area has actually lost jobs over the past decade and shows little sign of recovering its once prodigious growth rates.

    But easily the weakest of the economies has been Portland, which lacks the presence of major anchor firms like those in greater Seattle or the Bay Area. Portland’s unemployment rate has been well over 10% since late last year.

    A wave of youthful migration has made the city a slacker haven for the past decade and, in turn, exacerbated unemployment figures. Homeless kids now crowd the downtown area, which, although far from destitute, does appear pretty grungy in places.

    Yet, like the Ecotopians in the Callenbach novels, Portland residents and politicians seem nonplussed about their anemic economic performance. After all, the city voted heavily–despite solid opposition from the rest of the state–to raise Oregon’s taxes on wealthy individuals and corporations, a move likely to deter new in-bound investment.

    “You don’t have a big focus here on economic development,” observes Stephen B. Braun, dean of the School of Management at Portland’s Concordia University. “There’s much more emphasis on quality of life than on making a living.”

    The proof: Portland may have high unemployment, but the big idea around city hall is not how to promote jobs but about investing an additional $600 million in bike lanes.

    All these places, of course, avidly endorse green jobs even if there’s little prospect they could replace the jobs being lost in the fading blue-collar sectors. A growing green job sector needs a vibrant economy that produces things and builds new buildings, notions that have little currency across much of the region.

    This anti-growth attitude reflects that of Callenbach’s Ecotopia, which favors a “stable state” economy over job or wealth creation. Ecotopian politics explicitly ban both population increases and the private automobile.

    While the mayors of Portland, San Francisco and Seattle are hardly that extreme, they could propose policies that would make driving more burdensome. And they certainly seem to do wonders in chasing would-be baby-makers out of the city. All three cities have among the lowest percentages of children of any in the U.S.

    Perhaps the toughest issue facing the Ecotopian political economy lies with the issue of class. Callenbach’s Ecotopia adopts something of an anarchic socialism; the cities of the real ecotopia have tended toward ever greater class bifurcation.

    San Francisco, for example, boasts one of the highest per capita incomes in the nation and remains a favorite destination for inherited wealth, whether among individuals or nested in nonprofits. Yet according to the Public Policy Institute of California, if the cost of living is applied, San Francisco ranks high among urban counties in terms of its concentration of poverty.

    It doesn’t help that the city’s economy has been hemorrhaging corporate headquarters and mid-range middle-class jobs for decades. High-end workers commute to Google and other Valley companies, and others work in the financial or media sectors, but many mid-range jobs have been lost, many of them to more affordable business-friendly locales in places like Colorado.

    As middle-class jobs disappear, Ecotopia’s cities increasingly resemble restrictive communities that are anything but diverse. As analyst Aaron Renn has pointed out, Portland and Seattle stand as among the whitest big cities in the nation. And San Francisco’s once vibrant African-American population has been dropping for decades.

    In the coming years this pattern will likely become more pronounced in Seattle and Portland as well. These cities continue to attract many well-educated people, particularly from California, who in turn bring with them both significant accumulated wealth and anti-growth attitudes.

    Strict “green” planning regimes are also accelerating the decline of the local middle class by driving housing prices up, greatly diminishing the once wide affordability for the middle class. Seattle’s regulatory environment, according to one recent study, has bolstered housing prices in the region by $200,000 since 1989. The percentage of families who could afford a median price home in the area has fallen by more than half.

    Many observers see a similar outcome from Portland’s widely ballyhooed planning regime. Despite the massive acceptance by planners as something of a model for the restored city, the vast majority of all job and population growth in the region has occurred at the less pricey fringes, including across the river in Vancouver, Wash., which lies outside the fearsome Portland planning regime.

    So what is the future for the region, and particularly the eco-cities? If the country starts moving toward the center, and even the right, you can expect Ecotopian sentiment to rise again, perhaps not to the point of secession but expressed in attitude.

    But this may not be all bad. As America’s population grows and other regions rise, perhaps it’s helpful for the various parts of the country to experiment with different systems. Short of civil war, there’s something to be said for relentless, even if sometimes daft, experimentation at the local level. The rest of country may not follow all their strictures, but our would-be Ecotopians could produce some interesting and even usable ideas.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

  • Unlivable Vancouver

    Just in time for the winter Olympics, The Economist has rated Vancouver as the world’s most livable city. The Economist rates cities (presumably metropolitan areas or urban areas) “over 30 qualitative and quantitative factors across five broad categories: stability, healthcare, culture and environment, education and infrastructure.” There is no doubt that Vancouver is in a setting that is among the most attractive in the world. It is also clear that the quality of life is good in Vancouver.

    Vancouver won another honor in the last month, that of most unaffordable housing market in the six nations surveyed by the Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand). In Vancouver, housing costs 9.3 times annual gross household incomes and is rated severely unaffordable. This measure, the Median Multiple, would be 3.0 or less in a properly functioning urban market. The second most expensive major “city” in Canada was Toronto, far behind Vancouver, but still severely unaffordable at a Median Multiple of 5.2.

    Meanwhile, Pittsburgh, the ranked highest city in the United States (yes, higher than Portland, Seattle or San Diego) shows that affordability and livability are not incompatible. Pittsburgh has a Median Multiple of 2.6.

    Vancouver’s high ranking, however, makes it clear that the cost of housing (and by extension, the cost of living), has little to do with The Economist ratings. As Owen McShane wrote here to commemorate the last release of The Economist ratings, the cities are ranked based upon their attractiveness to expatriate executives. These are not ordinary Canadians. At historic credit underwriting standards, 85% of Canadians households could not qualify for a mortgage on the median priced house in Vancouver.

    Vancouver is doubtless among the most livable cities in the world for those for whom money is no object. But for ordinary Canadians, affordability is a prerequisite to livability. This makes Vancouver Canada’s least livable city.

  • Atlanta: Ground Zero for the American Dream

    The Atlanta area has much to be proud of, though it might not be obvious from the attitudes exhibited by many of its most prominent citizens. For years, local planners and business leaders have regularly trekked to planning’s Holy City (Portland) in hopes of replicating its principles in Atlanta. They would be better saving their air fares.

    Money Better Spent by Government than People? Most recently, Jay Bookman of the Atlanta Journal Constitution wonders whether taxes are high enough in Georgia and seems envious of the fact that Oregon’s voters approved tax increases in a recession, despite months of having one of the highest unemployment rates in the nation. Perhaps they were naïve enough to believe that the higher taxes would not stand in the way of attracting new business to the state. Or, perhaps the voters believed that, as a neighbor to basket case California, Golden State businesses might still flee to Oregon as an expensive but less congested environment (Note 1).

    Portland Transit: Nothing to Emulate: Bookman is also envious of Portland’s transit system with its light rail and commuter rail. Perhaps he is unaware of the “pecking order” of transit. Atlanta’s MARTA is superior to Portland’s MAX light rail in virtually every respect. MARTA a world class Metro. It is fully grade separated and averages about 70% faster than MAX, which is a revival of abandoned streetcar technology. It is thus not surprising that MARTA carries three times as much passenger demand as MAX, despite a total route length approximately the same as in Portland. Despite MARTA’s superiority to MAX, both the Atlanta and Portland transit systems share the transit curse of excessive costs. Atlantans are paying far less to subsidize their transit system than if they had unwisely, like Portland, extended it and taxed residents throughout the suburbs.

    Portland’s Embarrassing Commuter Rail Line: And, commuter rail does not appear to be a matter of pride in Portland at this point. Portland’s one commuter rail line celebrated its first year anniversary recently. Before the line opened, Tri-Met transit officials estimated that the line would “have 2,400 riders a day as soon as service begins.” The Wilsonville to Beaverton WES commuter rail line, however, never came close to that number. Daily ridership has been under 1,200. But the relative paucity of riders did not interfere with the transit agency’s spin and the media’s general sheepish agreement. At the one year anniversary a Tri-Met spokeswoman commented that “When you think about having 55,000 jobs lost in the region, that translates into fewer transit riders throughout the system and particularly during rush hour.” However, nowhere near the half of riders that failed to show for WES cannot be blamed on Portland’s high unemployment rate. If Portland were to return to unemployment levels of a year ago, WES would likely add no more than 50 daily riders.

    So, recession-ravaged Portland has built a commuter rail line that carries, at best, 0.5% of the capacity of adjacent freeways when it operates. Moreover, it has been costly. The line costs about $60 per passenger, only $2.50 of which is collected in fares. This means that the annual subsidy per passenger is nearly $15,000, almost enough to pay the annual mortgage cost on two median priced Atlanta homes.

    Portland Traffic Congestion Worse than Atlanta: Atlanta is renowned for its traffic congestion, which is a direct result of its failure to invest in the type of arterial grid that could provide substantial relief for its less than robust freeway system. Yet, based upon the latest Inrix National Traffic Scorecard, (GPS collected data for 2009), there is less peak period travel delay (as measured by the Travel Time Index) in Atlanta than in Portland, which is a reversal from data earlier in the decade (see note).

    Atlanta: Adding a New Zealand: Atlanta has no reason to look to Portland as a model, or anywhere else, for that matter. Coming out of World War II, the Portland metropolitan area was larger than the Atlanta metropolitan area (1950). Since that time, Portland has grown strongly, adding 1.5 million people. Atlanta has added more than three times as many people. The result is an economy that produces at least $150 billion more in wealth every year than Portland. Thus, the difference between Atlanta and Portland is more than the gross domestic product of New Zealand. For at least the last two decades, Atlanta has been the fastest growing large metropolitan area in the high-income world.

    Atlanta: Land of Opportunity: But perhaps the biggest draw about Portland for Atlanta leaders is its “growth management” (so-called “smart growth”) land use policies. Portland has drawn an urban growth boundary around its urbanization. Its land regulators commission “sun rises in the West” studies to deny the fact that this rationing of land increases house prices. There is, however, no question of the impact of more restrictive land use policies, from the World Bank to members of central bank boards to decorated economists such as Kat Barker of the Bank of England and Donald Brash, former governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.

    The result is superior housing affordability. Late in the year, the median house price in Atlanta was 2.1 times median household incomes (the Median Multiple). By comparison, the Median Multiple in Portland was 4.2, indicating that house prices are twice as high relatively speaking in Portland. In 1990, before Portland implemented its more stringent smart growth policies, housing affordability in Portland was about equal to Atlanta.

    But there is more to the story. Portland’s heavy handed planning policies are distorting product offerings so much that only the richest can afford more than a miniature back yard. This is illustrated by the images of new housing developments below in the suburbs of Portland and Atlanta (below). Both pictures are taken from approximately 1,500 feet above the ground.

    In the Portland example, virtually on the fringe of the urban area (the next urbanization is at least 10 miles away); houses are stacked in at more than 15 to the acre, with just a few feet between the roof-lines – vaguely reminiscent of third world shantytowns (Note 2). The more traditional suburban development that characterizes most of Portland is also shown on three sides of the overly dense new development.

    In the Atlanta example, houses have been recently built at about 4 to the acre, which has been the American suburban norm (except where land use regulations have required larger lots). The emerging sameness of Portland’s housing gives new meaning to the “ticky tack” criticism of suburbanization.

    Our 6th Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey found Atlanta to be the second most affordable metropolitan area with more than 1,000,000 residents and the 17th most affordable metropolitan area out of 272 markets in six nations. Portland ranked 180th. Atlanta is truly a land of opportunity for young households and lower middle income households that can never hope of owning their own home in Portland’s pricey, growth management driven market.

    Rather than being a shameful example of metropolitan disaster, Atlanta remains one of the diminishing number of American urban areas where the American Dream can still be offered at a price that middle income households can afford. Atlanta has also emerged as one of the world’s best examples of ethnic diversity, not only in the core but also in the suburbs. More than half of the new residents in the suburbs have been non-Anglo since 1990 in Atlanta, about which it can proud. Atlanta is inferior only in the quality of is public relations and self-understanding. It should be a required stop for planners from Portland and beyond, for remedial education on injecting humanity and aspiration back into urbanization.

    Note 1: Bookman also notes in his column that Portland’s traffic congestion has not worsened at the rate I predicted in a 1999 Atlanta Constitution oped. I had not anticipated the huge gasoline price increases, which have materially reduced the rate of traffic growth virtually everywhere and made previous congestion increase rates unreliable as predictors of future growth.

    Note 2: For example, see the similar rooflines in a Dhaka shantytown near Gulshan at 23:47 North and 90:24 East in Google Earth. The principal difference in roof lines is the Dhaka slum’s lack of streets and cars, both of which seem consistent with the anti-mobility stance of “smart growth” planning.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

    Photo: hyku

  • “First” vs. “Worst”

    Taking on the Portland mystique is not easy – and likely I’ll find out again with my most recent piece: Picture-perfect Portland?

    But I’d also like to take a Midwest perspective that shows some surprising things. Let’s compare Portland to a similarly sized and less acclaimed Midwest city, Indianapolis. You can think of Portland as being in “first place” from a policy perspective by popular acclaim. It has an urban growth boundary, extensive transit, excellent urban density, a strong biking culture, a strong culture of civic engagement, the most microbreweries per capita, and on down the line. It is a place people want to live in so badly that they will move there with no job in hand and would be one of the cities that comes to mind among similar sized metros as a talent hub.

    If Portland is first, then you’d have to characterize Indianapolis as “worst”. Indianapolis is surrounded by expanding suburbia with very pro-sprawl policies on all four sides. It is one of the least dense cities in America. It has no rail transit and only the 99th largest bus system, along with one of the lowest transit market shares in the country. It is currently in the middle of a multi-billion program to widen about 60 miles of freeway. It just recently put in its very first bike lanes and scores near the bottom in green measures of sustainability. Its brand image also is hardly the best. You don’t hear too many people around the country going, “Man, I’ve gotta get me to Indianapolis.”

    But let’s look at how these cities compare on various quantitative measures of urban performance.

     

    Portland

    Indianapolis

    Population Growth (2000-2008)

    14.5%

    12.5%

    Domestic In-Migration (2000-2008)

    5.4%

    4.2%

    International In-Migration (2000-2008)

    3.7%

    1.4%

    Job Growth 2001-2009 (QCEW)

    10,300 (1.1%)

    17,100 (2.1%)

    Job Growth 2001-2009 (CES)

    23,800 (2.4%)

    31,000 (3.6%)

    Unemployment Rate (Nov 2009)

    10.8%

    8.2%

    Per Capita GMP (2008)

    47,811

    46,450

    Per Capital GMP Growth (2001-2008)

    22.4%

    1.7%

    Median Household Income (ACS 2008)

    $58,758

    $53,671

    Median Monthly Housing Cost (ACS 2008)

    $1,522

    $1,125

    College Degree Attainment (ACS 2008)

    33.3%

    31.8%

    Travel Time Index (Texas A&M)

    1.28

    1.21

    Now in most of these Portland does beat Indy, but not by a lot. In job growth and unemployment – two big factors in today’s economy – Indy actually does better. Portland’s higher incomes are offset by higher housing costs. There are only two stats – international migration and GMP per capita growth – where Portland has a big lead.

    Given the wide difference in their policies, it is striking to see these cities so close. By rights, it should be total world domination by Portland – but it isn’t.

    Now obviously these aren’t the only statistics to measure a city by. Portland residents would no doubt tout their many livability advantages. Yet at some point isn’t livability supposed to translate into superior demographic and economic performance? Isn’t it supposed to make a city attractive to the talent pool needed to thrive in the 21st century? And isn’t that talent supposed to power the economy? I was particularly struck by how close the cities were on college degree attainment. While I called Portland a talent hub, perhaps I spoke too soon. Contrast with Boston, which has 41.9% of its over 25 population with a bachelors degree or better.

    It may be that policy changes act with a lag. But Portland has been at this a long time. The UGB dates to 1973 and the light rail system started construction in the early 80s, for example. Perhaps other factors play a bigger role than many imagine. Land use and transportation policies might provide benefits to cities, but they do not, by themselves, create an economic dynamo.

  • Will Anyone Stand Up for American Industry?

    “Esau for one morsel of meat sold his birthright. For ye know how that afterward, when he would have inherited the blessing, he was rejected: for he found no place of repentance, though he sought it carefully with tears.” – Hebrews 12:16-17

    Built from 1933-1936, the Bay Bridge linking San Francisco to Oakland was an engineering marvel of its day. A complex series of multiple spans, when it opened – six months ahead of the more famous Golden Gate Bridge – it was both the longest suspended bridge deck in the world and the longest cantilever bridge in the world. The western suspension bridge section, technically two bridges in one, had to settle for being only the second and third longest suspension bridges in the world.

    The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake badly damaged the Bay Bridge. The iconic western suspension span was seismically reinforced, but the eastern steel truss section required replacement. San Francisco wanted another iconic span, not just a functional one. A striking self-anchored suspension structure was selected and is under construction.

    The dubious part of this new span isn’t the usual matter of being way late and massively over budget – though it is – but where it’s being made. The steel for the bridge is not being built in America but in China.

    Why is this bridge being fabricated in China? The troubling answer, according to a lengthy article in the SF Public Press, is that no American company can do the job. America, a country that once pulled off the most audacious of engineering projects with panache, one that put a man on the moon in the 1960s, now can’t even build a bridge to replace one it constructed with ease in the 1930s.

    What’s more disturbing, is that China can’t really build it either – but we are teaching them, and paying for them to learn how.

    When you drive across that new Bay Bridge, your tolls will literally be helping to finance the advancement of China’s industrial base and the evisceration of America’s.

    I believe in free trade, strongly. I believe America can compete in a free market. But the United States is a country curiously uncommitted to industry. Other countries build, promote and protect industrial champions. They blockade their markets against American competitors. India freely sells us software and BPO, but passes laws to hamper Wal-Mart and other American firms. China demands many foreign companies do business there only through joint ventures, and transfer technology to local partners. It also intervenes to keep its currency artificially low. Many countries outright ban foreign involvement in many sectors such as energy. They view even their privately owned firms, many of which have close and corrupt ties to the state, as instruments of national and foreign policy.

    These places see Japan as a model to follow, a country that used its closed market to build industrial champions, even in high technology markets. Perhaps in time the same problems that hobbled Japan – asset bubbles, debt, demographic collapse, or an inflexible economy – will similarly afflict these emerging markets. But by that time it might be too late for American industry. And those problems are just as likely to affect us as them.

    This raises difficult questions about the future of America. Can we thrive as a purely post-industrial economy? Can we have a long term prosperous society built on little more than selling each other ever more exotic pieces of financial paper, creative consultancies, typing away at computers, serving up caffe lattes, and the like? Can we have a just social order as a two-tier society of only highly-paid elite knowledge workers and a low end service class, but not the robust middle class a manufacturing economy – along with agriculture and energy – supported?

    Can America even retain its military industrial strength under such conditions? In the past, military technologies launched spin-offs to the commercial world. Today, the reverse is as likely to happen. Already the only major ship builders left in America are captive suppliers to the US Navy. Only the anomalous Jones Act has kept a tradition of small and medium sized commercial shipbuilding alive.

    There’s a positive reinforcement cycle at work. The less we manufacture, the less we can manufacture. We slowly lose the skills, the facilities, the institutions, and the culture that enable a robust manufacturing economy to thrive. Eventually, we won’t be able to recover.

    Maybe we won’t even want to. The less we make, the less we want to make. As we become unmoored from our agro-industrial roots, we fail to see them as central to our national identity and frequently treat them with hostility. As Douglas and Wildavsky put it in Risk and Culture (1982):

    A larger proportion of the population of working age was disengaged from the production process than had been before. The economic boom and educational boom together produced a cohort of articulate, critical people with no commitment to commerce and industry.

    Increasingly, Americans have no personal experience with industry, and even no family experience with it. What was once common is just another niche, much like military service has become. This means most people have little familiarity or affection for industry, agriculture, or energy production. Many, especially urban dwellers, view most productive industry as a negative, as a source of blight where once others saw jobs and a strong tax base.

    Portland provides the perfect example. It views its waterfront as prime territory for residences and recreation, but not for industry. As the Oregonian reports:

    The question makes Jay Zidell uncomfortable. When will he stop building barges on the waterfront and start building high-rises? The room goes silent….Oregon power brokers have nudged the Zidell family for decades to do more with their prime Portland real estate…In the 1970s, Gov. Tom McCall called Jay Zidell’s late father, Emery, to suggest he stop adding industrial buildings. As Jay Zidell has told the story, McCall said: “We have big plans for the waterfront.”

    Those big plans don’t include manufacturing. Portland is the perfect example of where America is heading. It’s a place where thousands of highly educated but often underemployed young people sip lattes by the light rail while on the waiting list for a job at Starbucks. Meanwhile people in third world countries, hungry for more, hustle to build an ambitious future for themselves and their nation. Americans increasingly view manufacturing as an undesirable activity, particularly in an urban context, when in fact we should be looking to build new industrial cities – updated, re-imagined, and re-designed for a 21st century economy.

    Also, too often industry is viewed only as a source of pollution. Many industrial expansions are opposed on environmental grounds. But from a global, not local perspective, an ever stricter regime of regulation is sending firms offshore where pollution standards are usually far laxer. Corporations put a green gloss on their branding campaigns while building their products in China, where they get electricity from one of the new coal fired power plants that open at a rate of more than one per week. They also escape independent unions, anything like the Environment Impact Statement process in the US, and operate in a regime of weak property rights, questionable worker health and safety conditions, and a limited ability for the public to dissent. It’s not just cheap labor, it’s regulatory arbitrage. It’s like inverse colonialism, only this time the joke’s on the West. And the end result is a global environment that ends up worse, not better.

    To really protect the environment, we should be doing more manufacturing at home, where we can keep an eye on it and prevent the worst abuses. It’s like the Steak ‘n Shake boast about their open kitchens: “In sight, it must be right”.

    The sometimes exception to this negative take on manufacturing is, of course, “green” industry, notwithstanding that the concept does not exist except as a transitory state. In a decade there will just be “manufacturing”, and virtually all will adhere to green standards. But if America can’t succeed at traditional manufacturing, why would anyone think it will be different with green manufacturing? Even if so, by then there might not be many major American producers left to succeed.

    American firms and labor have made many mistakes over the years, but more often today they are adopting the new approaches needed to compete in tomorrow’s world. American labor can compete, even against cheap foreign workers, since it is the best and most productive workforce in the world. But not when public policy implicitly favors shipping manufacturing overseas.

    The answer is not protectionism, it’s freeing American labor to compete and developing policies designed to advance American manufacturing interests. Alexis de Tocqueville talked about Americans knowing the difference between raw, naked self interest, and “self-interest well-understood”. Likewise, we need to find a new approach to create “free trade, well understood”, a modern day trade equivalent of speaking softly, but carrying a big stick. Billions for American infrastructure, but not one $4 Bay Bridge toll to finance China’s technology ambitions.

    Alas, this seems unlikely. American industry is trapped between a political right that can’t see beyond instinctive anti-federalism and an overly ideological vision of free trade, and a political left that, while paying lip service to labor interests, no longer embraces industry. Almost alone among nations, America today lacks political champions for its industry. That, more than anything, is why it is being left to wither. Will anyone stand up and be counted before it’s too late?

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile.

  • Migration: Geographies In Conflict

    It’s an interesting puzzle. The “cool cities”, the ones that are supposedly doing the best, the ones with the hottest downtowns, the biggest buzz, leading-edge new companies, smart shops, swank restaurants and hip hotels – the ones that are supposed to be magnets for talent – are often among those with the highest levels of net domestic outmigration. New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston, Miami and Chicago – all were big losers in the 2000s. Seattle, Denver, and Minneapolis more or less broke even. Portland is the only proverbially cool city with a regional population over two million that gained any significant number of migrants.

    Those who find this an occasion for a schadenfreude moment attribute it to tax and regulatory climates. Clearly, things like cost of doing business are clearly very important. And indeed this is often under-rated by cool city proponents. And other things equal, people do prefer low tax jurisdictions. Still, is this the only answer, or is there another explanation? Could it be that rather than high costs driving migration, both costs and migration are being driven by other underlying factors?

    Perhaps the root problem is structural change in the economy in the age of globalization. As business became more globalized and more virtualized, this created demand for new types of financial products and producer services – notably in the law, accounting, consultancy, and marketing areas – to help businesses service and control their far flung networks. Unlike many activities, financial and producer services are subject to clustering economics, and have ended up concentrated in a relatively small number of cities around the world.

    These so-called “global cities” serve as control nodes for various global networks and key production sites for these services, along with other specialized niches they long had. In effect, more distributed economic activities requires increasing centralization of select functions, particularly the most highly value-added functions. Yet these activities are not set in stone; for example, areas that were once centers for global business, like Cleveland or Detroit, are fading; others like Houston and Dallas are rising.

    Yet unlike the Texas cities, which retain a strong middle-class and middle-echelon economy, many of the more elite, established urban centers – for example New York and London – increasingly create parallel economies and labor markets in those cities. These cities now generally contain two kinds of people and firms: those who are part of the global city functions and those who are not. Those who are engaged in global city functions operate in a world of very high value-added activities; specialized, niche skill markets; and rising demand conditions. Those skills are not readily acquired outside of global cities. Often, they are sub-specialized to particular places as different global cities specialize in different niches.

    In many cases, these functions have not yet migrated to India or China or often even another global city. This tends to inflate salaries significantly for these specialized, niche skill jobs.

    On the other hand, many people who once thrived in these cities have not benefited from these economic forces. They often are in occupations where labor arbitrage is feasible, and their jobs can either be off-shored, or readily transferred to lower cost locales in the US. This includes manufacturing work, but also important but less specialized white collar occupations like basic accounting, loan officers, corporate IT, and HR. In short, the routine side of the traditional monolithic corporate headquarters and services firm.

    In effect, in these global cities, two economic geographies share the same physical geography – and those economic geographies are in conflict. One set requires catering to high skill, highly paid workers and firms where cost is a secondary concern. The other involves occupations and industries where cost is very much a concern. The occupants of these two geographies have very different public policy priorities. Which of them will win out?

    In a global city, particularly a mature and expensive one, the elite geography wins. It is generating the most money, and with money comes power and influence. Additionally, the high wage workers in these industries are simply able to pay more for real estate and other items. Their mere paychecks are driving up costs in the city they live in. They are re-ordering the city in their own high income image, aided and abetted by a speculative financial fueled housing bubble.

    The prestige of these industries burnishes the civic brand, making them attractive to civic boosters. What’s more, leaders in global cities feel that these are their businesses of their future. For them the attractiveness of concentrating in areas where you think you can create a “wide moat” advantage makes sense.

    This is why cities like Portland, Minneapolis, Denver, and Seattle haven’t fared nearly so badly – they aren’t really full metal global cities and thus, while not always cheap, have remained relatively affordable versus places like San Francisco and New York.

    At the same time it is not easy for these more expensive cities to adopt a low tax, low cost approach. For many reasons, places like San Francisco, New York, and London will never, no matter what they do, be able to match Atlanta, Houston, or Dallas, or even Chicago in a war on costs. That would be a suicide mission. Their logical strategy is to follow the law of comparative advantage, and specialize where you have the best competitive position in the market, and that’s global city functions.

    Many other cities have followed this strategy, but with differing success. Fearing to end up like the next Michigan and Detroit pair, many states and cities have invested heavily to build up urban amenities to cater to the global city firms and their workers: transit systems, showplace public buildings, art and culture events, bike lanes, and beautification. Cost fell by the wayside as a concern, as did investments in priorities of the traditional middle class.

    This explains why, for example, not only have taxes gone up, but things like schools and other basic services have declined so badly in places like California. Traditional primary and secondary education is not important to industries where California is betting its future. Silicon Valley, Hollywood, and biotech draw their workers from the best and brightest of the world. They source globally, not locally. Their labor force is largely educated elsewhere. Basic education and investments in poorer neighborhoods has no ROI for those industries. With the decline of high tech manufacturing in Silicon Valley, even previously critical institutions such as community colleges are no longer as needed.

    The same goes for growth and sprawl. They are playing a game of quality over quantity. They specialize in elite urban areas and elite suburbs or exurbs. For example, San Francisco also has Marin, Palo Alto and Los Altos Hills. New York has, in addition to Manhattan, Greenwich and northern Westchester. The only thing they need size for is sheer scale in certain urban functions, and they already have it. Growth is unnecessary for them and only brings problems.

    It also explains the highly pro-immigration stance of these cities, as a large service class is needed for globalization’s new aristocrats. Immigrants are needed as low cost labor in the burgeoning restaurant and hotel business. In America’s global cities immigrant housekeepers, landscapers, and nannies are common. They may not dress like His Lordship’s butler, but that doesn’t make them any less servants.

    Lastly, it explains why we have seen the same polarizing class pattern so consistently despite broad geographic and socio-political differences between places like Los Angeles, Boston, and Chicago, to say nothing of overseas locales like London. A common global phenomenon probably has a common underlying cause.

    The traditional middle class, feeling the squeeze, is simply moving to where its own kind is king and its own priorities are catered to. In a battle of conflicting economic geographies, the one with higher value added wins, displacing others in what Jane Jacobs termed the “self-destruction of diversity”. First, an attractive environment draws diverse uses, then one becomes economically dominant and, through superior purchasing power, displaces other uses over time. The story ends when that dominant economic activity exhausts itself – the true danger facing global cities, though fortunately they are generally not dependent on just one small niche. It’s basic comparative advantage.

    If you are just an average middle class guy, why live in one of those global cities anyway? Unless you have roots there that you value, take advantage of something you can’t get anywhere else such as by having a passion for world class opera, or are one of globalization’s courtiers – a hanger on like a high end chef, artist, or indie rocker, perhaps – why put up with the high cost and hassles? It makes no sense. You’re better off living in suburban Cincinnati than suburban Chicago.

    And frankly, the folks on the global city side prefer it if you leave anyway. Immigrants are unlikely to start trouble, but a middle class facing an economic squeeze and threat to its way of life might raise a ruckus. That won’t happen if enough of them move to Dallas and rob the rest of critical mass and resulting political clout.

    Many of those leaving are college educated, especially, when they get older, get married, and start having families. A relatively large number of these people could be replaced by a smaller number of elite bankers, biotech PhDs, and celebrity chefs. In that case, both “narratives” could hold simultaneously. One type of talent moves in, while a greater number of a different kind moves out. As with trade generally, this could even be viewed as a win-win in some regard.

    Again, it is easy to blame the costs and public policy. Clearly there is room for improvement in governance such as reigning in out of control civil service pay and pensions in places like California and New York. But what is more pernicious is the rising income gap in America, and the likely outcomes it drives when a city acquires a small elite economic class with incomes that far outstrip the average, and lacks strong economic linkages to the rest of the city other than for personal services. It sets in motion economic logic that undermines the traditional middle class, which then starts leaving, exacerbating the gap.

    For years we worried that a large, stable middle class with a permanent, largely minority underclass constituted an unjust order. As it turns out, the alternatives are sometimes worse. Ultimately some American cities have come to take on the cast of their third world brethren, a perhaps somewhat less extreme version of Mexico City or São Paulo, where vast wealth and glitter exist side by side with the favelas.

    This explains why America’s global cities often feel more kinship with their international peers than with many of the places in their own country. The global cities, which now enjoy something of a political ascendency, are also sundering the American commonwealth. Taking steps to prevent a further widening of the income gap may be the only way to save these cities’ middle class – and maintain the solidarity of the country.

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile.

  • Numbers Don’t Support Migration Exodus to “Cool Cities”

    For the past decade a large coterie of pundits, prognosticators and their media camp followers have insisted that growth in America would be concentrated in places hip and cool, largely the bluish regions of the country.

    Since the onset of the recession, which has hit many once-thriving Sun Belt hot spots, this chorus has grown bolder. The Wall Street Journal, for example, recently identified the “Next Youth-Magnet Cities” as drawn from the old “hip and cool” collection of yore: Seattle, Portland, Washington, New York and Austin, Texas.

    It’s not just the young who will flock to the blue meccas, but money and business as well, according to the narrative. The future, the Atlantic assured its readers, did not belong to the rubes in the suburbs or Sun Belt, but to high-density, high-end places like New York, San Francisco and Boston.

    This narrative, which has not changed much over the past decade, is misleading and largely misstated. Net migration, both before and after the Great Recession, according to analysis by the Praxis Strategy Group, has continued to be strongest to the predominately red states of the South and Intermountain West.

    This seems true even for those seeking high-end jobs. Between 2006 and 2008, the metropolitan areas that enjoyed the fastest percentage shift toward educated and professional workers and industries included nominally “unhip” places like Indianapolis, Charlotte, N.C., Memphis, Tenn., Salt Lake City, Jacksonville, Fla., Tampa, Fla., and Kansas City, Mo.

    The overall migration numbers are even more revealing. As was the case for much of the past decade, the biggest gainers continue to include cities such as San Antonio, Dallas and Houston. Rather than being oases for migrants, some oft-cited magnets such as New York, Boston, Los Angeles and Chicago have all suffered considerable loss of population to other regions over the past year.

    Much the same pattern emerges when you look at longer-term state demographic patterns. A recent survey by the Empire Center for New York State Policy found that the biggest net losers in terms of per capita outmigration between 2000 and 2008 were, with the exception of Louisiana, all blue state bastions. New York residents lead in terms of rate of exodus, closely followed by the District of Columbia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and California.

    An even greater shock to the sensibilities of the insular, Manhattan-centric media, the report found that most of the movement from the Empire State was not from the much-dissed suburbia, but from that hip and cool paragon, New York City. This can not be ascribed as a loss of the unwanted: According to the report, those leaving the city had 13% higher incomes than those coming in.

    How can this be, when everyone who’s smart and hip is headed to the Big Apple? This question was addressed in a report by the center-left, New York-based Center for an Urban Future. True, considerable numbers of young, educated people come to New York, but it turns out that many of them leave for the suburbs or other states as they reach their peak earning years.

    Indeed, it’s astonishing given the many clear improvements in New York that more residents left the five boroughs for other locales in 2006, the peak of the last boom, than in 1993, when the city was in demonstrably worse shape. In 2006, the city had a net loss of 153,828 residents through domestic out-migration, compared to a decline of 141,047 in 1993, with every borough except Brooklyn experiencing a higher number of out-migrants in 2006.

    Of course, blue state boosters can point out that the exodus has slowed with the recession, as opportunities have dried up elsewhere. True, the flood of migration has slowed across the nation. Yet it has only slowed, not dried up. When the economy revives, it’s likely to start flowing heavily again.

    More important, the key group leaving New York and other so-called “youth-magnets” comprises the middle class, particularly families, critical to any long-term urban revival. This year’s Census shows that the number of single households in New York has reached record levels; in Manhattan, more than half of all households are singles. And the Urban Future report’s analysis found that even well-heeled Manhattanites with children tend to leave once they reach the age of 5 or above.

    The key factor here may well be economic opportunity. Virtually all the supposedly top-ranked cities cited in this media narrative have suffered below-average job growth throughout the decade. Some, like Portland and New York, have added almost no new jobs; others like San Francisco, Boston and Chicago have actually lost positions over the past decade.

    In contrast, even after the current doldrums, San Antonio, Orlando, Houston, Dallas and Phoenix all boast at least 5% more jobs now than a decade ago. Among the large-narrative magnet regions only one–government-bloated greater Washington–has enjoyed strong employment growth.

    The impact of job growth on the middle class has been profound. New York City, for example, has the smallest share of middle-income families in the nation, according to a recent Brookings Institution study; its proportion of middle-income neighborhoods was smaller than that of any metropolitan area except Los Angeles.The same pattern has also emerged in what has become widely touted as America’s “model city”–President Obama’s adopted hometown of Chicago.

    The likely reasons behind these troubling trends are things rarely discussed in “the narrative”–concerns like high costs, taxes and regulations making it tough on industries that employ the middle class. One clear culprit: out of control state spending. State spending in New York is second per capita in the nation (anomalous Alaska is first); California stands fourth and New Jersey seventh. Illinois is down the list but coming up fast. Over the past decade, while its population grew by only 7%, Illinois’ spending grew by an inflation-adjusted 39%.

    The problem here is more than just too-large government; it lies in how states spend their money. Massive public spending increases over the past decade in California, New Jersey, Illinois and New York have gone overwhelmingly into the pockets and pensions of public employees. It certainly has not flowed into such basic infrastructure as roads, bridges and ports that are needed to keep key industries competitive.

    The American Association of State Highway Transportation, for example, ranked New York 43rd in the country and New Jersey dead last in terms of quality of roads. Some 46% of the Garden State’s roads were rated in poor condition, compared with the national average of 13%, even as the state’s spending reached new highs. The typical New Jersey driver spends almost $600 a year in auto repairs necessitated by the poor conditions of the roads.

    In contrast, states in the South and parts of the Plains tend to pour their public resources into productive uses. Cities like Mobile, Ala., Houston, Charleston, S.C., and Savannah, Ga., have been investing in port facilities to take advantage of the planned widening of the Panama Canal. The primary goal is to take business away from the increasingly expensive, overregulated and under-invested ports of the Northeast and West Coast. Similarly, places like Kansas City and the Dakotas are looking to boost their basic rail and road networks to support export-heavy industries.

    Even in the face of the Obama administration’s strongly urban-centric, blue state-oriented economic policy, these generally less than hip places appear poised to grow as the economy recovers. Virtually all the top 10 economies that have withstood the recession come from outside the “youth-magnet” field: San Antonio; Oklahoma City; Little Rock, Ark.; Dallas, Baton Rouge, La.; Tulsa, Okla., Omaha, Neb.; Houston and El Paso, Texas. The one exception to this rule, Austin, also benefits from being located in solvent, generally low-tax Texas.

    This continued erosion of jobs and the middle class from the blue states and cities is not inevitable. Many of these places enjoy enormous assets in terms of universities, strategic location, concentrations of talented workers and entrenched high-wage industries. But short of a massive and continuing bailout from Washington, the only way to reverse their decline will be a thorough reformation of their governmental structure and policies. No narrative, no matter how well spun, can make up for that reality.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin Press early next year.

  • The Week New Urbanism Died?

    It has been a bad media week for New Urbanism.

    “The day that New Urbanism Died?” was the headline of the St. Louis Urban Workshop blog that detailed the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Whittaker Builders, developer of the “New Town at St. Charles,” a premier New Urbanist community located in the St. Louis exurbs (beyond the suburbs).

    The author notes that “New Town will not disappear, plenty of people are happy to live there, but its promise is gone. It’s become just another suburban enclave and will face the same challenges as other suburban developments; lack of retail, long commutes, etc.” The blog’s headline is a play on a characterization by postmodern architect Charles Jenks, who referred to the demolition of the infamous Pruitt-Igoe public housing project as “The Day Modern Architecture Died.”

    The Northwest Indiana Times detailed the failure of a new urbanist community (Coffee Creek) in an October 23 article. The article noted that the planned 2,000 home mixed use development, located in the exurbs 45 miles from Chicago’s Loop had attracted only 12 homes and an apartment building. Much of the empty land has been purchased by another developer, who indicated an affection for the new urbanism concept, noting however that it probably would not work here. The article notes that a more modest New Urbanist development is doing better, in nearby Burns Harbor, with 75 homes occupied out of a planned 300.

    Perhaps the unkindest cut of all was a survey, reported by the Oregonian, to the effect that residents of Orenco Station travel by car to work nearly as much as people who live in the unremarkably conventional and sprawling suburbs of Portland.

    Despite these unhappy stories, the death of New Urbanism is not imminent. True, to the extent that New Urbanism requires subsidies it is likely to prove unsustainable in the longer term, like its Pruitt-Igoe type predecessors. On the other hand, to the extent that New Urbanism represents a genuine response of architects, builders and developers to actual, rather than imagined demand, New Urbanism could be with us for some time to come.

  • The White City

    Among the media, academia and within planning circles, there’s a generally standing answer to the question of what cities are the best, the most progressive and best role models for small and mid-sized cities. The standard list includes Portland, Seattle, Austin, Minneapolis, and Denver. In particular, Portland is held up as a paradigm, with its urban growth boundary, extensive transit system, excellent cycling culture, and a pro-density policy. These cities are frequently contrasted with those of the Rust Belt and South, which are found wanting, often even by locals, as “cool” urban places.

    But look closely at these exemplars and a curious fact emerges. If you take away the dominant Tier One cities like New York, Chicago and Los Angeles you will find that the “progressive” cities aren’t red or blue, but another color entirely: white.

    In fact, not one of these “progressive” cities even reaches the national average for African American percentage population in its core county. Perhaps not progressiveness but whiteness is the defining characteristic of the group.

    The progressive paragon of Portland is the whitest on the list, with an African American population less than half the national average. It is America’s ultimate White City. The contrast with other, supposedly less advanced cities is stark.

    It is not just a regional thing, either. Even look just within the state of Texas, where Austin is held up as a bastion of right thinking urbanism next to sprawlvilles like Dallas-Ft. Worth and Houston.

    Again, we see that Austin is far whiter than either Dallas-Ft. Worth or Houston.

    This raises troubling questions about these cities. Why is it that progressivism in smaller metros is so often associated with low numbers of African Americans? Can you have a progressive city properly so-called with only a disproportionate handful of African Americans in it? In addition, why has no one called these cities on it?

    As the college educated flock to these progressive El Dorados, many factors are cited as reasons: transit systems, density, bike lanes, walkable communities, robust art and cultural scenes. But another way to look at it is simply as White Flight writ large. Why move to the suburbs of your stodgy Midwest city to escape African Americans and get criticized for it when you can move to Portland and actually be praised as progressive, urban and hip? Many of the policies of Portland are not that dissimilar from those of upscale suburbs in their effects. Urban growth boundaries and other mechanisms raise land prices and render housing less affordable exactly the same as large lot zoning and building codes that mandate brick and other expensive materials do. They both contribute to reducing housing affordability for historically disadvantaged communities. Just like the most exclusive suburbs.

    This lack of racial diversity helps explain why urban boosters focus increasingly on international immigration as a diversity measure. Minneapolis, Portland and Austin do have more foreign born than African Americans, and do better than Rust Belt cities on that metric, but that’s a low hurdle to jump. They lack the diversity of a Miami, Houston, Los Angeles or a host of other unheralded towns from the Texas border to Las Vegas and Orlando. They even have far fewer foreign born residents than many suburban counties of America’s major cities.

    The relative lack of diversity in places like Portland raises some tough questions the perennially PC urban boosters might not want to answer. For example, how can a city define itself as diverse or progressive while lacking in African Americans, the traditional sine qua non of diversity, and often in immigrants as well?

    Imagine a large corporation with a workforce whose African American percentage far lagged its industry peers, sans any apparent concern, and without a credible action plan to remediate it. Would such a corporation be viewed as a progressive firm and employer? The answer is obvious. Yet the same situation in major cities yields a different answer. Curious.

    In fact, lack of ethnic diversity may have much to do with what allows these places to be “progressive”. It’s easy to have Scandinavian policies if you have Scandinavian demographics. Minneapolis-St. Paul, of course, is notable in its Scandinavian heritage; Seattle and Portland received much of their initial migrants from the northern tier of America, which has always been heavily Germanic and Scandinavian.

    In comparison to the great cities of the Rust Belt, the Northeast, California and Texas, these cities have relatively homogenous populations. Lack of diversity in culture makes it far easier to implement “progressive” policies that cater to populations with similar values; much the same can be seen in such celebrated urban model cultures in the Netherlands and Scandinavia. Their relative wealth also leads to a natural adoption of the default strategy of the upscale suburb: the nicest stuff for the people with the most money. It is much more difficult when you have more racially and economically diverse populations with different needs, interests, and desires to reconcile.

    In contrast, the starker part of racial history in America has been one of the defining elements of the history of the cities of the Northeast, Midwest, and South. Slavery and Jim Crow led to the Great Migration to the industrial North, which broke the old ethnic machine urban consensus there. Civil rights struggles, fair housing, affirmative action, school integration and busing, riots, red lining, block busting, public housing, the emergence of black political leaders – especially mayors – prompted white flight and the associated disinvestment, leading to the decline of urban schools and neighborhoods.

    There’s a long, depressing history here.

    In Texas, California, and south Florida a somewhat similar, if less stark, pattern has occurred with largely Latino immigration. This can be seen in the evolution of Miami, Los Angeles, and increasingly Houston, San Antonio and Dallas. Just like African-Americans, Latino immigrants also are disproportionately poor and often have different site priorities and sensibilities than upscale whites.

    This may explain why most of the smaller cities of the Midwest and South have not proven amenable to replicating the policies of Portland. Most Midwest advocates of, for example, rail transit, have tried to simply transplant the Portland solution to their city without thinking about the local context in terms of system goals and design, and how to sell it. Civic leaders in city after city duly make their pilgrimage to Denver or Portland to check out shiny new transit systems, but the resulting videos of smiling yuppies and happy hipsters are not likely to impress anyone over at the local NAACP or in the barrios.

    We are seeing this script played out in Cincinnati presently, where an odd coalition of African Americans and anti-tax Republicans has formed to try to stop a streetcar system. Streetcar advocates imported Portland’s solution and arguments to Cincinnati without thinking hard enough to make the case for how it would benefit the whole community.

    That’s not to let these other cities off the hook. Most of them have let their urban cores decay. Almost without exception, they have done nothing to engage with their African American populations. If people really believe what they say about diversity being a source of strength, why not act like it? I believe that cities that start taking their African American and other minority communities seriously, seeing them as a pillar of civic growth, will reap big dividends and distinguish themselves in the marketplace.

    This trail has been blazed not by the “progressive” paragons but by places like Atlanta, Dallas and Houston. Atlanta, long known as one of America’s premier African American cities, has boomed to become the capital of the New South. It should come as no surprise that good for African Americans has meant good for whites too. Similarly, Houston took in tens of thousands of mostly poor and overwhelmingly African American refugees from Hurricane Katrina. Houston, a booming metro and emerging world city, rolled out the welcome mat for them – and for Latinos, Asians and other newcomers. They see these people as possessing talent worth having.

    This history and resulting political dynamic could not be more different from what happened in Portland and its “progressive” brethren. These cities have never been black, and may never be predominately Latino. Perhaps they cannot be blamed for this but they certainly should not be self-congratulatory about it or feel superior about the urban policies a lack of diversity has enabled.

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile.