New Geography

Tag: Transportation

  • Congress and the Administration Take Aim at Local Democracy

    Local democracy has been a mainstay of the US political system. This is evident from the town hall governments in New England to the small towns that the majority of Americans choose to live in today.

    In most states and metropolitan areas, substantial policy issues – such as zoning and land use decisions – are largely under the control of those who have a principal interest: local voters who actually live in the nation’s cities, towns, villages, townships and unincorporated county areas. This may be about to change. Two congressional initiatives – the Boxer-Kerry Cap and Trade Bill and the Oberstar Transportation Reauthorization Bill – and the Administration’s “Livability Partnership” take direct aim at local democracy as we know it.

    The Boxer-Kerry Bill: The first threat is the proposed Senate version of the “cap and trade” bill authored by Senator Barbara Boxer-Kerry (D-California) and Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts). This bill, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (S. 1733), would require metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) to develop greenhouse gas emission reduction plans. In these plans, the legislation would require consideration of issues such as increasing transit service, improvements to intercity rail service and “implementation of zoning and other land use regulations and plans to support infill, transit-oriented development or mixed use development.” This represents a significant step toward federal adoption of much of the “smart growth” or “compact development” agenda.

    At first glance, it may seem that merely requiring MPOs to consider such zoning and land use regulations seems innocent enough. However, the incentives that are created by this language could well spell the end of local control over zoning and land use decisions in the local area.

    True enough, the bill includes language to indicate that the bill does not intend to infringe “on the existing authority of local governments to plan or control land use.” Experience suggests, however, that this would provide precious little comfort in the behind-the-scenes negotiations that occur when a metropolitan area runs afoul of Washington bureaucrats.

    The federal housing, transportation and environmental bureaucracies have also been supportive of compact development policies. As these agencies develop regulations to implement the legislation, they could well be emboldened to make it far more difficult for local voters to retain control over land use decisions. There could be multiple repeats of the heavy-handedness exercised by the EPA when it singled out Atlanta for punishment over air quality issues. In response, the Georgia legislature was, in effect, coerced into enacting planning and oversight legislation more consistent with the planning theology endorsed by EPA’s bureaucrats. No federal legislation granted EPA the authority to seek such legislative changes, yet they were sought and obtained.

    There is also considerable support for the compact development agenda at the metropolitan area level. The proclivity of metropolitan and urban planners toward compact development is so strong as to require no encouragement by federal law. The emerging clear intent of federal policy to move land use development to the regional level and to densify existing communities could encourage MPOs to propose plans that pressure local governments to conform their zoning to central plans (or overarching “visions”) developed at the regional level. Along the way, smaller local jurisdictions could well be influenced, if not coerced into actions by over-zealous MPO staff claiming that federal law and regulation require more than the reality. It would not be the first time. Further, MPOs and organizations with similar views can be expected to lobby state legislatures to impose compact development policies that strip effective control of zoning and land use decisions from local governments.

    Surface Transportation Reauthorization: The second threat is the Surface Transportation Authorization Act (STAA or reauthorization) draft that has been released by Chairman James Oberstar (D-Minnesota) of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. This bill is riddled with requirements regarding consideration of land use restrictions by MPOs and states. Unlike the Boxer-Kerry bill, the proposed STAA includes no language denying any intention to interfere with local land use regulation authority.

    Like the Boxer-Kerry Bill, the Oberstar bill significantly empowers the Department of Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency and poses similar longer term risks.

    The Administration’s “Livability Agenda:” These legislative initiatives are reinforced by the Administration’s “Livability Agenda,” which is a partnership between the EPA, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Transportation. Among other things, this program is principally composed of compact development strategies, including directing development to certain areas, which would materially reduce the choices available to local government. Elements such as these could be included in an eventual STAA bill by the Obama Administration.

    The Livability Agenda: Regrettably, the Boxer-Kerry bill, the Oberstar bill and the “Livability Agenda” will make virtually nothing more livable. If they are successful in materially densifying the nation’s urban areas, communities will be faced with greater traffic congestion, higher congestion costs and greater air pollution. Despite the ideology to the contrary, higher densities increase traffic volumes within areas and produce more health hazards through more intense local air pollution. As federal data indicates, slower, more congested traffic congestion produces more pollution than more freely flowing traffic, and the resulting higher traffic volumes make this intensification even greater.

    There are also devastating impacts on housing affordability that occur when “development is directed.” This tends to increase land prices, which makes houses more expensive. This hurts all future home buyers and renters, particularly low income and minority households, since rent increases tend to follow housing prices. It is particularly injurious to low income households, which are disproportionately minority. The large gap between majority and minority home ownership rates likely widen further. So much for the American Dream for many who have not attained it already.

    The Marginal Returns of Compact Development Policies: These compact development initiatives continue to be pursued even in the face of research requested by the Congress indicating that such policies have precious little potential. The congressionally mandated Driving and the Built Environment report indicates that driving and greenhouse gas emissions could be higher in 2050 than in 2000 even under the maximum deployment of compact development strategies.

    Local Governments at the Table? The nation’s local governments should “weigh in” on these issues now, while the legislation is being developed. If they wait, they could find bullied by EPA and MPOs to follow not what the local voters want, but what the planners prefer. Local democracy will be largely dead, a product of a system that concentrates authority – and perceived wisdom – in the hands of the central governments, at the regional and national level.

    Even more, local citizens and voters need to be aware of the risk. It will be too late when MPOs or other organizations, whether at their own behest or that of a federal agency, force the character of neighborhoods to be radically changed, as Tony Recsei pointed out is
    already occurring in Australia.

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

  • Getting Real About “Green” Jobs

    Over the past year, Economic Modeling Specialists, Inc. (EMSI) has been fielding questions from local planners (workforce boards, community colleges, and economic developers) on how to look at green jobs, particularly at the regional level. Perhaps nothing has been more hyped, or misunderstood, than the potential impact of this sector on local economies.

    In order to wade through the rhetoric and often overblown expectations, we’ve been doing our best to link labor market data to potential green sectors so people can gain an understanding of trends, earnings, education levels, and skills associated with “green occupation clusters”. So far, we have made three general observations:

    1. Many of these jobs are going to fall within the construction and manufacturing sectors (e.g., welders, roofers, HVAC installers, etc.),
    2. Based on a lack of understanding, concrete information, and large scale demand, green jobs pose a very difficult development mission for local planners, and
    3. It is vital to speak “from the data” as much as possible.

    Such realism is necessary. Given the recession, job loss, and our nation’s otherwise dismal financial condition, many are now questioning the continued emphasis on green jobs, climate change, and cap-and-trade legislation. In recent months we have seen a sizable pushback against some of this policy from groups ranging from the American Farm bureau and even the educational community. Recently, for example, Inside Higher Ed wrote about how “some leaders in workforce development are concerned that more traditional skill trades within the manufacturing and construction fields are being deemphasized by community colleges looking for federal dollars to support newfangled programs.”

    The public is also getting skeptical. A Gallup poll indicated that the recession has dried up some of the support for increased environmental regulation. Similar surveys by Rasmussen and Pew suggest a similar trend in popular opinion.

    None of this suggests that most Americans, or most business, oppose environmental protection. It’s just that that economic growth and environmental protection should not be mutually exclusive.

    Increasingly we find ourselves at a crossroads between two competing points of view – one that thinks that we need to restore economic stability before we deal with environmental issues, and one that believes that if we fail to address environmental concerns aggressively right now, we are forfeiting our future.

    Chasing Trends vs. Being Demand Driven

    The promise of “green jobs” has the allure to square this circle, and reconcile the needs of the economy and the environment. This causes a kind of thinking reminiscent of that associated with the ‘90s dot-com boom. In that era, software and information was the next big thing. Many regional developers tried to get into the game, and some failed miserably. When the bubble burst, many were left empty-handed and embarrassed that they had essentially just wasted a lot of the public’s time, energy, and money on something that they frankly didn’t understand or have any real reason (in a regional context) to be pursuing.

    Given this experience, it’s not surprising that green is being met with skepticism by some local planners, who can and should be rigorously dedicated to spending their dollars wisely and only on things that will advance their region’s businesses and people. This seems to come from an understandable concern that economic development should essentially be “demand-driven” and in touch with needs of the local community.

    At the same time, regional development can be traced back to the needs of local industry. The activities, interests, and employment of local industries directly and indirectly drive much of the employment and earnings in an area (the concept of an economic base). This leads some loath to invest resources into an emerging sector or a new policy, such as green, where there is little demand, enough jobs, or the background to justify the efforts.

    “Policy” vs. “Environment”

    Right now, the primary struggles with green development come from: (1) actually understanding what “green” is and (2) knowing which industries people need to be prepared/trained for. Some of the problem stems from the fact that green is happening according to a top-down, policy driven approach rather than an industry driven one.

    In the U.S. we often see industry development happening from the ground up (e.g., from the local level and up to the national level). Industries develop hubs of production (e.g., Silicon Valley, the Research Triangle, and Hollywood). Regions benefit from this and become specialized and competitive at producing and exporting something that is demanded by the larger economy. This gives rise to specific skill and knowledge sets which further enhance the development of a region. Green jobs don’t really work this way. The “greening” of our economy has sprouted from a particular ideological point of view (global warming, overpopulation, etc.), that drive the initiatives, many of them associated with the stimulus.

    As is often the case, it is not particularly easy to translate the broad rhetoric, concepts, and policy (things like “clean tech”) into local industries, impacts, skills, training programs, and demand. At the local level, it is also incredibly difficult to project future trends of what jobs and industries will begin to thrive or fail. Those who try to use only national predictions to implement new regional training programs or to develop local policies could find their new programs may not result in tangible benefits to the region. In a recession folks need and want jobs (in some cases, any job will do), and discussions about how something like clean tech is going to be the next big thing can be really frustrating (think “dot-com” bubble).

    Finally, a big part of the frustration around green jobs actually comes down to semantics. Politicians and news anchors often refer to green jobs as some sort of new “industry.” Yet in reality green is much less about “what” is being produced than “how” things are produced.

    In this sense, in order to have “green” industry, you first need to have an industry that can be, if you will, “greened”. Here is an illustration that points out the nuance: let’s imagine you have two tire manufacturers. One produces tires using traditional “non-green” methods and the other uses recycled materials and can be classified as “green.” At the end of the day are they both manufacturing tires? Well, yes of course. Are they part of different industries? No. Both companies also likely employ the same sort of people, use the same sort of equipment, and have similar sales and supply chains. Also, from a training/workforce development perspective these industries are going to look pretty identical – with maybe a few minor skills differences.

    Seen from this angle, green is not actually about creating a new industry sector in either a general or specific sense. Rather, it’s more about changing and retooling all existing industry sectors to make them operate differently.

    It Needs to Be Data-Driven

    In the United States, we have a huge amount of data at our disposal for development decisions. Our nation has over 1,800 (and counting) well-established industry codes (NAICS codes) that are standardized for the entire country. The 20 big industry sectors that compose our economy exist because of broad, long-lasting, nationwide demand. But right now, local developers cannot take such a well-researched, data-driven approach to green. There are a lot of people who are highly in favor of green, but in many ways, they don’t bring the sort of objectivity needed to hash things out for the sake of the local workforce. What if green actually isn’t a good idea for a specific community? Something like Biotech is great if you can have it, but if it’s not the right fit for the community, forcing it can be a bad thing.

    Final Remark

    For green to work at the local level, it needs to be demand-driven. It needs to be harmonized with local development efforts, and it must complement and not fight against regional economies. This means helping and not hurting local industries with too much regulation, and allowing regional developers to stay focused on longer-term efforts as opposed to short-term trends.

    Do we want green to succeed? Well, sure. However, as the polls show, we will not have these things at the expense of economic growth. All this is to say that people are going to be more supportive of the green movement if it embraces another aspect of sustainability – economic sustainability. The green movement and economic considerations are not mutually exclusive. If the economy continues to suffer, the green movement will suffer as there will be no money or opportunities to invest in green technologies. Only a broad based economic recovery – based in the revival of productive industry – can make green industry not only desirable, but practicable.

    Rob Sentz is the marketing director at EMSI, an Idaho-based economics firm that provides data and analysis to workforce boards, economic development agencies, higher education institutions and the private sector. He is the author of a series of green jobs white papers.

    Illustration by Mark Beauchamp

  • Numbers Don’t Support Migration Exodus to “Cool Cities”

    For the past decade a large coterie of pundits, prognosticators and their media camp followers have insisted that growth in America would be concentrated in places hip and cool, largely the bluish regions of the country.

    Since the onset of the recession, which has hit many once-thriving Sun Belt hot spots, this chorus has grown bolder. The Wall Street Journal, for example, recently identified the “Next Youth-Magnet Cities” as drawn from the old “hip and cool” collection of yore: Seattle, Portland, Washington, New York and Austin, Texas.

    It’s not just the young who will flock to the blue meccas, but money and business as well, according to the narrative. The future, the Atlantic assured its readers, did not belong to the rubes in the suburbs or Sun Belt, but to high-density, high-end places like New York, San Francisco and Boston.

    This narrative, which has not changed much over the past decade, is misleading and largely misstated. Net migration, both before and after the Great Recession, according to analysis by the Praxis Strategy Group, has continued to be strongest to the predominately red states of the South and Intermountain West.

    This seems true even for those seeking high-end jobs. Between 2006 and 2008, the metropolitan areas that enjoyed the fastest percentage shift toward educated and professional workers and industries included nominally “unhip” places like Indianapolis, Charlotte, N.C., Memphis, Tenn., Salt Lake City, Jacksonville, Fla., Tampa, Fla., and Kansas City, Mo.

    The overall migration numbers are even more revealing. As was the case for much of the past decade, the biggest gainers continue to include cities such as San Antonio, Dallas and Houston. Rather than being oases for migrants, some oft-cited magnets such as New York, Boston, Los Angeles and Chicago have all suffered considerable loss of population to other regions over the past year.

    Much the same pattern emerges when you look at longer-term state demographic patterns. A recent survey by the Empire Center for New York State Policy found that the biggest net losers in terms of per capita outmigration between 2000 and 2008 were, with the exception of Louisiana, all blue state bastions. New York residents lead in terms of rate of exodus, closely followed by the District of Columbia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and California.

    An even greater shock to the sensibilities of the insular, Manhattan-centric media, the report found that most of the movement from the Empire State was not from the much-dissed suburbia, but from that hip and cool paragon, New York City. This can not be ascribed as a loss of the unwanted: According to the report, those leaving the city had 13% higher incomes than those coming in.

    How can this be, when everyone who’s smart and hip is headed to the Big Apple? This question was addressed in a report by the center-left, New York-based Center for an Urban Future. True, considerable numbers of young, educated people come to New York, but it turns out that many of them leave for the suburbs or other states as they reach their peak earning years.

    Indeed, it’s astonishing given the many clear improvements in New York that more residents left the five boroughs for other locales in 2006, the peak of the last boom, than in 1993, when the city was in demonstrably worse shape. In 2006, the city had a net loss of 153,828 residents through domestic out-migration, compared to a decline of 141,047 in 1993, with every borough except Brooklyn experiencing a higher number of out-migrants in 2006.

    Of course, blue state boosters can point out that the exodus has slowed with the recession, as opportunities have dried up elsewhere. True, the flood of migration has slowed across the nation. Yet it has only slowed, not dried up. When the economy revives, it’s likely to start flowing heavily again.

    More important, the key group leaving New York and other so-called “youth-magnets” comprises the middle class, particularly families, critical to any long-term urban revival. This year’s Census shows that the number of single households in New York has reached record levels; in Manhattan, more than half of all households are singles. And the Urban Future report’s analysis found that even well-heeled Manhattanites with children tend to leave once they reach the age of 5 or above.

    The key factor here may well be economic opportunity. Virtually all the supposedly top-ranked cities cited in this media narrative have suffered below-average job growth throughout the decade. Some, like Portland and New York, have added almost no new jobs; others like San Francisco, Boston and Chicago have actually lost positions over the past decade.

    In contrast, even after the current doldrums, San Antonio, Orlando, Houston, Dallas and Phoenix all boast at least 5% more jobs now than a decade ago. Among the large-narrative magnet regions only one–government-bloated greater Washington–has enjoyed strong employment growth.

    The impact of job growth on the middle class has been profound. New York City, for example, has the smallest share of middle-income families in the nation, according to a recent Brookings Institution study; its proportion of middle-income neighborhoods was smaller than that of any metropolitan area except Los Angeles.The same pattern has also emerged in what has become widely touted as America’s “model city”–President Obama’s adopted hometown of Chicago.

    The likely reasons behind these troubling trends are things rarely discussed in “the narrative”–concerns like high costs, taxes and regulations making it tough on industries that employ the middle class. One clear culprit: out of control state spending. State spending in New York is second per capita in the nation (anomalous Alaska is first); California stands fourth and New Jersey seventh. Illinois is down the list but coming up fast. Over the past decade, while its population grew by only 7%, Illinois’ spending grew by an inflation-adjusted 39%.

    The problem here is more than just too-large government; it lies in how states spend their money. Massive public spending increases over the past decade in California, New Jersey, Illinois and New York have gone overwhelmingly into the pockets and pensions of public employees. It certainly has not flowed into such basic infrastructure as roads, bridges and ports that are needed to keep key industries competitive.

    The American Association of State Highway Transportation, for example, ranked New York 43rd in the country and New Jersey dead last in terms of quality of roads. Some 46% of the Garden State’s roads were rated in poor condition, compared with the national average of 13%, even as the state’s spending reached new highs. The typical New Jersey driver spends almost $600 a year in auto repairs necessitated by the poor conditions of the roads.

    In contrast, states in the South and parts of the Plains tend to pour their public resources into productive uses. Cities like Mobile, Ala., Houston, Charleston, S.C., and Savannah, Ga., have been investing in port facilities to take advantage of the planned widening of the Panama Canal. The primary goal is to take business away from the increasingly expensive, overregulated and under-invested ports of the Northeast and West Coast. Similarly, places like Kansas City and the Dakotas are looking to boost their basic rail and road networks to support export-heavy industries.

    Even in the face of the Obama administration’s strongly urban-centric, blue state-oriented economic policy, these generally less than hip places appear poised to grow as the economy recovers. Virtually all the top 10 economies that have withstood the recession come from outside the “youth-magnet” field: San Antonio; Oklahoma City; Little Rock, Ark.; Dallas, Baton Rouge, La.; Tulsa, Okla., Omaha, Neb.; Houston and El Paso, Texas. The one exception to this rule, Austin, also benefits from being located in solvent, generally low-tax Texas.

    This continued erosion of jobs and the middle class from the blue states and cities is not inevitable. Many of these places enjoy enormous assets in terms of universities, strategic location, concentrations of talented workers and entrenched high-wage industries. But short of a massive and continuing bailout from Washington, the only way to reverse their decline will be a thorough reformation of their governmental structure and policies. No narrative, no matter how well spun, can make up for that reality.

    This article originally appeared at Forbes.com.

    Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His next book, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, will be published by Penguin Press early next year.

  • The Limits of Transit: Costly Dead-End

    The proposed Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) fare increase and service cuts for next year are indicative of transit’s recurring budgetary problems, and not only in Chicago but nationwide. But in the Windy City, these moves have elicited an understandably negative public reaction since the city of Chicago depends on transit about as much as any city besides New York.

    CTA, like other transit agencies around the nation routinely, claim that fare increases and service cuts are necessary due to under-funding. Transit budget crises seem to come as often as Presidents day in many places and more often than February 29 (every four years) virtually everywhere.

    If under-funding were the primary problem, then an examination of historic trends would indicate that the money available to transit had declined (after adjusting for inflation) relative to ridership. But in nearly all cases, including both the CTA and the national data, this is far from the truth.

    Cost Escalation at CTA: Despite its storied history as one of the nation’s premier transit agencies, CTA has suffered heavy ridership losses since its modern peak in 1979. A principal reason for this decline was a series of devastating fare increases that would not have been necessary if costs had been maintained within inflation. In 2007, CTA spent 13% more (inflation adjusted) to run its buses and trains than in 1979. That would be fine if ridership had risen 13% (or more), since then both riders and taxpayers could feel that they had obtained value for money. However, ridership dropped by more than 2 percent. If CTA had kept its costs per passenger within inflation, it would have at least $400 million more each year, and would have no need to consider fare increases or service reductions.

    National Transit Cost Escalation: Between 1982 (the last year before the federal gas dedicated gas tax for transit) and 2007, national transit ridership (passenger miles) rose 44% percent. At the same time, transit expenditures, adjusted for inflation, rose 100%. This means that each new inflation adjusted $1.00 for transit delivered $0.44 in new value (additional ridership). If transit had kept expenditures growth within inflation, there would have been in excess of $13 billion in 2007 (See Note).

    In contrast, the price (or cost) of most products and services rise about with the rate of inflation or slightly more or less. Over the same period of time, automobile and airline costs per passenger mile have declined, producing more than $1.00 in value for each new inflation adjusted dollar. Food costs have declined 3 percent relative to inflation, energy costs have declined 2 percent relative to inflation and housing costs have risen 1 percent relative to inflation.

    Transit’s Intractable Fiscal Problem: Transit is incapable of producing ridership increases that coincide with its funding increases because of its structure. Transit is a monopoly, and an unregulated monopoly incapable of managing itself effectively. Private monopolies, such as electric utilities, are routinely regulated. Economic theory generally holds that monopolies are to be avoided, because of their power to violate the interests of consumers by passing on higher than necessary prices and substandard service. No responsible government would think of granting a monopoly to a private company without exercising regulatory control to ensure that the company does abuse its position of power.

    Before the wide availability of subsidies to transit, there were private companies, which could not raise fares or cut service without regulatory review and approval. It was not the best possible system, but it was designed to principally serve consumers. But government is different. There are no commissions set up to regulate government monopolies, like transit.

    Competitive Incentives: The antidote to monopoly is competition, and transit costs cannot be controlled without it. There is a successful model. Transit agencies can competitively bid and competitively contract bus routes for limited periods of time, requiring firms to supply services they specify. The public agency continues to draw the routes, establish the timetables and set the fares. In a number of cases, competitive contracting has lowered costs and reduced the rate of cost increase.

    In Los Angeles, our efforts led to carving a new transit district (Foothill Transit) out of the old public monopoly (the Southern California Rapid Transit District). Other services were transferred from the public monopoly to be administered by the city of Los Angeles. In each case, the transferred services were competitively contracted, and evaluation reports put the savings at more than 40%. Similar results have been achieved in Denver and San Diego, where approximately 50% of bus services are now competitively contracted. In Denver, the competitive contracting program was established by state legislation, while in San Diego, local officials introduced the program to gain control of rapidly escalating costs. More than a decade ago, my report for the Metropolitan Transit Association showed that substantial savings could be achieved at CTA through competitive contracting without requiring employee layoffs or give-backs.

    Competitive contracting has even spread to commuter rail systems, such as in San Diego, Dallas-Fort Worth, Miami, Boston and Los Angeles. However, for all of these savings, competitive contracting accounts for only a small share of transit services in the United States.

    The Antithesis of Cost Effectiveness: There remains strong resistance by the special interests that control transit, from the managers to the employees to vendors. Within a couple of years, the California legislature caved to lobbying from transit interests, including the transit unions, and outlawed the kinds of cost reducing reforms that had created Foothill Transit. This is despite the fact that not a single penny in wages or benefits had been taken away from a single transit worker.

    Perhaps the most brazen case was when the Denver transit agency approached the state legislature in the early 1990s seeking repeal of the competitive contracting bill, claiming that it was costing the agency more than if the services were provided by its own employees. It later was revealed that the analysis had compared the internal costs of operations with the competitively contracted costs of operations and capital (buses and facilities). It was even worse than that. The cost of the competitively contracted buses was amortized at a rate more than double the normal accounting standard. After this misleading initiative, the legislature expanded the competitive contracting requirement.

    The resistance of monopoly transit interests to competitive contracting is understandable. People and organizations generally tend to look out for their own interests first and unregulated monopolies can do so with a vengeance. Without the countervailing force of competition (or, less effectively, regulation) their financial demands prevail over the interests of the riders and taxpayers, without whom there would be no reason for transit to exist.

    One result is that when major transit expansions are chosen, the approaches that cost the most per passenger are often selected. The classic case is the selection of rail technologies over bus technologies, which are usually far more cost-effective given the modest transit volumes in the United States. Instead we often choose rail systems that cost more on an annual basis than it would cost to lease each new transit customer a car in perpetuity. Sometimes the cost equals that of an economy car, other times it could be a Lexus.

    Another contributing factor has been transit wages and benefits, both for managers and operating employees. These have risen far faster than in competitive markets, whether unionized or not. Other costs have risen as well, from capital costs to the costs of administration. The present monopoly situation effectively establishes a public policy objective of maximizing transit costs per passenger. The focus should be on maximizing ridership by minimizing expenditures per passenger.

    Internal Reforms Do Not Survive: There is always the potential for internal reform. One of the most sweeping of such programs was implemented by Chicago’s Mayor Jane Byrne in the early 1980s. She forced major cost reductions at CTA. However, after she left, costs resumed their upward trend. It is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain the political will to control transit costs without the incentives of competition.

    Overseas: Perhaps surprisingly, the conversion to competition has been widespread overseas. Virtually all of the world’s largest public bus systems take this approach. Transport for London (formerly London Transport) is competitively bid. Between 1985 and 2000, the costs per mile of service declined more than one-half, adjusted for inflation. Much the same has occurred in Socialist Scandinavia. All Copenhagen bus service is competitively bid. Stockholm not only bid its bus service, but also saved money by competitively bidding its metro (subway) system. Commuter rail lines are being competitively bid in Germany, as are entire bus systems in Adelaide and Perth in Australia. In all of these cases, the public has gained by lower costs, expanded services and generally lower fares than would have otherwise been the case. In the United States, however, the surviving public monopoly structure skims more than half of the new money off the top, leaving less than half for the riders and taxpayers.

    Why This is Important: All of this is relevant because there is a sense that transit will play a much larger role in the future. Virtually none of the analysis exhibits any understanding of the dynamics that rule transit expenditures. For example, the contentious Moving Cooler presumes that transit expenditures will rise within the inflation rate and, as a result, expects romantically unachievable increases in ridership.

    This is wishful thinking of the worst kind. Congress, the state and the nation’s transit agencies have studiously avoided any sort of analysis that would compare transit costs to inflation. They cannot be relied upon to set things right since they will not confront the special interests that control transit.

    Instead, American transit agencies spend more without a corresponding increase in ridership. New money made available to transit loses value like the depreciating currency of a hyper-inflating economy. Washington, state governments and local governments can throw a lot more money at transit. They seem incapable however of producing a corresponding increase in ridership.

    Note: National expenditures calculated from the governments database of the United States Bureau of the Census. Ridership from the American Public Transportation Association. Chicago ridership and operating cost data from the American Public Transportation Association and the US Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration National Transit Database. Financial data adjusted to 2007$ using the Consumer Price Index.

    Wendell Cox was appointed to three terms by Mayor Tom Bradley to represent the city of Los Angeles on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC), which was the principal transit and highway policy body in the nation’s largest county. As the only LACTC member who was not an elected official, he chaired the Service Coordination Committee, which established the procedures that led to the establishment of Foothill Transit. He also chaired two American Public Transit Association national committees (Governing Boards and Policy & Planning).

  • The White City

    Among the media, academia and within planning circles, there’s a generally standing answer to the question of what cities are the best, the most progressive and best role models for small and mid-sized cities. The standard list includes Portland, Seattle, Austin, Minneapolis, and Denver. In particular, Portland is held up as a paradigm, with its urban growth boundary, extensive transit system, excellent cycling culture, and a pro-density policy. These cities are frequently contrasted with those of the Rust Belt and South, which are found wanting, often even by locals, as “cool” urban places.

    But look closely at these exemplars and a curious fact emerges. If you take away the dominant Tier One cities like New York, Chicago and Los Angeles you will find that the “progressive” cities aren’t red or blue, but another color entirely: white.

    In fact, not one of these “progressive” cities even reaches the national average for African American percentage population in its core county. Perhaps not progressiveness but whiteness is the defining characteristic of the group.

    The progressive paragon of Portland is the whitest on the list, with an African American population less than half the national average. It is America’s ultimate White City. The contrast with other, supposedly less advanced cities is stark.

    It is not just a regional thing, either. Even look just within the state of Texas, where Austin is held up as a bastion of right thinking urbanism next to sprawlvilles like Dallas-Ft. Worth and Houston.

    Again, we see that Austin is far whiter than either Dallas-Ft. Worth or Houston.

    This raises troubling questions about these cities. Why is it that progressivism in smaller metros is so often associated with low numbers of African Americans? Can you have a progressive city properly so-called with only a disproportionate handful of African Americans in it? In addition, why has no one called these cities on it?

    As the college educated flock to these progressive El Dorados, many factors are cited as reasons: transit systems, density, bike lanes, walkable communities, robust art and cultural scenes. But another way to look at it is simply as White Flight writ large. Why move to the suburbs of your stodgy Midwest city to escape African Americans and get criticized for it when you can move to Portland and actually be praised as progressive, urban and hip? Many of the policies of Portland are not that dissimilar from those of upscale suburbs in their effects. Urban growth boundaries and other mechanisms raise land prices and render housing less affordable exactly the same as large lot zoning and building codes that mandate brick and other expensive materials do. They both contribute to reducing housing affordability for historically disadvantaged communities. Just like the most exclusive suburbs.

    This lack of racial diversity helps explain why urban boosters focus increasingly on international immigration as a diversity measure. Minneapolis, Portland and Austin do have more foreign born than African Americans, and do better than Rust Belt cities on that metric, but that’s a low hurdle to jump. They lack the diversity of a Miami, Houston, Los Angeles or a host of other unheralded towns from the Texas border to Las Vegas and Orlando. They even have far fewer foreign born residents than many suburban counties of America’s major cities.

    The relative lack of diversity in places like Portland raises some tough questions the perennially PC urban boosters might not want to answer. For example, how can a city define itself as diverse or progressive while lacking in African Americans, the traditional sine qua non of diversity, and often in immigrants as well?

    Imagine a large corporation with a workforce whose African American percentage far lagged its industry peers, sans any apparent concern, and without a credible action plan to remediate it. Would such a corporation be viewed as a progressive firm and employer? The answer is obvious. Yet the same situation in major cities yields a different answer. Curious.

    In fact, lack of ethnic diversity may have much to do with what allows these places to be “progressive”. It’s easy to have Scandinavian policies if you have Scandinavian demographics. Minneapolis-St. Paul, of course, is notable in its Scandinavian heritage; Seattle and Portland received much of their initial migrants from the northern tier of America, which has always been heavily Germanic and Scandinavian.

    In comparison to the great cities of the Rust Belt, the Northeast, California and Texas, these cities have relatively homogenous populations. Lack of diversity in culture makes it far easier to implement “progressive” policies that cater to populations with similar values; much the same can be seen in such celebrated urban model cultures in the Netherlands and Scandinavia. Their relative wealth also leads to a natural adoption of the default strategy of the upscale suburb: the nicest stuff for the people with the most money. It is much more difficult when you have more racially and economically diverse populations with different needs, interests, and desires to reconcile.

    In contrast, the starker part of racial history in America has been one of the defining elements of the history of the cities of the Northeast, Midwest, and South. Slavery and Jim Crow led to the Great Migration to the industrial North, which broke the old ethnic machine urban consensus there. Civil rights struggles, fair housing, affirmative action, school integration and busing, riots, red lining, block busting, public housing, the emergence of black political leaders – especially mayors – prompted white flight and the associated disinvestment, leading to the decline of urban schools and neighborhoods.

    There’s a long, depressing history here.

    In Texas, California, and south Florida a somewhat similar, if less stark, pattern has occurred with largely Latino immigration. This can be seen in the evolution of Miami, Los Angeles, and increasingly Houston, San Antonio and Dallas. Just like African-Americans, Latino immigrants also are disproportionately poor and often have different site priorities and sensibilities than upscale whites.

    This may explain why most of the smaller cities of the Midwest and South have not proven amenable to replicating the policies of Portland. Most Midwest advocates of, for example, rail transit, have tried to simply transplant the Portland solution to their city without thinking about the local context in terms of system goals and design, and how to sell it. Civic leaders in city after city duly make their pilgrimage to Denver or Portland to check out shiny new transit systems, but the resulting videos of smiling yuppies and happy hipsters are not likely to impress anyone over at the local NAACP or in the barrios.

    We are seeing this script played out in Cincinnati presently, where an odd coalition of African Americans and anti-tax Republicans has formed to try to stop a streetcar system. Streetcar advocates imported Portland’s solution and arguments to Cincinnati without thinking hard enough to make the case for how it would benefit the whole community.

    That’s not to let these other cities off the hook. Most of them have let their urban cores decay. Almost without exception, they have done nothing to engage with their African American populations. If people really believe what they say about diversity being a source of strength, why not act like it? I believe that cities that start taking their African American and other minority communities seriously, seeing them as a pillar of civic growth, will reap big dividends and distinguish themselves in the marketplace.

    This trail has been blazed not by the “progressive” paragons but by places like Atlanta, Dallas and Houston. Atlanta, long known as one of America’s premier African American cities, has boomed to become the capital of the New South. It should come as no surprise that good for African Americans has meant good for whites too. Similarly, Houston took in tens of thousands of mostly poor and overwhelmingly African American refugees from Hurricane Katrina. Houston, a booming metro and emerging world city, rolled out the welcome mat for them – and for Latinos, Asians and other newcomers. They see these people as possessing talent worth having.

    This history and resulting political dynamic could not be more different from what happened in Portland and its “progressive” brethren. These cities have never been black, and may never be predominately Latino. Perhaps they cannot be blamed for this but they certainly should not be self-congratulatory about it or feel superior about the urban policies a lack of diversity has enabled.

    Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile.

  • On Cities, GHG Emissions, Apples & Oranges

    Every day or so a new greenhouse gas emission report crosses my desk. Often these reports are very useful, other times they add little of value to the subject. The problem is separating the “wheat” from the “chaff.”

    This dilemma is well illustrated by a paper called “Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Global Cities,” authored by 10 academics. I had received notification of the paper from Science Daily, a useful website that provides notification of new research on a wide range of scientific subjects.

    The Science Daily article indicated that Denver produces the most greenhouse gases per capita annually, while Barcelona produces the least. I am always interested in reports that compare the performance of “cities,” both out of general interest and because of the gross errors that often are the result of invalid comparisons. So, immediately I ran down the report, and to my surprise the report dealt with only 10 “cities.” This seems rather a small number, since the smallest in the sample, Geneva, is not even among the top 700 urban areas in the world. This seems to be a rather incomplete sample: 10 out of more than 700.

    That was just the beginning. There were serious problems of comparison between the 10 “cities.” Whenever someone starts talking about “cities,” it is best to ask what they mean. The word “cities” has so many meanings and is subject to such confusion that I generally avoid using it.

    “Cities” might be municipalities, such as the city of New York or the ville de Paris.

    Cities could be urban areas (urbanized areas or urban agglomerations), which are the urban footprints one observes from an airplane on a clear night.

    “Cities” could be metropolitan areas, which are labor markets and are generally larger than urban areas, because people commute from rural areas (outside the urban footprint) to work in the urban area.

    In nearly the entire world, with the exception of China, urban areas and metropolitan areas are larger than municipalities.

    Or, “cities” could be used in the sense of Chinese prefectural, sub-provincial or provincial level cities, which tend to be far larger than any reasonable definition of a metropolitan area. Nearly all of China is divided into cities, in the same way that most of the United States is divided into counties.

    These Chinese “cities” themselves often contain county level “cities” that are separate from the principal urban areas.

    These differing definitions of municipalities make any international comparison of these entities difficult and often misleading. The ville de Paris represents barely 20 percent of the Paris region. The “city” of Atlanta represents barely 10 percent of its metropolitan area. The “city” of Melbourne represents only 5 percent of its metropolitan area. Yet, other “cities” are larger than their metropolitan areas, such as Chongqing, China, which has at least five times the population of its genuine metropolitan area (the “city” covers an area the size of Austria or Indiana). The city of San Antonio, with its vast stretches of suburbanization is surely not comparable to the city of Hartford, which is dominated by an urban core.

    Any genuine comparison of “cities” must be at the metropolitan area or urban area level. These definitions both represent the city as the organism it is, rather than simply the happenstance of municipal boundaries. Of course, comparisons must be either between metropolitan areas or urban areas to be valid. It will not do to compare metropolitan areas with urban areas; they are as apples and oranges. Moreover, there are no international standards for delineation of metropolitan areas, which makes metropolitan comparisons more complex.

    All of this raises the principal problem with the “Global Cities” paper. There is no consistency to the city definitions the paper uses and its results are thus meaningless (though “headline grabbing”). For example, “Global Cities” uses the geographic areas of the following barely comparable “cities”:

    The municipality of Barcelona, which represents less than one half of the urban area and excludes the expansive suburbs that stretch in every direction but the Mediterranean.

    The municipalities of Bangkok, Denver and New York, which are only parts of their respective metropolitan or urban areas.

    The municipality of Cape Town, which could be considered a metropolitan area because of the large expanse of rural area under its jurisdiction.

    The canton (province) of Geneva might probably qualify as a metropolitan area, except that it excludes the suburbs in France, from which virtually free movement of labor is permitted.

    The Greater London Authority which is nearly co-existent with the London urban area, while Prague as the report defines it is somewhat larger than its urban area.

    The Greater Toronto Area which meets none of the “city” definitions above and is larger than both the metropolitan area and the urban area as defined by Statistics Canada.

    Los Angeles County, which meets none of the “city” definitions and is part of the larger Los Angeles-Orange County metropolitan area.

    All in all, as charitably as it can be put, the “Global City” compares four municipalities, three metropolitan areas, two urban areas, one area larger than a metropolitan area and one that is part of a metropolitan area. Put another way, it tries to make comparisons between four apples, three oranges, two peaches, one banana and one sweet potato.

    Granted, the paper indicates the geographical definitions it uses. That, does not, however, change the fact that treating apples and oranges as comparable is simply invalid.

    There are other problems with the “Global Cities” paper, but one more is enough. In the obligatory fashion, the authors stress how important it is to adopt “smart growth” policies in North America. They cite a US Department of Transportation study to indicate that a doubling of density reduces vehicle miles traveled by 40 percent.

    A bit closer reading would have indicated that the study says doubling density would reduce new vehicle miles by 40 percent, where population densities are already 6,000 to 7,000 per square mile. Only two large urban areas in the United States have densities that high, San Francisco and Los Angeles (which the authors characterize as having urban densities at least 40 percent below the US Bureau of the Census number for the Los Angeles urban area). A 40 percent reduction in “new” vehicle miles means that overall vehicle miles traveled increase 60 percent when the population is doubled, rather than 100 percent. Thus, even with the high density qualification in the US Department of Transportation study, vehicle miles would increase 60 percent as population densities double.

    Maybe tomorrow will bring a better report. One can always hope.

    Photograph: The “city” of Chongqing (part of its vast rural countryside)

    Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

  • Germany’s Role in the Green Energy Economy

    Germany likes to brag about its green credentials. It is a source of pride and it is justified to a certain extent. The country, which is located on the same latitude as Canada, had the largest number of installed solar panels as of 2007.

    The key to growth clearly has not been abundant sunshine, but massive subsidies. Germany sponsors its solar industry with generous tax credits that take the form of feed-in tariffs, i.e. payment above the going market rate for energy from renewable sources like solar panels, it can run anywhere from twice to three times the market rate for a conventionally produced kilowatt. These tariffs can run high. They are being lowered slowly but perhaps a bit too slowly. As we have recently seen with the disasters impacting Spain’s renewable energy industry, dependence on subsidies can create a potential catastrophic downturn once the spigot is turned off.

    Would a similar model be appropriate for sponsoring renewable energy in the US? Probably not, in large part the technology is already developed. The Germans and now the Chinese have already subsidized their industries. The legwork has been done and anti-greenhouse legislation will sustain the market without massive subsidization.

    The first factor is that most of the investment in research and development has created the pre-conditions for grid parity within the next few years for southern countries. Even Germany will achieve it by 2012 according to the German business newspaper Handelsblatt. The economies of scale are sinking unit costs dramatically and production technologies like thin film are allowing solar cell manufacturers to produce ever more efficient panels with less and less silicon. Several silicon production plants are set to come on line in China soon.

    The US, whose fiscal situation is parlous compared to China and even Germany, wants to waste years developing already available technologies from scratch. It could try the European approach but would probably be much better off to follow the same path that it followed with the automobile or the motion picture: allow other countries to get the basic technology in place and concentrate its exceptional energy on marketing and scaling up the technologies from abroad.

    China’s entry into the market seems destined to create a dramatic collapse in the price of what was until a few years ago essentially a cost plus industry. China has low labor costs and inflation busting economies of scale. China’s entry into the silicon wafer market already has depressed prices for the once dear raw material. They are also working on a massive power plant with First Solar of the United States.

    Some are predicting that China’s entry into the renewable energy market will have the same effect as its entry into the consumer electronics market, i.e. it will make the expensive affordable and then cheap. German solar cell production companies have suffered much like its chip producers but to the general benefit of the economy. China will drive production costs further down. Germany is still coming to terms with this.

    A recent article in Die Zeit illustrates the growing discrepancy between renewable energy policy and the market potential. The feed-in tariffs have the perverse effect of making solar energy far more expensive than it actually needs to be. The government subsidies are essentially shielding domestic producers from China making the consumers pay the higher rates. Germany needs to focus on its traditional strengths in producing industrial machinery and carve a niche for itself. The US would be better off to maintain trade relations with China and let Adam Smith’s invisible hand work its magic. It would be far cheaper than trying to use protectionist measures to protect domestic manufacturers.

    All this is predicated on the assumption that the price of oil will only increase in price in the coming decades as China and India motorize their masses. This in turn will drive up conventional power costs. Even at its current price of around $70 a barrel, oil is still 7 times more expensive than it was just a decade ago. Some are predicting that that last year’s prices of almost a $150 a barrel represent a taste of what will confront the world when the economy begins to grow again

    This, however, will be a gradual process, based on undulating prices. The hysterical claims of Peak Oil have been delayed again and again by technological improvements. The latest finds off of Brazil and the Gulf of Mexico represent dramatic examples. Massive new gas reserves in North America represent another countervailing force. In the end, fossil fuels will be more expensive, but they will make renewable energy more competitive only at reasonable price points.

    Politics will also play a role. Climate change and the perceived need to combat it has gained enormous currency among world leaders including German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Regardless of what one thinks of the arguments calling for action, we will probably see some sort of carbon tax in the future, whether it be cap and trade or some other means of increasing the costs of carbon emissions. Conventional fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas are only going to get more expensive for political if not economic reasons. The growing consensus, regardless of its veracity, is set to create huge costs for non-renewable sources of energy.

    Over time, this will make renewable energy more attractive and unit costs will shrink as economies of scale start to kick in. The European cheerleaders of climate legislation are not doing it out of the goodness of their heart. They want to see a return on the billions spent on developing renewable technology. The US would be ill-advised to simply try to create technologies that are already up and running. Take the technology, commercialize it and thank the Europeans for footing the bill.

    The US would be well advised to keep their renewable energy markets open. The Europeans will come and are coming. The solar energy trade fairs in Germany focus on the immense potential available in the US market. Several large German producers are expanding aggressively on the American market bringing with them the technologies that they have created. China will also start to flood the market with cheap silicon wafers and further reduce solar panel costs. The US does not need to subsidize this technology lavishly. It simply needs to allow the companies that have it to sell it on their market. The initial support provided by countries like Germany was more than enough to get the technology to the point where it is ready to survive on the free market.

    Kirk Rogers resides in Bubenreuth on the outer edges of Nuremberg and teaches languages and Amercan culture at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg’s Institut für Fremdsprachen und Auslandskunde. He has been living in Germany for about ten years now due to an inexplicable fascination with German culture.

  • Why the feds should stay out of high-speed rail (and most transportation)

    Set aside for a minute whether high-speed rail (HSR) makes sense or not on a cost-benefit basis. Regardless of whether it does or not (and some smart people are arguing not), I’d like to make the argument that federal funding has no place in HSR. Instead, it should be left to individual states or regional state coalitions.

    The federally-funded interstate system was originally conceived for defense purposes – rapid mobilization – after Ike saw the German autobahns. Freight and people movement were obvious beneficiaries, over short, medium, and long distances. It is a comprehensive network that crosses state lines, which argues for federal involvement. The government made the minimal investment it had to make – road beds – and people/companies paid for vehicles and fuel. Fuel was taxed to pay for it all. If EZ-tag technology had been available at the time, I suspect they would have tolled it all instead to pay for it.

    Airports followed a similar arrangement: government provides the landing strips and terminals while private companies provide the vehicles and fuel. Passenger ticket taxes pay for the infrastructure. As airports are a local decision, they are (mostly) paid for locally, although regulated federally for standardization and safety.

    HSR is targeted at medium distances only, making it more of a state/regional decision (i.e. a small collection of states). It also requires huge subsidies, as the government provides the track, cars, and energy. There is nothing directly related that can be taxed to pay for it (like fuel taxes for roads and passenger ticket taxes for airports). You could try to tax the rail tickets, but if they were fully priced they would not attract nearly enough riders. So no matter how you slice it, in the end the government (i.e. taxpayers) will be paying the majority of the cost of moving each passenger. The infrastructure cost cannot be covered by direct user fees, as demonstrated in other countries.

    Rather than compare HSR to the interstate highway system, the better analogy would be airports. Imagine if California said, “Feds, give us money to build a few airports in key CA cities and provide a subsidized government-run airline to provide frequent intra-state service where tickets are priced way below cost.” Put that way, people would recognize the idea as absurd, and tell California to do it themselves if they think it’s such a good idea.

    The problem is that a simple program that made sense at the time – a federal gas tax to build an interstate highway system – has evolved into a Frankenstein monster of massive federal involvement in enlarged urban freeways, local rail transit, and now high-speed rail – areas where they simply do not belong. Local transportation planners have shifted decision making from “What are the best cost-benefit investments we can make to move people in our area?” to “How to do we grab our ‘fair’ share of the federal pie, regardless of whether or not the project is something we would consider with our own money?” And that is leading to a lot of boondoggles being built around the country, culminating recently in the famous Bridge to Nowhere in Alaska.

    The answer? The feds need to get out of the transportation business beyond minimal maintenance of the interstate highway system (the basic four lanes – not the expanded urban freeways). Let local entities make local decisions on transportation investments, including funding, and a whole lot of waste will magically disappear.

    This post originally appeared at Houston Strategies.

  • Taiwan’s Failing High Speed Rail Line Faces Government Takeover

    According to Railway Technology, Taiwan’s struggling high speed rail line, the only fully private and commercial high speed rail system in the world, will be taken over by the government his week. The line has been plagued by disappointing ridership levels totaling approximately one-third projected levels. The company has generated insufficient revenues to meet its debt obligations and had previously renegotiated its bank credit to substantially lower interest rates. The company lost $770 million in 2008 and has a debt of approximately $10 billion. The cost of the system was approximately $15 billion.

  • Pittsburgh Didn’t Volunteer for G20

    As host of the G-20 summit, Pittsburgh briefly will sit in the global spotlight. With this article by longtime Pittsburgh resident and columnist Bill Steigerwald, New Geography opens a three part series looking at this intriguing metropolis from the point of view of planning, demography and economic performance.

    Pittsburgh didn’t volunteer to host the G-20 Summit that is coming here next week to inflict so much civic pain and disruption.

    It was entirely President Obama’s call. He apparently thought it would be a good idea to have the finance ministers and central bankers of the world’s top 20 economies hold one of their city-disrupting conferences in downtown Pittsburgh on Sept. 24-25.

    Perhaps Mr. Obama, who will chair the G-20, thought he was doing the financially strapped city of Pittsburgh a favor by sending 4,000 foreign bureaucrats and media folk here to spend their Euros and Yen on Steelers T-shirts and game jerseys.

    Maybe he thought placing the G-20 meeting in Western Pennsylvania – a disproportionately Caucasian and socially conservative corner of America where his 2008 vote totals were disappointing – would pay him political dividends in the 2012 election.

    In either case, the president was sadly mistaken.

    Except for the local booster & tourism sector – who’d welcome a Category 8 hurricane to Pittsburgh as long as the international media covered it and said nice things about their no-longer smoky city – it’s safe to say everyone in this town who doesn’t work in the homeland security industry wishes they had never heard of the G-20.

    As months of local media stories have made plain, the conference is not only going to be a huge public annoyance, it’s going to be a lose-lose situation for everyone – especially the city government.

    Any economic benefits to the local GDP from the arrival of 4,000 visitors with fat expense accounts will be outweighed by the cost of protecting property from the tens of thousands of leftist protestors, angry anarchists and professional window-breakers who stalk G-20 meetings around the world.

    To maximize security and minimize destruction, the Secret Service and local authorities will fortify most of the Golden Triangle, the photogenic downtown business district squeezed between the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers as they meet to create the Ohio River.

    Barricades will be erected. Cars and mass transit will be diverted. Several major construction sites will be sealed off to deny protestors dangerous things to throw. Most downtown businesses probably will close. City schools and colleges will shut down.

    The predicted cost to local public coffers for hiring, feeding and equipping additional police and paying overtime will be at least $20 million, most of which will be reimbursed by the federal government.

    Whatever the final bill is, hosting the G-20 is an “honor” the city of Pittsburgh and its taxpayers didn’t need and can’t afford. The city is already bankrupt and in state receivership because of the generous pension deals it’s promised but won’t be able to pay for.

    The city of Pittsburgh looks fabulous and robust when its skyline and riverbanks are shown on TV during Steelers home games. But it’s really the capital city of an economically stagnant, over-taxed, over-regulated, steadily depopulating metropolitan region that has been horribly governed for 60 years.

    The private-public power-brokers who’ve run the city have wasted billions on a never-ending series of destructive urban renewal projects, redevelopment boondoggles and wasteful mass-transit projects.

    Almost nothing has been built in downtown Pittsburgh or on its riverbanks in the last 20 years without being handed millions in public subsidies – whether it was PNC Financial Service’s almost completed downtown skyscraper, a gorgeous Lazarus department store that went bust in the ‘90s or the shiny new homes for the Pirates, Steelers and (soon) the Penguins.

    If curious G-20 attendees have time to stroll around the city’s abandoned downtown streets on Thursday and Friday, they will have no trouble finding evidence of City Hall’s current crop of fiascoes-in-the making.

    Right in front of fancy Fifth Avenue Place, for example, is a deep trench where busy Stanwix Street should be.

    It’s not where a Scud missile hit during the first Gulf war. It’s the construction zone of one end of the local mass transit system’s infamous “Tunnel to Nowhere.”

    The 1.2-mile light-rail extension goes from Gateway Center downtown under the Allegheny River to the North Shore, where its other end has been tearing asunder the wasteland of former parking lots between the subsidized new homes of the Steelers and Pirates for several years.

    The twin light-rail tunnel – cleverly built under a river in the “City of Bridges” so as to maximize the cost and provide unions and construction companies with six or seven years of high-paid make-work – will allegedly carry 4.2 million riders a year in the distant transit future.

    That impressive but fraudulent projection comes out to about 11,000 “riders” a day – which actually represents only 5,500 human commuters making a (two-ride) round trip commute. A large proportion of those annual riders, by the way, will be baseball or football fans.

    All that socially correct “mass transit” will end up costing at least $650 million, with federal and state taxpayers picking up about 97 percent of the tab. Except for yours truly and the conservatives on the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review’s editorial page, virtually no one in local politics or the media questioned or challenged the lunacy of building the transit tunnel.

    Another wasteland in the middle of downtown that G-20-goers might visit is the flattened construction site that used to be Market Square.

    Once upon a time, before City Hall planners began demolishing and rebuilding huge chunks of downtown in the 1950s; it was what urbanists are supposed to encourage: an actual square with markets.

    Then, in the 1960s, the city took it over and transformed it into a poorly designed, commerce-free urban park with trees, grass and heavy city bus traffic. The public space delighted crowds of lunching office workers at midday but the rest of the time it was a lawless playpen for about 100 homeless people, drunks and drug pushers.

    Today the area around Market Square, last refurbished in the 1990s, hardly has a live store or restaurant left standing. It is waiting to be turned into its next reincarnation – a $5 million European-style piazza with no vehicles piercing its heart and no low walls and green spaces for social misfits to reside.

    On one edge of battered Market Square is Fifth Avenue, which has been tortured constantly by City Hall for about 25 years.

    In the early 1980s, its street surface was torn up for several years so the city’s rinky-dink light-rail subway could be built beneath it. Not long after that, Fifth Avenue was rendered virtually impassable to shoppers for a couple years while the city slowly redid its sidewalks and curbs.

    Then, in the late 1990s, Fifth was targeted by City Hall for a preposterously stupid and destructive redevelopment scheme.

    The crude 1960s-style renewal project would have misused eminent domain power to clear-cut Fifth Avenue and Forbes Avenue, wipe out nearly 100 businesses and build what amounted to an outdoor suburban mall anchored by a Nordstrom store.

    Fortunately, that plan was miraculously stopped by an alliance of preservationists and property rights defenders. But is it any wonder that after a quarter century of torture by city planners Fifth Avenue became “dilapidated” and in need of serious redevelopment?

    As G-20 attendees will learn if they bother to walk a few moments from their hotels, the nightmare on Fifth Avenue continues. Its northern end is currently being torn down, fixed up, blocked to pedestrians or under construction.

    PNC Financial is putting the final touches on its new 23-story, $178 million headquarters – which received $48 million in state and local subsidies and wiped out half a block of retail storefronts. Meanwhile, up the street, the lovely stone tomb the city erected in the late 1990s for Lazarus has been all but given away to a local developer who’s converted it into a pricy condo and office space that still has 32 of its 65 units to sell.

    Whenever the national media rediscover the glories of Pittsburgh’s clear skies and affordable livability, which they seem to do every four years, they never stick around long enough to note the failings of its governments and politicians.

    Taxes on property and people and businesses are too high. The city schools are absurdly expensive and ineffective. The roads and 1950s parkways are old, narrow and crumbling. Public services are often poor or costly. Unions and Democrats wield the sort of uncontested political power that’s never good for a municipality.

    Yes, it is still true, as the national media and local booster sector never tire of repeating, that the “City of Champions” and its suburbs are a great place in which to live, raise a family, grow old and die peacefully.

    With its famous three rivers and hills and bridges and skyscrapers and hillside homes and urban neighborhoods and spectacular views and historic downtown buildings, Pittsburgh is rich in natural and man-made charm.

    Toss in a cost of living 17 percent below the national average and low crime rates, lots of good affordable housing, major-league super-teams like the Steelers and Penguins, great museums like the Carnegie and top universities like Carnegie Mellon and Pitt – Pittsburgh does deserve to be ranked highly on those meaningless most-livable city lists.

    It’s also true – as some in the national media latched on to earlier this year – that compared with many other parts of the country, Pittsburgh has not suffered greatly in the current recession.

    Pittsburgh has an unemployment figure lower than the national average, a very low home-foreclosure rate and stable-to-slightly-rising housing prices.

    But Pittsburgh’s good fortune was not, as out-of-town media claimed, because its wise leaders had figured out how to dodge a severe economic downturn. Or because – as President Obama has been led to believe – the region’s post-industrial “eds and meds” service economy is particularly healthy or even resilient.

    Pittsburgh’s relatively impressive economic statistics are pretty much the 30-year norm for Pittsburgh – in times of national booms or busts. They probably won’t change for the better unless the spectacularly rich Marcellus shale natural gas deposits lying underneath western Pennsylvania are exploited, which may not happen for decades or ever happen at all.

    There’s one thing about Pittsburgh’s future that is a near certainty: It’s going to have fewer residents next year than it has today.

    Since the mid-1990s, Pittsburgh has had more deaths than births each year. Between 2000 and 2006, in fact, it had 21,045 more deaths than births, earning it the distinction of being the largest metropolitan area where deaths outnumber births.

    That negative ratio wouldn’t be so bad if immigrants from anywhere else were flocking to Pittsburgh. But they aren’t. Metro Pittsburgh has the lowest percentage of foreign-born residents of any major city – 3 percent – compared to 12.5 percent nationally.

    Pittsburgh has only about 7,000 immigrants from Latin America – second to the 7,800 who hail from India. Only 16,000 international immigrants arrived in metro Pittsburgh between 2000 and 2006, dead last among the 25 largest cities.

    Post-industrial decline, out-migration, too many older people, more deaths than births, too few immigrants from Mexico and Georgia – they’ve all contributed to Pittsburgh’s incredible six-decade population decline.

    In 1950, Pittsburgh was the country’s 12th biggest city. It had 676,806 citizens in a metropolitan area of about 2.5 million.

    Today the metro population, ranked 22nd, is down to 2.35 million and Pittsburgh’s surviving population of 310,000 live in the country’s 59th biggest city – right behind Aurora, Colo., a growing municipality that will never have to worry about getting stuck with hosting a G-20 summit.

    Photos by Bill Steigerwald.

    Bill Steigerwald, a free-lance libertarian writer who recently retired from daily newspaper journalism, loves his native Pittsburgh but hates the political and corporate power brokers who’ve been damaging the city for 60 years. His columns are archived at the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review and his 2000 article for Reason magazine on the city’s abuse of eminent domain powers is here.